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For years, Iranian intelligence services have operated through deniable criminal intermediaries in the physical world. A similar pattern is now becoming visible in cyber space, where state objectives are increasingly pursued through criminal tools, services, and operational models. Notably, this dynamic appears with growing frequency in activity associated with actors linked to the Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS).
For a long time, Iranian actors sought to mask state activity behind the appearance of ordinary cyber crime, most often by posing as ransomware operators. The trend we are seeing now goes beyond imitation. Rather than simply adopting criminal and hacktivist personas to complicate attribution, some Iranian actors appear to be associating with the cyber criminal ecosystem itself, leveraging its malware, infrastructure, and affiliate-style mechanisms. This shift matters because it does more than improve deniability; it can also expand operational reach and enhance technical capability.
In this blog, we examine several cases that reflect this evolution, including Iranian-linked use of ransomware branding, commercial infostealers, and overlaps with criminal malware clusters. Taken together, these examples suggest that for some MOIS-associated actors, cyber crime is no longer just a cover story, but an operational resource.
Long before concern shifted to the digital arena, some of the clearest signs of cooperation between Iran’s intelligence services and criminal actors appeared in plots involving surveillance, kidnappings, shootings, and assassination attempts. In those cases, the value of criminal networks was straightforward: they gave Tehran reach, deniability, and access to people willing to carry out violence at arm’s length.
According to the U.S. Treasury, one of the clearest examples involved the network led by narcotics trafficker Naji Ibrahim Sharifi-Zindashti, which Treasury said operated at the behest of MOIS and targeted dissidents and opposition activists. The FBI has similarly said that an MOIS directorate operated the Zindashti criminal network and its associates against Iranian dissidents in the United States.
Sweden has described a similar pattern. According to Sweden’s Security Service, the Iranian regime has used criminal networks in Sweden to carry out violent acts against states, groups, and individuals it sees as threats; Swedish officials later linked that concern to attacks aimed at Israeli and Jewish targets, including incidents near Israel’s embassy in Stockholm.
Recent activity we have analyzed and associate with MOIS-affiliated cyber actors suggests that the same logic is now being applied in the cyber domain. The emphasis is not only on imitating cyber criminal behavior, but on associating with the cyber criminal ecosystem itself: drawing on its infrastructure, access brokers, marketplaces, and affiliate-style relationships.
Void Manticore, an Iranian threat actor linked to several hack-and-leak personas, is one of the most active groups pursuing strategic objectives through cyber operations. It has leveraged “hacktivistic” personas such as Homeland Justice in attacks against Albania and Handala in operations targeting Israel. While the group is most commonly associated with “hack and leak” operations and disruptive attacks, particularly wiper operations, the emergence of its Handala persona also revealed the use of a commercial infostealer sold on darknet forums: Rhadamanthys.
Rhadamanthys is a widely used infostealer employed by a range of threat actors, including both financially motivated groups and state-sponsored operators. It has built a strong reputation due to its complex architecture, active development, and frequent updates. Handala used Rhadamanthys on several occasions, pairing it with one of its custom wipers in phishing lures aimed at Israeli targets, most dominantly impersonating F5 updates.
MuddyWater, a threat actor that U.S. authorities have linked to Iran’s MOIS, has conducted cyber espionage and other malicious operations focused on the Middle East for years. According to CISA, MuddyWater is a subordinate element within MOIS and has carried out broad campaigns in support of Iranian intelligence objectives, targeting government and private-sector organizations across sectors including telecommunications, defense, and energy.
Recent reports detailing the activity of MuddyWater link its operations to several cyber crime clusters of activity. This appears to work in the actors’ favor: the use of such tools has created significant confusion, leading to misattribution and flawed pivoting, and clustering together activities that are not necessarily related. This demonstrates that the use of criminal software can be effective for obfuscation, and highlights the need for extreme caution when analyzing overlapping clusters.
To address this, we attempted to bring structure to the available evidence, to the best of our ability, and identify which activity is truly associated with MuddyWater.
The Tsundere Botnet was first uncovered in late 2025 and was later linked to MuddyWater. Large parts of its activity rely on Node.js and JavaScript scripts to execute code on compromised machines. In several instances observed in the wild, when the Node.js engine is detected, the botnet shifts to an alternative execution method using Deno, a runtime for JavaScript and TypeScript. Since Deno-based execution had not previously been associated with Tsundere, researchers linking this activity to MuddyWater designated this variant as DinDoor.
Given that two separate sources linked Tsundere to MuddyWater, one via a VPS and the other through vendor telemetry, it is likely that MuddyWater uses the botnet as part of its operations. Another overlap between DinDoor-related activity and known MuddyWater tradecraft is the use of rclone to access a Wasabi server, which traces back to an IP address previously associated with MuddyWater (18.223.24[.]218, linked to eb5e96e05129e5691f9677be4e396c88).
Another malware family recently linked to MuddyWater is FakeSet, which, according to our analysis, is a downloader used in recent infection chains delivering CastleLoader. CastleLoader operates as a Malware-as-a-Service offering used by multiple affiliates. Based on our understanding, the reported link between CastleLoader and MuddyWater stems from the use of a set of code-signing certificates, specifically under the Common Names “Amy Cherne” and “Donald Gay”. Certificates with these common names were also used to sign MuddyWater malware (“StageComp”), Tsundere Deno malware (“DinDoor”), and CastleLoader (“FakeSet”) variants.
In our assessment, this does not necessarily indicate that MuddyWater is a CastleLoader affiliate; rather, it suggests that both may have obtained certificates from the same source.
In October 2025, Israeli Shamir Medical Center was hit by a major cyber attack that was initially described as a ransomware incident. The attackers claimed to have stolen a large amount of data and demanded a ransom in exchange for not publishing it. Israeli officials said the attack did not affect hospital operations and patient care was not significantly disrupted. Still, some information appears to have been leaked, including limited email correspondence and certain medical data.
At first, the attack was presented as a ransomware incident linked to the Qilin group, but later Israeli assessments pointed much more directly to Iranian actors as the real force behind it. Qilin is known as a ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) operation, meaning it provides ransomware infrastructure and tooling to outside partners or “affiliates” who actually carry out intrusions. In this case, the emerging picture was that the attackers were likely Iranian-affiliated operators working through the cyber criminal ecosystem, using a criminal ransomware brand and methods associated with the broader extortion market, while serving a strategic Iranian objective.
This attack did not occur in isolation. It appears to be part of a broader, sustained campaign by MOIS and Hezbollah to target Israeli hospitals, a pattern that has been evident since late 2023. The use of Qilin, and participation in its affiliate program, likely serves not only as a layer of cover and plausible deniability, but also as a meaningful operational enabler, especially as earlier attacks appear to have heightened security measures and monitoring by Israeli authorities.
The cases examined in this blog show that, for some Iranian actors, cyber crime is no longer just a cover for state-directed activity. Across these examples, the pattern is not limited to the appearance of criminal behavior, but includes the use of criminal malware, ransomware branding, and affiliate-style ecosystems in support of strategic objectives. This reflects a clear shift from simply imitating cyber criminals to actively leveraging the cyber crime ecosystem.
This shift matters because it delivers clear operational benefits. For MOIS-linked actors in particular, engagement with criminal tools and services enhances capabilities while complicating attribution and fueling confusion around Iranian activity. Taken together, the cases discussed here show that cyber crime has become not just camouflage, but a practical operational resource.
