Kodak told SecurityWeek it believes there is no threat to its systems or operations as a result of the cybersecurity incident.
The post Kodak Admits Data Breach After ShinyHunters Hack Claims appeared first on SecurityWeek.
The public PoC code exploits a race condition in Microsoft Defender to spawn a command prompt with System privileges.
The post Microsoft Working on Patch for ‘RoguePlanet’ Zero-Day appeared first on SecurityWeek.
In 1838, the invention of the camera sparked predictions that photography would make artists obsolete. When the noted French painter Paul Delaroche first saw an early photograph on a metal plate, he declared that “From today, painting is dead!” As he reasoned, why would anyone pay an artist to slowly and laboriously paint a scene when a camera could do the job more accurately, more quickly, and at a lower cost?
This question has echoed through technological shifts and has resurfaced with intensity in recent weeks, as university students graduated on campuses across the United States. Today’s topic obviously is not photography but the societal impact of artificial intelligence. And as graduates booed the mention of AI during commencement addresses, they have provided a powerful reminder of several important truths. To start, people will insist on having a say in deciding when and how AI is used.
The reactions of this year’s graduates are a powerful wake-up call for the tech sector. Hopefully, leaders across our industry will listen and seek to learn from this reaction. For the past half century, the youngest generation of people and workers has led the way in adopting new digital technologies. A new Microsoft study shows this trend is true with AI. Counties with large college towns and outsized populations between the ages of 18 and 24 have the highest rates of AI adoption in the United States. When people who use a new technology complain about it, we had better take notice.
It’s perhaps no surprise that college campuses are among the best places to learn about these emerging views firsthand. Over Memorial Day weekend at Princeton University, I found no shortage of discussion and even examples of student action. Graduating seniors have long donned “beer jackets” for celebrations, each class selecting its own unique design. This past year, however, a brief controversy emerged until class officers, responding to a student petition, rejected a popular design because it had been created with the help of AI. In its place, graduates wore jackets labeled both “100 percent cotton” and “100 percent human.”
The rejection of artificial fibers and artificial intelligence illustrates how human tastes shape market economics even as efficiency and productivity advance. Machines don’t buy products. People do.
Students and graduates recognize AI’s benefits. But they want to keep AI in its proper place. They rightly believe in the indispensable role of human agency. They want the future to be determined by humans deciding the role of machines, not by machines deciding the role of humans. And they want these decisions to reflect input from a broad community, especially the next generation of the workforce, rather than just a narrow group of elites.
Today’s graduates are sending another powerful message as well: the American Dream has always stood for even more than a better job and greater economic opportunity, although that has been at its core. The American Dream has been founded on the dignity of work and the critical role it plays in giving life purpose. Great countries are built on great economies and great jobs. To those in the tech sector who seemingly want to pursue a future where computers replace jobs and AI becomes more capable than people, the next generation of people has offered a compelling response: “not so fast.”
The good news is that human ambition is irrepressible. It has been almost 300 years since the start of the first industrial revolution, and technology has changed many times over. But there is more human creativity at work in the world today than ever before.
A trip to an art museum shows this is true even for the impact of the camera on painting. The invention of the camera initially led to a decline in portrait painting. But even that made a comeback. More remarkable was the way accurate photos spurred new forms of artistic expression. By the 1870s, photography’s “artificial eye” led a new generation of artists to portray emotion rather than detail. Impressionist artists captured the effects of light, color, and atmosphere in ways that a camera shutter could not. New artistic movements followed – Post-Impressionism, Fauvism, Cubism, and Surrealism – and continue today, expanding what it means to be an artist. As it turns out, few things are as resilient as human creativity.
In 1986, I insisted on having a computer on my desk before I accepted a job at a leading law firm in Washington, D.C. For most of the past 40 years, I’ve been part of the tech sector – first as an outside lawyer, then a Microsoft attorney, and since 2001, in the company’s leadership ranks. I’ve long been an informal “liberal arts representative” among a group of extraordinary computer scientists and engineers.
As I’ve followed technologists across our industry, I’ve often marveled at their vision, intellectual dexterity, and engineering prowess. But I’ve also seen many insightful individuals across the industry repeat two mistakes. First, they frequently overestimate the arrival of new technology, especially the pace of its impact. And even more importantly, they underestimate the capabilities of people.
Human capability is neither fixed nor finite. Each discovery creates a stronger foundation that enables people to stand taller and reach higher. People have been proving this for millennia. There came a day when people discovered that a horse could run faster than a human. People learned how to ride horses.
None of this is meant to dismiss the anxiety of today’s graduates. They’re right to raise concerns and ask hard questions, including about AI and its impact on their future. They face multiple headwinds as they enter the job market. This includes AI automation of tasks in current entry-level positions and, especially in the tech sector, corporate pressure to reduce headcount to help pay for AI’s enormous capital expenditures. It also involves other factors, including geopolitical uncertainty, trade tensions, and correction from over-hiring in the early years of the decade. Like a perfect storm, the wind is blowing from multiple directions.
Today’s graduates have been through a lot. They spent much of their high school years living through a pandemic while studying and socializing at home through a screen. They are digital natives, with all the good and bad that social media, ubiquitous mobile devices, and other technologies have created. Now AI is coming, and they worry that jobs will start to disappear.
So, what should the next generation – and all the rest of us – do about AI?
First, we should put AI in context. No one has a crystal ball for the future, but we all can learn from the past. AI is the latest in a list of technologies that will reshape the economy and society. It has become the next “General Purpose Technology,” a term economists apply to technologies that, like electricity, are applied across the economy. Some of these technologies, including ironworking, machine tools, and digital computing, have profoundly reshaped not just job categories but economic power among nations. AI likely will be one of the most important general purpose technologies of the next quarter century. And like previous general purpose technologies, AI will displace some jobs, even as it creates others and changes many of the ways we currently work.
But it takes time for technology to diffuse across an economy and around the world. There are some who look at the power of AI and predict its massive diffusion in just a few years. It’s always possible that this time will be different, but the world has never previously seen technology diffusion at that pace. The reason is not grounded in technology. It’s people. As Professors Arvind Narayanan and Sayash Kapoor have written, “diffusion is limited by the speed of human, organizational, and institutional change.”
Put in historical context, broad AI transformation over the next quarter century would itself be remarkable. That pace of change appears to be reflected in Microsoft’s own recent data. Our most recent AI Diffusion Report estimates that 17.8 percent of the world’s working age population currently uses generative AI. The rate in the United States is higher than the global average, but still only at 31.3 percent. And as Professor Narayanan has shown, the impact of new technology across a high percentage of work typically lags well behind this type of initial usage rate.
As the legendary UCLA basketball coach John Wooden, who led his teams to 10 national championships, advised his players two generations ago, we should “be quick, but don’t hurry.” In other words, we should act quickly and decisively and with preparation and purpose. But we need not – and should not – rush in a way that creates mistakes or panic.
The key is to think things through. One good way to start is to consider some of the insights that have emerged already. For each of us as individuals. For companies and organizations. And for society.
In the three-and-a-half years since the release of ChatGPT, one initial insight is profound yet unsurprising. AI often is at its best when we use it to strengthen existing human capabilities and endeavors. In short, people can use AI to make themselves better.
