The World Cup attracts a great many fans — but also a great many scammers. While millions of fans tune in to watch the matches, cybercriminals are hard at work trying to get at their money and personal data. In fact, we’ve already flagged more than 336 fake websites designed to look exactly like the official World Cup page! As the biggest sporting event of the year heats up, here are the top red flags you need to watch out for.
Totally Legit Free Streams (No Scam)
Scoring a seat at WC26 has turned into quite the mission. Soccer fans are furious over ticket prices, which have officially been dubbed the highest in World Cup history. On top of lodging and travel costs, the situation is made even worse by America’s stringent immigration policies — where referees, team staff, and even players have faced major visa and entry headaches. But fans still want to watch the games, and that’s exactly where fake streaming platforms step in to “help”.
Here’s how the scam plays out: cybercriminals set up fake websites promising free access to World Cup match streams. But the moment you click Watch Now, you’re prompted to sign up and then pay for “lifetime access” to the entire tournament. In the example below, they’re asking for cryptocurrency — which is still a bit unusual, since scammers typically prefer good old-fashioned bank cards.
An example of a fake video streaming website requiring users to register and pay with cryptocurrency to watch all World Cup 2026 matches
Fans who are desperate to catch their favorite teams live risk losing not just their money, but also their personal data, which hackers can later weaponize in targeted phishing attacks.
A losing bet
Match result predictions and sports betting always skyrocket in popularity during the World Cup, and scammers waste no time cashing in on the trend. And behind the flashy slogans lie classic scam tactics.
Take this beautifully designed Spanish-language website. To sign up, it demands a massive amount of personal information, including your full name, national ID number, email address, and phone number — and, of course, it asks you to create a password. If a victim uses the exact same password for multiple accounts, they’re essentially handing the keys to their digital life over to cybercriminals.
To guess match outcomes on this site, you have to hand over way too much personal info — everything short of biometrics
Another site, specifically targeting users in Colombia, turned the sign-up process into a paid ordeal — and it features every trick in the book.
To “verify” your profile, you’re forced to use WhatsApp under the guise of avoiding legal complications.
Before your account is activated, you must make a deposit. This means sending 100 000 Colombian pesos (about $29) to a specified account and texting the receipt to an “administrator” on WhatsApp.
Next, you’re told to wait 12 hours for the “administrator” to manually activate your profile.
Only after all of this do the scammers tell you can place unlimited bets (of course not true).
These scammers built a whole website, but they do all their business over WhatsApp. That’s a red flag!
In many countries — including Colombia — sports betting is strictly regulated. Only a handful of licensed operators are legally allowed to run these sites, and users are required by law to verify their identity. Because of this, these shady workarounds can look tempting to people who love to gamble but don’t want to — or can’t — go through the official verification process.
Unfortunately, the scammers always win in this scenario. They walk away with your initial deposit and every single bet you place on their site. At the end of the day, their only real goal is to drain their victims’ wallets for as much as they possibly can.
Discounts for collectors!
The World Cup isn’t just about the matches; it also drives record-breaking sales of collectible merchandise — stickers, scarves, team jerseys, official match balls, and more. Naturally, plenty of scammers are eager to get a piece of that action.
Take a look at this website offering “exclusive, limited-edition” stickers and albums. Notice anything suspicious?
Talk about a steal! Too bad the whole website is a scam
Check out those prices: everything is heavily discounted, even though the tournament is in full swing. All it takes is a quick price check against the real deal to spot the trap. In the screenshot above, the scammers are charging 67 euros for a sticker collection. On actual online marketplaces, that exact same set goes for at least twice as much, and on the official Panini website, it’s three times the price.
Fake websites mimicking popular sporting goods stores also offer to sell you shin guards, socks, jerseys, and any other gear. Of course, you’ll never see the merchandise, and you’ll lose both your money and your bank card details.
When they’ve absolutely no intention of delivering any products, they can easily offer massive discounts and free shipping
Deals that seem too good to be true are one of the biggest red flags. To make matters worse, with the help of AI, fake websites now look just as professional as the real ones, making them harder than ever to spot. That’s why we recommend installing our security suite before you start shopping online. It blocks phishing sites in real time and uses the Safe Money feature to keep your financial data secure.
Soccer by mail
Another attack strategy involves spam campaigns centered around the World Cup. In one email, our experts uncovered an ad for a soccer analytics and betting-tips service. It uses the classic high-pressure playbook: “ONLY 10 SPOTS AVAILABLE” — so hurry up before they run out! Naturally, access comes with a price tag: AU$200.
Spammers hurrying the victim to make a decision as quickly as possible
This scheme targets fans who are into sports betting, and paying for these types of services usually ends one of two ways for them: they either lose their money with zero guarantee of getting actual predictions, or get sucked into an even deeper, multi-step financial trap.
How to avoid falling for the scams
Across all these scenarios, the World Cup is just another convenient pretext for cybercriminals. Once the tournament wraps up, they’ll most certainly pivot back to their usual tricks — like fake job offers or Telegram phishing scams — until the next Olympics or soccer tournament rolls around and they switch right back to sport.
Our research consistently shows that online fraud has evolved into a massive illegal enterprise. You aren’t just up against lone scammers anymore; you’re dealing with large criminal networks. When it comes to defense, the best approach is a proactive one. By installing Kaspersky Premium, you can safeguard all your devices from malware, phishing, spam, and malicious or lookalike websites. Plus, the included Kaspersky Password Manager will generate unique complex passwords, securely store your sensitive data — like documents and bank cards — and stop you from auto-filling your credentials on fake sites.
Watch the games only on legitimate streaming platforms. Don’t trust fake reviews and never enter your bank card information on unverified sites. Keep an eye out not just for sketchy streaming websites, but also for fake IPTV apps. As we’ve covered in detail before, scammers frequently use these to infect your devices with Trojans.
Shop smart. The best way to avoid getting ripped off is to buy merchandise exclusively through official channels (where you won’t see suspiciously deep discounts), or simply buy your gear in person at official retail locations.
Don’t click suspicious links. If a deal that’s too good to be true lands in your inbox — whether it’s exclusive betting tips or anything else — just ignore it and hit delete.
Avoid logging in through Telegram bots. At the very least, this saves you from future headaches and annoying spam. At best, it keeps your account from being hijacked and your crypto from being stolen.
Switch to passkeys wherever possible. Unlike traditional passwords, which are easily stolen and can be typed into any fake login page, a passkey is cryptographically tied to a specific website and won’t work on a phishing page. Kaspersky Password Manager can easily store and sync your passkeys across all your devices.
What other ruses do scammers use to make a quick buck? Check out our other posts:
During our recent threat hunting activities, we found EtherRAT malware being distributed by a website with a strange homepage. This homepage allowed us to discover a vast malicious infrastructure distributing malware, malicious documents, remote desktop software, and phishing pages.
EtherRAT is a RAT developed in Node.js which allows an attacker to gain complete control over the machine and execute arbitrary code returned by the Command and Control (C2) server. The malware uses the Etherium blockchain to obtain the C2 server, hence the “Ether” part of the name. EtherRAT is typically distributed via MSI, PowerShell, or JavaScript scripts.
An open directory that distributes EtherRAT: where it all began
While threat hunting, we found an open directory that was distributing MSI installers and PowerShell scripts, which ultimately distributed EtherRAT. In the analyzed cases, the PowerShell scripts and MSI installers were distributed from a “/install” folder. The versions have a progressive number, ranging from v1 to v10.
Open Directory hosting EtherRAT MSI
The returned home page caught our attention and prompted us to further explore the campaign.
The homepage returned by the EtherRAT distribution website
Analyzing domains and associated IPs with the EtherRAT distribution, we detected other similar home pages with a hacking-style theme. They appeared to belong to a larger distribution chain, which also distributes phishing, remote control software, and other malware. These websites usually have several folders with malware and phishing related content, and what is displayed depends on the specific infection chain.
Different websites that resolve to the same IP addresses have previously returned pages related to fake companies or default templates. The use of these new pages could therefore be a method to make detection more difficult for automated scanners or researchers. Here are some of the home pages we found:
Some of the malicious websites indexed on Google
EtherRAT is an interesting RAT, as it has few lines of code and allows the execution of arbitrary code returned by the C2 server. Furthermore, using the Ethereum blockchain to obtain the C2 server makes it more resilient to infrastructure takedowns.
Technical analysis of EtherRAT
The detected websites usually distribute an MSI or PowerShell script with the version name, such as v1.msi, v2.ps1, and so on.
MSI Loader
The MSI file “v9.msi” contains three components:
MSI Filename
Description
KmPuGimn.cmd
BAT launcher
cDQMlQAru0.xml
First Jscript loader
MRaQCipBIZeiZNx.log
Encrypted EtherRAT
When the MSI is executed, the “KmPuGimn.cmd” file is started:
conhost --headless cmd /c "KmPuGimn.cmd"
This obfuscated BAT file performs different operations:
Extracts the other files in a random folder in %LOCALAPPDATA%.
The final stage is to deploy EtherRAT. EtherRAT allows the attacker to:
Execute arbitrary JavaScript code received by the C2 server. This allows the attacker to execute new commands, perform operations on files and folders, modify the registry, and exfiltrate data.
Get a new C2 server using the Ethereum blockchain.
Reobfuscate itself.
Save the logs to “svchost.log”.
Part of decrypted EtherRAT code
The EtherRAT uses Ethereum’s “eth_call” JSON-RPC method to retrieve the active C2 URL from a smart contract on the Ethereum mainnet.
After startup, the RAT sends its own source code to the C2 server. The C2 responds with a newly obfuscated version of the script, which is written back to disk, making each execution generate a new file hash.
POST /api/[REOBF_PATH]/<victim-uuid>
Body: { "code": "<current_script_contents>", "build": "<build_id>" }
After the EtherRAT execution, we observed different post-compromised cmd.exe activities to check the environment. For example:
The activities performed by the PowerShell loaders are very similar to the last stage of the JS script of the MSI installer:
Downloads Node.js if it’s not present.
Create the necessary directories.
Decode the EtherRAT with a custom decryption algorithm.
Execute Node.js with conhost.exe and the decrypted EtherRAT payload.
We detected some variants of the PowerShell loader hosted on these websites; namely that the functions’ names and the decryption functions change in the analyzed PowerShell scripts.
The decryption of EtherRAT payload with the custom decryption algorithm
Tracking the malicious infrastructure
When we analyzed the different websites with the “hacking-theme” pages, we found that in the past many had hosted multiple phishing pages in some specific paths. For example:
/zht/sharep-redirect.html
/bl/me.php
/t/teams
/teams/Windows/invite.php
It seems that these domains and IPs are actually part of a much larger infrastructure that distributes malware, phishing, malicious documents, and remote software. It is possible that these infrastructures are shared by multiple threat actors who activate different URL endpoints based on the specific campaign.
Interestingly, the majority of the domains related to this malicious infrastructure in the past also returned an HTML page related to a “Bulletproof Infrastructure” service.
We found that these phishing campaigns typically start via emails with documents attached, such as PDF or Excel files. These documents ask the user to click a link to view another document. Below are two examples of the phishing documents attached to the emails:
These phishing pages typically ask the user to enter their email address, then continue the infection chain and distribute phishing or malware pages. Below are some of the phishing pages detected within the malicious infrastructure:
Misconfigurations exposed the phishing kits
While tracking malicious websites, we found one with an open directory containing part of the phishing kit used in the campaigns.
Open directory hosting part of phishing kits
The open directory contained several folders with code and pages related to the phishing campaigns.
Phishing kit code
Additionally, some domains were misconfigured and allowed the download of “cl.zip”, which contained the source code for the “URL Cloaker” pages.
During our recent threat hunting activities, we found EtherRAT malware being distributed by a website with a strange homepage. This homepage allowed us to discover a vast malicious infrastructure distributing malware, malicious documents, remote desktop software, and phishing pages.
EtherRAT is a RAT developed in Node.js which allows an attacker to gain complete control over the machine and execute arbitrary code returned by the Command and Control (C2) server. The malware uses the Etherium blockchain to obtain the C2 server, hence the “Ether” part of the name. EtherRAT is typically distributed via MSI, PowerShell, or JavaScript scripts.
An open directory that distributes EtherRAT: where it all began
While threat hunting, we found an open directory that was distributing MSI installers and PowerShell scripts, which ultimately distributed EtherRAT. In the analyzed cases, the PowerShell scripts and MSI installers were distributed from a “/install” folder. The versions have a progressive number, ranging from v1 to v10.
Open Directory hosting EtherRAT MSI
The returned home page caught our attention and prompted us to further explore the campaign.
The homepage returned by the EtherRAT distribution website
Analyzing domains and associated IPs with the EtherRAT distribution, we detected other similar home pages with a hacking-style theme. They appeared to belong to a larger distribution chain, which also distributes phishing, remote control software, and other malware. These websites usually have several folders with malware and phishing related content, and what is displayed depends on the specific infection chain.
Different websites that resolve to the same IP addresses have previously returned pages related to fake companies or default templates. The use of these new pages could therefore be a method to make detection more difficult for automated scanners or researchers. Here are some of the home pages we found:
Some of the malicious websites indexed on Google
EtherRAT is an interesting RAT, as it has few lines of code and allows the execution of arbitrary code returned by the C2 server. Furthermore, using the Ethereum blockchain to obtain the C2 server makes it more resilient to infrastructure takedowns.
Technical analysis of EtherRAT
The detected websites usually distribute an MSI or PowerShell script with the version name, such as v1.msi, v2.ps1, and so on.
MSI Loader
The MSI file “v9.msi” contains three components:
MSI Filename
Description
KmPuGimn.cmd
BAT launcher
cDQMlQAru0.xml
First Jscript loader
MRaQCipBIZeiZNx.log
Encrypted EtherRAT
When the MSI is executed, the “KmPuGimn.cmd” file is started:
conhost --headless cmd /c "KmPuGimn.cmd"
This obfuscated BAT file performs different operations:
Extracts the other files in a random folder in %LOCALAPPDATA%.
The final stage is to deploy EtherRAT. EtherRAT allows the attacker to:
Execute arbitrary JavaScript code received by the C2 server. This allows the attacker to execute new commands, perform operations on files and folders, modify the registry, and exfiltrate data.
Get a new C2 server using the Ethereum blockchain.
Reobfuscate itself.
Save the logs to “svchost.log”.
Part of decrypted EtherRAT code
The EtherRAT uses Ethereum’s “eth_call” JSON-RPC method to retrieve the active C2 URL from a smart contract on the Ethereum mainnet.
After startup, the RAT sends its own source code to the C2 server. The C2 responds with a newly obfuscated version of the script, which is written back to disk, making each execution generate a new file hash.
POST /api/[REOBF_PATH]/<victim-uuid>
Body: { "code": "<current_script_contents>", "build": "<build_id>" }
After the EtherRAT execution, we observed different post-compromised cmd.exe activities to check the environment. For example:
The activities performed by the PowerShell loaders are very similar to the last stage of the JS script of the MSI installer:
Downloads Node.js if it’s not present.
Create the necessary directories.
Decode the EtherRAT with a custom decryption algorithm.
Execute Node.js with conhost.exe and the decrypted EtherRAT payload.
We detected some variants of the PowerShell loader hosted on these websites; namely that the functions’ names and the decryption functions change in the analyzed PowerShell scripts.
The decryption of EtherRAT payload with the custom decryption algorithm
Tracking the malicious infrastructure
When we analyzed the different websites with the “hacking-theme” pages, we found that in the past many had hosted multiple phishing pages in some specific paths. For example:
/zht/sharep-redirect.html
/bl/me.php
/t/teams
/teams/Windows/invite.php
It seems that these domains and IPs are actually part of a much larger infrastructure that distributes malware, phishing, malicious documents, and remote software. It is possible that these infrastructures are shared by multiple threat actors who activate different URL endpoints based on the specific campaign.
Interestingly, the majority of the domains related to this malicious infrastructure in the past also returned an HTML page related to a “Bulletproof Infrastructure” service.
We found that these phishing campaigns typically start via emails with documents attached, such as PDF or Excel files. These documents ask the user to click a link to view another document. Below are two examples of the phishing documents attached to the emails:
These phishing pages typically ask the user to enter their email address, then continue the infection chain and distribute phishing or malware pages. Below are some of the phishing pages detected within the malicious infrastructure:
Misconfigurations exposed the phishing kits
While tracking malicious websites, we found one with an open directory containing part of the phishing kit used in the campaigns.
Open directory hosting part of phishing kits
The open directory contained several folders with code and pages related to the phishing campaigns.
Phishing kit code
Additionally, some domains were misconfigured and allowed the download of “cl.zip”, which contained the source code for the “URL Cloaker” pages.
Attackers are increasingly targeting collaboration platforms like Microsoft Teams. Learn the risks and key steps to strengthen your organization's security.
Phishing has changed. Slowly but surely, cybercriminals are turning to infostealers instead.
Traditional phishing hasn’t gone away. Far from it. But many attackers are no longer focused solely on tricking victims into entering usernames and passwords on fake login pages. Instead, they are using infostealers to quietly collect passwords, cookies, browser data, and other sensitive information from infected devices.
This approach is attractive because it scales well and reduces friction. Instead of relying on a victim to type credentials into a fake site, the malware can harvest logins already saved in browsers, session tokens, autofill data, cryptocurrency wallet details, and even files that contain useful information.
This makes the attack chain less visible. A traditional phishing email often leaves obvious clues: a suspicious link, a fake login page, or a strange attachment. Infostealers are different. They can arrive through malicious online ads (malvertising), cracked software, fake browser updates, game cheats, or dubious download sites, and once installed, they work in the background, stealing whatever the victim’s device has in store.
Part of this shift could be due to the widespread adoption of multi-factor authentication (MFA). By stealing session cookies, cybercriminals can bypass MFA, so they can access accounts without needing a password or authentication code.
Another factor is the rise of the malware-as-a-service (MaaS) ecosystem. Infostealers are cheap to deploy, easy to scale, and highly profitable. Rather than building a full attack chain themselves, many criminals buy access to ready-made stealer kits, loaders, or initial access services from underground vendors. This lowers the barrier to entry and allows less-skilled attackers to run credential theft operations.
In many cases, infostealers are just the first stage of a larger criminal operation. The stolen data is collected, packaged, and sold to other criminals interested in the harvested information. These buyers may specialize in fraud, account takeover, business email compromise, or ransomware. A single infected machine can generate multiple revenue streams: credentials for one buyer, session cookies for another, and corporate access or wallet data for a third.
That division of labor is one reason infostealers have become so persistent. Operators can update their code, rotate infrastructure, and launch new campaigns with minimal effort, while affiliates handle distribution through phishing, malvertising, fake downloads, or social media lures.
How to stay safe
Because infostealers commonly arrive through malvertising, fake browser updates, and one-click downloads, it’s worth treating ads and pop-ups with healthy skepticism. My personal tip: Never click on sponsored ads. Instead, visit official websites directly and download software only from trusted sources such as official vendor sites or app stores.
Another increasingly popular technique is ClickFix, a social engineering attack that tricks users into infecting their own devices. Never run commands or scripts copied from websites, emails, or messages unless you trust the source and understand the action’s purpose. If a website tells you to execute a command or perform a technical action, check official documentation or contact support before proceeding.
Pirated software, game cheats, and cracked tools remain some of the most common delivery methods for infostealers. These downloads often come bundled with malware that installs alongside the software you intended to get. The same caution applies to many browser extensions and add-ons that promise extra features or convenience. Stick to extensions from reputable developers, check reviews and permissions carefully, and avoid installing any add-on that asks for more access than it plausibly needs.
Phishing emails are still a major threat, but many can be spotted if you slow down and verify before clicking. Even if an email looks like it comes from a trusted brand, treat unsolicited attachments and links with caution, especially when they urge you to open a file, install something urgently, or fix a billing issue. If you’re unsure, check the sender address, look for typos or odd phrasing, and confirm the request through a separate channel such as the company’s official website rather than the link in the email.
