ABC Australia reports that researchers from NSB Cyber and Abstract Shield tested two inexpensive pairs, costing A$60 and A$110 (around US$42 and US$78), and found more than a dozen flaws across the smart glasses themselves, their app, and an associated website.
The main problem they uncovered was insecure Bluetooth pairing: If the glasses were powered on and not connected to their owner’s phone, an attacker could connect first, with no password or meaningful pairing confirmation.
After connecting, an attacker could reportedly control the glasses to capture photos or recordings, copy existing media, and intercept data moving between the glasses and the phone. An attacker could also make another device appear to be the victim’s glasses, allowing it to connect to the owner’s mobile app.
The testing also found that a Bluetooth-visible device identifier could allegedly be used with a weakness in the app’s website to retrieve a user’s email address and date of birth.
The research uncovered another privacy issue. ABC reports that voice or text submitted to the built-in AI, along with images sent to it, was first transmitted to a server in Shenzhen and could be forwarded elsewhere, depending on the function. The tests did not establish how the data was subsequently used.
The server locations, combined with some of the AI’s answers to specific questions, led researchers to conclude that the chatbot companion relied at least in part on Chinese sovereign AI models. Professor Kimberlee Weatherall, a technology regulation expert involved in the testing, said the failure to identify China in the privacy policy appeared to violate the Australian Privacy Principles,
The timing of the testing is also relevant because Australia’s smart-device security standards apply to most consumer smart devices manufactured on or after March 4, 2026. They require, among other measures, no universal default passwords, a way to report vulnerabilities, and information about the minimum security-update period. Devices made before that date are outside the requirements.
Experts quoted by ABC said the devices violated Australia’s privacy laws and were also likely to breach several sections of the Cyber Security Act. However, whether the new smart-device standards apply would depend partly on when the glasses were manufactured, and the rules have not yet been tested in a known enforcement action.
Professor Weatherall said:
“The rules say that the password must be unique. It doesn’t even seem like they were applying a password, which might mean that their standards are so low they don’t even technically breach that rule, which I find amazing.”
What to do
We’re not fans of smart glasses, expensive or cheap. But if you own a pair:
Avoid pairing or using inexpensive camera glasses that lack a clear physical pairing step, account authentication, a published security-contact process, and a stated update-support period.
Stop using their AI or cloud features for sensitive material, remove unnecessary permissions from the companion app, check for firmware and app updates, and consider returning the product if the vendor cannot document a fix.
Ask permission before recording people, and check your local laws to understand what is and isn’t allowed.
From reporting threats to removing them.
Cybersecurity risks should never spread beyond a headline. Keep threats off your devices by downloading Malwarebytes today.
Hackers captured a Flock camera and got a look (alternate link) at the software:
While much of the automatic license plate reader’s (ALPR) most sensitive storage remained encrypted and inaccessible, the joint analysis of the recovered data shows that software running on the device explicitly detects people as well as vehicles, license plates, and bicycles. The camera can produce dozens of images of a single passing vehicle and, according to several weeks of recovered logs, generated more than a million images. Its computer-vision software also sometimes isolated bumper stickers and other graphics, including, in one case, an American flag patch on a motorcyclist’s saddlebag.
If you’re wondering how the hackers got by disk encryption, one of the unencrypted partitions contained the key for an encrypted partition. That’s pretty bad security engineering.
In April 2026, we at Kaspersky’s Global Emergency Response Team (GERT) responded to a security incident at a manufacturing organization in the Middle East. The threat actor obtained domain admin-equivalent control of the organization’s Active Directory environment and authored a malicious Group Policy Object (GPO) named PAYLOAD, linking it at the domain root. Through that single object, the actor delivered ransom notes, hijacked the desktop wallpaper and lock screen, enforced a logon banner, and disabled the local administrator account across every domain-joined Windows workstation — all without dropping a ransomware binary or encrypting any data. The only ransomware we found in this incident was PAYLOAD sample targeting ESXi on Linux servers. Besides that, data exfiltration was observed originating from the file servers and several additional systems, and was later published on the dark web.
Living-off-the-land abuse of trusted AD infrastructure. Group Policy is a signed, allowlisted, SYSTEM-privileged distribution channel that the majority of endpoint detection and response tools is designed not to inspect. By delivering impact through GPO rather than through malware, the actor sidestepped the entire file- and process-based detection stack.
Encryptionless extortion. Industry telemetry shows extortion-only incidents grow significantly year-on-year. PAYLOAD fits this model; the leverage is operational disruption and the threat of escalation rather than cryptographic denial of data.
We confirmed that no files were encrypted on Windows machines, no malicious binaries were resident on disk, no endpoint persistence was established, and no malicious processes were running at the time of analysis. The entire attack lived inside Active Directory itself. The defensive implication is stark: an organization whose detection strategy depends on catching a ransomware executable would have seen nothing until the first endpoint rebooted and the ransom wallpaper appeared.
In this article, we will describe the GPO attack chain and provide operational advice on how to detect such threats, including detailed remediation recommendations.
Group Policy as an attack surface
Attacks through group policies are nothing new. They can inflict significant, domain-wide damage with multiple malicious capabilities. A Group Policy Object (GPO) is essentially a combination of a Group Policy Container (GPC) in Active Directory and a Group Policy Template (GPT) in SYSVOL. The Group Policy scope depends on whether the GPC is linked to the directory tree at the domain, site, or organization unit (OU) level. A link at the domain root means the policy applies to every computer and user object beneath it. Thus, a GPO compromised at the domain root can affect all in-scope domain users and computers, potentially granting an attacker complete control over the corporate network. What makes GPO abuse even more dangerous is that group policies are processed in a trusted, high-privilege environment, ensuring persistence because endpoint cleanup is not enough to remove them.
We have already discussed GPO architecture and ways it can be compromised in greater detail in an earlier blog post. Other public threat intelligence has also repeatedly documented this technique in ransomware operations. Microsoft observed Ryuk operators distributing ransomware through Group Policy, SYSVOL startup items, and PsExec. LockBit affiliates have been documented modifying SYSVOL Group Policy files, including ScheduledTasks.xml, to support ransomware execution and propagation. BlackCat/ALPHV operators have also abused GPOs to create scheduled tasks and deploy ransomware.
Another notable example of GPO abuse is PAYLOAD ransomware, which weaponizes GPO Preferences and policy settings for pure impact rather than as a launcher for an encryptor. Let’s take a closer look at this attack, which is detailed further below.
Attack timeline
During the April 2026 investigation, we managed to reconstruct the attack timeline as outlined below:
Date
Event
11 April
Initial access. Threat actor authenticates to the FortiGate SSL VPN using a valid but compromised domain credential.
13 April
GPO authored. Malicious GPO, PAYLOAD ({C897F2C7-C2AC-4E6F-BF48-58036FF29E79}) created and linked at the domain root, configuring ransom notes, wallpaper, lock screen, logon banner, and administrator account disablement.
13 April
SYSVOL staging. The payload.jpg and hello.txt files written to \\DC.THECOMPANY.local\sysvol\THECOMPANY.local\.
13 April
Second GPO. GPO named win Firewall Off ({22099AD2-E062-4F56-B574-5099BBA4E7A6}) linked at the domain root, disabling Windows Firewall on all profiles.
13 April
Dormancy. GPO cached on endpoints but computer configuration not yet applied — no endpoint had rebooted since the policy update.
13 April
Data exfiltration. Data exfiltration was observed originating from the file servers and several additional systems.
14 April
Detonation. Most of the endpoints begin rebooting; computer configuration policies apply. Ransom wallpaper, logon banner, and notes appear. Operational disruption begins.
15 April
Response. Kaspersky GERT engaged. Forensic triage of affected workstations and the domain controller initiated.
16 April
Assessment. GERT confirms no file encryption, no resident malware, no endpoint persistence.
Next, we will discuss each of these stages in more detail and share the findings from our incident response activities.
Incident overview
Initial access
The entry vector was a compromised valid account (MITRE ATT&CK T1078) used to authenticate through the organization’s FortiGate SSL VPN — an external remote service (T1133). Insufficient logging on the FortiGate appliance prevented us from reconstructing how the credential was originally compromised.
Three hypotheses were considered plausible in the context of the attack, in no particular order:
Password spraying or credential stuffing against the SSL VPN portal.
Phishing-led credential harvesting.
Purchase of pre-compromised credentials from an initial access broker (IAB).
Once on the internal network, the actor operated with the compromised security principal’s privileges. Because the account was able to create and link a GPO at the domain root, it held either domain admin privileges or a delegated equivalent (e.g., membership of Group Policy Creator Owners combined with link rights on the domain object).
