ClingSTUN operates as a back-connect proxy backdoor, sets up persistence, and contains exploits for self-propagation.
The post Linux Backdoor Abuses STUN Protocol, Exploits Dozens of Flaws appeared first on SecurityWeek.
Flashpoint’s monthly analysis of insider threat recruitment, illicit access advertising, and threat actor activity targeting enterprise environments.
Table Of ContentsUnknowingly, a member of key personnel is living two separate lives. On the clock, they are a highly-trusted systems administrator, but in their personal time, they moonlight on the deep and dark web, advertising their trust and access to the highest bidder. One day, they get a simple offer: $15,000 in the crypto of their choice to approve a single push notification at 2 AM. They accept. By morning, the attacker walks away with active domain admin credentials without the need for malware or cracking firewalls.
This is just one example of how insider threats lead to modern enterprise breaches. As perimeter security, EDR coverage, and other security tools mature, threat actors continue to target the human element, seeking employees and contractors willing to provide access to corporate systems or facilitate fraudulent activity.
In a threat landscape where identity is becoming the primary attack surface, monitoring illicit marketplaces and recruitment efforts is critical. This new monthly report leverages Flashpoint’s Primary Source Collection (PSC) to analyze insider threat tactics, tracking active recruitment and advertising on dark web forums and encrypted networks.
In September 2026, Flashpoint analysts identified a total of 9,787 insider-related posts across 1,216 channels and 1,778 authors. While the volume of observed activity decreased, threat actors continued to actively seek and advertise insider access, particularly within industries where legitimate employee privileges can be exploited to facilitate fraud. These communications included threat actors attempting to recruit insiders at target organizations, insiders advertising their services, and general discussions involving insider-related threat activity.
Of these communications, Flashpoint observed 857 unique posts between September 1 and September 30, 2026.
The majority of these posts appeared in mid-tier English-language Telegram channels, where threat actors sought or advertised insider access to organizations across several industries. Much of the observed activity focused on recruiting insiders to facilitate fraud operations.
Retail, telecommunications, and financial services remained prominent targets for insider threat activity in September 2026. However, a significant portion of the observed activity could not be attributed to a specific industry.
Flashpoint found that 45.7% of unique insider posts fell into the “Unknown” category, meaning analysts could not determine the targeted organization or industry. Among posts with an identifiable industry, retail accounted for the largest share, followed by telecommunications, financial services, and technology.
Together, these four industries accounted for 419 unique posts, or nearly 49% of all unique insider-related activity observed during the month.
The concentration of activity in retail, telecommunications, and financial services reflects continued threat actor interest in insiders who may be positioned to facilitate fraud, provide access to customer accounts, or exploit legitimate organizational privileges.
The following table shows a breakdown of unique insider posts by industry in September 2026:
| Industry | Posts |
| Other | 392 |
| Retail | 135 |
| Telecom | 116 |
| Financial | 85 |
| Technology | 83 |
| Public Sector | 41 |
| Healthcare | 3 |
| Media | 2 |
| Total | 857 |
Active insider threats generally involve two types of activity: an insider is recruited by a malicious outside party, or an insider advertises their access and services to interested threat actors. These arrangements can enable adversaries to exfiltrate sensitive data, install malware, compromise accounts, or carry out fraudulent activities such as SIM swaps.
In September 2026, Flashpoint analysts identified 15 notable insider recruitment and advertising posts across underground communities and chat forums. Of these, nine involved threat actors attempting to recruit insiders, while six involved actors advertising insider services.
Telecommunications accounted for the largest number of notable posts, with five instances of recruitment or advertising. Retail and technology followed with three each, while financial services and the public sector accounted for two each.
These examples illustrate how threat actors continue to seek access across industries, with particular interest in employees and contractors who can facilitate fraud or provide privileged access to organizational systems.
Flashpoint also observed numerous insider solicitations repeated across multiple discussion threads, often with limited details about the access or services being offered. Analysts could not independently verify the legitimacy of the recruitment and advertising claims.
Insider threats are inherently difficult to detect using internal security controls alone because the malicious activity relies on valid credentials and legitimate access privileges. Relying solely on internal logs means security teams often only detect an insider threat after data exfiltration or system sabotage has already occurred.
Flashpoint protects organizations against insider threats through our Primary Source Collection (PSC) and specialized intelligence platforms:
To learn more about how Flashpoint can help protect your enterprise from insider risk and monitor illicit underground communities, Request a Demo Today.
What is the Flashpoint Insider Threat Report?
The Flashpoint Insider Threat Report is a monthly intelligence brief that analyzes trends, volume, targeted industries, and tactics surrounding insider threat recruitment and illicit access advertising on the deep web, dark web, and encrypted chat channels.
How does Flashpoint collect insider threat data?
Flashpoint collects data using its Primary Source Collection (PSC) engine, which actively monitors thousands of dark web forums, illicit marketplaces, and underground chat networks where threat actors and malicious insiders communicate.
What is the difference between insider recruitment and insider advertising?
Insider recruitment occurs when an external cybercriminal attempts to entice a corporate employee into assisting with a cyberattack. Insider advertising occurs when an employee or contractor proactively lists their legitimate access or services for sale on illicit marketplaces.
The post Insider Threat Report: Dark Web Recruitment & Access Trends appeared first on Flashpoint.
Noteworthy stories that might have slipped under the radar: Kiteworks patches over 100 vulnerabilities, Microsoft publishes 2026 Digital Defense Report, AI finds 24 Android app flaws.
The post In Other News: $15K iCloud Spoofing Bugs, AI Policy Experts Phished, Adblocker Spies on AI Chats appeared first on SecurityWeek.
The dropper “carries a complete universal Mach-O inside itself, roughly 756 KB in the development build, and extracts it at runtime.
The post macOS Users Targeted by Fake Zoom Installer Carrying CloudSyncD Backdoor appeared first on SecurityWeek.
On September 15 this year, Google published details of patches for 110 vulnerabilities in its own Google Pixel smartphones. Among all the disclosed flaws, CVE-2026-58704 stands out the most, for it appears that this zero-day is being exploited in targeted attacks.
In today’s post, we talk about what’s so special about the Google Pixel, and why these devices get security updates all of their own – separate from regular Android updates. We also cover the vulnerabilities addressed in this latest update, with a special focus on the mentioned, most dangerous one – CVE-2026-58704 – and wrap up with tips on how to both protect your device and avoid becoming a victim of cyberattack on it.
The reader might reasonably wonder: I’ve already installed this month’s Android security updates on my Google Pixel. Isn’t that the same thing? Google Pixel does run on Android and receives those security updates, which are detailed in the monthly Android Security Bulletin. However, manufacturers of Android-based devices use different sets of hardware and software components. That’s why, alongside vulnerabilities common to all Android devices, there are security issues specific to individual manufacturers’ devices.
For its own smartphones, Google publishes separate security updates, covered by a dedicated Pixel Update Bulletin. Rather than replacing the Android Security Bulletin, this document complements it by detailing vulnerabilities specific to devices manufactured by Google. Other Android smartphones also receive similar updates from their manufacturers.
The Pixel Update Bulletin for September 2026 clearly shows why Google needs separate updates for its smartphones in the first place. Many of the vulnerabilities it fixes affect specific Pixel hardware (or hardware-related) components: the modem, bootloader, GPU, fingerprint scanner components, and other parts of the device. On smartphones from other manufacturers, these features might rely on entirely different hardware and software components, so the fixes listed in the Pixel Update Bulletin don’t apply to those phones.