We don’t just report on threats—we remove them
Cybersecurity risks should never spread beyond a headline. Keep threats off your devices by downloading Malwarebytes today.
Phishing has changed. Slowly but surely, cybercriminals are turning to infostealers instead.
Traditional phishing hasn’t gone away. Far from it. But many attackers are no longer focused solely on tricking victims into entering usernames and passwords on fake login pages. Instead, they are using infostealers to quietly collect passwords, cookies, browser data, and other sensitive information from infected devices.
This approach is attractive because it scales well and reduces friction. Instead of relying on a victim to type credentials into a fake site, the malware can harvest logins already saved in browsers, session tokens, autofill data, cryptocurrency wallet details, and even files that contain useful information.
This makes the attack chain less visible. A traditional phishing email often leaves obvious clues: a suspicious link, a fake login page, or a strange attachment. Infostealers are different. They can arrive through malicious online ads (malvertising), cracked software, fake browser updates, game cheats, or dubious download sites, and once installed, they work in the background, stealing whatever the victim’s device has in store.
Part of this shift could be due to the widespread adoption of multi-factor authentication (MFA). By stealing session cookies, cybercriminals can bypass MFA, so they can access accounts without needing a password or authentication code.
Another factor is the rise of the malware-as-a-service (MaaS) ecosystem. Infostealers are cheap to deploy, easy to scale, and highly profitable. Rather than building a full attack chain themselves, many criminals buy access to ready-made stealer kits, loaders, or initial access services from underground vendors. This lowers the barrier to entry and allows less-skilled attackers to run credential theft operations.
In many cases, infostealers are just the first stage of a larger criminal operation. The stolen data is collected, packaged, and sold to other criminals interested in the harvested information. These buyers may specialize in fraud, account takeover, business email compromise, or ransomware. A single infected machine can generate multiple revenue streams: credentials for one buyer, session cookies for another, and corporate access or wallet data for a third.
That division of labor is one reason infostealers have become so persistent. Operators can update their code, rotate infrastructure, and launch new campaigns with minimal effort, while affiliates handle distribution through phishing, malvertising, fake downloads, or social media lures.
How to stay safe
Because infostealers commonly arrive through malvertising, fake browser updates, and one-click downloads, it’s worth treating ads and pop-ups with healthy skepticism. My personal tip: Never click on sponsored ads. Instead, visit official websites directly and download software only from trusted sources such as official vendor sites or app stores.
Another increasingly popular technique is ClickFix, a social engineering attack that tricks users into infecting their own devices. Never run commands or scripts copied from websites, emails, or messages unless you trust the source and understand the action’s purpose. If a website tells you to execute a command or perform a technical action, check official documentation or contact support before proceeding.
Pirated software, game cheats, and cracked tools remain some of the most common delivery methods for infostealers. These downloads often come bundled with malware that installs alongside the software you intended to get. The same caution applies to many browser extensions and add-ons that promise extra features or convenience. Stick to extensions from reputable developers, check reviews and permissions carefully, and avoid installing any add-on that asks for more access than it plausibly needs.
Phishing emails are still a major threat, but many can be spotted if you slow down and verify before clicking. Even if an email looks like it comes from a trusted brand, treat unsolicited attachments and links with caution, especially when they urge you to open a file, install something urgently, or fix a billing issue. If you’re unsure, check the sender address, look for typos or odd phrasing, and confirm the request through a separate channel such as the company’s official website rather than the link in the email.
We don’t just report on threats—we remove them
Cybersecurity risks should never spread beyond a headline. Keep threats off your devices by downloading Malwarebytes today.
It starts with the familiar: a short message, a trusted name, a routine tone. Delivery updates, work pings, brand alerts hum in the background, rarely attracting scrutiny. You check, you answer… — until minutes later you’ve slipped into a trap built to lower your guard and hijack your trust.
That’s why messaging scams cut deep: they exploit everyday habits where instinct, not caution, leads. Communication once moved slowly, leaving room for doubt. Now it’s instant — and that speed is a weapon in criminal hands.
On our blog, we’ve already examined numerous scam schemes in messaging apps — from pig butchering, where the victim is groomed for a very long time, or catfishing, where the scammer creates a fake identity, to phishing via chatbots or through gift-giving campaigns in messaging apps.
Now, for the first time, Kaspersky has set out to capture the full end-to-end reality of messaging-based scams to understand how quickly harm occurs, how they impact trust and what remains after the interaction ends. What emerges is a highly organized and industrialized scam ecosystem embedded within everyday messaging channels such as SMS, WhatsApp, and email.
Kaspersky experts have prepared a report on targeted scams in messaging apps, detailing not only the financial but also the emotional damage caused by such attacks, as well as providing tips on how to protect yourself and avoid them. In this post, we explore the most interesting facts, but you can find more details in the full report.
The damage is underestimated
How much do you think a single successful attack via a messaging app costs the average victim? Ten dollars? Or maybe 50? You’re underestimating the scammers. Although more than a third (36%) of victims incur losses of less than $135, on average a victim loses… $733!
Country
Average loss per victim
Senegal
$392.94
Serbia
$493.32
Morocco
$504.28
Greece
$609.32
United Kingdom
$617.38
Côte d’Ivoire
$654.11
Spain
$672.67
United States
$724.73
Portugal
$868.20
Italy
$896.02
France
$1,193.58
Germany
$1,369.35
The average amount lost by a victim in a successful attack via a messaging app
On the one hand, the financial hit doesn’t look catastrophic in isolation. These are micro-losses by design. Small enough that some never report them to the police. Small enough that banks don’t always investigate. Small enough to be dismissed as bad luck rather than organized crime.
But $733 is not nothing. It’s enough to cover a month’s worth of groceries, school or daycare fees, or utility bills. Against the backdrop of the global cost-of-living crisis, a single such loss can seriously dent a family’s budget.
In 11% of cases, losses exceed $1,350, and more than a quarter of victims (28%) report having been scammed three or more times in the past six months. Once scammers discover that a phone number responds, that contact becomes an asset, circulating from one database to another.
Now imagine the scale of the problem: if just 10% of the three billion messaging‑app users worldwide fell victim with the average loss, the total damage would amount to… nearly $220 billion! This is comparable to the GDP of Greece, and exceeds that of Morocco, Serbia, or Côte d’Ivoire.
It becomes clear that behind the daily flood of fraudulent schemes lie large scam cartels operating on an industrial scale, using AI to personalize messages that mimic those of family members, friends, and familiar brands. This, in essence, forms the basis of a full-fledged economy built on digital identity theft.
Speed beats scrutiny
More than half of successful messaging scams (52%) unfold in under 30 minutes — from first contact to the moment money or personal data changes hands — or even faster, before the victim begins to doubt the legitimacy of the sender. In fact, one in seven scams takes less than five minutes — quicker than boiling an egg!
The speed isn’t accidental. It’s the method. Scammers structure their schemes to deny the victim a chance to come to their senses. Every element is engineered to compress the decision-making window: the urgency of the scenario, the familiarity of the format, the plausibility of the request.
They rush you — faster, faster, don’t tell anyone, you only have a few minutes, solve the problem, don’t ask questions. Click the link, fill in the details, approve the transaction, or else… Or else what? The scammers’ imagination knows no bounds here, but if you don’t do something right now, you’ll definitely regret it.
Alas, the realization of what has happened usually comes when the damage is already irreversible. More than half of victims (51%) lose money; another 43% hand over their personal data — most commonly phone numbers, names, and email addresses — to scammers, and often the victim loses both.
Where and how attacks occur
A delivery notification, a bank alert, a message from a merchant you ordered from last week — messaging apps permeate every aspect of everyday life, making such interactions completely normal. An attack shouldn’t feel like an attack. It should feel like the same message you’ve received hundreds of times.
It’s no surprise that scammers focus their attention on this method of communication first and foremost. The most popular platforms for scams are predictable: WhatsApp (43%), SMS/iMessage (40%), Facebook (27%), Telegram (22%), and Instagram (19%) — these are the ones that people trust most.
A wide variety of schemes is used. Brand impersonation is now one of the three most common types of messaging scam worldwide — accounting for 31% of cases. Fake delivery notifications top the list at 38%, followed by investment scams at 37%.
At the same time, nearly two-thirds (63%) of fraudulent schemes span multiple platforms, moving from SMS to WhatsApp, from WhatsApp to Telegram, etc. In this way, scammers achieve two goals: they mimic organic messaging and evade moderation algorithms.
AI has taken scams to a new level
Just a couple of years ago, fraudulent messages gave themselves away with bad grammar, awkward phrasing, illogical requests, and an obsessive sense of urgency. Today, a phishing message looks, sounds, and reads just like the real thing.
Scam cartels want to catch people in motion — between meetings, on a commute, or during everyday tasks — when your attention is already fragmented. They mimic your mother’s turn of phrase. They match your bank’s tone of voice. They copy your courier’s format exactly. They mirror the rhythm, structure, and style of authentic brand communications across messaging platforms. And AI is accelerating all of it.
What this creates is overlap. Legitimate and fraudulent messages appear in the same environment, using the same formats, language, and triggers. The difference between them is no longer obvious.
The data shows that two-thirds of victims (66%) believe AI was used in the scam against them, 42% cite messages written by AI, 31% report generated or cloned voices, and 25% encountered deepfake images or videos.
That’s why mere awareness and “tech-savviness” may no longer be enough to protect oneself. From Gen Z to Gen X, messaging scams cut across every generation.
And what about the emotional toll?
But money is far from the only problem a victim is left with after an attack. After what they’ve been through, people develop distrust toward incoming messages, unfamiliar numbers, and any requests for action. As a result, 99% of fraud victims say they no longer trust incoming notifications in messaging apps.
This creates a crisis of trust in all digital channels in general. Every legitimate message can now be perceived as a scam. Brands, banks, and delivery services are forced to operate in an environment where the customer is, by default, in a state of distrust.
Dr. Elizabeth Carter, a forensic linguist and criminologist at Kingston University in London, notes that scammers use familiar contexts, common social settings and embedded linguistic norms to create the illusion for the victim that their decision-making is rational and reasonable in the moment. However, what is actually happening is that they construct false realities in which those decisions end up causing financial and psychological harm. She also notes that it is very hard to identify a false reality while you are in it.
After realizing they had been deceived, more than half of victims felt anger — the kind that comes from having trusted something and discovering it was used against you. 42% of victims report frustration, 38% — feeling upset. Moreover, several months later, these feelings haven’t gone away: nearly half of all victims (48%) are still angry, a third (33%) remain frustrated, and 30% are upset.
And nearly one in 10 victims don’t tell anyone what happened. They feel shame, a sense of having fallen for something so obvious. This leaves a significant portion of the actual damage unreported: only 24% of victims contact the police, and only 23% report it to their bank.
So what can be done?
The crisis of trust — and even a touch of paranoia — that has arisen due to widespread attacks on users can linger in victims’ minds for a long time, affecting their quality of life. To prevent this, follow these guidelines:
Pause before you act. The sense of urgency you feel is almost always artificial. A legitimate bank, retailer, or delivery service won’t penalize you for taking 30 seconds to verify before clicking a link or confirming details. It’s precisely this instinct to resolve the situation quickly that scammers are counting on.
Verify through another channel. If a message appears to be from a relative, colleague, or company you trust — contact them through another channel before taking any action. Use secure verification methods, and cross-check identities when something doesn’t feel right. For families, agreeing on a “safe word” in advance can defeat even the most convincing voice clones.
Use a password manager. It will not only help you generate strong, unique passwords for all your accounts and store them securely, syncing them across all your devices, but also protect you from spoofed sites. Even if you click a phishing link and land on such a site, our password manager will notify you about the domain mismatch and refuse to autofill your username and password.
Use protection that works in real time. Modern security solutions, such as Kaspersky Premium, provide real-time protection against malicious links and phishing attempts in the apps and websites you use every day. On Android devices, a dedicated layer of anti-phishing security scans and neutralizes suspicious links as they appear, even within notifications, before you even have a chance to click them.
We’ve covered other threats in messaging apps in similar articles:
The 2026 World Cup presents major cyber risks from ransomware groups, state-aligned actors, and other groups targeting critical infrastructure. Learn more here.
In late April 2026, a client reached out to us for incident response support after discovering a miner running on users’ computers. We later discovered that the malware was being distributed via illegal movie and TV show streaming sites. The infection chain leveraged a fake update for a video player plugin. When the user attempted to watch a video, the player displayed a message saying the plugin version was outdated and asking to install an update to continue.
Clicking the link downloaded a ZIP archive with the following contents:
The archive contained a legitimate executable, HLS Installer.874.exe, alongside a malicious DLL. Launching the EXE triggered a DLL side-loading mechanism, injecting the malicious module into a legitimate program process and executing code within its context. The library contained the logic for deploying the miner and establishing persistence on the device.
At the time of the investigation, the infection risk was associated with two pirated video sites in the .ru and .top TLDs.
Link to previous campaigns
The current incident does not appear to be an isolated case. After analyzing the infection vector and the logic of the DLL, we concluded that this activity is a continuation of a campaign involving pirated digital libraries, which was previously described by another cybersecurity company.
The delivery mechanism for the malicious archive has remained virtually unchanged. Previously, the archive was downloaded in parts from the domain file[.]ipfs[.]us[.]69[.]mu, but this domain was unavailable at the time of our investigation. Instead, the threat actor employed a new website, urush1bar4[.]online.
The structure of the archive has also been preserved: inside is a legitimate executable and a large malicious DLL (see the screenshot below).
In the course of our research, we also discovered a blog post by NTT Security describing a similar delivery method for a malicious archive. In that instance, the threat actors displayed a fake browser crash page (shown below) while simultaneously downloading an archive to the device with a name starting with chromium-patch-nightly.
This scenario resembles the current scheme involving the fake video player plugin update. Given the previously described activity, it’s safe to assume that this campaign has been active since at least 2022. Throughout this entire period, the threat actor has been updating both the downloadable malware and individual parts of the infection mechanism.
Potential distribution scale
As in previous episodes of the campaign, infections occur via highly popular websites. As of late April 2026, sites linked to the campaign typically displayed extremely high monthly traffic. For instance, the audience for the smallest of the free digital libraries stood at 11,000 users, while the largest reached 4.7 million. For pirated movie and TV show streaming sites, this figure ranged from 2.1 million to 27.4 million. In April, the total number of visits to websites where the malware described in this study was detected reached 40 million.
The popularity of these sites increases the potential scale of the miner’s distribution. Furthermore, the campaign is not limited to a single type of platform: the malicious archive is being distributed through both online digital libraries and movie and TV show streaming sites. This broadens the potential range of victims and makes it more difficult to attribute the threat to a single infection vector.
The downloadable archive
The current version of the downloadable malware is a ZIP archive containing a legitimate EXE file and a malicious DLL. When the executable runs, the library side-loads into its process, triggering the malicious logic.
The technical analysis that follows covers the current version of this malware. This version was first observed in April 2025 and has been distributed unmodified for over a year.
DLL analysis
Most of the data inside the DLL carries no meaningful weight and was randomly generated just to inflate the file size and impede analysis.
Amidst the large volume of junk code inside the DLL, there is a single function that triggers a stack overflow during execution:
Based on the code, the size of the stackBuf buffer on the stack is only 64 bytes, and the SmashStack function overwrites this buffer without validating the length of the input data.
This overflow constructs a ROP chain that decrypts the next stage. After decryption, it transfers execution to code located within the modified DOS header of the PE file:
The header was intentionally modified to make it into valid shellcode:
pop r10
push r10
call $+5
pop rcx
sub rcx, 9
mov rax, rcx
add rax, 5C1000h
call rax
retn
This shellcode passes control to a function located at offset 0x5C1000 from the base of the PE file. This function then reflectively loads the same PE file into memory.
Going forward, we will refer to this decrypted PE file as the main module.
Main module
The module’s behavior across its different operational stages is detailed below:
Upon an initial run, the main module checks whether it has permission to proceed with execution. To do this, it collects the following data from the victim’s device:
Processor information
The serial number of the C:/ drive
Whether the process was launched with elevated privileges
The process start time in Unix timestamp format
The information is transmitted as a single large DNS query using the DNS tunneling technique. An example of the DNS query is shown below:
The attackers disguise the DNS query as legitimate traffic through low-level packet crafting and by using a domain name ending in microsoft.com. However, the IP address to which the query is actually sent has no relation to Microsoft.
DNS query crafting code
The execution of the main module proceeds only if the following byte sequence is detected in the response: 01 02 03 04. Following a successful check, the main module launches, and the subsequent logic is adjusted depending on whether the process has elevated privileges on the compromised host.
Let’s look at both scenarios:
1. The process is launched with elevated privileges.
In this case, preparatory steps precede the miner launch:
The malware adds Windows Defender exclusions for EXE and DLL files, as well as for the %USERPROFILE%, %PROGRAMDATA%, and %WINDIR% folders.
It kills Microsoft’s Malicious Software Removal Tool (MSRT) by calling ZwSetInformationFile with the FileDispositionInformation type, which causes the mrt.exe file to be deleted upon closing. To prevent MSRT from being automatically installed during the next update, the DontOfferThroughWUAU parameter is created with a value of 1 under the HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\MRT registry key.
Automatic hibernation and sleep mode are disabled for when the device is running on both AC power and battery.
This is done to maximize the miner’s potential runtime on the device.
Next, to achieve persistence, a copy is created in the C:\ProgramData\Google\Chrome directory, after which the GoogleUpdateTaskMachineQC service is registered and configured to launch automatically at system startup.
Finally, four reflexive loads are executed: the components are injected directly into the memory of the target processes without writing to disk, having bypassed standard Windows loading mechanisms. Each implant is injected into its own host process:
RAT agent → into conhost.exe
Watchdog → into explorer.exe
CPU miner → into explorer.exe
GPU miner → into explorer.exe, but only if a discrete GPU is present in the system. This is verified by enumerating all display adapters in the system.
2. The process is launched with standard privileges.
In this scenario, the miner begins repeatedly triggering User Account Control (UAC) prompts until it is successfully executed with elevated privileges. The workflow is as follows:
Upon initial execution, a copy is made to the %USERPROFILE%\AppData\Roaming\Sandboxie directory and relaunched from there. Simultaneously, an attempt is made to launch it with elevated privileges via UAC.
If execution occurs from the Sandboxie folder:
Persistence is configured for the miner copy in this folder by adding an entry to HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run.
Every three minutes, an attempt is made to launch with elevated privileges via UAC until the GoogleUpdateTaskMachineQC service is successfully installed.
A successful installation requires all of the following conditions to be met:
The GoogleUpdateTaskMachineQC service exists in the system.
The Start value for this service is set to 2 (Automatic).
The ImagePath value points to a file in the C:\ProgramData\Google\Chrome folder.
This file exists on disk.
Watchdog
The purpose of this component is to ensure the uninterrupted operation of the miner. At the very beginning of its execution, it copies all files from the C:\ProgramData\Google\Chrome folder and encrypts the contents of each file using a cyclic XOR algorithm with the key AFeIboiOmImJS2ypJU0pTpAO61SELkUc. After that, the encrypted contents are written into the process memory, and the following structure is created in memory for each file:
class FileContainer{
wchar_t* fullPath; // full path to file
size_t* ptrSize; // pointer to file size
uint8_t* xorEncryptedFile; //pointer to buffer containing encrypted file contents
};
As soon as the contents of all files are saved in memory, Watchdog enters an infinite loop, where every five seconds, it checks the integrity of the installed GoogleUpdateTaskMachineQC service, just as the main module does. If the service is found to be incorrectly installed, the miner overwrites its files in the C:\ProgramData\Google\Chrome path with the contents acquired at startup.
