The company will use the investment to scale operations and deepen intelligence and automation.

The post Nucleus Raises $20 Million for Exposure Management appeared first on SecurityWeek.

The startup relies on AI agents to identify software vulnerabilities and validate them before reporting.

The post Zast.AI Raises $6 Million for AI-Powered Code Security appeared first on SecurityWeek.

After a decade and a half of service, the current certificates will expire, and new ones will be rolled out.

The post Microsoft to Refresh Windows Secure Boot Certificates in June 2026 appeared first on SecurityWeek.

More than two dozen advisories have been published by the chip giants for vulnerabilities found recently in their products.

The post Chipmaker Patch Tuesday: Over 80 Vulnerabilities Addressed by Intel and AMD appeared first on SecurityWeek.

Dozens of vulnerabilities, bugs, and potential improvements have been identified by the tech giants’ security teams.

The post Google-Intel Security Audit Reveals Severe TDX Vulnerability Allowing Full Compromise appeared first on SecurityWeek.

Edge devices that are no longer supported have been targeted in attacks by state-sponsored hackers, the US says.

The post Organizations Urged to Replace Discontinued Edge Devices appeared first on SecurityWeek.

As breach costs go up and attackers focus on common web features like dashboards, admin panels, customer portals, and APIs, weak access control quickly leads to lost data, broken trust, and costly incidents. The worst part is that many failures are not rare technical flaws but simple mistakes, such as missing permission checks, roles with too much power, or predictable IDs in URLs.

This post aims to help you control who can access different parts of your website and explain why it matters. 

Continue reading Beyond Login Screens: Why Access Control Matters at Sucuri Blog.

VS Code-integrated configuration files are automatically executed in Codespaces when the user opens a repository or pull request.

The post VS Code Configs Expose GitHub Codespaces to Attacks appeared first on SecurityWeek.

The US National Reconnaissance Office has declassified information about a fleet of spy satellites operating between 1971 and 2006.

I’m actually impressed to see a declassification only two decades after decommission.

A hacker published malicious versions of four established VS Code extensions to distribute a GlassWorm malware loader.

The post Open VSX Publisher Account Hijacked in Fresh GlassWorm Attack appeared first on SecurityWeek.

The likely state-sponsored threat actor had access to the hosting provider for months and targeted only certain Notepad++ customers.

The post Notepad++ Supply Chain Hack Conducted by China via Hosting Provider appeared first on SecurityWeek.

Vulnerability reports and responsible disclosures are essential for website security awareness and education. Automated attacks targeting known software vulnerabilities are one of the leading causes of website compromises.

To help educate website owners about potential threats to their environments, we’ve compiled a list of important security updates and vulnerability patches for the WordPress ecosystem this past month.

The vulnerabilities listed below are virtually patched by the Sucuri Firewall and existing clients are protected.

Continue reading Vulnerability & Patch Roundup — January 2026 at Sucuri Blog.

Hackers compromised a MicroWorld Technologies update server and fed a malicious file to eScan customers.

The post eScan Antivirus Delivers Malware in Supply Chain Attack appeared first on SecurityWeek.

Last month, while working on a WordPress cleanup case, a customer reached out with a strange complaint: their website looked completely normal to them and their visitors, but Google search results were showing something very different.

Instead of normal titles and descriptions, Google was displaying casino and gambling-related content. We have been seeing rising cases of spam on WordPress websites. What made this even more confusing was where the spam was appearing.

Continue reading Shadow Directories: A Unique Method to Hijack WordPress Permalinks at Sucuri Blog.

From an Anthropic blog post:

In a recent evaluation of AI models’ cyber capabilities, current Claude models can now succeed at multistage attacks on networks with dozens of hosts using only standard, open-source tools, instead of the custom tools needed by previous generations. This illustrates how barriers to the use of AI in relatively autonomous cyber workflows are rapidly coming down, and highlights the importance of security fundamentals like promptly patching known vulnerabilities.

[…]

A notable development during the testing of Claude Sonnet 4.5 is that the model can now succeed on a minority of the networks without the custom cyber toolkit needed by previous generations. In particular, Sonnet 4.5 can now exfiltrate all of the (simulated) personal information in a high-fidelity simulation of the Equifax data breach—one of the costliest cyber attacks in history­­using only a Bash shell on a widely-available Kali Linux host (standard, open-source tools for penetration testing; not a custom toolkit). Sonnet 4.5 accomplishes this by instantly recognizing a publicized CVE and writing code to exploit it without needing to look it up or iterate on it. Recalling that the original Equifax breach happened by exploiting a publicized CVE that had not yet been patched, the prospect of highly competent and fast AI agents leveraging this approach underscores the pressing need for security best practices like prompt updates and patches.

