Using a vulnerability in the portal, hackers accessed names, addresses, email addresses, and phone numbers.
The post Skoda Data Breach Hits Online Shop Customers appeared first on SecurityWeek.
The incident occurred on April 20 and did not affect customer data in the company’s production and staging environments.
The post SailPoint Discloses GitHub Repository Hack appeared first on SecurityWeek.
Tens of thousands of students studying for final exams around the world have regained access to a key online learning system after a cyberattack had earlier knocked it offline.
The post Canvas System Is Online After a Cyberattack Disrupted Thousands of Schools appeared first on SecurityWeek.
Days after confirming a major data breach, Instructure is now facing a second blow.
Earlier this week, Instructure confirmed a major data breach affecting its cloud‑hosted Canvas environment, with the ShinyHunters group claiming it stole hundreds of millions of records tied to thousands of schools and universities worldwide. As discussed in our earlier blog, that incident involved data such as student and staff records, enrollment details, and private messages allegedly accessed through Canvas export features and APIs. At that stage, the focus was on large‑scale data theft and the long‑term risks for affected students and families, including identity fraud and highly targeted phishing.
According to new reporting, ShinyHunters has now hit Instructure again, this time moving from quiet data theft to very visible extortion. Using another vulnerability in Instructure’s systems, the attackers were able to modify Canvas login portals for hundreds of educational institutions, defacing both web logins and the Canvas app with an on‑screen ransom message.
The message both claimed responsibility for the earlier breach and set a deadline of May 12 for Instructure and affected schools to contact the gang or risk the public release of stolen data.
This second wave matters for two reasons. First, it confirms that ShinyHunters still has meaningful access to Instructure’s environment, or at least to components that control the look and behavior of school login pages. Second, it marks a clear escalation in pressure tactics, from leaked claims and dark web posts to messages shown directly to students, parents, and staff trying to access their courses.
For students and families, the practical advice from our original blog still applies:
For schools and districts, this latest extortion campaign underlines the need to coordinate closely with Instructure, review single sign-on (SSO) integrations, and prepare clear communications so that any future defacements or data leaks do not catch staff and parents by surprise.
According to CNET. Read their review →
Days after confirming a major data breach, Instructure is now facing a second blow.
Earlier this week, Instructure confirmed a major data breach affecting its cloud‑hosted Canvas environment, with the ShinyHunters group claiming it stole hundreds of millions of records tied to thousands of schools and universities worldwide. As discussed in our earlier blog, that incident involved data such as student and staff records, enrollment details, and private messages allegedly accessed through Canvas export features and APIs. At that stage, the focus was on large‑scale data theft and the long‑term risks for affected students and families, including identity fraud and highly targeted phishing.
According to new reporting, ShinyHunters has now hit Instructure again, this time moving from quiet data theft to very visible extortion. Using another vulnerability in Instructure’s systems, the attackers were able to modify Canvas login portals for hundreds of educational institutions, defacing both web logins and the Canvas app with an on‑screen ransom message.
The message both claimed responsibility for the earlier breach and set a deadline of May 12 for Instructure and affected schools to contact the gang or risk the public release of stolen data.
This second wave matters for two reasons. First, it confirms that ShinyHunters still has meaningful access to Instructure’s environment, or at least to components that control the look and behavior of school login pages. Second, it marks a clear escalation in pressure tactics, from leaked claims and dark web posts to messages shown directly to students, parents, and staff trying to access their courses.
For students and families, the practical advice from our original blog still applies:
For schools and districts, this latest extortion campaign underlines the need to coordinate closely with Instructure, review single sign-on (SSO) integrations, and prepare clear communications so that any future defacements or data leaks do not catch staff and parents by surprise.
According to CNET. Read their review →
An ongoing data extortion attack targeting the widely-used education technology platform Canvas disrupted classes and coursework at school districts and universities across the United States today, after a cybercrime group defaced the service’s login page with a ransom demand that threatened to leak data from 275 million students and faculty across nearly 9,000 educational institutions.
A screenshot shared by a reader showing the extortion message that was shown on the Canvas login page today.
Canvas parent firm Instructure responded to today’s defacement attacks by disabling the platform, which is used by thousands of schools, universities and businesses to manage coursework and assignments, and to communicate with students.