To successfully remediate the miner, this module, which runs inside the explorer.exe process, must be terminated first.
RAT agent
This module provides remote control capabilities via four commands, which are described at the end of this section. The command-and-control addresses used to receive these commands follow this format:
http://{domain}.space/index.php?authorization=1
http://{domain}.site/index.php? backup version
The {domain} is calculated based on the current date. The process starts with the current year, then adds the zone identifier for the current month. All 12 months are divided into four zones. Finally, the word microsoft is appended to the resulting string. This final string is used as the input for subsequent double hashing using the MurmurHash64 algorithm. The hash output is the domain for the implant to communicate with.
At the time of writing this, the following domains were registered:
2025, April-July → 5d14vnfb[.]space
2025, August-November → r7mvjl67[.]space
2025, December → zgj1tam9[.]space
2026, January-March → jeaw520i[.]space
2026, April–July → qdmagva5[.]space
An example of a request to the C2 server is provided below:
As can be seen, the request contains an encrypted body consisting of data encrypted via AES-CBC with the key 0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef and the initialization vector 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f. The data contains a list of installed programs on the system, along with processor information and the serial number of the C: drive.
This information is likely used by the backend to check for virtual or debugging environments.
The first 16 bytes of the server response body represent the initialization vector for the AES-CBC algorithm with the key 0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef, while the remaining bytes are the data encrypted with this algorithm. The decrypted data contains a malicious payload, as well as its RSA-SHA256 signature (sign):
The authenticity of the message is verified via the sign signature using the server’s public key, which is embedded in the executable.
Inside the malicious payload is a 4-byte code that determines the subsequent behavior of the program, along with additional data whose meaning depends on the code.
The table below lists the four remote control commands for the RAT agent module.
Code
Purpose
1
Execution of an arbitrary command
2
Reflexive execution of the provided PE file within the explorer.exe process
3
Execution of the provided shellcode
4
Exit
The miners
Depending on whether a discrete GPU is present in the system, either the CPU miner alone or a combination of the CPU and GPU miners is launched. The CPU miner is based on XMRig, while the GPU miner supports multiple algorithms.
Upon initial execution, both miners attempt to retrieve their startup configuration from a remote server. The potential addresses are listed below:
“{domain}.strangled.net”
“{domain}.ignorelist.com”
“{domain}.ftp.sh”
“{domain}.zanity.net”
As with the RAT agent component, the server address is generated from the current date — in this case, the server address changes every week. This results in quite a large number of domains for the 2020–2030 period; however, all of them point to the same IP address: 107[.]172[.]212[.]235. The first available domain out of the four potential domains listed above will be used.
The algorithm for retrieving the configuration from the server is completely identical to that used by the RAT agent, with the sole exception that th1s1sth3key0f4n1ntere5t1ngw0rld is used as the AES-CBC key in this scenario, and the configuration resides within the payload. The retrieved configuration is encrypted via AES-CBC using the key UXUUXUUXUUCommandULineUUXUUXUUXU and the initialization vector UUCommandULineUU. The encrypted data is then converted into a base64 string, which is passed as a command-line parameter to launch the miner inside the explorer.exe process through process hollowing.
Conclusion
Our investigation focused on an ongoing campaign distributing miners via popular illegal content sites. The threat actors leverage a variety of sites, ranging from online libraries to movie and TV show streaming platforms. There is no telling what channels they will use to distribute the malicious archive in the future. However, the current case shows that users visiting pirated websites continue to take a serious risk.
Our products detect this malware with the following Generic verdicts:
In late April 2026, a client reached out to us for incident response support after discovering a miner running on users’ computers. We later discovered that the malware was being distributed via illegal movie and TV show streaming sites. The infection chain leveraged a fake update for a video player plugin. When the user attempted to watch a video, the player displayed a message saying the plugin version was outdated and asking to install an update to continue.
Clicking the link downloaded a ZIP archive with the following contents:
The archive contained a legitimate executable, HLS Installer.874.exe, alongside a malicious DLL. Launching the EXE triggered a DLL side-loading mechanism, injecting the malicious module into a legitimate program process and executing code within its context. The library contained the logic for deploying the miner and establishing persistence on the device.
At the time of the investigation, the infection risk was associated with two pirated video sites in the .ru and .top TLDs.
Link to previous campaigns
The current incident does not appear to be an isolated case. After analyzing the infection vector and the logic of the DLL, we concluded that this activity is a continuation of a campaign involving pirated digital libraries, which was previously described by another cybersecurity company.
The delivery mechanism for the malicious archive has remained virtually unchanged. Previously, the archive was downloaded in parts from the domain file[.]ipfs[.]us[.]69[.]mu, but this domain was unavailable at the time of our investigation. Instead, the threat actor employed a new website, urush1bar4[.]online.
The structure of the archive has also been preserved: inside is a legitimate executable and a large malicious DLL (see the screenshot below).
In the course of our research, we also discovered a blog post by NTT Security describing a similar delivery method for a malicious archive. In that instance, the threat actors displayed a fake browser crash page (shown below) while simultaneously downloading an archive to the device with a name starting with chromium-patch-nightly.
This scenario resembles the current scheme involving the fake video player plugin update. Given the previously described activity, it’s safe to assume that this campaign has been active since at least 2022. Throughout this entire period, the threat actor has been updating both the downloadable malware and individual parts of the infection mechanism.
Potential distribution scale
As in previous episodes of the campaign, infections occur via highly popular websites. As of late April 2026, sites linked to the campaign typically displayed extremely high monthly traffic. For instance, the audience for the smallest of the free digital libraries stood at 11,000 users, while the largest reached 4.7 million. For pirated movie and TV show streaming sites, this figure ranged from 2.1 million to 27.4 million. In April, the total number of visits to websites where the malware described in this study was detected reached 40 million.
The popularity of these sites increases the potential scale of the miner’s distribution. Furthermore, the campaign is not limited to a single type of platform: the malicious archive is being distributed through both online digital libraries and movie and TV show streaming sites. This broadens the potential range of victims and makes it more difficult to attribute the threat to a single infection vector.
The downloadable archive
The current version of the downloadable malware is a ZIP archive containing a legitimate EXE file and a malicious DLL. When the executable runs, the library side-loads into its process, triggering the malicious logic.
The technical analysis that follows covers the current version of this malware. This version was first observed in April 2025 and has been distributed unmodified for over a year.
DLL analysis
Most of the data inside the DLL carries no meaningful weight and was randomly generated just to inflate the file size and impede analysis.
Amidst the large volume of junk code inside the DLL, there is a single function that triggers a stack overflow during execution:
Based on the code, the size of the stackBuf buffer on the stack is only 64 bytes, and the SmashStack function overwrites this buffer without validating the length of the input data.
This overflow constructs a ROP chain that decrypts the next stage. After decryption, it transfers execution to code located within the modified DOS header of the PE file:
The header was intentionally modified to make it into valid shellcode:
pop r10
push r10
call $+5
pop rcx
sub rcx, 9
mov rax, rcx
add rax, 5C1000h
call rax
retn
This shellcode passes control to a function located at offset 0x5C1000 from the base of the PE file. This function then reflectively loads the same PE file into memory.
Going forward, we will refer to this decrypted PE file as the main module.
Main module
The module’s behavior across its different operational stages is detailed below:
Upon an initial run, the main module checks whether it has permission to proceed with execution. To do this, it collects the following data from the victim’s device:
Processor information
The serial number of the C:/ drive
Whether the process was launched with elevated privileges
The process start time in Unix timestamp format
The information is transmitted as a single large DNS query using the DNS tunneling technique. An example of the DNS query is shown below:
The attackers disguise the DNS query as legitimate traffic through low-level packet crafting and by using a domain name ending in microsoft.com. However, the IP address to which the query is actually sent has no relation to Microsoft.
DNS query crafting code
The execution of the main module proceeds only if the following byte sequence is detected in the response: 01 02 03 04. Following a successful check, the main module launches, and the subsequent logic is adjusted depending on whether the process has elevated privileges on the compromised host.
Let’s look at both scenarios:
1. The process is launched with elevated privileges.
In this case, preparatory steps precede the miner launch:
The malware adds Windows Defender exclusions for EXE and DLL files, as well as for the %USERPROFILE%, %PROGRAMDATA%, and %WINDIR% folders.
It kills Microsoft’s Malicious Software Removal Tool (MSRT) by calling ZwSetInformationFile with the FileDispositionInformation type, which causes the mrt.exe file to be deleted upon closing. To prevent MSRT from being automatically installed during the next update, the DontOfferThroughWUAU parameter is created with a value of 1 under the HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\MRT registry key.
Automatic hibernation and sleep mode are disabled for when the device is running on both AC power and battery.
This is done to maximize the miner’s potential runtime on the device.
Next, to achieve persistence, a copy is created in the C:\ProgramData\Google\Chrome directory, after which the GoogleUpdateTaskMachineQC service is registered and configured to launch automatically at system startup.
Finally, four reflexive loads are executed: the components are injected directly into the memory of the target processes without writing to disk, having bypassed standard Windows loading mechanisms. Each implant is injected into its own host process:
RAT agent → into conhost.exe
Watchdog → into explorer.exe
CPU miner → into explorer.exe
GPU miner → into explorer.exe, but only if a discrete GPU is present in the system. This is verified by enumerating all display adapters in the system.
2. The process is launched with standard privileges.
In this scenario, the miner begins repeatedly triggering User Account Control (UAC) prompts until it is successfully executed with elevated privileges. The workflow is as follows:
Upon initial execution, a copy is made to the %USERPROFILE%\AppData\Roaming\Sandboxie directory and relaunched from there. Simultaneously, an attempt is made to launch it with elevated privileges via UAC.
If execution occurs from the Sandboxie folder:
Persistence is configured for the miner copy in this folder by adding an entry to HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run.
Every three minutes, an attempt is made to launch with elevated privileges via UAC until the GoogleUpdateTaskMachineQC service is successfully installed.
A successful installation requires all of the following conditions to be met:
The GoogleUpdateTaskMachineQC service exists in the system.
The Start value for this service is set to 2 (Automatic).
The ImagePath value points to a file in the C:\ProgramData\Google\Chrome folder.
This file exists on disk.
Watchdog
The purpose of this component is to ensure the uninterrupted operation of the miner. At the very beginning of its execution, it copies all files from the C:\ProgramData\Google\Chrome folder and encrypts the contents of each file using a cyclic XOR algorithm with the key AFeIboiOmImJS2ypJU0pTpAO61SELkUc. After that, the encrypted contents are written into the process memory, and the following structure is created in memory for each file:
class FileContainer{
wchar_t* fullPath; // full path to file
size_t* ptrSize; // pointer to file size
uint8_t* xorEncryptedFile; //pointer to buffer containing encrypted file contents
};
As soon as the contents of all files are saved in memory, Watchdog enters an infinite loop, where every five seconds, it checks the integrity of the installed GoogleUpdateTaskMachineQC service, just as the main module does. If the service is found to be incorrectly installed, the miner overwrites its files in the C:\ProgramData\Google\Chrome path with the contents acquired at startup.
To successfully remediate the miner, this module, which runs inside the explorer.exe process, must be terminated first.
RAT agent
This module provides remote control capabilities via four commands, which are described at the end of this section. The command-and-control addresses used to receive these commands follow this format:
http://{domain}.space/index.php?authorization=1
http://{domain}.site/index.php? backup version
The {domain} is calculated based on the current date. The process starts with the current year, then adds the zone identifier for the current month. All 12 months are divided into four zones. Finally, the word microsoft is appended to the resulting string. This final string is used as the input for subsequent double hashing using the MurmurHash64 algorithm. The hash output is the domain for the implant to communicate with.
At the time of writing this, the following domains were registered:
2025, April-July → 5d14vnfb[.]space
2025, August-November → r7mvjl67[.]space
2025, December → zgj1tam9[.]space
2026, January-March → jeaw520i[.]space
2026, April–July → qdmagva5[.]space
An example of a request to the C2 server is provided below:
As can be seen, the request contains an encrypted body consisting of data encrypted via AES-CBC with the key 0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef and the initialization vector 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f. The data contains a list of installed programs on the system, along with processor information and the serial number of the C: drive.
This information is likely used by the backend to check for virtual or debugging environments.
The first 16 bytes of the server response body represent the initialization vector for the AES-CBC algorithm with the key 0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef, while the remaining bytes are the data encrypted with this algorithm. The decrypted data contains a malicious payload, as well as its RSA-SHA256 signature (sign):
The authenticity of the message is verified via the sign signature using the server’s public key, which is embedded in the executable.
Inside the malicious payload is a 4-byte code that determines the subsequent behavior of the program, along with additional data whose meaning depends on the code.
The table below lists the four remote control commands for the RAT agent module.
Code
Purpose
1
Execution of an arbitrary command
2
Reflexive execution of the provided PE file within the explorer.exe process
3
Execution of the provided shellcode
4
Exit
The miners
Depending on whether a discrete GPU is present in the system, either the CPU miner alone or a combination of the CPU and GPU miners is launched. The CPU miner is based on XMRig, while the GPU miner supports multiple algorithms.
Upon initial execution, both miners attempt to retrieve their startup configuration from a remote server. The potential addresses are listed below:
“{domain}.strangled.net”
“{domain}.ignorelist.com”
“{domain}.ftp.sh”
“{domain}.zanity.net”
As with the RAT agent component, the server address is generated from the current date — in this case, the server address changes every week. This results in quite a large number of domains for the 2020–2030 period; however, all of them point to the same IP address: 107[.]172[.]212[.]235. The first available domain out of the four potential domains listed above will be used.
The algorithm for retrieving the configuration from the server is completely identical to that used by the RAT agent, with the sole exception that th1s1sth3key0f4n1ntere5t1ngw0rld is used as the AES-CBC key in this scenario, and the configuration resides within the payload. The retrieved configuration is encrypted via AES-CBC using the key UXUUXUUXUUCommandULineUUXUUXUUXU and the initialization vector UUCommandULineUU. The encrypted data is then converted into a base64 string, which is passed as a command-line parameter to launch the miner inside the explorer.exe process through process hollowing.
Conclusion
Our investigation focused on an ongoing campaign distributing miners via popular illegal content sites. The threat actors leverage a variety of sites, ranging from online libraries to movie and TV show streaming platforms. There is no telling what channels they will use to distribute the malicious archive in the future. However, the current case shows that users visiting pirated websites continue to take a serious risk.
Our products detect this malware with the following Generic verdicts:
Phishing campaigns have become significantly more sophisticated and convincing in recent years. Sender addresses are now nearly identical to the real deal, emails are flawlessly written, and users are called by their names. But what do you do when a suspicious email comes from a clearly legitimate email address?
Lately, phishers have been exploiting the Google AppSheet platform to set up email blasts that originate from an official Google-linked address. Following a successful attack, they walk away with their victims’ accounts and sensitive data.
In this post, we break down how this new data theft scheme works, and how to protect yourself from these sneaky phishing attacks.
Google is offering you a job. Or Coca-Cola. Or maybe Volvo. Or are they?
AppSheet is a Google service for building apps without any coding skills. It’s frequently used by small businesses to automate routine workflows. Unfortunately, it’s precisely this simplicity that makes AppSheet so attractive to cybercriminals. All it takes to pull off a phishing scam these days are a few dollars and an app quickly thrown together using pre-made commands and blocks.
The playbook for AppSheet phishing attacks is pretty run-of-the-mill. The victim receives an email on behalf of a major company — and these messages often begin by addressing the recipient by name. It appears the attackers are parsing leaked data to match names with specific email addresses.
Next, the attackers play on the recipient’s emotions — employing either stick or carrot. They might panic the victim with urgent warnings that demand immediate action — think “Your account will be disabled soon” or “Suspicious activity detected”. Alternatively, they lure them in with irresistible bait, like the promise of a verified badge or an interview invitation from a tech giant. These fake HR emails are engineered to give victims an immediate rush. They make it look like the recipient’s application was already fast-tracked and highly rated, teasing a job offer that could drop as early as tomorrow.
For most people, these messages don’t raise a single red flag. The email bypasses the spam folder completely, and the From field displays the exact name of the company they expect to see. Unfortunately, none of it means the email is authentic: attackers can put whatever they want in the display name. And let’s be honest: very few people actually stop to scrutinize the sender’s email address.
In AppSheet-based phishing campaigns, the sender is always the same: noreply{@}appsheet.com. But here’s the real kicker: that address is 100% legitimate. Because it’s tied directly to Google’s own infrastructure, there’s a good chance that standard anti-spam filters greenlight these emails without blinking.
Naturally, to secure that coveted interview or fix their account, the victim clicks the link — and then voluntarily hands over their entire digital identity on a copycat website: full name, address, phone number, etc. From there, the attackers can sell the harvested data on the dark web, or weaponize it for secondary, targeted attacks. To top it all off, the victim is redirected to a phishing login page, which allows the attackers to steal their accounts.
Here’s a step-by-step breakdown of how a victim goes from receiving a fake Google Careers portal email to having their account completely compromised:
Greetings, Candidate! Why don't you click the link to our fake Google site to schedule an interview?
The link in the email leads to a spoofed site with a design indistinguishable from the original. The user is prompted to fill out a form: provide their full name, work email, phone number, and preferred date for interview…
…Once the victim completes the form, they see a prompt asking them to log in with their Google credentials. All of this data goes straight to the attackers.
Similar phishing campaigns are launched on behalf of other major tech brands — and the users who hand over their Apple account data risk losing not just their account but also control of all their Apple devices. The attackers might pressure the victim into signing out of their personal Apple ID, and in to a “corporate account” for verification — which is in reality an Apple account they own. The moment the victim does so, the criminals take complete remote control of the used device, often using Lost Mode to lock the victim out and hold their phone to ransom.
To make matters worse, attackers don’t always drop a malicious link in the initial email. Instead, they play the long game — hooking the target into a conversation by asking them to reply and confirm their interest. This pretexting creates an illusion of chatting with a real recruiter. And this playbook isn’t reserved exclusively for Silicon Valley, either. Attackers frequently impersonate globally recognized household names, like Volvo or Coca-Cola. Of course, it’s highly unlikely that attackers want someone’s Coca-Cola account — if the user even has one to begin with. Most likely, the goal is to steal sensitive data or convince the user to log in to a phishing form using their Google/Apple/Facebook, etc. credentials.
An "HR team member" from Coca-Cola reaches out to praise the victim, laying it on thick about their expertise and achievements, analytical thinking, and creativity… The attackers intentionally keep the endgame under wraps — whether that means routing the victim to a phishing site, orchestrating a full account takeover, or pulling off a straight-up financial scam
A similar email pretending to be from the Volvo talent acquisition team
Do you want to become Meta-verified?
Of course, “dream jobs” aren’t the only bait used. We’ve seen campaigns where “Facebook Support” reaches out to tell a user they’ve been deemed eligible for the prestigious Meta Verified badge — a blue checkmark normally reserved for top-tier celebrities and global brands. To secure the coveted blue checkmark, the victim is directed to a phishing page where they’re asked to complete an identity form — before handing over the ultimate prize: their Facebook username and password. And it’s all in the name of security, naturally!
These spoofed sites are created in a wide variety of languages, and tailored to users in different countries. Below is the Dutch version.
To get the blue checkmark, the user is required to provide "additional information". Miss the deadline by just a few days and the offer expires
After the victim fills out the standard fields — name, phone number, personal and work emails, and birthdate — a prompt appears asking for their Facebook password
In other campaigns, attackers abuse Google’s AppSheet to weaponize sheer panic, trying to unsettle the user with claims that they’ve violated Meta’s intellectual property policy — and threatening to permanently close their Facebook account. To appeal, the victim must click a link to… a phishing site, provide their personal information, and, of course, enter their Facebook username and password.
