Brand, website, and corporate mailout impersonation is becoming an increasingly common technique used by cybercriminals. The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) reported a spike in such incidents in 2025. While tech companies and consumer brands are the most frequent targets, every industry in every country is generally at risk. The only thing that changes is how the imposters exploit the fakes In practice, we typically see the following attack scenarios:

• Luring clients and customers to a fake website to harvest login credentials for the real online store, or to steal payment details for direct theft.
• Luring employees and business partners to a fake corporate login portal to acquire legitimate credentials for infiltrating the corporate network.
• Prompting clients and customers to contact the scammers under various pretexts: getting tech support, processing a refund, entering a prize giveaway, or claiming compensation for public events involving the brand. The goal is to then swindle the victims out of as much money as possible.
• Luring business partners and employees to specially crafted pages that mimic internal company systems, to get them to approve a payment or redirect a legitimate payment to the scammers.
• Prompting clients, business partners, and employees to download malware — most often an infostealer — disguised as corporate software from a fake company website.

The words “luring” and “prompting” here imply a whole toolbox of tactics: email, messages in chat apps, social media posts that look like official ads, lookalike websites promoted through SEO tools, and even paid ads.

These schemes all share two common features. First, the attackers exploit the organization’s brand, and strive to mimic its official website, domain name, and corporate style of emails, ads, and social media posts. And the forgery doesn’t have to be flawless — just convincing enough for at least some of business partners and customers. Second, while the organization and its online resources aren’t targeted directly, the impact on them is still significant.

Business damage from brand impersonation

When fakes are crafted to target employees, an attack can lead to direct financial loss. An employee might be persuaded to transfer company funds, or their credentials could be used to steal confidential information or launch a ransomware attack.

Attacks on customers don’t typically imply direct damage to the company’s coffers, but they cause substantial indirect harm in the following areas:

• Strain on customer support. Customers who “bought” a product on a fake site will likely bring their issues to the real customer support team. Convincing them that they never actually placed an order is tough, making each case a major time waster for multiple support agents.
• Reputational damage. Defrauded customers often blame the brand for failing to protect them from the scam, and also expect compensation. According to a European survey, around half of affected buyers expect payouts and may stop using the company’s services — often sharing their negative experience on social media. This is especially damaging if the victims include public figures or anyone with a large following.
• Unplanned response costs. Depending on the specifics and scale of an attack, an affected company might need digital forensics and incident response (DFIR) services, as well as consultants specializing in consumer law, intellectual property, cybersecurity, and crisis PR.
• Increased insurance premiums. Companies that insure businesses against cyber-incidents factor in fallout from brand impersonation. An increased risk profile may be reflected in a higher premium for a business.
• Degraded website performance and rising ad costs. If criminals run paid ads using a brand’s name, they siphon traffic away from its official site. Furthermore, if a company pays to advertise its site, the cost per click rises due to the increased competition. This is a particularly acute problem for IT companies selling online services, but it’s also relevant for retail brands.
• Long-term metric decline. This includes drops in sales volume, market share, and market capitalization. These are all consequences of lost trust from customers and business partners following major incidents.

Does insurance cover the damage?

Popular cyber-risk insurance policies typically only cover costs directly tied to incidents explicitly defined in the policy — think data loss, business interruption, IT system compromise, and the like. Fake domains and web pages don’t directly damage a company’s IT systems, so they’re usually not covered by standard insurance. Reputational losses and the act of impersonation itself are separate insurance risks, requiring expanded coverage for this scenario specifically.

Of the indirect losses we’ve listed above, standard insurance might cover DFIR expenses and, in some cases, extra customer support costs (if the situation is recognized as an insured event). Voluntary customer reimbursements, lost sales, and reputational damage are almost certainly not covered.