FortiGate SSL VPN authentication logs and ESXi/virtualization privilege escalation logs were insufficient to reconstruct the lateral movement and privilege escalation chain between initial VPN access and the GPO write privilege level. The most common real-world routes to GPO control — DCSync, Kerberoasting of privileged service accounts, and Pass-the-Hash/Pass-the-Ticket — could not be confirmed or ruled out.
Execution
Rather than deploying an encryptor, the actor abused the victim’s Active Directory policy infrastructure, resulting in malicious GPOs being configured and linked at the domain root to deliver the observed impact across domain-joined systems. The two GPOs below constitute the entire offensive toolkit observed.
The PAYLOAD GPO
We performed a Resultant Set of Policy (RSOP) analysis, which helped us list all policy settings on the affected workstations. From these results, we reconstructed the following changes delivered by PAYLOAD:
Drop SYSVOL\hello.txt to the desktop and root directories C:\ and D:\ as a read-only README-payload.txt by tampering with the “Group Policy Files” client-side extension (CSE).
Modify the HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\ registry key, changing the legalnoticecaption value to "Welcome to Payload!" and the legalnoticetext to the ransom note text through the “Group Policy Registry” CSE.
Set payload.jpg located in the targeted domain controller’s SYSVOL as the lock screen image by altering the personalization policy, and as the wallpaper by altering the desktop policy at the user level.
Revoke administrator rights for the administrator account (locking the account) by editing the Security Settings CSE in the GptTmpl.inf file.
Settings changed by PAYLOAD GPO
This activity was enabled entirely through a legitimate group policy mechanism, meaning there is no malware code for security solutions to look for because the malicious logic is contained within the policy configuration.
The win Firewall Off GPO
A second domain-root-linked GPO, named “win Firewall Off”, disabled Windows Firewall across the domain, private and public profiles on all endpoints (T1562.004). Deployed independently of PAYLOAD, this object degraded host defenses and ensured the actor retained unimpeded network reach to endpoints for any follow-on activity.
Settings changed by win Firewall Off GPO
The one-day delay detonation
The most forensically instructive detail is the one-day gap between GPO creation (13 April) and visible impact (14 April). Analysis of Master File Table (MFT) timestamps and the Group Policy History registry key confirmed the policy was written to SYSVOL and cached on endpoints on 13 April. However, computer configuration settings (wallpaper and lock screen machine policy, security settings, firewall disabling) only apply upon reboot or policy refresh — and no endpoint had rebooted in the interim. The attack therefore remained dormant in the GPO cache for one day before detonating en masse when machines were restarted in accordance with standard procedures.
We have to point out here that this delayed policy application is characteristic of GPO-based operations and has two potential consequences for defenders. Firstly, it may grant the actor a quiet window for exfiltration, persistence, or further staging between weaponization and impact. Secondly, it can be used to sever the temporal link between the cause (a GPO-creation event in the directory log) and the effect (mass user-visible disruption occurring at a later time), complicating timeline reconstruction unless directory service auditing is in place.
Forensic findings
Initial incident response engagement revealed a number of findings associated with the attack that we share below.
No file encryption
A full review of the MFT on affected workstations found no files bearing a .payload extension characteristic to PAYLOAD ransomware and no evidence of bulk renaming or encryption I/O patterns. The attackers’ objectives were operational disruption and extortion via visual impact and access denial.
No endpoint persistence
All standard persistence locations were clean:
Scheduled tasks — no malicious tasks
Run/RunOnce keys — clean
Startup folders (user and system) — clean
Services — no malicious service installed
WMI event subscriptions — none
Boot sector/MBR — unmodified
The attack’s persistence mechanism is the GPO link itself on the domain controller, with no endpoint-resident component.
No active malicious processes
Live process and memory analysis revealed no injected threads, process hollowing or anomalous outbound connections.
Registry timeline analysis
Group Policy History, Shadow and State registry keys on the workstation recorded the application of PAYLOAD on 13 April:
HKLM\…\Group Policy\History\{35378EAC-683F-11D2-A89A-00C04FBBCFA2}\1
HKLM\…\Group Policy\Shadow\{827D319E-6EAC-11D2-A4EA-00C04F79F83A}\0
HKLM\…\Group Policy\State\Machine\GPO-List\7
HKCU\…\Group Policy\History\{7150F9BF-48AD-4da4-A49C-29EF4A8369BA}\1
HKCU\…\Group Policy\State\S-1-5-21-…\Loopback-GPO-List\5
The presence of the “Loopback-GPO-List” entry indicates the GPO was processed in loopback mode, ensuring the user configuration (wallpaper) applied regardless of which user logged on to the machine.
SYSVOL artifacts
Two files were staged on the domain controller’s SYSVOL share and served to endpoints through the Files Group Policy Preference CSE:
payload.jpg — the ransom image used for both wallpaper and lock screen.
hello.txt — the ransom note, distributed to desktops and drive roots as README-payload.txt.
Detection engineering
Because no malicious binary or process exists, the detection logic should focus on the directory service and SYSVOL indicators. Below are the highest-value telemetry sources for identifying the described malicious activity.
Directory service change auditing (DS Access)
Enable Advanced Audit Policy → DS Access → Audit Directory Service Changes on all domain controllers and set up alerts for the following events:
Event ID
Meaning
Hunt focus
5137
A directory service object was created
The account that created new groupPolicyContainer objects must be an authorized GPO administrator
5136
A directory service object was modified
Changes to gPLink on the domain root or sensitive organizational units; changes to gPCMachineExtensionNames/gPCUserExtensionNames/gPCFileSysPath/versionNumber for all GPOs
5141
A directory service object was deleted
GPO deletions (relevant for tamper detection and remediation assessment)
A gPLink modification at the domain root by a non-standard account is one of the most telling indicators of this attack class.
SYSVOL file integrity monitoring
Monitor \\DC.THECOMPANY.local\sysvol\THECOMPANY.local\Policies\ for unexpected files, particularly image files, text files, scripts, ScheduledTasks.xml, and modified registry.pol/GptTmpl.inf files that were created by sources other than legitimate replication.
Endpoint policy application telemetry
On endpoints, GPO application is logged in the Group Policy Operational log (Microsoft-Windows-GroupPolicy/Operational) and reflected in the History and Shadow registry keys shown above. A sudden domain-wide change to the applied policy set is a strong post-detonation signal.
Missing 5136 events
If the contents of a GPO’s SYSVOL change without a corresponding 5136 event, this can indicate direct SYSVOL/template editing (e.g., via open-source tools such as PowerView or SharpGPOAbuse) that bypasses the normal Group Policy Management Console (GPMC) modification path. While we recommend treating the absence of expected audit events as suspicious, it should be noted that this can be caused by misconfigured auditing.
Anti-forensics and recovery-inhibition capabilities
Confirmed PAYLOAD family capabilities
The Windows endpoint attack described in this report was implemented through malicious Group Policy Objects and did not involve a recovered ransomware executable, resident endpoint malware, confirmed file encryption or active malicious processes at the time of the forensic examination. However, PAYLOAD cryptomalware for Windows does exist, and other sources, including public analysis of its samples, reveal further malicious capabilities of this ransomware that could be used by security teams to enrich detection logic and security policies.
The behaviors documented in this section must therefore be interpreted as family-level capabilities identified through the public reverse engineering of PAYLOAD ransomware samples. They were not confirmed as having executed during the GPO-based incident unless corresponding evidence was identified in the host, memory, process, event-log, or hypervisor.
Windows Event Log clearing
Public reverse engineering of the PAYLOAD Windows variant reveals an optional event log clearing capability (T1685.005, formerly T1070.001). The ransomware dynamically resolves Windows Event Log APIs, enumerates available event log channels, and clears individual channels.
Implementation artifacts include:
Runtime loading of wevtapi.dll
EvtOpenChannelEnum
EvtNextChannelPath
EvtClearLog
Enumeration of Security, System, Application, and PowerShell logs, and operational channels
A command-line option controlling whether log clearing is performed
Clearing event logs reduces the availability of records related to process execution, authentication, PowerShell, service control, and system changes. However, it does not necessarily remove events that were already forwarded to a SIEM, Windows Event Collector, EDR backend, or protected log archive.
Forensic indicators
Windows Security Event ID 1102
Event logging shutdown or failure events
Sudden reductions in event record identifiers
Multiple event channels restarting from low record numbers
Gaps between endpoint and centrally forwarded telemetry
Execution of utilities or APIs associated with log management
Direct access to EVTX files (Windows Event Log files) under the Windows event log directory
We should note that these indicators can’t be interpreted on their own. For instance, Event ID 1102 should be correlated with a number of aggravating factors, such as:
Event ID 4688 or Sysmon Event ID 1 for process creation
Event ID 4624 for the associated administrative logon
EDR process trees
PowerShell operational logging
Windows Event Forwarding records
Privileged access management activity
At the same time, the absence of Event ID 1102 does not prove that log clearing did not occur. Direct deletion, truncation, service impairment, or an incomplete audit configuration may produce different evidence.
