The bugs could lead to authentication bypass, shell command execution, and memory corruption.

The post Fortra Patches Critical Vulnerabilities in BoKS appeared first on SecurityWeek.

On September 15 this year, Google published details of patches for 110 vulnerabilities in its own Google Pixel smartphones. Among all the disclosed flaws, CVE-2026-58704 stands out the most, for it appears that this zero-day is being exploited in targeted attacks.

In today’s post, we talk about what’s so special about the Google Pixel, and why these devices get security updates all of their own – separate from regular Android updates. We also cover the vulnerabilities addressed in this latest update, with a special focus on the mentioned, most dangerous one – CVE-2026-58704 – and wrap up with tips on how to both protect your device and avoid becoming a victim of cyberattack on it.

Why do Google Pixel phones get security updates separate from Android?

The reader might reasonably wonder: I’ve already installed this month’s Android security updates on my Google Pixel. Isn’t that the same thing? Google Pixel does run on Android and receives those security updates, which are detailed in the monthly Android Security Bulletin. However, manufacturers of Android-based devices use different sets of hardware and software components. That’s why, alongside vulnerabilities common to all Android devices, there are security issues specific to individual manufacturers’ devices.

For its own smartphones, Google publishes separate security updates, covered by a dedicated Pixel Update Bulletin. Rather than replacing the Android Security Bulletin, this document complements it by detailing vulnerabilities specific to devices manufactured by Google. Other Android smartphones also receive similar updates from their manufacturers.

The Pixel Update Bulletin for September 2026 clearly shows why Google needs separate updates for its smartphones in the first place. Many of the vulnerabilities it fixes affect specific Pixel hardware (or hardware-related) components: the modem, bootloader, GPU, fingerprint scanner components, and other parts of the device. On smartphones from other manufacturers, these features might rely on entirely different hardware and software components, so the fixes listed in the Pixel Update Bulletin don’t apply to those phones.

That said, these vulnerabilities could still be relevant for Pixel owners who’ve flashed their devices with custom ROMs. Switching to a different OS doesn’t alter the device’s hardware components, and may not replace the firmware. Therefore, the vulnerabilities themselves may persist, but whether patches are available, and how they’re installed, depends on the specific OS.

CVE-2026-58704: a zero-day vulnerability being actively exploited in the wild

Now let’s look closer at the specific vulnerabilities Google fixed in September. The most significant one is the above-mentioned CVE-2026-58704.

This vulnerability affects the Cellular Modem component, which handles the smartphone’s communication with cellular networks. It stems from a logic error in the code, which, under certain conditions, allows bypassing the intended permission check.

Successful exploitation of CVE-2026-58704 lets attackers escalate privileges on the smartphone to gain broader access to its functions and data. Note that the attack takes place over a cellular network and the threat actors need low-level privileges on the targeted device to start with.

In practice, this means attackers can’t exploit CVE-2026-58704 to attack a Pixel from just anywhere over the internet, as they’d apparently need to either compromise the cellular network the target smartphone is already connected to or, more likely, force it to connect to a malicious base station under their control.

Google hasn’t disclosed all the details of this vulnerability yet, and the related report is not publicly accessible. As a result, the technical details that would show how easy it is for attackers to exploit CVE-2026-58704 remain unknown pending installation of the patches on all devices.

Nevertheless, Google claims that there are signs of limited exploitation of CVE-2026-58704.

What we know about the other 109 vulnerabilities

Of the remaining 109 vulnerabilities found in Google Pixel devices, only one is rated moderate; the others are either high (62) or outright critical (46). Nine of these flaws fall into the RCE (remote code execution) category. This means that if an attacker successfully exploits one of these vulnerabilities, they can remotely force the device to run malicious code. The exact conditions for the attack depend on the specific vulnerability.

Another 88 vulnerabilities fall into the elevation of privilege (EoP) category. These let an attacker who’s already gained a certain level of access to the device expand their privileges. The CVE-2026-58704 vulnerability discussed above falls into this same category, which is why the September bulletin lists 89 EoP vulnerabilities in total.

Finally, 10 vulnerabilities can lead to information disclosure (ID), and two more to denial of service (DoS). In short, that’s a hefty list of flaws, so Google Pixel owners shouldn’t wait around to install the patches.

How to avoid becoming a victim

Google Pixel owners can install the update that fixes the vulnerabilities covered in this post by following this path: Settings → Security & privacy → System & updates → Security update → Install. Keep in mind that the phone will automatically restart to finish installing the update.

To keep your phone secure we recommend the following general measures:

• Install security updates on your phone regularly and promptly – whether it’s a Google Pixel, an Android smartphone from a different manufacturer, or even an iPhone.
• Avoid installing apps from questionable sources.
• Read reviews before installing apps from official stores, since malware isn’t uncommon there too. Users who have already been burned will often sound the alarm in the reviews long before store moderators get around to removing the dangerous app.
• Install a reliable security solution to keep you from downloading malware, and warn you about suspicious activity on your device.

The China-based hacking group has been exploiting SharePoint vulnerabilities since July 2025.

The post Warlock Expands SharePoint Exploitation in Critical Infrastructure Attacks appeared first on SecurityWeek.

CVE-2026-104286 is a critical-severity path traversal vulnerability that could allow attackers to write arbitrary files to the system.

The post Exploited Fortinet FortiMail Zero-Day Calls for Urgent Action appeared first on SecurityWeek.

The number of vulnerabilities detected in code continues to rise. According to Kaspersky’s threat analysis, 5,200 critical vulnerabilities were found in the first half of this year alone — nearly 50% more than during the same period last year. At the same time, the average gap between the publication of information about a vulnerability and the first attempts to exploit it is shrinking. The rapid development of AI systems plays a significant role in this process: while helping companies find weaknesses in their code, AI simultaneously shows hackers how to exploit them quicker.

It would seem that solving the problem of security gaps is very easy. All you need do is set up a scanner, check the infrastructure more often, and update vulnerable systems. But statistics from the Kaspersky Incident Response service show the opposite: a significant number of cyberattacks begin precisely by exploiting a flaw — and these are often already known flaws, not zero-day vulnerabilities.

Using a scanner does not give you an effective vulnerability management process. A scanner merely finds flaws (not always promptly), and then the IT team is tasked with prioritizing and fixing them. These processes can drag on for weeks, and in the meantime an attacker can easily gain access to the given infrastructure.

