Artificial intelligence platforms may be just as susceptible to social engineering as human beings, but they are proving remarkably good at finding security vulnerabilities in human-made computer code. That reality is on full display this month with some of the more widely-used software makers — including Apple, Google, Microsoft, Mozilla and Oracle — fixing near record volumes of security bugs, and/or quickening the tempo of their patch releases.
As it does on the second Tuesday of every month, Microsoft today released software updates to address at least 118 security vulnerabilities in its various Windows operating systems and other products. Remarkably, this is the first Patch Tuesday in nearly two years that Microsoft is not shipping any fixes to deal with emergency zero-day flaws that are already being exploited. Nor have any of the flaws fixed today been previously disclosed (potentially giving attackers a heads up in how to exploit the weakness).
Sixteen of the vulnerabilities earned Microsoft’s most-dire “critical” label, meaning malware or miscreants could abuse these bugs to seize remote control over a vulnerable Windows device with little or no help from the user. Rapid7 has done much of the heavy lifting in identifying some of the more concerning critical weaknesses this month, including:
CVE-2026-41089: A critical stack-based buffer overflow in Windows Netlogon that offers an attacker SYSTEM privileges on the domain controller. No privileges or user interaction are required, and attack complexity is low. Patches are available for all versions of Windows Server from 2012 onwards.
CVE-2026-41096: A critical RCE in the Windows DNS client implementation worthy of attention despite Microsoft assessing exploitation as less likely.
CVE-2026-41103: A critical elevation of privilege vulnerability that allows an unauthorized attacker to impersonate an existing user by presenting forged credentials, thus bypassing Entra ID. Microsoft expects that exploitation is more likely.
May’s Patch Tuesday is a welcome respite from April, which saw Microsoft fix a near-record 167 security flaws. Microsoft was among a few dozen tech giants given access to a “Project Glasswing,” a much-hyped AI capability developed by Anthropic that appears quite effective at unearthing security vulnerabilities in code.
Apple, another early participant in Project Glasswing, typically fixes an average of 20 vulnerabilities each time it ships a security update for iOS devices, said Chris Goettl, vice president of product management at Ivanti. On May 11, Apple shipped updates to address at least 52 vulnerabilities and backported the changes all the way to iPhone 6s and iOS 15.
Last month, Mozilla released Firefox 150, which resolved a whopping 271 vulnerabilities that were reportedly discovered during the Glasswing evaluation.
“Since Firefox 150.0.0 released, they have been on a more aggressive weekly cadence for security updates including the release of Firefox 150.0.3 on May Patch Tuesday resolving between three to five CVEs in each release,” Goettl said.
The software giant Oracle likewise recently increased its patch pace in response to their work with Glasswing. In its most recent quarterly patch update, Oracle addressed at least 450 flaws, including more than 300 fixes for remotely exploitable, unauthenticated flaws. But at the end of April, Oracle announced it was switching to a monthly update cycle for critical security issues.
On May 8, Google started rolling out updates to its Chrome browser that fixed an astonishing 127 security flaws (up from just 30 the previous month). Chrome automagically downloads available security updates, but installing them requires fully restarting the browser.
If you encounter any weirdness applying the updates from Microsoft or any other vendor mentioned here, feel free to sound off in the comments below. Meantime, if you haven’t backed up your data and/or drive lately, doing that before updating is generally sound advice. For a more granular look at the Microsoft updates released today, checkout this inventory by the SANS Internet Storm Center.
DarkSword is a sophisticated piece of malware—probably government designed—that targets iOS.
Google Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) has identified a new iOS full-chain exploit that leveraged multiple zero-day vulnerabilities to fully compromise devices. Based on toolmarks in recovered payloads, we believe the exploit chain to be called DarkSword. Since at least November 2025, GTIG has observed multiple commercial surveillance vendors and suspected state-sponsored actors utilizing DarkSword in distinct campaigns. These threat actors have deployed the exploit chain against targets in Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Malaysia, and Ukraine.