Security process and service termination
PAYLOAD analysis reveals that the Windows ransomware variant contains logic that targets security processes and services (T1685 and T1489). This capability is intended to stop security products, backup software, database services, and applications that may lock files targeted for encryption.
Process and service termination serves several objectives:
Reduce endpoint detection and response visibility.
Release file handles so data can be modified.
Interrupt backup and recovery services.
Prevent databases and enterprise applications from protecting active data.
Reduce interference with encryption operations.
Forensic indicators
Security agent services changing from running to stopped
Event ID 7036 service state changes
Event ID 7040 service start type changes
Event ID 4688 or Sysmon Event ID 1 for service control utilities
Sysmon Event ID 5 for terminated processes
EDR health degradation affecting many endpoints
Repeated termination attempts against security or backup processes
Execution of dedicated process killing utilities
VSS deletion, backup and recovery suppression
Public PAYLOAD sample analysis reports the deletion of Windows Volume Shadow Copies before encryption (T1490). This behavior removes local restore points and reduces the victim’s ability to recover files without external backups.
Recovery inhibition is broader than VSS deletion and may include multiple other malicious techniques, including the following:
Deleting shadow copies, backup catalogs, and hypervisor snapshots
Disabling recovery services
Modifying boot recovery settings
Compromising backup management platforms
Deleting or encrypting backup repositories
In the PAYLOAD Windows sample that is proven to perform encryption, VSS deletion is confirmed to have taken place before encryption. A broader compromise of the backup platform was not established in the investigated incident.
Forensic indicators
Execution of shadow copy management utilities
Backup catalog deletion attempts
Recovery configuration changes
Backup service termination
Mass snapshot deletions
Backup administrator logons outside normal maintenance windows
Backup retention or immutability changes
Backup jobs failing immediately before disruptive activity
Ecosystem-relevant ransomware techniques
Above, we discussed the techniques specific to PAYLOAD ransomware. In this section, we’ll review other common ransomware techniques, such as BYOVD abuse and ESXi policy weakening, that remain relevant risks in the ransomware ecosystem. However, these techniques should not be attributed to this incident without supporting driver load, process, memory, ESXi, vCenter, or backup platform telemetry. We describe these techniques below as they may prove useful in other ransomware-related forensic investigations.
The examples used in this section are therefore ecosystem-relevant: they are commonly observed in ransomware operations but not conclusively attributed to the analyzed PAYLOAD samples.
ETW suppression and in-memory patching
Event Tracing for Windows (ETW) is a kernel-supported tracing architecture used by Windows components, diagnostic utilities, security products, and endpoint monitoring systems.
Although we didn’t encounter this technique in our case, some ransomware families can patch ETW-related functions inside the ransomware process (T1685, formerly T1562.001). The reported routine changes the memory protection of code pages, overwrites the beginning of selected ETW functions so they return without producing events, restores the original protection, and refreshes the instruction cache.
Reported target functions include EtwEventWrite, EtwEventWriteFull, EtwEventWriteTransfer, and EtwRegister.
This modification applies to the process-local mapping of ntdll.dll. It does not disable ETW globally across Windows, but it can reduce the telemetry generated by the modified process.
Forensic indicators
Writable or recently modified executable pages within ntdll.dll
Memory protection changes affecting ETW function addresses
In-memory code differing from the corresponding clean DLL on disk
EDR memory tampering alerts
Unexpected calls to memory protection APIs followed by telemetry silence
Process execution visible in network or filesystem telemetry but absent from expected ETW-derived sources
Inconsistent telemetry between EDR, Sysmon, Windows Event Logs, and network monitoring
It should be noted that telemetry gaps are not conclusive evidence of ETW patching. Other factors include agent upgrades, network outages, endpoint shutdowns, SIEM ingestion failures, collector backpressure, and filtering or licensing changes.
Memory acquisition is the strongest validation source when process-local ETW patching is suspected.
Vulnerable signed driver abuse, BYOVD
Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD) involves introducing or abusing a legitimately signed but vulnerable kernel driver (T1068 and T1685). The attacker exploits the driver’s exposed functionality to gain kernel-level capabilities, modify protected memory, terminate security processes, remove security callbacks, or bypass operating system security controls.
BYOVD is highly relevant to contemporary ransomware operations. However, the reviewed public PAYLOAD analyses do not provide sufficient evidence to conclude that BYOVD is an intrinsic PAYLOAD capability.
It should therefore be presented as an ecosystem-relevant technique rather than a confirmed PAYLOAD feature.
Forensic indicators
Unexpected .sys files written to user-writable or temporary directories
New kernel driver services
Sysmon Event ID 6
Driver hashes matching Microsoft or community vulnerable driver blocklists
Invalid, revoked, expired, or unusual driver signatures
Driver load followed by EDR termination
New privileged processes immediately following driver loading
Code Integrity or Defender alerts
Service creation events referencing driver files
ESXi security policy weakening
Ransomware operators are increasingly targeting ESXi and vCenter because compromising the virtualization layer provides access to many business-critical virtual machines.
Public research typically describes operators performing the following activities (T1685, T1490 and T1489):
Enabling SSH on ESXi hosts
Changing root passwords
Disabling execInstalledOnly
Modifying lockdown mode exceptions
Stopping virtual machines
Deleting snapshots and backups
Changing host firewall policies
Copying custom ransomware binaries to hypervisors
On the target organization’s Linux servers we saw an ESXi PAYLOAD variant, which makes this behavior operationally relevant. Nevertheless, the reviewed evidence does not indicate that PAYLOAD operators used any of these policy-weakening actions in the investigated incident.
Forensic indicators
Unexpected ESXi SSH enablement
Changes to execInstalledOnly
Secure Boot enforcement changes
Lockdown mode configuration changes
Root password changes
New or unusual administrator accounts
Bulk VM shutdown activity
Bulk snapshot deletion
New binaries in datastore or temporary paths
vCenter tasks originating from unexpected accounts or systems
Missing or disabled remote syslog forwarding
Remediation
To contain the described threat and limit possible damage, several remediation steps should be taken. Below, we recommend a four-phase remediation approach for containing this threat and restoring the affected environment.
Phase 1 — domain controller actions (to be performed first)
When dealing with PAYLOAD GPO, the first priority of the remediation plan should be to remove the source GPOs. Until this is done, endpoint cleanup is ineffective because the next policy refresh re-infects cleaned machines.
The immediate domain controller actions to be taken are:
Delete PAYLOAD GPO. Remove {C897F2C7-C2AC-4E6F-BF48-58036FF29E79} via GPMC.
Delete or revert win Firewall Off GPO. Remove {22099AD2-E062-4F56-B574-5099BBA4E7A6}.
Clean SYSVOL. Delete jpg and hello.txt from \\DC.THECOMPANY.local\sysvol\THECOMPANY.local\.
Rotate credentials. Reset the compromised account; audit all privileged accounts and group memberships for unauthorized changes; rotate krbtgt twice if domain admin compromise is confirmed.
Force refresh. Perform gpupdate /force across endpoints after deletion; re-enable local administrator and firewall via clean policy.
Phase 2 — Active Directory and GPO hardening
Adopt the AD tiered administration model and confine domain admins to Tier 0 with no interactive logon to workstations and member servers.
Separate GPO creation from GPO linking rights, and grant both only to a dedicated, audited administrator role.
Enable GPO change auditing (Event IDs 5136, 5137, 5141) and forward to a SIEM.
Monitor SYSVOL with file integrity tooling.
Phase 3 — credential and access hardening
Enforce phishing-resistant MFA on all VPN and remote access entry points.
Deploy Windows LAPS to generate unique, rotated local administrator passwords.
PAYLOAD demonstrates a maturing tactic of turning the victim’s own trusted infrastructure into a weapon. By weaponizing Group Policy, the actor achieved a domain-wide impact without a single malicious binary on any endpoint, evaded file- and process-based detection entirely, and caused organization-wide disruption within seconds of the first reboot.
The absence of encryption is the most strategically significant finding and is consistent with the 2026 trend toward encryptionless extortion. At Kaspersky GERT, we assess with moderate confidence that the missing encryption reflects one of two scenarios: (1) a deliberate decision to stay below the irreversible data destruction threshold while preserving the option of a follow-on encryption phase, or (2) an operation interrupted before full execution.
The absence of encrypted files must not be mistaken for the absence of a serious compromise — the most critical impact lies in the actor gaining domain admin-level control. This incident proves that a threat actor with domain admin access and a working knowledge of group policy internals can inflict domain-wide disruption equivalent to a ransomware attack without writing a single malicious file to any endpoint.