Where time is lost

The first delay can occur immediately after information about a vulnerability appears in databases. In addition to monitoring for breaches, the information security team is normally handling a dozen-or-so other tasks, so it relies entirely on the scanner for monitoring. If the scanner is configured to run weekly, a new vulnerability will appear in the report in a few days. In a company where scans are conducted quarterly, this obviously happens much later. Attackers, on the other hand, actively monitor news feeds and learn about new vulnerabilities immediately.

When the report finally reaches the security team, it contains far more than just one issue, raising the question of where to start. Critical vulnerabilities are addressed first, but attackers might exploit more than just those. Meanwhile, prioritization decisions are rarely based on data: often, they’re based on the order of the errors in the report, the name of the vulnerable system (they start with the one everyone’s talking about), or increased activity from its owner. Because of this, the risk of overlooking a serious threat is very high. Finally, the IT department takes on the vulnerability, and… it ends up back in the queue: they need to check the update’s compatibility and wait for a maintenance window.

After installing the update, the specialists close the ticket with a clear conscience and mark the status as completed. But would anyone verify that the patch was applied to all affected machines? Even the one that was turned off at the time of installation? Probably not, and then the company would assume the vulnerability was fixed, even though it’ll actually remain in the infrastructure for an indefinite period. This is the worst possible outcome: the risk remains — yet it’s no longer visible.

Put it all together, and what we get is months passing between disclosure and actual resolution. There’s no one in particular to blame here: every participant in the chain did what they’re supposed to. It’s just that this chain itself is made up of links with gaps between them.

A recipe for vulnerability management

To give attackers as few opportunities to gain access to corporate infrastructure as possible, it’s important to ensure that an organization has four key processes clearly established:

1.       Inventory

It’s impossible to verify the security of a system that no one knows exists. At the same time, virtually any large infrastructure will contain things like having had a server set up “for a week” three years ago, a network device left over from previous business owners, or a workstation that was forgotten during an office move. And each of these assets can pose a serious threat.

The goal of inventory management is to ensure complete transparency of the IT infrastructure. To achieve this, an up-to-date list of assets is compiled.

2.       Prioritization

When analyzing vulnerabilities, a security specialist shouldn’t rely solely on ratings from public databases such as the NVD, for these don’t always rely the real severity of the actual potential damage caused by exploiting a vulnerability. The specific structure of an organization’s infrastructure will have a significant impact. For example, the same vulnerability in a server located in an isolated segment, and in a system accessible from the internet, represents two very different risks.

Effective prioritization takes into account not only the publicly reported severity level but also the role of the vulnerable asset within the infrastructure, the likelihood of exploitation, and actual attack trends.

3.       Configuration settings

Overly permissive access settings, disabled security mechanisms, and default accounts are not technically vulnerabilities, but they often serve as entry points for cybercriminals. To prevent an attacker from exploiting inadequate configuration settings, security teams should follow several basic security best practices:

• delete default accounts;
• use strong passwords and MFA;
• disable unused services;
• apply the principle of least privilege.

4.       Confirmation

Blind spots are particularly common at the last stage of the vulnerability management process. Typically, once the IT department formally installs an update, the vulnerability is considered patched. However, before breathing a final sigh of relief, it’s important to at least verify that the patch has been successfully applied to all affected systems and has actually resolved the vulnerability.

Five tasks — one solution

Our solution, the Kaspersky Vulnerability Management module for Kaspersky Next Optimum helps information security specialists establish centralized management of vulnerabilities, assets, and configuration errors. The product solves five key tasks:

• It reduces the time between publication of vulnerability data and its detection in assets. The product automatically inventories the infrastructure — tracking even long-forgotten assets — and continuously scans it for vulnerabilities. Scanning is performed in two ways: agent-based and agentless. In the former, the solution runs on top of Kaspersky Endpoint Security, which allows for in-depth analysis of workstations and servers without transmitting service credentials over the network. In the latter, it analyzes ports and services where no agent is present. Both methods complement each other, enabling complete coverage of the company’s infrastructure.
• Checks configurations. Compliance with security standards is verified using predefined profiles.
• Prioritizes vulnerabilities. Priorities are assigned based on severity level, the characteristics of the specific asset, likelihood of exploitation, and other parameters.
• Promptly fixes errors. This involves remediation recommendations and centralized patch management integrated into the familiar administration infrastructure.
• Helps ensure that the vulnerability is fully patched. A remediation task is considered complete only after a follow-up verification.

The Kaspersky Vulnerability Management Module helps transform vulnerability management from a series of disjointed actions into a well-thought-out cycle. Details about licensing can be found on the Kaspersky Next Optimum for small and mid-sized businesses offering page and more about Vulnerability Management Module — on the module's home page.

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Ransomware Risk Model: Flashpoint’s Patented Scoring Method to Inform Vulnerability Prioritization

Flashpoint was awarded U.S. Patent No. 12,705,360 for its Ransomware Risk model, which rates how closely new vulnerabilities match those used in ransomware attacks.

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Flashpoint

October 1, 2026

Table Of Contents

Table of Contents

Under the Hood: How Flashpoint’s Patented Ransomware Vulnerability Model Works

Comprehensive Vulnerability Intelligence Integration

Protect Against Vulnerability and Ransomware Risk Using Flashpoint

Ransomware Risk FAQs (Frequently Asked Questions)

More

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Vulnerability and exposure management (VM) teams need critical metadata and context that clearly show which issues pose an immediate risk to their organization. While traditional VM frameworks tell defenders how severe a vulnerability may be, they do not provide visibility into how likely threat actors are to exploit it. This leaves security teams overwhelmed in patch backlogs without a clear strategy for prioritization.

Nowhere is this prioritization gap more dangerous than with ransomware. Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) groups no longer choose targets at random. They look for specific technical conditions that make vulnerability exploitation easy, fast, and repeatable. With RaaS attacks rising by 45% period-over-period in H1 2026, organizations need a way to identify the specific traits that make a vulnerability attractive to ransomware operators before an attack occurs.

