We’ve written time and again about phishing schemes where attackers exploit various legitimate servers to deliver emails. If they manage to hijack someone’s SharePoint server, they’ll use that; if not, they’ll settle for sending notifications through a free service like GetShared. However, Google’s vast ecosystem of services holds a special place in the hearts of scammers, and this time Google Tasks is the star of the show. As per usual, the main goal of this trick is to bypass email filters by piggybacking the rock-solid reputation of the middleman being exploited.
What phishing via Google Tasks looks like
The recipient gets a legitimate notification from an @google.com address with the message: “You have a new task”. Essentially, the attackers are trying to give the victim the impression that the company has started using Google’s task tracker, and as a result they need to immediately follow a link to fill out an employee verification form.
To deprive the recipient of any time to actually think about whether this is necessary, the task usually includes a tight deadline and is marked with high priority. Upon clicking the link within the task, the victim is presented with an URL leading to a form where they must enter their corporate credentials to “confirm their employee status”. These credentials, of course, are the ultimate goal of the phishing attack.
How to protect employee credentials from phishing
Of course, employees should be warned about the existence of this scheme — for instance, by sharing a link to our collection of posts on the red flags of phishing. But in reality, the issue isn’t with any one specific service — it’s about the overall cybersecurity culture within a company. Workflow processes need to be clearly defined so that every employee understands which tools the company actually uses and which it doesn’t. It might make sense to maintain a public corporate document listing authorized services and the people or departments responsible for them. This gives employees a way to verify if that invitation, task, or notification is the real deal. Additionally, it never hurts to remind everyone that corporate credentials should only be entered on internal corporate resources. To automate the training process and keep your team up to speed on modern cyberthreats, you can use a dedicated tool like the Kaspersky Automated Security Awareness Platform.
Beyond that, as usual, we recommend minimizing the number of potentially dangerous emails hitting employee inboxes by using a specialized mail gateway security solution. It’s also vital to equip all web-connected workstations with security software. Even if an attacker manages to trick an employee, the security product will block the attempt to visit the phishing site — preventing corporate credentials from leaking in the first place.
Millions of IT systems — some of them industrial and IoT — may start behaving unpredictably on January 19. Potential failures include: glitches in processing card payments; false alarms from security systems; incorrect operation of medical equipment; failures in automated lighting, heating, and water supply systems; and many more or less serious types of errors. The catch is — it will happen on January 19, 2038. Not that that’s a reason to relax — the time left to prepare may already be insufficient. The cause of this mass of problems will be an overflow in the integers storing date and time. While the root cause of the error is simple and clear, fixing it will require extensive and systematic efforts on every level — from governments and international bodies and down to organizations and private individuals.
The unwritten standard of the Unix epoch
The Unix epoch is the timekeeping system adopted by Unix operating systems, which became popular across the entire IT industry. It counts the seconds from 00:00:00 UTC on January 1, 1970, which is considered the zero point. Any given moment in time is represented as the number of seconds that have passed since that date. For dates before 1970, negative values are used. This approach was chosen by Unix developers for its simplicity — instead of storing the year, month, day, and time separately, only a single number is needed. This facilitates operations like sorting or calculating the interval between dates. Today, the Unix epoch is used far beyond Unix systems: in databases, programming languages, network protocols, and in smartphones running iOS and Android.
The Y2K38 time bomb
Initially, when Unix was developed, a decision was made to store time as a 32-bit signed integer. This allowed for representing a date range from roughly 1901 to 2038. The problem is that on January 19, 2038, at 03:14:07 UTC, this number will reach its maximum value (2,147,483,647 seconds) and overflow, becoming negative, and causing computers to “teleport” from January 2038 back to December 13, 1901. In some cases, however, shorter “time travel” might happen — to point zero, which is the year 1970.
This event, known as the “year 2038 problem”, “Epochalypse”, or “Y2K38”, could lead to failures in systems that still use 32-bit time representation — from POS terminals, embedded systems, and routers, to automobiles and industrial equipment. Modern systems solve this problem by using 64 bits to store time. This extends the date range to hundreds of billions of years into the future. However, millions of devices with 32-bit dates are still in operation, and will require updating or replacement before “day Y” arrives.