That said, these vulnerabilities could still be relevant for Pixel owners who’ve flashed their devices with custom ROMs. Switching to a different OS doesn’t alter the device’s hardware components, and may not replace the firmware. Therefore, the vulnerabilities themselves may persist, but whether patches are available, and how they’re installed, depends on the specific OS.
Now let’s look closer at the specific vulnerabilities Google fixed in September. The most significant one is the above-mentioned CVE-2026-58704.
This vulnerability affects the Cellular Modem component, which handles the smartphone’s communication with cellular networks. It stems from a logic error in the code, which, under certain conditions, allows bypassing the intended permission check.
Successful exploitation of CVE-2026-58704 lets attackers escalate privileges on the smartphone to gain broader access to its functions and data. Note that the attack takes place over a cellular network and the threat actors need low-level privileges on the targeted device to start with.
In practice, this means attackers can’t exploit CVE-2026-58704 to attack a Pixel from just anywhere over the internet, as they’d apparently need to either compromise the cellular network the target smartphone is already connected to or, more likely, force it to connect to a malicious base station under their control.
Google hasn’t disclosed all the details of this vulnerability yet, and the related report is not publicly accessible. As a result, the technical details that would show how easy it is for attackers to exploit CVE-2026-58704 remain unknown pending installation of the patches on all devices.
Nevertheless, Google claims that there are signs of limited exploitation of CVE-2026-58704.
Of the remaining 109 vulnerabilities found in Google Pixel devices, only one is rated moderate; the others are either high (62) or outright critical (46). Nine of these flaws fall into the RCE (remote code execution) category. This means that if an attacker successfully exploits one of these vulnerabilities, they can remotely force the device to run malicious code. The exact conditions for the attack depend on the specific vulnerability.
Another 88 vulnerabilities fall into the elevation of privilege (EoP) category. These let an attacker who’s already gained a certain level of access to the device expand their privileges. The CVE-2026-58704 vulnerability discussed above falls into this same category, which is why the September bulletin lists 89 EoP vulnerabilities in total.
Finally, 10 vulnerabilities can lead to information disclosure (ID), and two more to denial of service (DoS). In short, that’s a hefty list of flaws, so Google Pixel owners shouldn’t wait around to install the patches.
Google Pixel owners can install the update that fixes the vulnerabilities covered in this post by following this path: Settings → Security & privacy → System & updates → Security update → Install. Keep in mind that the phone will automatically restart to finish installing the update.
To keep your phone secure we recommend the following general measures:
The China-based hacking group has been exploiting SharePoint vulnerabilities since July 2025.
The post Warlock Expands SharePoint Exploitation in Critical Infrastructure Attacks appeared first on SecurityWeek.
The attacks targeted the US Department of Education and Library and Archives Canada, and researchers linked some agents to OpenAI.
The post AI Agents Aimed SQL Injection at US and Canadian Government Sites appeared first on SecurityWeek.
Email hijacking remains one of the most effective techniques used by cybercriminals to conduct fraud, steal sensitive information, and impersonate trusted individuals.With new AI functionalities (dubbed "Anubis.AI") in our Mail Protection Service, we can stop such threats!
The personalized versions of ChatGPT were used to impersonate legitimate products and trick users into executing PowerShell commands.
The post Hackers Use ChatGPT Custom GPTs in ClickFix Attacks appeared first on SecurityWeek.
The malware framework uses a modular architecture and a custom executable file format for long-term persistence.
The post Daemon Tools Hackers’ NeedyMantis Malware Dissected by Microsoft appeared first on SecurityWeek.
Unit 42 is aware of possible 0-day activity against NetScaler devices. Citrix reports CVE-2026-88771, CVE-2026-88772 have been exploited in the wild.
The post Threat Brief: NetScaler Zero Days CVE-2026-88771 and CVE-2026-88772 Exploited in the Wild (Updated September 30) appeared first on Unit 42.
The company says the measure was precautionary and that it has no evidence of Kiteworks or customer systems being compromised.
The post Kiteworks Urges Server Shutdown, Finds Advanced Forms Vulnerability appeared first on SecurityWeek.
Malicious extensions and ClickFix attacks are two hugely popular topics on our blog, and for a good reason: they’re both very common. In this post, we bring them together. Here’s the thing: in our posts about malicious ClickFix instructions, we don’t always explain exactly how users end up on the attackers’ pages in the first place. A recent study gives us a chance to fill that gap and talk about one of those methods: malicious extensions.
Readers who are not deep into cybersecurity may already have a bunch of questions at this point: how can extensions be malicious? where do they come from? and what exactly is ClickFix, anyway? Fret not: this post answers all these questions.
Let’s start with the basics. Browser extensions or add-ons are lightweight tools installed in your browser to give it extra capabilities or change how it works with web pages. For example, extensions can block ads, translate pages, download audio and video, save passwords, or take screenshots.
Most browser developers offer users an official extension store. For instance, for the most popular browser, Chrome, that store is the Chrome Web Store. There are also alternative platforms for distributing extensions, though browser developers have recently made it much harder to install and use extensions that don’t come from an official source.
Just like any other software, extensions can be useful, but they can also be malicious. In fact, cybercriminals often spread malicious extensions through those very same official stores, and we’ve covered plenty of such cases on our blog before.
It’s no accident that criminals love spreading malicious plug-ins. To work properly, most extensions need permission to read and modify the content of every web page the user visits. Without that permission, add-ons would be basically useless. For instance, a translation extension needs to read all the text on a page before it can swap the original for the translation.
Cybercriminals take advantage of these capabilities for their own purposes: for example, they intercept logins, passwords and other data entered on websites, swap out payment details, or show victims fake forms and messages. And all of this happens on legitimate sites that users have come to trust without a second thought.
Now let’s move on to a fresh piece of research about a campaign that spread 19 malicious add-ons through the Chrome and Edge extension stores. We’ll use it as an example to look at what these tools can actually do.
In late August, cybersecurity researchers reported finding 18 malicious extensions for Chrome and one for Edge. They said all 19 add-ons were probably linked to the same campaign. They base this on the similarity of the malicious code and the methods the attackers used. You’ll find the full list of malicious extensions at the end of this post.
Most of the extensions discovered, 14 in total, were built by the attackers themselves. Their first versions weren’t malicious at all and did exactly what users downloaded them for. But after a while, once users had come to trust the add-on, the attackers pushed an update that slipped in malicious functionality.
As for the remaining five extensions, their creators had nothing to do with the cybercriminals at all. They simply sold their creations to them. This way of getting hold of extensions is also popular among cybercrooks. There are plenty of reasons for that: ready-made add-ons can be bought for relatively little money, and criminals don’t have to build or promote them from scratch. And most importantly, along with the extension, they also inherit its existing user base. Upon buying the add-on, all the attackers need to do is add malicious functions and push an update that installs automatically for users. Users are never told that the extension’s real owner has changed.
In this case, the add-on cybercriminals bought most often was Enable Right Click & Copy — Smart Unlock + OCR. It had 70 000 users in Chrome and 10 000 in Edge. This purchase is exactly why there’s a single Edge extension among all its Chrome relatives. The add-on itself originally served a perfectly benign purpose: it let users select and copy text on sites where that’s normally blocked, and it could also pull text out of images with optical character recognition (OCR).
At the time of the research, the Edge version of the extension had more than 10 000 users. Source
The malicious functionality introduced into the extension makes it reach out to the attackers’ command-and-control (C2) server to download additional modules of nefarious code. These modules can change over time. Since Chrome automatically updates all installed extensions by default, the malicious version lands on the device without users having to do anything at all.