aae017e7a36e016655c91bd01b4f3c46309bbe540733f82cce29392e72e9bd1f
| sha256 | Certificate Common Name | Certificate Thumbprint | Certificate Serial Number | Malware Family |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 077ab28d66abdafad9f5411e18d26e87fe43da1410ee8fe846bd721ab0cb52de | Amy Cherne | 0902d7915a19975817ec1ccb0f2f6714aed19638 | 330007f1068f41bf0f662a03b500000007f106 | FakeSet / CastleLoader |
| ddceade244c636435f2444cd4c4d3dc161981f3af1f622c03442747ecef50888 | Amy Cherne | 0902d7915a19975817ec1ccb0f2f6714aed19638 | 330007f1068f41bf0f662a03b500000007f106 | FakeSet / CastleLoader |
| 2b7d8a519f44d3105e9fde2770c75efb933994c658855dca7d48c8b4897f81e6 | Amy Cherne | 2087bb914327e937ea6e77fe6c832576338c2af8 | 330006df515a14fe3748416fe200000006df51 | FakeSet / CastleLoader |
| 64cf334716f15da1db7981fad6c81a640d94aa1d65391ef879f4b7b6edf6e7f1 | Amy Cherne | 21a435ecaa7b86efbec7f6fb61fcda3da686125c | 330006e75231f49437ae56778a00000006e752 | FakeSet / CastleLoader |
| 74db1f653da6de134bdc526412a517a30b6856de9c3e5d0c742cb5fe9959ad0d | Amy Cherne | 389b12da259a23fa4559eb1d97198120f2a722fe | 330007d5443a7d25208ec5feb100000007d544 | FakeSet / CastleLoader |
| 94f05495eb1b2ebe592481e01d3900615040aa02bd1807b705a50e45d7c53444 | Amy Cherne | 389b12da259a23fa4559eb1d97198120f2a722fe | 330007d5443a7d25208ec5feb100000007d544 | FakeSet / CastleLoader |
| 4aef998e3b3f6ca21c78ed71732c9d2bdcc8a4e0284f51d7462c79d446fbc7be | Amy Cherne | 579a4584a6eef0a2453841453221d0fb25c08c89 | 33000700e919066fd9db11bac70000000700e9 | FakeSet / CastleLoader |
| a4bd1371fe644d7e6898045cc8e7b5e1562bdfd0e4871d46034e29a22dec6377 | Amy Cherne | d920ae0f8ea8b5bd42de49e01c6bbd4c2c6d0847 | 330007ebfbe75a64b52aaf4cb700000007ebfb | FakeSet / CastleLoader |
| 64263640a6fdeb2388bca2e9094a17065308cf8dcb0032454c0a71d9b78327eb | Donald Gay | f8444dfc740b94227ab9b2e757b8f8f1fa49362a | 3300072b29c3bf8403a6c15be2000000072b29 | FakeSet / CastleLoader |
| a8c380b57cb7c381ca6ba845bd7af7333f52ee4dc4e935e98b48bb81facad72b | Donald Gay | 9dcb994ea2b8e6169b76a524fae7b2d2dcd1807d | 33000725fea86dd19e8571b26c0000000725fe | FakeSet / CastleLoader |
| 24857fe82f454719cd18bcbe19b0cfa5387bee1022008b7f5f3a8be9f05e4d14 | Donald Gay | b674578d4bdb24cd58bf2dc884eaa658b7aa250c | 3300079a51c7063e66053d229b000000079a51 | StageComp |
| a92d28f1d32e3a9ab7c3691f8bfca8f7586bb0666adbba47eab3e1a8faf7ecc0 | Donald Gay | b674578d4bdb24cd58bf2dc884eaa658b7aa250c | 3300079a51c7063e66053d229b000000079a51 | StageComp |
| 2a09bbb3d1ddb729ea7591f197b5955453aa3769c6fb98a5ef60c6e4b7df23a5 | Amy Cherne | 551bdf646df8e9abe04483882650a8ffae43cb55 | 330006e15e43401dbd9416e20e00000006e15e | DinDoor / Tsundere Deno |
The post Iranian MOIS Actors & the Cyber Crime Connection appeared first on Check Point Research.
Recently, we uncovered BeatBanker, an Android‑based malware campaign targeting Brazil. It spreads primarily through phishing attacks via a website disguised as the Google Play Store. To achieve their goals, the malicious APKs carry multiple components, including a cryptocurrency miner and a banking Trojan capable of completely hijacking the device and spoofing screens, among other things. In a more recent campaign, the attackers switched from the banker to a known RAT.
This blog post outlines each phase of the malware’s activity on the victim’s handset, explains how it ensures long‑term persistence, and describes its communication with mining pools.
The campaign begins with a counterfeit website, cupomgratisfood[.]shop, that looks exactly like the Google Play Store. This fake app store contains the “INSS Reembolso” app, which is in fact a Trojan. There are also other apps that are most likely Trojans too, but we haven’t obtained them.
The INSS Reembolso app poses as the official mobile portal of Brazil’s Instituto Nacional do Seguro Social (INSS), a government service that citizens can use to perform more than 90 social security tasks, from retirement applications and medical exam scheduling to viewing CNIS (National Registry of Social Information), tax, and payment statements, as well as tracking request statuses. By masquerading as this trusted platform, the fake page tricks users into downloading the malicious APK.
The initial APK file is packed and makes use of a native shared library (ELF) named libludwwiuh.so that is included in the application. Its main task is to decrypt another ELF file that will ultimately load the original DEX file.
First, libludwwiuh.so decrypts an embedded encrypted ELF file and drops it to a temporary location on the device under the name l.so. The same code that loaded the libludwwiuh.so library then loads this file, which uses the Java Native Interface (JNI) to continue execution.
The library does not have calls to its functions; instead, it directly calls the Java methods whose names are encrypted in the stack using XOR (stack strings technique) and restored at runtime:
Initially, the loader makes a request to collect some network information using https://ipapi.is to determine whether the infected device is a mobile device, if a VPN is being used, and to obtain the IP address and other details.
This loader is engineered to bypass mobile antivirus products by utilizing dalvik.system.InMemoryDexClassLoader. It loads malicious DEX code directly into memory, avoiding the creation of any files on the device’s file system. The necessary DEX files can be extracted using dynamic analysis tools like Frida.
Furthermore, the sample incorporates anti-analysis techniques, including runtime checks for emulated or analysis environments. When such an environment is detected (or when specific checks fail, such as verification of the supported CPU_ABI), the malware can immediately terminate its own process by invoking android.os.Process.killProcess(android.os.Process.myPid()), effectively self-destructing to hinder dynamic analysis.
After execution, the malware displays a user interface that mimics the Google Play Store page, showing an update available for the INSS Reembolso app. This is intended to trick victims into granting installation permissions by tapping the “Update” button, which allows the download of additional hidden malicious payloads.
The payload delivery process mimics the application update. The malware uses the REQUEST_INSTALL_PACKAGES permission to install APK files directly into its memory, bypassing Google Play. To ensure persistence, the malware keeps a notification about a system update pinned to the foreground and activates a foreground service with silent media playback, a tactic designed to prevent the operating system from terminating the malicious process.
When UPDATE is clicked on a fake Play Store screen, the malicious application downloads and executes an ELF file containing a cryptomining payload. It starts by issuing a GET request to the C2 server at either hxxps://accessor.fud2026.com/libmine-<arch>.so or hxxps://fud2026.com/libmine-<arch>.so. The downloaded file is then decrypted using CipherInputStream(), with the decryption key being derived from the SHA-1 hash of the downloaded file’s name, ensuring that each version of the file is encrypted with a unique key. The resulting file is renamed d-miner.
The decrypted payload is an ARM-compiled XMRig 6.17.0 binary. At runtime, it attempts to create a direct TCP connection to pool.fud2026[.]com:9000. If successful, it uses this endpoint; otherwise, it automatically switches to the proxy endpoint pool-proxy.fud2026[.]com:9000. The final command-line arguments passed to XMRig are as follows:
Login-o pool.fud2026[.]com:9000 or pool-proxy.fud2026[.]com:9000 (selected dynamically)-k (keepalive)--tls (encrypted connection)--no-color (disable colored output)--nicehash (NiceHash protocol support)
The malware uses Google’s legitimate Firebase Cloud Messaging (FCM) as its primary command‑and‑control (C2) channel. In the analyzed sample, each FCM message received triggers a check of the battery status, temperature, installation date, and user presence. A hidden cryptocurrency miner is then started or stopped as needed. These mechanisms ensure that infected devices remain permanently accessible and responsive to the attacker’s instructions, which are sent through the FCM infrastructure. The attacker monitors the following information:
The KeepAliveServiceMediaPlayback component ensures continuous operation by initiating uninterrupted playback via MediaPlayer. It keeps the service active in the foreground using a notification and loads a small, continuous audio file. This constant activity prevents the system from suspending or terminating the process due to inactivity.
The identified audio output8.mp3 is five seconds long and plays on a loop. It contains some Chinese words.
BeatBanker compromises the machine with a cryptocurrency miner and introduces another malicious APK that acts as a banking Trojan. This Trojan uses previously obtained permission to install an additional APK called INSS Reebolso, which is associated with the package com.destination.cosmetics.
Similar to the initial malicious APK, it establishes persistence by creating and displaying a fixed notification in the foreground to hinder removal. Furthermore, BeatBanker attempts to trick the user into granting accessibility permissions to the package.
Leveraging the acquired accessibility permissions, the malware establishes comprehensive control over the device’s user interface.
The Trojan constantly monitors the foreground application. It targets the official Binance application (com.binance.dev) and the Trust Wallet application (com.wallet.crypto.trustapp), focusing on USDT transactions. When a user tries to withdraw USDT, the Trojan instantly overlays the target app’s transaction confirmation screen with a highly realistic page sourced from Base64-encoded HTML stored in the banking module.
The module captures the original withdrawal address and amount, then surreptitiously substitutes the destination address with an attacker-controlled one using AccessibilityNodeInfo.ACTION_SET_TEXT. The overlay page shows the victim the address they copied (for Binance) or just shows a loading icon (for Trust Wallet), leading them to believe they are remitting funds to the intended wallet when, in fact, the cryptocurrency is transferred to the attacker’s designated address.
Fake overlay pages: Binance (left) and Trust Wallet (right)
BeatBanker’s banking module monitors the following browsers installed on the victim’s device:
Its aim is to collect the URLs accessed by the victim using the regular expression ^(?:https?://)?(?:[^:/\\\\]+\\\\.)?([^:/\\\\]+\\\\.[^:/\\\\]+). It also offers management functionalities (add, edit, delete, list) for links saved in the device’s default browser, as well as the ability to open links provided by the attacker.