For the sake of plausibility, the user is not only asked to fill out fields with personal information, but also to describe in detail why the decision to close the account was a mistake
Finally, the user is prompted to confirm their appeal request by signing in to “Facebook”. In reality, the victim is simply handing their credentials over to the attackers
How to spot phishing and protect your accounts
Sadly, phishing attacks are becoming increasingly sophisticated, with attackers routinely hijacking the reputation of legitimate services and domains. Here’s how to keep from falling into their traps, and safeguard your data:
Remember: not all phishing emails end up in the spam folder. Standard spam filters in email clients often fail to detect advanced attacks — and the AppSheet case is a prime example. To avoid accidentally taking the bait, use Kaspersky Premium on all your devices. It intercepts phishing emails and instantly blocks links to spoof websites — even if the attacker is hiding behind a completely legitimate domain. Additionally, the Android version can detect malicious and phishing links in messages from any app.
Check the email for odd typos. To keep their messages from setting off alarms, attackers frequently resort to sneakily inserting extra spaces or swapping out characters. Take this example from one of the emails we found: Fac eb o ok S u ppo r t instead of Facebook Support.
Before taking any action on a website, carefully check its domain name against the official address. Bad actors frequently create addresses that only appear to be the real thing until you look close enough. Install Kaspersky Premium to always be sure you don’t land on a spoofed site.
Look at the sender’s address first, not just the display name. If an email claims to be from Google Careers, Apple HR, or Facebook Support, but the sender address points to AppSheet or another unrelated service, don’t even bother reading this message. That domain mismatch is a dead giveaway that you’re looking at a trap. Cross-reference email addresses with the ones listed on the companies’ official websites.
Check for email signatures. For instance, all emails sent via AppSheet include a disclosure note at the very bottom. You are much more likely to receive a legitimate AppSheet notification from a small company or business, but definitely not from a tech giant. Major corporations typically use their own domains for their emails.
Usea password manager. Even if you land on a spoofed site and try to enter your password, a reliable password manager will notify you about the domain mismatch and refuse to autofill your username and password.
Don’t forget about two-factor authentication. If it’s enabled, just having your username and password won’t help the attackers access your account — they’ll also need a one-time code. However, they might still try to trick you into giving that up too, so be doubly careful whenever you enter two-factor authentication codes anywhere.
Use passkeys instead of passwords whenever possible. This technology provides excellent protection against phishing: even if you visit a malicious site and try to sign in, the passkey won’t work on the spoofed domain. You can store and sync passkeys across different devices in Kaspersky Password Manager. Read our post on the subject to learn more about how passkeys work.
Phishing attacks are growing increasingly sophisticated. Here’s what else you should know about phishing:
In 2025, we observed pervasive SSH tunnel activity, which has remained active into 2026, affecting many government organizations and commercial companies in Russia and Belarus. Behind some of this activity is Cloud Atlas, a group we have known since 2014. During our investigation, we identified new tools used by this group, as well as indicators of compromise.
The group is back to sending out archives containing malicious shortcuts that launch PowerShell scripts. This technique is employed in addition to the previously described use of malicious documents, which exploit an old vulnerability in the Microsoft Office Equation Editor process (CVE-2018-0802) to download and execute malicious code. We have observed the use of third-party public utilities (Tor/SSH/RevSocks) to gain a foothold in infected systems and create additional backup control channels.
Technical details
Initial infection
As for the primary compromise, Cloud Atlas remains consistent in using phishing. In the observed campaigns, the attackers emailed a ZIP archive containing an LNK file as an attachment.
Malware execution flow
Attackers use LNK shortcuts to covertly execute PowerShell scripts hosted on external resources. The command line of the shortcut:
Example of the PowerShell script downloaded and executed by the shortcut:
Example of the PowerShell script downloaded by the shortcut
Actions performed by the downloaded PowerShell:
Step
Action
Description
1
Drops “$temp\fixed.ps1”
Pre-staging: places the main payload locally in advance to ensure an execution capability independent of subsequent network connectivity or C2 availability.
2
Creates “Run” registry key “YandexBrowser_setup” for “$temp\fixed.ps1” startup
Early persistence: guarantees execution upon the next logon or reboot. If the script is interrupted during later stages, the payload will still activate automatically.
3
Downloads and drops “$temp\rar.zip”
Extracts “*.pdf” from the downloaded “$temp\rar.zip”
Payload delivery: retrieves the decoy archive from the remote server to prepare user-facing content for the distraction phase.
4
Extracts “*.pdf” from the downloaded “$temp\rar.zip”
Decoy preparation: unpacks the legitimate-looking document so it can be executed silently without requiring user interaction.
6
Opens extracted decoy document “*.pdf” with user’s default software
User distraction: opens a convincing document to maintain user engagement and creates a legitimate workflow appearance to buy additional 30–120 seconds for background operations.
6
Executes “taskkill.exe /F /Im winrar.exe”
Process concealment: terminates the archive extractor to prevent the user from seeing the archive contents or noticing unexpected file extraction activity.
7
Searches and deletes “rar.zip”, “*.pdf.zip” and “*.pdf.lnk”
Anti-forensic cleanup: removes the initial infection artifacts before activating the main payload, reducing the number of disk traces available for incident response or EDR correlation.
8
Executes “$temp\fixed.ps1”
Controlled execution: launches the main payload only after persistence is secured, the user is distracted, and access traces are cleaned up.
Fixed.ps1 (loader)
The primary purpose of the Fixed.ps1 script is to deliver and install subsequent malware onto the compromised system, specifically VBCloud and PowerShower. Fixed.ps1 establishes persistence (by adding itself to registry Run keys), creates a decoy for the user (by opening a PDF document), and executes the next stages of the attack.
Fixed.ps1::Payload (VBCloud dropper)
Example of the fixed.ps1::Payload (VBCloud dropper)
This module functions as a dropper for the VBCloud backdoor. It drops two files onto the infected machine:
video.vbs: the loader of the backdoor,VBCloud::Launcher. This is a VBScript that decrypts the contents of video.mds (typically using RC4 with a hardcoded key) and executes it in memory.
video.mds: the encrypted body of the backdoor, VBCloud::Backdoor. This is the main module that connects to a C2 server to receive additional scripts or execute built-in commands. This backdoor is designed to function as a stealer, specifically targeting files with extensions of interest (such as DOC, PDF, XLS) and exfiltrating them.
Fixed.ps1::Payload (PowerShower)
This module installs a second backdoor called PowerShower on the system. We don’t have the specific script that performs this installation, but we assume it’s performed by a script similar to fixed.ps1::Payload (VBCloud dropper).
Unlike VBCloud, which focuses on file theft, PowerShower is primarily used for network reconnaissance and lateral movement within the victim’s infrastructure. PowerShower can perform the following tasks:
Collect information about running processes, administrator groups, and domain controllers.
Download and execute PowerShell scripts from the C2 server.
Conduct “Kerberoasting” attacks (stealing password hashes of Active Directory accounts).
PowerShower is dropped onto the system via the path ‘C:\Users\[username]\Pictures\googleearth.ps1’.
Contents of the googleearth.ps1(PowerShower)
PowerShower::Payload (credential grabber)
PowerShower downloads an additional script for stealing credentials. It performs the following actions:
Creates a Volume Shadow Copy of the C:\ drive.
Copies the SAM (stores local user password hashes) and SECURITY system files from this shadow copy to C:\Users\Public\Documents\, disguising them as PDF files.
The script is launched in several stages. To execute with high privileges, the script uses a UAC bypass technique via fodhelper.exe (a built-in Windows utility). This allows PowerShell to run as an administrator without directly prompting the user, which could otherwise raise suspicion.
The full launch chain looks like this:
The full Base64-decoded script is given below.
Multi-user RDP by patching termsrv.dll
Moving laterally across the victim’s network, the attackers executed a suspicious PowerShell script named rdp_new.ps1 (MD5 1A11B26DD0261EF27A112CE8B361C247):
The script is designed to allow multiple RDP sessions in Windows 10 by patching the termsrv.dll file. Termsrv.dll is the core Windows library that enforces Remote Desktop Services rules.
By default, Windows limits the number of simultaneous RDP sessions. Removing this restriction allows attackers to operate on the machine in the background without disconnecting the legitimate user, thereby reducing the likelihood of detection.
At first, the script enables RDP on the firewall and downgrades the RDP security settings:
Before modifying termsrv.dll, the script takes ownership and assigns itself full permissions. Then the script finds the sequence of bytes 39 81 3C 06 00 00 ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? and replaces it with B8 00 01 00 00 89 81 38 06 00 00 90. After these manipulations, the script restarts the RDP service.
Example of script
The patched version allows multiple concurrent logins so attackers can stay connected without disrupting the legitimate user, thereby reducing suspicion.
Reverse SSH tunneling
As mentioned above, during this wave of attacks, the adversaries widely deployed reverse SSH tunnels to many hosts of interest. The compromised machine initiates an SSH connection to an attacker-controlled server, which allows attackers to bypass standard firewall rules via establishing outbound connections.
That way, even if the primary backdoor is discovered, the attackers can maintain control through the SSH tunnel.
To install a reverse SSH tunnel on a victim’s host, the attackers run VBS scripts via PAExec or PsExec.
We’ve seen three types of scripts:
Gen.vbs (WriteToSchedulerGenerateKey.vbs) generates key for SSH tunnel.
Kill.vbs (WriteToSchedulerKillSSH.vbs) stops reverse SSH tunnel via taskkill.exe.
To achieve persistence, the attackers added a new scheduled task in Windows:
In some cases, before establishing a reverse SSH tunnel, attackers set new access permissions to the folder containing the private key to prevent the legitimate user or system administrators from easily accessing or modifying it:
Patched OpenSSH
Some OpenSSH binaries used by the attackers had their imports modified. Instead of libcrypto.dll, the SSH executable imports syruntime.dll, which was placed in the same folder as the binary. This was likely done to evade detection and ensure stealth.
In addition, we found a portable version of OpenSSH, presumably compiled by the adversaries:
RevSocks
In addition to Reverse SSH tunnels, the attackers installed RevSocks using the same infrastructure. RevSocks is an alternative tool to SSH for establishing tunnels and proxy connections, written in Golang. This tool allows direct connection to workstations on the local network. It also allows attackers to gain access to other segments of the victim’s network by using the machine as a gateway. In some cases, C2 addresses were hardcoded into the binary; in other cases, the C2 was passed in command line arguments.
There were also reverse SOCKS samples with hardcoded C2 addresses:
Tor tunneling
To maintain control over the compromised host, the Tor network was used in some cases. A minimal set of a Tor executable and configuration files, necessary for launching HiddenService, was copied to the system directories of infected devices. The name of the Tor Browser executable file was modified. As a result, the infected machine was accessible via RDP from the Tor network when accessing the generated .onion domain.
Below is an example of a configuration file for routing connections from Tor to RDP ports on the local network, as well as example command lines for logging into Tor.
Example of TOR configuration file
PowerCloud
We analyzed a new Cloud Atlas tool, PowerCloud. It collects user data with administrator privileges and writes this information to Google Sheets in Base64 format.
The tool represents an obfuscated PowerShell script. In most cases, it is packaged into an executable file using the PS2EXE utility, but we have also encountered variants in the form of a separate PowerShell script.
To find administrators on the victim host, the tool executes the following command:
This information is appended with the computer name and current date, the data is encoded in base64, and then the collected data is added to an existing Google Sheet.
PowerCloud script
Browser checker
Additionally, the attackers used another PowerShell script (MD5 5329F7BFF9D0D5DB28821B86C26D628F), compiled into an executable file via PS2EXE, which checks whether browser processes (Chrome, Edge, Firefox, and other) are running. This helps detect when the user is working on the computer. This can be used to choose the optimal time for conducting attacks (for example, when the user is away but their browser is still open) or simply to gather information about the victim’s habits.
The information about running browsers is written to a log file on the local host.
Fragment of the deobfuscated script
Victims
According to our telemetry, in late 2025 and early 2026, the identified targets of the described malicious activities are located in Russia and Belarus. The targeted industries mostly include government agencies and diplomatic entities.
We attribute the activity described in this report to the Cloud Atlas APT group with a high degree of confidence. The group used techniques and tools described previously, such as the initial access vector, the Python script for information gathering, and the Tor application for forwarding ports to the Tor network. The victim profile and geography also matches the Cloud Atlas targets.
We couldn’t help but notice some parallels with recent Head Mare activity. The PhantomHeart backdoor (available in Russian only), attributed to Head Mare and used to create an SSH tunnel, was placed in directories actively used by Cloud Atlas:
C:\Windows\ime
C:\Windows\System32\ime
C:\Windows\pla
C:\Windows\inf
C:\Windows\migration
C:\Windows\System32\timecontrolsvc
C:\Windows\SKB
However, TTPs are still differentiated.
Conclusion
For more than ten years, the Cloud Atlas group has continued its activities and expanded its arsenal. Over the course of last year, many targeted campaigns in general were found to employ ReverseSocks, SSH and Tor, and the use of these utilities was no exception for Cloud Atlas. Creating such backup control channels using publicly available utilities significantly complicates the complete disruption of attackers’ actions on compromised systems. We will continue to closely monitor the group’s activity and describe their new tools and techniques.
In 2025, we observed pervasive SSH tunnel activity, which has remained active into 2026, affecting many government organizations and commercial companies in Russia and Belarus. Behind some of this activity is Cloud Atlas, a group we have known since 2014. During our investigation, we identified new tools used by this group, as well as indicators of compromise.
The group is back to sending out archives containing malicious shortcuts that launch PowerShell scripts. This technique is employed in addition to the previously described use of malicious documents, which exploit an old vulnerability in the Microsoft Office Equation Editor process (CVE-2018-0802) to download and execute malicious code. We have observed the use of third-party public utilities (Tor/SSH/RevSocks) to gain a foothold in infected systems and create additional backup control channels.
Technical details
Initial infection
As for the primary compromise, Cloud Atlas remains consistent in using phishing. In the observed campaigns, the attackers emailed a ZIP archive containing an LNK file as an attachment.
Malware execution flow
Attackers use LNK shortcuts to covertly execute PowerShell scripts hosted on external resources. The command line of the shortcut:
Example of the PowerShell script downloaded and executed by the shortcut:
Example of the PowerShell script downloaded by the shortcut
Actions performed by the downloaded PowerShell:
Step
Action
Description
1
Drops “$temp\fixed.ps1”
Pre-staging: places the main payload locally in advance to ensure an execution capability independent of subsequent network connectivity or C2 availability.
2
Creates “Run” registry key “YandexBrowser_setup” for “$temp\fixed.ps1” startup
Early persistence: guarantees execution upon the next logon or reboot. If the script is interrupted during later stages, the payload will still activate automatically.
3
Downloads and drops “$temp\rar.zip”
Extracts “*.pdf” from the downloaded “$temp\rar.zip”
Payload delivery: retrieves the decoy archive from the remote server to prepare user-facing content for the distraction phase.
4
Extracts “*.pdf” from the downloaded “$temp\rar.zip”
Decoy preparation: unpacks the legitimate-looking document so it can be executed silently without requiring user interaction.
6
Opens extracted decoy document “*.pdf” with user’s default software
User distraction: opens a convincing document to maintain user engagement and creates a legitimate workflow appearance to buy additional 30–120 seconds for background operations.
6
Executes “taskkill.exe /F /Im winrar.exe”
Process concealment: terminates the archive extractor to prevent the user from seeing the archive contents or noticing unexpected file extraction activity.
7
Searches and deletes “rar.zip”, “*.pdf.zip” and “*.pdf.lnk”
Anti-forensic cleanup: removes the initial infection artifacts before activating the main payload, reducing the number of disk traces available for incident response or EDR correlation.
8
Executes “$temp\fixed.ps1”
Controlled execution: launches the main payload only after persistence is secured, the user is distracted, and access traces are cleaned up.
Fixed.ps1 (loader)
The primary purpose of the Fixed.ps1 script is to deliver and install subsequent malware onto the compromised system, specifically VBCloud and PowerShower. Fixed.ps1 establishes persistence (by adding itself to registry Run keys), creates a decoy for the user (by opening a PDF document), and executes the next stages of the attack.
Fixed.ps1::Payload (VBCloud dropper)
Example of the fixed.ps1::Payload (VBCloud dropper)
This module functions as a dropper for the VBCloud backdoor. It drops two files onto the infected machine:
video.vbs: the loader of the backdoor,VBCloud::Launcher. This is a VBScript that decrypts the contents of video.mds (typically using RC4 with a hardcoded key) and executes it in memory.
video.mds: the encrypted body of the backdoor, VBCloud::Backdoor. This is the main module that connects to a C2 server to receive additional scripts or execute built-in commands. This backdoor is designed to function as a stealer, specifically targeting files with extensions of interest (such as DOC, PDF, XLS) and exfiltrating them.
Fixed.ps1::Payload (PowerShower)
This module installs a second backdoor called PowerShower on the system. We don’t have the specific script that performs this installation, but we assume it’s performed by a script similar to fixed.ps1::Payload (VBCloud dropper).
Unlike VBCloud, which focuses on file theft, PowerShower is primarily used for network reconnaissance and lateral movement within the victim’s infrastructure. PowerShower can perform the following tasks:
Collect information about running processes, administrator groups, and domain controllers.
Download and execute PowerShell scripts from the C2 server.
Conduct “Kerberoasting” attacks (stealing password hashes of Active Directory accounts).
PowerShower is dropped onto the system via the path ‘C:\Users\[username]\Pictures\googleearth.ps1’.
Contents of the googleearth.ps1(PowerShower)
PowerShower::Payload (credential grabber)
PowerShower downloads an additional script for stealing credentials. It performs the following actions:
Creates a Volume Shadow Copy of the C:\ drive.
Copies the SAM (stores local user password hashes) and SECURITY system files from this shadow copy to C:\Users\Public\Documents\, disguising them as PDF files.
The script is launched in several stages. To execute with high privileges, the script uses a UAC bypass technique via fodhelper.exe (a built-in Windows utility). This allows PowerShell to run as an administrator without directly prompting the user, which could otherwise raise suspicion.
The full launch chain looks like this:
The full Base64-decoded script is given below.
Multi-user RDP by patching termsrv.dll
Moving laterally across the victim’s network, the attackers executed a suspicious PowerShell script named rdp_new.ps1 (MD5 1A11B26DD0261EF27A112CE8B361C247):
The script is designed to allow multiple RDP sessions in Windows 10 by patching the termsrv.dll file. Termsrv.dll is the core Windows library that enforces Remote Desktop Services rules.
By default, Windows limits the number of simultaneous RDP sessions. Removing this restriction allows attackers to operate on the machine in the background without disconnecting the legitimate user, thereby reducing the likelihood of detection.
At first, the script enables RDP on the firewall and downgrades the RDP security settings:
Before modifying termsrv.dll, the script takes ownership and assigns itself full permissions. Then the script finds the sequence of bytes 39 81 3C 06 00 00 ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? and replaces it with B8 00 01 00 00 89 81 38 06 00 00 90. After these manipulations, the script restarts the RDP service.
Example of script
The patched version allows multiple concurrent logins so attackers can stay connected without disrupting the legitimate user, thereby reducing suspicion.
Reverse SSH tunneling
As mentioned above, during this wave of attacks, the adversaries widely deployed reverse SSH tunnels to many hosts of interest. The compromised machine initiates an SSH connection to an attacker-controlled server, which allows attackers to bypass standard firewall rules via establishing outbound connections.
That way, even if the primary backdoor is discovered, the attackers can maintain control through the SSH tunnel.
To install a reverse SSH tunnel on a victim’s host, the attackers run VBS scripts via PAExec or PsExec.
We’ve seen three types of scripts:
Gen.vbs (WriteToSchedulerGenerateKey.vbs) generates key for SSH tunnel.