I see this every day in the work of Microsoft’s AI for Good Lab, which works with non-profits and governments around the world. Firefighters in California are using AI to help spot wildfires more quickly. Legal professionals in Africa are using it to help provide advice to women who don’t have access to a lawyer. Teams in Ukraine are using AI to help identify and remove landmines that threaten civilians. And conservationists around the world are using it to help farmers develop more productive and sustainable agricultural practices.
There is a clear pattern in these examples. People are acting with ambition. They are using AI not to replace their subject matter expertise but to give it more impact. They are taking their knowledge, passion, and sense of purpose and using AI to help solve problems they care about.
My colleagues Ryan Roslansky and Aneesh Raman have been focusing on these issues in recent years, based on their longstanding work at LinkedIn. They recently published an important book on the topic, Open to Work: How to Get Ahead in the Age of AI. In my view, it’s the first book that combines a view on where AI is going with practical advice for individuals.
The more I’ve thought about it, two of their themes are particularly important. The first is for each of us in the workforce today to think about our job not as a title but a bundle of tasks. Their advice is to write down a list of your tasks and put them into three buckets: the bucket of tasks that AI can do; the bucket of tasks that you can do with AI; and the bucket of tasks that humans must do by themselves.
If almost everything is in the first bucket, then one should think about pursuing a different type of job. But for most people, most tasks fall into the second bucket. In other words, if I can get AI to do the tasks in the first bucket, then I can focus my attention on the second and third buckets and consider how to use AI as a tool to help become more productive and impactful.
There’s a second insight in the book that is even more important. In an Age of AI, there are perhaps even more opportunities to distinguish ourselves based on the soft skills that are uniquely human. Ryan and Aneesh point to five, all of which start with the letter C – curiosity, creativity, compassion, communications, and courage. Even when AI automates multiple tasks, people must continue to oversee its work. This creates the need for additional human observation and insight. In short, human judgment remains essential.
All this speaks to one of the questions I hear repeatedly from students and their parents. What should people study to prepare for the future? Call me old fashioned, but I believe people should continue to pursue their passions. Develop expertise in an important field that fascinates you. Keep working hard to master it. At the same time, develop AI fluency so you can use AI to help apply your expertise better than has ever been possible before. This doesn’t mean the future will be easy. It seldom is. But it’s a recipe that will continue to prepare you for success.
These insights apply as much to organizations as to individuals. After all, employers must thrive for employees to thrive. And successful businesses, like successful individuals, rely on distinctive and often deep expertise – about products, business processes, operating rhythms, and a deep understanding of customers. AI should not replace this foundation; it should strengthen and extend it.
This can build on where AI technology is going. Organizations can now move beyond chat-based assistants to a network with AI agents that can help employees reason, make decisions, and run workflows across their data and systems.
Organizations can implement their own AI systems that harness the power of multiple AI models and access their own unique enterprise knowledge. They can strengthen the effectiveness of these systems through AI tools that provide evaluations (“evals”) of a system’s performance and constantly make incremental improvements to it. Like climbing up a hill, each organization can manage an AI system that moves towards better outcomes and higher performance over time. Instead of solely consuming a frontier AI model, organizations can build their own “hill climbing machine” and participate more fully on their own terms in the AI ecosystem.
By taking this approach, organizations can use AI to accelerate learning rather than replace it. Leaders can use AI to add capabilities inside their organizations, ensuring that their human expertise and judgment remain key competitive differentiators.
This points to an age-old necessity. Business leaders and individual entrepreneurs must harness the latest technology while protecting their expertise and intellectual property, including through patents, copyrights, and trade secrets. AI adds a new dimension here. The benefits of AI for a business will be short-lived if it transfers and trains someone else’s AI model using a firm’s unique knowledge and expertise. This helps explain why each company needs to develop its own internal AI capabilities and control its own data.
This is emerging as a critical issue not only for organizations but for today’s graduates, our economies, and even nations. The best way to promote broad economic and job growth is to ensure that every economic sector can harness the power of AI without surrendering its unique expertise. Sovereignty must be preserved not only for countries but for companies. And privacy must be protected not only for individuals but for organizations.
For individuals and organizations alike, the key is to harness AI’s benefits while preserving timeless human values and economic needs. Given the magnitude of the AI transformation, we’ll need innovative and collaborative efforts that bring the public and private sectors together to help prepare people for success in the Age of AI. This should start with a sobering recognition. The technological, economic, and societal transformations of the past three decades have left too many people behind. We’ll need to try different approaches, built on more shared responsibilities, if we’re going to do better as we move forward.
Even in a time of fractured public discourse, it will be critical to find more ways to bring more people together to develop common solutions. This requires a big tent with a breadth of perspectives. We need to make room not only for technology companies, employers, and governments, but for non-profits, students, the world’s religions, labor leaders, and workers themselves. As Liz Shuler, the President of the AFL-CIO, said recently, “Who knows best how workplaces function and how work gets done than people who work for a living?”
As a company, we’re committed to playing an active part and constructive role in addressing these issues. We bring not only new technologies and ways of working, but perspective born of experience. For more than 50 years, Microsoft has helped workers and organizations adapt to technological changes, whether in offices, labs, classrooms, or factories. Our mission has been to build products to empower people and organizations to achieve more. And then help them put those tools to work.
Our experience gives us determination and even a dose of optimism. We remember when people worried that word processing would lead to the end of jobs for people who typed for a living. But what came next – knowledge work and entirely new industries to support the computer age – transformed what “work” was. When spreadsheets automated calculations, people didn’t do less math. They built more sophisticated financial models. When emails made communication instant, people didn’t write less. They communicated more frequently and with more people. When technology increases supply, human ambition often generates more demand. As humans, we don’t plateau. We expand.
This isn’t just philosophical. It’s our business model. Workers have been Microsoft’s lifeblood from the start. If the world’s people don’t have jobs, then neither do we. And if we’re not doing our part to help people use technology to pursue better jobs, then we’re not doing the job we were born to do.
This context shapes our reaction to recent commencement ceremonies. Graduating students who grimace or even boo at references to AI are telling us what we need to hear, that it’s time once again to raise the bar. That has been a frequent refrain from students for decades. The key is always to channel uncertainty into purposeful steps that build a better future. Across the tech sector and in business, non-profits, and government, we can do precisely that.
I would add a second message for today’s graduates: you’re in a unique position to have a positive impact. You’ve lived through significant challenges. While it may feel unfair that the job market is so uncertain, you were made for this moment. Technology is second nature to your generation. Constant change has taught you how to adapt quickly. As AI reshapes how we work, you don’t need to unlearn decades of habits the way some of us do. You are better equipped to move forward.
Technology will change, but you can stand firmly and speak loudly for values that are timeless. Agency. Ambition. Dignity. All fulfilled through work and technology that gives us purpose.
Do everything you can to help advance these values.
The post AI, jobs, and the next generation appeared first on Microsoft On the Issues.
Our new guide explores how infostealers are fueling modern identity-based attacks and how organizations can build a proactive defense before stolen access is weaponized.
Table Of ContentsA publicly exposed database surfaced in early 2026 containing more than 149 million stolen login credentials. The records were not tied to a single breach or organization. Instead, they had been quietly collected over time from devices infected with information-stealing malware, with each record containing usernames, passwords, session data, and the context needed to use them.