BeatBanker is also designed to receive commands from the C2. These commands aim to collect the victim’s personal information and gain complete control of the device.
| Command | Description |
| 0 | Starts dynamic loading of the DEX class |
| Update | Simulates software update and locks the screen |
| msg: | Displays a Toast message with the provided text |
| goauth<*> | Opens Google Authenticator (if installed) and enables the AccessService.SendGoogleAuth flag used to monitor and retrieve authentication codes |
| kill<*> | Sets the protection bypass flag AccessService.bypass to “True”and sets the initializeService.uninstall flag to “Off” |
| srec<*> | Starts or stops audio recording (microphone), storing the recorded data in a file with an automatically generated filename. The following path format is used to store the recording: /Config/sys/apps/rc/<timestamp>_0REC<last5digits>.wav |
| pst<*> | Pastes text from the clipboard (via Accessibility Services) |
| GRC<*> | Lists all existing audio recording files |
| gtrc<*> | Sends a specific audio recording file to the C2 |
| lcm<*> | Lists supported front camera resolutions |
| usdtress<*> | Sets a USDT cryptocurrency address when a transaction is detected |
| lnk<*> | Opens a link in the browser |
| EHP<*> | Updates login credentials (host, port, name) and restarts the application |
| ssms<*> | Sends an SMS message (individually or to all contacts) |
| CRD<*> | Adds (E>) or removes (D>) packages from the list of blocked/disabled applications |
| SFD<*> | Deletes files (logs, recordings, tones) or uninstalls itself |
| adm<>lck<> | Immediately locks the screen using Device Administrator permissions |
| adm<>wip<> | Performs a complete device data wipe (factory reset) |
| Aclk<*> | Executes a sequence of automatic taps (auto-clicker) or lists existing macros |
| KBO<*>lod | Checks the status of the keylogger and virtual keyboard |
| KBO<*>AKP/AKA | Requests permission to activate a custom virtual keyboard or activates one |
| KBO<*>ENB: | Enables (1) or disables (0) the keylogger |
| RPM<*>lod | Checks the status of all critical permissions |
| RPM<*>ACC | Requests Accessibility Services permission |
| RPM<*>DOZ | Requests Doze/App Standby permission (battery optimization) |
| RPM<*>DRW | Requests Draw Over Other Apps permission (overlay) |
| RPM<*>INST | Requests permission to install apps from unknown sources (Android 8+) |
| ussd<*> | Executes a USSD code (e.g., *#06# for IMEI) |
| Blkt<*> | Sets the text for the lock overlay |
| BLKV<*> | Enables or disables full-screen lock using WindowManager.LayoutParams.TYPE_APPLICATION_OVERLAY to display a black FrameLayout element over the entire screen |
| SCRD<> / SCRD2<> | Enables/disables real-time screen text submission to the C2 (screen reading) |
| rdall<*> | Clears or sends all keylogger logs |
| rdd<*> | Deletes a specific log file |
| rd<*> | Sends the content of a specific keylogger file |
| MO<*> | Manages application monitoring (add, remove, list, screenshot, etc.) |
| FW<*> | Controls VPN and firewall (status, block/allow apps, enable/disable) |
| noti<*> | Creates persistent and custom notifications |
| sp<*> | Executes a sequence of swipes/taps (gesture macro) |
| lodp<*> | Manages saved links in the internal browser (add, edit, delete, list) |
| scc: | Starts screen capture/streaming |
Our recent detection efforts uncovered a campaign leveraging a fraudulent StarLink application that we assess as being a new BeatBanker variant. The infection chain mirrored previous instances, employing identical persistence methods – specifically, looped audio and fixed notifications. Furthermore, this variant included a crypto miner similar to those seen previously. However, rather than deploying the banking module, it was observed distributing the BTMOB remote administration tool.
The BTMOB APK is highly obfuscated and contains a class responsible for configuration. Despite this, it’s possible to identify a parser used to define the application’s behavior on the device, as well as persistence features, such as protection against restart, deletion, lock reset, and the ability to perform real-time screen recording.
The simple decryption routine uses repetitive XOR between the encrypted data and a short key. It iterates through the encrypted text byte by byte, repeating the key from the beginning whenever it reaches the end. At each position, the sample XORs the encrypted byte with the corresponding byte of the key, overwriting the original. Ultimately, the modified byte array contains the original text, which is then converted to UTF-8 and returned as a string.
BTMOB is an Android remote administration tool that evolved from the CraxsRAT, CypherRAT, and SpySolr families. It provides full remote control of the victim’s device and is sold in a Malware-as-a-Service (MaaS) model. On July 26, 2025, a threat actor posted a screenshot of the BTMOB RAT in action on GitHub under the username “brmobrats”, along with a link to the website btmob[.]xyz. The website contains information about the BTMOB RAT, including its version history, features, and other relevant details. It also redirects to a Telegram contact. Cyfirma has already linked this account to CraxsRAT and CypherRAT.
Recently, a YouTube channel was created by a different threat actor that features videos demonstrating how to use the malware and facilitate its sale via Telegram.
We also saw the distribution and sale of leaked BTMOB source code on some dark web forums. This may suggest that the creator of BeatBanker acquired BTMOB from its original author or the source of the leak and is utilizing it as the final payload, replacing the banking module observed in the INSS Reebolso incident.
In terms of functionality, BTMOB maintains a set of intrusive capabilities, including: automatic granting of permissions, especially on Android 13–15 devices; use of a black FrameLayout overlay to hide system notifications similar to the one observed in the banking module; silent installation; persistent background execution; and mechanisms designed to capture screen lock credentials, including PINs, patterns, and passwords. The malware also provides access to front and rear cameras, captures keystrokes in real time, monitors GPS location, and constantly collects sensitive data. Together, these functionalities provide the operator with comprehensive remote control, persistent access, and extensive surveillance capabilities over compromised devices.
All variants of BeatBanker – those with the banking module and those with the BTMOB RAT – were detected on victims in Brazil. Some of the samples that deliver BTMOB appear to use WhatsApp to spread, as well as phishing pages.
BeatBanker is an excellent example of how mobile threats are becoming more sophisticated and multi-layered. Initially focused in Brazil, this Trojan operates a dual campaign, acting as a Monero cryptocurrency miner, discreetly draining your device’s battery life while also stealing banking credentials and tampering with cryptocurrency transactions. Moreover, the most recent version goes even further, substituting the banking module with a full-fledged BTMOB RAT.
The attackers have devised inventive tricks to maintain persistence. They keep the process alive by looping an almost inaudible audio track, which prevents the operating system from terminating it and allows BeatBanker to remain active for extended periods.
Furthermore, the threat demonstrates an obsession with staying hidden. It monitors device usage, battery level and temperature. It even uses Google’s legitimate system (FCM) to receive commands. The threat’s banking module is capable of overlaying Binance and Trust Wallet screens and diverting USDT funds to the criminals’ wallets before the victim even notices.
The lesson here is clear: distrust is your best defense. BeatBanker spreads through fake websites that mimic Google Play, disguising itself as trustworthy government applications. To protect yourself against threats like this, it is essential to:
Our solutions detect this threat as HEUR:Trojan-Dropper.AndroidOS.BeatBanker and HEUR:Trojan-Dropper.AndroidOS.Banker.*
Additional IoCs, TTPs and detection rules are available to customers of our Threat Intelligence Reporting service. For more details, contact us at crimewareintel@kaspersky.com.
Host-based (MD5 hashes)
F6C979198809E13859196B135D21E79B – INSS Reebolso
D3005BF1D52B40B0B72B3C3B1773336B – StarLink
Domains
cupomgratisfood[.]shop
fud2026[.]com
accessor.fud2026[.]com
pool.fud2026[.]com
pool-proxy.fud2026[.]com
aptabase.fud2026[.]com
aptabase.khwdji319[.]xyz
btmob[.]xyz
bt-mob[.]net
Recently, we uncovered BeatBanker, an Android‑based malware campaign targeting Brazil. It spreads primarily through phishing attacks via a website disguised as the Google Play Store. To achieve their goals, the malicious APKs carry multiple components, including a cryptocurrency miner and a banking Trojan capable of completely hijacking the device and spoofing screens, among other things. In a more recent campaign, the attackers switched from the banker to a known RAT.
This blog post outlines each phase of the malware’s activity on the victim’s handset, explains how it ensures long‑term persistence, and describes its communication with mining pools.
The campaign begins with a counterfeit website, cupomgratisfood[.]shop, that looks exactly like the Google Play Store. This fake app store contains the “INSS Reembolso” app, which is in fact a Trojan. There are also other apps that are most likely Trojans too, but we haven’t obtained them.
The INSS Reembolso app poses as the official mobile portal of Brazil’s Instituto Nacional do Seguro Social (INSS), a government service that citizens can use to perform more than 90 social security tasks, from retirement applications and medical exam scheduling to viewing CNIS (National Registry of Social Information), tax, and payment statements, as well as tracking request statuses. By masquerading as this trusted platform, the fake page tricks users into downloading the malicious APK.