What to do if your company is attacked by clones

If you find out someone is using your brand’s name for fraud, it makes sense to do the following:

• Send clear, straightforward notifications to your customers explaining what happened, what measures are being taken, and how to verify the authenticity of official websites, emails, and other communications.
• Create a simple “trust center” page listing your official domains, social media accounts, app store links, and support contacts. Make it easy to find and keep it updated.
• Monitor new registrations of social media pages and domain names that contain your brand names to spot the clones before an attack kicks off.
• Follow a takedown procedure. This involves gathering evidence, filing complaints with domain registrars, hosting providers, and social media administrators, then tracking the status until the fakes are fully removed. For a complete and accurate record of violations, preserve URLs, screenshots, metadata, and the date and time of discovery. Ideally, also examine the source code of fake pages, as it might contain clues pointing to other components of the criminal operation.
• Add a simple customer reporting form for suspicious sites or messages to your official website and/or branded app. This helps you learn about problems early.
• Coordinate activities between your legal, cybersecurity, and marketing teams. This ensures a consistent, unified, and effective response.

How to defend against brand impersonation attacks

While the open nature of the internet and the specifics of these attacks make preventing them outright impossible, a business can stay on top of new fakes and have the tools ready to fight back.

• Continuously monitor for suspicious public activity using specialized monitoring services. The most obvious indicator is the registration of domains similar to your brand name, but there are others — like someone buying databases related to your organization on the dark web. Comprehensive monitoring of all platforms is best outsourced to a specialized service provider, such as Kaspersky Digital Footprint Intelligence (DFI).
• The quickest and simplest way to take down a fake website or social media profile is to file a trademark infringement complaint. Make sure your portfolio of registered trademarks is robust enough to file complaints under UDRP procedures before you need it.
• When you discover fakes, deploy UDRP procedures promptly to have the fake domains transferred or removed. For social media, follow the platform’s specific infringement procedure — easily found by searching for “[social media name] trademark infringement” (for example, “LinkedIn trademark infringement”). Transferring the domain to the legitimate owner is preferred over deletion, as it prevents scammers from simply re-registering it. Many continuous monitoring services, such as Kaspersky Digital Footprint Intelligence, also offer a rapid takedown service, filing complaints on the protected brand’s behalf.
• Act quickly to block fake domains on your corporate systems. This won’t protect partners or customers, but it’ll throw a wrench into attacks targeting your own employees.
• Consider proactively registering your company’s website name and common variations (for example, with and without hyphens) in all major top-level domains, such as .com, and local extensions. This helps protect partners and customers from common typos and simple copycat sites.

The life of a modern head of information security (also known as CISO – Chief Information Security Officer) is not just about fighting hackers. It’s also an endless quest that goes by the name of “compliance”. Regulators keep tightening the screws, standards pop up like mushrooms, and headaches only get worse; but wait… – there’s more: CISOs are responsible not only for their own perimeter, but what goes on outside it too: for their entire supply chain, all their contractors, and the whole hodge-podge of software their business processes run on. Though the logic here is solid, it’s also unfortunately ruthless: if a hole is found at your supplier, but the problems hit you, in the end it’s you who’s held accountable. This logic applies to security software too.

Back in the day, companies rarely thought about what was actually inside the security solutions and products they used. Now, however, businesses – especially large ones – want to know everything: what’s really inside the box? Who wrote the code? Is it going to break some critical function or could it even bring everything down? (We’ve seen such precedents; example: the Crowdstrike 2024 update incident.) Where and how is data processed? And these are the right questions to ask.

The problem lies in the fact that almost all customers trust their vendors to answer accurately when asked such questions – very often because they have no other choice. A more mature approach in today’s cyber-reality is to verify.

In corporate-speak this is called supply-chain trust, and trying to solve this puzzle on your own is a serious headache. You need help from vendors. A responsible vendor is ready to show what’s under the hood of its solutions, to open up the source code to partners and customers for review, and, in general, to earn trust not with nice slides but with solid, practical steps.