DarkSword supports iOS versions 18.4 through 18.7 and utilizes six different vulnerabilities to deploy final-stage payloads. GTIG has identified three distinct malware families deployed following a successful DarkSword compromise: GHOSTBLADE, GHOSTKNIFE, and GHOSTSABER. The proliferation of this single exploit chain across disparate threat actors mirrors the previously discovered Coruna iOS exploit kit. Notably, UNC6353, a suspected Russian espionage group previously observed using Coruna, has recently incorporated DarkSword into their watering hole campaigns.
A week after it was identified, a version of it leaked onto the internet, where it is being used more broadly.
This news is a month old. Your devices are safe, assuming you patch regularly.
Apple has released a software update that deals with an issue that could allow deleted notifications to be retrieved. Something that, in at least one reported case, was used by law enforcement during forensic analysis.
Apple fixed the issue in iOS and iPadOS versions 18.7.8 and 26.4.2 (check availability for your device at those links). The update deals with a singular security vulnerability, tracked as CVE-2026-28950.
Although the description is brief—“a logging issue was addressed with improved data redaction”—the impact points us in the right direction.
“Notifications marked for deletion could be unexpectedly retained on the device.”
This suggests that Apple’s bug was that iOS kept copies of notification content in an internal database for longer than intended, even after the messages “disappeared” or the app was uninstalled. In a case reported by 404 Media, law enforcement was able to recover those notifications using standard forensic tools once they had access to the unlocked device. The example in that reported case involved Signal.
“The FBI was able to forensically extract copies of incoming Signal messages from a defendant’s iPhone, even after the app was deleted, because copies of the content were saved in the device’s push notification database.”
Before we go into the update process, you may want to know that you can mute or hide notifications in Signal, which also protects them from prying eyes. In Signal, open your Settings and tap on Notifications. You can adjust several settings there. For example, I have mine set so I only see the name of the sender.
Install the update
For iOS and iPadOS users, you can check if you’re using the latest software version by going to Settings > General > Software Update. It’s also worth turning on Automatic Updates if you haven’t already. You can do that on the same screen.
Update settings on iPad
Scammers know more about you than you think.
Malwarebytes Mobile Security protects you from phishing, scam texts, malicious sites, and more. With real-time AI-powered Scam Guard built right in.
Scammers have found a way to abuse legitimate Apple account notification emails to trick targets into calling fake tech support numbers.
According to a report from BleepingComputer, scammers create an Apple account and insert a phishing message into the personal information fields, then modify the account so that Apple sends a genuine security alert about the change to the target.
BleepingComputer was able to replicate the attack.
The attacker creates an Apple ID they control, then stuffs the phishing message into the personal information fields (first name, last name, possibly address), splitting it across fields because they will not fit into just one.
To launch the phish, the attacker changes something benign on their specially created Apple account, such as shipping information, which causes Apple’s systems to send a “Your Apple account was updated” security email.
While the original alert is addressed to the attacker’s iCloud email, they are then able to redistribute it to a wider victim list, for example through a mailing list.
In the copy the targets receive, the email headers still show a legitimate Apple sender, and the presence of the attacker’s iCloud address can even make it look like “someone else” has gained access to the account.
Because Apple includes those user-supplied fields in the security email, the phishing text is delivered inside a legitimate message sent from Apple’s own infrastructure.
This method, called call-back phishing, filters out suspicious users, so the scammers can focus on the people who fell for the first part.
The emails come from a legitimate source, sail through every security filter because of that, and look convincing enough to scare the receiver into thinking someone spent $899 from their PayPal account.
But the structure of the email does not make sense.
“Dear User” is immediately followed by the scam message where your name should have been. The header says it’s about account information rather than a purchase. And the iCloud account does not belong to the recipient. So, once you know how it’s done, they’re not impossible to spot. Which is why we wrote this blog.