The initial APK file is packed and makes use of a native shared library (ELF) named libludwwiuh.so that is included in the application. Its main task is to decrypt another ELF file that will ultimately load the original DEX file.
First, libludwwiuh.so decrypts an embedded encrypted ELF file and drops it to a temporary location on the device under the name l.so. The same code that loaded the libludwwiuh.so library then loads this file, which uses the Java Native Interface (JNI) to continue execution.
The library does not have calls to its functions; instead, it directly calls the Java methods whose names are encrypted in the stack using XOR (stack strings technique) and restored at runtime:
Initially, the loader makes a request to collect some network information using https://ipapi.is to determine whether the infected device is a mobile device, if a VPN is being used, and to obtain the IP address and other details.
This loader is engineered to bypass mobile antivirus products by utilizing dalvik.system.InMemoryDexClassLoader. It loads malicious DEX code directly into memory, avoiding the creation of any files on the device’s file system. The necessary DEX files can be extracted using dynamic analysis tools like Frida.
Furthermore, the sample incorporates anti-analysis techniques, including runtime checks for emulated or analysis environments. When such an environment is detected (or when specific checks fail, such as verification of the supported CPU_ABI), the malware can immediately terminate its own process by invoking android.os.Process.killProcess(android.os.Process.myPid()), effectively self-destructing to hinder dynamic analysis.
After execution, the malware displays a user interface that mimics the Google Play Store page, showing an update available for the INSS Reembolso app. This is intended to trick victims into granting installation permissions by tapping the “Update” button, which allows the download of additional hidden malicious payloads.
The payload delivery process mimics the application update. The malware uses the REQUEST_INSTALL_PACKAGES permission to install APK files directly into its memory, bypassing Google Play. To ensure persistence, the malware keeps a notification about a system update pinned to the foreground and activates a foreground service with silent media playback, a tactic designed to prevent the operating system from terminating the malicious process.
When UPDATE is clicked on a fake Play Store screen, the malicious application downloads and executes an ELF file containing a cryptomining payload. It starts by issuing a GET request to the C2 server at either hxxps://accessor.fud2026.com/libmine-<arch>.so or hxxps://fud2026.com/libmine-<arch>.so. The downloaded file is then decrypted using CipherInputStream(), with the decryption key being derived from the SHA-1 hash of the downloaded file’s name, ensuring that each version of the file is encrypted with a unique key. The resulting file is renamed d-miner.
The decrypted payload is an ARM-compiled XMRig 6.17.0 binary. At runtime, it attempts to create a direct TCP connection to pool.fud2026[.]com:9000. If successful, it uses this endpoint; otherwise, it automatically switches to the proxy endpoint pool-proxy.fud2026[.]com:9000. The final command-line arguments passed to XMRig are as follows:
-o pool.fud2026[.]com:9000 or pool-proxy.fud2026[.]com:9000 (selected dynamically)-k (keepalive)--tls (encrypted connection)--no-color (disable colored output)--nicehash (NiceHash protocol support)The malware uses Google’s legitimate Firebase Cloud Messaging (FCM) as its primary command‑and‑control (C2) channel. In the analyzed sample, each FCM message received triggers a check of the battery status, temperature, installation date, and user presence. A hidden cryptocurrency miner is then started or stopped as needed. These mechanisms ensure that infected devices remain permanently accessible and responsive to the attacker’s instructions, which are sent through the FCM infrastructure. The attacker monitors the following information:
The KeepAliveServiceMediaPlayback component ensures continuous operation by initiating uninterrupted playback via MediaPlayer. It keeps the service active in the foreground using a notification and loads a small, continuous audio file. This constant activity prevents the system from suspending or terminating the process due to inactivity.
The identified audio output8.mp3 is five seconds long and plays on a loop. It contains some Chinese words.
BeatBanker compromises the machine with a cryptocurrency miner and introduces another malicious APK that acts as a banking Trojan. This Trojan uses previously obtained permission to install an additional APK called INSS Reebolso, which is associated with the package com.destination.cosmetics.
Similar to the initial malicious APK, it establishes persistence by creating and displaying a fixed notification in the foreground to hinder removal. Furthermore, BeatBanker attempts to trick the user into granting accessibility permissions to the package.
Leveraging the acquired accessibility permissions, the malware establishes comprehensive control over the device’s user interface.
The Trojan constantly monitors the foreground application. It targets the official Binance application (com.binance.dev) and the Trust Wallet application (com.wallet.crypto.trustapp), focusing on USDT transactions. When a user tries to withdraw USDT, the Trojan instantly overlays the target app’s transaction confirmation screen with a highly realistic page sourced from Base64-encoded HTML stored in the banking module.
The module captures the original withdrawal address and amount, then surreptitiously substitutes the destination address with an attacker-controlled one using AccessibilityNodeInfo.ACTION_SET_TEXT. The overlay page shows the victim the address they copied (for Binance) or just shows a loading icon (for Trust Wallet), leading them to believe they are remitting funds to the intended wallet when, in fact, the cryptocurrency is transferred to the attacker’s designated address.
Fake overlay pages: Binance (left) and Trust Wallet (right)
BeatBanker’s banking module monitors the following browsers installed on the victim’s device:
Its aim is to collect the URLs accessed by the victim using the regular expression ^(?:https?://)?(?:[^:/\\\\]+\\\\.)?([^:/\\\\]+\\\\.[^:/\\\\]+). It also offers management functionalities (add, edit, delete, list) for links saved in the device’s default browser, as well as the ability to open links provided by the attacker.
BeatBanker is also designed to receive commands from the C2. These commands aim to collect the victim’s personal information and gain complete control of the device.
| Command | Description |
| 0 | Starts dynamic loading of the DEX class |
| Update | Simulates software update and locks the screen |
| msg: | Displays a Toast message with the provided text |
| goauth<*> | Opens Google Authenticator (if installed) and enables the AccessService.SendGoogleAuth flag used to monitor and retrieve authentication codes |
| kill<*> | Sets the protection bypass flag AccessService.bypass to “True”and sets the initializeService.uninstall flag to “Off” |
| srec<*> | Starts or stops audio recording (microphone), storing the recorded data in a file with an automatically generated filename. The following path format is used to store the recording: /Config/sys/apps/rc/<timestamp>_0REC<last5digits>.wav |
| pst<*> | Pastes text from the clipboard (via Accessibility Services) |
| GRC<*> | Lists all existing audio recording files |
| gtrc<*> | Sends a specific audio recording file to the C2 |
| lcm<*> | Lists supported front camera resolutions |
| usdtress<*> | Sets a USDT cryptocurrency address when a transaction is detected |
| lnk<*> | Opens a link in the browser |
| EHP<*> | Updates login credentials (host, port, name) and restarts the application |
| ssms<*> | Sends an SMS message (individually or to all contacts) |
| CRD<*> | Adds (E>) or removes (D>) packages from the list of blocked/disabled applications |
| SFD<*> | Deletes files (logs, recordings, tones) or uninstalls itself |
| adm<>lck<> | Immediately locks the screen using Device Administrator permissions |
| adm<>wip<> | Performs a complete device data wipe (factory reset) |
| Aclk<*> | Executes a sequence of automatic taps (auto-clicker) or lists existing macros |
| KBO<*>lod | Checks the status of the keylogger and virtual keyboard |
| KBO<*>AKP/AKA | Requests permission to activate a custom virtual keyboard or activates one |
| KBO<*>ENB: | Enables (1) or disables (0) the keylogger |
| RPM<*>lod | Checks the status of all critical permissions |
| RPM<*>ACC | Requests Accessibility Services permission |
| RPM<*>DOZ | Requests Doze/App Standby permission (battery optimization) |
| RPM<*>DRW | Requests Draw Over Other Apps permission (overlay) |
| RPM<*>INST | Requests permission to install apps from unknown sources (Android 8+) |
| ussd<*> | Executes a USSD code (e.g., *#06# for IMEI) |
| Blkt<*> | Sets the text for the lock overlay |
| BLKV<*> | Enables or disables full-screen lock using WindowManager.LayoutParams.TYPE_APPLICATION_OVERLAY to display a black FrameLayout element over the entire screen |
| SCRD<> / SCRD2<> | Enables/disables real-time screen text submission to the C2 (screen reading) |
| rdall<*> | Clears or sends all keylogger logs |
| rdd<*> | Deletes a specific log file |
| rd<*> | Sends the content of a specific keylogger file |
| MO<*> | Manages application monitoring (add, remove, list, screenshot, etc.) |
| FW<*> | Controls VPN and firewall (status, block/allow apps, enable/disable) |
| noti<*> | Creates persistent and custom notifications |
| sp<*> | Executes a sequence of swipes/taps (gesture macro) |
| lodp<*> | Manages saved links in the internal browser (add, edit, delete, list) |
| scc: | Starts screen capture/streaming |
Our recent detection efforts uncovered a campaign leveraging a fraudulent StarLink application that we assess as being a new BeatBanker variant. The infection chain mirrored previous instances, employing identical persistence methods – specifically, looped audio and fixed notifications. Furthermore, this variant included a crypto miner similar to those seen previously. However, rather than deploying the banking module, it was observed distributing the BTMOB remote administration tool.