Unlike traditional breach dumps, this data was structured, searchable, and immediately actionable. Credentials were mapped to specific services, session artifacts reflected active logins, and much of the information was recent enough to enable direct access without triggering traditional security controls.
This incident reflects a broader shift in the threat landscape.
More than 11.1 million devices were infected with infostealers last year, fueling a supply of over 3.3 billion stolen credentials, session cookies, cloud tokens, and other forms of identity data now circulating across illicit markets.
For security teams, the challenge is no longer simply detecting a breach after it occurs. It is understanding when access may already exist — where compromised credentials are circulating, how they are being used, and how quickly they can be weaponized.
That’s why Flashpoint created Identity Is the New Attack Surface: A Guide to Infostealers and Proactive Defense.
Drawing on Flashpoint’s Primary Source Collection (PSC) and analyst-driven intelligence, this guide helps IT, Threat Intelligence, Fraud, and HUNT teams understand how infostealers operate, how stolen identity data fuels real-world attacks, and how organizations can move from reactive response to proactive defense.
The guide explores:
For years, security teams focused on vulnerabilities, malware delivery, and network intrusion as the primary paths to compromise. Increasingly, however, threat actors are taking a different
Modern infostealers such as Lumma, StealC, Vidar, Acreed, and Rhadamanthys provide attackers with something more valuable than initial access: usable identity. These malware families collect credentials, browser artifacts, session cookies, application data, and host metadata that help threat actors understand how a victim authenticates and what systems they can access.
A single infected device can expose credentials, browser artifacts, session cookies, application data, host metadata, and access to enterprise SaaS platforms. Together, these artifacts create a detailed profile of how a user authenticates, what systems they access, and how those systems trust that identity.
This is what makes infostealer data so valuable.
“For years, organizations have invested heavily in detecting malware, blocking exploits, and hardening infrastructure. Meanwhile, attackers have increasingly shifted to a simpler strategy: logging in with valid identities.
Infostealers have fundamentally changed the economics of access. Threat actors no longer need to compromise a network directly when billions of credentials, session cookies, and authentication artifacts are already circulating in underground ecosystems. The challenge for defenders has risen from preventing compromise to identifying where access already exists and how quickly it can be weaponized.”
Ian Gray, Vice President of Intelligence at Flashpoint
Identity data is inherently reusable. A stolen credential can be tested across multiple services. A session cookie can potentially allow attackers to hijack authenticated sessions. Browser and host metadata can help threat actors recreate a victim’s environment and bypass security controls designed to detect suspicious logins.
What begins as a single infection can quickly evolve into access across multiple systems, applications, and organizations.
Identity-based attacks occur when threat actors use legitimate credentials, session cookies, authentication tokens, or other identity artifacts to gain access to systems and applications. Rather than exploiting a vulnerability or deploying malware inside a target environment, attackers authenticate as trusted users using stolen identity data.
This shift is one of the primary reasons infostealers have become so valuable. Modern infostealer logs often contain far more than usernames and passwords. They may also include browser cookies, session information, host metadata, application data, and other artifacts that help attackers understand how a user authenticates and what systems they can access. When combined, this information enables account takeover, fraud, lateral movement, and other forms of identity-based abuse.
The way threat actors operationalize stolen data is evolving just as rapidly as the data itself.
Historically, attackers often had to manually review stolen credentials and determine which accounts were worth pursuing. Today, that process is increasingly automated.
Infostealer logs can be aggregated, tested, and prioritized at scale, allowing threat actors to rapidly identify valid access across enterprise systems, SaaS platforms, VPNs, and cloud environments.
Flashpoint identifies this as a hybrid threat: the convergence of large-scale identity compromise and automated exploitation.
Once valid access is identified, attackers can move quickly. Credentials may be reused across services. Session data can be leveraged for account takeover. Access can be sold to ransomware operators, fraud actors, or other criminal groups. In many cases, exposure itself becomes part of the attack lifecycle rather than merely a precursor to it.
The result is a threat landscape where stolen identity data is not simply stored and sold. It is continuously tested, validated, reused, and operationalized.
For defenders, prevention remains important. But prevention alone is no longer enough.
Organizations must also be able to identify when credentials, session cookies, and other identity artifacts have already been exposed and are circulating within underground ecosystems.
The earliest opportunity to intervene is often after data has been exfiltrated but before attackers have successfully operationalized it.
Achieving that visibility requires more than traditional breach feeds or aggregated datasets.
Flashpoint’s Primary Source Collection approach provides direct visibility into the forums, marketplaces, Telegram channels, malware repositories, and illicit communities where infostealer activity originates. Rather than relying solely on recycled breach data, Flashpoint continuously collects from the environments where stolen identity data is first shared, sold, and operationalized.
However, collection alone is not enough.
Raw infostealer logs are noisy, fragmented, and difficult to operationalize at scale. Flashpoint transforms these logs into structured intelligence through a multi-stage workflow that includes:
This process helps defenders understand not only what was exposed, but who may be affected, how exposure occurred, what systems may be at risk, and how quickly action is required.
The rise of infostealers has fundamentally changed how organizations should think about attack surface management.
The attack surface is no longer limited to infrastructure, endpoints, or internet-facing applications. It now includes the digital identities of employees, partners, vendors, and customers.
Security teams need visibility into the identity layer itself — understanding where exposure exists, how attackers are leveraging stolen data, and what actions should be taken before access is exploited.
By combining direct visibility into underground ecosystems with structured, actionable intelligence, organizations can identify compromised accounts earlier, uncover infection trends, prioritize response efforts, and reduce the likelihood of downstream compromise.
Download Identity Is the New Attack Surface: A Guide to Infostealers and Proactive Defense to learn how your organization can build a proactive defense program across the identity layer.
According to Flashpoint research:
What is an infostealer?
An infostealer is a type of malware designed to collect sensitive information from an infected device. Depending on the strain, this can include usernames and passwords, browser cookies, session tokens, saved payment information, cryptocurrency wallets, system metadata, and other identity-related artifacts.
How do infostealers work?
Infostealers infect a victim’s device and collect information such as credentials, browser data, session cookies, autofill information, cryptocurrency wallet data, and system metadata. The stolen information is packaged into files known as infostealer logs, which can then be sold, shared, or operationalized by threat actors.
What information can infostealers steal?
Depending on the malware family, infostealers can collect usernames and passwords, session cookies, authentication tokens, browser history, saved payment information, cryptocurrency wallet data, system information, installed applications, and other identity-related artifacts. The goal is to provide attackers with enough information to access accounts and impersonate legitimate users.
What are the most common infostealers?
The infostealer ecosystem changes rapidly, but Flashpoint analysts currently track strains such as Lumma (also known as LummaC2/Remus), StealC, Vidar, Acreed, and Rhadamanthys among the most prominent malware families driving credential theft and identity-based attacks.
Why are infostealers so dangerous?
Infostealers provide attackers with more than credentials. Modern infostealer logs often contain the context needed to use stolen data, including session information, browser artifacts, and device metadata. This allows threat actors to perform account takeovers, move laterally within environments, and gain access to business-critical systems. According to Flashpoint’s 2026 Global Threat Intelligence Report, more than 11.1 million devices were infected with infostealers last year, contributing to a pool of over 3.3 billion stolen credentials, session cookies, cloud tokens, and other identity artifacts.