Kill.vbs (WriteToSchedulerKillSSH.vbs) stops reverse SSH tunnel via taskkill.exe.
To achieve persistence, the attackers added a new scheduled task in Windows:
In some cases, before establishing a reverse SSH tunnel, attackers set new access permissions to the folder containing the private key to prevent the legitimate user or system administrators from easily accessing or modifying it:
Patched OpenSSH
Some OpenSSH binaries used by the attackers had their imports modified. Instead of libcrypto.dll, the SSH executable imports syruntime.dll, which was placed in the same folder as the binary. This was likely done to evade detection and ensure stealth.
In addition, we found a portable version of OpenSSH, presumably compiled by the adversaries:
RevSocks
In addition to Reverse SSH tunnels, the attackers installed RevSocks using the same infrastructure. RevSocks is an alternative tool to SSH for establishing tunnels and proxy connections, written in Golang. This tool allows direct connection to workstations on the local network. It also allows attackers to gain access to other segments of the victim’s network by using the machine as a gateway. In some cases, C2 addresses were hardcoded into the binary; in other cases, the C2 was passed in command line arguments.
There were also reverse SOCKS samples with hardcoded C2 addresses:
Tor tunneling
To maintain control over the compromised host, the Tor network was used in some cases. A minimal set of a Tor executable and configuration files, necessary for launching HiddenService, was copied to the system directories of infected devices. The name of the Tor Browser executable file was modified. As a result, the infected machine was accessible via RDP from the Tor network when accessing the generated .onion domain.
Below is an example of a configuration file for routing connections from Tor to RDP ports on the local network, as well as example command lines for logging into Tor.
Example of TOR configuration file
PowerCloud
We analyzed a new Cloud Atlas tool, PowerCloud. It collects user data with administrator privileges and writes this information to Google Sheets in Base64 format.
The tool represents an obfuscated PowerShell script. In most cases, it is packaged into an executable file using the PS2EXE utility, but we have also encountered variants in the form of a separate PowerShell script.
To find administrators on the victim host, the tool executes the following command:
This information is appended with the computer name and current date, the data is encoded in base64, and then the collected data is added to an existing Google Sheet.
PowerCloud script
Browser checker
Additionally, the attackers used another PowerShell script (MD5 5329F7BFF9D0D5DB28821B86C26D628F), compiled into an executable file via PS2EXE, which checks whether browser processes (Chrome, Edge, Firefox, and other) are running. This helps detect when the user is working on the computer. This can be used to choose the optimal time for conducting attacks (for example, when the user is away but their browser is still open) or simply to gather information about the victim’s habits.
The information about running browsers is written to a log file on the local host.
Fragment of the deobfuscated script
Victims
According to our telemetry, in late 2025 and early 2026, the identified targets of the described malicious activities are located in Russia and Belarus. The targeted industries mostly include government agencies and diplomatic entities.
We attribute the activity described in this report to the Cloud Atlas APT group with a high degree of confidence. The group used techniques and tools described previously, such as the initial access vector, the Python script for information gathering, and the Tor application for forwarding ports to the Tor network. The victim profile and geography also matches the Cloud Atlas targets.
We couldn’t help but notice some parallels with recent Head Mare activity. The PhantomHeart backdoor (available in Russian only), attributed to Head Mare and used to create an SSH tunnel, was placed in directories actively used by Cloud Atlas:
C:\Windows\ime
C:\Windows\System32\ime
C:\Windows\pla
C:\Windows\inf
C:\Windows\migration
C:\Windows\System32\timecontrolsvc
C:\Windows\SKB
However, TTPs are still differentiated.
Conclusion
For more than ten years, the Cloud Atlas group has continued its activities and expanded its arsenal. Over the course of last year, many targeted campaigns in general were found to employ ReverseSocks, SSH and Tor, and the use of these utilities was no exception for Cloud Atlas. Creating such backup control channels using publicly available utilities significantly complicates the complete disruption of attackers’ actions on compromised systems. We will continue to closely monitor the group’s activity and describe their new tools and techniques.
We’ve written time and again about how QR codes are used in phishing schemes. Our secure email gateway solution even includes technology to read these codes — not just from emails, but also from attachments — and check the embedded links. Yet, attackers haven’t given up on trying to send QR codes to their victims. Lately, we’ve increasingly seen them use ASCII art for this purpose — images composed of characters. This seems particularly ironic considering that phishers once tried to evade link scanning by hiding links in images, and now they’re trying to dodge image scanning by going back to text. But with a few twists.
The lost art of ASCII, and how attackers use it
It’s hard to believe today, but there was a time when computers couldn’t display graphics. Consequently, the very first computer images were constructed from text characters. Following the adoption of the standard in 1963, characters from the ASCII (American Standard Code for Information Interchange) set were used for this type of artwork to ensure that images looked the same across different computers. Over time, other text symbols (for example, from the extended Unicode set) began to be used to create images, but the name “ASCII graphics” remained the term used to describe this art form as a whole. There were serious artists working in this medium, the earliest websites were designed with ASCII art, and even the first computer pornography was rendered with text characters.
As image display technology evolved, ASCII art began to fall out of fashion. It saw a major resurgence in the 2000s during the heyday of email spam. Back then, spammers primarily used it because it allowed them to disguise blatant spam keywords that could trigger mail filters, while also placing less load on mail servers than images. Additionally, since many users paid for volume of internet traffic at the time, they often disabled image loading in their email clients. Naturally, at that time, we augmented our email security solutions with technology specifically designed to block ASCII art.
Now, ASCII art has been rediscovered — this time by those looking to bypass technology that recognizes QR codes within images.
What does ASCII art phishing look like?
Here’s a recent example. The pretext itself is pretty run-of-the-mill: someone has supposedly sent to victim a confidential document via DocuSign, but to open it the recipient needs to scan the QR code in the email to visit a website and enter corporate login credentials.
A QR code rendered with unicode characters. We’ve blurred out a portion of the code to prevent the malicious link from being scanned.
Admittedly, the code looks weird. This is primarily because it’s drawn piece-by-piece in pseudo-graphic elements, and even the gaps between the lines can be seen. In reality, there’s no actual image in the e-mail message code; the QR code looks something like this behind the scenes:
ASCII art inside the email code
As a result, link scanners can’t see the link, and image analysis tools can’t find the URL hidden inside the QR code, so the attackers assume the phishing email is going to reach the victim just fine. Spoiler alert: no, we haven’t forgotten how to block ASCII art.
Is a QR code in an email even normal?
In theory, there are situations where using a QR code makes sense. It’s a fairly convenient way to share contacts, a link to a mobile app, a map location, or a configuration. In other words, it works well whenever information needs to be delivered specifically to the recipient’s mobile device.
However, someone using a QR code to make you enter corporate credentials on a mobile device is an instant red flag. And when that QR code is generated with ASCII art, it’s clearly a phishing attempt or an effort to lure you to a malicious URL. This trick can only have one purpose — an attempt to bypass security controls.
Additionally, we recommend regular security awareness training to educate employees on modern phishing tactics. Specifically, to explain that ASCII art in modern emails can be a telltale sign of an attempted phishing attack.
Have you ever tried to tally up how much you spend on subscriptions each month? Music, movies, gaming, language courses, delivery services, heated seats, and even the ability to chat with the Grok bot directly from your car — there’s a subscription for just about everything now. There’s even a subscription service specifically designed to… track your other subscriptions.
The number of subscriptions varies significantly depending on where you live, but statistically, 78% of adults worldwide have at least one paid subscription, with the average user juggling 5.6 active services. Furthermore, a large portion of these are family plans used by groups of close relatives… and sometimes other people: 37% of users share their subscriptions outside their immediate family.
Because subscription accounts, especially family plans, often contain sensitive personal data, they’ve become a prime target for cybercriminals. Today we look at how to manage your subscriptions securely, avoid having your accounts compromised, and keep from falling for scammers’ latest tricks.
Security of shared accounts and subscriptions
Why would anyone want to hack your subscription? Even if the service only offers entertainment, your account almost certainly contains sensitive information: your name, address, email, phone number, the names of other members, and other personally identifiable information. This data is then sold on the dark web and used for further attacks.
Attackers compromise subscription accounts either through social engineering and phishing, or by taking advantage of many users’ reliance on weak or leaked passwords. As we recently highlighted in our research, nearly half of all passwords worldwide can be cracked in less than a minute. Scammers then either resell existing subscriptions or slots in a family group at a discount, or they sign the victim up for new services, hoping the extra charges go unnoticed.
Finally, some middlemen don’t bother with hacking at all; they simply buy bulk subscriptions for a large number of devices, where the per-unit cost is typically much lower. They then resell individual slots in these plans on online marketplaces. As a result, a single “family” account can end up filled with people who are complete strangers to one another.
Sharing subscriptions with family and others
Many subscription owners think nothing of sharing access with family and friends. What could possibly go wrong?
The worst-case scenario from a security standpoint is when a single account is purchased and the owner shares the login and password with other users. This usually happens when people try to save money on a family plan by buying an individual subscription and sharing it. Some services even allow for different profiles, but they are all tied to a single account, meaning the credentials are shared. This is how streaming platforms like Hulu and Disney+ operate.
Sharing one account among multiple people significantly increases the risk of your credentials falling into the wrong hands. There’s no way to guarantee that everyone else is storing those details securely or that their devices aren’t infected with malware. Even without malware, it’s incredibly easy to accidentally hand over a password to attackers simply by signing in to the subscription service over unprotected public Wi-Fi.
It’s entirely possible that the password you kindly shared with some friends has already surfaced in some corner of the dark web, and you may soon lose access to your account. Furthermore, if you reuse the same password across different sites and apps, your other accounts are now in the crosshairs as well.
The second scenario is when each group member has an individual account. Many services now allow you to add extra users to a subscription at no additional cost, and most owners are happy to give away these free slots. Even then, you shouldn’t let your guard down: a breach of just one of these accounts can still leak sensitive information, such as family members’ names, addresses, billing info, and other subscription-related data.
How to protect your subscriptions (and your wallet)
To keep your and your loved ones’ personal data private and your accounts under your control, follow these simple rules.
Use strong account security
To do this, learn — and teach your friends and family — how to use password managers, two-factor authentication, or passkeys.
If you and your loved ones rely on memory to store passwords, there’s a high probability that you’re reusing the same one across multiple services. This is a major blunder: data breaches happen all the time, and a single compromised password gives attackers access to your other accounts.
The simplest solution is to use a password manager that generates and remembers complex, unique passwords for every site and service on your behalf. All you have to do is remember the single main password for its encrypted vault. Additionally, Kaspersky Password Manager doesn’t just store and create passwords; it can also check if they’ve appeared in leaked databases, and sync your credentials across all your devices.
Additionally, a password manager provides a robust defense against phishing: unlike a human, who can easily be misled by a sign-in form that looks almost identical to the real thing and is hosted on a look-alike domain, a password manager won’t fall for the trick. It’ll only offer to autofill your saved login and password on the specific site or service for which they were originally stored.
Two-factor authentication (2FA) is an extra layer of verification the system requests after you enter your password — such as an SMS code or a one-time code from an authenticator app. Whenever technically possible, be sure to enable 2FA on every account linked to a subscription. This applies to the subscription services themselves, as well as any third-party accounts you use to sign in, such as Google, Apple, or Facebook.
We recommend storing your two-factor authentication tokens and generating the one-time codes — which refresh every 30 seconds — inside Kaspersky Password Manager. This significantly lowers the chances of someone hijacking your account. Even if an attacker somehow discovers or guesses your password, they won’t be able to get the code without physical access to your device.
Finally, you can ditch passwords (almost) entirely by switching to passkeys. We’ve previously covered what this password alternative looks like and the specifics of using it. Currently, this is the most breach-resistant authentication system out there. Its main drawback has been the difficulty of syncing passkeys across different ecosystems, like Windows and iOS, but the updated version of Kaspersky Password Manager can now save and sync passkeys across Windows, macOS, iOS, and Android devices, making that issue a thing of the past.
Don’t overlook device security
Even a complex password and 2FA aren’t reasons to let your guard down. An attacker can infect your device with an infostealer: malware designed to swipe things like session cookies from your browser, app configuration files, and other sensitive data. Session cookies allow you to stay signed in without re-entering your credentials every time; however, if scammers get their hands on them, they can sign in to the service as you — even without knowing your username or password. This makes a proactive approach essential, especially if you use Chrome, Edge, Opera, or other Chromium-based browsers on Windows. We recommend installing Kaspersky Premium on all your devices; it includes Kaspersky Password Manager in addition to comprehensive protection against cyberthreats.
Only share subscriptions with people you trust
Otherwise, you might be asking for trouble. For example, if you share a Steam subscription with a friend who cheats, both of your accounts could end up banned. Furthermore, never try to let someone else into your personal account or individual subscription. Sharing your password with others is usually a violation of the terms of service, and can result in your account being blocked.
Make sure there are no strangers in your family group
To do this, periodically check active devices and sessions in your subscription settings. If you see an unrecognized device in the authorized list, terminate that session — or all of them — and change your account password immediately. Signing back in on a few devices is much easier than trying to recover a hijacked account.
And remember: don’t let your own habits compromise your security. If you’re visiting friends, on vacation, or on a business trip and use a local computer or smart TV — or if you sign in to your account from a public computer — don’t forget to sign out when you’re done. Otherwise, the next person to use that device might find themselves with free subscriptions or, even worse, access to your email or cloud photo stream.
Don’t take the bait
Watch out for phishing emails and messages spoofing legitimate services. If you receive a notification about a “need to update your billing details”, or a claim that a “new user has been added” to your family plan, don’t rush to click any links or open attachments. Links can lead to a phishing page, and attachments may hide malware. Scammers often use email addresses and domains that look nearly identical to the real ones — for instance, by swapping l (lowercase L) for I (uppercase i), or using a familiar name in a different domain zone.
Unfortunately, phishing pages are often indistinguishable from the originals now that AI is being used for high-quality design and layout. Since spotting every red flag yourself is increasingly difficult, it’s best to delegate anti-phishing protection to Kaspersky Premium. It will alert you to suspicious sites, saving your money and keeping your peace of mind.
Lastly, some scammers lure users in with freebies like fake gift subscriptions for Telegram Premium. The victim is asked to visit a phishing page mimicking the Telegram login screen and sign in to their account to claim the gift. The result isn’t hard to guess: instead of a premium subscription — a hijacked account. Recently, scammers have even learned to use mini-apps to steal credentials directly inside Telegram under various pretexts — ranging from gift giveaways to claims that you must move to a new chat because the old one was blocked.
Avoid buying subscriptions from third-party sellers
You can often find subscription offers on marketplaces and retail platforms at prices significantly lower than what the official provider charges. More likely than not, that tempting price hides a hacked account or a family group that you could be kicked out of at any moment, because the family admin is either the seller or a random user. Furthermore, sharing a family plan with strangers from around the world is a violation of terms for many services.
How to get rid of unwanted subscriptions
Now that we’ve covered subscription security, what about those extra subscriptions that quietly eat away at your balance every month? Research shows that users typically underestimate how many active subscriptions they have and how much they spend on them; they also frequently forget to cancel auto-renewals for subscriptions they no longer use, or auto-charges after the trial period ends.
If you suspect you’re in that boat, start your investigation with your own bank statements. Recurring charges for the same amount can be a subscription you’ve forgotten about. Check who received the payment; if the name doesn’t ring a bell, do an online search on the company. It’s also worth searching your email box for the merchant name or the payment amount; this can help you track down subscription notifications and figure out what exactly you’re paying for. And don’t forget to check your spam folder, as that’s where subscription alerts often end up.
Now, let’s look at how to check and cancel active subscriptions purchased through the App Store and Google Play.
For Android users
Open Settings on your device.
Tap Google, then tap your profile picture, and go to Google Account.
Go to Wallet & subscriptions.
If you’re the family group manager, you’ll be able to see the purchase history for other family members.
For iOS users
Open Settings on your device.
Tap your profile picture at the top of the menu.
Go to Subscriptions.
Note: to manage your iCloud subscription, you’ll need to go to the specific iCloud section located just below Subscriptions. In the Family Sharing section, if you’re the one who set it up, you can view the subscription and purchase history for all family members.
Over the past few months, we have conducted an in-depth analysis of specific activity clusters of Kimsuky (aka APT43, Ruby Sleet, Black Banshee, Sparkling Pisces, Velvet Chollima, and Springtail), a prolific Korean-speaking threat actor. Our research revealed notable tactical shifts throughout multiple phases of the group’s latest campaigns.
Kimsuky has continuously introduced new malware variants based on the PebbleDash platform, a tool historically leveraged by the Lazarus Group but appropriated by Kimsuky since at least 2021. Our monitoring indicates various strategic updates to the group’s arsenal, including the use of VSCode Tunneling, Cloudflare Quick Tunnels, DWAgent, large language models (LLMs), and the Rust programming language. This expanding set of tools underscores the group’s ongoing adaptation and evolution.
Specifically, Kimsuky leveraged legitimate VSCode tunneling mechanisms to establish persistence and distributed the open-source DWAgent remote monitoring and management tool for post-exploitation activities. These activities affected various sectors in South Korea, impacting both public and private entities.
This article covers both previously undocumented attacks and a deeper technical analysis of incidents within this campaign that have been reported before — offering new insight beyond what has already been published.
Executive summary
Kimsuky obtains initial access to target systems by delivering spear-phishing emails containing malicious attachments disguised as documents. They also contact targets via messengers in some cases.
Kimsuky uses a variety of droppers in different formats, such as JSE, PIF, SCR, EXE, etc.
The droppers deliver malware mainly belonging to two big clusters: PebbleDash and AppleSeed. These clusters are considered the most technically advanced in the group’s toolset. The report covers the following PebbleDash malware: HelloDoor, httpMalice, MemLoad, httpTroy. It also covers AppleSeed and HappyDoor from AppleSeed cluster.
For post-exploitation activities Kimsuky uses legitimate tools Visual Studio Code (VSCode) and DWAgent. For VSCode, the attacker uses GitHub authentication method.
For hosting C2 infrastructure the group mainly uses domains registered at a free South Korean hosting provider. It also occasionally relies on hacked South Korean websites and tunneling tools, such as Ngrok or VSCode.
Kimsuky mainly targets South Korean entities. However, PebbleDash attacks were also seen in Brazil and Germany. This malware cluster focuses on defense sector, while AppleSeed most often targets government organizations.
Background
First identified by Kaspersky in 2013, Kimsuky has been active for over 10 years and is considered less technically proficient compared to other Korean-speaking APT groups. The group has targeted a wide range of entities and demonstrated capability in creating tailored spear-phishing emails. The group’s arsenal includes proprietary malware such as PebbleDash, BabyShark, AppleSeed, and RandomQuery, as well as open-source RATs like xRAT, XenoRAT, and TutRAT. This blog post examines the evolving PebbleDash-based malware (referred to as the PebbleDash cluster) and its connections to the AppleSeed-based malware (referred to as the AppleSeed cluster).
The PebbleDash and AppleSeed clusters are considered the most technically advanced in Kimsuky’s toolset. Since at least 2019, these clusters have masqueraded as legitimate documents and application installers, manifesting as JSE droppers or executables with .EXE, .SCR and .PIF extensions. Both are particularly adept at establishing backdoors and stealing information, and ongoing development of their variants has been observed. They even occasionally utilize stolen legitimate certificates from South Korean organizations to avoid detection.
Timeline of the AppleSeed and PebbleDash malware families
AppleSeed and PebbleDash have primarily targeted the public and private sectors in South Korea. The PebbleDash cluster has shown a particular interest in the medical, military and defense industries worldwide. The PebbleDash cluster compromised Brazilian and South Korean defense organizations throughout the past several years, as well as a German defense firm. In 2024, the South Korean government released a security advisory regarding the AppleSeed cluster, detailing how the malware was distributed by replacing a security software installer required to access a construction entity’s website.