The BTMOB APK is highly obfuscated and contains a class responsible for configuration. Despite this, it’s possible to identify a parser used to define the application’s behavior on the device, as well as persistence features, such as protection against restart, deletion, lock reset, and the ability to perform real-time screen recording.
The simple decryption routine uses repetitive XOR between the encrypted data and a short key. It iterates through the encrypted text byte by byte, repeating the key from the beginning whenever it reaches the end. At each position, the sample XORs the encrypted byte with the corresponding byte of the key, overwriting the original. Ultimately, the modified byte array contains the original text, which is then converted to UTF-8 and returned as a string.
BTMOB is an Android remote administration tool that evolved from the CraxsRAT, CypherRAT, and SpySolr families. It provides full remote control of the victim’s device and is sold in a Malware-as-a-Service (MaaS) model. On July 26, 2025, a threat actor posted a screenshot of the BTMOB RAT in action on GitHub under the username “brmobrats”, along with a link to the website btmob[.]xyz. The website contains information about the BTMOB RAT, including its version history, features, and other relevant details. It also redirects to a Telegram contact. Cyfirma has already linked this account to CraxsRAT and CypherRAT.
Recently, a YouTube channel was created by a different threat actor that features videos demonstrating how to use the malware and facilitate its sale via Telegram.
We also saw the distribution and sale of leaked BTMOB source code on some dark web forums. This may suggest that the creator of BeatBanker acquired BTMOB from its original author or the source of the leak and is utilizing it as the final payload, replacing the banking module observed in the INSS Reebolso incident.
In terms of functionality, BTMOB maintains a set of intrusive capabilities, including: automatic granting of permissions, especially on Android 13–15 devices; use of a black FrameLayout overlay to hide system notifications similar to the one observed in the banking module; silent installation; persistent background execution; and mechanisms designed to capture screen lock credentials, including PINs, patterns, and passwords. The malware also provides access to front and rear cameras, captures keystrokes in real time, monitors GPS location, and constantly collects sensitive data. Together, these functionalities provide the operator with comprehensive remote control, persistent access, and extensive surveillance capabilities over compromised devices.
All variants of BeatBanker – those with the banking module and those with the BTMOB RAT – were detected on victims in Brazil. Some of the samples that deliver BTMOB appear to use WhatsApp to spread, as well as phishing pages.
BeatBanker is an excellent example of how mobile threats are becoming more sophisticated and multi-layered. Initially focused in Brazil, this Trojan operates a dual campaign, acting as a Monero cryptocurrency miner, discreetly draining your device’s battery life while also stealing banking credentials and tampering with cryptocurrency transactions. Moreover, the most recent version goes even further, substituting the banking module with a full-fledged BTMOB RAT.
The attackers have devised inventive tricks to maintain persistence. They keep the process alive by looping an almost inaudible audio track, which prevents the operating system from terminating it and allows BeatBanker to remain active for extended periods.
Furthermore, the threat demonstrates an obsession with staying hidden. It monitors device usage, battery level and temperature. It even uses Google’s legitimate system (FCM) to receive commands. The threat’s banking module is capable of overlaying Binance and Trust Wallet screens and diverting USDT funds to the criminals’ wallets before the victim even notices.
The lesson here is clear: distrust is your best defense. BeatBanker spreads through fake websites that mimic Google Play, disguising itself as trustworthy government applications. To protect yourself against threats like this, it is essential to:
Our solutions detect this threat as HEUR:Trojan-Dropper.AndroidOS.BeatBanker and HEUR:Trojan-Dropper.AndroidOS.Banker.*
Additional IoCs, TTPs and detection rules are available to customers of our Threat Intelligence Reporting service. For more details, contact us at crimewareintel@kaspersky.com.
Host-based (MD5 hashes)
F6C979198809E13859196B135D21E79B – INSS Reebolso
D3005BF1D52B40B0B72B3C3B1773336B – StarLink
Domains
cupomgratisfood[.]shop
fud2026[.]com
accessor.fud2026[.]com
pool.fud2026[.]com
pool-proxy.fud2026[.]com
aptabase.fud2026[.]com
aptabase.khwdji319[.]xyz
btmob[.]xyz
bt-mob[.]net
For the latest discoveries in cyber research for the week of 9th March, please download our Threat Intelligence Bulletin.
TOP ATTACKS AND BREACHES
AI THREATS
VULNERABILITIES AND PATCHES
THREAT INTELLIGENCE REPORTS
Check Point Harmony Endpoint and Threat Emulation provide protection against these threats
The post 9th March – Threat Intelligence Report appeared first on Check Point Research.
The escalation of geopolitical tensions specifically focused on the Iranian Conflict over the last days of February 2026 has intensified the significant cyber and physical security risks to organizations globally.
With threat activity emanating from advanced Iranian state-sponsored actors, aligned hacktivist collectives, and opportunistic criminal groups, security teams must remain agile, informed, and proactive.
The Iranian Conflict Intelligence Dashboard has been updated to equip defenders with timely, high-fidelity intelligence that specifically reflects the dynamic threat environment shaped by this high-profile regional conflict with a heightened focus on Iran-linked activity.
Key Threat Actor Groups & Campaign Themes Tracked Include:
Rather than tracking isolated threats, the –Iranian Conflict Intelligence Dashboard dashboard provides strategic context and operational detail across the broader cyber conflict spectrum, enabling faster detection, response, and mitigation.
Leveraging this dashboard allows security teams to anticipate conflict-related threats, understand attacker motivations, and tailor defenses to emerging risks as the Iranian cyber conflict evolves.
Specific Intelligence Focus: Iranian Malware List
Specific Intelligence Focus: Iranian ICS Targets
ICS Systems Likely to be targeted by Iranian threat actors (based on analysis like the Censys report):
Dashboard Components Include:
Screen Capture of Iranian Conflict Intelligence Dashboard
Lead Contributor – Adrian Dela Cruz , Customer Success Engineer
To gain access to the Iranian Conflict Intelligence Dashboard, please reach out to your Customer Success team or reach out to us through our contact form.
The dashboard is also available here, and can be added manually to your ThreatConnect instance.
The post Iranian Conflict Intelligence Dashboard Immediately Available for ThreatConnect appeared first on ThreatConnect.
The fourth quarter of 2025 went down as one of the most intense periods on record for high-profile, critical vulnerability disclosures, hitting popular libraries and mainstream applications. Several of these vulnerabilities were picked up by attackers and exploited in the wild almost immediately.
In this report, we dive into the statistics on published vulnerabilities and exploits, as well as the known vulnerabilities leveraged with popular C2 frameworks throughout Q4 2025.
This section contains statistics on registered vulnerabilities. The data is taken from cve.org.
Let’s take a look at the number of registered CVEs for each month over the last five years, up to and including the end of 2025. As predicted in our last report, Q4 saw a higher number of registered vulnerabilities than the same period in 2024, and the year-end totals also cleared the bar set the previous year.
Total published vulnerabilities by month from 2021 through 2025 (download)
Now, let’s look at the number of new critical vulnerabilities (CVSS > 8.9) for that same period.
Total number of published critical vulnerabilities by month from 2021 to 2025< (download)
The graph shows that the volume of critical vulnerabilities remains quite substantial; however, in the second half of the year, we saw those numbers dip back down to levels seen in 2023. This was due to vulnerability churn: a handful of published security issues were revoked. The widespread adoption of secure development practices and the move toward safer languages also pushed those numbers down, though even that couldn’t stop the overall flood of vulnerabilities.
This section contains statistics on the use of exploits in Q4 2025. The data is based on open sources and our telemetry.
In Q4 2025, the most prevalent exploits targeted the exact same vulnerabilities that dominated the threat landscape throughout the rest of the year. These were exploits targeting Microsoft Office products with unpatched security flaws.
Kaspersky solutions detected the most exploits on the Windows platform for the following vulnerabilities:
The list has remained unchanged for years.
We also see that attackers continue to adapt exploits for directory traversal vulnerabilities (CWE-35) when unpacking archives in WinRAR. They are being heavily leveraged to gain initial access via malicious archives on the Windows operating system:
As in the previous quarter, we see a rise in the use of archiver exploits, with fresh vulnerabilities increasingly appearing in attacks.
Below are the exploit detection trends for Windows users over the last two years.
Dynamics of the number of Windows users encountering exploits, Q1 2024 – Q4 2025. The number of users who encountered exploits in Q1 2024 is taken as 100% (download)
The vulnerabilities listed here can be used to gain initial access to a vulnerable system. This highlights the critical importance of timely security updates for all affected software.
