The FTC alleges that the company shared consumers’ sensitive health information with third‑party advertising platforms despite promising strong privacy protections.
Hims & Hers is a telehealth and digital health platform that connects users with licensed medical providers for online consultations, prescription medications, and personal care products.
The complaint also accuses Hims & Hers of deceptive billing and subscription practices that made it hard for users to avoid charges or cancel subscriptions.
According to the FTC’s complaint, filed in federal court in California, Hims & Hers:
Shared sensitive health data, including details about medical conditions, with ad platforms such as Meta and Snap despite privacy promises.
Charged before consultations. The company promised users they could consult a medical provider before being charged, but the FTC says many consumers were enrolled in recurring prescription subscriptions shortly after they submitted an intake form, often without first having a consultation.
Made cancellation difficult. Before 2023, cancellation reportedly required contacting customer service by phone, email, or chat. Even after an online cancellation option appeared, the FTC alleges the button was hidden behind multiple steps and confusing options.
From a cybersecurity and privacy research perspective, this isn’t just about a single telehealth brand. It highlights three broader trends we see repeatedly in consumer programs:
Privacy policies versus reality. A company can market itself as privacy‑focused while still integrating third‑party advertising and analytics software development kits (SDKs) that leak sensitive information. This becomes especially concerning when health‑related events are linked to user accounts or tracking cookies.
Friction as a feature. Hard‑to‑find cancellation flows and unclear billing practices are examples of “dark patterns” that nudge users into paying for services they might not have chosen given all relevant information.
Regulatory pressure is growing. Health‑related services are under increasing scrutiny, especially when they handle sensitive data and combine it with advertising platforms.
The court will ultimately decide whether Hims & Hers violated the law, but the FTC’s action sends a clear signal: regulators are paying close attention to how health‑related services collect, use, and share sensitive data.
For anyone who values online privacy, the Hims & Hers case is a reminder that “health tech” does not automatically mean “privacy first.”
How to stay safe
More often than not, the privacy loopholes are hidden in the privacy policy somewhere.
Pro tip: one thing AI is good at is reading between the lines. Ask an AI chatbot to summarize a privacy policy and identify when your information may be shared with third parties. AI makes it much easier to understand lengthy privacy policies without reading every word yourself. If companies fail to follow their own privacy policies, regulators and consumers can hold them accountable.
Other than that:
Don’t share sensitive information unless it’s genuinely needed to provide the service.
Use strong, unique passwords and multifactor authentication (MFA). Even if a company is compliant, breaches happen. Unique passwords and two‑factor authentication limit the damage if your account details are exposed.
Your name, address, and phone number may already be for sale.
Data brokers collect and sell your personal details to anyone willing to pay. Malwarebytes Personal Data Remover finds them and gets your information removed, then keeps watch so it stays that way.
Your phone rings, you pick up and say hello. On the other end: total silence. No one answers, and the call abruptly disconnects. If you don’t already use spam call blockers, you’ve almost certainly run into this situation before.
In most cases, these are scam calls. Today, we explain why these calls happen, what the callers want from you, and how to protect yourself. Most importantly, we’ll look at whether you even need to bother protecting yourself against them in the first place.
Who’s calling?
It’s not just scammers on the line — robots, legitimate call center operators, and ordinary folks make these calls too. Let’s break down each type of caller — ordered from best-case to worst-case scenario for your security.
Actual person
The most harmless scenario is that an actual person called you, but their microphone is acting up. Maybe they accidentally muted themselves with their ear, or their smartphone connected to a Bluetooth headset, speaker, or car system that isn’t capturing their voice. Carrier glitches can also mute one side of a call. The caller might have no idea there’s a problem — as far as they know, they are speaking, but no one can hear them. In cases like this, you usually recognize the incoming phone number.
If the call comes from an unknown number, there’s still no need to panic — though the list of those who might be calling gets much longer.
One legitimate possibility is a call center agent who simply didn’t pick up or connect their headset in time. Call center systems are designed to dial numbers faster than agents can wrap up their calls. The system tried to route the call to a human, but no reps were available. That’s why you sometimes have to wait a few seconds before hearing a single word, or why you might hear ringing tones as if you were the one making the call.
Robot or AI
Silence on the line is a common sign of robocalls. Robots test whether a phone number is active and, if it is, pass it along to a human — meaning a real sales rep (or scammer) will call you back in the next few days. It’s worth noting that scammers aren’t the only ones making these pinging calls. Legitimate call centers use the exact same tools to reduce the workload on their live agents.
An AI agent could also be behind the silent call. To the person answering, there’s no practical difference: the call looks identical to one made by a standard bot. However, AI can do more than just auto-dial numbers — it can analyze your response and use that data to decide whether your number is active and ready to be handed off to a live person for follow-up.
Unwanted caller
Now we get to the real threat. Perhaps one of the most dangerous and unpleasant sources of silent phone calls is a scammer. A quick, silent call like this can actually be the groundwork for a long, elaborate attack with cover stories about loans, government agencies, other fraudsters, even law enforcement.
Debt collectors might also be calling and staying quiet. Your number could end up on their radar if you, your family, or close contacts have outstanding debts. In these cases, a silent call is often used as a tactic for psychological pressure.
A similar technique is used in stalking. While silent calls cause no direct harm on their own, they can be leveraged to induce anxiety, create a feeling of being constantly watched, and cause ongoing emotional distress.
Why do they call and stay silent?
When you pick up, you likely respond out of habit with a quick “Hello?” or “Hi there.” That’s all it takes for the other party to gather a wealth of data. While this information used to be difficult to process, the rise of artificial intelligence has made the task significantly easier. Let’s look at what someone can learn about you from just one spoken word:
Region, accent, and location. Scammers are sophisticated and cunning. Their tactics are often tailored by region — targeting residents of specific countries or even regions within them. This is especially relevant in places like India or South Africa, which have 22 and 11 official languages, respectively.
Approximate age and gender. While a human listener might easily confuse a teenager’s voice with a young woman’s or misjudge someone’s age entirely, AI is far better at picking up on subtle vocal nuances. Knowing your age and gender helps scammers refine their playbook for future social engineering attacks.
Times you’re available. If you answer the phone in the morning, afternoon, or late at night, attackers can schedule their follow-up call during the exact time window when you’re most likely to pick up.
Likelihood of a successful attack. AI can automatically assess the potential value of a target. For instance, if someone answers quickly, speaks calmly, and doesn’t immediately hang up on unknown numbers, they’ll likely be assigned a higher priority for follow-up calls by live scam operators.
Back to the “why do they call and stay silent”, the main reason is to harvest biometric data. Just a few seconds of recorded audio can help cybercriminals create a voice deepfake. While one or two words might not yield a convincing clone on their own, attackers can stitch together recordings from multiple silent calls to build a believable replica.
This technology is already being used in real-world scams. Impersonating a relative, colleague, or boss, fraudsters can urgently ask you to send them money, to share a two-factor authentication code for government services, or to complete some other seemingly innocuous request. The more realistic the deepfake sounds, the harder it is to spot the scam — especially when backed by a convincing backstory.
What to do if you get a silent call?
If you answer a call, say a few words, and hang up, there’s no need to panic. However, that brief interaction can confirm to attackers that your number is active and that you’ll answer calls from unknown numbers. As a result, your phone number could end up on target lists for future spam or scam campaigns. That said, it’s important to remember that a single silent call poses no immediate security threat.
Here are a few tips to help you stay calm and avoid falling for scam tactics if those silent calls are becoming a problem:
Don’t answer calls from unknown or hidden numbers. Here’s a helpful tip: if someone genuinely needs to reach you, they’ll find another way to do so, or keep calling from the exact same number at various times. Scammers almost always dial from different numbers, while automated bots operate on a rigid schedule — like calling every day at precisely 8:05 AM.
Don’t rush to call back. Scammers often count on proactive victims who are curious enough to return calls from unfamiliar numbers. On top of that, calling back could end up costing you money if it’s a premium-rate number.
Don’t speak first. Wait for the caller to greet you before starting a conversation. If you hear muffled noise or complete silence on the line, hang up and save yourself the hassle — it’s likely a scam.
Block unknown numbers — even after the call. If you picked up and realized the call could be risky, it’s best to block the number right away. You can use the built-in features on most modern smartphones to do this.
Don’t share your number everywhere. Phishing sites, fly-by-night web pages, and sketchy giveaways often exist solely to collect your personal data. When filling out forms online, it doesn’t hurt to use a burner or secondary number.
Get a second phone number. Separate your daily life between two numbers. Use your main line strictly for family, friends, and work contacts, and reserve the secondary line for deliveries, online marketplaces, and general web sign-ups.
Reddit users found that by using a specific Google search query, it was possible to find Claude conversations that users had shared.
This exposed sensitive material, including crypto wallet keys, names, addresses, work notes, and even erotic or otherwise policy-violating chats. Fortune says Anthropic appears to have fixed the Google indexing issue, but the shared links themselves were still live for people who already had them.
The exposure was tied to Claude’s Share feature, which creates a public web link to a snapshot of a conversation rather than leaving it inside a user’s private account. Reddit users found a search query that surfaced many of these shared chats, plus Claude Artifacts (interactive documents, apps, and other content created by Claude) in Google results. Wired reports that this is still true for Bing.
The main risk is that people use chatbots to think through work, health, legal, or personal matters without realizing that a shared link can behave like ordinary public web content.
Anthropic says Claude chats are private by default, and only conversations users explicitly chose to share were affected. But the incident is a reminder that a “share” button on an AI chat can be more like publishing than messaging, especially if search engines can discover the resulting URL.
How to stay safe
The easy way out here is not to share your AI chatbot conversations with anyone, because you could end up reaching more people than you intended.
That’s because it’s harder to stop pages from being indexed than you might expect. And you don’t have those controls aren’t in your hands. The AI provider should take care of that.
To review or stop sharing conversations in Claude, go to Settings > Privacy > Shared chats.
If you’re using an AI service from a social media company, such as Meta AI, Grok, or Gemini), remember that your conversations could be tied to your account—which might contain a lot of personal information.
When using AI, make sure you understand how to keep your conversations private. Many services offer temporary or incognito chats that aren’t saved to your history, but they aren’t a guarantee against bugs, leaks, or data breaches. Only use the share feature when you’re comfortable with anyone potentially seeing that conversation.
Read the privacy policy so you understand how your conversations are stored and shared. If it’s too long, you can always ask an AI to summarise the important points.
Let’s face it, an incognito window can only do so much.
Breaches, dark web trading, credit fraud. Malwarebytes Identity Theft Protection monitors for all of it, alerts you fast, and comes with identity theft insurance.
A prayer app launched by Pope Francis in 2019 contained a security flaw that exposed the personal information of hundreds of thousands of users before it was finally fixed this year.
The app, Click To Pray, was developed by La Machi Communication for Good Causes for the Pope’s Worldwide Prayer Network. Pope Francis endorsed the service and had an account on it. The app offers a “digital community of prayer” by guiding people through three prayers each day.
