Last week we talked about an app that promises users they can make money testing games, or even just by scrolling through TikTok.

Imagine our surprise when we ended up on a site promoting that same Freecash app while investigating a “cloud storage” phish. We’ve all probably seen one of those. They’re common enough and according to recent investigation by BleepingComputer, there’s a

“large-scale cloud storage subscription scam campaign targeting users worldwide with repeated emails falsely warning recipients that their photos, files, and accounts are about to be blocked or deleted due to an alleged payment failure.”

Based on the description in that article, the email we found appears to be part of this campaign.

The subject line of the email is:

“{Recipient}. Your Cloud Account has been locked on Sat, 24 Jan 2026 09:57:55 -0500. Your photos and videos will be removed!”

This matches one of the subject lines that BleepingComputer listed.

And the content of the email:

“Payment Issue – Cloud Storage

Dear User,

We encountered an issue while attempting to renew your Cloud Storage subscription.

Unfortunately, your payment method has expired. To ensure your Cloud continues without interruption, please update your payment details.

Subscription ID: 9371188

Product: Cloud Storage Premium

Expiration Date: Sat,24 Jan-2026

If you do not update your payment information, you may lose access to your Cloud Storage, which may prevent you from saving and syncing your data such as photos, videos, and documents.

Update Payment Details {link button}

Security Recommendations:

• Always access your account through our official website
• Never share your password with anyone
• Ensure your contact and billing information are up to date”

The link in the email leads to  https://storage.googleapis[.]com/qzsdqdqsd/dsfsdxc.html#/redirect.html, which helps the scammer establish a certain amount of trust because it points to Google Cloud Storage (GCS). GCS is a legitimate service that allows authorized users to store and manage data such as files, images, and videos in buckets. However, as in this case, attackers can abuse it for phishing.

The redirect carries some parameters to the next website.

The feed.headquartoonjpn[.]com domain was blocked by Malwarebytes. We’ve seen it before in an earlier campaign involving an Endurance-themed phish.

After a few more redirects, we ended up at hx5.submitloading[.]com, where a fake CAPTCHA triggered the last redirect to freecash[.]com, once it was solved.

The end goal of this phish likely depends on the parameters passed along during the redirects, so results may vary.

Rather than stealing credentials directly, the campaign appears designed to monetize traffic, funneling victims into affiliate offers where the operators get paid for sign-ups or conversions.

BleepingComputer noted that they were redirected to affiliate marketing websites for various products.

“Products promoted in this phishing campaign include VPN services, little-known security software, and other subscription-based offerings with no connection to cloud storage.”

How to stay safe

Ironically, the phishing email itself includes some solid advice:

• Always access your account through our official website.
• Never share your password with anyone.

We’d like to add:

• Never click on links in unsolicited emails without verifying with a trusted source.
• Use an up-to-date, real-time anti-malware solution with a web protection component.
• Do not engage with websites that attract visitors like this.

Pro tip: Malwarebytes Scam Guard would have helped you identify this email as a scam and provided advice on how to proceed.

Redirect flow (IOCs)

storage.googleapis[.]com/qzsdqdqsd/dsfsdxc.html

feed.headquartoonjpn[.]com

revivejudgemental[.]com

hx5.submitloading[.]com

freecash[.]com

Update February 5, 2026

Almedia GmbH, the company behind the Freecash platform, reached out to us for information about the chain of redirects that lead to their platform. And after an investigation they notified us that:

“Following Malwarebytes’ reporting and the additional information they shared with us, we investigated the issue and identified an affiliate operating in breach of our policies. That partner has been removed from our network.

Almedia does not sell user data, and we take compliance, user trust, and responsible advertising seriously.”

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We don’t just report on scams—we help detect them

Cybersecurity risks should never spread beyond a headline. If something looks dodgy to you, check if it’s a scam using Malwarebytes Scam Guard, a feature of our mobile protection products. Submit a screenshot, paste suspicious content, or share a text or phone number, and we’ll tell you if it’s a scam or legit. Download Malwarebytes Mobile Security for iOS or Android and try it today!

“You’re invited!” 

It sounds friendly, familiar and quite harmless. But in a scam we recently spotted, that simple phrase is being used to trick victims into installing a full remote access tool on their Windows computers—giving attackers complete control of the system. 

What appears to be a casual party or event invitation leads to the silent installation of ScreenConnect, a legitimate remote support tool quietly installed in the background and abused by attackers. 

Here’s how the scam works, why it’s effective, and how to protect yourself. 

The email: A party invitation 

Victims receive an email framed as a personal invitation—often written to look like it came from a friend or acquaintance. The message is deliberately informal and social, lowering suspicion and encouraging quick action. 

In the screenshot below, the email arrived from a friend whose email account had been hacked, but it could just as easily come from a sender you don’t know.

So far, we’ve only seen this campaign targeting people in the UK, but there’s nothing stopping it from expanding elsewhere. 

Clicking the link in the email leads to a polished invitation page hosted on an attacker-controlled domain. 

The invite: The landing page that leads to an installer 

The landing page leans heavily into the party theme, but instead of showing event details, the page nudges the user toward opening a file. None of them look dangerous on their own, but together they keep the user focused on the “invitation” file: 

• A bold “You’re Invited!” headline 
• The suggestion that a friend had sent the invitation 
• A message saying the invitation is best viewed on a Windows laptop or desktop
• A countdown suggesting your invitation is already “downloading” 
• A message implying urgency and social proof (“I opened mine and it was so easy!”) 