Flashpoint built the Ransomware Risk score into Flashpoint Vulnerability Intelligence to solve exactly this problem. Since 2022, it has rated newly discovered vulnerabilities based on how closely they resemble those known to be used in ransomware attacks. With the grant of the U.S. Patent No. 12,705,360 on August 11, 2026, the methodology behind the score is now formally patented. This milestone formalizes Flashpoint’s ability to cut through the noise with a proven, threat-informed signal that gives defenders the clarity they need to act on Day Zero.

“As vulnerability disclosures surge, prioritization is more important than ever for security teams. A severity score alone can’t tell you which vulnerabilities pose the greatest real-world risk of exploitation by ransomware actors.

Our patented Ransomware Risk model applies years of threat intelligence to that problem, giving customers an earlier signal and helping them prioritize based on how attackers actually operate.”

josh lefkowitz, co-founder and ceo at flashpoint

Under the Hood: How Flashpoint’s Patented Ransomware Vulnerability Model Works

The patented system evaluates newly disclosed vulnerabilities against the patterns shared by vulnerabilities ransomware groups have exploited. Rather than trying to predict what threat actors will do next, the model learns what past ransomware-exploited vulnerabilities have in common and compares each new flaw against those patterns.

The Four Step Process

Multi-Factor Fingerprinting

Every vulnerability ingested into Flashpoint Vulnerability Intelligence is profiled against more than 60 distinct technical factors. This “fingerprinting” links the vulnerability to key inputs including whether the flaw is remotely exploitable without authentication, whether it affects SCADA or Operational Technology (OT) systems, and its potential impact on data availability, which is central to extortion schemes.

Coordinate Mapping

The model turns each multi-factor fingerprint into a set of values that place it as a single point on a map, so vulnerabilities with similar profiles land close together.

Identifying the Ransomware Neighborhood (Cluster Check)

Flashpoint overlays historical threat data onto the map to establish neighborhoods where vulnerabilities previously exploited in real-world ransomware attacks aggregate.

Similarity and Likelihood Rating

When a new vulnerability is ingested, its coordinates are checked against these neighborhoods. The scoring system calculates its spatial proximity to known ransomware vectors and assigns a clear rating: Low, Medium, High, or Critical.

This four-step method, developed by Flashpoint’s Ben Haynes and Jacob Kouns, is the basis of U.S. Patent No. 12,705,360.

What It Means for Vulnerability Management Teams

By translating complex structural attributes into a single risk score, the patented model delivers four key operational advantages:

1. Prioritize Beyond CVSS: Leveraging the Ransomware Risk model, security teams can confidently prioritize 1.0 to 6.9 CVSS issues if its structural profile lands it in a “High” or “Critical” ransomware cluster.
2. Act on Day Zero: Because the Flashpoint model rates all vulnerabilities on disclosure, security teams gain actionable guidance immediately, eliminating the need to wait weeks for external exploitation reports.
3. Effectively Communicate Risk: CISOs can present clear, business-centric risk statements rather than abstract numerical scores.
4. Adaptive Ratings: Scores update in near real time as vulnerability details change, and the model keeps adjusting as new vulnerabilities join the set it compares against.

Comprehensive Vulnerability Intelligence Integration

Flashpoint’s Ransomware Risk model is built to enhance, not replace the vulnerability management frameworks organizations already rely on. In fact, it provides even greater value for security teams as our Ransomware Risk model provides clarity for every vulnerability detailed by Flashpoint Vulnerability Intelligence, including over 105,000 issues missed by CVE and NVD.

Within Flashpoint Ignite, security teams have a complete view of vulnerability risk, seeing the score alongside CVSS (v3 and v4), EPSS, Social Risk, and exploit maturity.

Protect Against Vulnerability and Ransomware Risk Using Flashpoint

Vulnerability management requires more than cataloging. It demands threat-informed prioritization that aligns security operations with real-world business risk. Flashpoint’s patented Ransomware Risk model eliminates guesswork by surfacing the flaws that match the profile of known ransomware targets, allowing security teams to patch what matters most, first. 

By combining proprietary knowledge of vulnerability architecture and ransomware attacks, Flashpoint bridges the gap between theoretical and active exposure. Request a demo today to see how our Ransomware Risk model provides the definitive signal needed to stay ahead of extortion groups.

Ransomware Risk FAQs (Frequently Asked Questions)

What is the Ransomware Risk score? 

The Ransomware Risk score is a rating in Flashpoint Vulnerability Intelligence that shows how closely a vulnerability resembles those known to be used in ransomware attacks. Each vulnerability is rated Low, Medium, High, or Critical, so security teams can see which ones to patch first to reduce their ransomware exposure.

How is Ransomware Risk different from CVSS and EPSS?

CVSS measures how severe a vulnerability could be, and EPSS estimates how likely it is to be exploited in general. Ransomware Risk adds a ransomware-specific signal that works alongside both, showing how closely a vulnerability matches those ransomware groups have used. In Flashpoint Ignite, all three scores appear together.

What does Flashpoint’s ransomware patent cover?

U.S. Patent No. 12,705,360, granted August 11, 2026, covers Flashpoint’s method for rating how likely a vulnerability is to be used in a ransomware event. Each vulnerability is profiled on more than 60 factors, compared with vulnerabilities used in past ransomware attacks, and rated by similarity. The patent formalizes the model behind the Ransomware Risk score, live since 2022.

How often are Ransomware Risk scores updated?

Ransomware Risk scores update in near real time, so new vulnerabilities are rated as soon as they’re disclosed. The model also keeps adjusting as new vulnerabilities join the body it compares against, so ratings reflect the ransomware landscape as it stands today.

The post Ransomware Risk Model: Flashpoint’s Patented Scoring Method to Inform Vulnerability Prioritization appeared first on Flashpoint.

Roughly a dozen vulnerabilities have been patched in each of the open source cryptographic libraries. 

The post High-Severity Vulnerabilities Patched in OpenSSL, WolfSSL appeared first on SecurityWeek.

Branch Target Reuse (BTR) is a new Spectre v2 attack targeting JIT compilers in web browsers, language runtimes, and the operating system kernel

The post New Spectre v2 Variant Exposes Intel, AMD, Arm CPUs to Data Leaks appeared first on SecurityWeek.

We introduce OperTraitor, a tool to audit privileges of Kubernetes operators, identify excessive RBAC risks, and secure non-human identities.

The post OperTraitors: How Kubernetes Operators Betray Your Security Posture appeared first on Unit 42.