Instructure acknowledged a data breach earlier this week, after the cybercrime group ShinyHunters claimed responsibility and said they would leak data on tens of millions of students and faculty unless paid a ransom. The stated deadline for payment was initially set at May 6, but it was later pushed back to May 12.
In a statement on May 6, Instructure said the investigation so far shows the stolen information includes “certain identifying information of users at affected institutions, such as names, email addresses, and student ID numbers, as well as as messages among users.” The company said it found no evidence the breached data included more sensitive information, such as passwords, dates of birth, government identifiers or financial information.
The May 6 update stated that Canvas was fully operational, and that Instructure was not seeing any ongoing unauthorized activity on their platform. “At this stage, we believe the incident has been contained,” Instructure wrote.
However, by mid-day on Thursday, May 7, students and faculty at dozens of schools and universities were flooding social media sites with comments saying that a ransom demand from ShinyHunters had replaced the usual Canvas login page. Instructure responded by pulling Canvas offline and replacing the portal with the message, “Canvas is currently undergoing scheduled maintenance. Check back soon.”
“We anticipate being up soon, and will provide updates as soon as possible,” reads the current message on Instructure’s status page.
While the data stolen by ShinyHunters may or may not contain particularly sensitive information (ShinyHunters claims it includes several billion private messages among students and teachers, as well as names, phone numbers and email addresses), this attack could hardly have come at a worse time for Instructure: Many of the affected schools and universities are in the middle of final exams, and a prolonged outage could be highly damaging for the company.
The extortion message that greeted countless Canvas users today advised the affected schools to negotiate their own ransom payments to prevent the publication of their data — regardless of whether Instructure decides to pay.
“ShinyHunters has breached Instructure (again),” the extortion message read. “Instead of contacting us to resolve it they ignored us and did some ‘security patches.'”
A source close to the investigation who was not authorized to speak to the press told KrebsOnSecurity that a number of universities have already approached the cybercrime group about paying. The same source also pointed out that the ShinyHunters data leak blog no longer lists Instructure among its current extortion victims, and that the samples of data stolen from Canvas customers were removed as well. Data extortion groups like ShinyHunters will typically only remove victims from their leak sites after receiving an extortion payment or after a victim agrees to negotiate.
Dipan Mann, founder and CEO of the security firm Cloudskope, slammed Instructure for referring to today’s outage as a “scheduled maintenance” event on its status page. Mann said Shiny Hunters first demonstrated they’d breached Instructure on May 1, prompting Instructure’s Chief Information Security Officer Steve Proud to declare the following day that the incident had been contained. But Mann said today’s attack is at least the third time in the past eight months that Instructure has been breached by ShinyHunters.
In a blog post today, Mann noted that in September 2025, ShinyHunters released thousands of internal University of Pennsylvania files — donor records, internal memos, and other confidential materials — through what the Daily Pennsylvanian and other outlets later determined was, in part, a Canvas/Instructure-mediated access path.
“Penn was the named victim,” Mann wrote. “Instructure was the mechanism. The incident was treated as a Penn-specific story by most of the national press and quietly handled by Instructure as a customer-specific matter. That framing was wrong then. It is dramatically more wrong in light of the May 2026 events, which now look like the planned escalation of an attack pattern that ShinyHunters had been working against Instructure’s environment for at least eight months prior. The September 2025 Penn breach was the proof of concept. The May 1, 2026 incident was the production run. The May 7, 2026 recompromise was ShinyHunters demonstrating publicly that the May 2 ‘containment’ did not happen.”
In February, a ShinyHunters spokesperson told The Daily Pennsylvanian that Penn failed to pay a $1 million ransom demand. On March 5, ShinyHunters published 461 megabytes worth of data stolen from Penn, including thousands of files such as donor records and internal memos.
ShinyHunters is a prolific and fluid cybercriminal group that specializes in data theft and extortion. They typically gain access to companies through voice phishing and social engineering attacks that often involve impersonating IT personnel or other trusted members of a targeted organization.
Last month, ShinyHunters relieved the home security giant ADT of personal information on 5.5 million customers. The extortion group told BleepingComputer they breached the company by compromising an employee’s Okta single sign-on account in a voice phishing attack that enabled access to ADT’s Salesforce instance. BleepingComputer says ShinyHunters recently has taken credit for a number of extortion attacks against high-profile organizations, including Medtronic, Rockstar Games, McGraw Hill, 7-Eleven and the cruise line operator Carnival.