And when in doubt, you can always ask Malwarebytes Scam Guard.
Scam Guard identified the screenshot as a scam and guides users through the next steps.
Scams like these work, because many users still view phone calls as more trustworthy than email, especially if the email itself passed all the usual technical authenticity checks and they initiated the call themselves.
How to stay safe
Tech support scammers will try to convince callers to install some kind of remote desktop application to steal data from your computer, or ask for financial details so they can steal your money.
To stay safe from these scammers:
Be wary of unexpected alerts about high‑value purchases you do not recognize. They are suspicious even if they come from a real domain.
Never call a number sent to you by unsolicited means or even found in sponsored search results.
Carefully read emails and text messages, even if they come form trustworthy addresses. Does the email make sense from a structural and linguistic point of view?
If someone claiming to be support for a legitimate company asks for remote access or payment details during a call, hang up and contact the company through official channels.
Use Malwarebytes Scam Guard to analyze any kind of message that alarms you or urges you to take immediate action.
Something feel off? Check it before you click.
Malwarebytes Scam Guard helps you analyze suspicious links, texts, and screenshots instantly.
On March 4, 2026, Google and iVerify published reports about a highly sophisticated exploit kit targeting Apple iPhone devices. According to Google, the exploit kit was first discovered in targeted attacks conducted by a customer of an unnamed surveillance vendor. It was later used by other attackers in watering-hole attacks in Ukraine and in financially motivated attacks in China. Additionally, researchers discovered an instance with the debug version of the exploit kit, which revealed the internal names of the exploits and the framework name used by its developers — Coruna. Analysis of the kit showed that it relies on the exploitation of many previously patched vulnerabilities and also includes exploits for CVE-2023-32434 and CVE-2023-38606. These two vulnerabilities particularly caught our attention because they had been first discovered as zero-days used in Operation Triangulation.
Operation Triangulation is a complex mobile APT campaign targeting iOS devices. We discovered it while monitoring the network traffic of our own corporate Wi-Fi network. We noticed suspicious activity that originated from several iOS-based phones. Following the investigation, we learned that this campaign employed a sophisticated spyware implant and multiple zero-day exploits. The investigation lasted for over six months, during which we disclosed our findings in connection to the attack. Kaspersky GReAT experts also presented these findings at the 37th Chaos Communication Congress (37C3).
Although all the details of both CVE-2023-32434 and CVE-2023-38606 have long been publicly available, and other researchers have developed their own exploits without ever seeing the Triangulation code, we decided to closely investigate the exploits used in Coruna. Some of the exploit kit distribution links provided by Google remained active at the time the report was published, which allowed us to collect, decrypt, and analyze all components of Coruna.
During our analysis, we discovered that the kernel exploit for CVE-2023-32434 and CVE-2023-38606 vulnerabilities used in Coruna, in fact, is an updated version of the same exploit that had been used in Operation Triangulation. The images below illustrate a high-level overview of the two attack chains. The exploit in question is highlighted with a red rectangle.
Attack chain of Operation Triangulation (simplified)
Attack chain of Coruna (simplified)
Moreover, we discovered that Coruna includes four additional kernel exploits that we had not seen used in Operation Triangulation, two of which were developed after the discovery of Operation Triangulation. All of these exploits are built on the same kernel exploitation framework and share common code. Code similarities from kernel exploits can also be found in other components of Coruna. These findings led us to conclude that this exploit kit was not patchworked but rather designed with a unified approach. We assume that it’s an updated version of the same exploitation framework that was used — at least to some extent — in Operation Triangulation.
Technical details
While we continue to investigate all exploits and vulnerabilities used by Coruna, this post provides a high-level overview of the exploit kit and attack chain.
Safari
Exploitation begins with a stager that fingerprints the browser and selects and executes appropriate remote code execution (RCE) and pointer authentication code (PAC) exploits depending on the browser version. It also contains a URL to an encrypted file with information about all available packages containing exploits and other components. The stager also includes a 256-bit key used to decrypt it. The URL and decryption key are passed to a payload embedded in PAC exploits.
