Rather than scanning code alone, Build Application Firewalls inspect runtime behavior inside the software build pipeline.
The post Build Application Firewalls Aim to Stop the Next Supply Chain Attack appeared first on SecurityWeek.
A malicious version of the plugin was published to the Jenkins Marketplace late last week.
The post Checkmarx Jenkins AST Plugin Compromised in Supply Chain Attack appeared first on SecurityWeek.
Also called Copy Fail 2 and tracked as CVE-2026-43284 and CVE-2026-43500, the exploit was disclosed before a patch was released.
The post New ‘Dirty Frag’ Linux Vulnerability Possibly Exploited in Attacks appeared first on SecurityWeek.
Turning on DNSSEC makes your domain more secure — but if it’s misconfigured, newer certificate validation rules can stop SSL renewals in their tracks.
Hey there,
You know that satisfying click when you finally turn on DNSSEC? It feels like adding a shiny new deadbolt to your domain’s front door. You’re doing the responsible thing: locking down your DNS against spoofing and hijacks, and making the internet just a bit safer.
Continue reading DNSSEC: The Extra Security Layer That Can Break Your Padlock at Sucuri Blog.
Vulnerability reports and responsible disclosures are essential for website security awareness and education. Automated attacks targeting known software vulnerabilities are one of the leading causes of website compromises.
To help educate website owners about potential threats to their environments, we’ve compiled a list of important security updates and vulnerability patches for the WordPress ecosystem this past month.
The vulnerabilities listed below are virtually patched by the Sucuri Firewall and existing clients are protected.
Continue reading Vulnerability & Patch Roundup — April 2026 at Sucuri Blog.
Update, May 11, 2026: Utah has agreed to not enforce the VPN law until Sept. 3, 2026 after Aylo, the parent company of Pornhub.com, challenged the law in court.
For the last couple of years, we’ve watched the same predictable cycle play out across the globe: a state (or country) passes a clunky age-verification mandate, and, without fail, Virtual Private Network (VPN) usage surges as residents scramble to maintain their privacy and anonymity. We've seen this everywhere—from states like Florida, Missouri, Texas, and Utah, to countries like the United Kingdom, Australia, and Indonesia.
Instead of realizing that mass surveillance and age gates aren't exactly crowd favorites, Utah lawmakers have decided that VPNs themselves are the real issue.
On May 6, 2026, Utah will become, to EFF’s knowledge, the first state in the nation to target the use of VPNs to avoid legally mandated age-verification gates. While advocates in states like Wisconsin successfully forced the removal of similar provisions due to constitutional and technical concerns, Utah is proceeding with a mandate that threatens to significantly undermine digital privacy rights.
Formally known as the “Online Age Verification Amendments,” Senate Bill 73 (SB 73) was signed by Governor Spencer Cox on March 19, 2026. While the majority of the bill consists of provisions related to a 2% tax on revenues from online adult content that is set to take effect in October, one of the more immediate concerns for EFF is the section regulating VPN access, which goes into effect this coming Wednesday.
The new law explicitly addresses VPN use in Section 14, which amends Section 78B-3-1002 of existing Utah statutes in two primary ways:
By holding companies liable for verifying the age of anyone physically in Utah, even those using a VPN, the law creates a massive "liability trap." Just like we argued in the case of the Wisconsin bill, if a website cannot reliably detect a VPN user's true location and the law requires it to do so for all users in a particular state, then the legal risk could push the site to either ban all known VPN IPs, or to mandate age verification for every visitor globally. This would subject millions of users to invasive identity checks or blocks to their VPN use, regardless of where they actually live.
HELP US STOP THESE VPN BILLS ACROSS THE COUNTRY
In practice, SB 73 is different from the Wisconsin proposal in that it stops short of a total VPN ban. Instead, it discourages using VPNs by imposing the liability described above and by muzzling the websites themselves from sharing information about VPNs. This raises significant First Amendment concerns, as it prevents platforms from providing basic, truthful information about a lawful privacy tool to their users.