What is an infostealer log?
An infostealer log is a package of data collected from an infected device. Logs may contain credentials, cookies, browser data, application information, host metadata, and other artifacts that help attackers understand how a victim authenticates and what systems they can access.
Can infostealers bypass multi-factor authentication (MFA)?
In some cases, yes. While multifactor authentication remains a critical security control, stolen session cookies and authenticated session data can sometimes allow threat actors to hijack existing sessions without needing to complete the MFA process themselves. Flashpoint found that more than 4.2% of infostealer-exposed credentials in its dataset were associated with browser cookies, highlighting the growing importance of session-based risk.
How do threat actors obtain infostealer logs?
Infostealer logs are frequently bought and sold across illicit marketplaces, forums, Telegram channels, and other underground communities. Many are distributed through Malware-as-a-Service (MaaS) offerings that make infostealer capabilities accessible to a wide range of threat actors. Flashpoint analysts identified more than 30 unique infostealer strains actively offered for sale across underground ecosystems.
How can organizations detect credential exposure from infostealers?
Organizations can monitor underground sources where stolen data is shared and sold, identify exposed credentials associated with their domains, and investigate related artifacts such as cookies, host metadata, and malware attribution. The earlier exposure is identified, the greater the opportunity to remediate before attackers operationalize access. Flashpoint collects and parses some infostealer logs within one to two days of infection, helping organizations detect exposure closer to the point of compromise.
What should organizations do if employee credentials appear in an infostealer log?
Organizations should immediately assess the scope of exposure, reset affected credentials, invalidate active sessions, review authentication activity, investigate the infected device, and determine whether additional accounts or systems may have been impacted.
How is Flashpoint’s approach to infostealer intelligence different from traditional breach monitoring?
Many organizations rely on aggregated breach feeds or credential dumps that may be weeks or months old by the time they are discovered. Flashpoint’s Primary Source Collection (PSC) approach provides direct visibility into the forums, marketplaces, Telegram channels, and underground communities where stolen identity data is first shared, sold, and operationalized.
In addition to collecting raw infostealer logs, Flashpoint parses and enriches the data with context such as malware attribution, session cookies, host metadata, browser artifacts, and affected identities. Today, Flashpoint’s credential database contains more than 48 billion credentials, including over 1 billion tied to infostealer activity, providing organizations with actionable intelligence rather than raw exposure data.
The post Identity Is the New Attack Surface: How Infostealers Are Reshaping Enterprise Risk appeared first on Flashpoint.
As part of our ongoing series, we focus on the shared infrastructure that fuels threat actors; the intersection of mainstream social media, open-source messaging platforms, and gaming communities.
Table Of ContentsThreat actors and their illicit communities do not exist in a vacuum. To scale their operations, coordinate financial fraud, deploy malware, and recruit new talent, threat actors must interface with the broader digital world. This means leveraging everyday, public digital spaces to facilitate illicit activity, effectively hiding in plain sight.
When conceptualizing the cybercriminal underground, it is easy to focus exclusively on Tor-based onion sites or restricted-access dark web forums and marketplaces. However, a massive portion of modern illicit activity thrives on the clearnet. Threat actors heavily utilize commercial social media and public messaging networks to coordinate fraud, deploy malware, and run public relations campaigns for their operations.
At first glance, conducting illicit operations on highly monitored, mainstream platforms seems counterintuitive. However, the massive, continuous volume of legitimate traffic on the clearnet provides a form of operational security. By blending into the noise, threat actors can maintain a highly accessible digital presence. This visibility is crucial for their business models: it allows them to maintain a low barrier to entry for potential recruits and targets who know exactly what markers to look for, or who are systematically funneled into these spaces.
The misuse of mainstream communication tools has changed how threat actors interact. Rather than waiting for users to seek out the dark web, cybercriminals are actively meeting their targets or co-conspirators on platforms designed for daily socialization.
Originally built to connect gaming communities, Discord’s rapid growth and robust infrastructure have inadvertently made it a target for malicious activity. Cybercriminals treat the platform as a multi-functional tool for both technical infrastructure, social engineering, and radicalization.
On a technical level, advanced persistent threats (APTs) and other threat actors exploit Discord’s content delivery network (CDN) to host and distribute malware. Because traffic to Discord domains is generally trusted by corporate networks, threat actors can potentially use it to deliver payloads—such as infostealers and remote access trojans (RATs)—bypassing standard security perimeters.
Beyond hosting malware, extremist groups across various ideological spectrums often target the platform’s demographic, which skews heavily towards younger tech-savvy users. This group provides an impressionable pool of adolescents who may be susceptible to grooming, indoctrination, and recruitment into illicit operations.
While monitoring The Com, Flashpoint analysts have observed the systematic use of platforms like Discord, Roblox, and Minecraft to run predatory extortion pipelines. The mechanics of this ecosystem takes place through a multi-phase methodology:
Once isolated, perpetrators coerce victims into sending sensitive imagery or CSAM. This material is immediately compiled and weaponized as leverage for blackmail via doxxing. This creates a severe psychological trap in which the victim feels compelled to partake in escalating illegal activity to keep their previous actions hidden. This drives the victim to transition from a victim into an aggressor to escape their own abuse.
While many social media and messaging platforms can serve as an initial funnel for engagement, Telegram has been known to be used from time to time as an operational hub for the broader illicit ecosystem. Since the arrest of Pavel Durov, Telegram has begun working more closely with law enforcement, leading to several key arrests and major disruptions due to their cooperation.
The platform occupies a unique space in threat intelligence and open source intelligence (OSINT). While the vast majority of its user base is entirely benign, its minimal moderation policy and robust channel architecture have made it vital to public and private intelligence gathering.
Telegram functions as an open marketplace and real-time coordination center for a vast spectrum of threat actors. Flashpoint has observed it being used by:
Furthermore, threat actors routinely use other public-facing platforms like X (formerly Twitter) alongside Telegram to amplify their impact. They leverage the broad reach of social media to broadcast proof of their compromises, hype up ransomware leaks, and exert public pressure on corporate victims during extortion cycles. Concurrently, Telegram often acts as the backend repository where the stolen data is hosted, discussed, and monetized.
The evolution of illicit ecosystems demonstrates that the lines between the dark web and the clearnet have intersected. Whether analyzing the activities of extremist and threat actor groups or tracking the predatory pipelines of The Com, defenders must look beyond traditional intelligence sources.
Because malicious actors rely heavily on consumer messaging apps and social platforms to coordinate attacks, leak data, and target people, monitoring these public-to-private pipelines is an essential component of threat intelligence. Uncovering these physical and cyber threats requires best-in-class threat intelligence and OSINT investigations capable of parsing the massive noise of the clearnet to find the signals of illicit coordination.
Request a demo to see how Flashpoint empowers security teams to monitor these decentralized threat landscapes to proactively protect their critical assets.
| Check out the rest of our “Understanding Illicit Ecosystems” series: |
| Understanding Illicit Ecosystems: The Hybrid Threat of “The Com” |
| Understanding Illicit Ecosystems: XSS and the Current State of the Russian-Speaking Underground |
The post Understanding Illicit Ecosystems: Weaponizing Mainstream Apps and Social Infrastructure appeared first on Flashpoint.