For the downloaded code to run on the websites the user visits, the extension disables one of their defenses — Content Security Policy (CSP). This mechanism allows website owners to declare which scripts and other resources are allowed to load and run on a page. Once this protection is turned off, the extension can inject code it gets from the C2 server right into the pages open in the browser. The website itself isn’t hacked, and it looks the same to everyone else, but for that one infected user, the legitimate page quietly turns malicious.
Now let’s take a closer look at what the malicious modules loaded by the extension are actually capable of. Researchers found 16 such modules, built for all sorts of tasks: from stealing data and hijacking cryptocurrency to the ClickFix attacks we’re focusing on here.
Some of the modules simply collect user data. They intercept logins, passwords, email addresses, and other valuable information the user enters into web forms, including payment details. On top of that, the add-ons steal data from Facebook and LinkedIn accounts and collect browsing history. Criminals can use this information to take over accounts, steal money, and launch further attacks against the victim.
A few other modules focus specifically on stealing cryptocurrency and related data directly. One of them is a crypto drainer, a tool that empties crypto wallets. It works with Ethereum and compatible blockchains as well as Solana and Tron. It replaces the real Connect Wallet and Swap buttons on websites with its own fake ones. When a user clicks one of these buttons, the drainer takes over all further interaction with the wallet and walks the victim through confirming the actions needed to steal their cryptocurrency.
Other modules target users of Ledger and Trezor hardware wallets. Right on the official websites of these services, the malicious extension displays a fake wallet update-and-restore page that asks for a seed phrase of 12, 18, or 24 words. The seed phrase the user enters is forwarded straight to the attackers, giving them full control over the wallet.
The fake form asks the user to enter a seed phrase of 12, 18, or 24 words, which then ends up in the attackers’ hands. Source
Finally, some modules gather information from crypto service pages open in the browser, such as OKX, MEXC, Kraken, KuCoin, Coinbase, Binance, Bybit, and MetaMask, including balance details and active session data that can be used to hijack accounts.
And now we’ve finally reached the module that matters most for this post: the one used for ClickFix attacks. We’ll talk about it in the next part.
The ClickFix attack technique has become extremely popular among cybercriminals lately. It relies on social engineering: the victim is shown fake instructions supposedly needed to complete some action, such as passing a CAPTCHA check, fixing an error, or updating a program. Following these instructions, the user copies the command suggested by the attackers, pastes it into a system tool built for running these commands, and runs it, all by themselves.
We’ve written about attacks like this and their consequences more than once on our blog. But we rarely dig into exactly how a victim ends up on a page with fake instructions in the first place. A campaign that spread malicious extensions through the Chrome Web Store shows us one way this can happen.
Add-ons turn out to be a very handy tool for ClickFix attacks. As we mentioned earlier, when a user visits a page, extensions are allowed reading and changing its content in order to work. That gives attackers the chance to swap in a fake ClickFix instruction at just the right moment, replacing the content of the page the person actually wanted to open.
What’s more, the ClickFix technique itself lets attackers break out of the browser and gain a foothold directly in the system. That means removing the malicious extension won’t necessarily undo the damage: after the user has run the ClickFix command, malware may already be installed outside the browser.
In the specific attack example the researchers describe, the user sees a fake notification saying their browser needs to be updated, along with instructions on how to do it. The instructions change depending on the operating system, and the extension picks up that information automatically too.
In the macOS version of this attack, the user is told to open Terminal, copy a command, paste it there and run it, then restart Chrome to supposedly finish the update. Source
First off, we recommend checking whether any of the following malicious extensions are already installed in your browser:
If you find any of these extensions on your device, we recommend removing it as soon as you can and running a full system scan with a reliable antivirus. As we mentioned above, simply deleting the add-on might not be enough. You can use a free trial version to detect and remove the infection.
How to avoid falling victim to malicious extensions and ClickFix attacks in the future?
What else makes browser extensions and the ClickFix technique dangerous? Find out in our other posts:
In 2026, the owner of an ordinary home router, smart TV, or TV box is a prime target for cybercriminals. These devices are readily recruited into botnets and residential proxy networks, which we’ve covered before.
Criminals “sublease” the infected device by letting outsiders pay to visit any website from the victim’s IP address, so it looks like the device’s owner is doing it. The service is in demand across all kinds of shady schemes: from ad fraud and spam campaigns to password bruteforcing and account hacking. In our previous post, we described how home routers get recruited into these proxy networks; today we take a look at an even more vulnerable, and equally ubiquitous category of devices: smart TVs and TV boxes.
These appeal to criminals for two reasons. First, unlike computers and smartphones, TVs are almost always plugged into the power and have a fast internet connection. A dark screen doesn’t mean the device is switched off. On top of that, the limited user interface and monitoring tools mean suspicious background processes can easily slip unnoticed past users.
The threat is evolving and growing more aggressive. A recent study found that once proxyware turns up on a set-top box, the risks to its owner go well beyond having their traffic siphoned off.
The researchers focused on a popular TV box by SuperBox, which we already covered earlier in the post Is your TV box renting out your network?
SuperBox’s marketing leans heavily on the promise of providing thousands of TV channels, with no subscription or monthly fees. But out of the box, the device can’t actually do anything of the sort. To get access to pirated content, you need to install the brand’s proprietary app store.
When you launch it and install additional apps, the thousands of TV channels do appear. Meanwhile behind the scenes, with no warnings or permission prompts, the device floods external sites with unauthorized requests, and network traffic spikes sharply.
The researchers uncovered several alarming facts. First, the victim gets enrolled into as many as five botnets at once. The SuperBox runs clients for several proxyware networks simultaneously, which even try to compete with one another by blocking rival software from being installed.
But the real shock was the attacks on the internal network. The TV box’s proxyware places no limits on what its paying clients can actually do on the network. They can reach not only external sites but also devices inside your home network.
Normally, your home router and ISP settings protect you from outside attacks. But proxyware bypasses these barriers because it operates from inside the network. During an experiment, the researchers confirmed that an attacker on the internet can easily leverage the infected set-top box to open the admin panel of a home router, such as a Linksys, which is supposed to be accessible only to its owner when connected to the home Wi-Fi network. This means hackers can try to steal data from other devices in the same household, or even encrypt home network storage (NAS).
At the same time, flaws in SuperBox’s factory firmware let hackers remotely install and run any application with superuser privileges, and the threat is anything but hypothetical. Over three weeks of monitoring, the test set-top box was hit by more than 1300 attacks through the home proxy network. Attackers installed three different types of malware, including a module for launching DDoS attacks.
The malware uses several methods to gain a foothold in the system, and it survives reboots and power failures alike.
If you have a cheap TV set-top box or Android TV from a little-known brand, it’s worth checking it for anomalies.
The most reliable method is to review the network traffic. Use the statistics in your router’s control panel, but note that some budget models may lack this feature. This feature is called Traffic Analyzer on Asus routers, Traffic Usage on TP-Link, and Traffic Monitor on Keenetic. Find your TV or set-top box in the device list and check the ratio of downloaded to uploaded data. They should consume a lot of traffic to download video while sending very little. If your box is quietly pushing gigabytes of data out or staying chatty on the network even while idle, that’s a telltale sign it’s infected.