Within seconds, the browser is redirected to download RSVPPartyInvitationCard.msi 

The page even triggers the download automatically to keep the victim moving forward without stopping to think. 

This MSI file isn’t an invitation. It’s an installer. 

The guest: What the MSI actually does 

When the user opens the MSI file, it launches msiexec.exe and silently installs ScreenConnect Client, a legitimate remote access tool often used by IT support teams.  

There’s no invitation, RSVP form, or calendar entry. 

What happens instead: 

• ScreenConnect binaries are installed under C:\Program Files (x86)\ScreenConnect Client\ 
• A persistent Windows service is created (for example, ScreenConnect Client 18d1648b87bb3023) 
• ScreenConnect installs multiple .NET-based components 
• There is no clear user-facing indication that a remote access tool is being installed 

From the victim’s perspective, very little seems to happen. But at this point, the attacker can now remotely access their computer. 

The after-party: Remote access is established 

Once installed, the ScreenConnect client initiates encrypted outbound connections to ScreenConnect’s relay servers, including a uniquely assigned instance domain.

That connection gives the attacker the same level of access as a remote IT technician, including the ability to: 

• See the victim’s screen in real time
• Control the mouse and keyboard 
• Upload or download files 
• Keep access even after the computer is restarted 

Because ScreenConnect is legitimate software commonly used for remote support, its presence isn’t always obvious. On a personal computer, the first signs are often behavioral, such as unexplained cursor movement, windows opening on their own, or a ScreenConnect process the user doesn’t remember installing. 

Why this scam works 

This campaign is effective because it targets normal, predictable human behavior. From a behavioral security standpoint, it exploits our natural curiosity and appears to be a low risk. 

Most people don’t think of invitations as dangerous. Opening one feels passive, like glancing at a flyer or checking a message, not installing software. 

Even security-aware users are trained to watch out for warnings and pressure. A friendly “you’re invited” message doesn’t trigger those alarms. 

By the time something feels off, the software is already installed. 

Signs your computer may be affected 

Watch for: 

• A download or executed file named RSVPPartyInvitationCard.msi 
• An unexpected installation of ScreenConnect Client 
• A Windows service named ScreenConnect Client with random characters  
• Your computer makes outbound HTTPS connections to ScreenConnect relay domains 
• Your system resolves the invitation-hosting domain used in this campaign, xnyr[.]digital 

How to stay safe  

This campaign is a reminder that modern attacks often don’t break in—they’re invited in. Remote access tools give attackers deep control over a system. Acting quickly can limit the damage.  

For individuals 

If you receive an email like this: 

• Be suspicious of invitations that ask you to download or open software 
• Never run MSI files from unsolicited emails 
• Verify invitations through another channel before opening anything 

If you already clicked or ran the file:  

• Disconnect from the internet immediately 
• Check for ScreenConnect and uninstall it if present 
• Run a full security scan 
• Change important passwords from a clean, unaffected device 

For organisations (especially in the UK) 

• Alert on unauthorized ScreenConnect installations
• Restrict MSI execution where feasible 
• Treat “remote support tools” as high-risk software
• Educate users: invitations don’t come as installers 

This scam works by installing a legitimate remote access tool without clear user intent. That’s exactly the gap Malwarebytes is designed to catch.

Malwarebytes now detects newly installed remote access tools and alerts you when one appears on your system. You’re then given a choice: confirm that the tool is expected and trusted, or remove it if it isn’t.

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We don’t just report on threats—we remove them

Cybersecurity risks should never spread beyond a headline. Keep threats off your devices by downloading Malwarebytes today.

Loyal readers and other privacy-conscious people will be familiar with the expression, “If it’s too good to be true, it’s probably false.”

Getting paid handsomely to scroll social media definitely falls into that category. It sounds like an easy side hustle, which usually means there’s a catch.

In January 2026, an app called Freecash shot up to the number two spot on Apple’s free iOS chart in the US, helped along by TikTok ads that look a lot like job offers from TikTok itself. The ads promised up to $35 an hour to watch your “For You” page. According to reporting, the ads didn’t promote Freecash by name. Instead, they showed a young woman expressing excitement about seemingly being “hired by TikTok” to watch videos for money.

The landing pages featured TikTok and Freecash logos and invited users to “get paid to scroll” and “cash out instantly,” implying a simple exchange of time for money.

Those claims were misleading enough that TikTok said the ads violated its rules on financial misrepresentation and removed some of them.

Once you install the app, the promised TikTok paycheck vanishes. Instead, Freecash routes you to a rotating roster of mobile games—titles like Monopoly Go and Disney Solitaire—and offers cash rewards for completing time‑limited in‑game challenges. Payouts range from a single cent for a few minutes of daily play up to triple‑digit amounts if you reach high levels within a fixed period.

The whole setup is designed not to reward scrolling, as it claims, but to funnel you into games where you are likely to spend money or watch paid advertisements.

Freecash’s parent company, Berlin‑based Almedia, openly describes the platform as a way to match mobile game developers with users who are likely to install and spend. The company’s CEO has spoken publicly about using past spending data to steer users toward the genres where they’re most “valuable” to advertisers. 