The Meta-owned communications app is filing a federal court contempt order against NSO.
The post WhatsApp Catches Spyware Firm NSO Defying No-Hacking Court Order appeared first on SecurityWeek.
Artificial intelligence is accelerating discovery across the life sciences. From drug development to materials science, AI is helping researchers move faster and solve problems once thought intractable. This convergence of AI and biology holds extraordinary promise for human health, economic growth, and scientific leadership.
At the same time, advances in AI technologies are introducing new risks, like re-engineered toxins and pathogens. As these tools become more capable and widely accessible, they can lower barriers not only to scientific discovery, but also to accidental harm and deliberate misuse. For example, recent research has shown that specialized AI tools for protein design can be used to re-engineer toxins in ways that may preserve harmful function while evading some existing synthesis safeguards. That work revealed vulnerabilities in screening systems designed for an earlier technological era—and also showed that those systems can be strengthened through coordinated action across industry, government, and the scientific community.
Rising biosecurity concerns are not a reason to slow innovation, but they are a reason to strengthen our defenses. History shows that powerful general-purpose technologies become more accessible—as with advances in networking and computing—effective governance depends on developing technical and policy safeguards early, before misuse outpaces controls and oversight. The convergence of AI and biology presents a similar challenge: we must preserve the openness that fuels discovery while modernizing protections for a new era of capability.
This blog examines how advances across the AI-biology ecosystem are reshaping both opportunity and risk. It explains why nucleic acid synthesis screening has emerged as a critical control point, and how government, industry, and the scientific community can work together to strengthen biosecurity without slowing innovation.
To better understand the trajectory of AI capabilities in the biosciences—and the associated policy and risk landscape—it is useful to distinguish among four related types of advances. Each matter on its own, but effective policy will need to account for how these advances increasingly interact and reinforce one another.
While each category can be analyzed separately, the most consequential developments arise from how these capabilities increasingly interact. Improvements in generalist models can make specialized biological tools easier to use; those tools make it easier to engineer biology; automated laboratories provide non-experts with access to sophisticated laboratory workflows; and agentic programming tools can connect these elements into integrated design, analysis, and synthesis workflows. Together, these advances are forming a converging “capability stack”—one that can accelerate innovation but lead to a more complex policy and risk landscape.
Why nucleic acid synthesis screening matters
These developments make clear that effective governance must focus not only on frontier models but also expand to consider multiple practical control points.
One of the most effective near‑term defenses against biological misuse is nucleic acid synthesis screening. Synthetic DNA providers sit at a critical checkpoint in the biotechnology ecosystem. They are often the place where theoretical biological designs are translated into physical reality. Screening DNA orders and verifying customers helps ensure that powerful tools are used for legitimate purposes and not diverted toward harm.
Today, however, most DNA synthesis screening remains voluntary and unevenly applied. Standards vary across providers, and there is no universal requirement that all orders be screened to the same level. As AI‑enabled design tools grow more powerful, these gaps become more consequential.
Strengthening nucleic acid synthesis screening is a pragmatic and targeted response. It does not regulate ideas or restrict legitimate research. Instead, it focuses on responsible access to sensitive capabilities, reinforcing a line of defense that already exists but must now be modernized. The necessity and viability of such modernization was demonstrated by the Paraphrase Project, led by Microsoft. By stress-testing existing screening systems against AI-designed biological sequences, the project showed both where safeguards could fail and how they could be improved. The effort followed a familiar model from cybersecurity: responsible disclosure, red teaming, and rapid deployment of fixes. It highlights how biosecurity tools, like software, must evolve continuously to keep pace with changing threats.
The importance of biosecurity in the age of AI has been recognized across administrations and parties. On May 5, 2025, the Trump Administration released an Executive Order on Improving the Safety and Security of Biological Research, emphasizing the importance of nucleic acid synthesis screening and calling for broader biosecurity oversight. That action built on work that began in 2024, when the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy set out a federal framework emphasizing comprehensive screening, customer verification, and the development of technical standards in partnership with industry.
Leaders in Congress are now building on this foundation. Earlier this year, Senators Cotton and Klobuchar introduced the Biosecurity Modernization and Innovation Act, known as S. 3741. The bill reflects a bipartisan commitment to strengthening U.S. biosecurity while sustaining scientific leadership and innovation. It would establish mandatory screening requirements (extending beyond current requirements for screening for federally funded research), conformity assessments, and enforcement mechanisms, while also advancing practical implementation through technical assistance and a biotechnology governance sandbox to promote exploratory efforts. The bill also directs OSTP to conduct a 90-day assessment of biosecurity authorities and develop a plan to consolidate oversight to improve efficiency and effectiveness.
Taken together, these efforts reflect a durable consensus: safeguarding biotechnology in the AI era is a national security priority.
Supporting innovation while reducing risk will require a balanced approach grounded in continuous monitoring of emerging capabilities, investment in technical safeguards, and thoughtful policy development.
Nucleic acid synthesis screening is not a comprehensive solution, but it is an essential one. Strengthening it now—through bipartisan legislation, thoughtful regulation, and continued public‑private collaboration—would represent the type of balanced, durable action that this moment requires.
The Biosecurity Modernization and Innovation Act would help advance that goal by pairing stronger screening requirements with practical implementation tools and oversight mechanisms. Microsoft strongly supports efforts like this that build on our longstanding work with researchers, synthesis providers, and other partners to strengthen safeguards while sustaining innovation.
The United States has an opportunity to continue to lead by pairing innovation with responsible stewardship. If we get this balance right, we can reap the rewards of AI-enabled biotechnology while guarding against its risks—for this generation and the next.
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In this post, we explore XSS’ shift from a unified forum to a scattered community spread across several competing factions.
Table Of ContentsFor more than two decades, XSS was the gathering ground for the Russian-speaking cybercriminal underground. Evolving from its former name, DaMaGeLaB, XSS evolved from a mid-tier message board into a top-tier hacking forum.
XSS is home to vendors of various crime types, including loaders, phishing, scamming, carding, malware development, distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) bots, and related services. It also facilitates the trade of illicit goods and services, while simultaneously serving as a networking and recruitment hub for threat actors.
XSS forum content falls within the following main sections:
On July 23, 2025, law enforcement organizations reportedly seized XSS as part of a multinational operation with Ukrainian authorities, French police, and Europol. Alongside the domain seizure, French authorities reported the arrest of XSS’s longtime administrator in Ukraine.
This arrest triggered an immediate chain reaction that has had lasting effects on the Russian-speaking underground—with the XSS ecosystem splintering into several competing factions.
While the original XSS architecture was severely disrupted, the surrounding Russian-speaking cybercriminal ecosystem remains intensely active. However, instead of a centralized hub, the XSS ecosystem is spread out through competing environments that emerged directly from the fallout of the takedown.
Launched by the legacy moderators of XSS, DamageLib represents a structural pivot away from standard illicit forums. Concluding that the old XSS site was compromised by law enforcement, the moderators launched a new model that completely abandons commerce—shutting down all buying, selling, and auctions entirely—-to eliminate user tracking and surveillance. Instead, it focuses strictly on technical materials and tutorials.