In January this year, independent researcher BobDaHacker discovered a flaw in the app’s API endpoint. An API is an online service that responds to requests for data. Typically, only the mobile app should send such requests, and the API should only return information about the specific person using that app. However, BobDaHacker found it was giving out information about any of the app’s users to anyone who asked.
Apps typically query an endpoint by sending it a specific ID for the person using it. In this case, those IDs were simply sequential numbers. According to BobDaHacker, there were 719,517 registered IDs for the app, meaning over 700,000 users had information stored in the system.
The problem was that the API didn’t check whether someone requesting a record was actually authorised to see it. Anyone could request information for any ID, from 1 through to 719,517. The API would then return that user’s record, including:
Email address
First and last names
Country
Date of birth
This kind of flaw is known as an Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) and we’ve seen it before. Stalkerware-type app TheTruthSpy was found leaking details on its victims via an IDOR vulnerability in 2022, and it still hadn’t been fixed two years later. The web server for the MiCODUS MV720 vehicle-tracking GPS device also had the vulnerability in 2022, putting 1.5 million people at risk.
A second flaw in the Click To Pray API made things worse. When people register with an app, the service typically sends a link to their email address containing a unique code known as a validation hash. Clicking the link proves they have access to that inbox and therefore own the email address they registered with.
Unfortunately, the Click To Pray API also returned the validation hash in its response when someone clicked the verification link. These responses are easy to inspect using a web browser’s developer tools, meaning an attacker could register an account using an email address they didn’t control and verify it before the real owner even saw the verification email.
Six months, nine contacts, zero replies
BobDaHacker first reported the bug on January 3, 2026, eventually emailing nine addresses spanning the Click To Pray service, the Pope’s Worldwide Prayer Network, and a general information address. They got no response. It was only fixed more than six months later after the researcher contacted a journalist, who filed a query with the Vatican.
Responsible disclosure only works when the recipient has a functioning intake process. Nine unanswered emails were a strong signal that no such process existed.
Not the first security flaw in a Vatican app
This isn’t the first security flaw involving a Vatican app. In 2019, UK firm Fidus Information Security found a flaw in the app for the Vatican’s Bluetooth eRosary device. It didn’t use a conventional password for logins. Instead, users entered their email address and the app sent a four-digit PIN to that address. They then entered the PIN to log in.
However, when the user entered their email address, the app also returned the PIN in plain text in its web response. That enabled an attacker to take over anyone’s account simply by inspecting the response.
That flaw was similar to the account verification issue that BobDaHacker discovered more than six years later. Although the incidents involved different apps, they show how the same type of security mistake can reappear years apart.
BobDaHacker also noted that Vatican City State introduced its own data protection regulation, Decree No. DCLVII, on April 30, 2024. The regulation requires appropriate safeguards for personal data. However, it’s not clear whether it applies directly to Click To Pray or the organisations that operate it.
What users can do now
Thankfully, someone on the Vatican side has now fixed the flaws, but the vulnerability meant that user data was exposed for a long time. If you registered an account, assume your email, name, date of birth, and country are potentially in circulation. Watch for phishing that references the app, and be especially skeptical of messages claiming to come from Vatican-affiliated services asking you to click, verify, or log in.
This is particularly important because BobDaHacker also reported that emails from the service failed standard email authentication checks. These checks help receiving email providers verify that a message really came from the domain it claims to represent. According to the researcher, this could make it easier for phishing attackers to impersonate the organisation.
Your name, address, and phone number may already be for sale.
Data brokers collect and sell your personal details to anyone willing to pay. Malwarebytes Personal Data Remover finds them and gets your information removed, then keeps watch so it stays that way.
Twenty years ago, a British mathematician named Clive Humby popularized a phrase that came to describe data’s relationship with the entire global economy: “Data is the new oil.”
Pithy as the phrase sounds, it is undeniably true.
Data steers decisions at businesses of every size. Data created entirely new industries built around its capture. And, for a select number of companies, data has produced billions—if not trillions—of dollars in value.
So how is it that, on the dark web, your stolen identity can be purchased for just 95 cents?
That’s what a Malwarebytes researcher found last month after spending 48 hours inside the dark web to investigate cybercrime. Across a variety of forums and directories, he found subscription plans for malware that steals information once implanted on a device. He found guides for deploying social engineering scams. He found people selling their services to build fake websites that trick people into handing over their usernames and passwords. And he found one of the dark web’s most traded commodities—personal data, packaged together about individual people, to help a cybercriminal commit identity fraud.
These packages are called “fullz.” For victims in the United States, a fullz contains a full name, Social Security Number, date of birth, address, and other personal details. That is enough, on its own, for a cybercriminal to potentially open a bogus line of credit, file a fake tax return, access financial accounts, or obtain medical services under someone else’s name.
As we wrote on Malwarebytes Labs:
“For less than the cost of a cup of coffee, a cybercriminal can buy enough information to devastate someone’s financial life.”
It’s the kind of risk that could scare anyone, especially considering the scale behind it. In just the first six months of 2026, Malwarebytes found more than 7,500 compromised data sets on the dark web containing more than 8.4 billion records.
And yet, even today, cybersecurity professionals still get asked why anyone should bother protecting their data.
The public, understandably, are exhausted. With data breaches happening every week—if not every day—cybersecurity can start to feel pointless. With young people unable to build financial security, they start believing that they have nothing worth stealing. And with Big Tech already collecting our every movement, behavior, click, and concern, people understandably feel powerless to fight any kind of data abuse, be it corporate or criminal.
So today’s episode approaches the question from a different direction. This isn’t about why you should protect yourself—plenty of company websites will tell you that, and most of them rely on fear. This is about why hackers want your data in the first place.
Today, on the Lock and Code podcast, host David Ruiz explains how cybercriminals turn a single repeated password into account takeover, how a screenshot of your house from Google Maps became a tool in extortion emails, and why the most benign information about you—an address, an age, one public photo—is often the most useful data a stranger can buy.
Virtually every website selling products or services features a live chat widget. It usually appears as a small window in the corner of your screen, complete with an agent’s name and picture.
Sometimes these chats simply collect tickets for tech support or sales to process. But often there’s a real person on the other end of the screen. And here’s where many users get an unwelcome surprise: agents can see absolutely everything you type into the chat box, even if you have no intention of sending it. In this article, we break down why this happens and what you can do about it.
All in the name of customer experience
It’s all thanks to a feature known as live typing preview, or real-time typing view, which exists under one name or another in almost every popular customer chat platform. Here’s how the developer of LiveAgent, a customer support system used by more than 40 000 companies, describes it in its blog: “This live chat typing preview allows agents to anticipate questions and deliver faster responses. Additionally, real-time chat monitoring enables supervisors to oversee chat interactions, ensuring quality and timeliness.”
While that might sound helpful and harmless to some, having their unsent messages watched without their permission can trigger outright panic for others. To make matters worse, it’s almost impossible to tell whether the website uses the feature. That is, unless the chat agent admits it to you directly… or replies to a message you decided not to send.
As an alternative, you can run a quick test: type out a message in the chat box, wait 15 seconds, and see if the agent starts typing a response. If they do, you’re almost certainly dealing with real-time typing view. Whether to continue that conversation is up to you. Most importantly, never type personal information into a chat box — even if you are doing so from a Kaspersky Premium device.
Real-time typing view is just the tip of the iceberg. In reality, websites collect far more information than you might think. You’re likely already familiar with cookies, and have probably asked yourself at least once, “Should I accept these or not?” We answer that and other questions in our post Taking the biscuit: why hackers like cookies so much.
Tracking techniques that use web beacons and tracking pixels are not as widely known. To learn why they’re a concern and how to turn them off, check out our post Who is tracking you on the web and how.
Another technology that remains largely unknown to the general public is session replay scripts. These tools allow website owners to watch a recording of your visit: how fast you moved your cursor, where you clicked, which pages you browsed, and what you added to your shopping cart.
Of course, the primary goal of session replay is the same as real-time typing view: improving customer and user experience. It helps companies analyze your behavior, identify friction points, and make improvements. If a customer fails to complete a checkout or encounters a technical issue, developers can review the recording of their session to pinpoint what went wrong.
In theory, it sounds helpful enough: “We will collect a small amount of data about you to make the site better for you.” In practice, however, this approach comes with significant risks for users.
What’s the catch?
The primary risk here lies in whether websites collect this data legally, how they store it, and whether they share it with anyone. While you can usually gauge legality by reading their privacy policy, the terms of data storage and sharing are often described vaguely.
On top of that, users rarely realize an agent can read their message before it’s actually sent. If you change your mind about asking a question, edit a sentence, or delete your text entirely, that doesn’t mean no one saw the draft. Unlike cookies, opting out of this technology is practically impossible. Most chat widgets simply don’t offer a setting to disable typing previews.
As for tracking pixels, web beacons, and session replays, they’re essentially a form of digital surveillance. Beyond collecting vast amounts of data, they can also slow down your device’s performance. Even worse, if attackers compromise a website’s analytics system, they can gain access to this data, reconstruct your path through the site, and uncover details that can be leveraged in future attacks. To learn more about how scammers pull off these tricks and how social engineering works, check out our post They’re reading you like a book: scammers’ favorite tricks.
While you can’t prevent a potential breach on a third-party website, you can — and should — take steps to secure your own browsing session.
What you can do about it
First and foremost, pay close attention to what you type in a chat box. It’s critical never to share personal data, credit card numbers, logins, passwords, or any other sensitive information with live chat agents.
Beyond that, there’s always a risk of landing on a phishing site and entering your account credentials there. To prevent this, we recommend using our security solutions, which block visits to malicious and suspicious websites. We also suggest storing your credentials in Kaspersky Password Manager — our password manager won’t let you auto-fill saved logins and passwords on a fake site.
Users of Kaspersky Standard, Kaspersky Plus, and Kaspersky Premium have access to our Private Browsing feature (on Windows and macOS). It prevents third-party services from tracking your online activity and collecting real-time information about what you do on websites.
To minimize the risk of data leaks, keep these tips in mind:
Never type anything into a chat box that you aren’t prepared to send. On almost every website, the agent can see your text while you type, so deleting a message is no guarantee it stays private.
Keep in mind that your activity on a website may be recorded. These recordings can capture your clicks, page navigation, and form inputs. Treat every website as if your actions are being watched.
Pay attention to privacy policies. Reputable companies typically state whether they use analytics tools, session recording, or third-party support services.
Approach chat interactions with caution. Real-life rules apply here as well: never share verification codes, passwords, phone numbers, or other sensitive details in a chat.
Be smart about accepting cookies. Taking a moment to check what information a website collects is well worth the effort — it helps you make an informed choice about whether you’re comfortable sharing that data.
Tired of endless digital tracking? Here’s how you can protect yourself and your data:
Starting last year, Android users have been seeing the “number is now verified” system notification more frequently. And in some cases people even find mysterious outgoing text messages in their history that they never sent.
These messages often cause confusion and even anxiety: has a virus infected the phone? Are tech giants spying on our phone numbers? Let’s break down how this feature works, and what potential risks it poses to your privacy.
Why all these phone number verifications?
The notification pops up whenever Google’s phone number verification feature is triggered on your device.
Its main job is to make sure that the SIM card tied to a specific phone number is physically inside the phone. Once verified, that phone number automatically links to all active Google accounts on the device.