Unlike previous drafts seen in other states, SB 73 doesn't explicitly ban the use of a VPN. Under a "don't ask, don't tell" style of enforcement, websites likely only have an obligation to ask for proof of age if they actually learn that a user is physically in Utah and using a VPN. If a site doesn’t know a user is in Utah, their broader obligation to police VPNs remains murky. So, while SB 73 isn’t as extreme as the discarded Wisconsin proposal, it remains a dangerous precedent.
Then there is also the question of technical feasibility: Blocking all known VPN and proxy IP addresses is a technical whack-a-mole that likely no company can win. Providers add new IP addresses constantly, and no comprehensive blocklist exists. Complying with Utah’s requirements would require impossible technical feats.
The internet is built to, and will always, route around censorship. If Utah successfully hampers commercial VPN providers, motivated users will transition to non-commercial proxies, private tunnels through cloud services like AWS, or residential proxies that are virtually indistinguishable from standard home traffic. These workarounds will emerge within hours of the law taking effect. Meanwhile, the collateral damage will fall on businesses, journalists, and survivors of abuse who rely on commercial VPNs for essential data security.
These provisions won't stop a tech-savvy teenager, but they certainly will impact the privacy of every regular Utah resident who just wants to keep their data out of the hands of brokers or malicious actors.
Lawmakers have watched age-verification mandates fail and, instead of reconsidering the approach, have decided to wage war on privacy itself. As the Cato Institute states:
“The point is that when an internet policy can be avoided by a relatively common technology that often provides significant privacy and security benefits, maybe the policy is the problem. Age verification regimes do plenty of damage to online speech and privacy, but attacking VPNs to try to keep them from being circumvented is doubling down on this damaging approach."
Attacks on VPNs are, at their core, attacks on the tools that enable digital privacy. Utah is setting a precedent that prioritizes government control over the fundamental architecture of a private and secure internet, and it won’t stop at the state’s borders. Regulators in countries outside the U.S. are still eyeing VPN restrictions, with the UK Children’s Commissioner calling VPNs a “loophole that needs closing” and the French Minister Delegate for Artificial Intelligence and Digital Affairs saying VPNs are “the next topic on my list” after the country enacted a ban on social media for kids under 15.
As this law goes into effect, we are entering uncharted territory. Lawmakers who can’t distinguish between a security tool and a "loophole" are now writing the rules for one of the most complex infrastructures on Earth. And we can assure that the result won't be a safer internet, only an increasingly less private one.
BECOME AN EFF MEMBER TODAY
Researchers have reverse-engineered a piece of malware named Fast16. It’s almost certainly state-sponsored, probably US in origin, and was deployed against Iran years before Stuxnet:
“…the Fast16 malware was designed to carry out the most subtle form of sabotage ever seen in an in-the-wild malware tool: By automatically spreading across networks and then silently manipulating computation processes in certain software applications that perform high-precision mathematical calculations and simulate physical phenomena, Fast16 can alter the results of those programs to cause failures that range from faulty research results to catastrophic damage to real-world equipment.”
Another news article.
Lots of interesting details at the links.
Online gambling spam thrives on dreams of easy money and high stakes. Beating the house at an exotic casino. Splitting sevens. Going all in on the flop. A baccarat dealer calling La grande! For most people, though, the reality falls far short of Monte Carlo and an Aston Martin.
So they turn to online gambling. And bad actors harness that allure to create their scams. They think they’re buying credits at a hot new online casino.
Continue reading What is online gambling spam and what can I do about it? at Sucuri Blog.
Most phishing advice is written for the person staring at a suspicious email. This guide is for the other kind of victim: The website owner whose legitimate site has been quietly turned into the attacker’s weapon.
You didn’t send the message or build the fake login page. You just woke up to a browser warning, a suspended hosting account, or a polite note from someone’s security team asking why your domain is requesting Apple ID credentials.
Continue reading My Website Is Hosting a Phishing Page – Now What? at Sucuri Blog.
CrowdStrike has fixed a critical LogScale vulnerability, while Tenable addressed a high-severity Nessus flaw.
The post Vulnerabilities Patched in CrowdStrike, Tenable Products appeared first on SecurityWeek.
Tied to a fresh Checkmarx supply chain attack claimed by TeamPCP, the incident references the Shai-Hulud worm.