Our concern, beyond the bait-and-switch, is the privacy issue. Freecash’s privacy policy allows the automatic collection of highly sensitive information, including data about race, religion, sex life, sexual orientation, health, and biometrics. Each additional mobile game you install to chase rewards adds its own privacy policy, tracking, and telemetry. Together, they greatly increase how much behavioral data these companies can harvest about a user.

Experts warn that data brokers already trade lists of people likely to be more susceptible to scams or compulsive online behavior—profiles that apps like this can help refine.

We’ve previously reported on data brokers that used games and apps to build massive databases, only to later suffer breaches exposing all that data.

When asked about the ads, Freecash said the most misleading TikTok promotions were created by third-party affiliates, not by the company itself. Which is quite possible because Freecash does offer an affiliate payout program to people who promote the app online. But they made promises to review and tighten partner monitoring.

For experienced users, the pattern should feel familiar: eye‑catching promises of easy money, a bait‑and‑switch into something that takes more time and effort than advertised, and a business model that suddenly makes sense when you realize your attention and data are the real products.

How to stay private

Free cash? Apparently, there is no such thing.

If you’re curious how intrusive schemes like this can be, consider using a separate email address created specifically for testing. Avoid sharing real personal details. Many users report that once they sign up, marketing emails quickly pile up.

Some of these schemes also appeal to people who are younger or under financial pressure, offering tiny payouts while generating far more value for advertisers and app developers.

So, what can you do?

• Gather information about the company you’re about to give your data. Talk to friends and relatives about your plans. Shared common sense often helps make the right decisions.
• Create a separate account if you want to test a service. Use a dedicated email address and avoid sharing real personal details.
• Limit information you provide online to what makes sense for the purpose. Does a game publisher need your Social Security Number? I don’t think so.
• Be cautious about app installs that are framed as required to make the money initially promised, and review permissions carefully.
• Use an up-to-date real-time anti-malware solution on all your devices.

Work from the premise that free money does not exist. Try to work out the business model of those offering it, and then decide.

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We don’t just report on threats – we help protect your social media

Cybersecurity risks should never spread beyond a headline. Protect your social media accounts by using Malwarebytes Identity Theft Protection.

The LastPass Threat Intelligence, Mitigation, and Escalation (TIME) team has published a warning about an active phishing campaign in which fake “maintenance” emails pressure users to back up their vaults within 24 hours. The emails lead to credential-stealing phishing sites rather than any legitimate LastPass page.

The phishing campaign that started around January 19, 2026, uses emails that falsely claim upcoming infrastructure maintenance and urge users to “backup your vault in the next 24 hours.”

“Scheduled Maintenance: Backup Recommended

As part of our ongoing commitment to security and performance, we will be conducting scheduled infrastructure maintenance on our servers.
Why are we asking you to create a backup?
While your data remains protected at all times, creating a local backup ensures you have access to your credentials during the maintenance window. In the unlikely event of any unforeseen technical difficulties or data discrepancies, having a recent backup guarantees your information remains secure and recoverable. We recommend this precautionary measure to all users to ensure complete peace of mind and seamless continuity of service.

Create Backup Now (link)

How to create your backup
1 Click the “Create Backup Now” button above
2 Select “Export Vault” from you account settings
3 Download and store your encrypted backup file securely”

The link in the email points to mail-lastpass[.]com, a domain that doesn’t belong to LastPass and has now been taken down.

Note that there are different subject lines in use. Here is a selection:

• LastPass Infrastructure Update: Secure Your Vault Now
• Your Data, Your Protection: Create a Backup Before Maintenance
• Don’t Miss Out: Backup Your Vault Before Maintenance
• Important: LastPass Maintenance & Your Vault Security
• Protect Your Passwords: Backup Your Vault (24-Hour Window)

It is imperative for users to ignore instructions in emails like these. Giving away the login details for your password manager can be disastrous. For most users, it would provide access to enough information to carry out identity theft.

Stay safe

First and foremost, it’s important to understand that LastPass will never ask for your master password or demand immediate action under a tight deadline. Generally speaking, there are more guidelines that can help you stay safe.

• Don’t click on links in unsolicited emails without verifying with the trusted sender that they’re legitimate.
• Always log in directly on the platform that you are trying to access, rather than through a link.
• Use a real-time, up-to-date anti-malware solution with a web protection module to block malicious sites.
• Report phishing emails to the company that’s being impersonated, so they can alert other customers. In this case emails were forwarded to abuse@lastpass.com.

Pro tip: Malwarebytes Scam Guard  would have recognized this email as a scam and advised you how to proceed.

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We don’t just report on threats—we help safeguard your entire digital identity

Cybersecurity risks should never spread beyond a headline. Protect your, and your family’s, personal information by using identity protection.

If you can’t beat them, copy them. That seems to be the thinking behind an unusual campaign by the Dutch police, who set up a fake ticket website selling tickets that don’t exist.

The website, TicketBewust.nl, invites people to order tickets for events like football matches and concerns. But the offers were never real. The entire site was a deliberate sting, designed to show people how easily ticket fraud works.