There are several key services that rely on the verification. Most importantly, it drives Rich Communication Services (RCS) — the modern standard for “rich” messaging right inside your standard text messaging app. It feels like a popular chat app, but without the need to install anything extra. Unlike iMessage, which is locked to Apple’s ecosystem, RCS works across compatible smartphones on various platforms since it’s an industry standard set by carriers rather than tech giants. Since recently, both Apple and Android users have been able to exchange RCS messages. For this feature to work in the Google Messages app, Google needs ongoing confirmation that your SIM card is active. If you pull out your SIM card, RCS chats will keep working for about eight days before turning off automatically.
According to Google, phone number verification serves several other purposes as well:
Account security and recovery. A verified phone number enables quick sign-ins to your Google account, two-factor authentication, and easy password recovery.
Emergency services and device location. This includes Find My Device, remote phone lock, and sharing your location with emergency responders — including via satellite messaging on the Pixel 9 and certain other modern smartphones.
Better sharing on Google. This feature helps other people find you faster on Google Meet or Duo, use Quick Share to send you files, and see that the phone number is linked to your profile.
Google also recently confirmed that this data is used to counter scams. Verification helps block calls or text messages from spoofed numbers if both the real owner of the number and the recipient are using Android devices with verified phone numbers.
How does Google verify phone numbers?
Phone number verification technology has been around on Android for quite some time — Google was sending test SMS messages as far back as in 2019. However, it became widely visible to most users following a Google system update in September 2025. The process was baked deeper into the operating system, with number verification now running by default during initial phone setup, and re-running periodically in the background.
There are two main technical methods for the verification process. Which one your device uses depends on your mobile carrier and your version of Android.
The older method relies on hidden text messages. In the background, your smartphone sends a specialized technical text message to Google’s servers. The operating system intercepts this message before you ever see it, which is why it rarely appears in your standard text messaging app. However, due to software glitches or Android customization quirks, these texts occasionally surface in sent messages, startling users. They typically look like this: “(string of letters and numbers) Google is re-verifying the phone# of this device.” Google explicitly notes in its help documentation that standard messaging rates from your carrier may apply.
In recent years, direct carrier verification (via carrier APIs) has become the primary verification method. This approach is more modern and secure than previous ones. The smartphone sends an encrypted token containing device and SIM card identifiers to the mobile carrier, and the carrier responds with the confirmed phone number. The whole process takes just a couple of seconds and runs completely unnoticed by the user. Both global telecom giants and smaller providers have connected to this verification network. Notably, third-party apps can also tap into the results of this check through Firebase Phone Number Verification, getting confirmation from your mobile carrier about which phone number is active on the device.
“Other device data” and privacy concerns
In its official documentation, Google notes that device identifiers and SIM card data may be collected during verification. In practice, this refers to unique identifiers for the SIM card and its subscriber profile (ICCID and IMSI), as well as technical device identifiers needed to run mobile networks. Google also explicitly states that it does not sell your personal information, including your phone number, to anyone.
Naturally, sending additional unique identifiers to Google — especially given the scale of its advertising business — always raises concern among privacy-conscious users. Here’s what you should keep in mind:
Metadata collection. To run RCS, Google exchanges data with your mobile carrier. Even when the content of RCS messages is encrypted, metadata — such as who is messaging whom and when — can still be stored on your carrier’s servers, and in some cases, on Google’s servers. As cybersecurity experts at the Electronic Frontier Foundation point out, if privacy is your top priority, you’re better off sticking to dedicated encrypted messaging apps.
Linked accounts. If you have both a personal and a work Google account (or a personal and a family account) set up on the same phone, the verified number will automatically link to both profiles. The operating system does not offer built-in tools to separate numbers for different accounts on a single device.
Phone number leaks. Apps on your device can already access various user identifiers, including your phone number. However, this verification system makes it easier to link multiple phone numbers to a user who has multiple Google accounts. And while Google states that it never sells phone numbers, you cannot say the same with confidence about obscure third-party Android developers.
On by default. The feature is enabled out of the box, and most users have no idea their device is silently querying their carrier in the background. While you can opt out in your Google settings once you notice it, there’s no guarantee that any data already collected will actually be deleted.
Turning off verification — why and how
For most users, verification is genuinely helpful. It simplifies account recovery, makes finding a lost phone easier, powers modern text messaging features, and assists emergency services when every second counts.
However, if you want to minimize the amount of metadata sent to Google, mobile carriers, and other data brokers, you can manually disable the feature. Here’s how:
Open your Android smartphone’s settings.
Tap Google, select the account at the top, and switch to the All services tab.
Under Privacy and security, tap Phone number verification.
Turn off automatic phone number verification.
If you also want to disable Better sharing on Google, go to Settings → Google → Manage your Google Account → Personal info → Contact info → Phone, select your number, and turn off the setting.
If you have multiple Google accounts on your phone, you’ll need to repeat these steps for each one. Unfortunately, verification sometimes turns itself back on automatically, and there’s no reliable way to prevent this on standard consumer phones with stock software.
Keep in mind that disabling verification means losing access to RCS chats in Google Messages — forcing you to fall back on basic SMS, or switch to alternative secure messaging apps. You also won’t be able to use that number for quick account recovery should you forget your password.
To thoughtfully customize your privacy settings across all your devices — regardless of the operating system, browser, or app — check out our free online tool, Privacy Checker.
Curious about other privacy risks you might not even know exist? Check out our other deep dives, here:
A breakup is a major upheaval — the kind that turns life upside down. The familiar order of things, where two people shared the same interests, moments, and often even the same physical space, collapses in an instant, leaving each of you in a world of your own.
Besides that, couples are connected not just in real life, but digitally too. Shared subscriptions, saved addresses and passwords, access to joint cloud storage — all of that used to be woven into your day-to-day life. Moving on emotionally can take a long time, sure, but there are steps you can take right now that will tighten up your security — even if they won’t help you get over your ex.
Here’s what you need to check after a breakup, which services to disconnect, and why you should do it even if the split was amicable.
Digital hygiene: your insurance policy
Cutting off your ex’s access to your online accounts isn’t paranoia — it’s looking out for your own security. A breakup doesn’t automatically sever your digital ties: any access you granted each other during the relationship stays active until someone manually shuts it down. Most of the time, nobody’s plotting to actually exploit it, yet it can still lead to anything from awkward moments to a genuine risk of being tracked.
Take Aleta Dignard-Fung, of Las Vegas, who told NPR that after breaking up with her boyfriend, it didn’t immediately occur to her that he still knew her Spotify password. One day, in the shower with music playing, she noticed her playlist suddenly switch. Her ex had logged in from another device and started playing his own chosen tracks. “It was just kind of like the Spotify wars, and we’d just spend like 10 minutes trying to override each other’s songs,” she admitted. But the fallout isn’t always this lighthearted.
Relationship coach Susan Winter shared a case from her own practice in that same interview. One of her clients simply couldn’t let go of his ex-girlfriend after their breakup. The two had shared an OpenTable account — the restaurant reservation service — and she’d never revoked his access. He started tracking her bookings: where she was going, what time, how many people. That’s how he kept tabs on whether someone new had entered her life.
These two stories, while showing very different behavior from the exes involved, both trace back to the same root cause: accounts that were never properly locked down. In the former case, it led to an awkward moment. In the latter, it led to anxiety and a real sense of being watched. To make sure neither scenario happens to you, it’s worth running through a quick checklist.
Terminate your partner’s sessions
In the settings for your social media, messaging apps, email, and other key services, pull up the list of active sessions and log out everything except your current devices.
Change your passwords
Update the passwords to any key accounts your partner might have known — say, if you used a meaningful date as your password. If you reused the same password across multiple services, change it everywhere. While you’re at it, review your security questions and your backup email or phone number for account recovery — neither should still be tied to your ex. To skip the hassle of memorizing new credentials while still leveling up your security, we recommend using a password manager — it’ll generate a unique, strong password for every account, and save and sync it across all your devices; the only thing you need to remember is a single main password.
Check two-factor authentication and trusted devices
Make sure verification codes only go to your own device. Remove your partner’s devices from your trusted list — you can do this in your Apple and Google account settings.
Split up your shared Apple/Google accounts
If you shared an Apple or Google account, sign out of that. Turn off Family Sharing, iCloud, and backups. Check your shared photo albums too — anything that lands there automatically is visible to your ex as well.
Review your subscriptions
If you shared subscriptions — streaming services, family plans, that kind of thing — cancel them or set up new ones and link your own card.
Check your bank cards
If your ex’s card is linked to a marketplace, delivery app, or rideshare service account you own, remove it from your saved payment methods. If your card is linked to their account and you no longer have access to it, the safest move is to just get your card reissued.
Revoke smart home access
Cut off your ex’s access to cameras, video doorbells, GPS trackers, and smart speakers. If the devices were on a shared account, change the password or move them over to your own personal account.
Review your privacy settings
Check the privacy settings across your accounts on various services and social media using our free online tool, Privacy Checker. It walks you through a privacy configuration tailored to your operating system, platform, and even your browser.
If you notice signs of stalking
Reach out to advocacy or legal aid organizations — they can help you map out the best course of action. It’s also worth leaning on family and close friends who can support you through a tough situation. On Android devices, you can use our security suite with the Who’s Spying on Me feature. It’s designed to help you detect tracking and stalking so you can take the right steps to protect yourself. The feature includes:
Stalkerware Detection. Flags apps designed to secretly monitor your life and collect data you’d never want shared with anyone else.
Device Scanner. Finds planted trackers that let someone follow your movements and always know where you are.
Permissions Control. Shows which apps have access to permissions that could make it easier for someone to spy on you or compromise your privacy.
What can actually help — and what might make things worse — during this difficult time? Check out our other posts:
At Microsoft, we are committed to our customers’ fundamental right to privacy. In a world defined by rapid technological change and geopolitical volatility, this commitment has remained constant. It’s rooted in decades of experience building trusted technologies that our customers rely on every day to manage their data. Many of these organizations depend on the ability to move data across the Atlantic, from the EU to the U.S., in a way that protects their privacy. That’s why we support the European Commission in its defense of the EU-U.S. Data Privacy Framework. And that’s why we have formally intervened in the Latombe v. Commission case before the Court of Justice of the European Union. This case puts at stake two principles that are important for Microsoft – the protection of our customers’ privacy and their ability to do business on both sides of the Atlantic.
To intervene in a case before the Court of Justice, a company must apply for permission. In this case, the Court granted our application, finding that Microsoft has a direct and existing interest in its result. Put simply, the outcome of this case will determine whether Microsoft and its enterprise customers may continue to use the EU-U.S. Data Privacy Framework to transfer data to participating U.S. companies, including vital customers and suppliers. This critical legal bridge promotes stability, beneficial trans-Atlantic ties, economic growth, and prosperity, while upholding strong privacy safeguards. The Latombe case seeks to dismantle it. As an intervener, we can now file legal briefs in support of the European Commission, participate in oral hearings, and share our perspective on the importance of upholding a framework that directly benefits the European economy.