Over the past year, our Global Emergency Response Team (GERT) has investigated several incidents involving the NightEagle group (also tracked as APT-Q-95). This group has been active since at least 2023 and originally focused on organizations in Asia. We have now identified attacks by the group targeting businesses in Russia. This post examines both known and new tools NightEagle used in its latest campaign.

Initial access

In most incidents, the attackers used compromised valid credentials to gain access to corporate VPNs. VPN connections originated from IP addresses in the Russian segment linked to Cloudflare WARP tunnels, as well as from IP addresses associated with European virtual infrastructure providers.

GhostContainer on Microsoft Exchange

Both during the initial access stage and as the attack progressed, the attackers deployed the GhostContainer backdoor on Microsoft Exchange servers. It incorporates components from several open-source projects, including the Neo-reGeorg tunnel, an exploit for the CVE-2020-0688 vulnerability, and the GhostWebShell class from the ysoserial utility. All of these components are publicly available on GitHub.

We were unable to determine the exact method the attackers used to deliver the backdoor to Microsoft Exchange servers. We believe with a high degree of confidence that they applied a technique already familiar to us: extracting the cryptographic keys used by Microsoft Exchange from the ASP.NET configuration, overwriting the VIEWSTATE framework parameter, and injecting a payload into it, which then launched the GhostContainer backdoor in memory.

The backdoor is a .NET assembly containing three classes that implement its core functionality:

• Stub: processes C2 commands delivered to the infected system through the x-owa-urlpostdata headers and evades detection by the Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) and Windows Event Log mechanisms by overwriting addresses in amsi.dll and ntdll.dll.
• App_Web_843e75cf5b63: accepts the fakePath and fakePageName parameters and creates virtual paths that redirect requests to the App_Web_8c9b251fb5b3 class.
• App_Web_8c9b251fb5b3: implements network traffic redirection (proxying) and socket forwarding functionality.

Kaspersky products detect the GhostContainer backdoor as Trojan.MSIL.GhostContainer.gen.

GhostContainer samples identified by the Similarity technology from Kaspersky Threat Analysis

Traffic redirection

Once the attackers gain sufficient privileges during an attack, they leverage RDP to move laterally within the internal network segment. To do this, they download and run tools for tunneling and redirecting network traffic.

The attackers used GitHub repositories to host their archived tools. The names of the repositories and archives were disguised to look legitimate:

• https://github[.]com/mirror-js/mirror-js/refs/heads/main/js/js-webpack.zip
• https://github[.]com/mirror-js/mirror-js/refs/heads/main/js/jsonp-pack.zip
• https://github[.]com/browserthemes/resourcepack/releases/download/main/resource-pack.zip

One of the repositories used for storing network tools

The files contained within the archives were also given names mimicking known legitimate software, though unrelated to the archive names:

• adobe_32.exe;
• AdobeSync.exe;
• trueconf.exe;
• 1cbroker.exe;
• 1c-office-plugin.exe;
• trueconf-broker.exe.

Across the incidents we investigated, we found two tools that the attackers combined for traffic tunneling.

1. Microsoft dev tunnels
   This is a legitimate Microsoft mechanism that allows local web services to be published for internet access on *.*.devtunnels.ms domains. The attackers used this tunneling capability to expose port 3389 (RDP) on the compromised system.
   

   Execution graph of adobe_32.exe in Kaspersky Research Sandbox

2. rdp2tcp
   This is a publicly available tool for tunneling TCP traffic over an established RDP connection. It includes a server component that runs on the target system and a client component that runs on the attacker’s side.

   When virtual channels are opened and closed, corresponding events with IDs 132 (channel opened) and 148 (channel closed) are logged in the Microsoft-Windows-RemoteDesktopServices-RdpCoreTS/Operational.evtx Windows log. These events contain the names of the channels (such as XPSRD, cliprdr, Microsoft::Windows::RDS::DisplayControl, and others) used by the RemoteFX module, which extends the capabilities of the RDP protocol.

   When the rdp2tcp tool is used, events with IDs 132 and 148 will contain the channel name rdp2tcp or other random alphanumeric combinations chosen by the attackers.

   

   Creation event for a channel named rdp2tcp (server component startup)

The combination of Microsoft dev tunnels and rdp2tcp allows the attackers to maintain network access by using legitimate services without opening additional suspicious ports.

The attackers also used the atexec utility from the Impacket toolkit to create scheduled tasks on target systems. These tasks enabled network port forwarding through standard Windows functionality:

netsh interface portproxy add v4tov4 listenport=443 connectaddress=10.0.12.101 connectport=445

Lateral movement

To obtain elevated privileges and move laterally through the network, NightEagle exploited various vulnerabilities in Active Directory. The attackers used previously established tunnels to connect to internal infrastructure systems.

In one incident, they exploited a well-known RDP implementation vulnerability, CVE-2019-0708 (BlueKeep). They used the vulnerable mechanism to create a local account on the system and add it to the Administrators and Remote Desktop Users groups.

Contents of a system memory dump showing artifacts of the CVE-2019-0708 exploit

The attackers also requested Kerberos tickets with a non-standard combination of flags (Forwardable, Proxiable, Renewable) and attempted to replicate the Domain-Password object from the Active Directory database to impersonate the domain controller (a technique known as DCSync) after obtaining an account with sufficient privileges.

Through these methods, the attackers establish persistence in the infrastructure, obtain password hashes for domain accounts, use long-lived Kerberos tickets to gain legitimate access to target resources, and ultimately compromise domain controllers and the victim’s entire Active Directory infrastructure.

Takeaways

To expand the geographic scope of its targets, NightEagle is updating its methods and adopting new techniques for persistence and lateral movement. Despite the group’s efforts to stay hidden, timely detection of anomalies combined with a comprehensive approach to infrastructure protection can significantly hinder the attackers from achieving their goals. Since the attackers rely on known legitimate tools and infrastructure vulnerabilities, well-configured monitoring can help detect NightEagle’s presence on the network.

Detection by Kaspersky solutions

Kaspersky solutions reliably identify the malicious activity described above at various stages of the attack. We showed examples above of how Kaspersky Threat Analysis detects samples of the GhostContainer backdoor and the tunneling utility. This toolkit also includes the analytical solution Kaspersky Threat Attribution Engine (KTAE), which helps SOC analysts and incident responders determine which APT groups malware can be attributed to. The solution uses a proprietary comparison method that measures the similarity between analyzed samples of suspicious files and known malicious samples in Kaspersky’s collection.