On Linux-based devices, the most frequently detected exploits targeted the following vulnerabilities:
Dynamics of the number of Linux users encountering exploits, Q1 2024 – Q4 2025. The number of users who encountered exploits in Q1 2024 is taken as 100% (download)
We are seeing a massive surge in Linux-based exploit attempts: in Q4, the number of affected users doubled compared to Q3. Our statistics show that the final quarter of the year accounted for more than half of all Linux exploit attacks recorded for the entire year. This surge is primarily driven by the rapidly growing number of Linux-based consumer devices. This trend naturally attracts the attention of threat actors, making the installation of security patches critically important.
The distribution of published exploits by software type in Q4 2025 largely mirrors the patterns observed in the previous quarter. The majority of exploits we investigate through our monitoring of public research, news, and PoCs continue to target vulnerabilities within operating systems.
Distribution of published exploits by platform, Q1 2025 (download)
Distribution of published exploits by platform, Q2 2025 (download)
Distribution of published exploits by platform, Q3 2025 (download)
Distribution of published exploits by platform, Q4 2025 (download)
In Q4 2025, no public exploits for Microsoft Office products emerged; the bulk of the vulnerabilities were issues discovered in system components. When calculating our statistics, we placed these in the OS category.
We analyzed which vulnerabilities were utilized in APT attacks during Q4 2025. The following rankings draw on our telemetry, research, and open-source data.
TOP 10 vulnerabilities exploited in APT attacks, Q4 2025 (download)
In Q4 2025, APT attacks most frequently exploited fresh vulnerabilities published within the last six months. We believe that these CVEs will remain favorites among attackers for a long time, as fixing them may require significant structural changes to the vulnerable applications or the user’s system. Often, replacing or updating the affected components requires a significant amount of resources. Consequently, the probability of an attack through such vulnerabilities may persist. Some of these new vulnerabilities are likely to become frequent tools for lateral movement within user infrastructure, as the corresponding security flaws have been discovered in network services that are accessible without authentication. This heavy exploitation of very recently registered vulnerabilities highlights the ability of threat actors to rapidly implement new techniques and adapt old ones for their attacks. Therefore, we strongly recommend applying the security patches provided by vendors.
In this section, we will look at the most popular C2 frameworks used by threat actors and analyze the vulnerabilities whose exploits interacted with C2 agents in APT attacks.
The chart below shows the frequency of known C2 framework usage in attacks against users during Q4 2025, according to open sources.
TOP 10 C2 frameworks used by APTs to compromise user systems in Q4 2025 (download)
Despite the significant footprints it can leave when used in its default configuration, Sliver continues to hold the top spot among the most common C2 frameworks in our Q4 2025 analysis. Mythic and Havoc were second and third, respectively. After reviewing open sources and analyzing malicious C2 agent samples that contained exploits, we found that the following vulnerabilities were used in APT attacks involving the C2 frameworks mentioned above:
The set of vulnerabilities described above suggests that attackers have been using them for initial access and early-stage maneuvers in vulnerable systems to create a springboard for deploying a C2 agent. The list of vulnerabilities includes both zero-days and well-known, established security issues.
This section highlights the most noteworthy vulnerabilities that were publicly disclosed in Q4 2025 and have a publicly available description.
We typically describe vulnerabilities affecting a specific application. CVE-2025-55182 stood out as an exception, as it was discovered in React, a library primarily used for building web applications. This means that exploiting the vulnerability could potentially disrupt a vast number of applications that rely on the library. The vulnerability itself lies in the interaction mechanism between the client and server components, which is built on sending serialized objects. If an attacker sends serialized data containing malicious functionality, they can execute JavaScript commands directly on the server, bypassing all client-side request validation. Technical details about this vulnerability and an example of how Kaspersky solutions detect it can be found in our article.
This vulnerability represents a data-handling flaw that occurs when retrieving information from a remote server: when executing the curl or Invoke-WebRequest command, Windows launches Internet Explorer in the background. This can lead to a cross-site scripting (XSS) attack.
This vulnerability reinforces the trend of exploiting security flaws found in file archivers. The core of CVE-2025-11001 lies in the incorrect handling of symbolic links. An attacker can craft an archive so that when it is extracted into an arbitrary directory, its contents end up in the location pointed to by a symbolic link. The likelihood of exploiting this vulnerability is significantly reduced because utilizing such functionality requires the user opening the archive to possess system administrator privileges.
This vulnerability was associated with a wave of misleading news reports claiming it was being used in real-world attacks against end users. This misconception stemmed from an error in the security bulletin.
The year 2025 saw a surge in high-profile vulnerabilities, several of which were significant enough to earn a unique nickname. This was the case with CVE-2025-49844, also known as RediShell, which was unveiled during a hacking competition. This vulnerability is a use-after-free issue related to how the load command functions within Lua interpreter scripts. To execute the attack, an attacker needs to prepare a malicious script and load it into the interpreter.
As with any named vulnerability, RediShell was immediately weaponized by threat actors and spammers, albeit in a somewhat unconventional manner. Because technical details were initially scarce following its disclosure, the internet was flooded with fake PoC exploits and scanners claiming to test for the vulnerability. In the best-case scenario, these tools were non-functional; in the worst, they infected the system. Notably, these fraudulent projects were frequently generated using LLMs. They followed a standardized template and often cross-referenced source code from other identical fake repositories.
Driver vulnerabilities are often discovered in legitimate third-party applications that have been part of the official OS distribution for a long time. Thus, CVE-2025-24990 has existed within code shipped by Microsoft throughout nearly the entire history of Windows. The vulnerable driver has been shipped since at least Windows 7 as a third-party driver for Agere Modem. According to Microsoft, this driver is no longer supported and, following the discovery of the flaw, was removed from the OS distribution entirely.
The vulnerability itself is straightforward: insecure handling of IOCTL codes leading to a null pointer dereference. Successful exploitation can lead to arbitrary command execution or a system crash resulting in a blue screen of death (BSOD) on modern systems.
CVE-2025-59287 represents a textbook case of insecure deserialization. Exploitation is possible without any form of authentication; due to its ease of use, this vulnerability rapidly gained traction among threat actors. Technical details and detection methodologies for our product suite have been covered in our previous advisories.
In Q4 2025, the rate of vulnerability registration has shown no signs of slowing down. Consequently, consistent monitoring and the timely application of security patches have become more critical than ever. To ensure resilient defense, it is vital to regularly assess and remediate known vulnerabilities while implementing technology designed to mitigate the impact of potential exploits.
Continuous monitoring of infrastructure, including the network perimeter, allows for the timely identification of threats and prevents them from escalating. Effective security also demands tracking the current threat landscape and applying preventative measures to minimize risks associated with system flaws. Kaspersky Next serves as a reliable partner in this process, providing real-time identification and detailed mapping of vulnerabilities within the environment.
Securing the workplace remains a top priority. Protecting corporate devices requires the adoption of solutions capable of blocking malware and preventing it from spreading. Beyond basic measures, organizations should implement adaptive systems that allow for the rapid deployment of security updates and the automation of patch management workflows.
The fourth quarter of 2025 went down as one of the most intense periods on record for high-profile, critical vulnerability disclosures, hitting popular libraries and mainstream applications. Several of these vulnerabilities were picked up by attackers and exploited in the wild almost immediately.
In this report, we dive into the statistics on published vulnerabilities and exploits, as well as the known vulnerabilities leveraged with popular C2 frameworks throughout Q4 2025.
This section contains statistics on registered vulnerabilities. The data is taken from cve.org.
Let’s take a look at the number of registered CVEs for each month over the last five years, up to and including the end of 2025. As predicted in our last report, Q4 saw a higher number of registered vulnerabilities than the same period in 2024, and the year-end totals also cleared the bar set the previous year.
Total published vulnerabilities by month from 2021 through 2025 (download)
Now, let’s look at the number of new critical vulnerabilities (CVSS > 8.9) for that same period.
Total number of published critical vulnerabilities by month from 2021 to 2025< (download)
The graph shows that the volume of critical vulnerabilities remains quite substantial; however, in the second half of the year, we saw those numbers dip back down to levels seen in 2023. This was due to vulnerability churn: a handful of published security issues were revoked. The widespread adoption of secure development practices and the move toward safer languages also pushed those numbers down, though even that couldn’t stop the overall flood of vulnerabilities.
This section contains statistics on the use of exploits in Q4 2025. The data is based on open sources and our telemetry.
In Q4 2025, the most prevalent exploits targeted the exact same vulnerabilities that dominated the threat landscape throughout the rest of the year. These were exploits targeting Microsoft Office products with unpatched security flaws.
Kaspersky solutions detected the most exploits on the Windows platform for the following vulnerabilities:
The list has remained unchanged for years.
We also see that attackers continue to adapt exploits for directory traversal vulnerabilities (CWE-35) when unpacking archives in WinRAR. They are being heavily leveraged to gain initial access via malicious archives on the Windows operating system:
As in the previous quarter, we see a rise in the use of archiver exploits, with fresh vulnerabilities increasingly appearing in attacks.
Below are the exploit detection trends for Windows users over the last two years.