Supporting the European Commission’s adequacy decision on the EU-U.S. Data Privacy Framework before the Court of Justice of the European Union
Companies across the globe rely on data flows to manage their people, produce their goods and services, and distribute products to their customers. We understand that data flows trigger questions about differences in legal traditions. They should. And for that reason, the European Commission and the U.S. administration worked diligently, in the decade since the Safe Harbour ruling, to harmonize EU and U.S. law. As a result of that hard work, and as required under the European General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), the U.S. has now created an independent review court for any complaints regarding U.S. surveillance and implemented other required measures to provide an “adequate” level of data protection that is essentially equivalent to that in the EU.
This equivalence is a key point. The law entitles our customers to privacy on both sides of the Atlantic. This is the principle on which the Data Privacy Framework rests. And our intervention in the Latombe case is just one part of a long history in which we have stood up for that principle in Europe, as well as in the U.S. As far back as 2014, Microsoft challenged the FBI’s secret attempt to use its national security authorities to obtain information about an account that belonged to one of our enterprise customers. After we filed the case, the FBI withdrew its request. In 2016, we sued the U.S. government to challenge its practice of seeking indefinite secrecy orders—i.e., orders that prevented Microsoft from ever notifying its enterprise customers when the government sought their data. As a result of that case, the U.S. Department of Justice changed its policy to place strict limits on the duration of secrecy orders. In the decade since that first constitutional challenge, we’ve launched a series of successful court challenges to ensure that secrecy orders, of any duration, are the exception, not the rule. As a result of our litigation, numerous secrecy orders have been vacated or modified to allow notification to our customers.
We don’t confine our advocacy to courts. We are a steadfast proponent of strong privacy regulation on both sides of the Atlantic. That’s why we are specifically pushing Congress to update the U.S. Electronic Communications Privacy Act to place stricter limits on the use of secrecy orders and ensuring they are subject to meaningful judicial review. This legislative reform is gaining momentum in Congress and will greatly enhance our continued ability to protect our customers’ data.
Stable and trusted data transfers are not an end in themselves. They are a means to enable innovation, economic opportunity, and public services—while upholding the fundamental rights that are at the core of EU and U.S. law. Our intervention in the Latombe case reflects that principled balance and follows a long line of legal actions we have taken to protect our customers.
Looking ahead
At Microsoft, we have long recognized that trust is not a given—it is earned through sustained action, thoughtful design, and a willingness to engage openly with governments, customers, and individuals. Microsoft has consistently advocated for strong, clear, and globally interoperable privacy frameworks, recognizing that trust in technology depends on the strength of the rules that govern it.
Our customers in Europe can rely on us to continuously improve and update our privacy practices as technology and legal standards evolve. In 2018, we were the first major technology company to extend GDPR subject matter rights to all our customers around the world. And recent positive assessments of our privacy compliance by the European Data Protection Supervisor and the Hessian DPA in Germany underscore our continuous commitment to our customers’ fundamental right to privacy.
In support of this work, we’ve updated the Microsoft Privacy Statement to use clearer structure, simplified language, and more precise explanations of our data practices—making it easier to understand what data we collect and how it’s used, without changing our underlying privacy protections or commitments.
The future of technology will be shaped not only by what we build, but by the principles that guide us. By grounding innovation in respect for people and organizations, and strong legal protections, we can help ensure that technology continues to be a force for good.
Meta’s smart glasses are once again at the center of a privacy debate due to face recognition.
WIRED reports that Meta had quietly embedded unreleased face-recognition code, internally called “NameTag,” into its Meta AI companion app, which powers the company’s smart glasses. The code was not active, but its presence in an app installed on more than 50 million devices raised immediate concerns about how quickly using smart glasses could slide into biometric surveillance.
Face recognition in glasses, even if disabled or unreleased, is especially sensitive because it can identify people at a distance, in real time, and without their consent. Many organizations have warned that this technology could be misused by stalkers, abusers, and others who want to identify people in public without drawing attention.
Gizmodo reports on a proposed Pennsylvania bill that would require smart glasses and similar wearable recording devices to include a visible indicator light when they are capturing audio or video. The bill would also prohibit users from disabling that indicator, a move clearly aimed at reducing covert recording in public spaces.
Most smart glasses already include such an indicator, but reporters noted that some users have been paying others to have them removed or disabled. The proposal is interesting because it tries to solve a hardware-level trust problem with a visible signal. But a visible light only helps if it is both mandatory and difficult to bypass, and history suggests that any visible privacy safeguard becomes a target for tampering when the incentives are high enough.
These two stories are really about the same issue: smart glasses are normalizing the use of always-on cameras, microphones, and AI features in a form that is much easier to conceal than a phone. That creates an unwanted privacy problem for people around the wearer.
Smart glasses are supposed to make computing more seamless. Instead, they are becoming a test case for what happens when cameras, microphones, AI, and biometric features are squeezed into everyday wearables before the privacy rules catch up.
From our point of view, smart glasses sit at the intersection of consumer privacy, surveillance tech, and potential abuse. The risk is not just that a device records audio or video. AI-enabled wearables can process what they see, deduce identities, and potentially store biometric data in ways that ordinary users and bystanders can’t easily detect.
We’d rather err on the side of caution and use an app that can detect when smart glasses are nearby. Unfortunately, it only detects some devices, and we don’t yet know how well it will perform if smart glasses become more common.
As noted by 404 Media, the app is an imperfect, tech-based response to a social and legal problem: it can misfire, it can’t tell you who is being recorded, and it risks giving a false sense of safety. The developer frames it not as a solution but as a small, user-controlled countermeasure in an environment where surveillance devices are becoming less visible and more AI-enabled.
Don’t get recognized
If facial recognition features ever become common in smart glasses, much of their effectiveness will depend on how much information about you is already available online. There are a few steps you can take today to reduce your visibility in facial recognition systems and people-search databases.
A major factor is limiting who can see the photographs you post on social media and other online platforms. But there is more you can do:
Remove yourself from reverse face search engines
The major, most accurate reverse face search engines, Pimeyes and Facecheck.id, offer opt-out and removal processes that can help reduce your visibility in search results:
Most people don’t realize how much information can be found from a name alone. People-search sites often aggregate home addresses, phone numbers, ages, and relatives from public records and commercial databases.
The New York Times has compiled a useful guide to many of the major people-search sites, along with instructions for opting out and removing your information.
Scrub your data
If you’re in the US, you can also use Malwarebytes Personal Data Remover to help find and remove personal information that data broker sites have collected about you.
Pavel Durov and his “private” messaging app have a brand new rival, and it’s — drumroll, please — Elon Musk and his XChat. On our blog, we’ve discussed more than once why Durov’s claims about Telegram privacy and security are exaggerated, to put it mildly. Here, I’ll just remind the reader that standard (non-secret) chats on Telegram aren’t protected by end-to-end encryption — the bare minimum required for user data to stay private.
But let’s get back to Musk. In late April 2026, the XChat app launched for iOS users. The tech mogul had been touting his messaging app for a long time, pitching it from day one as an incredibly private and secure way to communicate, and as a direct threat to Signal, WhatsApp, Telegram, and iMessage. Today, we look at whether we should actually trust Musk’s promises this new service, break down its core features, and stack it up against the competition.
Bitcoin-style encryption
Musk initially teased XChat on June 1, 2025, naturally via his X (formerly Twitter) account. Responding to another user’s question about when to expect the new service, Musk wrote: “This week if there are no scaling issues.”
Apparently, scaling issues there were: the app’s beta didn’t drop until September 2025, and iOS users didn’t get full access until April 2026. As for Android, there is zero info on when that version would launch at the time of this writing. That said, an XChat page is already live on Google Play where users can queue up “pre-register”, whatever that means.
But let’s go back to Musk’s post announcing XChat. That specific post turned a lot of heads in the privacy and cybersecurity community, and here’s why: the tech mogul wrote that the service would be built on an “entirely new architecture”, written in Rust, and featuring “Bitcoin-style encryption”.
Elon Musk announces the launch of XChat, claiming the new messaging app is written in Rust and uses “Bitcoin-style encryption”. Source
The expert community spent a long time scratching their heads and trying to figure out what Musk actually meant. After all, Bitcoin isn’t an anonymous, encrypted data exchange system. The blockchain does use public and private cryptographic keys, but for something entirely different: signing transactions. Meanwhile, these transactions aren’t hidden from prying eyes; they’re out in the open for anyone to see, forever. Simply put, Bitcoin protects its users not by ensuring privacy, but quite the opposite — through ultimate transparency.
Most likely, Musk used “Bitcoin-style encryption” as a marketing gimmick. Bitcoin was trading near all-time highs at the time of his announcement, and cryptocurrency was the talk of the town. Technically, the XChat beta that dropped in September 2025 protected user chats with a “kind of” end-to-end encryption, but this was implemented in a way that raised serious doubts among cryptography experts.
And not without a reason. Normally, setting up an end-to-end encrypted chat automatically generates a public and private key pair. The public key is used to encrypt messages, while the private key decrypts them. Because other users need your public key to start a secure chat with you, these keys are usually stored on the app’s servers.
The private key, however, should ideally live only on the user’s device — which is exactly how Signal does it. This serves as a simple, ironclad guarantee that neither the company itself nor any third party breaching its infrastructure can access user chats, even if they really want to.
But Elon Musk’s projects always march to the beat of their own drum: the XChat developers decided it would be a great idea to store users’ private keys on XChat servers. X claims they’ll use hardware security modules (HSMs) to store these private keys — specialized appliances designed to prevent even the system owner from easily accessing the data inside. However, experts are also questioning the reliability of this setup, and coming to a grim conclusion: if X really wants to get a user’s private key, they will most likely be able to do so.
How encrypted messaging in XChat works in practice
Finally, once the scaling issues were ironed out nearly a year after the announcement, X officially rolled out the XChat app for iOS in April 2026. Now anyone can use it, but from a practical standpoint, the situation with encrypted chats seems even more convoluted than in Telegram.
According to the social network’s help center, to use end-to-end chat encryption in XChat, both users must have an X account, set up XChat, and have some sort of connection between them:
Follow, or be subscribed to each other
Have exchanged messages before
Have previously accepted a direct message request
Be a member of the same Premium Business / Premium Organization subscription on X
If users don’t follow each other and haven’t interacted before, XChat might still let them send a message request. However, that initial request goes out without end-to-end encryption.
Again, this is how the process is described in the messaging app’s official help documentation. Sound overly complicated? Let me reassure you: in practice, it works — or rather, doesn’t — completely differently. I personally managed to send a message to another user who had NOT set up XChat. The app itself, of course, gave me absolutely no warning about this.
The app allows you to start a chat with a user who hasn’t even set up XChat yet, without giving the sender any heads-up.
It gets even better. The user I messaged saw a notification for it on the web version of X, but couldn’t actually access the message. Here’s the catch: to start using XChat, the user first has to create a four-digit PIN. Yet, the app asks for this PIN the very first time the user tries to open it — meaning, before they even get a chance to create one. Along with this prompt, the user also sees a warning stating that without the PIN, they won’t be able to view past encrypted chats.
The user is prompted to enter a PIN to decrypt past messages before even completing the initial XChat setup.