The attack on Canvas customers is just one of several major cybercrime campaigns being launched by ShinyHunters at the moment, said Charles Carmakal, chief technology officer at the Google-owned Mandiant Consulting. Carmakal declined to comment specifically on the Canvas breach, but said “there are multiple concurrent and discrete ShinyHunters intrusion and extortion campaigns happening right now.”
Cloudskope’s Mann said what happens next depends largely on whether Instructure’s customers — the universities, K-12 districts, and education ministries paying for Canvas — choose to apply pressure or absorb the breach quietly.
“The history of education-vendor incidents suggests the path of least resistance is the second one,” he concluded.
Update, May 8, 11:05 a.m. ET: Instructure has published an incident update page that includes more information about the breach. Instructure said its Canvas portal is functioning normally again, and that the hackers exploited an issue related to Free-for-Teacher accounts.
“This is the same issue that led to the unauthorized access the prior week,” Instructure wrote. “As a result, we have made the difficult decision to temporarily shut down Free-for-Teacher accounts. These accounts have been a core part of our platform, and we’re committed to resolving the issues with these accounts.”
Instructure said affected organizations were notified on May 6.
“If your organization is affected, Instructure will contact your organization’s primary contacts directly,” the update states. “Please don’t rely on third-party lists or social media posts naming potentially affected organizations as those lists aren’t verified. Instructure will confirm validated information through direct outreach to all affected organizations.”
Update, May 11, 10:16 p.m. ET: Instructure posted an update saying they paid their extortionists in exchange for a promise to destroy the stolen data. “The data was returned to us,” the update reads. “We received digital confirmation of data destruction (shred logs). We have been informed that no Instructure customers will be extorted as a result of this incident, publicly or otherwise.”
Instructure, the company behind the Canvas learning management system (LMS), confirmed a cyber incident and subsequent data breach affecting its cloud‑hosted environment.
The ShinyHunters ransomware group claims it is behind the attack and says it stole roughly 275 million records tied to students, teachers, and staff.
The criminals shared a list of 8,809 school districts, universities, and online education platforms with BleepingComputer whose Canvas instances they claim were impacted, with per‑institution record counts ranging from tens of thousands to several million.
If you’ve been told that your child was affected by the Instructure breach, you may be wondering what you can do to protect them. Here are some practical steps you can take right away.
Start with the notification from the school or district and Instructure’s own updates to understand what data about your child was involved (for example: name, email address, student ID, or course information). Follow any specific steps they recommend for student accounts and keep an eye on follow‑up messages in case new information comes to light.
Make sure the notification is real before anything else. If anything in the message looks suspicious, such as odd links, pressure to act immediately, or requests for extra data, check this first. Go to the district’s or Instructure’s site directly and use the contact details listed there to verify.
If your child has a Canvas or related account, change that password immediately, especially if your school lets students or parents log in with a username and password instead of single sign‑on. If your child tends to reuse passwords (for example, using the same one for Canvas, email, and gaming accounts), change those other passwords as well.
Give every account its own strong, unique password and consider using a family password manager so you can create and store these without relying on memory. For younger children, you may want to manage these credentials yourself and keep a list of which education platforms they use.
Multi‑factor authentication (MFA) makes it much harder for someone to log into an account with just a password. If your school or district allows it on parent or student accounts (for example, a code sent by SMS, email, or generated in an authenticator app), turn it on and, ideally, have the codes go to a device or app you control.
Remind your child that security codes are like short‑term passwords. They should never share them with friends, teachers, or anyone claiming to be “IT support,” even if a message looks urgent or uses school branding.
If the breach included very sensitive identifiers (such as national ID or Social Security numbers in some regions), ask both the school and the breached provider what protection is being offered for minors, such as credit monitoring or identity restoration services. In some countries, you can also place a credit freeze or similar block on a minor’s file to prevent new accounts being opened in their name.
Even if your child is too young to have a credit file today, it’s worth keeping a note of this incident so you remember to check their records once they are old enough.
Attackers like to reuse stolen data from education platforms to make phishing and scam messages more convincing, mentioning real school names, teachers, or courses. Be especially wary of emails and texts that claim to be from the school, district, or Instructure and that ask you to “confirm” login details, open unexpected attachments (like “new assignments”), or pay fees via unusual methods.
As a rule of thumb, avoid clicking links in unsolicited messages about the breach. Instead, open a new browser window and go to the official site or app as you normally would, then log in from there to check for messages.