The backdoor we discovered showed similarity to previously analyzed GhostContainer samples and a connection to the NightEagle APT group:

Backdoor analysis with KTAE

However, detection scenarios for this kind of attacks are not limited to file analysis. Deploying a backdoor on a target host produces numerous characteristic artifacts, which allow Kaspersky Endpoint Detection and Response Expert to alert users to anomalies in the infrastructure in a timely manner.

This malicious activity is detected by the following rules, available in the repository:

• Initial detection of the malicious signature occurs through the generic_ransomware_related_detection rule, based on EPP module events
• Detection of a malicious DLL’s .NET assembly being loaded via PowerShell: suspicious_assembly_loading_into_powershell_via_reflection
• Activity of tunneling and traffic redirection tools: detection_of_access_to_tunnel_domains_dns
• Use of tools from the Impacket toolkit, such as atexec:
  • impacket_possible_activity
  • attempt_to_download_hacktool_or_risktool_by_non_browser
  • credentials_dumping_tools_file_artifacts_creation
• Attempts to replicate an Active Directory database object to impersonate a domain controller: potential_dcsync_via_startupparameters

Process tree in KEDR Expert

Kaspersky Anti Targeted Attack (KATA) detects this malicious activity in network traffic. For example, the Exploit.CVE-2019-0708.TCP.C&C signature allows detecting attempts to exploit the CVE-2019-0708 (BlueKeep) vulnerability.

Alert card for the BlueKeep vulnerability exploitation

Beyond this activity, KATA also detects other NightEagle actions in network traffic, such as the following:

• Traffic redirection and tunneling variations
• Attacks on Active Directory (DCSync, attempts to compromise AD CS, and others)
• Lateral movement across the network

Indicators of compromise

Apple released iOS and macOS updates to patch a zero-day vulnerability (CVE-2026-86950) reported by Meta’s product security team.

The post Apple Patches Zero-Day Linked to ‘Extremely Sophisticated Attack’  appeared first on SecurityWeek.

A critical vulnerability has been discovered in the popular WordPress content management system that allows attackers to execute arbitrary code on the web server. The vulnerability has been assigned the number CVE-2026-87902. The good news is that on September 22, WordPress released an update that patches it. The bad news is that the first attempts to exploit CVE-2026-87902 were detected just a few hours after the patch was released. Therefore, all companies whose corporate websites or blogs run on this platform are advised to update immediately.

WordPress versions affected by CVE-2026-87902

According to data published by WordPress on GitHub, all versions of the CMS from 4.7.0 through 7.1.1 are vulnerable. The company has released updates for all supported branches of the system; a complete table listing the patched version numbers can be found on the company’s GitHub page. The latest version of WordPress should be updated to version 7.1.2 (or newer).

What’s the nature of the CVE-2026-87902 vulnerability, and why is it so dangerous?

Under normal circumstances, WordPress loads PHP template files only from a specific folder within the active theme. However, due to the CVE-2026-87902 vulnerability, an attacker can craft a request to WordPress in such a way that an arbitrary PHP file is included — without requiring any authorization. Yes, the file must already be uploaded to the targeted server in some way, but that’s not really a problem for an attacker.

It sounds like a path traversal vulnerability, but in most publications, CVE-2026-87902 is classified as an RCE (Remote Code Execution) vulnerability because, under certain WordPress and PHP server configurations, the attack can lead to the execution of arbitrary code.

How to stay safe

The only way to secure a corporate WordPress site is to install the latest version. The researcher who discovered the vulnerability also offers several tips for hardening CMS security, but emphasizes that these are meant to complement the patch, not replace it.

The Hacker News lists several PHP filenames and IP addresses used in the attack via CVE-2026-87902. These can serve as indicators that a WordPress instance has been compromised.

Given that only a few hours pass between the publication of information about a vulnerability’s existence and the start of attacks exploiting it, it’s crucial for companies to have a properly configured, centralized vulnerability management system. To achieve this, they should have a specialized solution capable of identifying and resolving vulnerabilities, prioritizing them based on actual risks, and automating remediation processes. Our vulnerability management module for Kaspersky Next Optimum can help with this task.

Over the past year, our Global Emergency Response Team (GERT) has investigated several incidents involving the NightEagle group (also tracked as APT-Q-95). This group has been active since at least 2023 and originally focused on organizations in Asia. We have now identified attacks by the group targeting businesses in Russia. This post examines both known and new tools NightEagle used in its latest campaign.

Initial access

In most incidents, the attackers used compromised valid credentials to gain access to corporate VPNs. VPN connections originated from IP addresses in the Russian segment linked to Cloudflare WARP tunnels, as well as from IP addresses associated with European virtual infrastructure providers.

GhostContainer on Microsoft Exchange

Both during the initial access stage and as the attack progressed, the attackers deployed the GhostContainer backdoor on Microsoft Exchange servers. It incorporates components from several open-source projects, including the Neo-reGeorg tunnel, an exploit for the CVE-2020-0688 vulnerability, and the GhostWebShell class from the ysoserial utility. All of these components are publicly available on GitHub.

We were unable to determine the exact method the attackers used to deliver the backdoor to Microsoft Exchange servers. We believe with a high degree of confidence that they applied a technique already familiar to us: extracting the cryptographic keys used by Microsoft Exchange from the ASP.NET configuration, overwriting the VIEWSTATE framework parameter, and injecting a payload into it, which then launched the GhostContainer backdoor in memory.

The backdoor is a .NET assembly containing three classes that implement its core functionality:

• Stub: processes C2 commands delivered to the infected system through the x-owa-urlpostdata headers and evades detection by the Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) and Windows Event Log mechanisms by overwriting addresses in amsi.dll and ntdll.dll.
• App_Web_843e75cf5b63: accepts the fakePath and fakePageName parameters and creates virtual paths that redirect requests to the App_Web_8c9b251fb5b3 class.
• App_Web_8c9b251fb5b3: implements network traffic redirection (proxying) and socket forwarding functionality.

Kaspersky products detect the GhostContainer backdoor as Trojan.MSIL.GhostContainer.gen.