If traffic statistics aren’t available, look for indirect signs:
The best solution is to disconnect the device from the internet and dispose of it. If you have to keep using it, follow these steps to minimize the risks:
Buying cheap devices with pirate streaming features and installing software from shady sources is a surefire way to compromise your home network. Your IP address will become a source of malicious activity, which at best gets you blocked by your ISP and at worst puts you on law enforcement’s radar. What’s more, hackers can use the box as a launchpad to attack your home computers and NAS, which can lead to personal data theft or a ransomware attack.
The best protection is to buy devices from trusted brands and pay for legal content. And to rule out someone hijacking control of your network, make sure your router’s admin panel and other home devices are protected with unique, strong passwords. To avoid having to remember them all, use a reliable password manager such as Kaspersky Password Manager. Additionally, the Smart Home Monitor feature included in Kaspersky Premium lets you keep all your devices fully under control.
There may be more things you don’t know about your smart home devices:
Security researchers have found a way to hack a Boeing 737 with a device no bigger than a coin. The 737 is one of the most widely used airliners in the world, so chances are you’ve flown on one yourself at least once.
The attack requires installing a small device in a port that’s accessible through a hatch on the outside of the plane. According to the researchers, this port is regularly within reach not just of maintenance crews, but of other airport and airline staff too. And installing the device takes less than 60 seconds. So let’s talk about what this mysterious little device actually is, what it can do, and whether it’s still safe to fly on a Boeing 737.
Most of us have gotten used to the idea that our computers and phones can be hacked. It’s probably the most common topic on this blog. But we’ve also covered attacks on less common targets: cars, robot lawnmowers, automated card shufflers, bikes, and even mattresses. In today’s world, all of these (and many other) devices contain tiny (or not-so-tiny) computers.
Airplanes are no exception. A modern airliner is packed with computers — some of which handle critical functions: from calculating takeoff parameters to controlling the flight itself. But there’s one key difference: airliner manufacturers, unlike the makers of most smart home gadgets, take security very seriously, which makes it far harder to reach these systems from the outside.
Maybe that’s precisely why the idea of hacking a real plane has been tempting the most inquisitive security researchers for years. A team at the University of California San Diego and Oberlin College — the researchers who finally pulled it off — spent more than a decade wrestling with the problem. As mentioned above, the main challenge in hacking a plane is that its critical systems aren’t connected to the external internet. Because of that, studying plane-related attack vectors wasn’t seen as especially promising within the cybersecurity research community: reaching isolated systems remotely is extremely difficult, and the odds of an attacker gaining physical access were considered very low.
Two other successful projects changed that assumption for UC San Diego researchers Kirill Levchenko and Aaron Schulman: a hack of the Chevrolet Impala, and research into payment card skimmers. The car hack led their team to buy secondhand Boeing 737 computer components and build their own test rig. The skimmer research gave them the idea for a small physical device that could plug directly into the plane’s internal systems.
After studying the Boeing 737’s circuit diagrams, the researchers found a port accessible from outside the plane — protected only by an unlocked hatch. That port connects to a data channel called the ARINC 429 bus, which links the plane’s flight management computer (FMC) to its multifunction control and display unit (MCDU).
The port sits in the electronics bay beneath the cockpit. From outside the plane, it’s covered only by an unlocked hatch. Source
On their test rig, the researchers checked what would happen if they connected to the ARINC 429 bus through this port and sent electrical signals more powerful than the ones the Boeing’s components normally exchange with one another. It turned out that doing so let them override legitimate commands with their own. From there, all that was left was building a device small enough to fit into the port they’d found.
Step by step, the team built a device compact enough to slot into the unprotected port. The finished version set them back less than US$100, and appears to have been built largely from off-the-shelf parts: a small microcontroller, electronics for communicating with the bus, and a Wi-Fi module. That last part could potentially help the device connect to the plane’s public in-flight Wi-Fi network, giving the attacker access over the internet, and eventually letting them control the device remotely. And the whole thing takes less than a minute to install into the port.
The device the researchers built to connect to Boeing 737 systems. A coin sits next to it for scale. Source
The researchers dubbed their attack “Bus Driver”, apparently a play on words: “bus” refers to both a passenger vehicle and the data channel that lets a system’s components talk to each other. The attack lets someone step into that channel and swap out the commands being sent — effectively controlling the bus.
An unprotected port, a coin-sized device, access to the bus: that’s all and well and good, but what did the researchers actually manage to pull off? What kind of damage can this tiny implant do? As it turns out, quite a lot — potentially even fatal. By gaining the ability to tamper with the data flowing between the flight management computer and the control and display unit, the researchers found they could interfere with several critical aspects of how the plane operates.
Researchers testing Bus Driver on real Boeing 737 avionics hardware. Their attack interface is running on the MCDU screen. Source
First, the implant can alter the data used to calculate takeoff and landing parameters. For example, it can change the plane’s recorded zero-fuel weight, which throws off the calculation of the speeds needed for a safe takeoff.
The device can also manipulate the assumed temperature value pilots use to determine how much engine thrust is needed at takeoff. Feed the system the wrong numbers, and under certain conditions the plane could end up with insufficient thrust to take off safely — potentially even going off the end of the runway. Faulty calculations during landing carry similarly serious risks.
The implant can also change the route the autopilot is following. On a long flight, a deviation of just a few degrees — subtle enough to go unnoticed — could be enough to send the plane badly off course so it runs out of fuel somewhere over open ocean.
Beyond that, an attacker could use the device to steer the plane into the airspace of a country that isn’t part of its approved flight path. That kind of deviation can also have deadly consequences: the history of civil aviation has seen more than one case of a passenger plane being mistakenly shot down by the military after straying into restricted airspace.
Of course, the odds of a deviation like this slipping past both pilots and air traffic control are very low, but disasters tend to happen exactly when several human errors line up.
Once installed, the implant is nearly invisible inside the port and very hard to spot unless you know to look for it. Source
Finally, the device doesn’t just let someone change flight parameters, it lets them hide those changes from the pilots. For instance, an attacker could load a new route into the flight computer while simultaneously altering what’s shown on the MCDU display, so the pilots keep seeing the original route.
That said, the researchers note that in most cases an attentive crew would catch the discrepancy. The correct data still shows up on other cockpit displays, and switching to manual control lets pilots disengage the autopilot and take back control of the plane.
To wrap up, I’ll try to put the longtime aerophobes (and anyone this article has just turned into one) at ease. The researchers themselves say that despite everything they’ve learned, they still fly on Boeing 737s. And to avoid causing any real-world trouble, they deliberately left out exactly which port they used in their experiments.
The researchers also reached out to Boeing back in 2020 to share their findings. Boeing took the information seriously and worked on addressing the issue.
Specifically, the researchers suggested Boeing either remove the vulnerable port or seal it with epoxy resin to physically rule out the possibility of someone plugging in an unauthorized device. There are more involved options too, like redesigning the internal bus’s electrical protections so a rogue device can’t override the real signals, and adding systems that can detect this kind of attack in the first place.
Longer term, the researchers recommend that Boeing, along with other aircraft manufacturers, adopt cryptographic authentication for the messages passed between avionics components.
Whether Boeing acted on this specific advice or came up with its own fixes isn’t publicly known. When Wired reporters asked the company about it, the response was fairly vague:
“Our technical experts are confident that the layers of protection in place on the airplane, including within the system design and the operating environment, provide sufficient mitigation to significantly limit the feasibility and risk of real-world attacks.”
So no, there’s apparently no need to swear off Boeing 737 flights just yet. That said, I happen to have a lot of respect for trains, so I won’t try to talk you out of traveling by rail or using other ways of getting around either. I’ve actually written about train hacking on this blog before, though in that case the goal was constructive, not destructive.