In this context, 32 and 64 bits refer specifically to the date storage format. Just because an operating system or processor is 32-bit or 64-bit, it doesn’t automatically mean it stores the date in its “native” bit format. Furthermore, many applications store dates in completely different ways, and might be immune to the Y2K38 problem, regardless of their bitness.
In cases where there’s no need to handle dates before 1970, the date is stored as an unsigned 32-bit integer. This type of number can represent dates from 1970 to 2106, so the problem will arrive in the more distant future.
Differences from the year 2000 problem
The infamous year 2000 problem (Y2K) from the late 20th century was similar in that systems storing the year as two digits could mistake the new date for the year 1900. Both experts and the media feared a digital apocalypse, but in the end there were just numerous isolated manifestations that didn’t lead to global catastrophic failures.
The key difference between Y2K38 and Y2K is the scale of digitization in our lives. The number of systems that will need updating is way higher than the number of computers in the 20th century, and the count of daily tasks and processes managed by computers is beyond calculation. Meanwhile, the Y2K38 problem has already been, or will soon be, fixed in regular computers and operating systems with simple software updates. However, the microcomputers that manage air conditioners, elevators, pumps, door locks, and factory assembly lines could very well chug along for the next decade with outdated, Y2K38-vulnerable software versions.
Potential problems of the Epochalypse
The date’s rolling over to 1901 or 1970 will impact different systems in different ways. In some cases, like a lighting system programmed to turn on every day at 7pm, it might go completely unnoticed. In other systems that rely on complete and accurate timestamps, a full failure could occur — for example, in the year 2000, payment terminals and public transport turnstiles stopped working. Comical cases are also possible, like issuing a birth certificate with a date in 1901. Far worse would be the failure of critical systems, such as a complete shutdown of a heating system, or the failure of a bone marrow analysis system in a hospital.
Cryptography holds a special place in the Epochalypse. Another crucial difference between 2038 and 2000 is the ubiquitous use of encryption and digital signatures to protect all communications. Security certificates generally fail verification if the device’s date is incorrect. This means a vulnerable device would be cut off from most communications — even if its core business applications don’t have any code that incorrectly handles the date.
Unfortunately, the full spectrum of consequences can only be determined through controlled testing of all systems, with separate analysis of a potential cascade of failures.
The malicious exploitation of Y2K38
IT and InfoSec teams should treat Y2K38 not as a simple software bug, but as a vulnerability that can lead to various failures, including denial of service. In some cases, it can even be exploited by malicious actors. To do this, they need the ability to manipulate the time on the targeted system. This is possible in at least two scenarios:
Interfering with NTP protocol data by feeding the attacked system a fake time server
Spoofing the GPS signal — if the system relies on satellite time
Exploitation of this error is most likely in OT and IoT systems, where vulnerabilities are traditionally slow to be patched, and the consequences of a failure can be far more substantial.
An example of an easily exploitable vulnerability related to time counting is CVE-2025-55068 (CVSSv3 8.2, CVSSv4 base 8.8) in Dover ProGauge MagLink LX4 automatic fuel-tank gauge consoles. Time manipulation can cause a denial of service at the gas station, and block access to the device’s web management panel. This defect earned its own CISA advisory.
The current status of Y2K38 mitigation
The foundation for solving the Y2K38 problem has been successfully laid in major operating systems. The Linux kernel added support for 64-bit time even on 32-bit architectures starting with version 5.6 in 2020, and 64-bit Linux was always protected from this issue. The BSD family, macOS, and iOS use 64-bit time on all modern devices. All versions of Windows released in the 21st century aren’t susceptible to Y2K38.