Recognizing that displaced cybercriminals still required a commercial venue to trade, a former XSS moderator launched Rehub quickly after the emergence of DamageLib. Rehub immediately integrated a commercial platform, successfully recruiting prominent threat actors into its moderation team to establish underground credibility.
The forum is still in its development stage, with its content being populated, and an active member base being built.
In early August 2025, an unknown entity launched an alleged resurrection of the forum on a new domain [.pro], utilizing old backups that preserved legacy user data, threads, and forum deposits. However, this new version has been met with significant distrust from Exploit and DamageLib, believing the [.pro] domain to be a honeypot controlled by law enforcement.
Started by a pro-Russian Telegram hacking group, this community actively targets EU and Ukrainian digital infrastructure. According to user discussions on DamageLib, this forum is not related to XSS. In addition, Flashpoint analysts note that targeting Ukrainian infrastructure directly contradicts its original community rules. The authenticity of this forum and its ownership has not been verified.
While law enforcement achieved a significant victory over XSS, they did not eliminate the Russian-speaking cybercriminal underground. Instead, they broke the foundational trust mechanics that had kept it centralized for twenty years.
This has left the Russian-speaking underground in a deeply fractured state that is still intensely active and highly adaptive. For defenders and analysts, this threat has not diminished—it has diversified. Tracking this ecosystem no longer means watching a single centralized community, but rather actively mapping out the live migrations, shifting rules, and behavioral patterns across these splintered groups.
Request a demo to learn how Flashpoint helps security teams aggregate intelligence from these scattered factions into a single source of truth, empowering your organization to proactively monitor and intercept emerging threats.
The post Understanding Illicit Ecosystems: XSS and the Current State of the Russian-Speaking Underground appeared first on Flashpoint.
In this post we break down the technical mechanics of TeamPCP’s recent campaign, the impact on the developer ecosystem, and the urgent steps needed to secure software supply chains.
Table Of ContentsThe developer ecosystem recently faced one of its most significant architectural threats to date, with the threat actor group TeamPCP unleashing Mini Shai-Hulud—a self propagating worm and multi-ecosystem threat. Potentially affecting millions of developers and thousands of companies, Mini Shai-Hulud has fundamentally compromised the trust layer of modern CI/CD pipelines.
The operational tempo of Mini Shai-Hulud has accelerated with every campaign. What began as opportunistic credential theft has now evolved into a high-speed, automated operation that can compromise hundreds of packages in under thirty minutes. From the exfiltration of approximately 3,800 internal GitHub repositories to the poisoning of critical libraries like TanStack and AntV, TeamPCP’s campaign has been incredibly effective in exploiting developer tooling and identity infrastructure.
Mini Shai-Hulud is deployed as a 498 KB obfuscated script executed using the Bun JavaScript runtime. The deliberate choice of Bun, rather than Node.js, is a tactical evasion technique as most endpoint detection and response (EDR) platforms and security information and event management (SIEM) solutions have behavioral rules tuned to Node.js execution patterns.
The worm propagates by stealing npm and GitHub authentication (OIDC) tokens from developer environments, then using those credentials to publish malicious versions of packages the compromised user maintains. To accomplish this, the worm scrapes runner process memory to extract short-lived identity tokens, which it then exchanges for per-package npm trusted-publisher tokens without requiring any long-lived npm secrets.
Mini Shai-Hulud targets credentials across 130 file paths, including npm tokens, GitHub personal access tokens, AWS, GCP, and Azure configuration files, Kubernetes kubeconfig files, Docker credentials, HashiCorp Vault tokens, 1Password and Bitwarden CLI vaults, SSH private keys, and Bitcoin wallet files.
Exfiltration occurs across multiple channels: the Session Protocol network, the GitHub Git Data API using dynamically created Dune-themed repositories on victim accounts, HTTPS to the threat actor-controlled domain, and an api for GitHub Actions workflow exfiltration.
The worm uses a dead-drop command-and-control (C2) architecture via GitHub’s public commit search API. An installed daemon (kitty-monitor, deployed as a systemd service on Linux or a LaunchAgent on macOS) polls GitHub for commits containing the string “firedalazer,” parses RSA-PSS-signed command payloads from matching commits, and executes them. This technique leverages GitHub as a trusted relay, making C2 traffic difficult to block without disrupting legitimate GitHub usage.
The worm then uses a persistence mechanism as a dead-man’s switch: a GitHub personal access token named “IfYouRevokeThisTokenItWillWipeTheComputerOfTheOwner” is created on compromised developer machines. If an operator revokes this token without first disabling the persistence mechanism, the worm destroys all home directory data on the compromised device.
Beyond standard persistence mechanisms, Mini Shai-Hulud targets AI coding agents. The SafeDep analysis documents that the worm modifies Claude Code’s settings .json to insert a SessionStart hook, enabling the worm to be reinstated with full LLM API privileges even if the infected npm packages are later removed, or the npm cache is cleared. A similar technique targets Visual Studio Code’s tasks.json file using the “runOn”: “folderOpen” trigger, and Codex configuration files are also targeted.
These AI agent hijacking techniques represent a novel attack surface: by persisting within trusted AI tool configurations, the malware can exfiltrate all code and secrets processed by those tools during future development sessions.
Flashpoint has observed at least four documented waves of TeamPCP npm and PyPI supply chain attacks in 2026, leveraging Mini Shai-Hulud to compromise developer tooling ecosystems and steal credentials, cloud keys, and source code across tens of thousands of organizations.
The following timeline tracks the escalation of TeamPCP and the Mini Shai-Hulud waves throughout 2026:
The first documented wave of Mini Shai-Hulud attacks targeted a small number of SAP-ecosystem npm packages in April 2026. While TeamPCP had already proven their CI/CD attack capabilities in March 2026 by compromising Aqua Security’s Trivy scanner and Checkmarx KICS via GitHub Actions, this initial wave served primarily as a proof-of-concept for the self-propagation mechanism and a reconnaissance phase for TeamPCP’s access broker network. Further, these attacks demonstrated the group’s ability to compromise widely used security tooling—a development that significantly undermines defenders’ ability to trust automated CI/CD pipeline scanning results.
Leveraging a GitHub Actions cache-poisoning technique, TeamPCP published malicious versions of 42 TanStack packages across 84 releases, impacting a project with over 518 million cumulative downloads.
The attack also compromised Mistral AI and Guardrails AI, extending the attack surface to the AI developer tools ecosystem. Forged commit authorship was used to blend the attacker’s commits into AI-assisted development environments where Claude Code is commonly deployed.
TeamPCP simultaneously listed Mistral AI source code for sale on BreachForums, claiming possession of approximately 5 GB of data across 450 internal Mistral repositories.
Targeting AntV enterprise data visualization ecosystem, TeamPCP compromised the atool npm account, which held publishing rights across a broad catalog of AntV packages. In 22 minutes, 637 malicious versions were published across 323 packages—a scale and speed that overwhelmed standard security monitoring pipelines.
Each infected package contained the Mini Shai-Hulud worm, which, upon execution, created up to 2,500 compromised repositories on victim accounts within hours.