Payload
The payload is responsible for initiating the exploitation of the kernel. After initialization, the payload first downloads a file with information about other available components. To extract it, the payload performs several steps processing multiple file formats.
First, the downloaded file is decrypted using the ChaCha20 stream cipher. Decryption yields a container with the magic number 0xBEDF00D, which stores LZMA-compressed data.
The file format used by the exploit kit to store compressed data
Offset
Field
0x00
Magic number (0xBEDF00D)
0x04
Decompressed data size
0x08
LZMA-compressed data
The decompressed data presents another container with the magic number 0xF00DBEEF. This file format is used in the exploit kit to store and retrieve files by their IDs.
The file format used by the exploit kit to store files
Offset
Field
0x00
Magic number (0xF00DBEEF)
0x04
Number of entries
0x08
Entry[0].File ID
0x0C
Entry[0].Status
0x10
Entry[0].File offset
0x14
Entry[0].File size
We provide a description of all possible File ID values below. At this stage, when the payload gathers information about all available file packages, this container holds only one file, and its File ID is 0x70000.
Finally, we get to the file with information about all available file packages. It starts with the magic value 0x12345678. The exploit kit uses this file format to obtain URLs and decryption keys for additional components that need to be downloaded.
The file format used by the exploit kit to store information about file packages
Offset
Field
0x00
Magic number (0x12345678)
0x04
Flags
0x08
Directory path
0x108
Number of entries
0x10C
Entry[0].Package ID
0x110
Entry[0].ChaCha20 key
0x130
Entry[0].File name
The components required for exploiting a targeted device are selected using the Package ID. Its high byte specifies the package type and required hardware. We’ve seen the following package types:
0xF2 – exploit for ARM64,
0xF3 – exploit for ARM64E,
0xA2 – Mach-O loader for ARM64,
0xA3 – Mach-O loader for ARM64E,
2 – implant for ARM64,
0xE2 – implant for ARM64E.
The payload code also supports additional package types, such as 0xF1, an exploit for older ARM devices that do not support 64-bit architecture. Interestingly, however, the files for such exploits are missing.
Other bytes of the Package ID define the supported firmware version and CPU generation.
Some of the observed Package IDs (those with unique content)
Package ID
Description
0xF3300000
Kernel exploit (iOS < 14.0 beta 7) and other components
0xF3400000
Kernel exploit (iOS < 14.7) and other components
0xF3700000
Kernel exploit (iOS < 16.5 beta 4) and other components
0xF3800000
Kernel exploit (iOS < 16.6 beta 5) and other components
0xF3900000
Kernel exploit (iOS < 17.2) and other components
0xA3030000
Mach-O loader (iOS 16.X) (A13 – A16)
0xA3050000
Mach-O loader (iOS 16.0 – 16.4)
The files inside these packages are also stored in encrypted and compressed 0xF00DBEEF containers, but this time compression is optional and is determined by the second bit in the Flags field. Different packages contain different sets of files. A description of all possible File IDs is given in the table below.
Observed File IDs
File ID
Description
0x10000
Implant
0x50000
Mach-O loader (default)
0x70000
List of additional components
0x70005
Launcher config
0x80000
Launcher in 0xF2/0xF3 packages, or Mach-O loader in 0xA2/0xA3
0x90000
Kernel exploit
0x90001
Kernel exploit (for Mach-O loader)
0xA0000
Logs cleaner
0xA0001
Mach-O loader component
0xA0002
Mach-O loader component
0xF0000
RPC stager
After downloading the necessary components, the payload begins executing kernel exploits, Mach-O loaders, and the malware launcher. The payload selects an appropriate Mach-O loader based on the firmware version, CPU, and presence of the iokit-open-service permission.