The situation at the data storage and application level is far more complex. Modern file systems like ZFS, F2FS, NTFS, and ReFS were designed with 64-bit timestamps, while older systems like ext2 and ext3 remain vulnerable. Ext4 and XFS require specific flags to be enabled (extended inode for ext4, and bigtime for XFS), and might need offline conversion of existing filesystems. In the NFSv2 and NFSv3 protocols, the outdated time storage format persists. It’s a similar patchwork landscape in databases: the TIMESTAMP type in MySQL is fundamentally limited to the year 2038, and requires migration to DATETIME, while the standard timestamp types in PostgreSQL are safe. For applications written in C, pathways have been created to use 64-bit time on 32-bit architectures, but all projects require recompilation. Languages like Java, Python, and Go typically use types that avoid the overflow, but the safety of compiled projects depends on whether they interact with vulnerable libraries written in C.
A massive number of 32-bit systems, embedded devices, and applications remain vulnerable until they’re rebuilt and tested, and then have updates installed by all their users.
Various organizations and enthusiasts are trying to systematize information on this, but their efforts are fragmented. Consequently, there’s no “common Y2K38 vulnerability database” out there (1, 2, 3, 4, 5).
Approaches to fixing Y2K38
The methodologies created for prioritizing and fixing vulnerabilities are directly applicable to the year 2038 problem. The key challenge will be that no tool today can create an exhaustive list of vulnerable software and hardware. Therefore, it’s essential to update inventory of corporate IT assets, ensure that inventory is enriched with detailed information on firmware and installed software, and then systematically investigate the vulnerability question.
The list can be prioritized based on the criticality of business systems and the data on the technology stack each system is built on. The next steps are: studying the vendor’s support portal, making direct inquiries to hardware and software manufacturers about their Y2K38 status, and, as a last resort, verification through testing.
When testing corporate systems, it’s critical to take special precautions:
Never test production systems.
Create a data backup immediately before the test.
Isolate the system being tested from communications so it can’t confuse other systems in the organization.
If changing the date uses NTP or GPS, ensure the 2038 test signals cannot reach other systems.
After testing, set the systems back to the correct time, and thoroughly document all observed system behaviors.
If a system is found to be vulnerable to Y2K38, a fixing timeline should be requested from the vendor. If a fix is impossible, plan a migration; fortunately, the time we have left still allows for updating even fairly complex and expensive systems.
The most important thing in tackling Y2K38 is not to think of it as a distant future problem whose solution can easily wait another five to eight years. It’s highly likely that we already have insufficient time to completely eradicate the defect. However, within an organization and its technology fleet, careful planning and a systematic approach to solving the problem will allow to actually make it in time.
Brand, website, and corporate mailout impersonation is becoming an increasingly common technique used by cybercriminals. The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) reported a spike in such incidents in 2025. While tech companies and consumer brands are the most frequent targets, every industry in every country is generally at risk. The only thing that changes is how the imposters exploit the fakes In practice, we typically see the following attack scenarios:
Luring clients and customers to a fake website to harvest login credentials for the real online store, or to steal payment details for direct theft.
Luring employees and business partners to a fake corporate login portal to acquire legitimate credentials for infiltrating the corporate network.
Prompting clients and customers to contact the scammers under various pretexts: getting tech support, processing a refund, entering a prize giveaway, or claiming compensation for public events involving the brand. The goal is to then swindle the victims out of as much money as possible.
Luring business partners and employees to specially crafted pages that mimic internal company systems, to get them to approve a payment or redirect a legitimate payment to the scammers.
Prompting clients, business partners, and employees to download malware — most often an infostealer — disguised as corporate software from a fake company website.
The words “luring” and “prompting” here imply a whole toolbox of tactics: email, messages in chat apps, social media posts that look like official ads, lookalike websites promoted through SEO tools, and even paid ads.
These schemes all share two common features. First, the attackers exploit the organization’s brand, and strive to mimic its official website, domain name, and corporate style of emails, ads, and social media posts. And the forgery doesn’t have to be flawless — just convincing enough for at least some of business partners and customers. Second, while the organization and its online resources aren’t targeted directly, the impact on them is still significant.
Business damage from brand impersonation
When fakes are crafted to target employees, an attack can lead to direct financial loss. An employee might be persuaded to transfer company funds, or their credentials could be used to steal confidential information or launch a ransomware attack.
Attacks on customers don’t typically imply direct damage to the company’s coffers, but they cause substantial indirect harm in the following areas:
Strain on customer support. Customers who “bought” a product on a fake site will likely bring their issues to the real customer support team. Convincing them that they never actually placed an order is tough, making each case a major time waster for multiple support agents.