What do cybercriminals know about you?
Use Malwarebytes’ free Digital Footprint scan to see whether your personal information has been exposed online.
Instructure, the company behind the Canvas learning management system (LMS), confirmed a cyber incident and subsequent data breach affecting its cloud‑hosted environment.
The ShinyHunters ransomware group claims it is behind the attack and says it stole roughly 275 million records tied to students, teachers, and staff.
The criminals shared a list of 8,809 school districts, universities, and online education platforms with BleepingComputer whose Canvas instances they claim were impacted, with per‑institution record counts ranging from tens of thousands to several million.
If you’ve been told that your child was affected by the Instructure breach, you may be wondering what you can do to protect them. Here are some practical steps you can take right away.
Start with the notification from the school or district and Instructure’s own updates to understand what data about your child was involved (for example: name, email address, student ID, or course information). Follow any specific steps they recommend for student accounts and keep an eye on follow‑up messages in case new information comes to light.
Make sure the notification is real before anything else. If anything in the message looks suspicious, such as odd links, pressure to act immediately, or requests for extra data, check this first. Go to the district’s or Instructure’s site directly and use the contact details listed there to verify.
If your child has a Canvas or related account, change that password immediately, especially if your school lets students or parents log in with a username and password instead of single sign‑on. If your child tends to reuse passwords (for example, using the same one for Canvas, email, and gaming accounts), change those other passwords as well.
Give every account its own strong, unique password and consider using a family password manager so you can create and store these without relying on memory. For younger children, you may want to manage these credentials yourself and keep a list of which education platforms they use.
Multi‑factor authentication (MFA) makes it much harder for someone to log into an account with just a password. If your school or district allows it on parent or student accounts (for example, a code sent by SMS, email, or generated in an authenticator app), turn it on and, ideally, have the codes go to a device or app you control.
Remind your child that security codes are like short‑term passwords. They should never share them with friends, teachers, or anyone claiming to be “IT support,” even if a message looks urgent or uses school branding.
If the breach included very sensitive identifiers (such as national ID or Social Security numbers in some regions), ask both the school and the breached provider what protection is being offered for minors, such as credit monitoring or identity restoration services. In some countries, you can also place a credit freeze or similar block on a minor’s file to prevent new accounts being opened in their name.
Even if your child is too young to have a credit file today, it’s worth keeping a note of this incident so you remember to check their records once they are old enough.
Attackers like to reuse stolen data from education platforms to make phishing and scam messages more convincing, mentioning real school names, teachers, or courses. Be especially wary of emails and texts that claim to be from the school, district, or Instructure and that ask you to “confirm” login details, open unexpected attachments (like “new assignments”), or pay fees via unusual methods.
As a rule of thumb, avoid clicking links in unsolicited messages about the breach. Instead, open a new browser window and go to the official site or app as you normally would, then log in from there to check for messages.
What do cybercriminals know about you?
Use Malwarebytes’ free Digital Footprint scan to see whether your personal information has been exposed online.
Security researchers are warning about a newly discovered vulnerability in the widely used web server management software cPanel and WebHost Manager (WHM).
This is a critical, actively exploited authentication-bypass bug in cPanel/WHM that lets attackers gain administrative access to the interface without credentials, potentially take over servers and all hosted sites.
The vulnerability, tracked as CVE-2026-41940, has been added to the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog by the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), meaning there is evidence it is being used in real-world attacks.
Because cPanel/WHM is used by over a million sites worldwide, including banks and health organizations, the potential impact is huge. In simple terms, the bug can act like a front‑door key to a big chunk of the web’s hosting infrastructure.
cPanel released patches on April 28, 2026, and urged all customers and hosts to update. It said all supported versions after 11.40 are affected, including DNSOnly and WP Squared.
Hosting providers including Namecheap, HostGator, and KnownHost temporarily blocked access to cPanel interfaces while patching, treating this as a critical authentication bypass and reporting exploit attempts going back to late February 2026.
While it’s up to the hosting companies and website owners to patch as quickly as possible, there are ways to reduce your risk if a site you use is compromised.
As always, limit the data you share with websites to what’s absolutely necessary. Data they don’t have can’t be stolen.
When ordering from an online retailer, don’t tick the box to save your card details for future purchases as they will be stored on the server.
If there’s an option to check out as a guest, use it. It reduces the amount of personal data tied to an account.