Kernel exploits
We analyzed all five kernel exploits from the kit and discovered that one of them is an updated version of the same exploit we discovered in Operation Triangulation. There are many small changes, but the most noticeable are as follows:
The code takes into account more values from XNU version strings, allowing for more accurate version checking.
Added a check for iOS 17.2. We assume that this was the latest version of iOS at the time of development (released in December 2023).
Added checks for newer Apple processors: A17, M3, M3 Pro, M3 Max (released in fall 2023).
Added a check for iOS version 16.5 beta 4. This version patched the exploit after our report to Apple.
Why does the exploit need to check for iOS 17.2 and newer CPUs if the targeted vulnerabilities were fixed in iOS 16.5 beta 4? The answer can be found by examining other exploits: they are all based on the same source code. The only difference is in the vulnerabilities they exploit, so these checks were added to support the newer exploits and appeared in the older version after recompilation.
Launcher
The launcher is responsible for orchestrating the post-exploitation activities. It also uses the kernel exploit and the interface it provides. However, since the exploit creates special kernel objects during its execution that provide the ability to read and write to kernel memory, the launcher simply reuses these objects without the need to trigger vulnerabilities and go through the entire exploitation path again. The launcher cleans up exploitation artifacts, retrieves the process name for injection from a config with the 0xDEADD00F magic number, injects a stager into the target process, uses it to execute itself, and launches the implant.
Conclusions
This case demonstrates once again the dangers associated with such malicious tools that lie in their potential wide usage. Originally developed for cyber-espionage purposes, this framework is now being used by cybercriminals of a broader kind, placing millions of users with unpatched devices at risk. Given its modular design and ease of reuse, we expect that other threat actors will begin incorporating it into their attacks. We strongly recommend that users install the latest security updates as soon as possible, if they have not already done so.
…iPhone and iPad are the first and only consumer devices in compliance with the information assurance requirements of NATO nations. This enables iPhone and iPad to be used with classified information up to the NATO restricted level without requiring special software or settings—a level of government certification no other consumer mobile device has met.
This is out of the box, no modifications required.
On March 3, 2026, Google warned about a powerful exploit kit targeting Apple iPhone models running iOS version 13.0 (released in September 2019) up to version 17.2.1 (released in December 2023).
In the latest security updates, Apple patched the vulnerabilities used in the Coruna exploit kit for older mobile devices that can no longer be updated to the latest iOS version. For newer iOS versions, patches associated with the Coruna exploit were already shipped in iOS 16.6 through 17.2 in updates released in 2023 and 2024.
The Coruna exploit kit was first observed in highly targeted attacks, but was later seen in watering hole attacks targeting Ukrainian users by a suspected Russian espionage group. Later still, it appeared on a very large set of fake Chinese financial websites, suggesting the exploit was being used by more mainstream cybercriminals.
The exploit relies on WebKit vulnerabilities (CVE-2023-43000 and CVE-2024-23222) that can be triggered by processing maliciously crafted web content, and then gains kernel privileges by abusing a separate kernel vulnerability tracked as CVE-2023-41974.
The table below shows which updates are available and points you to the relevant security content for that operating system (OS).
Apple has released security updates for iPhones, iPads, Macs, Apple Watches, Apple TVs, and Safari, fixing, in particular, a zero-day flaw that is actively exploited in targeted attacks.
Exploiting this zero-day flaw would allow cybercriminals to run any code they want on the affected device, potentially installing spyware or backdoors without the owner noticing.
Installing these updates as soon as possible keeps your personal information—and everything else on your Apple devices—safe from such an attack.
CVE-2026-20700
The zero-day vulnerability tracked as CVE-2026-20700, is a memory corruption issue in versions before watchOS 26.3, tvOS 26.3, macOS Tahoe 26.3, visionOS 26.3, iOS 26.3 and iPadOS 26.3. An attacker with memory write capability may be able to execute arbitrary code.
Apple says the vulnerability was used as part of an infection chain combined with CVE-2025-14174 and CVE-2025-43529 against devices running iOS versions prior to iOS 26.