The only workaround I found to actually start using XChat is to tap “Forgot PIN?” — even though that PIN never existed in the first place — confirm your identity, and create a new (well, your first) PIN. Naturally, you lose access to your chat history this way, so you won’t be able to read any messages sent to you in XChat before you officially set up the app.
XChat: the new Telegram, WhatsApp, Signal… or Facebook Messenger?
All these PIN hurdles actually exist for a reason. Remember, unlike WhatsApp and Signal, the XChat developers decided to store users’ private keys on their own servers. Consequently, the app uses these four-digit PINs to encrypt those keys.
According to the XChat help documentation, this mechanism was designed to ensure a “seamless” multi-device experience. It’s impossible not to point out that both WhatsApp and Signal managed to pull this off without sketchy workarounds like PIN requirements or server-side private key storage.
The problem is, workarounds like these undermine any claims of app privacy and security. First and chief among them, a PIN isn’t exactly the most secure way to protect sensitive data. We’ve mentioned time and again that four-digit combinations are easy to crack via brute force — especially since XChat gives you a generous 20 attempts to guess the right code.
The app allows up to 20 attempts to enter the four-digit PIN. Once the limit is reached, XChat warns that access to messages will be permanently lost.
Stepping away from the bizarre implementation of end-to-end encryption compared to other messaging apps, it’s hard to ignore the overall sense of pointlessness that comes with trying to use XChat. As a Wired journalist rightly pointed out, the app feels less like a relative of WhatsApp, Signal, or Telegram, and much more like Facebook Messenger. Except people usually open Messenger to read a text from their mom or grandma, whereas XChat seems meant for anyone wanting to check in on that weird nephew who spends all his free time on X, still believes John McAfee’s promise of $500 000 Bitcoin, and fanboys over Elon Musk.
So, what’s the bottom line on XChat?
The best way to wrap up this post is with a quote from a cybersecurity expert: “If what you want is good security, use Signal. If what you want is to be able to talk to pretty much anybody using encrypted messages, use WhatsApp. If your whole life is based around X, I guess this is better than nothing.”
If you do use XChat, rule number one is to avoid a predictable PIN — absolutely don’t use your birth year or, worse, 1234. It’s also crucial not to forget this code, because if you do, your entire chat history is gone for good. Finally, just like your other passwords, you shouldn’t keep it in your notes app, but rather in a secure password manager. This won’t only save you from having to memorize dozens of character combinations, but will also reduce the risk of losing access to your vital data and conversations.
To learn more about secure messaging in other apps, check out our other posts:
Customer service chatbots have one job: get the user what they’re asking for without bothering a human. Meta’s new AI support assistant took that brief a little too seriously. Over the past few months, attackers have been opening support chats, telling the bot they were locked out of Instagram accounts they didn’t own, and walking away with the keys.
Over the weekend, Meta pushed an emergency patch after Instagram accounts belonging to the Obama White House (now dormant), beauty retailer Sephora, and a senior US Space Force official were taken over and briefly defaced with pro-Iranian imagery. Security researcher and former Meta employee Jane Manchun Wong was also hit.
How the trick worked
The attack was simple. Attackers worked out where the account owner lived (there are lists of account owners’ home cities online, or they could just research the target). Then they used a VPN to match the target account’s geographic region, which avoided raising flags with Instagram’s security systems.
Then they started a normal password reset and opened the support chat. They asked the AI bot providing support to change the email address on the account, and it did exactly that, sending a one-time code straight to the attacker’s inbox.
To do this, the chatbot appears to have been wired into Meta’s account management systems with permission to make account changes, but without being taught how to verify it was talking to the real account owner. Security people have a name for that: “confused deputy.” The term has been around since the 1980s.
In fairness to the confused bot, attackers were successful even if the enhanced security was triggered. They would apparently create video deepfakes of their targets using images that were harvested from—you guessed it—Instagram.
Meta hoisted on its own AI petard
Meta has been shedding headcount and pouring money into AI, and rolled out its AI-powered support assistant earlier this year to help handle account recovery and other support requests.
The downside is that the AI appears to have been given the ability to perform actions such as email changes and password resets without applying enough safeguards to confirm the user’s identity first.
Meta communications executive Andy Stone said on X that the issue was resolved and impacted accounts were being secured. The company has not disclosed how many accounts were affected.
What actually worked
Why would anyone want to hack an Instagram account anyway? Revenge can be a driver, but more often than not, financial gain is the goal. Hijackers have blackmailed businesses that rely on those accounts for marketing.
Attackers using this technique have also been spotted targeting “OG” accounts with short or highly desirable usernames. If you joined Instagram early and registered a memorable handle, it can be worth thousands of dollars on underground markets.
What can you do to protect yourself?
A perennial piece of advice still holds: turn on multi-factor authentication (MFA). According to veteran cybersecurity reporter Brian Krebs, the attack failed against accounts that had MFA enabled, including those using SMS codes.
That doesn’t make MFA perfect, but it adds an important layer of protection.
So the practical advice is unglamorous:
Open Instagram’s Settings
Navigate to your Meta Accounts Center
Turn on Two-factor authentication. An authenticator app is better than SMS, but either is better than nothing.
Do it now, because this might not yet be over. TheCyberSecGuru reports that another attack is circulating, this time using an Android emulator called BlueStacks running a modified version of Instagram to send new prompts with hidden characters designed to manipulate the AI.
Expect more snafus from “helpful” bots
This won’t be the last attack against AI chatbots. As more companies use AI to reduce customer support costs, their attack surface will grow, and they’ll make plenty of mistakes as they try to balance security and functionality.
The Meta exploit is patched, but the confused deputy concept is not. And there’s nothing quite as damaging as a confused AI with the keys to your digital life.
Scammers don’t need to hack you. They just need you to click once.
One of the biggest football (soccer) events of this summer is the World Cup 2026. The tournament is co-hosted by three countries: the U.S., Canada, and Mexico. Unfortunately, events of this scale attract not just fans, but also scammers from all over the globe. We’ve already covered how cybercriminals are prepping for the World Cup online, and today we’re talking about digital security for fans on the ground in Mexico.
The country will host 13 matches and welcome millions of tourists. They’ll be staying in hotels, heading to games, checking out restaurants, navigating airports, and visiting popular tourist spots — and everywhere they go, the temptation to connect to public Wi-Fi will be high.
We’ve surveyed more than 84 500 (!) public Wi-Fi access points in Mexico City, Guadalajara, and Monterrey — and we have a lot to share about their security. Spoiler alert: many networks are still using outdated security standards, so you really shouldn’t go on vacation without reliable protection and an eSIM.
What and how we tested
Walking across Mexico looking for public Wi-Fi access points would have been a bit tough, though that’s exactly what we did for a similar Wi-Fi security survey in Paris. You can check out the results of that in our post, How safe is Wi-Fi in Paris?
This time the mission was far more demanding: mapping the wireless landscape of three major metropolises. That’s why we went wardriving — scanning for and logging wireless networks from a moving vehicle while equipped with a smartphone or laptop. It’s similar to searching for Wi-Fi on your phone, where the device constantly listens for nearby networks. Except instead of connecting to them, we just collect data about them.
All information was used strictly for passive observation and infrastructure analysis. Beyond receiving publicly broadcast service information, the experts of Kaspersky’s Global Research and Analysis Team (GReAT) didn’t attempt to authenticate, intercept traffic, exploit systems, or otherwise interact with the wireless networks they discovered. Mobile access points deployed in cars and on mobile devices were excluded from the sample.
Our main target was Mexico City — the capital and one of the most densely populated cities in Latin America. We took a drive through popular tourist spots: Mexico City Stadium, Mexico City International Airport, Zócalo, Paseo de la Reforma, Colonia Roma, La Condesa, Polanco, Coyoacán.
In Guadalajara and Monterrey, we drove similar routes: stadiums, main avenues, airports, and popular neighborhoods. Below you can see a heatmap of the areas we covered, ranging from red for areas with the highest density of public access points, through yellow and green, to blue for the lowest concentration.
Heatmap showing the locations of all Wi-Fi access points we covered in Mexico City
Heatmap showing the locations of all Wi-Fi access points we covered in Guadalajara
Heatmap showing the locations of all Wi-Fi access points we covered in Monterrey
We used passive radio reconnaissance to log 84 500 signals and 69 500 unique network identifiers across these three cities. The majority of the signals were caught in Mexico City (61.4%), followed by Guadalajara (23.6%) and Monterrey (14.8%).
What we analyzed:
Wireless network identifiers (SSIDs): the names that show up in your list of available Wi-Fi networks
Information that can be gleaned from these identifiers
Default router configurations and how ISPs deploy their networks
Frequencies used and signal characteristics
Channel load and radio frequency spectrum usage
Wireless network security configurations:
Open and insecure networks
Networks with WPS enabled
Secure networks (WPA2/WPA3) with WPS activated
You can find the full version of the study on the Securelist blog.
Telltale public Wi-Fi access point names
Network names (SSIDs) can tell you a lot by unintentionally revealing information about hardware manufacturers, ISPs, deployment methods, and whether an access point belongs to a business or a private user.
About 34% of the public Wi-Fi networks we logged didn’t bother changing their names at all, either sticking with the factory SSIDs from the router manufacturers or using standard naming conventions from their ISPs. For attackers, this can be a pretty solid hint, since this kind of network name lets them know which provider owns a given access point, what hardware is being used, and how it’s likely configured by default.
Another troubling nuance is the large number of Wi-Fi networks (over 30%) that use the access point’s MAC address (BSSID) as the visible network name. The first few bytes of a BSSID contain an Organizationally Unique Identifier (OUI), which gives away the router’s manufacturer. This is a useful lead for bad actors: they can find out who made the hardware and test for vulnerabilities specific to that brand’s models.
Is Mexican Wi-Fi well-protected?
An access point secured with WPA2/WPA3 can be considered more or less safe. All other authentication mechanisms yield much weaker results. We grouped the public Wi-Fi networks into four categories:
Secure (WPA2/WPA3)
Unsecured (open/WEP)
Weak (WPA)
Undetermined
The results are roughly the same across all three cities: about 82% of all analyzed access points are protected by secure standards. The outdated and insecure WPA protocol was practically nonexistent. However, more than 10% of the access points turned out to be completely unsecured. Connecting to these networks carries the risk of traffic interception and hidden surveillance.
But security isn’t evaluated by WPA protocols alone. We also checked for the presence of WPS, the infamous feature for quickly connecting to a network without entering a password, which is highly vulnerable to attacks. It turned out that WPS is enabled on nearly half (47%) of the access points in Mexico City, 43% in Guadalajara, and 41% in Monterrey. On average, 45% of the access points are potentially vulnerable to WPS-related attacks — sacrificing security for the sake of convenience.
What’s more, this feature frequently remained active even on seemingly secure WPA2/WPA3 networks — about half of them utilized WPS. This shows that having WPA2/WPA3 is still not enough to consider a Wi-Fi access point safe, as additional features like WPS can still leave the door open to attacks.