The post Bitwarden NPM Package Hit in Supply Chain Attack appeared first on SecurityWeek.
WordPress powers over 40% of the web, which makes it one of the most attractive targets for Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks. If your site goes down for an hour, you lose revenue, search rankings, and visitor trust. If it goes down repeatedly, you lose much more.
A DDoS attack floods your website with fake traffic until it slows to a crawl or crashes entirely. Unlike hacks that steal data, DDoS attacks are about disruption.
Continue reading WordPress DDoS Protection: How to Keep Your Site Online at Sucuri Blog.
New analysis from Abnormal AI reveals how attackers have abandoned technical exploits to weaponize routine workflows and internal trust.
The post The Behavioral Shift: Why Trusted Relationships Are the Newest Attack Surface appeared first on SecurityWeek.
ICE has admitted that it uses spyware from the Israeli company Graphite.
Last week, Anthropic pulled back the curtain on Claude Mythos Preview, an AI model so capable at finding and exploiting software vulnerabilities that the company decided it was too dangerous to release to the public. Instead, access has been restricted to roughly 50 organizations—Microsoft, Apple, Amazon Web Services, CrowdStrike and other vendors of critical infrastructure—under an initiative called Project Glasswing.
The announcement was accompanied by a barrage of hair-raising anecdotes: thousands of vulnerabilities uncovered across every major operating system and browser, including a 27-year-old bug in OpenBSD, a 16-year-old flaw in FFmpeg. Mythos was able to weaponize a set of vulnerabilities it found in the Firefox browser into 181 usable attacks; Anthropic’s previous flagship model could only achieve two.
This is, in many respects, exactly the kind of responsible disclosure that security researchers have long urged. And yet the public has been given remarkably little with which to evaluate Anthropic’s decision. We have been shown a highlight reel of spectacular successes. However, we can’t tell if we have a blockbuster until they let us see the whole movie.
For example, we don’t know how many times Mythos mistakenly flagged code as vulnerable. Anthropic said security contractors agreed with the AI’s severity rating 198 times, with an 89 per cent severity agreement. That’s impressive, but incomplete. Independent researchers examining similar models have found that AI that detects nearly every real bug also hallucinates plausible-sounding vulnerabilities in patched, correct code.
This matters. A model that autonomously finds and exploits hundreds of vulnerabilities with inhuman precision is a game changer, but a model that generates thousands of false alarms and non-working attacks still needs skilled and knowledgeable humans. Without knowing the rate of false alarms in Mythos’s unfiltered output, we cannot tell whether the examples showcased are representative.
There is a second, subtler problem. Large language models, including Mythos, perform best on inputs that resemble what they were trained on: widely used open-source projects, major browsers, the Linux kernel and popular web frameworks. Concentrating early access among the largest vendors of precisely this software is sensible; it lets them patch first, before adversaries catch up.
But the inverse is also true. Software outside the training distribution—industrial control systems, medical device firmware, bespoke financial infrastructure, regional banking software, older embedded systems—is exactly where out-of-the-box Mythos is likely least able to find or exploit bugs.
However, a sufficiently motivated attacker with domain expertise in one of these fields could nevertheless wield Mythos’s advanced reasoning capabilities as a force multiplier, probing systems that Anthropic’s own engineers lack the specialized knowledge to audit. The danger is not that Mythos fails in those domains; it is that Mythos may succeed for whoever brings the expertise.
Broader, structured access for academic researchers and domain specialists—cardiologists’ partners in medical device security, control-systems engineers, researchers in less prominent languages and ecosystems—would meaningfully reduce this asymmetry. Fifty companies, however well chosen, cannot substitute for the distributed expertise of the entire research community.
None of this is an indictment of Anthropic. By all appearances the company is trying to act responsibly, and its decision to hold the model back is evidence of seriousness.
But Anthropic is a private company and, in some ways, still a start-up. Yet it is making unilateral decisions about which pieces of our critical global infrastructure get defended first, and which must wait their turn.
It has finite staff, finite budget and finite expertise. It will miss things, and when the thing missed is in the software running a hospital or a power grid, the cost will be borne by people who never had a say.