The Netherlands’ National Police created the site to warn people about ticket fraud. They worked with the Fraud Helpdesk and online marketplace Marktplaats to run ads promoting “exclusive tickets” for sold-out concerts. If anyone got far enough to try and buy a ticket, the fake site took them to a police webpage explaining that they’d just interacted with a fake online shop.

People fell for these too-good-to-be-true deals—and that’s the most interesting part of this story. Many of us assume we’re far too savvy to fall prey to such online shenanigans, but a surprisingly large number of people do.

More than 300,000 people saw the police ads on Marktplaats between October 30, 2025, and January 11, 2026. Over 30,000 people opened opened it to take a look. 7,402 of them clicked the link to the fake site that was in the ad, and 3,432 people tried to order tickets.

That’s a reminder that online crime works a lot like regular ecommerce. Whether you’re selling real tickets or fake ones, it’s just a numbers game. Only a small percentage of people who see an ad will ever convert—but even a tiny fraction can be lucrative.

In this case, around 1% of people that saw the ad took the bait, but that represents a big profit for scammers. Fake ticket sellers raked in an average of $672 per victim in the US between 2020 and 2024, according to data from the Better Business Bureau (BBB).

Why ticket fraud is so common

Dutch police get around 50,000 online fraud complaints annually, with 10% involving fake tickets. It’s a problem in other countries too, with UK losses to gig ticket scams doubling in 2024 to £1.6 million (around $2.1 million).

Part of the reason fake ticket scams are so effective is that many cases never get reported. Some victims don’t think the loss is significant enough, while others simply don’t want to admit they were tricked. But there’s another, more fundamental reason these scams work so well: the audience is already primed to buy.

People searching for tickets are usually doing so because they don’t want to miss out. Scammers lean hard into that fear of missing out (FOMO), pairing it with scarcity cues like “sold out,” “limited availability,” or time-limited offers. People under emotional pressure from urgency and scarcity tend to do irrational things and take risks they shouldn’t. It’s why people invest erratically or take gambles on dodgy online sales.

How to protect yourself from fake ticket sites

The advice for avoiding shady ticket sellers looks a lot like advice for avoiding scams in general:

• Watch what you click on social media. Social media accounts for 52% of concert ticket fraud cases, according to the BBB data. Stick to official channels like Ticketmaster, AXS, or the venue’s box office—and double check the URL you’re accessing.
• Don’t let emotions get the better of you. Ticket sellers target high-demand events because they know people are desperate to attend and might let their guard down. That’s why fake ticket scams spiked after Oasis announced their reunion tour.
• Don’t be fooled by support lines. Just because they’re on the phone doesn’t mean they’re legit.
• Never pay via Zelle, Venmo, Cash App, gift cards or crypto. Use credit cards or other payment methods that offer purchase protection.

A little skepticism can go a long way when looking for sought-after tickets. So if you see an online ad offering you the seats of a lifetime, take a minute to research the seller. It could save you hundreds of dollars and a heap of disappointment.

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We don’t just report on scams—we help detect them

Cybersecurity risks should never spread beyond a headline. If something looks dodgy to you, check if it’s a scam using Malwarebytes Scam Guard, a feature of our mobile protection products. Submit a screenshot, paste suspicious content, or share a text or phone number, and we’ll tell you if it’s a scam or legit. Download Malwarebytes Mobile Security for iOS or Android and try it today!

This week on the Lock and Code podcast…

There’s a bizarre thing happening online right now where everything is getting worse.

Your Google results have become so bad that you’ve likely typed what you’re looking for, plus the word “Reddit,” so you can find discussion from actual humans. If you didn’t take this route, you might get served AI results from Google Gemini, which once recommended that every person should eat “at least one small rock per day.” Your Amazon results are a slog, filled with products that have surreptitiously paid reviews. Your Facebook feed could be entirely irrelevant because the company decided years ago that you didn’t want to see what your friends posted, you wanted to see what brands posted, because brands pay Facebook, and you don’t, so brands are more important than your friends.

But, according to digital rights activist and award-winning author Cory Doctorow, this wave of online deterioration isn’t an accident—it’s a business strategy, and it can be summed up in a word he coined a couple of years ago: Enshittification.

Enshittification is the process by which an online platform—like Facebook, Google, or Amazon—harms its own services and products for short-term gain while managing to avoid any meaningful consequences, like the loss of customers or the impact of meaningful government regulation. It begins with an online platform treating new users with care, offering services, products, or connectivity that they may not find elsewhere. Then, the platform invites businesses on board that want to sell things to those users. This means businesses become the priority and the everyday user experience is hindered. But then, in the final stage, the platform also makes things worse for its business customers, making things better only for itself.

This is how a company like Amazon went from helping you find nearly anything you wanted to buy online to helping businesses sell you anything you wanted to buy online to making those businesses pay increasingly high fees to even be discovered online. Everyone, from buyers to sellers, is pretty much entrenched in the platform, so Amazon gets to dictate the terms.

Today, on the Lock and Code podcast with host David Ruiz, we speak with Doctorow about enshittification’s fast damage across the internet, how to fight back, and where it all started.

 ”Once these laws were established, the tech companies were able to take advantage of them. And today we have a bunch of companies that aren’t tech companies that are nevertheless using technology to rig the game in ways that the tech companies pioneered.”