What else every tourist needs to know
Digital risks on a trip aren’t limited to public Wi-Fi alone, especially now that many are shifting away from public Wi-Fi to an eSIM. There are still plenty of threats in crowded places: public USB chargers, QR codes with swapped links, NFC and Bluetooth attacks, and, of course, social engineering tactics. Let’s break it all down.
Charging stations. Public USB chargers can also be dangerous: bad actors could potentially gain access to the data on your device or try to install malware. We covered these attacks in detail in our post, Data theft during smartphone charging.
Dangerous QR codes. Criminals can plant phishing QR codes in popular tourist spots. The pretexts can vary wildly; for instance, ads for team-specific fan “events”, or links supposedly offering discounts or restaurant menus. In reality, any QR code posted on the street can be considered insecure by default, and you shouldn’t scan them with your smartphone unless you have a QR code threat analyzer installed.
Fake broadcasts, tickets, and betting pools. Earlier, we described cases where bad actors were distributing malware via fake IPTV apps to capitalize on the WC26 hype. Remember, even if you plan to watch the tournament from home, you still need to stay alert and not trust the first sites that pop up advertising free broadcasts, offering betting pools, or promising unbelievably generous payouts.
Despite the prevalence of secure WPA2/WPA3 public Wi-Fi access points in Mexico City, Guadalajara, and Monterrey, our study shows that public Wi-Fi networks remain vulnerable. It’s also important to remember that attackers can create fake networks — so-called evil twins — disguised as legitimate public Wi-Fi in airports, hotels, cafés, and tourist spots.
For the average user, it’s practically impossible to tell how safe a specific access point is when trying to connect. That’s why the safest option is to use cellular data to access the internet — completely eliminating the need for Wi-Fi. Besides, there’s no need to research the nuances of local laws, rates, and other cellular details for every country you plan to visit; you can just buy a global eSIM online in two clicks. We explained how to make the entire process hassle-free in our post, Internet on the go with Kaspersky eSIM Store.
If you still plan on connecting to public Wi-Fi, always use a VPN to secure your device and data when connecting to unfamiliar — especially unsecured — Wi-Fi networks. This creates an encrypted tunnel between your device and the VPN server, making it impossible to intercept your data along the way. Haven’t picked a VPN yet? Try Kaspersky VPN Secure Connection, which is included with both Kaspersky Premium and Kaspersky Plus subscriptions.
Now, if you still plan to attend the World Cup without any cybersecurity solution, at least follow these basic rules of digital hygiene:
Don’t use public USB chargers
Don’t send sensitive information over connections that aren’t secure
Don’t log in to banking, email, or social media accounts over unsecured Wi-Fi
Turn off Bluetooth and NFC while walking around in crowded places
Don’t trust QR codes posted on the street
Connect to public Wi-Fi only when absolutely necessary
What else to read to make sure cheering for your favorite team isn’t only exciting, but also safe:
California has sued the former shell of DNA testing company 23andMe over alleged security failures and misleading statements surrounding its 2023 data breach.
On May 27, 2026, Attorney General Rob Bonta filed suit in San Francisco Superior Court against Chrome Holding Co., the company now handling 23andMe’s remaining assets following its bankruptcy.
California’s complaint accuses 23andMe of failing to implement reasonable security measures to protect sensitive data and alleges violations of several state privacy and consumer protection laws. It also accuses the company of making misleading statements about its security practices.
The 2023 breach used old-school credential-stuffing tactics against 23andMe’s login page. Attackers operated inside the systems for roughly five months without anyone noticing. The direct compromise was modest, affecting about 14,000 accounts, but that was all the attackers needed to steal the data of just under seven million customers.
The intruders pivoted from those accounts through DNA Relatives, the platform’s headline feature, which enabled people to determine who they were connected with through DNA similarity. The lawsuit alleges a critical coding error in that feature enabled the perpetrators to scrape data from millions of other users connected by biological kinship.
The victim-blaming defense became evidence
After the breach went public, 23andMe sent victims’ legal representatives a letter blaming users for reusing passwords from sites that had been compromised earlier. The exposed data, the company suggested, had been shared of the users’ own free will and would not cause “pecuniary harm.”
The harms stemming from genetic data theft extend far beyond financial losses, however. The genetic information that was stolen enabled thieves to determine an individual’s genetic origins.
The data was reportedly offered for sale on the dark web with this information as a selling point, enabling sellers to offer records on Asian American Pacific Islander (AAPI) or Jewish customers, for example. Bonta’s office pointed out that antisemitic violence was on the rise at the time.
In spite of the letter’s attempt to blame users, only about 14,000 accounts were directly compromised through password reuse. The rest of the data was allegedly exposed through 23andMe’s own product. According to the complaint, the coding error in DNA Relatives exposed the data of anyone who had opted into the service, not just those linked to the 14,000 compromised accounts.
Can the state recover damages?
California is seeking statutory penalties ranging from $1,000 to $7,500 per violation. With 855,541 Californians among the affected users, the costs could mount up quickly.
The question is how much of it the state will collect if it wins its case. 23andMe filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in March 2025, then sold most of its assets, including the genomic data of more than 15 million customers, to TTAM Research Institute, a nonprofit founded by former 23andMe CEO Anne Wojcicki. California and several other states opposed the sale on Genetic Information Privacy Act grounds, but a federal bankruptcy judge approved it. The states are now appealing that decision.
Chrome Holding Co., the corporate shell that remains of 23andMe, received $305 million from that sale. But others have already been picking over what’s left.
Other regulators have already had their turn. The UK Information Commissioner’s Office fined 23andMe £2.31 million in June last year following a joint investigation with the Privacy Commissioner of Canada. A federal court initially approved a $30 million class-action settlement covering most US customer claims. That settlement later grew to $50 million and received final approval in January 2026.
What customers can do
If you tested with 23andMe, the standard breach hygiene still applies. Reset any password you reused on other sites and turn on multi-factor authentication wherever it’s offered. Credential stuffing only works on usernames and passwords that have already been exposed elsewhere. Also watch for phishing attacks that name-drop 23andMe or the breach itself. And maybe weigh the benefits of using DNA testing services against the security risks.
Because there’s one part of this that no fine and no settlement can solve: stolen genetic data sold on the dark web cannot be taken back. Passwords can be changed. DNA can’t.
Browse like no one’s watching.
Malwarebytes Privacy VPN encrypts your connection and never logs what you do, so the next story you read doesn’t have to feel personal. Try it free →
A fake website impersonating BlueWallet (a real Bitcoin wallet) is targeting Mac users with a simple but effective attack. BlueWallet itself has not been compromised. Instead, cybercriminals have stolen the name and branding of the legitimate Bitcoin wallet to make a malicious download appear trustworthy.
If you went looking for a cryptocurrency wallet and landed on one of these fake BlueWallet download pages, the site tried to trick you into opening a downloaded file in a built-in macOS tool and pressing “Run.” If you followed those instructions, the malware could steal saved passwords, browser logins, cryptocurrency wallets, documents, and other sensitive data. It also watches the clipboard for cryptocurrency wallet addresses and can replace them with attacker-controlled addresses..
That last feature is particularly dangerous. If you copy a wallet address before sending funds, the malware can silently replace it with the attacker’s address. Everything looks normal on screen, but the money goes somewhere else.
Should you worry? Only if you downloaded and ran the file. Simply visiting the page and closing it does nothing on its own. The attack depends entirely on the user opening the script and pressing play.
If you did run it, treat the machine as compromised and follow the steps below.
What to do if you may have run it
If you opened the file and pressed play, assume your device was compromised and work through these steps:
Disconnect the machine from the network to cut the control channel
The most interesting part of this campaign isn’t technical. The attackers didn’t break into the Mac or bypass Apple’s security protections. They persuaded victims to run the malware themselves.
The fake website walks users through the process with a convincing download page, simple instructions, and even a keyboard shortcut. The attack succeeds because the victim trusts what they are seeing.
As operating systems get better at blocking malicious software, attackers are increasingly investing in social engineering. Instead of finding ways around security controls, they convince people to click through them.
That’s why one habit is becoming increasingly important: Be suspicious of any download that arrives with instructions to open it in a scripting tool, developer utility, or Terminal window and press “Run.”
In this campaign, a single press of ⌘R was enough to turn a Mac into a password stealer, cryptocurrency wallet thief, clipboard hijacker, and remote access tool.
Technical analysis
Stage one: The AppleScript downloader
The page lives at update-bluewallet[.]com, a domain name close enough to the real wallet (bluewallet.io) to pass a quick glance. The first thing the page does is not wait for consent. Its script calls a download routine on a two-second timer the moment the page loads, and again if the visitor clicks either of two buttons.
The file that lands in the Downloads folder is named BlueWallet Installer.applescript, an extension most people have never seen and have no instinct to distrust.
Then the page does something quietly clever. After a short delay, it rewrites its own status text to read like setup instructions: open the installer, then press the play button or ⌘R. It even draws a small blue play triangle in the text so the wording matches the real Script Editor interface the victim is about to see.
The page walks the victim through the exact motions needed to run the file.
On modern macOS, an unsigned application downloaded from the web gets quarantined and checked before it can run. A plain script opened in Script Editor and executed by the user sidesteps that flow. The person is manually instructing a trusted Apple tool to run code, so there is no notarization gate to fail.
This is why the attacker chose an AppleScript instead of a packaged app: it moves the risky action out of the operating system’s hands and into the victim’s.
The AppleScript itself is remarkably short. Stripped of its decorative comments, including a fake version number and a line claiming to be a “Brew Install Upgrade,” it runs a single base64-encoded shell command and then tells Script Editor to quit without saving, removing the evidence from view.
It fetches a second script from a remote host, saves it to a hidden file in the temp directory, makes it executable, and runs it in the background with all output suppressed.
The victim sees nothing. The filename .sysupd.sh is dressed up to look like a system update. This is a textbook staged dropper: stage one is tiny and disposable, and its only job is to fetch the real payload.
Stage two: Payload analysis
The first lines establish how the malware intends to operate. It sets umask 077 so everything it creates is readable only by the compromised user, then builds a hidden, randomly named working directory under /tmp seeded from /dev/urandom.
Its configuration is obfuscated, but weakly. A small function named _xd walks a hex string two characters at a time and XORs each byte against a hardcoded repeating key: swckR9JCD2Uu.
That function decodes the script’s Telegram bot token, chat identifier, secondary command token, and staging URL at runtime. It is enough to defeat tools that only search for plaintext strings, but not much more. Because the key and algorithm are both sitting in the file, every encoded value is fully recoverable.
One detail stands out: The decoded Telegram chat value and decoded command-and-control chat value are identical. The attacker is using a single Telegram channel as both the exfiltration drop and the control channel. It is cheap, scalable, encrypted, and blends into ordinary HTTPS traffic.
Not everything is obfuscated. The clipboard-hijacking addresses are sitting in the file in plain text: a Bitcoin address, an Ethereum address, and a Solana address. These are the addresses the implant swaps in when it catches you copying a wallet address. Because they are public on their respective blockchains, they are also among the most useful artifacts in the whole sample.
What the malware steals
The second stage’s collection routines are sweeping. They pull from six broad categories.