Cars, lawnmowers, card shufflers, bikes, smart mattresses — it’s not even an exhaustive list of the devices that hackers have successfully tampered with. What else was hacked? Find out in our other posts:
Artificial intelligence has gone from a technological novelty to a tool so ordinary that kids in elementary school are already using it. Trying to ban children from using AI at this point makes about as much sense as it once did to ban search engines or Wikipedia.
Today we’re breaking down how chatbots actually work, and how to teach your kid to use AI as a study aid rather than a substitute for thinking for themselves
Before explaining anything about artificial intelligence to your child, it helps to understand how it actually works and where its limits are.
Most of the popular chatbots that kids (as well as adults) use are what’s known as large language models, or LLMs. To build such a model, researchers train it to spot patterns across huge amounts of text. The model breaks text down into small units called tokens (each token can be a sequence of words, a punctuation mark, a single word or character, or a whole sentence), then predicts which token is most likely to come next.
This example shows how the GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 models split messages into tokens. Source
The same thing happens when a chatbot converses with a person. A language model doesn’t actually reason on its own. It’s calculating which words and phrases are most likely to follow one another in order to produce a response that fits your query. That means chatbots will sometimes give incomplete or flat-out wrong answers, no matter how often they’re updated or retrained. A vivid example: just two years ago, popular chatbots confidently assured users that the word “strawberry” has two letters “r” instead of three. Mistakes like these are commonly known as hallucinations.
Many chatbots can also search the internet for information. In that case, the AI pulls in data from an outside source, but it still uses its own internal algorithms to put the answer together. And search results themselves can include outdated posts, advertising content, tabloids, and other questionable sources.
We’ve already seen that artificial intelligence isn’t immune to errors. Unfortunately, hallucinations aren’t the only issue. Even when a chatbot is working from accurate information, it can still present it in a misleading way by leaving something out, putting the emphasis in the wrong place, or drawing a questionable conclusion. Sometimes the result depends on factors a user would never think to consider when asking a question.
One surprising factor is simply what language you’re using. Most of the data that major models are trained on is in English, so these systems tend to perform better in English. The same AI model might answer a question correctly in English but get it wrong when asked the exact same thing in, say, Serbian. This gap shows up most in fields such as science, medicine, technology, and law, where there’s simply far more high-quality English-language material for the model to draw on.
Another quirk of chatbots is that they get worse as you feed them more information. Studies show that the more text and data a model has to work with, the harder it is for it to keep track of details, connect information from different parts of a conversation, and answer questions that require real depth of understanding. Therefore, uploading an entire book to a chatbot and asking detailed questions about it is a surefire way to trigger hallucinations.
It’s also worth questioning not just what the AI tells you, but the way you ask your questions in the first place. Chatbots often try to please the user, and will shape their answer to match the user’s apparent point of view. For example, the same chatbot might give opposite answers to “Why is the Earth overpopulated?” and “Why isn’t the Earth overpopulated?”, each time building its response around the assumption baked into the question. One recent study found that even the most advanced language models failed to challenge false premises in 26–42% of cases.
Many a former student knows that copying others’ work is an art unto itself — one that takes exceptional skill and at least some engagement with the material (sometimes even a fair amount). These days, unfortunately, even that skill is at risk of disappearing: the temptation to copy an answer that took only a few seconds to generate is simply too strong. But chatbots are far from straight-A students themselves.
In one study, researchers had three popular chatbots sit a chemistry exam, and compared their scores to those of real students from 2009–2023. The students came out ahead. Chatbots will sometimes land on the correct answer, but arrive at it via a chain of flawed reasoning, so their answers could just as easily be wrong.
So it’s worth explaining to your child that having AI write essays from scratch, or solve equations without then double-checking them, is a dead end. On top of that, in a real job they’ll be judged on actual skills and knowledge, and chatbots won’t help them fake the expertise. What AI can genuinely help with, without getting in the way of learning, is explaining difficult topics and working through mistakes. Here are some examples:
Make sure your child understands that they shouldn’t blindly trust what a chatbot tells them — even when it cites other sources. And asking the same chatbot to double-check its own work isn’t a great idea either; there’s a real chance it will make the same mistakes twice, or even pile up the errors.
Take any chatbot answer and go through it together, breaking it down into individual statements and asking questions about each one. Where did that date or number come from? Is the AI citing a specific person, publication, or study? Is the quote actually something that person said? If the chatbot includes a link, open it and check how accurately the AI actually represented it.
While you’re at it, take a look at the quality of the source itself. If something is written in an overly emotional tone or makes bold claims without backing them up, that’s a good sign to look for information somewhere else.
Anything your child shares with a chatbot ends up on that company’s servers, and it’s used to further train the model by default. Over the past few years we’ve seen that even the biggest companies aren’t immune to bugs and data leaks. To lower the risk of your child’s information leaking and to keep their account secure, follow a few simple rules:
What else to read about keeping kids safe online and at school:
- Keeping kids safe online: a practical guide for parents
- How to help your kid become a blogger without ever worrying about their safety
- How hackers target Gen Z
- Choosing wisely: a guide to your kids’ first gadget
- Back-to-school threats: gadgets
- Back-to-school threats: virtual classrooms and videoconferencing
- Back-to-school threats: social networking
- Back to School Security Tips
Cybersecurity researchers have discovered a new family of Android malware, and it goes by the name of Manic. It lets criminals spy on their victims, steal banking credentials, and take remote control of infected devices.
But its most unusual trick is this: Manic can send stolen data back to attackers even when the given device has no internet connection. Apparently, random mobile internet outages seem to get in cybercriminals’ way just as much as anyone else’s, so the actors behind Manic came up with an unusual workaround.
People across a wide range of European countries are at risk, from Russia to the United Kingdom. In this post, we walk through what this Trojan can actually do, how it smuggles stolen data out to attackers, and how you can protect your Android device from Manic and other similar threats.
Researchers haven’t yet pinned down exactly how attackers are getting Manic onto people’s devices. Typically, malware like this spreads through channels like:
Google has told journalists it hasn’t found any trace of Manic spreading through apps on the Google Play Store. That suggests people are most likely installing infected apps from unofficial sources.
Experts have traced the beginnings of the attackers’ infrastructure for this campaign to February 2026. The earliest samples of the malware itself turned up in late May of this year. Since then, the criminals behind the Trojan have refined the ways it hides from detection on a victim’s device.
Manic currently combines the powers of a banking Trojan, spyware, and a remote-access tool that lets an attacker control the device. Attackers are especially interested in data from sources like:
By looking at which banking apps Manic targets, researchers have been able to work out which countries it has in its sights. It turns out its reach is broad, covering Austria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Germany, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, Russia, Slovakia, Spain, Ukraine, and the United Kingdom.
Let’s look at exactly what information Manic steals, and how it manages to get it. The malware’s main trick relies on abusing Android’s Accessibility services, a set of built-in features designed to help users with visual impairments. Used as intended, these features are genuinely helpful for people with vision loss. But criminals have long been quietly exploiting the very same tools for their own purposes.
Once a user grants an app permission to use Accessibility services, that app can “see” the text and buttons on the screen, interact with them, scroll through pages, and carry out actions automatically — all as if a user were doing it themselves. Attackers use this to read messages on screen, quietly grant the malware extra permissions, interfere with attempts to uninstall it, switch off security protections, or control other apps without the victim ever noticing.