Tune in today to listen to the full conversation.

Show notes and credits:

Intro Music: “Spellbound” by Kevin MacLeod (incompetech.com)
Licensed under Creative Commons: By Attribution 4.0 License
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
Outro Music: “Good God” by Wowa (unminus.com)

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Listen up—Malwarebytes doesn’t just talk cybersecurity, we provide it.

Protect yourself from online attacks that threaten your identity, your files, your system, and your financial well-being with our exclusive offer for Malwarebytes Premium Security for Lock and Code listeners.

Attackers are sending very convincing fake “Google” emails that slip past spam filters, route victims through several trusted Google-owned services, and ultimately lead to a look-alike Microsoft 365 sign-in page designed to harvest usernames and passwords.

Researchers found that cybercriminals used Google Cloud Application Integration’s Send Email feature to send phishing emails from a legitimate Google address: noreply-application-integration@google[.]com.

Google Cloud Application Integration allows users to automate business processes by connecting any application with point-and-click configurations. New customers currently receive free credits, which lowers the barrier to entry and may attract some cybercriminals.

The initial email arrives from what looks like a real Google address and references something routine and familiar, such as a voicemail notification, a task to complete, or permissions to access a document. The email includes a link that points to a genuine Google Cloud Storage URL, so the web address appears to belong to Google and doesn’t look like an obvious fake.

After the first click, you are redirected to another Google‑related domain (googleusercontent[.]com) showing a CAPTCHA or image check. Once you pass the “I’m not a robot check,” you land on what looks like a normal Microsoft 365 sign‑in page, but on close inspection, the web address is not an official Microsoft domain.

Any credentials provided on this site will be captured by the attackers.

The use of Google infrastructure provides the phishers with a higher level of trust from both email filters and the receiving users. This is not a vulnerability, just an abuse of cloud-based services that Google provides.

Google’s response

Google said it has taken action against the activity:

“We have blocked several phishing campaigns involving the misuse of an email notification feature within Google Cloud Application Integration. Importantly, this activity stemmed from the abuse of a workflow automation tool, not a compromise of Google’s infrastructure. While we have implemented protections to defend users against this specific attack, we encourage continued caution as malicious actors frequently attempt to spoof trusted brands. We are taking additional steps to prevent further misuse.”

We’ve seen several phishing campaigns that abuse trusted workflows from companies like Google, PayPal, DocuSign, and other cloud-based service providers to lend credibility to phishing emails and redirect targets to their credential-harvesting websites.

How to stay safe

Campaigns like these show that some responsibility for spotting phishing emails still rests with the recipient. Besides staying informed, here are some other tips you can follow to stay safe.

• Always check the actual web address of any login page; if it’s not a genuine Microsoft domain, do not enter credentials.​ Using a password manager will help because they will not auto-fill your details on fake websites.
• Be cautious of “urgent” emails about voicemails, document shares, or permissions, even if they appear to come from Google or Microsoft.​ Creating urgency is a common tactic by scammers and phishers.
• Go directly to the service whenever possible. Instead of clicking links in emails, open OneDrive, Teams, or Outlook using your normal bookmark or app.
• Use multi‑factor authentication (MFA) so that stolen passwords alone are not enough, and regularly review which apps have access to your account and remove anything you don’t recognize.

Pro tip: Malwarebytes Scam Guard can recognize emails like this as scams. You can upload suspicious text, emails, attachments and other files and ask for its opinion. It’s really very good at recognizing scams.

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We don’t just report on scams—we help detect them

Cybersecurity risks should never spread beyond a headline. If something looks dodgy to you, check if it’s a scam using Malwarebytes Scam Guard, a feature of our mobile protection products. Submit a screenshot, paste suspicious content, or share a text or phone number, and we’ll tell you if it’s a scam or legit. Download Malwarebytes Mobile Security for iOS or Android and try it today!

In August 2025, we discovered a campaign targeting individuals in Turkey with a new Android banking Trojan we dubbed “Frogblight”. Initially, the malware was disguised as an app for accessing court case files via an official government webpage. Later, more universal disguises appeared, such as the Chrome browser.

Frogblight can use official government websites as an intermediary step to steal banking credentials. Moreover, it has spyware functionality, such as capabilities to collect SMS messages, a list of installed apps on the device and device filesystem information. It can also send arbitrary SMS messages.

Another interesting characteristic of Frogblight is that we’ve seen it updated with new features throughout September. This may indicate that a feature-rich malware app for Android is being developed, which might be distributed under the MaaS model.

This threat is detected by Kaspersky products as HEUR:Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Frogblight.*, HEUR:Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Agent.eq, HEUR:Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Agent.ep, HEUR:Trojan-Spy.AndroidOS.SmsThief.de.

Technical details

Background

While performing an analysis of mobile malware we receive from various sources, we discovered several samples belonging to a new malware family. Although these samples appeared to be still under development, they already contained a lot of functionality that allowed this family to be classified as a banking Trojan. As new versions of this malware continued to appear, we began monitoring its development. Moreover, we managed to discover its control panel and based on the “fr0g” name shown there, we dubbed this family “Frogblight”.