So who’s already doing this, and who’s still stuck in the past? A fresh, in-depth study from our colleagues in Europe has the answer. It was conducted by the respected testing lab AV-Comparatives, the Tyrol Chamber of Commerce (WKO), the MCI Entrepreneurial School, and the law firm Studio Legale Tremolada.

The main conclusion of the study is that the era of “black boxes” in cybersecurity is over. RIP. Amen. The future belongs to those who don’t hide their source code and vulnerability reports, and who give customers maximum choice when configuring their products. And the report clearly states who doesn’t just promise but actually delivers. Guess who!…

What a great guess! Yes – it’s us!

We give our customers something that is still, unfortunately, a rare and endangered species in the industry: transparency centers, source code reviews of our products, a detailed software bill of materials (SBOM), and the ability to check update history and control rollouts. And of course we provide everything that’s already become the industry standard. You can study all the details in the full “Transparency and Accountability in Cybersecurity” (TRACS) report, or in our summary. Below, I’ll walk through some of the most interesting bits.

Not mixing apples and oranges

TRACS reviewed 14 popular vendors and their EPP/EDR products – from Bitdefender and CrowdStrike to our EDR Optimum and WithSecure. The objective was to understand which vendors don’t just say “trust us”, but actually let you verify their claims. The study covered 60 criteria: from GDPR (General Data Protection Regulation – it’s a European study after all) compliance and ISO 27001 audits, to the ability to process all telemetry locally and access a product’s source code. But the authors decided not to give points for each category or form a single overall ranking.

Why? Because everyone has different threat models and risks. What is a feature for one may be a bug and a disaster for another. Take fast, fully automatic installation of updates. For a small business or a retail company with thousands of tiny independent branches, this is a blessing: they’d never have enough IT staff to manage all of that manually. But for a factory where a computer controls the conveyor it would be totally unacceptable. A defective update can bring a production line to a standstill, which in terms of business impact could be fatal (or at least worse than the recent Jaguar Land Rover cyberattack); here, every update needs to be tested first. It’s the same story with telemetry. A PR agency sends data from its computers to the vendor’s cloud to participate in detecting cyberthreats and get protection instantly. Perfect. A company that processes patients’ medical records or highly classified technical designs on its computers? Its telemetry settings would need to be reconsidered.

Ideally, each company should assign “weights” to every criterion, and calculate its own “compatibility rating” with EDR/EPP vendors. But one thing is obvious: whoever gives customers choices, wins.

Take file reputation analysis of suspicious files. It can work in two ways: through the vendor’s common cloud, or through a private micro-cloud within a single organization. Plus there’s the option to disable this analysis altogether and work completely offline. Very few vendors give customers all three options. For example, “on-premise” reputation analysis is available from only eight vendors in the test. It goes without saying we’re one of them.

Raising the bar

In every category of the test the situation is roughly the same as with the reputation service. Going carefully through all 45 pages of the report, we’re either ahead of our competitors or among the leaders. And we can proudly say that in roughly a third of the comparative categories we offer significantly better capabilities than most of our peers. See for yourself:

Visiting a transparency center and reviewing the source code? Verifying that the product binaries are built from this source code? Only three vendors in the test provide these things. And for one of them – it’s only for government customers. Our transparency centers are the most numerous and geographically spread out, and offer customers the widest range of options.

Downloading database updates and rechecking them? Only six players – including us – provide this.

Configuring multi-stage rollout of updates? This isn’t exactly rare, but it’s not widespread either – only seven vendors besides us support it.

Reading the results of an external security audit of the company? Only we and six other vendors are ready to share this with customers.

Breaking down a supply chain into separate links using an SBOM? This is rare too: you can request an SBOM from only three vendors. One of them is the green-colored company that happens to bear my name.

Of course, there are categories where everyone does well: all of them have successfully passed an ISO/IEC 27001 audit, comply with GDPR, follow secure development practices, and accept vulnerability reports.