Those two vulnerabilities were already patched in the December 2025 update.
Updates for your particular device
The table below shows which updates are available and points you to the relevant security content for that operating system (OS).
iPhone 11 and later, iPad Pro 12.9-inch 3rd generation and later, iPad Pro 11-inch 1st generation and later, iPad Air 3rd generation and later, iPad 8th generation and later, and iPad mini 5th generation and later
For iOS and iPadOS users, here’s how to check if you’re using the latest software version:
Go to Settings > General > Software Update. You will see if there are updates available and be guided through installing them.
Turn on Automatic Updates if you haven’t already—you’ll find it on the same screen.
How to update macOS on any version
To update macOS on any supported Mac, use the Software Update feature, which Apple designed to work consistently across all recent versions. Here are the steps:
Click the Apple menu in the upper-left corner of your screen.
Choose System Settings (or System Preferences on older versions).
Select General in the sidebar, then click Software Update on the right. On older macOS, just look for Software Update directly.
Your Mac will check for updates automatically. If updates are available, click Update Now (or Upgrade Now for major new versions) and follow the on-screen instructions. Before you upgrade to macOS Tahoe 26, please read these instructions.
Enter your administrator password if prompted, then let your Mac finish the update (it might need to restart during this process).
Make sure your Mac stays plugged in and connected to the internet until the update is done.
How to update Apple Watch
Ensure your iPhone is paired with your Apple Watch and connected to Wi-Fi, then:
Keep your Apple Watch on its charger and close to your iPhone.
Open the Watch app on your iPhone.
Tap General > Software Update.
If an update appears, tap Download and Install.
Enter your iPhone passcode or Apple ID password if prompted.
Your Apple Watch will automatically restart during the update process. Make sure it remains near your iPhone and on charge until the update completes.
How to update Apple TV
Turn on your Apple TV and make sure it’s connected to the internet, then:
Open the Settings app on Apple TV.
Navigate to System > Software Updates.
Select Update Software.
If an update appears, select Download and Install.
The Apple TV will download the update and restart as needed. Keep your device connected to power and Wi-Fi until the process finishes.
How to update your Safari browser
Safari updates are included with macOS updates, so installing the latest version of macOS will also update Safari. To check manually:
Open the Apple menu > System Settings > General > Software Update.
If you see a Safari update listed separately, click Update Now to install it.
Restart your Mac when prompted.
If you’re on an older macOS version that’s still supported (like Sonoma or Sequoia), Apple may offer Safari updates independently through Software Update.
More advice to stay safe
The most important fix—however inconvenient it may be—is to upgrade to iOS 26.3 (or the latest available version for your device). Not doing so means missing an accumulating list of security fixes, leaving your device vulnerable to newly found vulnerabilities.
In January, Google settled a lawsuit that pricked up a few ears: It agreed to pay $68 million to a wide array of people who sued the company together, alleging that Google’s voice-activated smart assistant had secretly recorded their conversations, which were then sent to advertisers to target them with promotions.
Google denied any admission of wrongdoing in the settlement agreement, but the fact stands that one of the largest phone makers in the world decided to forego a trial against some potentially explosive surveillance allegations. It’s a decision that the public has already seen in the past, when Apple agreed to pay $95 million last year to settle similar legal claims against its smart assistant, Siri.
Back-to-back, the stories raise a question that just seems to never go away: Are our phones listening to us?
This week, on the Lock and Code podcast with host David Ruiz, we revisit an episode from last year in which we tried to find the answer. In speaking to Electronic Frontier Foundation Staff Technologist Lena Cohen about mobile tracking overall, it becomes clear that, even if our phones aren’t literally listening to our conversations, the devices are stuffed with so many novel forms of surveillance that we need not say something out loud to be predictably targeted with ads for it.
“Companies are collecting so much information about us and in such covert ways that it really feels like they’re listening to us.”