Don’t reuse passwords. When one site is compromised, having the same credentials in several places turns it into a multi‑account takeover problem. A password manager can help you create complex unique passphrases, and remember them for you.
Where possible, pay by credit card. In many regions, this gives you stronger fraud protection.
If you think you’ve been affected by a data breach, take the following steps:
What do cybercriminals know about you?
Use Malwarebytes’ free Digital Footprint scan to see whether your personal information has been exposed online.
Security researchers are warning about a newly discovered vulnerability in the widely used web server management software cPanel and WebHost Manager (WHM).
This is a critical, actively exploited authentication-bypass bug in cPanel/WHM that lets attackers gain administrative access to the interface without credentials, potentially take over servers and all hosted sites.
The vulnerability, tracked as CVE-2026-41940, has been added to the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog by the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), meaning there is evidence it is being used in real-world attacks.
Because cPanel/WHM is used by over a million sites worldwide, including banks and health organizations, the potential impact is huge. In simple terms, the bug can act like a front‑door key to a big chunk of the web’s hosting infrastructure.
cPanel released patches on April 28, 2026, and urged all customers and hosts to update. It said all supported versions after 11.40 are affected, including DNSOnly and WP Squared.
Hosting providers including Namecheap, HostGator, and KnownHost temporarily blocked access to cPanel interfaces while patching, treating this as a critical authentication bypass and reporting exploit attempts going back to late February 2026.
While it’s up to the hosting companies and website owners to patch as quickly as possible, there are ways to reduce your risk if a site you use is compromised.
As always, limit the data you share with websites to what’s absolutely necessary. Data they don’t have can’t be stolen.
When ordering from an online retailer, don’t tick the box to save your card details for future purchases as they will be stored on the server.
If there’s an option to check out as a guest, use it. It reduces the amount of personal data tied to an account.
Don’t reuse passwords. When one site is compromised, having the same credentials in several places turns it into a multi‑account takeover problem. A password manager can help you create complex unique passphrases, and remember them for you.
Where possible, pay by credit card. In many regions, this gives you stronger fraud protection.
If you think you’ve been affected by a data breach, take the following steps:
What do cybercriminals know about you?
Use Malwarebytes’ free Digital Footprint scan to see whether your personal information has been exposed online.
A Brazilian tech firm that specializes in protecting networks from distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks has been enabling a botnet responsible for an extended campaign of massive DDoS attacks against other network operators in Brazil, KrebsOnSecurity has learned. The firm’s chief executive says the malicious activity resulted from a security breach and was likely the work of a competitor trying to tarnish his company’s public image.
An Archer AX21 router from TP-Link. Image: tp-link.com.
For the past several years, security experts have tracked a series of massive DDoS attacks originating from Brazil and solely targeting Brazilian ISPs. Until recently, it was less than clear who or what was behind these digital sieges. That changed earlier this month when a trusted source who asked to remain anonymous shared a curious file archive that was exposed in an open directory online.
The exposed archive contained several Portuguese-language malicious programs written in Python. It also included the private SSH authentication keys belonging to the CEO of Huge Networks, a Brazilian ISP that primarily offers DDoS protection to other Brazilian network operators.
Founded in Miami, Fla. in 2014, Huge Networks’s operations are centered in Brazil. The company originated from protecting game servers against DDoS attacks and evolved into an ISP-focused DDoS mitigation provider. It does not appear in any public abuse complaints and is not associated with any known DDoS-for-hire services.
Nevertheless, the exposed archive shows that a Brazil-based threat actor maintained root access to Huge Networks infrastructure and built a powerful DDoS botnet by routinely mass-scanning the Internet for insecure Internet routers and unmanaged domain name system (DNS) servers on the Web that could be enlisted in attacks.
DNS is what allows Internet users to reach websites by typing familiar domain names instead of the associated IP addresses. Ideally, DNS servers only provide answers to machines within a trusted domain. But so-called “DNS reflection” attacks rely on DNS servers that are (mis)configured to accept queries from anywhere on the Web. Attackers can send spoofed DNS queries to these servers so that the request appears to come from the target’s network. That way, when the DNS servers respond, they reply to the spoofed (targeted) address.