GhostContainer samples identified by the Similarity technology from Kaspersky Threat Analysis

Traffic redirection

Once the attackers gain sufficient privileges during an attack, they leverage RDP to move laterally within the internal network segment. To do this, they download and run tools for tunneling and redirecting network traffic.

The attackers used GitHub repositories to host their archived tools. The names of the repositories and archives were disguised to look legitimate:

• https://github[.]com/mirror-js/mirror-js/refs/heads/main/js/js-webpack.zip
• https://github[.]com/mirror-js/mirror-js/refs/heads/main/js/jsonp-pack.zip
• https://github[.]com/browserthemes/resourcepack/releases/download/main/resource-pack.zip

One of the repositories used for storing network tools

The files contained within the archives were also given names mimicking known legitimate software, though unrelated to the archive names:

• adobe_32.exe;
• AdobeSync.exe;
• trueconf.exe;
• 1cbroker.exe;
• 1c-office-plugin.exe;
• trueconf-broker.exe.

Across the incidents we investigated, we found two tools that the attackers combined for traffic tunneling.

1. Microsoft dev tunnels
   This is a legitimate Microsoft mechanism that allows local web services to be published for internet access on *.*.devtunnels.ms domains. The attackers used this tunneling capability to expose port 3389 (RDP) on the compromised system.
   

   Execution graph of adobe_32.exe in Kaspersky Research Sandbox

2. rdp2tcp
   This is a publicly available tool for tunneling TCP traffic over an established RDP connection. It includes a server component that runs on the target system and a client component that runs on the attacker’s side.

   When virtual channels are opened and closed, corresponding events with IDs 132 (channel opened) and 148 (channel closed) are logged in the Microsoft-Windows-RemoteDesktopServices-RdpCoreTS/Operational.evtx Windows log. These events contain the names of the channels (such as XPSRD, cliprdr, Microsoft::Windows::RDS::DisplayControl, and others) used by the RemoteFX module, which extends the capabilities of the RDP protocol.

   When the rdp2tcp tool is used, events with IDs 132 and 148 will contain the channel name rdp2tcp or other random alphanumeric combinations chosen by the attackers.

   

   Creation event for a channel named rdp2tcp (server component startup)

The combination of Microsoft dev tunnels and rdp2tcp allows the attackers to maintain network access by using legitimate services without opening additional suspicious ports.

The attackers also used the atexec utility from the Impacket toolkit to create scheduled tasks on target systems. These tasks enabled network port forwarding through standard Windows functionality:

netsh interface portproxy add v4tov4 listenport=443 connectaddress=10.0.12.101 connectport=445

Lateral movement

To obtain elevated privileges and move laterally through the network, NightEagle exploited various vulnerabilities in Active Directory. The attackers used previously established tunnels to connect to internal infrastructure systems.

In one incident, they exploited a well-known RDP implementation vulnerability, CVE-2019-0708 (BlueKeep). They used the vulnerable mechanism to create a local account on the system and add it to the Administrators and Remote Desktop Users groups.

Contents of a system memory dump showing artifacts of the CVE-2019-0708 exploit

The attackers also requested Kerberos tickets with a non-standard combination of flags (Forwardable, Proxiable, Renewable) and attempted to replicate the Domain-Password object from the Active Directory database to impersonate the domain controller (a technique known as DCSync) after obtaining an account with sufficient privileges.

Through these methods, the attackers establish persistence in the infrastructure, obtain password hashes for domain accounts, use long-lived Kerberos tickets to gain legitimate access to target resources, and ultimately compromise domain controllers and the victim’s entire Active Directory infrastructure.

Takeaways

To expand the geographic scope of its targets, NightEagle is updating its methods and adopting new techniques for persistence and lateral movement. Despite the group’s efforts to stay hidden, timely detection of anomalies combined with a comprehensive approach to infrastructure protection can significantly hinder the attackers from achieving their goals. Since the attackers rely on known legitimate tools and infrastructure vulnerabilities, well-configured monitoring can help detect NightEagle’s presence on the network.

Detection by Kaspersky solutions

Kaspersky solutions reliably identify the malicious activity described above at various stages of the attack. We showed examples above of how Kaspersky Threat Analysis detects samples of the GhostContainer backdoor and the tunneling utility. This toolkit also includes the analytical solution Kaspersky Threat Attribution Engine (KTAE), which helps SOC analysts and incident responders determine which APT groups malware can be attributed to. The solution uses a proprietary comparison method that measures the similarity between analyzed samples of suspicious files and known malicious samples in Kaspersky’s collection.

The backdoor we discovered showed similarity to previously analyzed GhostContainer samples and a connection to the NightEagle APT group:

Backdoor analysis with KTAE

However, detection scenarios for this kind of attacks are not limited to file analysis. Deploying a backdoor on a target host produces numerous characteristic artifacts, which allow Kaspersky Endpoint Detection and Response Expert to alert users to anomalies in the infrastructure in a timely manner.

This malicious activity is detected by the following rules, available in the repository:

• Initial detection of the malicious signature occurs through the generic_ransomware_related_detection rule, based on EPP module events
• Detection of a malicious DLL’s .NET assembly being loaded via PowerShell: suspicious_assembly_loading_into_powershell_via_reflection
• Activity of tunneling and traffic redirection tools: detection_of_access_to_tunnel_domains_dns
• Use of tools from the Impacket toolkit, such as atexec:
  • impacket_possible_activity
  • attempt_to_download_hacktool_or_risktool_by_non_browser
  • credentials_dumping_tools_file_artifacts_creation
• Attempts to replicate an Active Directory database object to impersonate a domain controller: potential_dcsync_via_startupparameters

Process tree in KEDR Expert

Kaspersky Anti Targeted Attack (KATA) detects this malicious activity in network traffic. For example, the Exploit.CVE-2019-0708.TCP.C&C signature allows detecting attempts to exploit the CVE-2019-0708 (BlueKeep) vulnerability.

Alert card for the BlueKeep vulnerability exploitation

Beyond this activity, KATA also detects other NightEagle actions in network traffic, such as the following:

• Traffic redirection and tunneling variations
• Attacks on Active Directory (DCSync, attempts to compromise AD CS, and others)
• Lateral movement across the network

Indicators of compromise

Unit 42 is aware of possible 0-day activity against NetScaler devices. Citrix reports CVE-2026-88771, CVE-2026-88772 have been exploited in the wild.