Detection strategies anchored solely in file- or process-based indicators are blind to this attack class. Effective controls include directory service change auditing, SYSVOL integrity monitoring, and privileged access governance, which allow for GPO protection.
Detection by Kaspersky solutions
Kaspersky security solutions effectively detect the described malicious activity at various stages of the attack. Possible detection scenarios are listed below.
To protect organizations that use our Kaspersky SIEM system, we have prepared a package of correlation rules designed to help detect this type of malicious activity. The rules are now available for customers to download from the SIEM repository; the package name is: [OOTB] Group policy hijacked: PAYLOAD ransomware – ENG.
The “Group policy hijacked: PAYLOAD ransomware” package contains rules that detect suspicious file creation or modification in the SYSVOL shared folder on a domain controller, as well as changes to critical attributes and settings of domain group policies. Some rules may require adjustment if they trigger in response to legitimate activity, such as synchronization between domain controllers or the configuration of a new group policy.
To ensure the detection rules function correctly, verify that events from Windows systems are being received in full, including events with the following identifiers: Sysmon: 11, Security — 4663, 5136, 4657.
We also recommend applying the following rules available in the repository to detect all attack stages.
Detection of Windows Event Log clearing to cover up traces of an attack: R050_03_Windows Event Log was cleared
Detection of suspicious access to the LSASS process, which may indicate attempts to dump credentials: R262_Suspicious access to the LSASS process
Detection of the Volume Shadow Copy service being started, which is used to create shadow copies before deleting them: R231_20_Running the Volume Shadow Copy service
Detection of shadow copy deletion: R321_Shadow copy deletion
Detection of Windows Defender disablement: R076_01_Windows Defender Antivirus was disabled
Detection of attempts to disable or modify the system firewall: R240_03_Disabling system firewall via the registry
Detection of a service installation from a non-system folder, which may indicate malware persistence techniques: R281_01_Installation of a service from a non-system folder
For the rules in this list to function correctly, it is necessary to configure Security event auditing for event IDs 4663, 5136, 4657, 7036, and 1102.
In addition to the SIEM system, when audit settings are configured correctly, the process of creating, modifying, and deleting GPOs generates a large number of characteristic artifacts on the domain controller, enabling Kaspersky Endpoint Detection and Response Expert to promptly alert the user to anomalies in the infrastructure.
The creation of a new GPO is covered by the gpo_creation rule, which triggers in response to the corresponding event in the infrastructure. Changes to existing policies are detected by the following rules:
The setting_the_gpcfilesyspath_attribute rule detects the use of the gPCFileSysPath attribute of a Group Policy Object, which specifies the path to the GPO’s contents in SYSVOL.
In the next major version update of Kaspersky EDR Expert, a new event type, GPO, will be introduced, allowing users to track changes to Group Policy Objects.
For information security officers, GPO events will serve as an additional source of context when investigating activity in Active Directory and will help detect changes that could affect the configuration, access rights, and security of endpoints before a potentially malicious policy is deployed.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping
Tactic
Technique
Observed behavior
Initial Access
T1078 — Valid Accounts
Compromised domain credential used for VPN authentication
Initial Access
T1133 — External Remote Services
FortiGate SSL VPN used as entry point
Privilege Escalation
T1078.002 — Domain Accounts
Account held domain-level GPO create/link rights
Privilege Escalation/Defense Impairment
T1484.001 — Group Policy Modification
Malicious PAYLOAD GPO created and linked at domain root; re-applies on every refresh/reboot; uses trusted channel to evade EDR
Defense Impairment
T1686 — Disable or Modify System Firewall
win Firewall Off GPO disables Windows Firewall on all profiles
Impact
T1491.001 — Internal Defacement
Wallpaper and lock screen replaced with ransom image
Impact
T1531 — Account Access Removal
Local Administrator account disabled via GPO Security Settings
Collection
T1005 — Data from Local System
Data exfiltration was observed originating from the file servers
Command and Control
T1071 — Application Layer Protocol
No live C2 confirmed; delivery achieved entirely via GPO
Indicators of compromise
GPOs
PAYLOAD ransomware GPO: {C897F2C7-C2AC-4E6F-BF48-58036FF29E79}
win Firewall Off GPO: {22099AD2-E062-4F56-B574-5099BBA4E7A6}
File names and MD5 hashes
payload.jpg: Ransom wallpaper and lock screen image (SYSVOL)
hello.txt: Ransom note source (SYSVOL)
README-payload.txt: Ransom note dropped to desktops and drive roots
killer.exe (0108656A3E1ADE6CA4F21B084F5E1208): process killer tool
kill.exe (BEA5E267F24D7DA59F6821BFFDBFF293): process killer tool
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Twenty years ago, a British mathematician named Clive Humby popularized a phrase that came to describe data’s relationship with the entire global economy: “Data is the new oil.”
Pithy as the phrase sounds, it is undeniably true.
Data steers decisions at businesses of every size. Data created entirely new industries built around its capture. And, for a select number of companies, data has produced billions—if not trillions—of dollars in value.
So how is it that, on the dark web, your stolen identity can be purchased for just 95 cents?
That’s what a Malwarebytes researcher found last month after spending 48 hours inside the dark web to investigate cybercrime. Across a variety of forums and directories, he found subscription plans for malware that steals information once implanted on a device. He found guides for deploying social engineering scams. He found people selling their services to build fake websites that trick people into handing over their usernames and passwords. And he found one of the dark web’s most traded commodities—personal data, packaged together about individual people, to help a cybercriminal commit identity fraud.
These packages are called “fullz.” For victims in the United States, a fullz contains a full name, Social Security Number, date of birth, address, and other personal details. That is enough, on its own, for a cybercriminal to potentially open a bogus line of credit, file a fake tax return, access financial accounts, or obtain medical services under someone else’s name.
As we wrote on Malwarebytes Labs:
“For less than the cost of a cup of coffee, a cybercriminal can buy enough information to devastate someone’s financial life.”
It’s the kind of risk that could scare anyone, especially considering the scale behind it. In just the first six months of 2026, Malwarebytes found more than 7,500 compromised data sets on the dark web containing more than 8.4 billion records.
And yet, even today, cybersecurity professionals still get asked why anyone should bother protecting their data.
The public, understandably, are exhausted. With data breaches happening every week—if not every day—cybersecurity can start to feel pointless. With young people unable to build financial security, they start believing that they have nothing worth stealing. And with Big Tech already collecting our every movement, behavior, click, and concern, people understandably feel powerless to fight any kind of data abuse, be it corporate or criminal.
So today’s episode approaches the question from a different direction. This isn’t about why you should protect yourself—plenty of company websites will tell you that, and most of them rely on fear. This is about why hackers want your data in the first place.
Today, on the Lock and Code podcast, host David Ruiz explains how cybercriminals turn a single repeated password into account takeover, how a screenshot of your house from Google Maps became a tool in extortion emails, and why the most benign information about you—an address, an age, one public photo—is often the most useful data a stranger can buy.
A suspicious website is a web resource that cannot be definitively classified as phishing, but whose activities are unsafe. Such sites manipulate users, tricking them into voluntarily transferring money for non-existent services, signing up for hidden subscriptions, or disclosing personal data through carefully crafted terms of service. These include fake online stores, dubious crypto exchanges, investment platforms, and services with paid subscriptions.
Kaspersky has introduced a new web filtering category, “Sites with an undefined trust level,” into its security products (Kaspersky Premium, Android and iOS apps, etc.). The system analyzes the domain name and age, IP address reputation, DNS configuration, HTTP security headers, and SSL certificate to automatically detect suspicious resources.
According to Kaspersky data for January 2026, the most widespread global threat is fake browser extensions that mimic security products — they were detected in 9 out of 10 regions analyzed worldwide. Such extensions intercept browser data, track user activity, hijack search queries, and inject ads.
Kaspersky’s regional statistics reveal the specific nature of these threats: in Africa, over 90% of the top 10 suspicious websites are online trading scam platforms; in Latin America, fake betting services predominate; in Russia, fake binary options brokers and “educational platforms” with fraudulent subscriptions lead the way; in CIS countries — crypto scams and bots for inflating engagement.
Key indicators of a suspicious website to check: a strange domain name with numbers or random characters, cheap top-level domains (.xyz, .top, .shop), a recently registered domain (less than 6 months old according to WHOIS data), unrealistic promises (“100% guaranteed income,” “up to 300% profit”), lack of company contact information, and payments only via cryptocurrency or irreversible bank transfers.