By taking advantage of an extension to the DNS protocol that enables large DNS messages, botmasters can dramatically boost the size and impact of a reflection attack — crafting DNS queries so that the responses are much bigger than the requests. For example, an attacker could compose a DNS request of less than 100 bytes, prompting a response that is 60-70 times as large. This amplification effect is especially pronounced when the perpetrators can query many DNS servers with these spoofed requests from tens of thousands of compromised devices simultaneously.
A DNS amplification and reflection attack, illustrated. Image: veracara.digicert.com.
The exposed file archive includes a command-line history showing exactly how this attacker built and maintained a powerful botnet by scouring the Internet for TP-Link Archer AX21 routers. Specifically, the botnet seeks out TP-Link devices that remain vulnerable to CVE-2023-1389, an unauthenticated command injection vulnerability that was patched back in April 2023.
Malicious domains in the exposed Python attack scripts included DNS lookups for hikylover[.]st, and c.loyaltyservices[.]lol, both domains that have been flagged in the past year as control servers for an Internet of Things (IoT) botnet powered by a Mirai malware variant.
The leaked archive shows the botmaster coordinated their scanning from a Digital Ocean server that has been flagged for abusive activity hundreds of times in the past year. The Python scripts invoke multiple Internet addresses assigned to Huge Networks that were used to identify targets and execute DDoS campaigns. The attacks were strictly limited to Brazilian IP address ranges, and the scripts show that each selected IP address prefix was attacked for 10-60 seconds with four parallel processes per host before the botnet moved on to the next target.
The archive also shows these malicious Python scripts relied on private SSH keys belonging to Huge Networks’s CEO, Erick Nascimento. Reached for comment about the files, Mr. Nascimento said he did not write the attack programs and that he didn’t realize the extent of the DDoS campaigns until contacted by KrebsOnSecurity.
“We received and notified many Tier 1 upstreams regarding very very large DDoS attacks against small ISPs,” Nascimento said. “We didn’t dig deep enough at the time, and what you sent makes that clear.”
Nascimento said the unauthorized activity is likely related to a digital intrusion first detected in January 2026 that compromised two of the company’s development servers, as well as his personal SSH keys. But he said there’s no evidence those keys were used after January.
“We notified the team in writing the same day, wiped the boxes, and rotated keys,” Nascimento said, sharing a screenshot of a January 11 notification from Digital Ocean. “All documented internally.”
Mr. Nascimento said Huge Networks has since engaged a third-party network forensics firm to investigate further.
“Our working assessment so far is that this all started with a single internal compromise — one pivot point that gave the attacker downstream access to some resources, including a legacy personal droplet of mine,” he wrote.
“The compromise happened through a bastion/jump server that several people had access to,” Nascimento continued. “Digital Ocean flagged the droplet on January 11 — compromised due to a leaked SSH key, in their wording — I was traveling at the time and addressed it on return. That droplet was deprecated and destroyed, and it was never part of Huge Networks infrastructure.”
The malicious software that powers the botnet of TP-Link devices used in the DDoS attacks on Brazilian ISPs is based on Mirai, a malware strain that made its public debut in September 2016 by launching a then record-smashing DDoS attack that kept this website offline for four days. In January 2017, KrebsOnSecurity identified the Mirai authors as the co-owners of a DDoS mitigation firm that was using the botnet to attack gaming servers and scare up new clients.
In May 2025, KrebsOnSecurity was hit by another Mirai-based DDoS that Google called the largest attack it had ever mitigated. That report implicated a 20-something Brazilian man who was running a DDoS mitigation company as well as several DDoS-for-hire services that have since been seized by the FBI.
Nascimento flatly denied being involved in DDoS attacks against Brazilian operators to generate business for his company’s services.
“We don’t run DDoS attacks against Brazilian operators to sell protection,” Nascimento wrote in response to questions. “Our sales model is mostly inbound and through channel integrator, distributors, partners — not active prospecting based on market incidents. The targets in the scripts you received are small regional providers, the vast majority of which are neither in our customer base nor in our commercial pipeline — a fact verifiable through public sources like QRator.”
Nascimento maintains he has “strong evidence stored on the blockchain” that this was all done by a competitor. As for who that competitor might be, the CEO wouldn’t say.
“I would love to share this with you, but it could not be published as it would lose the surprise factor against my dishonest competitor,” he explained. “Coincidentally or not, your contact happened a week before an important event – one that this competitor has NEVER participated in (and it’s a traditional event in the sector). And this year, they will be participating. Strange, isn’t it?”
Strange indeed.
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