In the most recent wave, TeamPCP announced its assumption of co-ownership of BreachForums, the largest English-language cybercriminal forum currently active. This development significantly elevates TeamPCP’s standing and operational reach. As co-owners, the group stated it would manage platform operations, handle dispute resolution, staff and vet moderation personnel, and host monetary contests for the community. The announcement positions TeamPCP as both an active threat actor and a platform-level infrastructure operator, with the ability to shape forum policies, curate the availability of criminal tooling, and influence the broader access broker and ransomware ecosystem.
Additionally, by poisoning a GitHub employee’s development environment, TeamPCP exfiltrated approximately 3,800 internal GitHub repositories. Within the stolen data were highly sensitive codebases such as:
Critically, the theft of internal source code from one of the world’s most widely used code hosting platforms creates incredible downstream risk for organizations that depend on GitHub Copilot and GitHub Actions for their own software development pipelines. Organizations running AI coding agents such as Claude Code and VS Code with extensions in their CI/CD pipelines face heightened exposure. Security teams should treat AI agent configuration files as sensitive assets subject to integrity monitoring and change-control policies.
If your organization uses npm, PyPi, or AI-assisted development tools, Flashpoint recommends the following immediate steps:
Flashpoint assesses with high confidence that TeamPCP will continue to scale its supply-chain attacks against npm, PyPI, and developer tooling ecosystems. The group’s shift from direct execution to orchestrating a broader ecosystem via BreachForums signals a maturation into a platform-layer criminal operation. While TeamPCP has hinted that the group may be approaching “retirement” due to law enforcement pressure, this should be treated with caution. Whether a misdirection or a genuine exit plan, the open-sourcing of Shai-Hulud means the tradecraft is available to the wider cybercriminal community.
Organizations should reference the OpenSSF npm Best Practices guidance for a practical baseline in hardening their package consumption posture. Flashpoint customers can gain access to known Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) and MITRE ATT&CK Mapping for Mini Shai-Hulud by logging into Flashpoint Ignite. To learn more about how Flashpoint tracks threat actor groups like TeamPCP and protects the software supply chain, request a demo.
The post The Mini Shai-Hulud Worm and the New Era of CI/CD Exploitation appeared first on Flashpoint.
More than 30 percent of the US working-age population is using AI, an increase of three percentage points from the end of 2025. But what does that number mean, and what lessons should we take from it? Today Microsoft released a new report that offers an in-depth look at AI adoption across the United States, allowing for the first time a state- and county-level review. This data and the trends it shows are important.
On a national basis, the US leads the world in AI innovation but ranks just 21st in global AI adoption. Part of the reason for this gap is a clear and uneven pattern of AI adoption across the country. We are also seeing a significant divide between urban and rural counties in AI usage. Usage averages 32.9 percent in metropolitan counties, compared with 16.2 percent in rural areas. In other words, metropolitan usage is about double what we see across rural America.
The study also shows that another powerful driver of AI diffusion is the presence of colleges and universities. Counties with higher shares of residents aged 18 to 24 have significantly higher AI usage rates—28.6 percent compared with 20.3 percent in other counties. And while college students are some of the most vocal about the risks of AI, they are also helping lead adoption. In counties with college towns like Williamsburg, Virginia, and Story, Iowa, we see usage rates that rival the highest in the world.
Read the Microsoft US AI Diffusion Report.
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When intimate images are shared without consent—whether real or AI-generated—the harm is immediate, deeply personal, and often long-lasting. It can affect someone’s sense of safety, dignity, and control, both online and offline. Protecting people from harms like non-consensual intimate imagery (NCII) has long been a priority for Microsoft. And as technology advances, our response continues to evolve to tackle very real challenges like the proliferation of highly realistic synthetic imagery. With the US Take It Down Act coming into force this month, establishing new federal protections against the spread of NCII, it’s important to share how we’re evolving our approach: making it easier to report harm, taking new steps to detect known NCII, and enabling more effective enforcement across our services.
Our goal is to make it simpler for individuals, or their representatives, to report violative content to Microsoft. We have strengthened our global reporting processes for NCII with a more intuitive form, with clear options to describe harm, including both real and AI‑generated images. These changes are designed to ease the burden for people in a distressing moment and enable faster, more effective action by our teams. Microsoft’s NCII policy is applied consistently across real and synthetic content, recognizing that the harm to individuals is the same, regardless of how an image was created. To report content on Microsoft services, hit “Report A Concern” or in the product where you encounter the content.
We also want to proactively detect and prevent the spread of known NCII by working with StopNCII.org, a reporting platform that enables individuals to create a digital “fingerprint,” or hash, of their images. Two years ago, we provided StopNCII.org with a new version of PhotoDNA that enables victims to create a hash without an image ever leaving their device. This can then be used by StopNCII.org partners to detect and remove matching NCII content across platforms, allowing industry to work together to prevent re-sharing and protect individuals’ privacy. We have been piloting the use of these hashes in Bing since September 2024.
We have now expanded our use of validated StopNCII.org hashes across Microsoft consumer services, including Teams Free, OneDrive, and Xbox. We will implement these changes carefully to advance effectiveness and accuracy—accelerating removals, automating where appropriate, maintaining human review for reported cases, and providing clear, accessible paths for users to appeal decisions.
No single company can address NCII alone. It requires coordination across industry, governments, and civil society. Microsoft will continue working with partners to improve shared tools and approaches that help prevent this content from spreading. We will also continue to advocate for clear, effective policies that protect victims, support innovation, and strengthen accountability across the ecosystem.
We will also continue to advocate for policies that support efforts to advance laws that prevent and deter image-based abuse. Microsoft advocated in support of the US Take It Down Act and welcomes the European Union’s work to strengthen protections against “nudification” apps, alongside global efforts to criminalize this misuse of technology. We are closely tracking Ofcom’s recent announcement that new measures will be required under the UK Online Safety Act to address illegal NCII harms. We believe our proactive work in this area will help us maintain trust with survivors, users, and regulators, among others.
Speed, clarity, and trust matter for people affected by intimate image abuse. When someone reaches out for help, we will strive to respond quickly, respectfully, and effectively. Our goal, though, is to invest in technologies and partnerships that reduce the likelihood of harm. We have joined forces with Childnet, a UK NGO that aims to safeguard children online, and created educational materials to prevent the misuse of AI to create intimate imagery among teens. These materials have now been released in the UK, as well as localized with partners in Singapore, South Korea, and Japan.
I am proud to learn from our digital safety team, which is carefully charting our path, and from the many industry and community leaders contributing to this work. This is an evolving challenge. We are committed to the journey, grounded by the voices of experts and survivors.
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The bugs could be exploited to elevate privileges to System or create a denial-of-service (DoS) condition.
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More than 200 vulnerabilities patched in recent Chrome releases are marked as ‘reported by Google’.
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The researcher who found it says the vulnerability could have been chained with a prompt injection to exfiltrate data.
The post Anthropic Silently Patches Claude Code Sandbox Bypass appeared first on SecurityWeek.
SecurityWeek spoke with several ICS security experts and companies about their most memorable experiences in the field.
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The TeamPCP hacking group accessed the repositories after a GitHub employee installed a poisoned VS Code extension.