Reputational damage. Defrauded customers often blame the brand for failing to protect them from the scam, and also expect compensation. According to a European survey, around half of affected buyers expect payouts and may stop using the company’s services — often sharing their negative experience on social media. This is especially damaging if the victims include public figures or anyone with a large following.
Unplanned response costs. Depending on the specifics and scale of an attack, an affected company might need digital forensics and incident response (DFIR) services, as well as consultants specializing in consumer law, intellectual property, cybersecurity, and crisis PR.
Increased insurance premiums. Companies that insure businesses against cyber-incidents factor in fallout from brand impersonation. An increased risk profile may be reflected in a higher premium for a business.
Degraded website performance and rising ad costs. If criminals run paid ads using a brand’s name, they siphon traffic away from its official site. Furthermore, if a company pays to advertise its site, the cost per click rises due to the increased competition. This is a particularly acute problem for IT companies selling online services, but it’s also relevant for retail brands.
Long-term metric decline. This includes drops in sales volume, market share, and market capitalization. These are all consequences of lost trust from customers and business partners following major incidents.
Does insurance cover the damage?
Popular cyber-risk insurance policies typically only cover costs directly tied to incidents explicitly defined in the policy — think data loss, business interruption, IT system compromise, and the like. Fake domains and web pages don’t directly damage a company’s IT systems, so they’re usually not covered by standard insurance. Reputational losses and the act of impersonation itself are separate insurance risks, requiring expanded coverage for this scenario specifically.
Of the indirect losses we’ve listed above, standard insurance might cover DFIR expenses and, in some cases, extra customer support costs (if the situation is recognized as an insured event). Voluntary customer reimbursements, lost sales, and reputational damage are almost certainly not covered.
What to do if your company is attacked by clones
If you find out someone is using your brand’s name for fraud, it makes sense to do the following:
Send clear, straightforward notifications to your customers explaining what happened, what measures are being taken, and how to verify the authenticity of official websites, emails, and other communications.
Create a simple “trust center” page listing your official domains, social media accounts, app store links, and support contacts. Make it easy to find and keep it updated.
Monitor new registrations of social media pages and domain names that contain your brand names to spot the clones before an attack kicks off.
Follow a takedown procedure. This involves gathering evidence, filing complaints with domain registrars, hosting providers, and social media administrators, then tracking the status until the fakes are fully removed. For a complete and accurate record of violations, preserve URLs, screenshots, metadata, and the date and time of discovery. Ideally, also examine the source code of fake pages, as it might contain clues pointing to other components of the criminal operation.
Add a simple customer reporting form for suspicious sites or messages to your official website and/or branded app. This helps you learn about problems early.
Coordinate activities between your legal, cybersecurity, and marketing teams. This ensures a consistent, unified, and effective response.
How to defend against brand impersonation attacks
While the open nature of the internet and the specifics of these attacks make preventing them outright impossible, a business can stay on top of new fakes and have the tools ready to fight back.
Continuously monitor for suspicious public activity using specialized monitoring services. The most obvious indicator is the registration of domains similar to your brand name, but there are others — like someone buying databases related to your organization on the dark web. Comprehensive monitoring of all platforms is best outsourced to a specialized service provider, such as Kaspersky Digital Footprint Intelligence (DFI).
The quickest and simplest way to take down a fake website or social media profile is to file a trademark infringement complaint. Make sure your portfolio of registered trademarks is robust enough to file complaints under UDRP procedures before you need it.
When you discover fakes, deploy UDRP procedures promptly to have the fake domains transferred or removed. For social media, follow the platform’s specific infringement procedure — easily found by searching for “[social media name] trademark infringement” (for example, “LinkedIn trademark infringement”). Transferring the domain to the legitimate owner is preferred over deletion, as it prevents scammers from simply re-registering it. Many continuous monitoring services, such as Kaspersky Digital Footprint Intelligence, also offer a rapid takedown service, filing complaints on the protected brand’s behalf.