Introduction
The online landscape is filled with various traps lying in wait for users. One such threat involves websites that can’t be strictly classified as phishing, yet whose activities are inherently unsafe. These sites often operate on the fringes of the law, even if they aren’t directly violating it. Sometimes they use a cleverly crafted Terms of Service document as a loophole. These agreements might include clauses such as no-refund policies or forced automatic subscription renewals.
Fake online stores, dubious financial platforms, and various online services that mimic legitimate business operations are all categorized as suspicious. Unlike actual phishing sites, which aim to steal sensitive data like banking credentials or passwords, these suspicious sites represent a far more cunning trap. Their goal is manipulation: tricking the victim into willingly paying for non-existent goods and services or signing them up for a subscription that’s nearly impossible to cancel. Beyond financial gain, these sketchy websites may also hunt for personal data to sell later on the dark web.
Our solutions categorize them as having an “undefined trust level”. This article explains what these sites look like, how to identify them, and what you can do to stay safe.
The dangers of shady websites
One of the biggest risks associated with making a purchase from an untrusted website that seems to be an online store is the financial loss and falling victim to fraud. Fake shops will entice you with attractive deals to get you hooked. After you pay, you may never receive what you paid for, or you may receive some cheap piece of unusable junk instead of the item you ordered. Investment or “guaranteed income” programs are another type of classic scam — they promise rapid returns, and once they take your deposits, they disappear without a trace.
Visiting or buying from untrusted suspicious websites can expose you to various risks that go beyond a single bad purchase. Fraudulent websites often collect your personal information even if you do not end up making a purchase. By completing a form or signing up for a “free offer”, you may be providing the scammer with access to your information.
Personal data collection can happen in a fairly straightforward and obvious way — for instance, through a standard order delivery form. In this scenario, attackers end up with sensitive information like the user’s full name, shipping and billing addresses, phone number, email address, and, of course, payment details. As we’ve previously discussed, fraudsters sell this kind of information, and there’re countless ways it can be used down the line. For example, this data might be leveraged for spam campaigns or more serious threats like stalking or targeted attacks.
Common types of suspicious sites
Let’s take a closer look at the different types of shady sites out there and how interacting with them can lead to financial loss, data leaks, the unauthorized use of personal information, and other consequences.
It’s worth noting that rogue websites can masquerade as legitimate ones in almost any industry. The first type of fraudulent site we’ll look at is fake online stores. These can appear as clones of real brand websites or as standalone stores. Usually, the scam follows one of two paths: the buyer either receives a counterfeit or poor-quality product, or they receive nothing at all. These sites lure victims in with suspiciously low prices and “exclusive” deals. Often, users are subjected to psychological pressure: the time to make a purchase decision is purposefully limited, provoking the victim, as with any other scam, into making an impulse purchase.
Another common type of shady site includes online exchanges and trading platforms. These primarily target cryptocurrency, as the lack of legislative regulation for digital currency in certain countries makes them a magnet for fraudsters. These suspicious sites often lure victims with supposedly favorable exchange rates or other enticing gimmicks. If the user attempts to exchange cryptocurrency, their tokens are gone for good. Beyond simple exchanges, rogue sites offer investment services and even display a fake balance growth to appear credible. However, withdrawing funds is impossible; when the victim tries to cash out, they’re prompted to pay some fee or fictional tax.
Subscription traps are also worth noting, offering everything from psychological tests to online video streaming platforms. The hallmark of these sites is that they deliberately withhold critical information, such as recurring charges, or hide the fact it even exists. Typically, the scheme works like this: a user is offered a subscription for a nominal fee, like $1. While that seems attractive, the next charge – perhaps only a week later – might be as much as $50. This information is intentionally obscured, buried in fine print or tucked away in the Terms of Service where it’s harder to find. Legitimate services always clearly disclose subscription terms and provide an easy way to cancel before a trial period ends. Scam services, on the other hand, do everything possible to distract the user from the actual terms of use and subscription.
Shady sites can also masquerade as providers of mediation services, such as legal or real estate assistance. In reality, the service is either never delivered or provided in a stripped-down, incomplete form. For example, a user might be prompted to pay for a service that’s normally provided for free. The danger here lies not only in losing money for non-existent services but also in the significant risk of exposing personal data, such as ID details, taxpayer identification numbers, social security numbers, or driver’s license information. Once in the hands of attackers, this data can become a tool for executing further scams or targeted attacks.
On the whole, suspicious sites are fairly difficult to distinguish from legitimate, trustworthy services. Masquerading as a legitimate business is the primary goal of these sites, and the fraudulent schemes they employ are not always obvious. Nevertheless, there are protective measures as well as certain indicators that can help you suspect a site is unsafe for purchases or financial transactions.
How to identify suspicious or fraudulent websites
Despite the increasingly convincing attempts to create fake shops, the majority of them still lack the quality of real online stores, and there are many signs that may give them away. Some of these signs can be caught by the eye while others require a bit of technical investigation. By combining visual inspection, technical checks, and trusted online tools, you can protect yourself from financial loss or data theft.
Visual and manual clues
You don’t need to be a cybersecurity expert to catch many red flags just by observing the site’s domain, visuals, language and behavior. For instance, scam sites often have strange or randomly generated names, filled with numbers, underscores, hyphens, or meaningless words, like best-shop43.com. In addition, such vague top-level domains as .xyz, .top, or .shop are also frequently used in scams because they’re cheap and easy to register.
Furthermore, most fake stores sites look unprofessional, with poor visuals, pixelated images, mismatched fonts, or copied templates. Many fraudulent websites borrow layouts or logos from other brands or free templates, which makes them appear generic and sketchy.
Another major giveaway lies in the content itself. Be aware of persuasive language, unrealistic promises, or emotional triggers such as No KYC, Risk-free returns, 100% guaranteed income, Up to 300% profit, or Passive income with zero effort. Unrealistic deals are another red flag. If the products are listed at extremely low prices, continuous countdown timers, and “limited time only” messages that are often used to pressure you into making a quick purchase, it’s a clear tell of a fraudulent website.
Legitimate businesses always provide verifiable contact details, such as a physical address, company name, and customer support. On the contrary, scam sites hide this information. You may also notice the non-functioning pages, broken or suspicious links leading to unrelated external sites which indicate poor maintenance or malicious intent.
Another important signal is the website’s social media presence. Legitimate online businesses usually maintain at least one active social media account to promote their products and communicate with customers. In most cases, these businesses have long-established social media accounts with harmonized posting history and engagement from real users, consistency between the brand website and social media profiles (same name, logo, and links). The links to social media profiles from the website are usually direct. In contrast, fraudulent or deceptive websites often lack any meaningful social media presence or display signs of superficial or artificial activity. This may include missing social media accounts altogether, social media icons that lead to non-existent, inactive, or unrelated pages, or recently created profiles with very few posts and minimal user engagement. In some cases, comment sections are disabled or dominated by spam and automated content, suggesting an attempt to avoid public interaction rather than engage with customers.
Lastly, the payment options offered by the site can also tell a lot about its legitimacy. Be extremely cautious if a website only accepts cryptocurrency, wire transfers, or third-party P2P payments. These payment methods are irreversible and are preferred by scammers. Legitimate e-commerce platforms typically offer secure and reversible payment options, such as credit cards or trusted payment gateways that include buyer protection policies.
However, the absence or existence of any of these factors alone does not necessarily indicate malicious intent. It should be evaluated in combination with technical, linguistic, and behavioral indicators, rather than treated as a standalone signal of legitimacy.
Technical indicators to check
Looking into technical signs can reveal whether a website is trustworthy or potentially fraudulent.
One of the first things to check is the domain age. Scam websites are often short-lived, appearing only for a few weeks or months before disappearing once users start reporting them. To check when the domain was created, use a WHOIS lookup. If it’s less than six months old, be cautious — especially for e-commerce or investment sites, where legitimacy and trust take time to build.
Let’s take a look at the registration details for the popular online marketplace Amazon. As we can see from the WHOIS information, it was registered in 1994.
Meanwhile, a reported suspicious online store was created a couple of months ago.
Legitimate websites usually operate on stable hosting platforms and remain on the same IP addresses or networks for long periods. In contrast, fraudulent websites often move between servers (in most cases using a cheap shared hosting service) or reuse infrastructure already associated with abuse. Checking the IP address reputation can reveal if the website or the hosting server has previously been linked to suspicious activities. Even if the website looks legitimate, a poor IP reputation can expose it.
In addition to that, looking at the infrastructure behavior over time can reveal patterns about its legitimacy. Websites associated with fraudulent activity often show short lifespans, sudden spikes in activity, or rapid appearance and disappearance, which indicates a coordinated campaign rather than a legitimate business.
Another important clue is hidden ownership. When the WHOIS details show “Redacted for Privacy” or leaves the organization name blank, it may indicate that the website owner is deliberately hiding their identity.