1. Web browsers
The script extracts history, cookies, login data, and bookmarks from a wide range of browsers, including:
Chromium-based browsers: Google Chrome Stable, Beta, Canary, and Dev; Brave; Microsoft Edge; Vivaldi; Opera; Opera GX; Arc; Chromium; Coccoc; and Yandex
Firefox-based browsers: Firefox, Waterfox, Pale Moon, Zen, and LibreWolf
macOS native browser data: Safari cookies, history, and form values
Other ecosystems: Yoroi, Lace, Petra, Martian, Suiet, Talisman, SubWallet, Braavos, and Temple
3. Password managers and security tools
The malware targets local storage and settings for several password managers, including LastPass, 1Password, Dashlane, Bitwarden, Keeper, RoboForm, NordPass, Enpass, StickyPassword, TrueKey, Passbolt, and Buttercup.
It also looks for data associated with 2FA and authenticator tools, including Google Authenticator, Authy, Duo, Microsoft Authenticator, 2FAS, and FreeOTP.
4. Communication and social apps
The script attempts to copy session data and local storage for Telegram Desktop and Discord, including Discord Canary and Discord PTB.
5. Developer and cloud tools
It looks for credentials and configuration files in the user’s home directory, including:
AWS CLI configurations in .aws
SSH keys in .ssh
GnuPG keys in .gnupg
Kubernetes configs in .kube
Shell and Git files including .zshrc, .zsh_history, .bash_history, and .gitconfig
6. Productivity apps and general files
The script copies the local Apple Notes database, NoteStore.sqlite.
It also looks for browser-extension data related to shopping and productivity tools, including Honey, CapitalOne Shopping, Rakuten, CamelCamelCamel, Grammarly, Evernote, Notion Clipper, Todoist, and Google Keep.
Finally, it scans Desktop, Documents, and Downloads for files with extensions including .txt, .pdf, .docx, .doc, .rtf, .wallet, .key, .keys, .seed, .kdbx, .pem, and .env, under a size cap.
What it does with the stolen data
The malware tries to capture the user’s account password directly. An osascript dialog titled “System Preferences” asks the user to re-enter their password “to continue.” The script validates each attempt against dscl . authonly before saving it, so it only stops once it has a working credential.
For exfiltration, it archives the staged data with macOS’s own ditto, likely because it is always present, unlike zip. To stay under Telegram’s 50 MB upload limit, it breaks larger archives into 49 MB chunks with split before sending each part.
It establishes persistence by writing a LaunchAgent plist into the user’s ~/Library/LaunchAgents, backed by a hidden support directory, and loading it with launchctl so the implant runs again at every login.
The clipboard hijack is a live background loop. A clip_watch function continuously inspects the clipboard, matches Bitcoin, Ethereum, and Solana address formats by regex, reports the original address to the command-and-control channel, and overwrites the clipboard with the attacker’s address via pbcopy.
That means the substitution happens silently between copy and paste.
Finally, the malware can be controlled interactively. A c2_loop polls the Telegram bot for commands and supports a full operator toolkit:
/info for system details
/exec for arbitrary shell commands
/clipboard to read current clipboard contents
/download to pull specific files
/exfil to rerun the theft module
/selfdestruct to wipe traces
This makes the Telegram channel a real-time remote-control link, not just a one-way drop.
Living off the land, and off Telegram
The pattern here is familiar and getting more common: lean on tools that are already trusted.
The delivery abuses Apple’s own Script Editor. The configuration hides behind a trivial XOR rather than packed binaries. The command channel rides Telegram’s Bot API, which can pass through egress filters that would flag an unknown server.
None of these pieces is novel on its own. The effectiveness comes from stacking legitimate-looking components so no single step trips an alarm.
Detection opportunities
The lessons here are less about the lure and more about the technique itself.
Script Editor executing a one-line base64 do shell script that immediately quits is a strong behavioral signal, and a far better detection target than the disposable stage-one file. So is a hidden /tmp/.sysupd.sh downloaded by curl and launched in the background.
Browsers and download surfaces could treat .applescript files arriving from the web with the same suspicion as executables. And Telegram remains an under-addressed command-and-control medium that bot-token abuse reporting could disrupt at the source.
It starts with the familiar: a short message, a trusted name, a routine tone. Delivery updates, work pings, brand alerts hum in the background, rarely attracting scrutiny. You check, you answer… — until minutes later you’ve slipped into a trap built to lower your guard and hijack your trust.
That’s why messaging scams cut deep: they exploit everyday habits where instinct, not caution, leads. Communication once moved slowly, leaving room for doubt. Now it’s instant — and that speed is a weapon in criminal hands.
On our blog, we’ve already examined numerous scam schemes in messaging apps — from pig butchering, where the victim is groomed for a very long time, or catfishing, where the scammer creates a fake identity, to phishing via chatbots or through gift-giving campaigns in messaging apps.
Now, for the first time, Kaspersky has set out to capture the full end-to-end reality of messaging-based scams to understand how quickly harm occurs, how they impact trust and what remains after the interaction ends. What emerges is a highly organized and industrialized scam ecosystem embedded within everyday messaging channels such as SMS, WhatsApp, and email.
Kaspersky experts have prepared a report on targeted scams in messaging apps, detailing not only the financial but also the emotional damage caused by such attacks, as well as providing tips on how to protect yourself and avoid them. In this post, we explore the most interesting facts, but you can find more details in the full report.
The damage is underestimated
How much do you think a single successful attack via a messaging app costs the average victim? Ten dollars? Or maybe 50? You’re underestimating the scammers. Although more than a third (36%) of victims incur losses of less than $135, on average a victim loses… $733!
Country
Average loss per victim
Senegal
$392.94
Serbia
$493.32
Morocco
$504.28
Greece
$609.32
United Kingdom
$617.38
Côte d’Ivoire
$654.11
Spain
$672.67
United States
$724.73
Portugal
$868.20
Italy
$896.02
France
$1,193.58
Germany
$1,369.35
The average amount lost by a victim in a successful attack via a messaging app
On the one hand, the financial hit doesn’t look catastrophic in isolation. These are micro-losses by design. Small enough that some never report them to the police. Small enough that banks don’t always investigate. Small enough to be dismissed as bad luck rather than organized crime.
But $733 is not nothing. It’s enough to cover a month’s worth of groceries, school or daycare fees, or utility bills. Against the backdrop of the global cost-of-living crisis, a single such loss can seriously dent a family’s budget.
In 11% of cases, losses exceed $1,350, and more than a quarter of victims (28%) report having been scammed three or more times in the past six months. Once scammers discover that a phone number responds, that contact becomes an asset, circulating from one database to another.
Now imagine the scale of the problem: if just 10% of the three billion messaging‑app users worldwide fell victim with the average loss, the total damage would amount to… nearly $220 billion! This is comparable to the GDP of Greece, and exceeds that of Morocco, Serbia, or Côte d’Ivoire.
It becomes clear that behind the daily flood of fraudulent schemes lie large scam cartels operating on an industrial scale, using AI to personalize messages that mimic those of family members, friends, and familiar brands. This, in essence, forms the basis of a full-fledged economy built on digital identity theft.
Speed beats scrutiny
More than half of successful messaging scams (52%) unfold in under 30 minutes — from first contact to the moment money or personal data changes hands — or even faster, before the victim begins to doubt the legitimacy of the sender. In fact, one in seven scams takes less than five minutes — quicker than boiling an egg!
The speed isn’t accidental. It’s the method. Scammers structure their schemes to deny the victim a chance to come to their senses. Every element is engineered to compress the decision-making window: the urgency of the scenario, the familiarity of the format, the plausibility of the request.
They rush you — faster, faster, don’t tell anyone, you only have a few minutes, solve the problem, don’t ask questions. Click the link, fill in the details, approve the transaction, or else… Or else what? The scammers’ imagination knows no bounds here, but if you don’t do something right now, you’ll definitely regret it.
Alas, the realization of what has happened usually comes when the damage is already irreversible. More than half of victims (51%) lose money; another 43% hand over their personal data — most commonly phone numbers, names, and email addresses — to scammers, and often the victim loses both.
Where and how attacks occur
A delivery notification, a bank alert, a message from a merchant you ordered from last week — messaging apps permeate every aspect of everyday life, making such interactions completely normal. An attack shouldn’t feel like an attack. It should feel like the same message you’ve received hundreds of times.
It’s no surprise that scammers focus their attention on this method of communication first and foremost. The most popular platforms for scams are predictable: WhatsApp (43%), SMS/iMessage (40%), Facebook (27%), Telegram (22%), and Instagram (19%) — these are the ones that people trust most.
A wide variety of schemes is used. Brand impersonation is now one of the three most common types of messaging scam worldwide — accounting for 31% of cases. Fake delivery notifications top the list at 38%, followed by investment scams at 37%.
At the same time, nearly two-thirds (63%) of fraudulent schemes span multiple platforms, moving from SMS to WhatsApp, from WhatsApp to Telegram, etc. In this way, scammers achieve two goals: they mimic organic messaging and evade moderation algorithms.
AI has taken scams to a new level
Just a couple of years ago, fraudulent messages gave themselves away with bad grammar, awkward phrasing, illogical requests, and an obsessive sense of urgency. Today, a phishing message looks, sounds, and reads just like the real thing.
Scam cartels want to catch people in motion — between meetings, on a commute, or during everyday tasks — when your attention is already fragmented. They mimic your mother’s turn of phrase. They match your bank’s tone of voice. They copy your courier’s format exactly. They mirror the rhythm, structure, and style of authentic brand communications across messaging platforms. And AI is accelerating all of it.
What this creates is overlap. Legitimate and fraudulent messages appear in the same environment, using the same formats, language, and triggers. The difference between them is no longer obvious.
The data shows that two-thirds of victims (66%) believe AI was used in the scam against them, 42% cite messages written by AI, 31% report generated or cloned voices, and 25% encountered deepfake images or videos.
That’s why mere awareness and “tech-savviness” may no longer be enough to protect oneself. From Gen Z to Gen X, messaging scams cut across every generation.
And what about the emotional toll?
But money is far from the only problem a victim is left with after an attack. After what they’ve been through, people develop distrust toward incoming messages, unfamiliar numbers, and any requests for action. As a result, 99% of fraud victims say they no longer trust incoming notifications in messaging apps.
This creates a crisis of trust in all digital channels in general. Every legitimate message can now be perceived as a scam. Brands, banks, and delivery services are forced to operate in an environment where the customer is, by default, in a state of distrust.
Dr. Elizabeth Carter, a forensic linguist and criminologist at Kingston University in London, notes that scammers use familiar contexts, common social settings and embedded linguistic norms to create the illusion for the victim that their decision-making is rational and reasonable in the moment. However, what is actually happening is that they construct false realities in which those decisions end up causing financial and psychological harm. She also notes that it is very hard to identify a false reality while you are in it.
After realizing they had been deceived, more than half of victims felt anger — the kind that comes from having trusted something and discovering it was used against you. 42% of victims report frustration, 38% — feeling upset. Moreover, several months later, these feelings haven’t gone away: nearly half of all victims (48%) are still angry, a third (33%) remain frustrated, and 30% are upset.