With Manic, this abuse of Accessibility services is paired with the Trojan’s own advanced capabilities. It can generate an invisible keyboard that overlays the phone’s real one. When a user types their password to log in to a banking app, Manic records exactly which keys they pressed. Then it uses Accessibility services to instantly replay that same keystroke on the actual app keyboard.
Manic generates a transparent capture layer that covers the phone’s keyboard, recording each tap and relaying it to the real keyboard. Source
This means attackers don’t have to build a fake login screen for every single app they want to target. Because Manic works as an invisible layer sitting on top of the genuine app, everything looks and behaves as usual, so a phone owner has no reason to suspect they’re handing over their PIN or password to a criminal.
Manic doesn’t simply log everything a user types, either. It automatically recognizes what kind of information it has just captured and sorts it into categories: passwords, email logins, four-to-six-digit SMS codes, strings of characters that look like crypto wallet seed phrases, and phone unlock codes or pattern locks. Alongside the captured text itself, Manic also records which app it came from, when it was entered, whether the user typed it manually or used autofill, and whether that app is on its hit list.
Manic’s abilities don’t stop at collecting information. Using Accessibility services once again, it also lets attackers take remote control of an infected device. To conceal this activity, Manic can show a black screen or fake a system update.
On top of Accessibility services, the malware also asks for permission to read text messages and notifications. That lets attackers intercept two-factor authentication codes and one-time verification codes before a victim even has a chance to type them into the app.
Put together, this hands attackers not just passwords, banking credentials, and verification codes, but the ability to remotely control the victim’s phone as well.
Manic’s original method for relaying stolen data off the device and back to the attackers deserves a separate mention. Even today, devices get knocked offline more often than people might expect, and Manic’s creators built a workaround specifically for such situations.
Normally, malware like this collects information on the device and sends it straight to a server controlled by the attackers. But what happens when the infected device has no direct internet access, or can’t reach the command-and-control server for some other reason?
In that case, Manic simply stores the stolen data on the device and starts scanning nearby for other infected phones it can reach over Wi-Fi or Bluetooth. If it finds one with internet access, it hands over the encrypted data to that phone, which then forwards it on to the attackers’ server.
But it doesn’t stop there. Data can hop across a chain of infected devices. By default, Manic allows up to four of these relay devices in the chain. If no suitable device is nearby, the data simply stays on the original phone, and Manic tries again later.
Android malware keeps getting more sophisticated. That makes it worth remembering — and actually following — a few basic digital hygiene habits for Android phone and tablet users:
Malware doesn’t just target smartphones; it feels at home on other Android-powered devices too — from streaming boxes to… cars. Check out the details in our related posts:
Threat actors are constantly developing new attack schemes — from OAuth token theft to attacks on AI agents — but the classics never quite leave their playbook. On any given day, an employee may receive malware attached directly to an email, or lying in wait behind a link embedded in an email. Making these attacks succeed still requires a degree of creativity, and in recent years attackers have increasingly adopted exotic file formats. Users don’t perceive these formats as dangerous; more importantly, many EDR and email security solutions skip scanning them entirely. Yet they’ve proven highly effective for deploying malware or harvesting credentials.
Below are the file types that may be blind spots in your organization’s detection strategy — despite being observed as used in real-world attacks.
This is the broadest and most dangerous attachment category. A disk image can contain a fully prepared, correctly structured set of files tailored to a wide range of attack scenarios. It mounts as a separate volume (standalone virtual disk), and when doing so often uses tools built into the operating system. The victim doesn’t need to extract anything or create suspicious folders on disk.
The most versatile format is ISO, which dates back to the heyday of multimedia CDs. ISO images mount natively on every major OS without additional utilities, whether through simple tools like File Explorer or via the command line interface. This is precisely why threat actors have no hesitation in sending ISO files as email attachments.
Somewhat less common are IMG containers, which also mount without additional tooling on macOS or Linux, but require installing a small, free utility such as OSFMount on Windows, or using WSL2 (Windows Subsystem for Linux), which is built into recent Windows versions. A file with identical content may also carry a DD extension.
Threat actors also make use of VHD, a virtual disk format native to Windows, which generally works on Linux machines as well (via qemu-nbd or guestmount). On macOS, an additional utility — again, qemu-nbd is a common choice — is required to mount it. Note that on unpatched Windows systems, the victim doesn’t need to take any further action after the disk mounts: CVE-2025-24993 — a vulnerability actively exploited in real-world attacks — triggers attacker code execution immediately upon mounting the image.
For completeness’ sake, VMDK, the disk image format used by VMware, is also worth detecting, though it’s largely ineffective in attacks on regular users since every popular OS requires additional software to mount it.
All of these image formats can be viewed and unpacked not only with specialized tools, but with standard archive utilities like 7-Zip or RAR. As a result, the odds that the user will fall for the bait are higher than one might hope.
In addition to not being a well-known potentially dangerous format, image files give attackers one further advantage: files extracted from disk images on Windows frequently lack the Mark of the Web flag, and therefore can be launched without triggering additional system warnings.
There’s one more reason why EPP/EDR solutions must scan virtual machines and disk images: these formats are also used during later stages of an attack. To mask active file-system activity from monitoring tools, ransomware gangs sometimes run the entire encryption process inside a virtual machine deployed on the victim’s computer. The RagnarLocker ransomware strain has used VirtualBox for this purpose, while the CRON#TRAP campaign relied on a QEMU environment.
No, this isn’t about macro-laced DOC files. Microsoft has grown weary enough of this classic attack vector that macros in downloaded documents are now blocked outright, and enabling them requires considerable effort from the user. But Office relies on dozens of file formats, and some of the less common ones still occasionally give attackers an edge.
Less familiar to both users and security solutions are OneNote files (.one). These are essentially simple notes, but they can carry embedded attachments, including not just images and links, but VBS/WSF/BAT scripts as well. Within the note, an attachment normally displays as an icon, but attackers overlay it with a picture showing a message with a “View” button.
Another Office format popular with attackers is the Excel add-in. These files use the .xll extension but are, in effect, full-fledged Windows dynamic-link libraries (DLLs), and therefore may have extensive functionality. Victims receive a malicious email with what looks like an invoice; the icon suggests that the file will open in Excel. Ignoring the security warning may result in an infostealer infection.
The description of the SVG (Scalable Vector Graphics) format sounds entirely innocuous. Indeed, 99% of SVG files are logos and interface icons. But unlike PNG or JPG, SVG files are fundamentally XML documents, and beyond points, lines and fills they can contain JavaScript. In terms of malicious potential, SVG is not far behind a full web page. In real-world attacks, SVG files can redirect a user to a phishing page immediately upon opening, or render the phishing page directly by unpacking a Base64-encoded block into full HTML.
SVG files pose a distinct risk to corporate portals that accept user file uploads. If a portal’s Content Security Policy (CSP) isn’t sufficiently restrictive, and lets someone upload a malicious SVG file, the embedded JavaScript can steal cookies from the page, inject unauthorized content, and carry out similar attacks.
Polyglot file formats are less exotic in and of themselves, but the files carry more than meets the eye. They’re called polyglots because attackers construct a file that can be validly interpreted in multiple ways: for example, it can be a valid ZIP archive and a valid executable at the same time. The purpose is purely to evade detection by security solutions and deceive the user. We’ve covered polyglots in detail in a separate blog post.