The post Threat Brief: NetScaler Zero Days CVE-2026-88771 and CVE-2026-88772 Exploited in the Wild (Updated September 30) appeared first on Unit 42.

The extortion group has modified its exploit in new attacks targeting the PeopleSoft vulnerability CVE-2026-35273.

The post Google Warns of ShinyHunters’ Fresh Oracle PeopleSoft Campaign appeared first on SecurityWeek.

The company says the measure was precautionary and that it has no evidence of Kiteworks or customer systems being compromised.

The post Kiteworks Urges Server Shutdown, Finds Advanced Forms Vulnerability appeared first on SecurityWeek.

Citrix has released patches for the critical NetScaler vulnerabilities tracked as CVE-2026-88771 and CVE-2026-88772.

The post Citrix Confirms 2 NetScaler Zero-Days After Admins Pulled the Plug appeared first on SecurityWeek.

CISA added CVE-2026-65660 to its KEV catalog, giving federal agencies a patching deadline of September 28.

The post Microsoft SharePoint Flaw CVE-2026-65660 Now Exploited in Attacks appeared first on SecurityWeek.

How can an industrial server be compromised through its GPU without leaving a trace? Such a complex, largely theoretical attack would typically leverage hardware vulnerabilities. This isn’t even about design flaws in the hardware itself, but about quirks in how it operates — sometimes at the physical level. A recent paper by Canadian researchers at the University of Toronto describes GPUThor — a new and more effective Rowhammer attack that exploits precisely this kind of hardware behavior in video memory.

Rowhammer and graphics cards

GPUThor builds on the idea behind the original attack on RAM, first proposed in 2014 in the Rowhammer research. Rowhammer and every attack in its class rest on a simple fact: memory cells aren’t fully isolated from one another. Repeatedly accessing (hammering) the same row of cells can, under certain conditions, corrupt data (that is, flip bits) in neighboring rows. Once that effect is confirmed as possible, all that’s left is finding a way to weaponize it — for example, by triggering a denial of service or even executing arbitrary code.

So what do servers and graphics accelerators have to do with any of this? As artificial intelligence technologies have taken off, so has demand for hardware that can run large numbers of parallel, similar computations. And the accelerators built into gaming graphics cards are a natural fit for this kind of workload. This makes cloud providers that rent out graphics accelerators to all comers an attractive target for Rowhammer attacks. The hypothetical scenario runs like this: an attacker buys access to a graphics chip, and uses it to try to compromise the provider’s entire infrastructure. This is exactly why attacks on video memory remain a topic of special interest to researchers.

How the GPUThor attack works

In the spring of this year, three new papers were published — each demonstrating a different attack on Nvidia accelerators equipped with GDDR6 memory. All three delivered fairly modest results: the most damage was done when the target was a consumer-grade graphics card, while attacks on an industrial accelerator like the Nvidia A6000 proved to be far less effective. On top of that, none of the attacks worked with ECC (error correction code) memory protection enabled.

GPUThor also looks at the possibility of attacking Nvidia’s older Ampere accelerators with GDDR6 memory: the researchers studied the A4000, A4500, A5000, and A6000 models. But the effectiveness of the new method — measured by the number of cells whose data was forcibly altered — is significantly higher. The researchers also argue that, in theory, the technique could be applied to newer accelerators as well.

GPUThor’s effectiveness compared to earlier attacks. Source

How were these results achieved? The standard defense mechanism against Rowhammer attacks is called Target Row Refresh (TRR), which the Canadian researchers took a closer look at. It turns out that if TRR detects repeated access attempts, it forces a refresh of neighboring cells — making data corruption difficult or impossible. Attackers typically try to defeat TRR by accessing cells at random — confusing the defense system and reducing its effectiveness. The researchers discovered that on Nvidia Ampere cards, TRR only triggers once every 72 memory-cell refresh cycles. Armed with this finding, they applied an uneven access pattern — hammering the target cells far more aggressively than before. The result: measured against the original GDDR attack known as GPUHammer as a baseline, GPUThor turns out to be around 7 000 to 23 000 times more effective.

Results and outlook

Combining this more aggressive attack pattern with other refinements produced 72 000 to 377 000 bit flips per gigabyte. Earlier Rowhammer variants managed a few hundred at best. This let the researchers achieve double and even triple-bit errors. ECC easily corrects a single-bit error, but not a double-bit one.

The new method also demonstrates the real-world damage a Rowhammer attack could cause: repeated access to video memory using GPUThor triggers a denial of service. The accelerator first reboots, losing data in the process, then flags itself to the administrator as needing replacement.

Despite these impressive research results, GPUThor attacks aren’t successful. For one, the researchers weren’t able to demonstrate arbitrary code execution as a result of the data corruption — though they claim this is possible even with ECC enabled. For another, an attack thousands of times more effective hints at the theoretical possibility of compromising newer accelerators too, but this also remains unproven for now.

Even so, the Canadian researchers have shown that Rowhammer attacks on graphics accelerators still have untapped potential. It wouldn’t be surprising if future research demonstrated similar attacks against far more advanced devices previously considered highly resistant to them.

Security researchers have found a way to hack a Boeing 737 with a device no bigger than a coin. The 737 is one of the most widely used airliners in the world, so chances are you’ve flown on one yourself at least once.

The attack requires installing a small device in a port that’s accessible through a hatch on the outside of the plane. According to the researchers, this port is regularly within reach not just of maintenance crews, but of other airport and airline staff too. And installing the device takes less than 60 seconds. So let’s talk about what this mysterious little device actually is, what it can do, and whether it’s still safe to fly on a Boeing 737.

Why hacking a plane is harder than hacking a car

Most of us have gotten used to the idea that our computers and phones can be hacked. It’s probably the most common topic on this blog. But we’ve also covered attacks on less common targets: cars, robot lawnmowers, automated card shufflers, bikes, and even mattresses. In today’s world, all of these (and many other) devices contain tiny (or not-so-tiny) computers.

Airplanes are no exception. A modern airliner is packed with computers — some of which handle critical functions: from calculating takeoff parameters to controlling the flight itself. But there’s one key difference: airliner manufacturers, unlike the makers of most smart home gadgets, take security very seriously, which makes it far harder to reach these systems from the outside.