Initial access
Kimsuky meticulously crafts and delivers spear-phishing emails to its targets in an attempt to entice them into opening attachments. According to recent research, the group also occasionally approaches targets by contacting them via messengers. In all cases, the initial contact leads to the delivery of a malicious attachment disguised as a document. These attachments often consist of compressed files containing droppers in formats such as .JSE, .EXE, .PIF, or .SCR. The filenames are consistent with the message content and are meant to convince the recipient to open the attachment. The malicious files are often disguised as product quotations, job offers, information guides, surveys, government documents, and personal photos.
Appendix Form No. 8 – Request for Access, Correction, Deletion, and Suspension of Processing of Personal Information (PIPA Enforcement Rules).hwp.jse
August 28, 2025
995a0a49ae4b244928b3f67e2bfd7a6e
HelloDoor
2
2026년 상반기 국내대학원 석사야간과정 위탁교육생 선발관련 서류.hwpx.jse
Documents for the Selection of Commissioned Students for Domestic Graduate School Master’s Evening Programs (H1 2026).hwpx.jse
December 14, 2025
52f1ff082e981cbdfd1f045c6021c63f
httpMalice
3
security_20260126.scr
–
January 26, 2026
65fc9f06de5603e2c1af9b4f288bb22c
Reger Dropper, MemLoad, httpTroy
4
노현정님.pdf.jse
Ms. Noh Hyun-jung.pdf.jse
January 28, 2026
8e15c4d4f71bdd9dbc48cd2cabc87806
AppleSeed chain
5
대국민서비스관리운영체계현장점검증적(초안).pif
On-site Inspection Evidence for the Public Service Management System (Draft).pif
February 5, 2026
8983ffa6da23e0b99ccc58c17b9788c7
Pidoc Dropper, HappyDoor
JSE droppers contain a minimum of two Base64-encoded blobs: one serving as a benign lure file and one or more containing malicious code. Additional blobs may exist within the dropper, but they are unused. The two blobs are decoded using JScript and stored in an arbitrary location on disk, such as C:\ProgramData, with the malicious filenames randomly generated according to the scheme [random]{7}.[random]{4}. The lure file is opened immediately. The malicious payload leverages powershell.exe -windowstyle hidden certutil -decode [src path] [dst path] for the second Base64 decoding before execution. Ultimately, the malicious payload is executed via command-line instructions such as regsvr32.exe /s [file path] or rundll32.exe [file path] [export function].
Reger Dropper (.SCR) and Pidoc Dropper (.PIF) also contain benign lure files and malicious payloads that, in both cases, are encrypted using XOR operations. Specifically, Reger Dropper employs a hard-coded key #RsfsetraW#@EsfesgsgAJOPj4eml;, while Pidoc Dropper utilizes single-byte XOR with 0xFF to decrypt the internal data for execution. Pidoc Dropper is fully obfuscated using dummy data and encrypted strings. Both droppers deploy files in specific directories such as %temp% or C:\ProgramData before executing the malware using regsvr32.exe.
In addition to these droppers, Kimsuky employed a variety of executable droppers, including those crafted in Go or packaged with Inno Setup.
Deployed malware
In this section, we describe several malware families recently dropped by the droppers discussed above.
HelloDoor: first Rust-based PebbleDash variant
Written in Rust, a programming language rarely used by Kimsuky, HelloDoor is a DLL-based backdoor first identified in August 2025. It is deployed via a malicious JSE dropper. Since it has limited capabilities and a simplistic communication mechanism, the backdoor is most probably in the early stages of development. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that HelloDoor employs a C2 server hosted through TryCloudflare, a temporary tunneling service provided by Cloudflare. This service allows users to expose a local web service to the internet with no setup or account, making the infrastructure behind it difficult to trace.
HelloDoor establishes persistence upon execution by registering itself to the HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run key with the value name tdll and the command regsvr32.exe /s [current file path].
The implant communicates with the C2 server (hxxp://female-disorder-beta-metropolitan.trycloudflare[.]com/index.php) over the HTTP protocol. Depending on whether the process is executing with an elevated token, it binds to a specific local port: 5555 if the token is elevated, or 5554 if not. Before initiating communication, it generates a unique identifier by collecting device information, such as the MAC address, computer name, and the string “windows”, then computes a hash value from this information.
The malware then constructs a query string in the format aaaaaaaaaa=2&bbbbbbbbbb=[the unique identifier]&cccccccccc=1, which is a traditional format used across the PebbleDash cluster. Subsequent server responses are Base64-decoded and then decrypted using RC4 with the key fwr3errsettwererfs. The decrypted content contains command strings. Possible commands are:
Command
Description
“mcd”
Set the current directory
“msleep”
Sleep for the provided time
“install”
Register the regsvr32.exe /s [the provided file path] command to the HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run autorun registry using the install value name
[command]
Execute the provided command using chcp 65001 > nul & cmd /U /C [command]
Though interesting, it is no longer surprising that we found comments in the code that appear to have been generated by an LLM service rather than a human developer. This is based on traces that include emojis used for logging debugging messages.
✅ Port is now listening (no accepting)
❌ Port is already in use
🔍 regsvr32.exe detected as parent. Attempting to terminate...
This is a common trait of LLM services that provides users with better visibility. We previously observed similar comments in the PowerShell-based stealer suite used by BlueNoroff. HelloDoor’s simple structure and the fact that no other Rust-based malware from the group has been discovered yet support our claim.
Even though the code is believed to have been developed using an LLM service, we still found some typos and grammatical errors, such as:
result send fail (grammatically incorrect text)
server request fail (grammatically incorrect text)
It is likely that the flawed comments were added manually before or after AI was used.
httpMalice: latest backdoor variant of PebbleDash
The latest PebbleDash-based backdoor, httpMalice, emerged no later than December 2025 and is deployed by the JSE Dropper. Although we found limited direct connections to both the AppleSeed and PebbleDash clusters, the malware is closer to PebbleDash. The following shared characteristics have been identified:
(PebbleDash cluster) Ability to run commands received from the C2 server with the S-1-12-12288 SID, indicating a high integrity level – a feature also observed in PebbleDash and httpTroy.
(PebbleDash cluster) Unique identifier generated by combining the volume serial number of the root directory with the elevation status of the current token, mirroring a technique used since the appearance of NikiDoor.
(PebbleDash cluster) Communication with its C2 server utilizing three HTTP parameters, consistent with other PebbleDash-based families.
(PebbleDash cluster) Core command set more closely aligned with PebbleDash than with AppleSeed-based malware.
(AppleSeed cluster) Use of the m= parameter in C2 communication.
(AppleSeed cluster) Gathering system details using PowerShell and Windows commands similar to those found in AppleSeed and Troll Stealer.
Our analysis revealed two distinct versions of httpMalice based on their C2 communications: version 1.9 communicates over HTTP and version 1.8 uses Dropbox. The latter, the older variant, leverages the Dropbox API by utilizing pre-defined application credentials. Unlike its predecessor, the HTTP variant employs HTTP/HTTPS protocols to interact with its C2 server and maintains persistent access to the victim device through a Windows service named CacheDB. This mirrors tactics observed in similar threats, such as httpSpy.
The more recent variant gathers critical information from the compromised system, such as the current directory path, volume serial numbers, user privileges, username, local IP address, and the name and size of the currently executed httpMalice DLL file. It then combines the root drive’s volume serial number with the user’s access token privilege level to create a unique identifier for each infected system, formatted as [volume serial]{8}_[elevation status].
Value of elevation status
Description
0
Running under the SYSTEM account with an elevated token
1
Running under an elevated administrator account
2
Running without elevation
Depending on the token privilege, the backdoor then establishes persistence by either creating a service or registering itself to autostart at user logon. If the token is elevated, a service named CacheDB is created that executes the command cmd.exe /c “rundll32.exe [current DLL path], load”. The service’s display name is set to Administrator, and its description is defined as CacheDB Service. If the token is not elevated, the backdoor registers the same command under the registry key HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run with the value name Everything 1.9a-[filesize]. The older version used Everything 1.8a-[filesize] as a value name.
The latest version can execute a combination of Windows commands by default to perform host profiling, while the older version fetches the command set from Dropbox. In httpMalice, commands are mostly executed using the format cmd.exe /c chcp 949 [command] > [temporary filename], which redirects the output to separate files, with the consistent prefix 2Ato6478s added to their names. The chcp 949 command changes the code page to 949, indicating that the malware targets users of the Korean language (EUC-KR charset).
Windows commands used to gather system details
httpMalice transmits the result of host profiling to its C2 server as a URL parameter, using the POST method over the HTTP/HTTPS protocol, with the header x-www-form-urlencoded. The URL includes two or three parameters: operation mode, unique identifier (referred to as UID), and data. The operation mode, or parameter m, supports the following values:
Value
Description
1
Send the session identifier (parameter s) along with the current state (parameter a)
2
Request command
3
Send result after executing the command (parameter d)
8
Request directory to be archived and sent
9
Send the archived directory
10
Send a message like “.cmd” or “.tmp” (parameter d)
11
Send ping
12
Send the captured screenshot (parameter d)
13
Send the infected device information (parameter d)
As shown in the table above, the mode is set to 13 at the host profiling stage. The UID is formatted as [volume serial]{8}_[elevation status], and the data contains the ChaCha20-encrypted and Base64-encoded output of the command set stored in the temporary file. The resulting URL format is: m=13&u=[volume serial]{8}_[elevation status]&d=[Chacha20 encrypted + Base64-encoded data to be sent].
The key and nonce used for ChaCha20 encryption are derived from the pointer address of the buffer, resulting in nearly randomized keys. To ensure proper decryption on the attacker side, the nonce and key values are appended after the encrypted data, and the combined blob is then Base64-encoded. The counter is initialized to 0. The following figure illustrates how the encrypted data is structured after performing Base64 decoding.
Structure of the ChaCha20-encrypted data blob
After sending the host profiling data, the backdoor continuously transmits a screen capture with mode 12 and a ping message with mode 11. Finally, it sends a session identifier, which is a combination of the current username and local IP address separated by an ‘@’ symbol. In this case, the mode is set to 1 and the a parameter (current state) is set to 0, indicating that the C2 operation has been activated. The following table provides other possible values of the a parameter:
Value
Description
0
httpMalice has been activated
1
httpMalice has been inactivated (upon command 9)
2
httpMalice has been removed (upon command 8)
The whole process from sending the host profile to the backdoor activation repeats every two minutes until the C2 server returns a “success!” message.
C2 communication sequence of httpMalice
When the backdoor receives the message from the C2 server, it creates two threads dedicated to processing commands and sending the current state, including the session identifier. The first thread receives a command from the C2 server. It requests a command by sending mode 2 and, if successful, immediately sends mode 10 along with the string “.cmd” in the d parameter.
The commands supported by httpMalice are as follows:
Command
Description
0
Do nothing
1
Execute the command with EUC-KR encoding
2
Download and extract the file to the infected device
3
Upload a directory to the C2 server after it has been archived
5
Get the current directory
6
Set the current directory
7
Execute the command without setting a EUC-KR character set
8
Remove its persistence traces and exit the process
9
Hibernate
10
Execute the command using the provided session ID
12
Capture the screen
13
Load the downloaded payload into memory
MemLoad downloads httpTroy
Since early 2025, we have observed several versions of MemLoad; specifically, MemLoad V2 emerged in March, and V3 appeared by September. The payload that began being deployed through the Reger Dropper this year has been identified as an updated variant of MemLoad, slightly modified from the V3 version (referred to internally as MemLoader.dll).
Kimsuky leverages MemLoad to evade detection of its final backdoor and to carefully assess the value of targeted systems through anti-VM checks and reconnaissance. Upon installation, it requests an additional payload from the C2 server, executing it reflectively in memory if deemed suitable. Notably, all versions of MemLoad V2 and later use the same RC4 key.
Below are the key operations of MemLoad:
Creates a flag file. Creates a file containing a random eight-character string from the set 0123456789abcdefABCDEF with another random eight-character string as the name and “.dat.cfg” extension at the current file path.
Generates an ID. Generates an ID value by adding either ‘A-‘ or ‘U-‘ to the beginning of the random bytes. The choice of symbol is determined by attempting to create a random file in the C:\Windows\system32 directory. If successful, the ID starts with ‘A-‘ (indicating administrative privileges); otherwise, it starts with ‘U-‘.
Persistence via a scheduled task. Checks for the existence of the .dat.cfg file, and if confirmed, a scheduled task is set up for persistence. The task name is determined by whether the process is running with elevated privileges. If elevated, the task is named ChromeCheck, and the command
schtasks/create/tn<task name>/tr"regsvr32 /s <current file path>"/sc minute/mo1/rl highest/f is executed. Otherwise, the task is named EdgeCheck, and the command
schtasks/create/tn<task name>/tr"regsvr32 /s <current file path>"/sc minute/mo1/f is executed.
C2 communication and payload download. Requests an additional payload from its C2 server, with the header Authorization: Bearer {ID} or X-Browser-Validation: {ID} for authentication. The ID is set to the previously generated ID value.
Payload decryption and execution. Once the download is successful, the payload is decrypted using the RC4 algorithm with the key #RsfsetraW#@EsfesgsgAJOPj4eml;. The decrypted payload is then reflectively loaded into memory, and its hello export function is invoked.
The payload downloaded and executed by MemLoad is identified as the httpTroy backdoor. This backdoor serves as the primary role for long-term access and data exfiltration. Similar to MemLoad, it employs stealth techniques by creating a flag file and writing eight random bytes to it. However, in this case the file is created at [current file path]:HUI in the ADS (Alternative Data Stream) area. The backdoor then checks its privileges to determine if it is elevated and assigns an ID value in the format A-[random-8-chars] or U-[random-8-chars].
Since Gen Digital covers httpTroy’s features and functionality in detail elsewhere, we will not provide a thorough explanation here to avoid redundancy. Instead, we will simply note that it communicates with the C2 server at hxxps://file.bigcloud.n-e[.]kr/index.php.
AppleSeed
AppleSeed first appeared in 2019 and reached version 3.0. However, we now only see version 2.1. It originally consisted of two components: a dropper and the main AppleSeed. Since 2022, the updated AppleSeed chain has involved two droppers, an additional component referred to as the installer, and the main payload. It is mostly delivered through JSE Dropper.
Updated AppleSeed infection chain
There are two versions of the main AppleSeed: Dropper and Spy. The Dropper variant is responsible for downloading additional malware and executing commands received from its C2 server, while the Spy version gathers sensitive information such as documents, screenshots, keystrokes, and lists of USB drives. A notable change in version 2.1 is the inclusion, since 2022, of collecting the C:\GPKI directory – functionality that is also implemented in Troll Stealer. This directory contains a digital certificate used by the South Korean government to securely authenticate public officials and government systems.
HappyDoor
HappyDoor, an AppleSeed-based backdoor malware disclosed by AhnLab in 2024, is less visible than AppleSeed. HappyDoor shares several features with AppleSeed, including the same string obfuscation algorithm, the data types it collects, and the use of RSA encryption. Given these similarities, we assess with medium confidence that HappyDoor is an advanced variant evolved from AppleSeed.
Post-exploitation
We observed interesting post-exploitation activities involving VSCode and DWAgent. All of the observed VSCode droppers used the same lure files as the PebbleDash malware cluster. While we are unsure of the exact reason for this strategy, we suspect that the actor prepared both PebbleDash and VSCode droppers in anticipation of the PebbleDash infection chain being detected by security products because of its backdoor capabilities. In contrast, the use of VSCode is designed to have fewer detection points.
VSCode (launched by the JSE dropper)
Since last year, Kimsuky has been leveraging the legitimate Visual Studio Code Remote Tunneling feature to establish covert remote access to the victim’s device, bypassing detection designed for traditional malware-based C2 channels (first described by Darktrace researchers). In these attacks, instead of dropping malware, the JSE dropper downloads a legitimate Visual Studio Code (VSCode) CLI onto the infected device. The script establishes persistence by creating a tunnel via the application, with the tunnel name “bizeugene”, using the command below.
The Remote Tunneling feature in VSCode supports establishing a tunnel using either a Microsoft or GitHub account. When the code tunnel command is executed, the CLI initiates an authentication flow and returns a login URL along with a device code. The user must then navigate to the URL, enter the device code, and authenticate with their account. Once authentication is successful, the tunnel is created and the CLI outputs a URL for tunneling that enables browser-based access to the remote host.
The GitHub authentication method is selected in this instance because GitHub is configured as the default provider in non-interactive execution contexts. By using echo |, the script injects a \r\n (Carriage Return and Line Feed) into the standard input stream, effectively confirming the default prompt selection without manual interaction. As a result, the CLI automatically initiates the GitHub authentication flow. Next, all CLI output that includes a login URL and a device code is saved to out.txt.
Out.txt content
The JScript code in the JSE dropper monitors the out.txt file for a URL that begins with hxxps://vscode[.]dev/tunnel. This URL contains the full address of the established tunnel. Once detected, the file content containing the URL and the device code is sent to a compromised legitimate South Korean website (hxxps://www.yespp.co[.]kr/common/include/code/out[.]php) using the HTTP POST method. The request contains the file contents in the application/x-www-form-urlencoded header data formatted as out=URLencoded{result of the command}&token=URLencoded{"bizeugene"}. After authentication is complete, the attacker can access the compromised host externally through a web browser by authenticating with their own GitHub account.
VSCode (launched by VSCode installer)
While searching our telemetry for artifacts related to a different infection, we identified a new VSCode tunnel installer written in Go. A previous version of this installer was implemented using JScript and was limited to secure channels because of its reliance on a specific tunnel name. The new variant, named vscode_payload by the developer based on the embedded Go path, is fully operational and supports every tunnel on each targeted device. It includes features that are nearly identical to those of the previous version, such as downloading, unarchiving, and executing the VSCode CLI.
After the VSCode CLI file has been successfully downloaded, it is unzipped into the C:\Users\Public directory, and the extracted code.exe is executed with the tunnel command.
This is how the installer works:
Executes code.exe tunnel.
Searches for the “Microsoft Account” string in the stdout.
Sends the 0x1B 0x5B 0x42 (Down Arrow) and 0x0A (Enter) escape sequence to the pseudo-terminal, which enables tunnel creation via a GitHub account.
Searches for the “use code” string in the stdout.
Sends the printed code for authentication, prepended with the “hxxps://github[.]com/login/device” => prefix. The attacker authorizes Visual Studio Code with the logged-in GitHub account using the printed code.
Searches for the “What would you like to call this machine?” string in the stdout.
Sends the 0x0A escape sequence to the pseudo-terminal to use the current machine name as the identifier.
Searches for the “https://vscode.dev/tunnel/” string in the stdout.
Sends the printed URL for tunneling to the Slack WebHook.
The following figure illustrates the sequence for creating a tunnel using the VSCode CLI. Red boxes highlight the strings that the installer searches for. Yellow boxes indicate standard input operations sent from the installer using escape sequences. Sky blue boxes represent the values that are necessary to create the tunnel on the attacker’s side. (The “Microsoft Account” string in the second step is not shown in this figure because the second “GitHub Account” was already selected during the process.)
Creating a tunnel using VSCode CLI
Once the process is complete, the attacker can access the targeted host through the tunnel on their remote machine using their GitHub account via a browser or VSCode. The targeted device then begins communicating with Microsoft-owned servers without the user realizing that the communication is from an attacker.
An interesting feature of this variant is that it sends debugging messages and necessary values to a Slack channel via a WebHook. Upon execution, it sends "+++ I am started +++", as well as a heartbeat message "~~~ I am alive ~~~" approximately every second during tunneling authentication.