Initial infection

We believe that smishing is one of the distribution vectors for Frogblight, and that the users had to install the malware themselves. On the internet, we found complaints from Turkish users about phishing SMS messages convincing users that they were involved in a court case and containing links to download malware. versions of Frogblight, including the very first ones, were disguised as an app for accessing court case files via an official government webpage and were named the same as the files for downloading from the links mentioned above.

While looking for online mentions of the names used by the malware, we discovered one of the phishing websites distributing Frogblight, which disguises itself as a website for viewing a court file.

We were able to open the admin panel of this website, where it was possible to view statistics on Frogblight malware downloads. However, the counter had not been fully implemented and the threat actor could only view the statistics for their own downloads.

Additionally, we found the source code of this phishing website available in a public GitHub repository. Judging by its description, it is adapted for fast deployment to Vercel, a platform for hosting web apps.

App features

As already mentioned, Frogblight was initially disguised as an app for accessing court case files via an official government webpage. Let’s look at one of the samples using this disguise (9dac23203c12abd60d03e3d26d372253). For analysis, we selected an early sample, but not the first one discovered, in order to demonstrate more complete Frogblight functionality.

After starting, the app prompts the victim to grant permissions to send and read SMS messages, and to read from and write to the device’s storage, allegedly needed to show a court file related to the user.

The full list of declared permissions in the app manifest file is shown below:

• MANAGE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE
• READ_EXTERNAL_STORAGE
• WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE
• READ_SMS
• RECEIVE_SMS
• SEND_SMS
• WRITE_SMS
• RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED
• INTERNET
• QUERY_ALL_PACKAGES
• BIND_ACCESSIBILITY_SERVICE
• DISABLE_KEYGUARD
• FOREGROUND_SERVICE
• FOREGROUND_SERVICE_DATA_SYNC
• POST_NOTIFICATIONS
• QUICKBOOT_POWERON
• RECEIVE_MMS
• RECEIVE_WAP_PUSH
• REQUEST_IGNORE_BATTERY_OPTIMIZATIONS
• SCHEDULE_EXACT_ALARM
• USE_EXACT_ALARM
• VIBRATE
• WAKE_LOCK
• ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE
• READ_PHONE_STATE

After all required permissions are granted, the malware opens the official government webpage for accessing court case files in WebView, prompting the victim to sign in. There are different sign-in options, one of them via online banking. If the user chooses this method, they are prompted to click on a bank whose online banking app they use and fill out the sign-in form on the bank’s official website. This is what Frogblight is after, so it waits two seconds, then opens the online banking sign-in method regardless of the user’s choice. For each webpage that has finished loading in WebView, Frogblight injects JavaScript code allowing it to capture user input and send it to the C2 via a REST API.

The malware also changes its label to “Davalarım” if the Android version is newer than 12; otherwise it hides the icon.

The app icon before (left) and after launching (right)
In the sample we review in this section, Frogblight uses a REST API for C2 communication, implemented using the Retrofit library. The malicious app pings the C2 server every two seconds in foreground, and if no error is returned, it calls the REST API client methods fetchOutbox and getFileCommands. Other methods are called when specific events occur, for example, after the device screen is turned on, the com.capcuttup.refresh.PersistentService foreground service is launched, or an SMS is received. The full list of all REST API client methods with parameters and descriptions is shown below.

REST API client method	Description	Parameters
fetchOutbox	Request message content to be sent via SMS or displayed in a notification	device_id: unique Android device ID
ackOutbox	Send the results of processing a message received after calling the API method fetchOutbox	device_id: unique Android device ID msg_id: message ID status: message processing status error: message processing error
getAllPackages	Request the names of app packages whose launch should open a website in WebView to capture user input data	action: same as the API method name
getPackageUrl	Request the website URL that will be opened in WebView when the app with the specified package name is launched	action: same as the API method name package: the package name of the target app
getFileCommands	Request commands for file operations Available commands: ●       download: upload the target file to the C2 ●       generate_thumbnails: generate thumbnails from the image files in the target directory and upload them to the C2 ●       list: send information about all files in the target directory to the C2 ●       thumbnail: generate a thumbnail from the target image file and upload it to the C2	device_id: unique Android device ID
pingDevice	Check the C2 connection	device_id: unique Android device ID
reportHijackSuccess	Send captured user input data from the website opened in a WebView when the app with the specified package name is launched	action: same as the API method name package: the package name of the target app data: captured user input data
saveAppList	Send information about the apps installed on the device	device_id: unique Android device ID app_list: a list of apps installed on the device app_count: a count of apps installed on the device
saveInjection	Send captured user input data from the website opened in a WebView. If it was not opened following the launch of the target app, the app_name parameter is determined based on the opened URL	device_id: unique Android device ID app_name: the package name of the target app form_data: captured user input data
savePermission	Unused but presumably needed for sending information about permissions	device_id: unique Android device ID permission_type: permission type status: permission status
sendSms	Send information about an SMS message from the device	device_id: unique Android device ID sender: the sender’s/recipient’s phone number message: message text timestamp: received/sent time type: message type (inbox/sent)
sendTelegramMessage	Send captured user input data from the webpages opened by Frogblight in WebView	device_id: unique Android device ID url: website URL title: website page title input_type: the type of user input data input_value: user input data final_value: user input data with additional information timestamp: the time of data capture ip_address: user IP address sms_permission: whether SMS permission is granted file_manager_permission: whether file access permission is granted
updateDevice	Send information about the device	device_id: unique Android device ID model: device manufacturer and model android_version: Android version phone_number: user phone number battery: current battery level charging: device charging status screen_status: screen on/off ip_address: user IP address sms_permission: whether SMS permission is granted file_manager_permission: whether file access permission is granted
updatePermissionStatus	Send information about permissions	device_id: unique Android device ID permission_type: permission type status: permission status timestamp: current time
uploadBatchThumbnails	Upload thumbnails to the C2	device_id: unique Android device ID thumbnails: thumbnails
uploadFile	Upload a file to the C2	device_id: unique Android device ID file_path: file path download_id: the file ID on the C2 The file itself is sent as an unnamed parameter
uploadFileList	Send information about all files in the target directory	device_id: unique Android device ID path: directory path file_list: information about the files in the target directory
uploadFileListLog	Send information about all files in the target directory to an endpoint different from uploadFileList	device_id: unique Android device ID path: directory path file_list: information about the files in the target directory
uploadThumbnailLog	Unused but presumably needed for uploading thumbnails to an endpoint different from uploadBatchThumbnails	device_id: unique Android device ID thumbnails: thumbnails