Maybe that’s precisely why the idea of hacking a real plane has been tempting the most inquisitive security researchers for years. A team at the University of California San Diego and Oberlin College — the researchers who finally pulled it off — spent more than a decade wrestling with the problem. As mentioned above, the main challenge in hacking a plane is that its critical systems aren’t connected to the external internet. Because of that, studying plane-related attack vectors wasn’t seen as especially promising within the cybersecurity research community: reaching isolated systems remotely is extremely difficult, and the odds of an attacker gaining physical access were considered very low.

Two other successful projects changed that assumption for UC San Diego researchers Kirill Levchenko and Aaron Schulman: a hack of the Chevrolet Impala, and research into payment card skimmers. The car hack led their team to buy secondhand Boeing 737 computer components and build their own test rig. The skimmer research gave them the idea for a small physical device that could plug directly into the plane’s internal systems.

After studying the Boeing 737’s circuit diagrams, the researchers found a port accessible from outside the plane — protected only by an unlocked hatch. That port connects to a data channel called the ARINC 429 bus, which links the plane’s flight management computer (FMC) to its multifunction control and display unit (MCDU).

The port sits in the electronics bay beneath the cockpit. From outside the plane, it’s covered only by an unlocked hatch. Source

 A “bus driver” at the controls

On their test rig, the researchers checked what would happen if they connected to the ARINC 429 bus through this port and sent electrical signals more powerful than the ones the Boeing’s components normally exchange with one another. It turned out that doing so let them override legitimate commands with their own. From there, all that was left was building a device small enough to fit into the port they’d found.

Step by step, the team built a device compact enough to slot into the unprotected port. The finished version set them back less than US$100, and appears to have been built largely from off-the-shelf parts: a small microcontroller, electronics for communicating with the bus, and a Wi-Fi module. That last part could potentially help the device connect to the plane’s public in-flight Wi-Fi network, giving the attacker access over the internet, and eventually letting them control the device remotely. And the whole thing takes less than a minute to install into the port.

The device the researchers built to connect to Boeing 737 systems. A coin sits next to it for scale. Source

The researchers dubbed their attack “Bus Driver”, apparently a play on words: “bus” refers to both a passenger vehicle and the data channel that lets a system’s components talk to each other. The attack lets someone step into that channel and swap out the commands being sent — effectively controlling the bus.

What the improvised Boeing 737 hacking device can actually do

An unprotected port, a coin-sized device, access to the bus: that’s all and well and good, but what did the researchers actually manage to pull off? What kind of damage can this tiny implant do? As it turns out, quite a lot — potentially even fatal. By gaining the ability to tamper with the data flowing between the flight management computer and the control and display unit, the researchers found they could interfere with several critical aspects of how the plane operates.

Researchers testing Bus Driver on real Boeing 737 avionics hardware. Their attack interface is running on the MCDU screen. Source

First, the implant can alter the data used to calculate takeoff and landing parameters. For example, it can change the plane’s recorded zero-fuel weight, which throws off the calculation of the speeds needed for a safe takeoff.

The device can also manipulate the assumed temperature value pilots use to determine how much engine thrust is needed at takeoff. Feed the system the wrong numbers, and under certain conditions the plane could end up with insufficient thrust to take off safely — potentially even going off the end of the runway. Faulty calculations during landing carry similarly serious risks.

The implant can also change the route the autopilot is following. On a long flight, a deviation of just a few degrees — subtle enough to go unnoticed — could be enough to send the plane badly off course so it runs out of fuel somewhere over open ocean.

Beyond that, an attacker could use the device to steer the plane into the airspace of a country that isn’t part of its approved flight path. That kind of deviation can also have deadly consequences: the history of civil aviation has seen more than one case of a passenger plane being mistakenly shot down by the military after straying into restricted airspace.

Of course, the odds of a deviation like this slipping past both pilots and air traffic control are very low, but disasters tend to happen exactly when several human errors line up.

Once installed, the implant is nearly invisible inside the port and very hard to spot unless you know to look for it. Source

Finally, the device doesn’t just let someone change flight parameters, it lets them hide those changes from the pilots. For instance, an attacker could load a new route into the flight computer while simultaneously altering what’s shown on the MCDU display, so the pilots keep seeing the original route.

That said, the researchers note that in most cases an attentive crew would catch the discrepancy. The correct data still shows up on other cockpit displays, and switching to manual control lets pilots disengage the autopilot and take back control of the plane.

So, should we all switch to trains?

To wrap up, I’ll try to put the longtime aerophobes (and anyone this article has just turned into one) at ease. The researchers themselves say that despite everything they’ve learned, they still fly on Boeing 737s. And to avoid causing any real-world trouble, they deliberately left out exactly which port they used in their experiments.

The researchers also reached out to Boeing back in 2020 to share their findings. Boeing took the information seriously and worked on addressing the issue.

Specifically, the researchers suggested Boeing either remove the vulnerable port or seal it with epoxy resin to physically rule out the possibility of someone plugging in an unauthorized device. There are more involved options too, like redesigning the internal bus’s electrical protections so a rogue device can’t override the real signals, and adding systems that can detect this kind of attack in the first place.

Longer term, the researchers recommend that Boeing, along with other aircraft manufacturers, adopt cryptographic authentication for the messages passed between avionics components.

Whether Boeing acted on this specific advice or came up with its own fixes isn’t publicly known. When Wired reporters asked the company about it, the response was fairly vague:

“Our technical experts are confident that the layers of protection in place on the airplane, including within the system design and the operating environment, provide sufficient mitigation to significantly limit the feasibility and risk of real-world attacks.”

So no, there’s apparently no need to swear off Boeing 737 flights just yet. That said, I happen to have a lot of respect for trains, so I won’t try to talk you out of traveling by rail or using other ways of getting around either. I’ve actually written about train hacking on this blog before, though in that case the goal was constructive, not destructive.

Cars, lawnmowers, card shufflers, bikes, smart mattresses — it’s not even an exhaustive list of the devices that hackers have successfully tampered with. What else was hacked? Find out in our other posts:

• Botnets on wheels: the mass hacking of dashcams
• Car hacking via Bluetooth
• Five hacks that were (mostly) just for laughs
• Vulnerabilities in a toy robot permitting snooping. Seriously
• Ecovacs robot vacuums get hacked