Dynamics of the number of Windows users encountering exploits, Q1 2024 – Q4 2025. The number of users who encountered exploits in Q1 2024 is taken as 100% (download)
The vulnerabilities listed here can be used to gain initial access to a vulnerable system. This highlights the critical importance of timely security updates for all affected software.
On Linux-based devices, the most frequently detected exploits targeted the following vulnerabilities:
Dynamics of the number of Linux users encountering exploits, Q1 2024 – Q4 2025. The number of users who encountered exploits in Q1 2024 is taken as 100% (download)
We are seeing a massive surge in Linux-based exploit attempts: in Q4, the number of affected users doubled compared to Q3. Our statistics show that the final quarter of the year accounted for more than half of all Linux exploit attacks recorded for the entire year. This surge is primarily driven by the rapidly growing number of Linux-based consumer devices. This trend naturally attracts the attention of threat actors, making the installation of security patches critically important.
The distribution of published exploits by software type in Q4 2025 largely mirrors the patterns observed in the previous quarter. The majority of exploits we investigate through our monitoring of public research, news, and PoCs continue to target vulnerabilities within operating systems.
Distribution of published exploits by platform, Q1 2025 (download)
Distribution of published exploits by platform, Q2 2025 (download)
Distribution of published exploits by platform, Q3 2025 (download)
Distribution of published exploits by platform, Q4 2025 (download)
In Q4 2025, no public exploits for Microsoft Office products emerged; the bulk of the vulnerabilities were issues discovered in system components. When calculating our statistics, we placed these in the OS category.
We analyzed which vulnerabilities were utilized in APT attacks during Q4 2025. The following rankings draw on our telemetry, research, and open-source data.
TOP 10 vulnerabilities exploited in APT attacks, Q4 2025 (download)
In Q4 2025, APT attacks most frequently exploited fresh vulnerabilities published within the last six months. We believe that these CVEs will remain favorites among attackers for a long time, as fixing them may require significant structural changes to the vulnerable applications or the user’s system. Often, replacing or updating the affected components requires a significant amount of resources. Consequently, the probability of an attack through such vulnerabilities may persist. Some of these new vulnerabilities are likely to become frequent tools for lateral movement within user infrastructure, as the corresponding security flaws have been discovered in network services that are accessible without authentication. This heavy exploitation of very recently registered vulnerabilities highlights the ability of threat actors to rapidly implement new techniques and adapt old ones for their attacks. Therefore, we strongly recommend applying the security patches provided by vendors.
In this section, we will look at the most popular C2 frameworks used by threat actors and analyze the vulnerabilities whose exploits interacted with C2 agents in APT attacks.
The chart below shows the frequency of known C2 framework usage in attacks against users during Q4 2025, according to open sources.
TOP 10 C2 frameworks used by APTs to compromise user systems in Q4 2025 (download)
Despite the significant footprints it can leave when used in its default configuration, Sliver continues to hold the top spot among the most common C2 frameworks in our Q4 2025 analysis. Mythic and Havoc were second and third, respectively. After reviewing open sources and analyzing malicious C2 agent samples that contained exploits, we found that the following vulnerabilities were used in APT attacks involving the C2 frameworks mentioned above:
The set of vulnerabilities described above suggests that attackers have been using them for initial access and early-stage maneuvers in vulnerable systems to create a springboard for deploying a C2 agent. The list of vulnerabilities includes both zero-days and well-known, established security issues.
This section highlights the most noteworthy vulnerabilities that were publicly disclosed in Q4 2025 and have a publicly available description.
We typically describe vulnerabilities affecting a specific application. CVE-2025-55182 stood out as an exception, as it was discovered in React, a library primarily used for building web applications. This means that exploiting the vulnerability could potentially disrupt a vast number of applications that rely on the library. The vulnerability itself lies in the interaction mechanism between the client and server components, which is built on sending serialized objects. If an attacker sends serialized data containing malicious functionality, they can execute JavaScript commands directly on the server, bypassing all client-side request validation. Technical details about this vulnerability and an example of how Kaspersky solutions detect it can be found in our article.
This vulnerability represents a data-handling flaw that occurs when retrieving information from a remote server: when executing the curl or Invoke-WebRequest command, Windows launches Internet Explorer in the background. This can lead to a cross-site scripting (XSS) attack.
This vulnerability reinforces the trend of exploiting security flaws found in file archivers. The core of CVE-2025-11001 lies in the incorrect handling of symbolic links. An attacker can craft an archive so that when it is extracted into an arbitrary directory, its contents end up in the location pointed to by a symbolic link. The likelihood of exploiting this vulnerability is significantly reduced because utilizing such functionality requires the user opening the archive to possess system administrator privileges.
This vulnerability was associated with a wave of misleading news reports claiming it was being used in real-world attacks against end users. This misconception stemmed from an error in the security bulletin.
The year 2025 saw a surge in high-profile vulnerabilities, several of which were significant enough to earn a unique nickname. This was the case with CVE-2025-49844, also known as RediShell, which was unveiled during a hacking competition. This vulnerability is a use-after-free issue related to how the load command functions within Lua interpreter scripts. To execute the attack, an attacker needs to prepare a malicious script and load it into the interpreter.
As with any named vulnerability, RediShell was immediately weaponized by threat actors and spammers, albeit in a somewhat unconventional manner. Because technical details were initially scarce following its disclosure, the internet was flooded with fake PoC exploits and scanners claiming to test for the vulnerability. In the best-case scenario, these tools were non-functional; in the worst, they infected the system. Notably, these fraudulent projects were frequently generated using LLMs. They followed a standardized template and often cross-referenced source code from other identical fake repositories.
Driver vulnerabilities are often discovered in legitimate third-party applications that have been part of the official OS distribution for a long time. Thus, CVE-2025-24990 has existed within code shipped by Microsoft throughout nearly the entire history of Windows. The vulnerable driver has been shipped since at least Windows 7 as a third-party driver for Agere Modem. According to Microsoft, this driver is no longer supported and, following the discovery of the flaw, was removed from the OS distribution entirely.
The vulnerability itself is straightforward: insecure handling of IOCTL codes leading to a null pointer dereference. Successful exploitation can lead to arbitrary command execution or a system crash resulting in a blue screen of death (BSOD) on modern systems.
CVE-2025-59287 represents a textbook case of insecure deserialization. Exploitation is possible without any form of authentication; due to its ease of use, this vulnerability rapidly gained traction among threat actors. Technical details and detection methodologies for our product suite have been covered in our previous advisories.
In Q4 2025, the rate of vulnerability registration has shown no signs of slowing down. Consequently, consistent monitoring and the timely application of security patches have become more critical than ever. To ensure resilient defense, it is vital to regularly assess and remediate known vulnerabilities while implementing technology designed to mitigate the impact of potential exploits.
Continuous monitoring of infrastructure, including the network perimeter, allows for the timely identification of threats and prevents them from escalating. Effective security also demands tracking the current threat landscape and applying preventative measures to minimize risks associated with system flaws. Kaspersky Next serves as a reliable partner in this process, providing real-time identification and detailed mapping of vulnerabilities within the environment.
Securing the workplace remains a top priority. Protecting corporate devices requires the adoption of solutions capable of blocking malware and preventing it from spreading. Beyond basic measures, organizations should implement adaptive systems that allow for the rapid deployment of security updates and the automation of patch management workflows.
Starting from the third quarter of 2025, we have updated our statistical methodology based on the Kaspersky Security Network. These changes affect all sections of the report except for the installation package statistics, which remain unchanged.
To illustrate trends between reporting periods, we have recalculated the previous year’s data; consequently, these figures may differ significantly from previously published numbers. All subsequent reports will be generated using this new methodology, ensuring accurate data comparisons with the findings presented in this article.
Kaspersky Security Network (KSN) is a global network for analyzing anonymized threat intelligence, voluntarily shared by Kaspersky users. The statistics in this report are based on KSN data unless explicitly stated otherwise.
According to Kaspersky Security Network, in 2025:
In 2025, cybercriminals launched an average of approximately 1.17 million attacks per month against mobile devices using malicious, advertising, or unwanted software. In total, Kaspersky solutions blocked 14,059,465 attacks throughout the year.
Attacks on Kaspersky mobile users in 2025 (download)
Beyond the malware mentioned in previous quarterly reports, 2025 saw the discovery of several other notable Trojans. Among these, in Q4 we uncovered the Keenadu preinstalled backdoor. This malware is integrated into device firmware during the manufacturing stage. The malicious code is injected into libandroid_runtime.so – a core library for the Android Java runtime environment – allowing a copy of the backdoor to enter the address space of every app running on the device. Depending on the specific app, the malware can then perform actions such as inflating ad views, displaying banners on behalf of other apps, or hijacking search queries. The functionality of Keenadu is virtually unlimited, as its malicious modules are downloaded dynamically and can be updated remotely.
Cybersecurity researchers also identified the Kimwolf IoT botnet, which specifically targets Android TV boxes. Infected devices are capable of launching DDoS attacks, operating as reverse proxies, and executing malicious commands via a reverse shell. Subsequent analysis revealed that Kimwolf’s reverse proxy functionality was being leveraged by proxy providers to use compromised home devices as residential proxies.