Act quickly to block fake domains on your corporate systems. This won’t protect partners or customers, but it’ll throw a wrench into attacks targeting your own employees.
Consider proactively registering your company’s website name and common variations (for example, with and without hyphens) in all major top-level domains, such as .com, and local extensions. This helps protect partners and customers from common typos and simple copycat sites.
The life of a modern head of information security (also known as CISO – Chief Information Security Officer) is not just about fighting hackers. It’s also an endless quest that goes by the name of “compliance”. Regulators keep tightening the screws, standards pop up like mushrooms, and headaches only get worse; but wait… – there’s more: CISOs are responsible not only for their own perimeter, but what goes on outside it too: for their entire supply chain, all their contractors, and the whole hodge-podge of software their business processes run on. Though the logic here is solid, it’s also unfortunately ruthless: if a hole is found at your supplier, but the problems hit you, in the end it’s you who’s held accountable. This logic applies to security software too.
Back in the day, companies rarely thought about what was actually inside the security solutions and products they used. Now, however, businesses – especially large ones – want to know everything: what’s really inside the box? Who wrote the code? Is it going to break some critical function or could it even bring everything down? (We’ve seen such precedents; example: the Crowdstrike 2024 update incident.) Where and how is data processed? And these are the right questions to ask.
The problem lies in the fact that almost all customers trust their vendors to answer accurately when asked such questions – very often because they have no other choice. A more mature approach in today’s cyber-reality is to verify.
In corporate-speak this is called supply-chain trust, and trying to solve this puzzle on your own is a serious headache. You need help from vendors. A responsible vendor is ready to show what’s under the hood of its solutions, to open up the source code to partners and customers for review, and, in general, to earn trust not with nice slides but with solid, practical steps.
So who’s already doing this, and who’s still stuck in the past? A fresh, in-depth study from our colleagues in Europe has the answer. It was conducted by the respected testing lab AV-Comparatives, the Tyrol Chamber of Commerce (WKO), the MCI Entrepreneurial School, and the law firm Studio Legale Tremolada.
The main conclusion of the study is that the era of “black boxes” in cybersecurity is over. RIP. Amen. The future belongs to those who don’t hide their source code and vulnerability reports, and who give customers maximum choice when configuring their products. And the report clearly states who doesn’t just promise but actually delivers. Guess who!…
What a great guess! Yes – it’s us!
We give our customers something that is still, unfortunately, a rare and endangered species in the industry: transparency centers, source code reviews of our products, a detailed software bill of materials (SBOM), and the ability to check update history and control rollouts. And of course we provide everything that’s already become the industry standard. You can study all the details in the full “Transparency and Accountability in Cybersecurity” (TRACS) report, or in our summary. Below, I’ll walk through some of the most interesting bits.
Not mixing apples and oranges
TRACS reviewed 14 popular vendors and their EPP/EDR products – from Bitdefender and CrowdStrike to our EDR Optimum and WithSecure. The objective was to understand which vendors don’t just say “trust us”, but actually let you verify their claims. The study covered 60 criteria: from GDPR (General Data Protection Regulation – it’s a European study after all) compliance and ISO 27001 audits, to the ability to process all telemetry locally and access a product’s source code. But the authors decided not to give points for each category or form a single overall ranking.
Why? Because everyone has different threat models and risks. What is a feature for one may be a bug and a disaster for another. Take fast, fully automatic installation of updates. For a small business or a retail company with thousands of tiny independent branches, this is a blessing: they’d never have enough IT staff to manage all of that manually. But for a factory where a computer controls the conveyor it would be totally unacceptable. A defective update can bring a production line to a standstill, which in terms of business impact could be fatal (or at least worse than the recent Jaguar Land Rover cyberattack); here, every update needs to be tested first. It’s the same story with telemetry. A PR agency sends data from its computers to the vendor’s cloud to participate in detecting cyberthreats and get protection instantly. Perfect. A company that processes patients’ medical records or highly classified technical designs on its computers? Its telemetry settings would need to be reconsidered.
Ideally, each company should assign “weights” to every criterion, and calculate its own “compatibility rating” with EDR/EPP vendors. But one thing is obvious: whoever gives customers choices, wins.