Remote device control, persistence, and protection against deletion

The app includes several classes to provide the threat actor with remote access to the infected device, gain persistence, and protect the malicious app from being deleted.

• capcuttup.refresh.AccessibilityAutoClickService
  This is intended to prevent removal of the app and to open websites specified by the threat actor in WebView upon target apps startup. It is present in the sample we review, but is no longer in use and deleted in further versions.
• capcuttup.refresh.PersistentService
  This is a service whose main purpose is to interact with the C2 and to make malicious tasks persistent.
• capcuttup.refresh.BootReceiver
  This is a broadcast receiver responsible for setting up the persistence mechanisms, such as job scheduling and setting alarms, after device boot completion.

Further development

In later versions, new functionality was added, and some of the more recent Frogblight variants disguised themselves as the Chrome browser. Let’s look at one of the fake Chrome samples (d7d15e02a9cd94c8ab00c043aef55aff).

In this sample, new REST API client methods have been added for interacting with the C2.

REST API client method	Description	Parameters
getContactCommands	Get commands to perform actions with contacts Available commands: ●       ADD_CONTACT: add a contact to the user device ●       DELETE_CONTACT: delete a contact from the user device ●       EDIT_CONTACT: edit a contact on the user device	device_id: unique Android device ID
sendCallLogs	Send call logs to the C2	device_id: unique Android device ID call_logs: call log data
sendNotificationLogs	Send notifications log to the C2. Not fully implemented in this sample, and as of the time of writing this report, we hadn’t seen any samples with a full-fledged implementation of this API method	action: same as the API method name notifications: notification log data

Also, the threat actor had implemented a custom input method for recording keystrokes to a file using the com.puzzlesnap.quickgame.CustomKeyboardService service.

Another Frogblight sample we observed trying to avoid emulators and using geofencing techniques is 115fbdc312edd4696d6330a62c181f35. In this sample, Frogblight checks the environment (for example, device model) and shuts down if it detects an emulator or if the device is located in the United States.

Later on, the threat actor decided to start using a web socket instead of the REST API. Let’s see an example of this in one of the recent samples (08a3b1fb2d1abbdbdd60feb8411a12c7). This sample is disguised as an app for receiving social support via an official government webpage. The feature set of this sample is very similar to the previous ones, with several new capabilities added. Commands are transmitted over a web socket using the JSON format. A command template is shown below:

{
    "id": <command ID>,
    "command_type": <command name>
    "command_data": <command data>
}

It is also worth noting that some commands in this version share the same meaning but have different structures, and the functionality of certain commands has not been fully implemented yet. This indicates that Frogblight was under active development at the time of our research, and since no its activity was noticed after September, it is possible that the malware is being finalized to a fully operational state before continuing to infect users’ devices. A full list of commands with their parameters and description is shown below:

Command	Description	Parameters
connect	Send a registration message to the C2	–
connection_success	Send various information, such as call logs, to the C2; start pinging the C2 and requesting commands	–
auth_error	Log info about an invalid login key to the Android log system	–
pong_device	Does nothing	–
commands_list	Execute commands	List of commands
sms_send_command	Send an arbitrary SMS message	recipient: message destination message: message text msg_id: message ID
bulk_sms_command	Send an arbitrary SMS message to multiple recipients	recipients: message destinations message: message text
get_contacts_command	Send all contacts to the C2	–
get_app_list_command	Send information about the apps installed on the device to the C2	–
get_files_command	Send information about all files in certain directories to the C2	–
get_call_logs_command	Send call logs to the C2	–
get_notifications_command	Send a notifications log to the C2. This is not fully implemented in the sample at hand, and as of the time of writing this report, we hadn’t seen any samples with a full-fledged implementation of this command	–
take_screenshot_command	Take a screenshot. This is not fully implemented in the sample at hand, and as of the time of writing this report, we hadn’t seen any samples with a full-fledged implementation of this command	–
update_device	Send registration message to the C2	–
new_webview_data	Collect WebView data. This is not fully implemented in the sample at hand, and as of the time of writing this report, we hadn’t seen any samples with a full-fledged implementation of this command	–
new_injection	Inject code. This is not fully implemented in the sample at hand, and as of the time of writing this report, we hadn’t seen any samples with a full-fledged implementation of this command	code: injected code target_app: presumably the package name of the target app
add_contact_command	Add a contact to the user device	name: contact name phone: contact phone email: contact email
contact_add	Add a contact to the user device	display_name: contact name phone_number: contact phone email: contact email
contact_delete	Delete a contact from the user device	phone_number: contact phone
contact_edit	Edit a contact on the user device	display_name: new contact name phone_number: contact phone email: new contact email
contact_list	Send all contacts to the C2	–
file_list	Send information about all files in the specified directory to the C2	path: directory path
file_download	Upload the specified file to the C2	file_path: file path download_id: an ID that is received with the command and sent back to the C2 along with the requested file. Most likely, this is used to organize data on the C2
file_thumbnail	Generate a thumbnail from the target image file and upload it to the C2	file_path: image file path
file_thumbnails	Generate thumbnails from the image files in the target directory and upload them to the C2	folder_path: directory path
health_check	Send information about the current device state: battery level, screen state, and so on	–
message_list_request	Send all SMS messages to the C2	–
notification_send	Show an arbitrary notification	title: notification title message: notification message app_name: notification subtext
package_list_response	Save the target package names	packages: a list of all target package names. Each list element contains: package_name: target package name active: whether targeting is active
delete_contact_command	Delete a contact from the user device. This is not fully implemented in the sample at hand, and as of the time of writing this report, we hadn’t seen any samples with a full-fledged implementation of this command	contact_id: contact ID name: contact name
file_upload_command	Upload specified file to the C2. This is not fully implemented in the sample at hand, and as of the time of writing this report, we hadn’t seen any samples with a full-fledged implementation of this command	file_path: file path file_name: file name
file_download_command	Download file to user device. This is not fully implemented in the sample at hand, and as of the time of writing this report, we hadn’t seen any samples with a full-fledged implementation of this command	file_url: the URL of the file to download download_path: download path
download_file_command	Download file to user device. This is not fully implemented in the sample at hand, and as of the time of writing this report, we hadn’t seen any samples with a full-fledged implementation of this command	file_url: the URL of the file to download download_path: downloading path
get_permissions_command	Send a registration message to the C2, including info about specific permissions	–
health_check_command	Send information about the current device state, such as battery level, screen state, and so on	–
connect_error	Log info about connection errors to the Android log system	A list of errors
reconnect	Send a registration message to the C2	–
disconnect	Stop pinging the C2 and requesting commands from it	–

Authentication via WebSocket takes place using a special key.

At the IP address to which the WebSocket connection was made, the Frogblight web panel was accessible, which accepted the authentication key mentioned above. Since only samples using the same key as the webpanel login are controllable through it, we suggest that Frogblight might be distributed under the MaaS model.

Judging by the menu options, the threat actor can sort victims’ devices by certain parameters, such as the presence of banking apps on the device, and send bulk SMS messages and perform other mass actions.

Victims

Since some versions of Frogblight opened the Turkish government webpage to collect user-entered data on Turkish banks’ websites, we assume with high confidence that it is aimed mainly at users from Turkey. Also, based on our telemetry, the majority of users attacked by Frogblight are located in that country.

Attribution

Even though it is not possible to provide an attribution to any known threat actor based on the information available, during our analysis of the Frogblight Android malware and the search for online mentions of the names it uses, we discovered a GitHub profile containing repos with Frogblight, which had also created repos with Coper malware, distributed under the MaaS model. It is possible that this profile belongs to the attackers distributing Coper who have also started distributing Frogblight.

Also, since the comments in the Frogblight code are written in Turkish, we believe that its developers speak this language.

Conclusions

The new Android malware we dubbed “Frogblight” appeared recently and targets mainly users from Turkey. This is an advanced banking Trojan aimed at stealing money. It has already infected real users’ devices, and it doesn’t stop there, adding more and more new features in the new versions that appear. It can be made more dangerous by the fact that it may be used by attackers who already have experience distributing malware. We will continue to monitor its development.

Indicators of Compromise

More indicators of compromise, as well as any updates to these, are available to the customers of our crimeware reporting service. If you are interested, please contact crimewareintel@kaspersky.com.

APK file hashes
8483037dcbf14ad8197e7b23b04aea34
105fa36e6f97977587a8298abc31282a
e1cd59ae3995309627b6ab3ae8071e80
115fbdc312edd4696d6330a62c181f35
08a3b1fb2d1abbdbdd60feb8411a12c7
d7d15e02a9cd94c8ab00c043aef55aff
9dac23203c12abd60d03e3d26d372253

C2 domains
1249124fr1241og5121.sa[.]com
froglive[.]net

C2 IPs
45.138.16.208[:]8080

URL of GitHub repository with Frogblight phishing website source code
https://github[.]com/eraykarakaya0020/e-ifade-vercel

URL of GitHub account containing APK files of Frogblight and Coper
https://github[.]com/Chromeapk

Distribution URLs
https://farketmez37[.]cfd/e-ifade.apk
https://farketmez36[.]sbs/e-ifade.apk
https://e-ifade-app-5gheb8jc.devinapps[.]com/e-ifade.apk

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