The security problem is far greater than one company and one model. There’s no reason to believe that Mythos Preview is unique. (Not to be outdone, OpenAI announced that its new GPT-5.4-Cyber is so dangerous that the model also will not be released to the general public.) And it’s unclear how much of an advance these new models represent. The security company Aisle was able to replicate many of Anthropic’s published anecdotes using smaller, cheaper, public AI models.
Any decisions we make about whether and how to release these powerful models are more than one company’s responsibility. Ultimately, this will probably lead to regulation. That will be hard to get right and requires a long process of consultation and feedback.
In the short term, we need something simpler: greater transparency and information sharing with the broader community. This doesn’t necessarily mean making powerful models like Claude Mythos widely available. Rather, it means sharing as much data and information as possible, so that we can collectively make informed decisions.
We need globally co-ordinated frameworks for independent auditing, mandatory disclosure of aggregate performance metrics and funded access for academic and civil-society researchers.
This has implications for national security, personal safety and corporate competitiveness. Any technology that can find thousands of exploitable flaws in the systems we all depend on should not be governed solely by the internal judgment of its creators, however well intentioned.
Until that changes, each Mythos-class release will put the world at the edge of another precipice, without any visibility into whether there is a landing out of view just below, or whether this time the drop will be fatal. That is not a choice a for-profit corporation should be allowed to make in a democratic society. Nor should such a company be able to restrict the ability of society to make choices about its own security.
This essay was written with David Lie, and originally appeared in The Globe and Mail.
Overview
During a recent malware cleanup investigation, we encountered a compromised Joomla website where the site owner reported a strange issue. Their website displayed a large number of suspicious product links that had nothing to do with their business. These products were not added by the website owner and did not exist in their catalog.
Visitors and search engines were seeing pages that promoted unrelated products, raising immediate concerns about spam injection or remote content manipulation.
This article on the walls of Constantinople is fascinating.
The system comprised four defensive lines arranged in formidable layers:
- The brick-lined ditch, divided by bulkheads and often flooded, 15-20 meters wide and up to 7 meters deep.
- A low breastwork, about 2 meters high, enabling defenders to fire freely from behind.
- The outer wall, 8 meters tall and 2.8 meters thick, with 82 projecting towers.
- The main wall—a towering 12 meters high and 5 meters thick—with 96 massive towers offset from those of the outer wall for maximum coverage.
Behind the walls lay broad terraces: the parateichion, 18 meters wide, ideal for repelling enemies who crossed the moat, and the peribolos, 15–20 meters wide between the inner and outer walls. From the moat’s bottom to the highest tower top, the defences reached nearly 30 meters—a nearly unscalable barrier of stone and ingenuity.
What is 2FA?
Two-factor authentication (2FA) offers a second layer of security to help protect an account from brute force, phishing, and social engineering attacks.
2FA requires an extra step for a user to prove their identity, which reduces the chance of a bad actor gaining access to their account or data. And since notifications are sent to verify the initial authentication via username and passwords, it also gives users and business the ability to monitor for potential indicators of a compromise.
Continue reading Why 2FA SMS is a Bad Idea in 2026 at Sucuri Blog.
Vulnerability reports and responsible disclosures are essential for website security awareness and education. Automated attacks targeting known software vulnerabilities are one of the leading causes of website compromises.
To help educate website owners about potential threats to their environments, we’ve compiled a list of important security updates and vulnerability patches for the WordPress ecosystem this past month.
The vulnerabilities listed below are virtually patched by the Sucuri Firewall and existing clients are protected.
Continue reading Vulnerability & Patch Roundup — March 2026 at Sucuri Blog.
If you own a WordPress website and ever encountered the “Not Secure” warning, you might have worried that visitors would perceive your site as spam or fraudulent. Not only does this warning impact user trust, but it can also create technical search issues when both HTTP and HTTPS versions of your pages remain accessible or when redirects, canonicals, and sitemaps point to different URL versions. Browsers show the visible security warning, while search engines rely on permanent redirects, canonical URLs, and updated sitemaps to understand your preferred HTTPS pages.
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