Take file reputation analysis of suspicious files. It can work in two ways: through the vendor’s common cloud, or through a private micro-cloud within a single organization. Plus there’s the option to disable this analysis altogether and work completely offline. Very few vendors give customers all three options. For example, “on-premise” reputation analysis is available from only eight vendors in the test. It goes without saying we’re one of them.
Raising the bar
In every category of the test the situation is roughly the same as with the reputation service. Going carefully through all 45 pages of the report, we’re either ahead of our competitors or among the leaders. And we can proudly say that in roughly a third of the comparative categories we offer significantly better capabilities than most of our peers. See for yourself:
Visiting a transparency center and reviewing the source code? Verifying that the product binaries are built from this source code? Only three vendors in the test provide these things. And for one of them – it’s only for government customers. Our transparency centers are the most numerous and geographically spread out, and offer customers the widest range of options.
The opening of our first transparency center back in 2018
Downloading database updates and rechecking them? Only six players – including us – provide this.
Configuring multi-stage rollout of updates? This isn’t exactly rare, but it’s not widespread either – only seven vendors besides us support it.
Reading the results of an external security audit of the company? Only we and six other vendors are ready to share this with customers.
Breaking down a supply chain into separate links using an SBOM? This is rare too: you can request an SBOM from only three vendors. One of them is the green-colored company that happens to bear my name.
Of course, there are categories where everyone does well: all of them have successfully passed an ISO/IEC 27001 audit, comply with GDPR, follow secure development practices, and accept vulnerability reports.
Finally, there’s the matter of technical indicators. All products that work online send certain technical data about protected computers, and information about infected files. For many businesses this isn’t a problem, and they’re glad it improves effectiveness of protection. But for those seriously focused on minimizing data flows, AV-Comparatives measures those too – and we just so happen to collect the least amounts of telemetry compared to other vendors.
Practical conclusions
Thanks to the Austrian experts, CISOs and their teams now have a much simpler task ahead when checking their security vendors. And not just the 14 that were tested. The same framework can be applied to other security solution vendors and to software in general. But there are strategic conclusions too…
Transparency makes risk management easier. If you’re responsible for keeping a business running, you don’t want to guess whether your protection tool will become your weak point. You need predictability and accountability. The WKO and AV-Comparatives study confirms that our model reduces these risks and makes them manageable.
Evidence instead of slogans. In this business, it’s not enough to be able write “we are secure” on your website. You need audit mechanisms. The customer has to be able to drop by and verify things for themselves. We provide that. Others are still catching up.
Transparency and maturity go hand in hand. Vendors that are transparent for their customers usually also have more mature processes for product development, incident response, and vulnerability handling. Their products and services are more reliable.
Our approach to transparency (GTI) works. When we announced our initiative several years ago and opened Transparency Centers around the world, we heard all kinds of things from critics – like that it was a waste of money and that nobody needed it. Now independent European experts are saying that this is how a vendor should operate in 2025 and beyond.
It was a real pleasure reading this report. Not just because it praises us, but because the industry is finally turning in the right direction – toward transparency and accountability.
We started this trend, we’re leading it, and we’re going to keep pioneering within it. So, dear readers and users, don’t forget: trust is one thing; being able to fully verify is another.
On December 3, the coordinated elimination of the critical vulnerability CVE-2025-55182 (CVSSv3 — 10) became known. It was found in React server components (RSC), as well as in a number of derivative projects and frameworks: Next.js, React Router RSC preview, Redwood SDK, Waku, and RSC plugins Vite and Parcel. The vulnerability allows any unauthenticated attacker to send a request to a vulnerable server and execute arbitrary code. Considering that tens of millions of websites, including Airbnb and Netflix, are built on React and Next.js, and vulnerable versions of the components were found in approximately 39% of cloud infrastructures, the scale of exploitation could be very serious. Measures to protect your online services must be taken immediately.
A separate CVE-2025-66478 was initially created for the Next.js vulnerability, but it was deemed a duplicate, so the Next.js defect also falls under CVE-2025-55182.