DWAgent
DWAgent is a remote administration tool that is frequently exploited by threat actors, including ransomware and APT groups, to easily access compromised endpoints with minimal risk of detection. Kimsuky is one of the threat actors that uses this tool in its operations.
We observed that the group delivered DWAgent in at least two ways. The first involved delivering a compressed file containing DWAgent, along with separate commands, to a host infected with httpMalice for installation. The second method involved creating a separate installer.
This installer is very similar to the Reger Dropper. It uses the same RC4 key and has a similar code structure. It includes an archived binary and a legitimate unrar.exe binary, both encrypted with RC4. When executed, the installer decrypts the archived binary and saves it as 1.zip in the C:\ProgramData directory. It also creates an unrar.exe file in the same location using the decrypted unrar.exe binary. The dropper then uses the command C:\programdata\unrar.exe x C:\programdata\1.zip C:\programdata\ to extract the contents of the ZIP file. Finally, it executes the commands necessary to install DWService as a service on the target host:
The compressed file contains a pre-packaged, ready-to-use DWAgent, as well as a predefined config file. The actor deployed the agent with a config.json file linked to their own account to covertly control the device. As a result, the remote session is immediately activated by the above command, granting the attacker control.
The predefined config file is as follows. Note that the servers are legitimate DWAgent relay servers.
For years, Kimsuky has relied heavily on the South Korea-based free domain hosting service 내도메인[.]한국 (pronounced as “naedomain[.]hankook) to mimic legitimate sites with domains like .p-e.kr, .o-r.kr, .n-e.kr, .r-e.kr, and .kro.kr. This service has been utilized to create C2 servers for PebbleDash and AppleSeed clusters, and the background infrastructures have been mostly resolved to the virtual private servers belonging to InterServer. It has also been noted that many other malicious actors have exploited this free domain hosting service, so it alone cannot be considered proof of a connection to Kimsuky.
The actor also occasionally exploits South Korean websites as C2 servers to evade network-IoC-based detection and increase the success rate of attacks. Furthermore, they actively leverage tunneling services such as Cloudflare Quick Tunnels, VSCode Tunneling, and Ngrok to hide their infrastructure. These traits are mostly observed across the PebbleDash cluster.
Victims
We identified multiple infection logs uploaded to the Dropbox storage used for httpMalice’s C2 server. They were analyzed as having been stolen from infected systems across various organizations or individuals in South Korea. Notably, each victim’s folder contained a user.txt file with detailed information such as target details, the presence of something named “http” (possibly a backdoor, such as httpTroy or httpMalice), DWAgent existence, and relationships between infected devices and targets. While we could not verify the exact creation process of these files, they were likely created manually by attackers to manage victims using Korean words.
Below you can see an example of this type of file content. In this context, “장악” means “take over” and “있음” means “exists”.
While both clusters have mainly focused on targeting the private and public sectors in South Korea, the AppleSeed malware cluster shows more interest in government entities. The PebbleDash cluster has also shown particular interest in the defense sector worldwide.
Attribution
Over the past few years, we have observed two clusters using overlapping distribution methods – JSE, EXE, SCR, and PIF droppers. The targets are also increasingly aligning. Furthermore, we noted that several samples from both malware clusters were signed with the same stolen certificate and used identical mutex patterns. These findings suggest that a single actor is likely controlling both clusters and has the capability to modify code as needed. This concept was also described in another research paper at the Virus Bulletin conference.
Since its emergence, AppleSeed has been linked to Kimsuky operations, with each variant showing ties to the group. Since 2021, PebbleDash has been found exclusively in Kimsuky attacks. Based on our analysis of targets, infrastructure, and malware characteristics, we assess with medium-high confidence that attacks associated with these malware families are conducted by Kimsuky-affiliated clusters.
These two clusters share technical links to the threat actor known as Ruby Sleet, one of the names Microsoft uses for Kimsuky activity. In previous reports, Mandiant also referred to these clusters as Cerium, but now they appear to consider them part of the broader APT43 designation – another name for Kimsuky.
Conclusion
Our analysis shows that the actor retains access to the original source code of the malware clusters and the ability to modify it. Over time, malware undergoes updates and modifications, sometimes being repurposed or reused by other actors. Although analyzing malware may seem repetitive and time-consuming, understanding how these tools evolve helps us grasp the threat actor’s changing tactics.
Two clusters have overlapping target sectors that span the defense, military, government, medical, machinery, and energy industries. The AppleSeed cluster is shifting its focus to data exfiltration, and GPKI certificate extraction has become a signature capability. Meanwhile, the PebbleDash cluster demonstrates advanced remote control capabilities and an expanding set of targets.
Although AI may offer full automation for some attacks, many groups stick with the tools and strategies they have used for years. Structuring a fully automated attack is not trivial. Despite ongoing changes, we will continue to track advanced threat actors by comprehensively considering malware, initial vectors, targets, post-exploitation activities, and ultimate goals.
Over the past few months, we have conducted an in-depth analysis of specific activity clusters of Kimsuky (aka APT43, Ruby Sleet, Black Banshee, Sparkling Pisces, Velvet Chollima, and Springtail), a prolific Korean-speaking threat actor. Our research revealed notable tactical shifts throughout multiple phases of the group’s latest campaigns.
Kimsuky has continuously introduced new malware variants based on the PebbleDash platform, a tool historically leveraged by the Lazarus Group but appropriated by Kimsuky since at least 2021. Our monitoring indicates various strategic updates to the group’s arsenal, including the use of VSCode Tunneling, Cloudflare Quick Tunnels, DWAgent, large language models (LLMs), and the Rust programming language. This expanding set of tools underscores the group’s ongoing adaptation and evolution.
Specifically, Kimsuky leveraged legitimate VSCode tunneling mechanisms to establish persistence and distributed the open-source DWAgent remote monitoring and management tool for post-exploitation activities. These activities affected various sectors in South Korea, impacting both public and private entities.
This article covers both previously undocumented attacks and a deeper technical analysis of incidents within this campaign that have been reported before — offering new insight beyond what has already been published.
Executive summary
Kimsuky obtains initial access to target systems by delivering spear-phishing emails containing malicious attachments disguised as documents. They also contact targets via messengers in some cases.
Kimsuky uses a variety of droppers in different formats, such as JSE, PIF, SCR, EXE, etc.
The droppers deliver malware mainly belonging to two big clusters: PebbleDash and AppleSeed. These clusters are considered the most technically advanced in the group’s toolset. The report covers the following PebbleDash malware: HelloDoor, httpMalice, MemLoad, httpTroy. It also covers AppleSeed and HappyDoor from AppleSeed cluster.
For post-exploitation activities Kimsuky uses legitimate tools Visual Studio Code (VSCode) and DWAgent. For VSCode, the attacker uses GitHub authentication method.
For hosting C2 infrastructure the group mainly uses domains registered at a free South Korean hosting provider. It also occasionally relies on hacked South Korean websites and tunneling tools, such as Ngrok or VSCode.
Kimsuky mainly targets South Korean entities. However, PebbleDash attacks were also seen in Brazil and Germany. This malware cluster focuses on defense sector, while AppleSeed most often targets government organizations.
Background
First identified by Kaspersky in 2013, Kimsuky has been active for over 10 years and is considered less technically proficient compared to other Korean-speaking APT groups. The group has targeted a wide range of entities and demonstrated capability in creating tailored spear-phishing emails. The group’s arsenal includes proprietary malware such as PebbleDash, BabyShark, AppleSeed, and RandomQuery, as well as open-source RATs like xRAT, XenoRAT, and TutRAT. This blog post examines the evolving PebbleDash-based malware (referred to as the PebbleDash cluster) and its connections to the AppleSeed-based malware (referred to as the AppleSeed cluster).
The PebbleDash and AppleSeed clusters are considered the most technically advanced in Kimsuky’s toolset. Since at least 2019, these clusters have masqueraded as legitimate documents and application installers, manifesting as JSE droppers or executables with .EXE, .SCR and .PIF extensions. Both are particularly adept at establishing backdoors and stealing information, and ongoing development of their variants has been observed. They even occasionally utilize stolen legitimate certificates from South Korean organizations to avoid detection.
Timeline of the AppleSeed and PebbleDash malware families
AppleSeed and PebbleDash have primarily targeted the public and private sectors in South Korea. The PebbleDash cluster has shown a particular interest in the medical, military and defense industries worldwide. The PebbleDash cluster compromised Brazilian and South Korean defense organizations throughout the past several years, as well as a German defense firm. In 2024, the South Korean government released a security advisory regarding the AppleSeed cluster, detailing how the malware was distributed by replacing a security software installer required to access a construction entity’s website.
Initial access
Kimsuky meticulously crafts and delivers spear-phishing emails to its targets in an attempt to entice them into opening attachments. According to recent research, the group also occasionally approaches targets by contacting them via messengers. In all cases, the initial contact leads to the delivery of a malicious attachment disguised as a document. These attachments often consist of compressed files containing droppers in formats such as .JSE, .EXE, .PIF, or .SCR. The filenames are consistent with the message content and are meant to convince the recipient to open the attachment. The malicious files are often disguised as product quotations, job offers, information guides, surveys, government documents, and personal photos.
Appendix Form No. 8 – Request for Access, Correction, Deletion, and Suspension of Processing of Personal Information (PIPA Enforcement Rules).hwp.jse
August 28, 2025
995a0a49ae4b244928b3f67e2bfd7a6e
HelloDoor
2
2026년 상반기 국내대학원 석사야간과정 위탁교육생 선발관련 서류.hwpx.jse
Documents for the Selection of Commissioned Students for Domestic Graduate School Master’s Evening Programs (H1 2026).hwpx.jse
December 14, 2025
52f1ff082e981cbdfd1f045c6021c63f
httpMalice
3
security_20260126.scr
–
January 26, 2026
65fc9f06de5603e2c1af9b4f288bb22c
Reger Dropper, MemLoad, httpTroy
4
노현정님.pdf.jse
Ms. Noh Hyun-jung.pdf.jse
January 28, 2026
8e15c4d4f71bdd9dbc48cd2cabc87806
AppleSeed chain
5
대국민서비스관리운영체계현장점검증적(초안).pif
On-site Inspection Evidence for the Public Service Management System (Draft).pif
February 5, 2026
8983ffa6da23e0b99ccc58c17b9788c7
Pidoc Dropper, HappyDoor
JSE droppers contain a minimum of two Base64-encoded blobs: one serving as a benign lure file and one or more containing malicious code. Additional blobs may exist within the dropper, but they are unused. The two blobs are decoded using JScript and stored in an arbitrary location on disk, such as C:\ProgramData, with the malicious filenames randomly generated according to the scheme [random]{7}.[random]{4}. The lure file is opened immediately. The malicious payload leverages powershell.exe -windowstyle hidden certutil -decode [src path] [dst path] for the second Base64 decoding before execution. Ultimately, the malicious payload is executed via command-line instructions such as regsvr32.exe /s [file path] or rundll32.exe [file path] [export function].
Reger Dropper (.SCR) and Pidoc Dropper (.PIF) also contain benign lure files and malicious payloads that, in both cases, are encrypted using XOR operations. Specifically, Reger Dropper employs a hard-coded key #RsfsetraW#@EsfesgsgAJOPj4eml;, while Pidoc Dropper utilizes single-byte XOR with 0xFF to decrypt the internal data for execution. Pidoc Dropper is fully obfuscated using dummy data and encrypted strings. Both droppers deploy files in specific directories such as %temp% or C:\ProgramData before executing the malware using regsvr32.exe.
In addition to these droppers, Kimsuky employed a variety of executable droppers, including those crafted in Go or packaged with Inno Setup.
Deployed malware
In this section, we describe several malware families recently dropped by the droppers discussed above.
HelloDoor: first Rust-based PebbleDash variant
Written in Rust, a programming language rarely used by Kimsuky, HelloDoor is a DLL-based backdoor first identified in August 2025. It is deployed via a malicious JSE dropper. Since it has limited capabilities and a simplistic communication mechanism, the backdoor is most probably in the early stages of development. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that HelloDoor employs a C2 server hosted through TryCloudflare, a temporary tunneling service provided by Cloudflare. This service allows users to expose a local web service to the internet with no setup or account, making the infrastructure behind it difficult to trace.
HelloDoor establishes persistence upon execution by registering itself to the HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run key with the value name tdll and the command regsvr32.exe /s [current file path].
The implant communicates with the C2 server (hxxp://female-disorder-beta-metropolitan.trycloudflare[.]com/index.php) over the HTTP protocol. Depending on whether the process is executing with an elevated token, it binds to a specific local port: 5555 if the token is elevated, or 5554 if not. Before initiating communication, it generates a unique identifier by collecting device information, such as the MAC address, computer name, and the string “windows”, then computes a hash value from this information.
The malware then constructs a query string in the format aaaaaaaaaa=2&bbbbbbbbbb=[the unique identifier]&cccccccccc=1, which is a traditional format used across the PebbleDash cluster. Subsequent server responses are Base64-decoded and then decrypted using RC4 with the key fwr3errsettwererfs. The decrypted content contains command strings. Possible commands are:
Command
Description
“mcd”
Set the current directory
“msleep”
Sleep for the provided time
“install”
Register the regsvr32.exe /s [the provided file path] command to the HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run autorun registry using the install value name
[command]
Execute the provided command using chcp 65001 > nul & cmd /U /C [command]
Though interesting, it is no longer surprising that we found comments in the code that appear to have been generated by an LLM service rather than a human developer. This is based on traces that include emojis used for logging debugging messages.
✅ Port is now listening (no accepting)
❌ Port is already in use
🔍 regsvr32.exe detected as parent. Attempting to terminate...
This is a common trait of LLM services that provides users with better visibility. We previously observed similar comments in the PowerShell-based stealer suite used by BlueNoroff. HelloDoor’s simple structure and the fact that no other Rust-based malware from the group has been discovered yet support our claim.
Even though the code is believed to have been developed using an LLM service, we still found some typos and grammatical errors, such as:
result send fail (grammatically incorrect text)
server request fail (grammatically incorrect text)
It is likely that the flawed comments were added manually before or after AI was used.
httpMalice: latest backdoor variant of PebbleDash
The latest PebbleDash-based backdoor, httpMalice, emerged no later than December 2025 and is deployed by the JSE Dropper. Although we found limited direct connections to both the AppleSeed and PebbleDash clusters, the malware is closer to PebbleDash. The following shared characteristics have been identified:
(PebbleDash cluster) Ability to run commands received from the C2 server with the S-1-12-12288 SID, indicating a high integrity level – a feature also observed in PebbleDash and httpTroy.
(PebbleDash cluster) Unique identifier generated by combining the volume serial number of the root directory with the elevation status of the current token, mirroring a technique used since the appearance of NikiDoor.
(PebbleDash cluster) Communication with its C2 server utilizing three HTTP parameters, consistent with other PebbleDash-based families.
(PebbleDash cluster) Core command set more closely aligned with PebbleDash than with AppleSeed-based malware.
(AppleSeed cluster) Use of the m= parameter in C2 communication.
(AppleSeed cluster) Gathering system details using PowerShell and Windows commands similar to those found in AppleSeed and Troll Stealer.
Our analysis revealed two distinct versions of httpMalice based on their C2 communications: version 1.9 communicates over HTTP and version 1.8 uses Dropbox. The latter, the older variant, leverages the Dropbox API by utilizing pre-defined application credentials. Unlike its predecessor, the HTTP variant employs HTTP/HTTPS protocols to interact with its C2 server and maintains persistent access to the victim device through a Windows service named CacheDB. This mirrors tactics observed in similar threats, such as httpSpy.
The more recent variant gathers critical information from the compromised system, such as the current directory path, volume serial numbers, user privileges, username, local IP address, and the name and size of the currently executed httpMalice DLL file. It then combines the root drive’s volume serial number with the user’s access token privilege level to create a unique identifier for each infected system, formatted as [volume serial]{8}_[elevation status].
Value of elevation status
Description
0
Running under the SYSTEM account with an elevated token
1
Running under an elevated administrator account
2
Running without elevation
Depending on the token privilege, the backdoor then establishes persistence by either creating a service or registering itself to autostart at user logon. If the token is elevated, a service named CacheDB is created that executes the command cmd.exe /c “rundll32.exe [current DLL path], load”. The service’s display name is set to Administrator, and its description is defined as CacheDB Service. If the token is not elevated, the backdoor registers the same command under the registry key HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run with the value name Everything 1.9a-[filesize]. The older version used Everything 1.8a-[filesize] as a value name.
The latest version can execute a combination of Windows commands by default to perform host profiling, while the older version fetches the command set from Dropbox. In httpMalice, commands are mostly executed using the format cmd.exe /c chcp 949 [command] > [temporary filename], which redirects the output to separate files, with the consistent prefix 2Ato6478s added to their names. The chcp 949 command changes the code page to 949, indicating that the malware targets users of the Korean language (EUC-KR charset).
Windows commands used to gather system details
httpMalice transmits the result of host profiling to its C2 server as a URL parameter, using the POST method over the HTTP/HTTPS protocol, with the header x-www-form-urlencoded. The URL includes two or three parameters: operation mode, unique identifier (referred to as UID), and data. The operation mode, or parameter m, supports the following values:
Value
Description
1
Send the session identifier (parameter s) along with the current state (parameter a)
2
Request command
3
Send result after executing the command (parameter d)
8
Request directory to be archived and sent
9
Send the archived directory
10
Send a message like “.cmd” or “.tmp” (parameter d)
11
Send ping
12
Send the captured screenshot (parameter d)
13
Send the infected device information (parameter d)
As shown in the table above, the mode is set to 13 at the host profiling stage. The UID is formatted as [volume serial]{8}_[elevation status], and the data contains the ChaCha20-encrypted and Base64-encoded output of the command set stored in the temporary file. The resulting URL format is: m=13&u=[volume serial]{8}_[elevation status]&d=[Chacha20 encrypted + Base64-encoded data to be sent].
The key and nonce used for ChaCha20 encryption are derived from the pointer address of the buffer, resulting in nearly randomized keys. To ensure proper decryption on the attacker side, the nonce and key values are appended after the encrypted data, and the combined blob is then Base64-encoded. The counter is initialized to 0. The following figure illustrates how the encrypted data is structured after performing Base64 decoding.
Structure of the ChaCha20-encrypted data blob
After sending the host profiling data, the backdoor continuously transmits a screen capture with mode 12 and a ping message with mode 11. Finally, it sends a session identifier, which is a combination of the current username and local IP address separated by an ‘@’ symbol. In this case, the mode is set to 1 and the a parameter (current state) is set to 0, indicating that the C2 operation has been activated. The following table provides other possible values of the a parameter:
Value
Description
0
httpMalice has been activated
1
httpMalice has been inactivated (upon command 9)
2
httpMalice has been removed (upon command 8)
The whole process from sending the host profile to the backdoor activation repeats every two minutes until the C2 server returns a “success!” message.
C2 communication sequence of httpMalice
When the backdoor receives the message from the C2 server, it creates two threads dedicated to processing commands and sending the current state, including the session identifier. The first thread receives a command from the C2 server. It requests a command by sending mode 2 and, if successful, immediately sends mode 10 along with the string “.cmd” in the d parameter.
The commands supported by httpMalice are as follows:
Command
Description
0
Do nothing
1
Execute the command with EUC-KR encoding
2
Download and extract the file to the infected device
3
Upload a directory to the C2 server after it has been archived
5
Get the current directory
6
Set the current directory
7
Execute the command without setting a EUC-KR character set
8
Remove its persistence traces and exit the process
9
Hibernate
10
Execute the command using the provided session ID
12
Capture the screen
13
Load the downloaded payload into memory
MemLoad downloads httpTroy
Since early 2025, we have observed several versions of MemLoad; specifically, MemLoad V2 emerged in March, and V3 appeared by September. The payload that began being deployed through the Reger Dropper this year has been identified as an updated variant of MemLoad, slightly modified from the V3 version (referred to internally as MemLoader.dll).