We should point out that while this can raise suspicion during investigations, hidden WHOIS data is not inherently malicious. Many legitimate businesses use privacy protection services for valid reasons. These may include protection from spam and phishing after public email addresses are taken from WHOIS databases, personal safety for small business owners, and brand protection to prevent competitors or malicious actors from targeting the registrant. This means that some businesses can use services like WHOIS Privacy Protection, Domains By Proxy, or PrivacyGuardian.org to remove the WHOIS data while still operating transparently on their websites through clear contact details, customer support channels, and legal pages (e.g. terms of use).
Therefore, hidden ownership should be treated as a contextual risk indicator, not a standalone proof of fraud. It becomes more suspicious when combined with other signals such as newly registered domains, and lack of legal information.
Next, you can check the security headers of the website. Legitimate websites are usually well maintained and include several key HTTP headers for protection. Some examples include:
Content-Security-Policy (CSP) provides strong defense against cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks by defining which scripts are allowed to run on the site and blocking any malicious JavaScript that could steal login data or inject fake forms.
HTTP Strict-Transport-Security (HSTS) forces browsers to connect to the site only over HTTPS. It ensures all communication is encrypted and prevents redirecting users to an insecure (HTTP) version of the site.
X-Frame-Options prevents clickjacking, which is a type of attack where a legitimate-looking button or link on a malicious page secretly performs another action in the background.
X-Content-Type-Options blocks MIME-type attacks by preventing browsers from misinterpreting file types.
Referrer-Policy controls how much information about your previous browsing (referrer URLs) is shared with other sites.
These headers form the “digital hygiene” of a website. Their absence doesn’t always mean a site is malicious, but it does suggest a lack of security awareness or professional maintenance — both strong reasons to be cautious.
You should also check the SSL certificate. Scam sites may use self-signed or short-lived SSL certificates. You can inspect this by clicking the padlock icon in your browser’s address bar — if it says “not secure” or the certificate authority seems unfamiliar, that’s a red flag.
You can check the security headers and the SSL certificate by sending an HTTP request programmatically or by using some online service.
Another indicator that provides insight into how well a website is done and managed is DNS configurations. Legitimate businesses typically use reliable DNS providers and maintain consistent DNS records. Missing the name server NS or mail exchange MX records may indicate poor DNS configuration. In addition to NS and MX, reputable sites also configure SPF and DMARC records to protect their brand from email spoofing and phishing. Something scam website developers won’t bother with because they don’t intend to build a long-standing reputation.
You can check the configurations of DNS records either programmatically or by using an online service.
Another recommendation is to pay attention to website behavior. If there are frequent redirects, pop-up ads, or background requests to unknown domains, this may indicate unsafe scripting or tracking.
How to protect yourself
Tools and databases for detecting suspicious websites
We at Kaspersky have built an intelligent system for detecting suspicious web resources and added this new type of protection into many of our products, including Kaspersky Premium, Kaspersky for Android and iOS, and others. Our detection model is based on many factors, including but not limited to the following:
domain name and age,
IP reputation,
stability of the infrastructure used,
DNS configurations,
HTTP security headers,
digital identity and popularity of the web resource.
When a user tries to visit a site flagged as having an undefined trust level, our solutions show a warning to stop the visitor from becoming a victim of personal data leaks, financial losses or a bad purchase:
This component is on by default.
Moreover, there are several online tools and databases that can help assess a website’s legitimacy:
ScamAdviser analyzes trust based on WHOIS, server location, and web reputation.
APIVoid provides risk scoring using DNS, IP, and domain reputation databases.
National government databases often maintain official lists of fraudulent or blacklisted domains.
Preventive measures
To protect yourself from such threats, it might a good idea to take some additional preventive measures. Always double-check the URL and domain name, especially when you are about to click a link or make a payment. Make sure the site uses HTTPS and has a trusted certificate.
You can use standard browser tools to verify site security. For example, in Google Chrome, clicking the site information button (the lock or settings icon in the address bar) displays details about the connection security and the site’s certificate.
In the Security section, you can check whether the site supports HTTPS – it should say “Connection is secure” – and view the site’s digital certificate.
Additionally, keep reliable security software with real-time protection running on your device to stop you from accessing dangerous websites. Do not download any files or enter your personal information on websites that look unprofessional or suspicious. And finally, remember the golden rule: if a deal seems too good to be true, it often is.
If you realize that you’re on a scam website, it’s important to perform certain post-incident actions immediately. First, contact your bank or payment provider as soon as possible to block the transaction or card. Then, change your passwords for the services which might have been compromised, and run a full antivirus scan on your device to detect and remove any potential threats. Lastly, consider reporting the website to the cybercrime agency in your country or to the consumer protection agency. Sharing your experience online by leaving a review or warning will give notice to potential customers alike.
By staying careful and taking quick actions, you can significantly reduce the chances of being a target and help make the internet a safer place for everyone.
An overview of detection statistics for sites with an undefined trust level
To illustrate the types of suspicious sites prevalent in various regions around the world, we analyzed anonymized detection data from Kaspersky solutions for the “websites with an undefined trust level” category in January 2026. For each region, we identified the 10 most frequently encountered sites and calculated the share of each within that list. To maintain privacy, specific domains are not listed directly; instead, they’re described based on their functionality and characteristics.
Most visited suspicious sites
First, let’s examine the sites that appear across multiple regions, indicating a high prevalence.
In 9 out of the 10 regions analyzed, we encountered a suspicious image processing platform (*a*o*.com). This site positions itself as a photo editing tool, but in reality, it serves as an intermediary server for uploading images used in phishing and other campaigns. By interacting with such a site, users risk exposing personal data under the guise of uploading images or falling victim to a phishing attack.
Percentage of the *a*o*.com domain detections by region, January 2026 (download)
This site has the largest share of detections in the Russian Federation, where it ranks first in the TOP 10 with a 40.80% share. It is also prevalent in Latin American countries (21.70%) and the CIS (14.64%), while it’s least common in Canada at 0.24%.
The next site appeared in 7 regions. It consists of a landing page for a fake antivirus solution presented as a browser extension (*n*s*.com). This extension redirects the user to a fake search engine page allowing it to collect data and track user activity, specifically search queries.
Percentage of the *n*s*.com domain detections by region, January 2026 (download)
This site is most frequently detected in South Asia, with a share of 33.31%. Its presence in Canada and Oceania is roughly equal (15.47% and 15.09%, respectively). We recorded the lowest number of detections in Africa, at 2.99%.
Another suspicious browser extension appeared in the TOP 10 in 6 out of the 10 regions. It’s a fake privacy-enhancing tool hosted at *w*a*.com. Instead of providing the advertised privacy features, this extension carries a high risk of intercepting browser data. It can modify browser settings, harvest user data, and swap the default search engine for a fake one. Furthermore, it maintains full control over all browser traffic.
Percentage of the *w*a*.com domain detections by region, January 2026 (download)
This “service” has its largest share, 22.25%, in the Middle East and North Africa, and is also quite common in Canada (16.26%). It’s least frequently encountered in Latin America (5.38%) and East Asia (4.02%).
The site *o*r*.com appeared in five regional rankings. It’s a fake security service promising to provide online safety by warning users about malicious sites and dangerous search queries. This extension has the potential to steal cookies (including session cookies), inject advertisements, spoof login forms, and harvest browser history and search queries. We noted that this site made the TOP 10 in Africa (0.59%), the MENA (Middle East and North Africa) region (4.57%), Europe (5.61%), Canada (7.21%), and Oceania (1.93%).
In 4 out of the 10 regions, we identified several other recurring sites. One of them (*n*p*.xyz) mimics a repository for creative AI image generation prompts while capturing browser data. The domain hosting this site exhibits several red flags: it was recently registered, and the owner’s information is hidden. This site reached the TOP 10 in Africa (0.51%), the MENA region (7.04%), Latin America (22.54%, ranking first in that region), and South Asia (5.91%).
The second service (*i*s*.com) positions itself as a tool for safe searching, protecting the browser from threats, and verifying extensions. However, this is a typical browser hijacker, much like the others mentioned above. It made the TOP 10 in South Asia (8.03%), Oceania (17.97%), Europe (3.90%), and Canada (14.35%).
The third site (*h*t*.com) poses as a private browsing extension. In reality, it’s another potentially unwanted application designed for browser hijacking: it modifies settings, steals sensitive data (cookies, browser history, and queries), and can redirect the user to phishing pages. Users have specifically noted the difficulty involved in removing the extension. This site appears in the TOP 10 for the MENA region (10.17%), Canada (7.06%), Europe (3.81%), and Oceania (2.81%).