Where and how does the React4Shell vulnerability work?
React is a popular JavaScript library for creating user interfaces for web applications. Thanks to RSC components, which appeared in React 18 in 2020, part of the work of assembling a web page is performed not in the browser, but on the server. The web page code can call React functions that will run on the server, get the execution result from them, and insert it into the web page. This allows some websites to run faster — the browser doesn’t need to load unnecessary code. RSC divides the application into server and client components, where the former can perform server operations (database queries, access to secrets, complex calculations), while the latter remains interactive on the user’s machine. A special lightweight HTTP-based protocol called Flight is used for fast streaming of serialized information between the client and server.
CVE-2025-55182 lies in the processing of Flight requests, or to be more precise — in the unsafe deserialization of data streams. React Server Components versions 19.0.0, 19.1.0, 19.1.1, 19.2.0 — or, more specifically, the react-server-dom-parcel, react-server-dom-turbopack, and react-server-dom-webpack packages — are vulnerable. Vulnerable versions of Next.js are: 15.0.4, 15.1.8, 15.2.5, 15.3.5, 15.4.7, 15.5.6, and 16.0.6.
To exploit the vulnerability, an attacker can send a simple HTTP request to the server, and even before authentication and any checks, this request can initiate the launch of a process on the server with React privileges.
There’s no data on the exploitation of CVE-2025-55182 in the wild yet, but experts agree that it’s possible, and will most likely be large-scale. Wiz claims that its test RCE exploit works with almost 100% reliability. A prototype of the exploit is already available on GitHub, so it won’t be difficult for attackers to adopt it and launch mass attacks.
React was originally designed to create client-side code that runs in a browser; server-side components containing vulnerabilities are relatively new. Many projects built on older versions of React, or projects where React server-side components are disabled, are not affected by this vulnerability.
However, if a project doesn’t use server-side functions, this doesn’t mean it’s protected — RSCs may still be active. Websites and services built on recent versions of React with default settings (for example, an application on Next.js built using create-next-app) will be vulnerable.
Protective measures against exploitation of CVE-2025-55182
Updates. React users should update to the versions 19.0.1, 19.1.2 or 19.2.1. Next.js users should update to versions 15.1.9, 15.2.6, 15.3.6, 15.4.8, 15.5.7, or 16.0.7. Detailed instructions for updating the react-server component for React Router, Expo, Redwood SDK, Waku, and other projects are provided in the React blog.
Cloud provider protection. Major providers have released rules for their application-level web filters (WAF) to prevent exploitation of vulnerabilities:
AWS (AWS WAF rules are included in the standard set, but require manual activation);
Cloudflare (protects all customers, including those on the free plan. Works if traffic to the React application is proxied through Cloudflare WAF. Customers on professional or enterprise plans should verify that the rule is active);
Google Cloud (Cloud Armor rules for Firebase Hosting and Firebase App Hosting are applied automatically);
However, all providers emphasize that WAF protection only buys time for scheduled patching, and RSC components still need to be updated on all projects.
Protecting web services on your own servers. The least invasive solution would be to apply detection rules that prevent exploitation to your WAF or firewall. Most vendors have already released the necessary rule sets, but you can also prepare them yourself — for example, based on our list of dangerous POST requests.
If granular analysis and filtering of web traffic isn’t possible in your environment, identify all servers on which RSC (server function endpoints) are available, and significantly restrict access to them. For internal services, you can block requests from all untrusted IP ranges; for public services, you can strengthen IP reputation filtering and rate limiting.
An additional layer of protection will be provided by an EPP/EDR agent on servers with RSC. It will help detect anomalies in react-server behavior after the vulnerability has been exploited, and prevent the attack from developing.
In-depth investigation. Although information about exploitation of the vulnerability in the wild hasn’t been confirmed yet, it cannot be ruled out that it’s already happening. It’s recommended to study the logs of network traffic and cloud environments, and if suspicious requests are detected, to carry out a full response — including the rotation of keys and other secrets available on the server. Signs of post-exploitation activity to look for first: reconnaissance of the server environment, searches for secrets (.env, CI/CD tokens, etc.), and installation of web shells.
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