The clear standout in our roundup is a malicious campaign distributing the IcedID infostealer. Victims receive emails with a ZIP attachment, which unpacks into an ISO disk image. That further unpacks into a CHM file (the Windows Help format) that’s also correctly processed as an mshta (Microsoft HTML Application host) application, which then downloads the primary malware payload.
These attacks rely on the assumption that security solutions either don’t scan unusual file formats, or scan them only superficially. Preventing the threat starts with not operating on that assumption with regard to your own infrastructure:
Neighborhood chats regularly light up with posts about lost bank cards being found. People mean well and want to help a neighbor out, so they post a photo of the card with the number and other details fully visible. Others mention in the chat that they’ve left the card with, say, a security guard, cashier, or manager at whatever store or business it was found, or which happens to be the closest. Today we’re going to explain why none of that is a good idea, and what you should really do if you find someone else’s bank card.
Let’s start with why you shouldn’t post a photo of the card with its details visible in a group chat, keep the card, or hand it to a stranger. The first reason is the most obvious, but worth spelling out anyway: card details are private information that shouldn’t be shared with people who have no business seeing them. A photo posted in a group chat can end up in the hands of criminals, who may try to use those details to make fraudulent purchases online. The worst-case scenario is a photo showing both sides of the card that also exposes the three-digit security code (known as the CVC, CVV, or CVP) on the back.
Now to a less obvious point: why you shouldn’t post about finding a card, even with a photo of it with the number blurred out, and then hold on to it, planning to return it once the owner turns up. Since there’s no guarantee you were the first person to have the card in your hands, doing this puts you at risk of coming under suspicion if money disappears from that account. Even if you had absolutely nothing to do with any theft, the mere fact that the card was in your possession for a while could still land you in an uncomfortable conversation with its owner or the police.
The same logic applies to handing the card over to a third party. A security guard, cashier, or manager is just as much a stranger as anyone else, and none of them have any special authority to take charge of a found bank card. Handing it to them gives them the opportunity to use someone else’s money themselves, and if that happens, you could end up as a person of interest.
An “out of sight — out of mind” approach, that is, leaving the card where you found it, or moving it somewhere more visible, is safer for you personally, but it’s still not really the right call. If you do that, someone else will find it, and there’s no guarantee that they’ll be a decent person. They might try to drain money from the rightful owner’s account. So this isn’t a good option either.
Now let’s talk about what you should do instead. The right approach might surprise you: call the bank that issued the card, report that you’ve found it, and then… destroy the card. It’s entirely possible the owner hasn’t even noticed it’s missing yet: with contactless payments now so widespread, a physical card can sit untouched in a wallet for quite a while. The bank will block the card, notify the owner that it’s gone, and issue a new one.
That last step — destroying the card — may come as a surprise and even attract some push-back among readers, but we stand by it: a found card really should be destroyed. That way, no one can possibly use it, and you won’t have to hold onto someone else’s property or risk coming under suspicion if money goes missing from the account. The simplest and most reliable way to destroy a card is to carefully cut it into small pieces with kitchen scissors and throw it in the trash or recycle it.
Here’s something worth keeping in mind: these days, a physical card isn’t actually worth all that much to its rightful owner. For one thing, banks reissue cards quickly and easily. With most banks, you won’t even need to visit a branch since the new card gets delivered straight to your door.
For another, getting a new card issued usually doesn’t leave the owner unable to pay for things in the meantime: in many cases, they can just switch to a virtual card or another payment method. So a destroyed card is a much smaller headache for its owner than the risk of its ending up in the wrong hands and being used to drain their account.
And if the card’s disgruntled owner does somehow track you down with questions, just show them this article so they can appreciate the trouble they avoided, thanks to you.
Beyond bank cards, there are also multi-purpose cards, such as ones issued to schoolchildren and students that combine a few functions, like a school or university access pass and a public transit pass. Kids, especially younger ones, lose these kinds of cards fairly often. Restoring full functionality on cards like these can take much longer than reissuing a bank card, and the amounts stored on them are usually small, so if you find one, your best move is to take it to the school or university named on the card and hand it to security or reception / front office.
To sum it up, if a lost bank card ends up in your hands:
And one more reminder of what not to do: don’t post photos of the card or its details in chats or on social media, don’t hold on to the card hoping to track down the owner, and don’t hand it over to strangers.
We’d also recommend following our blog to stay on top of the latest online threats. And feel free to share this article in that neighborhood chat so your neighbors know exactly what to do if they ever find someone else’s bank card.
As for protecting your own money, it’s worth using a robust, multi-layered security solution that safeguards your money, cards, wallets, and payments. Read more in Five Kaspersky technologies to protect your finances.
What other hidden risks do bank cards carry? Find out in our other posts:
In Q2 2026, the percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked continued to decrease, falling to 19.15%, its lowest level since 2022.
Percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked, Q3 2023–Q2 2026
Regionally, the percentages ranged from 8.1% in Northern Europe to 27.9% in Africa.
Regions ranked by percentage of attacked ICS computers
The figures increased in five regions over the quarter, most notably in East Asia (by 2.0 pp) and Africa (by 0.5 pp).
East Asia saw increases in percentages for all threats except miners. The region ranked first in terms of growth for malicious scripts and phishing pages, spyware, and viruses. East Asia also led in terms of growth in threats from the internet. The percentage of ICS computers on which email threats were blocked also increased.
The biometrics sector (26.44%) has traditionally led the rankings of industries and OT infrastructures surveyed in this report in terms of the percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked. Biometric systems are characterized by the availability of internet access, extensive email use for data exchange and approvals (e.g. access granting), and, in many cases, minimal cybersecurity controls within the organizations that use them.
Industries ranked by percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked
The biometrics sector ranked first among industries in terms of the following threat categories: malicious scripts and phishing pages, malicious documents, spyware, ransomware, and worms. The sector is also leading among industries in terms of email threats. At the same time, unlike other industries, the percentage of affected ICS computers for email threats in biometrics exceeds that for internet threats.
In all selected industries, the global average follows a downward trend.
In Q2 2026, Kaspersky security solutions blocked malware from 10,904 different malware families of various categories on industrial automation systems.
Over the quarter, the percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects of the following categories were blocked increased: denylisted internet resources, malicious documents, worms, ransomware, and malware for AutoCAD.
Percentage of ICS computers on which the activity of malicious objects from various categories was blocked
Malicious scripts and phishing pages remained in first place in the threat category rankings based on the percentage of ICS computers on which the respective threats were blocked. In Q2 2026, the global average dropped to 5.42%.
Over the quarter, the figure for this category only increased in East Asia, rising by 0.93 pp to 4.86%. This is the second-highest figure in the region in the last three years.
In East Asia, the percentage of ICS computers affected by malicious scripts and phishing pages increased in all the industries surveyed, except construction. The highest figures were recorded for biometrics (9.01%) and building automation (6.49%).
In Q2 2026, denylisted internet resources rose in the threat category rankings from third to second place, displacing spyware. Globally, the percentage of ICS computers on which denylisted internet resources were blocked has been increasing for two quarters in row and reached 4.31%.
The figures increased in all regions over the quarter, most notably in Russia (by 1.33 pp). Moreover, Russia ranked first (5.17%) among the regions in terms of denylisted internet resources. Since 2022, the region has topped these rankings twice before, both times in Q2: in 2022 and 2024.
Among the selected industries in Russia, the highest figures for the denylisted internet resources were in the electric power (6.61%) and engineering and ICS integration (5.62%) industries.