Finally, there’s the matter of technical indicators. All products that work online send certain technical data about protected computers, and information about infected files. For many businesses this isn’t a problem, and they’re glad it improves effectiveness of protection. But for those seriously focused on minimizing data flows, AV-Comparatives measures those too – and we just so happen to collect the least amounts of telemetry compared to other vendors.

Practical conclusions

Thanks to the Austrian experts, CISOs and their teams now have a much simpler task ahead when checking their security vendors. And not just the 14 that were tested. The same framework can be applied to other security solution vendors and to software in general. But there are strategic conclusions too…

Transparency makes risk management easier. If you’re responsible for keeping a business running, you don’t want to guess whether your protection tool will become your weak point. You need predictability and accountability. The WKO and AV-Comparatives study confirms that our model reduces these risks and makes them manageable.

Evidence instead of slogans. In this business, it’s not enough to be able write “we are secure” on your website. You need audit mechanisms. The customer has to be able to drop by and verify things for themselves. We provide that. Others are still catching up.

Transparency and maturity go hand in hand. Vendors that are transparent for their customers usually also have more mature processes for product development, incident response, and vulnerability handling. Their products and services are more reliable.

Our approach to transparency (GTI) works. When we announced our initiative several years ago and opened Transparency Centers around the world, we heard all kinds of things from critics – like that it was a waste of money and that nobody needed it. Now independent European experts are saying that this is how a vendor should operate in 2025 and beyond.

It was a real pleasure reading this report. Not just because it praises us, but because the industry is finally turning in the right direction – toward transparency and accountability.

We started this trend, we’re leading it, and we’re going to keep pioneering within it. So, dear readers and users, don’t forget: trust is one thing; being able to fully verify is another.

Our experts from the Global Research and Analysis Team (GReAT) have investigated a new wave of targeted emails from the ForumTroll APT group. Whereas previously their malicious emails were sent to public addresses of organizations, this time the attackers have targeted specific individuals — scientists from Russian universities and other organizations specializing in political science, international relations, and global economics. The purpose of the campaign was to infect victims’ computers with malware to gain remote access thereto.

What the malicious email looks like

The attackers sent the emails from the address support@e-library{.}wiki, which imitates the address of the scientific electronic library eLibrary (its real domain is elibrary.ru). The emails contained personalized links to a report on the plagiarism check of some material, which, according to the attackers’ plan, was supposed to be of interest to scientists.

In reality, the link downloaded an archive from the same e-library{.}wiki domain. Inside was a malicious .lnk file and a .Thumbs directory with some images that were apparently needed to bypass security technologies. The victim’s full name was used in the filenames of the archive and the malicious link-file.

In case the victim had doubts about the legitimacy of the email and visited the e-library{.}wiki page, they were shown a slightly outdated copy of the real website.

What happens if the victim clicks on the malicious link

If the scientist who received the email clicked on the file with the .lnk extension, a malicious PowerShell script was executed on their computer, triggering a chain of infection. As a result, the attackers installed a commercial framework Tuoni for red teams on the attacked machine, providing the attackers with remote access and other opportunities for further compromising the system. In addition, the malware used COM Hijacking to achieve persistency, and downloaded and displayed a decoy PDF file, the name of which also included the victim’s full name. The file itself, however, was not personalized — it was a rather vague report in the format of one of the Russian plagiarism detection systems.

Interestingly, if the victim tried to open the malicious link from a device running on a system that didn’t support PowerShell, they were prompted to try again from a Windows computer. A more detailed technical analysis of the attack, along with indicators of compromise, can be found in a post on the Securelist website.

How to stay safe

The malware used in this attack is successfully detected and blocked by Kaspersky’s security products. We recommend installing a reliable security solution not only on all devices used by employees to access the internet, but also on the organization's mail gateway, which can stop most threats delivered via email before they reach an employee’s device.