AI models are getting better at this faster than I expected. This will be a major power shift in cybersecurity.

Zero Trust is not a thing; it is an idea. It is not a product; it is a concept – it is a destination that has no precise route and may never be reached.

The post Cyber Insights 2026: Zero Trust and Following the Path appeared first on SecurityWeek.

Malicious attacks are increasing in frequency, sophistication and damage. Defenders need to find and harden system weaknesses before attackers can attack them.

The post Cyber Insights 2026: Offensive Security; Where It Is and Where It’s Going appeared first on SecurityWeek.

Rein aims to close the production visibility gap by stopping attacks inside the application runtime.

The post Rein Security Emerges From Stealth With $8M, Bringing Inside-Out AppSec Approach appeared first on SecurityWeek.

The protections against NPM supply chain attacks could be bypassed, leading to arbitrary code execution.

The post ‘PackageGate’ Flaws Open JavaScript Ecosystem to Supply Chain Attacks appeared first on SecurityWeek.

The cybercriminals in control of Kimwolf — a disruptive botnet that has infected more than 2 million devices — recently shared a screenshot indicating they’d compromised the control panel for Badbox 2.0, a vast China-based botnet powered by malicious software that comes pre-installed on many Android TV streaming boxes. Both the FBI and Google say they are hunting for the people behind Badbox 2.0, and thanks to bragging by the Kimwolf botmasters we may now have a much clearer idea about that.

Our first story of 2026, The Kimwolf Botnet is Stalking Your Local Network, detailed the unique and highly invasive methods Kimwolf uses to spread. The story warned that the vast majority of Kimwolf infected systems were unofficial Android TV boxes that are typically marketed as a way to watch unlimited (pirated) movie and TV streaming services for a one-time fee.

Our January 8 story, Who Benefitted from the Aisuru and Kimwolf Botnets?, cited multiple sources saying the current administrators of Kimwolf went by the nicknames “Dort” and “Snow.” Earlier this month, a close former associate of Dort and Snow shared what they said was a screenshot the Kimwolf botmasters had taken while logged in to the Badbox 2.0 botnet control panel.

That screenshot, a portion of which is shown below, shows seven authorized users of the control panel, including one that doesn’t quite match the others: According to my source, the account “ABCD” (the one that is logged in and listed in the top right of the screenshot) belongs to Dort, who somehow figured out how to add their email address as a valid user of the Badbox 2.0 botnet.

Badbox has a storied history that well predates Kimwolf’s rise in October 2025. In July 2025, Google filed a “John Doe” lawsuit (PDF) against 25 unidentified defendants accused of operating Badbox 2.0, which Google described as a botnet of over ten million unsanctioned Android streaming devices engaged in advertising fraud. Google said Badbox 2.0, in addition to compromising multiple types of devices prior to purchase, also can infect devices by requiring the download of malicious apps from unofficial marketplaces.

Google’s lawsuit came on the heels of a June 2025 advisory from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), which warned that cyber criminals were gaining unauthorized access to home networks by either configuring the products with malware prior to the user’s purchase, or infecting the device as it downloads required applications that contain backdoors — usually during the set-up process.

The FBI said Badbox 2.0 was discovered after the original Badbox campaign was disrupted in 2024. The original Badbox was identified in 2023, and primarily consisted of Android operating system devices (TV boxes) that were compromised with backdoor malware prior to purchase.

KrebsOnSecurity was initially skeptical of the claim that the Kimwolf botmasters had hacked the Badbox 2.0 botnet. That is, until we began digging into the history of the qq.com email addresses in the screenshot above.

CATHEAD

An online search for the address 34557257@qq.com (pictured in the screenshot above as the user “Chen“) shows it is listed as a point of contact for a number of China-based technology companies, including:

–Beijing Hong Dake Wang Science & Technology Co Ltd.
–Beijing Hengchuang Vision Mobile Media Technology Co. Ltd.
–Moxin Beijing Science and Technology Co. Ltd.

The website for Beijing Hong Dake Wang Science is asmeisvip[.]net, a domain that was flagged in a March 2025 report by HUMAN Security as one of several dozen sites tied to the distribution and management of the Badbox 2.0 botnet. Ditto for moyix[.]com, a domain associated with Beijing Hengchuang Vision Mobile.