Malicious documents ranked fourth in the threat category rankings by the percentage of ICS computers on which they were blocked. The percentage for this category decreased over the previous three quarters, reaching its lowest level in three years. However, in Q2 2026, it increased to 1.77%.
Over the quarter, the figures for malicious documents increased in seven regions, most notably in South America (by 1.35 pp) and Southern Europe (by 0.48 pp). These two regions are among the top three in terms of malicious documents, malicious scripts and phishing pages, as well as threats from email clients.
South America ranked second in the rankings of regions in terms of malicious documents. In Q2 2026, the percentage of ICS computers in the region on which this threat was blocked was 3.56%, which was the fourth highest in three years.
Among the selected industries in South America, the highest percentage of ICS computers on which malicious documents were blocked was in biometrics (6.67%).
Southern Europe ranked first in the rankings of regions in terms of malicious documents. In the previous quarter, the percentage of ICS computers in the region on which this threat was blocked was the lowest in three years, but in Q2 2026 it increased to 3.63%.
Among the selected industries in Southern Europe, the highest percentage of ICS computers on which malicious documents were blocked was once again in biometrics (11.48%).
Spyware ranked third in the threat category rankings based on the percentage of ICS computers on which it was blocked. The percentage for this category (3.30%) is the lowest since 2022.
Over the quarter, the figures increased in three regions, most notably in East Asia (by 0.53 pp) and Southeast Asia (by 0.42 pp).
East Asia ranked third based on the figures for spyware (4.77%), behind Africa and Southeast Asia. This is the region’s highest rate since Q2 2025. Among the countries and territories in the region, the highest percentage of ICS computers on which spyware was blocked was in mainland China (6.61%). Among the selected industries in East Asia, the highest figures for spyware were in the electric power (11.75%) and manufacturing (5.87%) industries. In all the industries surveyed, the figures are higher than the regional average.
Southeast Asia ranked second after Africa in the ranking of regions in terms of spyware, with 5.32%. Among the selected industries in Southeast Asia, the highest figures for spyware were in biometrics (8.93%) and manufacturing (7.32%). The figures increased in all industries over the quarter.
The percentage of ICS computers on which ransomware was blocked decreased in the previous three quarters but increased to 0.16% in Q2 2026.
During the quarter, the percentage increased in all regions, except Western and Southern Europe and North America (Canada). Africa led the ranking in terms of growth for this metric.
In Q2 2026, Africa ranked first among the regions in terms of the percentage of ICS computers on which ransomware was blocked (0.29%). The only time the figure in the region was higher in the past three years was Q2 2025 (0.31%).
Among the selected industries in Africa, the highest figures for ransomware were in the electric power industry (0.72%) and biometrics (0.52%). Over the quarter, the figures increased in all industries, except manufacturing and construction. The biggest increase was recorded in the electric power industry.
In Russia, the percentage of ICS computers on which ransomware was blocked in biometric systems has increased for three consecutive quarters, reaching 1.22%. This is the highest level of ransomware across all industries in all regions.
In Q2 2026, the percentage of ICS computers on which miners were blocked was the lowest since 2021, for both miners in the form of executable files for Windows (0.48%) and web miners running in browsers (0.14%).
The figures for both categories decreased in all regions, except for Africa where figures for miners in the form of executable files for Windows increased slightly.
On average, the oil and gas industry led the rankings among the selected industries both in terms of miners in the form of executable files for the Windows OS (0.66%) and in terms of web miners (0.34%).
In Q2 2026, the percentage of ICS computers on which worms were blocked increased to 1.43%.
In Q2 2026, the Middle East (2.11%) was second (after Africa) in the rankings of regions in terms of worms, displacing Central Asia and the South Caucasus.
Among the selected industries in the Middle East, the highest percentage of ICS computers on which worms were blocked was in building automation (2.90%). Over the quarter, the figures increased in all industries.
Australia and New Zealand ranked 12th among the regions in terms of the percentage of ICS computers on which worms were blocked (0.41%). Over the past three years, the figure in this region was only higher in Q2 2024 (0.42%). The figures increased in all the surveyed industries in the region, most notably in manufacturing and electric power. As a result, for these industries they exceeded the regional average by 2.9 and 2.3 times, respectively.
In Q2 2026, the percentage of ICS computers on which viruses were blocked decreased to 1.29%.
The top three regions for this metric remain unchanged: Southeast Asia (6.03%), Africa (4.22%), and East Asia (3.14%). These same regions lead the rankings in terms of malware for AutoCAD.
The figures increased in three regions: East Asia, Australia and New Zealand, and Africa, where it has been growing for four consecutive quarters and reached its highest value since 2022.
Among the selected industries in Africa, the highest percentage of ICS computers on which viruses were blocked was in construction (5.47%).
East Asia ranked third among the regions in terms of viruses, reaching the highest level in the region for the past three years. Among the countries and administrative regions of East Asia, mainland China is the clear leader in terms of viruses (5.07%).
Among the selected industries in East Asia, the highest percentage of ICS computers on which viruses were blocked was in construction (5.93%).
In Australia and New Zealand, the increase in the percentage of ICS computers on which viruses were blocked was primarily due to a 4.3-fold increase in the figure for the electric power industry: from 0.29% to 1.24%. For a region where the percentage of attacked ICS computers for all threats is 0.12%, this is a very high value.
In Q2 2026, the percentage of ICS computers on which malware for AutoCAD was blocked increased to 0.31%.
The most notable increase over the quarter was observed in Africa. After more than doubling in the previous quarter, the figure for the region continued to rise (although not so dramatically), reaching 1.02%.
Among the selected industries across all regions, the highest percentage of ICS computers on which malware for AutoCAD was blocked was in construction in East Asia (6.38%) and in Southeast Asia (4.05%).
In Q2 2026, of all the threat sources, the percentage increased only for email.
Percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects from various sources were blocked
The percentage of ICS computers on which threats from the internet were blocked decreased to 7.61%, reaching its lowest level since 2021.
Over the quarter, the percentage increased in three regions: East Asia by 0.8 pp (to 6.3%), South Asia by 0.3 pp (to 10.4%), and Russia by 0.3 pp (to 6.4%).
Among the selected industries across all regions, the highest percentage of ICS computers on which threats from the internet were blocked was in biometrics (13.03%) and engineering and ICS integration (12.16%) in South Asia.
The percentage of ICS computers on which email threats were blocked increased to 2.84%.
In Q2 2026, the percentage of ICS computers on which email threats were blocked increased in South America by 1.0 pp (to 5.2%) and in Africa by 0.7 pp (to 4.3%).
Among the selected industries across all regions, the highest percentage of ICS computers on which email threats were blocked was in biometrics (19.14%) and building automation (12.49%) in Southern Europe.
The percentage of ICS computers on which threats from removable media were blocked continued to decrease, reaching 0.24%, the lowest value for the period under review.
Among the selected industries across all regions, the highest percentage of ICS computers on which threats from removable media were blocked was in the electric power industry in East Asia (1.34%) and biometrics in Africa (1.29%).
The percentage of ICS computers on which threats from network folders were blocked continued to decrease. In Q2 2026, it was the lowest for the period under review, at 0.023%.
The only region to see an increase in the percentage of ICS computers on which threats from network folders were blocked during the quarter was Africa. This was mainly due to an increase in the building automation figure to 0.05%.
Among the selected industries across all regions, the highest percentage of ICS computers on which threats from network folders were blocked was in biometrics (0.23%), building automation (0.17%), and engineering and ICS integration (0.13%) in East Asia.
For more information on industrial threats see the full version of the report.
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