Kimsuky leverages MemLoad to evade detection of its final backdoor and to carefully assess the value of targeted systems through anti-VM checks and reconnaissance. Upon installation, it requests an additional payload from the C2 server, executing it reflectively in memory if deemed suitable. Notably, all versions of MemLoad V2 and later use the same RC4 key.
Below are the key operations of MemLoad:
Creates a flag file. Creates a file containing a random eight-character string from the set 0123456789abcdefABCDEF with another random eight-character string as the name and “.dat.cfg” extension at the current file path.
Generates an ID. Generates an ID value by adding either ‘A-‘ or ‘U-‘ to the beginning of the random bytes. The choice of symbol is determined by attempting to create a random file in the C:\Windows\system32 directory. If successful, the ID starts with ‘A-‘ (indicating administrative privileges); otherwise, it starts with ‘U-‘.
Persistence via a scheduled task. Checks for the existence of the .dat.cfg file, and if confirmed, a scheduled task is set up for persistence. The task name is determined by whether the process is running with elevated privileges. If elevated, the task is named ChromeCheck, and the command
schtasks/create/tn<task name>/tr"regsvr32 /s <current file path>"/sc minute/mo1/rl highest/f is executed. Otherwise, the task is named EdgeCheck, and the command
schtasks/create/tn<task name>/tr"regsvr32 /s <current file path>"/sc minute/mo1/f is executed.
C2 communication and payload download. Requests an additional payload from its C2 server, with the header Authorization: Bearer {ID} or X-Browser-Validation: {ID} for authentication. The ID is set to the previously generated ID value.
Payload decryption and execution. Once the download is successful, the payload is decrypted using the RC4 algorithm with the key #RsfsetraW#@EsfesgsgAJOPj4eml;. The decrypted payload is then reflectively loaded into memory, and its hello export function is invoked.
The payload downloaded and executed by MemLoad is identified as the httpTroy backdoor. This backdoor serves as the primary role for long-term access and data exfiltration. Similar to MemLoad, it employs stealth techniques by creating a flag file and writing eight random bytes to it. However, in this case the file is created at [current file path]:HUI in the ADS (Alternative Data Stream) area. The backdoor then checks its privileges to determine if it is elevated and assigns an ID value in the format A-[random-8-chars] or U-[random-8-chars].
Since Gen Digital covers httpTroy’s features and functionality in detail elsewhere, we will not provide a thorough explanation here to avoid redundancy. Instead, we will simply note that it communicates with the C2 server at hxxps://file.bigcloud.n-e[.]kr/index.php.
AppleSeed
AppleSeed first appeared in 2019 and reached version 3.0. However, we now only see version 2.1. It originally consisted of two components: a dropper and the main AppleSeed. Since 2022, the updated AppleSeed chain has involved two droppers, an additional component referred to as the installer, and the main payload. It is mostly delivered through JSE Dropper.
Updated AppleSeed infection chain
There are two versions of the main AppleSeed: Dropper and Spy. The Dropper variant is responsible for downloading additional malware and executing commands received from its C2 server, while the Spy version gathers sensitive information such as documents, screenshots, keystrokes, and lists of USB drives. A notable change in version 2.1 is the inclusion, since 2022, of collecting the C:\GPKI directory – functionality that is also implemented in Troll Stealer. This directory contains a digital certificate used by the South Korean government to securely authenticate public officials and government systems.
HappyDoor
HappyDoor, an AppleSeed-based backdoor malware disclosed by AhnLab in 2024, is less visible than AppleSeed. HappyDoor shares several features with AppleSeed, including the same string obfuscation algorithm, the data types it collects, and the use of RSA encryption. Given these similarities, we assess with medium confidence that HappyDoor is an advanced variant evolved from AppleSeed.
Post-exploitation
We observed interesting post-exploitation activities involving VSCode and DWAgent. All of the observed VSCode droppers used the same lure files as the PebbleDash malware cluster. While we are unsure of the exact reason for this strategy, we suspect that the actor prepared both PebbleDash and VSCode droppers in anticipation of the PebbleDash infection chain being detected by security products because of its backdoor capabilities. In contrast, the use of VSCode is designed to have fewer detection points.
VSCode (launched by the JSE dropper)
Since last year, Kimsuky has been leveraging the legitimate Visual Studio Code Remote Tunneling feature to establish covert remote access to the victim’s device, bypassing detection designed for traditional malware-based C2 channels (first described by Darktrace researchers). In these attacks, instead of dropping malware, the JSE dropper downloads a legitimate Visual Studio Code (VSCode) CLI onto the infected device. The script establishes persistence by creating a tunnel via the application, with the tunnel name “bizeugene”, using the command below.
The Remote Tunneling feature in VSCode supports establishing a tunnel using either a Microsoft or GitHub account. When the code tunnel command is executed, the CLI initiates an authentication flow and returns a login URL along with a device code. The user must then navigate to the URL, enter the device code, and authenticate with their account. Once authentication is successful, the tunnel is created and the CLI outputs a URL for tunneling that enables browser-based access to the remote host.
The GitHub authentication method is selected in this instance because GitHub is configured as the default provider in non-interactive execution contexts. By using echo |, the script injects a \r\n (Carriage Return and Line Feed) into the standard input stream, effectively confirming the default prompt selection without manual interaction. As a result, the CLI automatically initiates the GitHub authentication flow. Next, all CLI output that includes a login URL and a device code is saved to out.txt.
Out.txt content
The JScript code in the JSE dropper monitors the out.txt file for a URL that begins with hxxps://vscode[.]dev/tunnel. This URL contains the full address of the established tunnel. Once detected, the file content containing the URL and the device code is sent to a compromised legitimate South Korean website (hxxps://www.yespp.co[.]kr/common/include/code/out[.]php) using the HTTP POST method. The request contains the file contents in the application/x-www-form-urlencoded header data formatted as out=URLencoded{result of the command}&token=URLencoded{"bizeugene"}. After authentication is complete, the attacker can access the compromised host externally through a web browser by authenticating with their own GitHub account.
VSCode (launched by VSCode installer)
While searching our telemetry for artifacts related to a different infection, we identified a new VSCode tunnel installer written in Go. A previous version of this installer was implemented using JScript and was limited to secure channels because of its reliance on a specific tunnel name. The new variant, named vscode_payload by the developer based on the embedded Go path, is fully operational and supports every tunnel on each targeted device. It includes features that are nearly identical to those of the previous version, such as downloading, unarchiving, and executing the VSCode CLI.
After the VSCode CLI file has been successfully downloaded, it is unzipped into the C:\Users\Public directory, and the extracted code.exe is executed with the tunnel command.
This is how the installer works:
Executes code.exe tunnel.
Searches for the “Microsoft Account” string in the stdout.
Sends the 0x1B 0x5B 0x42 (Down Arrow) and 0x0A (Enter) escape sequence to the pseudo-terminal, which enables tunnel creation via a GitHub account.
Searches for the “use code” string in the stdout.
Sends the printed code for authentication, prepended with the “hxxps://github[.]com/login/device” => prefix. The attacker authorizes Visual Studio Code with the logged-in GitHub account using the printed code.
Searches for the “What would you like to call this machine?” string in the stdout.
Sends the 0x0A escape sequence to the pseudo-terminal to use the current machine name as the identifier.
Searches for the “https://vscode.dev/tunnel/” string in the stdout.
Sends the printed URL for tunneling to the Slack WebHook.
The following figure illustrates the sequence for creating a tunnel using the VSCode CLI. Red boxes highlight the strings that the installer searches for. Yellow boxes indicate standard input operations sent from the installer using escape sequences. Sky blue boxes represent the values that are necessary to create the tunnel on the attacker’s side. (The “Microsoft Account” string in the second step is not shown in this figure because the second “GitHub Account” was already selected during the process.)
Creating a tunnel using VSCode CLI
Once the process is complete, the attacker can access the targeted host through the tunnel on their remote machine using their GitHub account via a browser or VSCode. The targeted device then begins communicating with Microsoft-owned servers without the user realizing that the communication is from an attacker.
An interesting feature of this variant is that it sends debugging messages and necessary values to a Slack channel via a WebHook. Upon execution, it sends "+++ I am started +++", as well as a heartbeat message "~~~ I am alive ~~~" approximately every second during tunneling authentication.
DWAgent
DWAgent is a remote administration tool that is frequently exploited by threat actors, including ransomware and APT groups, to easily access compromised endpoints with minimal risk of detection. Kimsuky is one of the threat actors that uses this tool in its operations.
We observed that the group delivered DWAgent in at least two ways. The first involved delivering a compressed file containing DWAgent, along with separate commands, to a host infected with httpMalice for installation. The second method involved creating a separate installer.
This installer is very similar to the Reger Dropper. It uses the same RC4 key and has a similar code structure. It includes an archived binary and a legitimate unrar.exe binary, both encrypted with RC4. When executed, the installer decrypts the archived binary and saves it as 1.zip in the C:\ProgramData directory. It also creates an unrar.exe file in the same location using the decrypted unrar.exe binary. The dropper then uses the command C:\programdata\unrar.exe x C:\programdata\1.zip C:\programdata\ to extract the contents of the ZIP file. Finally, it executes the commands necessary to install DWService as a service on the target host:
The compressed file contains a pre-packaged, ready-to-use DWAgent, as well as a predefined config file. The actor deployed the agent with a config.json file linked to their own account to covertly control the device. As a result, the remote session is immediately activated by the above command, granting the attacker control.
The predefined config file is as follows. Note that the servers are legitimate DWAgent relay servers.
For years, Kimsuky has relied heavily on the South Korea-based free domain hosting service 내도메인[.]한국 (pronounced as “naedomain[.]hankook) to mimic legitimate sites with domains like .p-e.kr, .o-r.kr, .n-e.kr, .r-e.kr, and .kro.kr. This service has been utilized to create C2 servers for PebbleDash and AppleSeed clusters, and the background infrastructures have been mostly resolved to the virtual private servers belonging to InterServer. It has also been noted that many other malicious actors have exploited this free domain hosting service, so it alone cannot be considered proof of a connection to Kimsuky.
The actor also occasionally exploits South Korean websites as C2 servers to evade network-IoC-based detection and increase the success rate of attacks. Furthermore, they actively leverage tunneling services such as Cloudflare Quick Tunnels, VSCode Tunneling, and Ngrok to hide their infrastructure. These traits are mostly observed across the PebbleDash cluster.
Victims
We identified multiple infection logs uploaded to the Dropbox storage used for httpMalice’s C2 server. They were analyzed as having been stolen from infected systems across various organizations or individuals in South Korea. Notably, each victim’s folder contained a user.txt file with detailed information such as target details, the presence of something named “http” (possibly a backdoor, such as httpTroy or httpMalice), DWAgent existence, and relationships between infected devices and targets. While we could not verify the exact creation process of these files, they were likely created manually by attackers to manage victims using Korean words.
Below you can see an example of this type of file content. In this context, “장악” means “take over” and “있음” means “exists”.
While both clusters have mainly focused on targeting the private and public sectors in South Korea, the AppleSeed malware cluster shows more interest in government entities. The PebbleDash cluster has also shown particular interest in the defense sector worldwide.
Attribution
Over the past few years, we have observed two clusters using overlapping distribution methods – JSE, EXE, SCR, and PIF droppers. The targets are also increasingly aligning. Furthermore, we noted that several samples from both malware clusters were signed with the same stolen certificate and used identical mutex patterns. These findings suggest that a single actor is likely controlling both clusters and has the capability to modify code as needed. This concept was also described in another research paper at the Virus Bulletin conference.
Since its emergence, AppleSeed has been linked to Kimsuky operations, with each variant showing ties to the group. Since 2021, PebbleDash has been found exclusively in Kimsuky attacks. Based on our analysis of targets, infrastructure, and malware characteristics, we assess with medium-high confidence that attacks associated with these malware families are conducted by Kimsuky-affiliated clusters.
These two clusters share technical links to the threat actor known as Ruby Sleet, one of the names Microsoft uses for Kimsuky activity. In previous reports, Mandiant also referred to these clusters as Cerium, but now they appear to consider them part of the broader APT43 designation – another name for Kimsuky.
Conclusion
Our analysis shows that the actor retains access to the original source code of the malware clusters and the ability to modify it. Over time, malware undergoes updates and modifications, sometimes being repurposed or reused by other actors. Although analyzing malware may seem repetitive and time-consuming, understanding how these tools evolve helps us grasp the threat actor’s changing tactics.
Two clusters have overlapping target sectors that span the defense, military, government, medical, machinery, and energy industries. The AppleSeed cluster is shifting its focus to data exfiltration, and GPKI certificate extraction has become a signature capability. Meanwhile, the PebbleDash cluster demonstrates advanced remote control capabilities and an expanding set of targets.
Although AI may offer full automation for some attacks, many groups stick with the tools and strategies they have used for years. Structuring a fully automated attack is not trivial. Despite ongoing changes, we will continue to track advanced threat actors by comprehensively considering malware, initial vectors, targets, post-exploitation activities, and ultimate goals.
Modern phishing campaigns are no longer trying to convince users. They are trying to outrun them. By forcing an automatic progression from click to download, attackers eliminate the moment of hesitation entirely by forcing files to download instantly using trusted cloud platforms like Dropbox and Google Drive.
Detecting when these legitimate SaaS auto-download features are being weaponized is an immense challenge for traditional defenses. This is exactly where Cortex® Email Security steps in. By combining deep static analysis with advanced behavioral intelligence, the module can distinguish in this attack between a benign file share and a malicious, forced-momentum trigger.
This technical detection is vital because while the autodownload method is the primary cause of infection, its effectiveness relies on a clever strategy, using a wide range of changing social engineering lures. By alternating between lures like 'Invoices' or 'Quotes,' attackers rotate their themes to catch a wider variety of victims. This strategy allows attackers to convert trusted email links into rapid, dangerous file executions that effectively evade standard security measures.
How Forced Momentum Drives Auto-Downloads
The core of this attack leverages the infrastructure of real SaaS providers to eliminate the user's preview buffer. Typically, cloud sharing directs users to a webpage for file examination. In this campaign, however, forced-download parameters (such as ?dl=1 on Dropbox) are used instead. To ensure the victim executes the file once it lands on their machine, attackers hide the danger behind "visual anchors." By using double extensions like PDF and .EXE, the threat actor exploits default settings in certain operating systems that hide known extensions. The user's eyes stop at the familiar ".PDF" or ".ZIP," leading them to believe the file is a harmless document rather than a malicious executable.
When the targeted victim clicks the link in the email, it triggers an immediate file download in the browser, effectively bypassing any intermediary steps.
Attack Flow: From Email to Execution
The Bait: A highly personalized email arrives, using a trusted cloud link (like Dropbox) to lower the victim's guard.
The Trap: Clicking the link skips the usual "preview" screen and instantly drops a file onto the victim's computer.
The Disguise: The file is cleverly named to look like a safe PDF or document, hiding its true identity as a harmful program.
The Lock: In many cases, the attacker ensures only the intended victim can open the file, preventing security tools from scanning it first.
The Takeover: Once the victim opens the file, the attacker gains remote access to the system.
Multi-step attack flow, starting from targeted phishing email, to bypass security and establish persistence.
The Library of Lures Strategy
To fuel the autodownload machine, attackers employ a flexible strategy by switching between various social engineering themes. This spear phishing campaign targets specific inboxes, such as "Orders," to exploit professional routines. Some common lures found in this campaign include:
Financial Urgency – Fake "Invoices" or "Receipts" that induce anxiety. These often set close-day payment deadlines, pressuring recipients to click quickly.
Business Operations – "Quote Requests" or "Purchase Orders" that exploit professional habits.
Deceptive Naming – Concealing the download as a safe document, using display text like "invoice.pdf" in the email body to hide the underlying Dropbox URL.
Government Domain Impersonation
Attackers often leverage high-authority lures designed to paralyze a user's critical thinking. In one sophisticated wave, we observed threats impersonating a government entity by exploiting the high-reputation, official government domain. By borrowing the reputational authority associated with official infrastructure, the attacker successfully maneuvered an "Unidentified Payment Notice" past standard "Untrusted Sender" filters. To the recipient, the email carries the weight of a sanctioned document. Fearing legal or financial ramifications, they feel a heightened sense of urgency to click "View Invoice" to resolve the issue immediately.
Employee Impersonation
When government authority isn’t the angle, attackers shift to impersonating internal staff. In one case, the sender’s display name was spoofed to match a real employee in the target organization. Attackers rely on a “Momentum of Trust” tied to familiar names to overwhelm user judgment. Even when a generic Gmail address is used, users, especially those on mobile devices, rarely pause to check the underlying headers.
Internal Trust Amplification ("Human Relay")
The most effective aspect of this campaign occurs through Internal Laundering, where the threat shifts from external suspicion to a trusted internal message. This was observed when a Finance Department employee received a "Quote Analysis" file and, believing it to be a valid inquiry, mistakenly forwarded the link to the Procurement department.
At that stage, the attack no longer depended on deception, it propagated through trusted human workflows. These various tactics illustrate the sophistication and adaptability of phishing campaigns and highlight the importance of vigilance in email security.
How We Uncovered a Single Threat Actor
Although the lures appeared diverse, a deeper technical analysis revealed that they were all orchestrated by a single, coordinated threat actor.
By mapping the campaign, we uncovered a significant pattern: Each autodownload link pointed to a different file hash to evade signature detection, but all unique executables were ultimately associated with the same parent installer hash.
The file was identified as a specific Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) executable, an administrative software used to manage computers remotely. Because RMM tools are legitimate, they often trigger fewer alerts than traditional Trojans. This allows the attacker to maintain persistent access under the guise of “authorized” system activity.
How Cortex Email Security Addresses the Threat
To defend against a campaign that emphasizes speed and rotation, behavioral analysis is essential.
The Cortex® Email Security Module addresses this threat:
Advanced URL Analysis – Detection of forced-download parameters, combined with delivery of high-risk files via URLs.
Deep Metadata Correlation– Correlating sender identity with behavioral anomalies to flag threats that traditional scanners might overlook.
The security engine triggers an alert by synthesizing LLM analysis with real-time email telemetry, global threat intelligence and behavioral signals.
Securing the Click
The combination of autodownload links and rotating lures is crafted to exploit user momentum and the "psychology of trust."
This campaign represents a shift from deception to acceleration. Attackers no longer need perfect lures, they only need to remove friction. Defenders must evolve accordingly, focusing not only on what a link is, but on what it forces a user to do.
Palo Alto Networks Cortex Advanced Email Security was built for this evolution. By moving beyond static file analysis to identify the behavioral "red flags" of autodownloads and forced-momentum URLs, we provide the visibility needed to stop these attacks before they reach the device.
The module examines email metadata, content, and behavior to uncover hidden malicious intent and sophisticated impersonation, including AI-crafted threats. By assigning precise risk scores to every detection, the system filters out the noise, allowing analysts to move past alert fatigue and focus on the most critical threats first.
Why is the "Auto-Download" parameter so effective? It removes the "moment of doubt." By bypassing the preview page, the attacker forces the file onto the computer instantly, prompting the user to "Open" it out of habit.
How does the use of rotating lures benefit the attacker? It maximizes both psychological and technical success. People have different "blind spots" (e.g., finance professionals are likely to click on invoices), and variety increases the chances of finding a template that can bypass specific customers' security filters.
Why might a sandbox fail to catch the malicious file? Because the link was "Identity-Bound." To the scanner, the link appeared to lead to a harmless error page (cloaking), resulting in a false negative.
Cloaking involves showing different content to security scanners than what is presented to the victim. By using Identity-Bound access, the file only reveals itself to the intended target.
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