Another notable discovery in 2025 was the LunaSpy Trojan.
LunaSpy Trojan, distributed under the guise of an antivirus app
Disguised as antivirus software, this spyware exfiltrates browser passwords, messaging app credentials, SMS messages, and call logs. Furthermore, it is capable of recording audio via the device’s microphone and capturing video through the camera. This threat primarily targeted users in Russia.
815,735 new unique installation packages were observed in 2025, showing a decrease compared to the previous year. While the decline in 2024 was less pronounced, this past year saw the figure drop by nearly one-third.
Detected Android-specific malware and unwanted software installation packages in 2022–2025 (download)
The overall decrease in detected packages is primarily due to a reduction in apps categorized as not-a-virus. Conversely, the number of Trojans has increased significantly, a trend clearly reflected in the distribution data below.
Distribution* of detected mobile software by type, 2024–2025 (download)
* The data for the previous year may differ from previously published data due to some verdicts being retrospectively revised.
A significant increase in Trojan-Banker and Trojan-Spy apps was accompanied by a decline in AdWare and RiskTool files. The most prevalent banking Trojans were Mamont (accounting for 49.8% of apps) and Creduz (22.5%). Leading the persistent adware category were MobiDash (39%), Adlo (27%), and HiddenAd (20%).
Share* of users attacked by each type of malware or unwanted software out of all users of Kaspersky mobile solutions attacked in 2024–2025 (download)
* The total may exceed 100% if the same users encountered multiple attack types.
Trojan-Banker malware saw a significant surge in 2025, not only in terms of unique file counts but also in the total number of attacks. Nevertheless, this category ranked fourth overall, trailing far behind the Trojan file category, which was dominated by various modifications of Triada and Fakemoney.
Note that the malware rankings below exclude riskware and potentially unwanted apps, such as RiskTool and adware.
| Verdict | % 2024* | % 2025* | Difference in p.p. | Change in ranking |
| Trojan.AndroidOS.Triada.fe | 0.04 | 9.84 | +9.80 | |
| Trojan.AndroidOS.Triada.gn | 2.94 | 8.14 | +5.21 | +6 |
| Trojan.AndroidOS.Fakemoney.v | 7.46 | 7.97 | +0.51 | +1 |
| DangerousObject.Multi.Generic | 7.73 | 5.83 | –1.91 | –2 |
| Trojan.AndroidOS.Triada.ii | 0.00 | 5.25 | +5.25 | |
| Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Mamont.da | 0.10 | 4.12 | +4.02 | |
| Trojan.AndroidOS.Triada.ga | 10.56 | 3.75 | –6.81 | –6 |
| Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Mamont.db | 0.01 | 3.53 | +3.51 | |
| Backdoor.AndroidOS.Triada.z | 0.00 | 2.79 | +2.79 | |
| Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Coper.c | 0.81 | 2.54 | +1.72 | +35 |
| Trojan-Clicker.AndroidOS.Agent.bh | 0.34 | 2.48 | +2.14 | +74 |
| Trojan-Dropper.Linux.Agent.gen | 1.82 | 2.37 | +0.55 | +4 |
| Trojan.AndroidOS.Boogr.gsh | 5.41 | 2.06 | –3.35 | –8 |
| DangerousObject.AndroidOS.GenericML | 2.42 | 1.97 | –0.45 | –3 |
| Trojan.AndroidOS.Triada.gs | 3.69 | 1.93 | –1.76 | –9 |
| Trojan-Downloader.AndroidOS.Agent.no | 0.00 | 1.87 | +1.87 | |
| Trojan.AndroidOS.Triada.hf | 0.00 | 1.75 | +1.75 | |
| Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Mamont.bc | 1.13 | 1.65 | +0.51 | +8 |
| Trojan.AndroidOS.Generic. | 2.13 | 1.47 | –0.66 | –6 |
| Trojan.AndroidOS.Triada.hy | 0.00 | 1.44 | +1.44 |
* Unique users who encountered this malware as a percentage of all attacked users of Kaspersky mobile solutions.
The list is largely dominated by the Triada family, which is distributed via malicious modifications of popular messaging apps. Another infection vector involves tricking victims into installing an official messaging app within a “customized virtual environment” that supposedly offers enhanced configuration options. Fakemoney scam applications, which promise fraudulent investment opportunities or fake payouts, continue to target users frequently, ranking third in our statistics. Meanwhile, the Mamont banking Trojan variants occupy the 6th, 8th, and 18th positions by number of attacks. The Triada backdoor preinstalled in the firmware of certain devices reached the 9th spot.
This section describes malware families whose attack campaigns are concentrated within specific countries.
| Verdict | Country* | %** |
| Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Coper.a | Türkiye | 95.74 |
| Trojan-Dropper.AndroidOS.Hqwar.bj | Türkiye | 94.96 |
| Trojan.AndroidOS.Thamera.bb | India | 94.71 |
| Trojan-Proxy.AndroidOS.Agent.q | Germany | 93.70 |
| Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Coper.c | Türkiye | 93.42 |
| Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Rewardsteal.lv | India | 92.44 |
| Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Rewardsteal.jp | India | 92.31 |
| Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Rewardsteal.ib | India | 91.91 |
| Trojan-Dropper.AndroidOS.Rewardsteal.h | India | 91.45 |
| Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Rewardsteal.nk | India | 90.98 |
| Trojan-Dropper.AndroidOS.Agent.sm | Türkiye | 90.34 |
| Trojan-Dropper.AndroidOS.Rewardsteal.ac | India | 89.38 |
| Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Rewardsteal.oa | India | 89.18 |
| Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Rewardsteal.ma | India | 88.58 |
| Trojan-Spy.AndroidOS.SmForw.ko | India | 88.48 |
| Trojan-Dropper.AndroidOS.Pylcasa.c | Brazil | 88.25 |
| Trojan-Dropper.AndroidOS.Hqwar.bf | Türkiye | 88.15 |
| Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Agent.pp | India | 87.85 |
* Country where the malware was most active.
** Unique users who encountered the malware in the indicated country as a percentage of all users of Kaspersky mobile solutions who were attacked by the same malware.
Türkiye saw the highest concentration of attacks from Coper banking Trojans and their associated Hqwar droppers. In India, Rewardsteal Trojans continued to proliferate, exfiltrating victims’ payment data under the guise of monetary giveaways. Additionally, India saw a resurgence of the Thamera Trojan, which we previously observed frequently attacking users in 2023. This malware hijacks the victim’s device to illicitly register social media accounts.
The Trojan-Proxy.AndroidOS.Agent.q campaign, concentrated in Germany, utilized a compromised third-party application designed for tracking discounts at a major German retail chain. Attackers monetized these infections through unauthorized use of the victims’ devices as residential proxies.
In Brazil, 2025 saw a concentration of Pylcasa Trojan attacks. This malware is primarily used to redirect users to phishing pages or illicit online casino sites.
The number of new banking Trojan installation packages surged to 255,090, representing a several-fold increase over previous years.
Mobile banking Trojan installation packages detected by Kaspersky in 2022–2025 (download)
Notably, the total number of attacks involving bankers grew by 1.5 times, maintaining the same growth rate seen in the previous year. Given the sharp spike in the number of unique malicious packages, we can conclude that these attacks yield significant profit for cybercriminals. This is further evidenced by the fact that threat actors continue to diversify their delivery channels and accelerate the production of new variants in an effort to evade detection by security solutions.
| Verdict | % 2024* | % 2025* | Difference in p.p. | Change in ranking |
| Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Mamont.da | 0.86 | 15.65 | +14.79 | +28 |
| Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Mamont.db | 0.12 | 13.41 | +13.29 | |
| Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Coper.c | 7.19 | 9.65 | +2.46 | +2 |
| Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Mamont.bc | 10.03 | 6.26 | –3.77 | –3 |
| Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Mamont.ev | 0.00 | 4.10 | +4.10 | |
| Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Coper.a | 9.04 | 4.00 | –5.04 | –4 |
| Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Mamont.ek | 0.00 | 3.73 | +3.73 | |
| Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Mamont.cb | 0.64 | 3.04 | +2.40 | +26 |
| Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Faketoken.pac | 2.17 | 2.95 | +0.77 | +5 |
| Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Mamont.hi | 0.00 | 2.75 | +2.75 |
* Unique users who encountered this malware as a percentage of all users of Kaspersky mobile solutions who encountered banking threats.
In 2025, we observed a massive surge in activity from Mamont banking Trojans. They accounted for approximately half of all new apps in their category and also were utilized in half of all banking Trojan attacks.
The year 2025 saw a continuing trend toward a decline in total unique unwanted software installation packages. However, we noted a significant year-over-year increase in specific threats – most notably mobile banking Trojans and spyware – even though adware remained the most frequently detected threat overall.
Among the mobile threats detected, we have seen an increased prevalence of preinstalled backdoors, such as Triada and Keenadu. Consistent with last year’s findings, certain mobile malware families continue to proliferate via official app stores. Finally, we have observed a growing interest among threat actors in leveraging compromised devices as proxies.