A search at the breach tracking service Constella Intelligence finds 34557257@qq.com at one point used the password “cdh76111.” Pivoting on that password in Constella shows it is known to have been used by just two other email accounts: daihaic@gmail.com and cathead@gmail.com.

Constella found cathead@gmail.com registered an account at jd.com (China’s largest online retailer) in 2021 under the name “陈代海,” which translates to “Chen Daihai.” According to DomainTools.com, the name Chen Daihai is present in the original registration records (2008) for moyix[.]com, along with the email address cathead@astrolink[.]cn.

Incidentally, astrolink[.]cn also is among the Badbox 2.0 domains identified in HUMAN Security’s 2025 report. DomainTools finds cathead@astrolink[.]cn was used to register more than a dozen domains, including vmud[.]net, yet another Badbox 2.0 domain tagged by HUMAN Security.

XAVIER

A cached copy of astrolink[.]cn preserved at archive.org shows the website belongs to a mobile app development company whose full name is Beijing Astrolink Wireless Digital Technology Co. Ltd. The archived website reveals a “Contact Us” page that lists a Chen Daihai as part of the company’s technology department. The other person featured on that contact page is Zhu Zhiyu, and their email address is listed as xavier@astrolink[.]cn.

Astute readers will notice that the user Mr.Zhu in the Badbox 2.0 panel used the email address xavierzhu@qq.com. Searching this address in Constella reveals a jd.com account registered in the name of Zhu Zhiyu. A rather unique password used by this account matches the password used by the address xavierzhu@gmail.com, which DomainTools finds was the original registrant of astrolink[.]cn.

ADMIN

The very first account listed in the Badbox 2.0 panel — “admin,” registered in November 2020 — used the email address 189308024@qq.com. DomainTools shows this email is found in the 2022 registration records for the domain guilincloud[.]cn, which includes the registrant name “Huang Guilin.”

Constella finds 189308024@qq.com is associated with the China phone number 18681627767. The open-source intelligence platform osint.industries reveals this phone number is connected to a Microsoft profile created in 2014 under the name Guilin Huang (桂林 黄). The cyber intelligence platform Spycloud says that phone number was used in 2017 to create an account at the Chinese social media platform Weibo under the username “h_guilin.”

The remaining three users and corresponding qq.com email addresses were all connected to individuals in China. However, none of them (nor Mr. Huang) had any apparent connection to the entities created and operated by Chen Daihai and Zhu Zhiyu — or to any corporate entities for that matter. Also, none of these individuals responded to requests for comment.

The mind map below includes search pivots on the email addresses, company names and phone numbers that suggest a connection between Chen Daihai, Zhu Zhiyu, and Badbox 2.0.

UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS

The idea that the Kimwolf botmasters could have direct access to the Badbox 2.0 botnet is a big deal, but explaining exactly why that is requires some background on how Kimwolf spreads to new devices. The botmasters figured out they could trick residential proxy services into relaying malicious commands to vulnerable devices behind the firewall on the unsuspecting user’s local network.

The vulnerable systems sought out by Kimwolf are primarily Internet of Things (IoT) devices like unsanctioned Android TV boxes and digital photo frames that have no discernible security or authentication built-in. Put simply, if you can communicate with these devices, you can compromise them with a single command.

Our January 2 story featured research from the proxy-tracking firm Synthient, which alerted 11 different residential proxy providers that their proxy endpoints were vulnerable to being abused for this kind of local network probing and exploitation.

Most of those vulnerable proxy providers have since taken steps to prevent customers from going upstream into the local networks of residential proxy endpoints, and it appeared that Kimwolf would no longer be able to quickly spread to millions of devices simply by exploiting some residential proxy provider.

However, the source of that Badbox 2.0 screenshot said the Kimwolf botmasters had an ace up their sleeve the whole time: Secret access to the Badbox 2.0 botnet control panel.

“Dort has gotten unauthorized access,” the source said. “So, what happened is normal proxy providers patched this. But Badbox doesn’t sell proxies by itself, so it’s not patched. And as long as Dort has access to Badbox, they would be able to load” the Kimwolf malware directly onto TV boxes associated with Badbox 2.0.

The source said it isn’t clear how Dort gained access to the Badbox botnet panel. But it’s unlikely that Dort’s existing account will persist for much longer: All of our notifications to the qq.com email addresses listed in the control panel screenshot received a copy of that image, as well as questions about the apparently rogue ABCD account.