Another domain (*o*t*.com) that reached the TOP 10 in four regions is a service mimicking a browser extension for safe searching and web browsing. It’s dangerous because it injects ads and steals user data. It’s important to note that such extensions can be installed without explicit user consent – for example, via links embedded in other software. This service holds the number one spot in two regions: Canada (25.72%) and Oceania (30.92%), while also appearing in the TOP 10 for East Asia (8.01%) and Africa (0.88%).
Consequently, we can see that the majority of suspicious sites detected by our solutions worldwide are browser hijackers masquerading as security products. Nevertheless, other categories of sites also appear in the TOP 10.
Next, we’ll examine each region individually, focusing on descriptions of domains not previously covered. For clarity, the sites mentioned above will be marked as [MULTI-REGION], while those appearing in only two or three regions will include the names of those specific areas. We’ll observe several regional overlaps and similarities, allowing us to determine which types of suspicious sites are popular both within specific regions and globally.
Africa
Distribution of the TOP 10 suspicious websites in Africa, January 2026 (download)
The three most prevalent domains in African countries are found exclusively in this region. All of them – *i*r*.world (60.27%), *m*a*.com (22.84%), and *e*p*.com (9.36%) – are potentially fraudulent online trading platforms suspected of using forged licenses. These sites employ classic scam schemes where it’s impossible to withdraw any alleged earnings. In fifth place is a domain we’ll also see in the European TOP 10, *r*e*.com (1.46%): a platform marketed as a tool for retail and semi-professional traders. It charges for services available elsewhere for free. Eighth place is held by a site that also appears in the Russian TOP 10: *a*c*.com (0.56%). This is a dubious AI tool that claims to offer free subscriptions to a premium graphics editor. In ninth place is a domain that also surfaces in the Canadian TOP 10: *u*e*.com (0.53%), a browser extension of the “web protection” variety that we’ve encountered previously.
In summary, the African region is dominated by financial scams within the online trading and brokerage sectors. These include fake platforms that make it impossible to withdraw funds and use fake licenses and classic schemes to steal users’ money. Additionally, Africa sees paid tools that duplicate free services and questionable AI-based subscriptions. The primary threat in this region is financial loss through fraudulent investment-themed sites.
MENA
Distribution of the TOP 10 suspicious websites in the Middle East and North Africa, January 2026 (download)
In the MENA region, the site *a*v*.su holds the top spot with a 28.64% share; notably, this site also appears in the TOP 10 for Russia. It markets itself as a tool for building custom VoIP-PBX systems. However, it has an extremely low trust rating and is frequently associated with phishing, and hidden redirects. Using this service carries significant risks, including data leaks, and financial loss.
Ranked seventh is *a*r*.foundation (6.32%), an AI bot allegedly designed for trading, which we also identified in the TOP 10 for Oceania. This service has been flagged as an investment scam operating as a pyramid scheme with the hallmarks of a Ponzi scheme.
The ranking is rounded out by two domains not found in any other region. The first one, *l*e*.pro (4.42%), is a spoof of a popular betting service. The second, *p*r*.group (2.21%), is a clone of a well-known broker. Both sites are scams.
In the MENA region, the landscape is dominated by fake VoIP services as well as counterfeits of financial and betting platforms, which attackers use to conduct phishing attacks, and perform hidden redirects. A significant portion of suspicious sites consists of fake online privacy tools and browser hijackers masquerading as security extensions. Ponzi schemes and cryptocurrency scams are also prominent. The primary risks for the region are data theft, and financial loss.
Latin America
Distribution of the TOP 10 suspicious websites in Latin America, January 2026 (download)
In Latin America, we identified five popular suspicious sites specific to this region, which is unusual compared to other areas where more overlaps are typically observed. Ranking third with a share of 10.81% is the fake betting platform *b*e*.net. In fifth place is *r*e*.club, an illegitimate clone of a well-known bookmaker, with a share of 7.82%.
Further down the list of local threats are *a*a*.com.br (7.02%), a Brazilian Ponzi scam; *s*a*.com (5.07%), which offers dubious investment programs; and *t*r*.com (4.53%), a potentially dangerous trading platform.
In Latin America, the most-visited suspicious sites are betting-themed scams, including both clones of legitimate sites and those built from scratch. Also prevalent are Ponzi schemes, fake investment programs, and dubious online brokers. A significant portion of these sites consists of browser hijackers posing as crypto platforms and AI bots. The primary threats in Latin American countries include financial loss through gambling and Ponzi schemes, as well as the theft of NFTs and other tokens.
East Asia
Distribution of the TOP 10 suspicious websites in East Asia, January 2026 (download)
In the East Asian TOP 10, we see the highest concentration of domains that are absent from other regional rankings.
In first place, with an 18.77% share, is the fake broker *r*x*.com, which can be used to steal personal data or funds. Second place is held by a crypto-gaming site (16.44%) that we previously encountered in the Latin American TOP 10. Visitors to this site risk losing NFTs and other tokens. In third place is the domain *u*h*.net (11.61%), used for redirects, which can hijack sessions. Following this is *s*m*.com (9.98%), a domain typically used as a browser-hijacking server and for phishing attacks, serving as a link in an infection chain.
Rounding out the local threats in East Asia are the following domains: *e*v*.com (9.37%), utilized in drive-by attacks; *a*k*.com (9.16%), an API-like domain associated with suspicious scripts and extensions; and *b*l*.com (4.38%), a domain potentially used for redirects.
East Asia has a high concentration of region-specific fake brokers, crypto gaming platforms, and NFT marketplaces. The primary threats for this region include the loss of financial data, NFTs, and other tokens, as well as session hijacking.
South Asia
Distribution of the TOP 10 suspicious websites in South Asia, January 2026 (download)
In South Asian countries, we also observe a concentration of local suspicious sites specific to the region.
The second most popular site in the region is *a*s*.com (12.01%), a poor-reputation, high-risk microloan service typical of South Asia. By interacting with these sites, users risk not only losing significant funds but also compromising their overall security. Following this are *v*n*.com with a 9.47% share and *l*f*.com with 8.65%. These domains are employed in various fraudulent schemes, ranging from phishing to spam.
The TOP 10 also includes *s*o*.com (4.80%), a free video downloading service associated with a high risk of infection. The final site we analyzed in the South Asia region is *c*o*.site (1.89%), a pseudo-tool for local SEO optimization that carries the danger of data loss and a high risk of financial fraud through subscription sign-ups.
In summary, the region is dominated by fake antivirus extensions, microloan services, dubious video downloaders, and counterfeit SEO tools. The primary risks for South Asia include financial fraud, phishing and spam distribution, and data theft.
CIS
When analyzing statistics for suspicious sites in CIS countries, we treat Russia as a separate region due to the unique characteristics of its online space which are not found in any other CIS member states. However, we’ve placed these two regions in the same section, as we’ve observed overlaps between them that are not seen in other parts of the world.
Distribution of the TOP 10 suspicious websites in the CIS, January 2026 (download)
The top two sites in the CIS TOP 10 also appear in the Russian TOP 10. The domain *r*a*.bar, which ranks first in the CIS (39.50%), holds the second spot in Russia (15.93%) and is a fake trading site. It’s worth noting that sites in the .bar domain zone are frequently used for scams. In second place in the CIS (15.29%) and sixth in Russia (3.75%) is the domain *p*o*.ru, which is often associated with bots for inflating follower counts and automating community management.
Domains from fourth to eighth place are specific only to the CIS region and don’t appear in the Russian TOP 10. These sites include:
*a*e*.online (8.42%): an online image editor that carries risks of data harvesting
*n*a*.io (6.51%): a high-risk cryptocurrency trading platform
*e*r*.com (3.72%): a site promising free cryptocurrency and posing the risk of compromising visitors’ private keys and digital wallets
*s*o*.ltd (3.70%): a domain with an extremely low trust rating
*s*.gg (3.49%): a scam site masquerading as a play-to-earn blockchain game
The ranking concludes with sites that overlap with the Russian region. *a*.consulting (2.42%) is a fake clone of a binary options site, and *a*.lol (2.32%) is a domain suspected of dubious activity.
The CIS landscape is dominated by fake trading platforms (particularly crypto exchanges), promises of easy profits, play-to-earn scams, and dubious investment projects. We also observe many bots for inflating social metrics and automation. The primary threat in the CIS is the theft of private keys, digital wallets, and funds through investment schemes and lures involving online promotion.
Distribution of the TOP 10 suspicious websites in Russia, January 2026 (download)
The Russian TOP 10 includes three unique domains not found in the rankings of other regions. The first, *n*m*.top (7.84%), is an imitator of a well-known binary options broker. This suspicious site was recently registered and has a tellingly low rating on domain verification services. The second, *t*e*.ru (3.25%), claims to be an educational platform and has a dubious subscription system with a high probability of fraud involving difficulties in canceling subscriptions. The third site, *e*e*.org (3.14%), positions itself as a tool for a popular media platform, but it’s actually a scam that fails to provide its stated services.