The post GitHub Confirms Hack Impacting 3,800 Internal Repositories appeared first on SecurityWeek.
Fox Tempest provides a service that cybercriminals use to distribute ransomware and other malware disguised as legitimate software.
The post Microsoft Disrupts Malware-Signing Service Run by ‘Fox Tempest’ appeared first on SecurityWeek.
Every day, we decide what software to trust in seconds guided by simple labels such as “verified,” “secure,” and “safe to install.” The problem is that those signs can be manipulated.
Today, Microsoft unsealed a legal case in the US District Court for the Southern District of New York targeting a cybercrime service known as Fox Tempest, which, since May 2025, has enabled cybercriminals to disguise malware as legitimate software. The malware-signing-as-a-service (MSaaS) worked by fraudulently accessing and abusing code signing tools, such as Microsoft’s Artifact Signing, a system designed to verify that software is legitimate and hasn’t been tampered with. Cybercriminals used the service to deliver malware and enable ransomware and other attacks, infecting thousands of machines and compromising networks worldwide.
For the first time, Microsoft is taking public action against a powerful, but often unseen, enabler within the cybercrime ecosystem, targeting how cybercriminals prepare and employ techniques to optimize their rate of success. To disrupt the service, we seized Fox Tempest’s website signspace[.]cloud, took offline hundreds of the virtual machines running the operation, and blocked access to a site hosting the underlying code. This action builds upon persistent internal efforts to revoke fraudulently obtained code‑signing certificates and enhance our defenses and employ new security features to detect and thwart such malicious activity. It’s already having an impact: cybercriminals are complaining about challenges accessing the current service.
Our impact extends beyond one actor. The lawsuit targets Fox Tempest’s infrastructure and also names Vanilla Tempest as a co-conspirator, a prominent ransomware group that used the service to deploy malware like Oyster, Lumma Stealer, and Vidar, and ransomware, including Rhysida, in multiple recent cyberattacks. Vanilla Tempest has targeted schools, hospitals, and other critical organizations worldwide, while Rhysida, a highly evolved ransomware variant that both encrypts files and steals data, often used for double extortion, has been used by various actors in numerous high-profile attacks globally, including to steal and leak internal documents from the British Library and to disrupt operations at Seattle-Tacoma International Airport. Microsoft’s investigation further linked Fox Tempest to various additional ransomware affiliates and families, including INC, Qilin, Akira, and others.
More broadly, this case points to how cybercrime is changing. What once required a single group to carry out an attack from start to finish is now broken into a modular ecosystem where services are bought and sold and work interchangeably with one another. Some services are inexpensive and widely used. Others, like Fox Tempest, are highly specialized and expensive because they remove friction or bypass obstacles that make attacks fail, making them both more reliable and harder to detect. As seen with Fox Tempest, when these services are combined with AI-powered tactics, attacks can scale more easily, reaching more people and becoming more convincing.
Illicit code-signing certificates have been sold and trafficked for more than a decade. That includes its use by nation-state actors to target critical infrastructure organizations in Europe. What’s changed is how this activity is marketed, packaged, and sold as a service, along with the scale at which it is now used across ransomware campaigns. Instead of buying certificates one-by-one, criminals upload their malware to a service that signs it for them.
What also makes this model notable is the level of investment. Unlike lower-cost services like RedVDS, a cybercriminal infrastructure provider that costs as little as $24 per month, which Microsoft disrupted earlier this year, Fox Tempest shows that more sophisticated actors are willing to pay thousands of dollars for advanced capabilities that make attacks easier to carry out, harder to detect, and more likely to succeed.
Fox Tempest’s business model was straightforward: sell fraudulent code-signing capability, let others package malware, and enable attacks downstream. The model has generated millions in proceeds, demonstrating significant financial profit.
Behind the scenes, the operators built access at scale. Using fabricated identities and impersonating legitimate organizations, they created hundreds of fraudulent Microsoft accounts to obtain real code-signing credentials in volume. Customers who paid for Fox Tempest’s services could then upload malicious files via an online portal for them to be signed using Fox Tempest-controlled certificates. Cybercriminals paid thousands of dollars for the service, reflecting how valuable this capability was.
Once signed, their malware appeared legitimate. Attackers then distributed the signed malware through tactics such as search manipulation and malicious ads, where users are more likely to trust what they encounter. AI then helped generate and refine these campaigns to reach a broader audience.
That changed the odds. Malicious software that should have been blocked or flagged by antivirus and other safeguards was more likely to be opened, allowed to run, or pass security checks—essentially allowing malware to hide in plain sight. Instead of forcing their way in, attackers could slip through the front door by masquerading as a welcomed guest.
As Microsoft disabled fraudulent accounts, revoked fraudulently obtained certificates and introduced enhanced protections, the Fox Tempest operators continually adapted. In February 2026, they ultimately shifted to networks of third-party-hosted virtual machines to maintain and scale operations. That kind of rapid change is part of the model: these services evolve quickly in response to pressure and friction. In fact, Microsoft has observed further adaptations in response to our layered disruption efforts, with Fox Tempest attempting to shift operations and customers to another code-signing service.
In addition to seizing the core infrastructure behind the operation and degrading its ability to function at scale, we have taken further steps to prevent similar abuse, removing fraudulent accounts, strengthening verification, and limiting how this type of access can be reused. More technical details on the operation and the steps we’re taking to prevent similar abuse are available in this Microsoft Threat Intelligence blog.
This action wasn’t about stopping one actor. It sought to strategically neutralize a vital service that many attackers, particularly ransomware groups, rely on. When legitimate code signing services are weaponized, everything downstream gets easier: malware looks legitimate, security warnings are less likely to trigger, and attacks are more likely to succeed. Degrading that capability adds friction and forces a reset. The success rates of attacks decrease, and attackers have to rebuild, find new ways in, and accept more risk with each attempt—driving up both the cost and the time required to operate.
Importantly, disruption actions don’t happen in isolation and are never one-and- done. Collaboration is critical, as different organizations and sectors have visibility into different parts of the cybercrime ecosystem. In this case, we are working closely with cybersecurity company Resecurity, whose insights help us better understand how Fox Tempest operates. We are also collaborating closely with Europol’s European Cybercrime Centre (EC3) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). As we’ve seen in previous efforts, we expect actors to try to rebuild. Collectively, we will continue to take action and keep the pressure on. That also means strengthening the code signing ecosystem through intelligence sharing and partnering with other code signing services, so it’s harder for malicious actors to regain that ground in the first place.
When attackers can make malicious software look legitimate, it undermines how people and systems decide what’s safe. Disrupting that capability is key to raising the cost of cybercrime. As threats evolve, the Microsoft Digital Crimes Unit will continue working with partners across industry and law enforcement to persistently identify and cut off the services that enable them.
For more than a decade, the Microsoft Digital Crimes Unit (DCU) has persistently disrupted cybercrime and nation-state threats targeting people, organizations, and critical infrastructure. Explore major disruptions—and the ongoing cases and operations behind them here: Disrupting cyberthreats since 2008 | Microsoft
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The vulnerability, CVE-2026-8153, affects Universal Robots PolyScope 5 and it can be exploited for OS command injection.
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The hackers claimed to have stolen more than 600,000 Salesforce records, including personal information and corporate data.
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