And nearly one in 10 victims don’t tell anyone what happened. They feel shame, a sense of having fallen for something so obvious. This leaves a significant portion of the actual damage unreported: only 24% of victims contact the police, and only 23% report it to their bank.
So what can be done?
The crisis of trust — and even a touch of paranoia — that has arisen due to widespread attacks on users can linger in victims’ minds for a long time, affecting their quality of life. To prevent this, follow these guidelines:
Pause before you act. The sense of urgency you feel is almost always artificial. A legitimate bank, retailer, or delivery service won’t penalize you for taking 30 seconds to verify before clicking a link or confirming details. It’s precisely this instinct to resolve the situation quickly that scammers are counting on.
Verify through another channel. If a message appears to be from a relative, colleague, or company you trust — contact them through another channel before taking any action. Use secure verification methods, and cross-check identities when something doesn’t feel right. For families, agreeing on a “safe word” in advance can defeat even the most convincing voice clones.
Use a password manager. It will not only help you generate strong, unique passwords for all your accounts and store them securely, syncing them across all your devices, but also protect you from spoofed sites. Even if you click a phishing link and land on such a site, our password manager will notify you about the domain mismatch and refuse to autofill your username and password.
Use protection that works in real time. Modern security solutions, such as Kaspersky Premium, provide real-time protection against malicious links and phishing attempts in the apps and websites you use every day. On Android devices, a dedicated layer of anti-phishing security scans and neutralizes suspicious links as they appear, even within notifications, before you even have a chance to click them.
We’ve covered other threats in messaging apps in similar articles:
You’re working hard late at night, replying to emails and planning the week ahead. Then suddenly, a PDF file requests access to your camera. Why would a PDF need camera access?
Cybercriminals often disguise spyware inside seemingly harmless files and programs. An unexpected request for access to your webcam can be a red flag that something is amiss.
Malwarebytes Windows Webcam Monitoring alerts you if a program tries to access your camera, so you can allow trusted programs to continue or block suspicious ones instantly.
Spyware doesn’t just steal passwords. Some malicious apps try to access webcams to secretly spy on victims or capture sensitive information.
What does Windows Webcam Monitoring do?
Sends you an instant alert when a program tries to access your webcam.
Allows only the programs you trust to access your camera, blocking everything else.
Lets you manage notification preferences in Privacy Controls. A dedicated “Webcam Monitoring” table shows recognized programs and gives you control over which apps trigger alerts, and which don’t.
With the benefit of real-time alerts, Windows Webcam Monitoring gives you visibility into which programs are trying to access your devices. And when it’s something you don’t recognize, it may even help you stop spyware before it can spy on you.
At Malwarebytes, we believe security shouldn’t be complicated. Windows Webcam Monitoring is another step toward giving you simple, proactive protection that works automatically, so you can stay focused on pretty much anything else.
Ready to take control?
Update Malwarebytes for Windows, go to Privacy Controls and enable Webcam Monitoring.
Mozilla has published release notes for Firefox browser version 151.0, and this update includes several genuinely meaningful privacy and security improvements.
Three changes stand out in particular:
Stronger anti‑fingerprinting
Broader protection for local network access
More control over private sessions and permissions
Note that Mozilla says several Firefox 151 features are “part of a progressive roll out,” meaning they will appear for some users first and be expanded over time. So, you may not see all of them immediately.
Privacy
One of the more visible additions is a new “end private session” control in Private Browsing Mode. Instead of closing every private window to clear your traces, you now get a dedicated fire‑icon button next to the address bar that wipes the current private session’s data and immediately starts a fresh one.
End private session button
Under the hood, this clears the usual private browsing artifacts for that session, including history, cookies, cached files, and other site data that would normally disappear only when the last private window closes.
For people who routinely mix normal and private windows, this is safer and less error‑prone than hunting down every private tab before you walk away from the machine.
Firefox 151 also tightens its defenses against browser fingerprinting in the default “Standard” Enhanced Tracking Protection (ETP) mode. Mozilla says Firefox now limits the amount of device and browser information exposed to websites in a way that reduces the number of uniquely identifiable users by about 14% overall, and by roughly 49% on macOS.
This makes it harder for trackers to pick you out of the crowd, especially on platforms with fewer users to begin with (like certain macOS configurations). This reduces the privacy risk surface by default, which makes it harder for phishing and landing pages that redirect visitors to “categorize” you.
Another important change is Firefox’s “local network access restrictions,” which are now rolling out to all users, not just those who turned Enhanced Tracking Protection to Strict.
This means that when a website wants to communicate with devices on your local network, or with apps and services running on your machine, Firefox now asks for permission first. Chrome and Edge have been rolling out similar permission prompts.
The most notable example is CVE‑2026‑8953, a sandbox escape due to a use‑after‑free in the Disability Access APIs component. While there are currently no reports of in‑the‑wild exploitation for this specific bug at the time of writing, this is the kind of bug cybercriminals love.
A use-after-free (UAF) is a software memory vulnerability where a program attempts to access a memory location after it has been freed. If the program fails to clear the pointer to that freed memory, attackers can manipulate the error to crash the system or execute arbitrary code. A memory corruption leading to a sandbox escape is exactly the kind of link attackers want to complete a browser exploit chain.
How to update
If you’re running Firefox in a home or small‑office environment, we recommend updating to Firefox 151 as soon as possible to get the fingerprinting protections, local network access prompts, and security patches.
To update Firefox:
Open Firefox
Click the menu (three stacked lines) in the upper-right corner
Go to Help > About Firefox
Firefox will automatically check for updates and begin downloading them
Restart the browser when prompted to complete the update
Once your Firefox browser has been updated, it will show a green checkmark along with the message: “Firefox is up to date.”
Let’s face it, an incognito window can only do so much.
Breaches, dark web trading, credit fraud. Malwarebytes Identity Theft Protection monitors for all of it, alerts you fast, and comes with identity theft insurance.
If you’re worried about deepfake likenesses of yourself showing up online, you’re not alone; YouTube is worried for you. It wants to protect you by having you upload a selfie video and government ID to its site.
The idea is that the video giant will use its own AI to patrol the service for fake videos using your likeness. In exchange, you get the chance to have them taken down.
This isn’t available for everyone, though. It’s for celebs, those in vulnerable jobs, and now, most YouTube creators.
YouTube has been working on this concept, which it calls its “likeness detection” system, since it first floated the idea publicly in September 2024. That December, it launched a partnership with the Creative Artists Agency that saw it using the technology with sporting and entertainment figures.
In October last year, it expanded likeness detection to cover more creators, and then in March it expanded it again to cover politicians and journalists. And last month, it widened the net again, offering the service to Hollywood celebs. They can use it regardless of whether they have a YouTube account, it added.
Now, in its latest move, anyone 18 or older with a selfie and ID can sign up. At least in theory, as it hasn’t rolled out to everyone yet. It’s also for faces only; AI-generated voice clones are another problem entirely.
The privacy risk
Privacy advocates warned that YouTube’s likeness detection system could normalize handing biometric data to large tech platforms, even if YouTube says the data is only used to improve likeness detection models with creator permission.
On the help page for the likeness detection service, YouTube says creators can separately choose whether their face and voice templates are used to improve its likeness detection models.
“When you sign up for Likeness detection, you also have the option to allow YouTube to use your face and voice templates to develop and improve likeness detection models. This helps us build better, more accurate likeness detection technologies.”
Adding:
“You can opt out of YouTube’s use of this data for development and improvement of likeness models at any time.”
YouTube supports legislation intended to tackle deepfakes, such as the NO FAKES and TAKE IT DOWN acts. These are designed to help stop the misappropriation of someone’s image online. TAKE IT DOWN, which became law a year ago, focuses purely on “nonconsensual intimate imagery.” But that doesn’t cover other kinds of deepfakes, such as fake politicians or celebrity endorsements. Those are becoming increasingly common. NO FAKES, which hasn’t yet become law, is far broader in scope, assigning people federal rights over their own image.
So is it worth the trade?
Deepfakes, intimate and otherwise, are definitely a threat, especially for YouTubers who become popular. And the barrier to entry is lowering all the time. Google’s own DeepMind researchers found most generative AI misuse isn’t sophisticated; it’s mundane likeness manipulation by anyone with a browser.
So do you hand over your face and government ID for your protection, to a company whose broader data collection practices have faced years of scrutiny, and hope its policies don’t change? Or do you skip it and hope that the deepfake merchants don’t decide to target you?
Creators commenting on YouTube’s video revealing the service six months ago were less than impressed. One commenter said:
“I was 100% on board, up until the ID upload. That makes me very uncomfortable.”
Echoing several others who complained that it’s difficult to get takedown requests actioned, another added:
“If YouTube actually acted upon these kinds of reports, then I’d be more in favour of this.”
Whether you decide to sign up for the service or not, just be sure to do it with your eyes open.
Someone’s watching your accounts. Make sure it’s us.
Microsoft said it will change Edge’s password handling as a “defense‑in‑depth” measure.
Originally, Edge decrypted the entire saved‑password store on startup and kept all credentials resident in process memory in clear text for the whole browser session, regardless of whether a given credential was ever used or not.
A short while ago, Microsoft said this plaintext password behavior was by design. Now, Microsoft has changed course, and the new password-handling behavior is already present in Canary (the experimental preview version of Microsoft Edge), with rollout prioritized across all channels.
The researcher who originally flagged the issue said:
“Edge is the only Chromium‑based browser I’ve tested that behaves this way. By contrast, Chrome uses a design that makes it far harder for attackers to extract saved passwords by simply reading process memory.”
Microsoft Edge Security Lead Gareth Evans said Microsoft is now taking a broader view and has committed to changing Edge so that saved passwords are no longer loaded into memory on startup as clear text. As a result, exposure will be reduced as a defense‑in‑depth improvement. That means even if an attacker has administrative control of a device, it becomes harder to harvest all the passwords.
According to Microsoft:
“Going forward, Microsoft Edge will no longer load all saved passwords into memory at browser startup. Instead, passwords will be decrypted only when needed for autofill or password management operations.”
The change is already live in the Edge Canary channel and will be included in the next update for all supported Edge releases (build 148 and newer across Stable, Beta, Dev, Canary, and Extended Stable).
The reason for this change is probably more reputational and strategic rather than an acknowledgment of an exploitable vulnerability. Microsoft seems to want to align reality with its “secure by design” messaging and reduce a very visible, easy‑to‑demo weakness, even if it still doesn’t treat it as a classic memory‑disclosure bug.
Passwords in your browser
Please note that this change just means Edge will become roughly as secure an option to store passwords as every other Chromium-based browser.
Your browser password manager gives you ease of use, but that comes with some security tradeoffs. Of course, password managers aren’t foolproof either, so it’s important to decide for yourself where you store your passwords.
If you’re confident a website is safe, and anyone who can access it under your account wouldn’t learn anything sensitive, feel free to store the password in your browser, but disable autofill so you stay in control.
Use MFA where possible. It enormously reduces the risk if someone gets hold of your password. And avoid using the browser password manager to store your credit card details or other sensitive personally identifiable information, such as medical information.
Let’s face it, an incognito window can only do so much.
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