Overall, the Russian landscape is characterized by fake binary options brokers and sketchy sites with fraudulent subscriptions posing as e-learning platforms. There are also frequent instances of sites spoofing well-known legitimate services. The primary risks in Russia are scams related to the knowledge business sector, as well as the theft of money and personal data.
Europe
Distribution of the TOP 10 suspicious websites in Europe, January 2026 (download)
In the European region, we’ve found two unique domains. The first of these, *c*r*.org, has been identified as part of a chain for massive phishing and spam attacks. It accounts for a 16.08% share of the TOP 10. The second site, *o*n*.de, is an unofficial reseller with a poor reputation and a high likelihood of fraud. This domain ranks second to last in our statistics with a 5.95% share.
Among the sites not previously covered, the European TOP 10 includes one site that also appears in the Oceania TOP 10: *o*i*.com (6.61%). This is a classic cryptocurrency scam promising passive income.
A significant portion of suspicious sites in Europe consists of intermediary sites for phishing and spam, fake security extensions, and crypto scams. Unofficial sales services and paid trading tools are also on the list. The primary threats in the European region include session hijacking, data theft, spam, and investment fraud.
Canada
Distribution of the TOP 10 suspicious websites in Canada, January 2026 (download)
Canada has been designated as a separate region to illustrate prevailing trends within North America. The first four positions in the Canadian TOP 10 are held by multiregional domains discussed previously. In fifth place is *t*c*.com (10.88%), which also appears in the TOP 10 rankings for Oceania and South Asia. This is yet another browser extension masquerading as a security solution. Occupying the final spot is the domain *e*w*.com (0.17%), which is unique to the Canadian market. This site operates a dropshipping scam, offering products at prices significantly below market value. Customers typically either never receive their orders or get low-quality counterfeits.
The landscape of dubious websites in Canada is largely defined by fraudulent extensions capable of hijacking browser data, tracking user activity, spoofing search queries, harvesting cookies, and injecting ads. This is further compounded by dropshipping schemes involving counterfeit goods. The primary risks for users in Canada include data theft and financial loss from purchasing substandard products.
Oceania
Distribution of the TOP 10 suspicious websites in Oceania, January 2026 (download)
The final region under consideration is Oceania. Notably, we didn’t identify a single domain unique to this region. Every site appearing in the TOP 10 represents a global threat that’s already been detailed in previous sections. To summarize the findings for this region: the primary threats consist of fake security extensions and privacy products designed for browser hijacking, tracking user activity, displaying advertisements, and stealing data. There’s a minimal presence of crypto Ponzi schemes in this area. The main risk for users in Oceania is the loss of privacy and confidentiality through unwanted apps.
Conclusion
Suspicious websites are particularly dangerous because they often masquerade as legitimate sites with high levels of persuasiveness. They mimic online stores, subscription-based streaming platforms, repair firms, and various other services. Unlike standard phishing sites, they employ more sophisticated manipulations to deceive users, tricking them into voluntarily handing over their personal data and transferring funds.
By examining the TOP 10 suspicious sites across the world’s major regions, we can draw several conclusions. On average, the most prevalent threats globally are fraudulent extensions masquerading as security solutions and privacy services. Their true purpose is to hijack browser data, track user activity, and display ads. We also frequently encounter phishing platforms for image processing and financial scams involving trading, cryptocurrency, betting, and microloans. Our statistics demonstrate that these sites not only employ classic fraudulent schemes centered on easy money but also adapt to contemporary trends targeting younger audiences and specific regional characteristics. The primary risks for users interacting with these sites are a combination of privacy threats and financial loss.
To help protect users from these shady sites, we’ve introduced the category of “websites with an undefined trust level” as part of the web filtering features in our solutions. However, it’s important to note that user awareness and individual responsibility play a significant role in ensuring safe web browsing. It’s essential for users to be able to recognize suspicious sites and remain vigilant toward any that appear untrustworthy.
Researchers have reverse-engineered a piece of malware named Fast16. It’s almost certainly state-sponsored, probably US in origin, and was deployed against Iran years before Stuxnet:
“…the Fast16 malware was designed to carry out the most subtle form of sabotage ever seen in an in-the-wild malware tool: By automatically spreading across networks and then silently manipulating computation processes in certain software applications that perform high-precision mathematical calculations and simulate physical phenomena, Fast16 can alter the results of those programs to cause failures that range from faulty research results to catastrophic damage to real-world equipment.”
You might not know it, given the many headlines focused on new questions about copyright and Generative AI, but the year’s biggest copyright case concerned an old-for-the-internet question: do ISPs have to be copyright cops? After years of litigation, that question is now squarely before the Supreme Court. And if the Supreme Court doesn’t reverse a lower court’s ruling, ISPs could be forced to terminate people’s internet access based on nothing more than mere accusations of copyright infringement. This would threaten innocent users who rely on broadband for essential aspects of daily life.
The Stakes: Turning ISPs into Copyright Police
This issue turns on what courts call “secondary liability,” which is the legal idea that someone can be held responsible not for what they did directly, but for what someone else did using their product or service. The case began when music companies sued Cox Communications, arguing that the ISP should be held liable for copyright infringement committed by some of its subscribers. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit agreed, adopting a “material contribution” standard for contributory copyright liability (a rule for when service providers can be held liable for the actions of users). Under that standard, providing a service that could be used for infringement is enough to create liability when a customer infringes.
The Fourth Circuit’s rule would have devastating consequences for the public. Given copyright law’s draconian penalties, ISP would be under enormous pressure to terminate accounts whenever they get an infringement notice, whether or not the actual accountholder has infringed anything: entire households, schools, libraries, or businesses that share an internet connection. These would include:
Public libraries, which provide internet access to millions of Americans who lack it at home, could lose essential service.
Universities, hospitals, and local governments could see internet access for whole communities disrupted.
Households—especially in low-income and communities of color, which disproportionately share broadband connections with other people—would face collective punishment for the alleged actions of a single user.
And with more than a third of Americans having only one or no broadband provider, many users would have no way to reconnect.
EFF—along with the American Library Association, the Association of Research Libraries, and Re:Create—filed an amicus brief urging the Court to reverse the Fourth Circuit’s decision, taking guidance from patent law. In the Patent Act, where Congress has explicitly defined secondary liability, there’s a different test: contributory infringement exists only where a product is incapable of substantial non-infringing use. Internet access, of course, is overwhelmingly used for lawful purposes, making it the very definition of a “staple article of commerce” that can’t be liable under the patent framework.
The Supreme Court held a hearing in the case on December 1, and a majority of the justices seemed troubled by the implications of the Fourth Circuit’s ruling. One exchange was particularly telling: asked what should happen when the notices of infringement target a university account upon which thousands of people rely, Sony’s counsel suggested the university could resolve the issue by essentially slowing internet speeds so infringement might be less appealing. It’s hard to imagine the university community would agree that research, teaching, artmaking, library services, and the myriad other activities that rely on internet access should be throttled because of the actions of a few students. Hopefully the Supreme Court won’t either.
We expect a ruling in the case in the next few months. Fingers crossed that the Court rejects the Fourth Circuit’s draconian rule.
This article is part of our Year in Review series. Read other articles about the fight for digital rights in 2025.
Keeping websites and applications secure starts with knowing which vulnerabilities exist, how severe they are, and whether they affect your stack. That’s exactly where the CVE program shines. Below, we’ll cover some CVE fundamentals, including what they are, how to search and understand the data, and how to translate this information into actionable steps.
Introduction to the CVE database
So, what is CVE?
CVE stands for Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures, a community-driven program that assigns unique identifiers to publicly known vulnerabilities.
Last month I gave a workshop for a group of 20-25 enthusiastic women, all either starting in infosec, or with an interest to start in this field.
For that purpose, I had created a full workshop: slides or a presentation introducing the concepts of Malware Analysis, Threat Intelligence and Reverse Engineering.
The idea was to convey these topics in a clear and approachable manner, both theory and in practice; for the latter, I had set up a custom VM, with Labs, including my own created applications, some with simple obfuscation.
All participants were very enthusiastic, and I hope to have sparkled most, if not some of them to pursue a career in this field. For this exact same reason, I am now releasing the presentation to the public - the VM and recordings however will not be published, as I created these solely for CWF.
I would also like to thank Nathalie for putting me in touch with Rosanna, the organiser of the CyberWayFinder program. And of course, my gratitude to all the attendees for making it!
Mind the disclaimer for the slides. License: CC Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs License
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