Attackers often go after outdated and unused test accounts, or stumble upon publicly accessible cloud storage containing critical data that’s a bit dusty. Sometimes an attack exploits a vulnerability in an app component that was actually patched, say, two years ago. As you read these breach reports, a common theme emerges: the attacks leveraged something outdated: a service, a server, a user account… Pieces of corporate IT infrastructure that sometimes fall off the radar of IT and security teams. They become, in essence, unmanaged, useless, and simply forgotten. These IT zombies create risks for information security, regulatory compliance, and lead to unnecessary operational costs. This is generally an element of shadow IT — with one key difference: nobody wants, knows about, or benefits from these assets.

In this post, we try to identify which assets demand immediate attention, how to identify them, and what a response should look like.

Physical and virtual servers

Priority: high. Vulnerable servers are entry points for cyberattacks, and they continue consuming resources while creating regulatory compliance risks.

Prevalence: high. Physical and virtual servers are commonly orphaned in large infrastructures following migration projects, or after mergers and acquisitions. Test servers no longer used after IT projects go live, as well as web servers for outdated projects running without a domain, are also frequently forgotten. The scale of the problem is illustrated by Lets Encrypt statistics: in 2024, half of domain renewal requests came from devices no longer associated with the requested domain. And there are roughly a million of these devices in the world.

Detection: the IT department needs to implement an Automated Discovery and Reconciliation (AD&R) process that combines the results of network scanning and cloud inventory with data from the Configuration Management Database (CMDB). It enables the timely identification of outdated or conflicting information about IT assets, and helps locate the forgotten assets themselves.

This data should be supplemented by external vulnerability scans that cover all of the organization’s public IPs.

Response: establish a formal, documented process for decommissioning/retiring servers. This process needs to include verification of complete data migration, and verified subsequent destruction of data on the server. Following these steps, the server can be powered down, recycled, or repurposed. Until all procedures are complete, the server needs to be moved to a quarantined, isolated subnet.

To mitigate this issue for test environments, implement an automated process for their creation and decommission. A test environment should be created at the start of a project, and dismantled after a set period or following a certain duration of inactivity. Strengthen the security of test environments by enforcing their strict isolation from the primary (production) environment, and by prohibiting the use of real, non-anonymized business data in testing.

Forgotten user, service, and device accounts

Priority: critical. Inactive and privileged accounts are prime targets for attackers seeking to establish network persistence or expand their access within the infrastructure.

Prevalence: very high. Technical service accounts, contractor accounts, and non-personalized accounts are among the most commonly forgotten.

Detection: conduct regular analysis of the user directory (Active Directory in most organizations) to identify all types of accounts that have seen no activity over a defined period (a month, quarter, or year). Concurrently, it’s advisable to review the permissions assigned to each account, and remove any that are excessive or unnecessary.

Response: after checking with the relevant service owner on the business side or employee supervisor, outdated accounts should be simply deactivated or deleted. A comprehensive Identity and Access Management system (IAM) offers a scalable solution to this problem. In this system, the creation, deletion, and permission assignment for accounts are tightly integrated with HR processes.

For service accounts, it’s also essential to routinely review both the strength of passwords, and the expiration dates for access tokens — rotating them as necessary.

Forgotten data stores

Priority: critical. Poorly controlled data in externally accessible databases, cloud storage and recycle bins, and corporate file-sharing services — even “secure” ones — has been a key source of major breaches in 2024–2025. The data exposed in these leaks often includes document scans, medical records, and personal information. Consequently, these security incidents also lead to penalties for non-compliance with regulations such as HIPAA, GDPR, and other data-protection frameworks governing the handling of personal and confidential data.

Prevalence: high. Archive data, data copies held by contractors, legacy database versions from previous system migrations — all of these often remain unaccounted for and accessible for years (even decades) in many organizations.

Detection: given the vast variety of data types and storage methods, a combination of tools is essential for discovery:

• Native audit subsystems within major vendor platforms, such as AWS Macie, and Microsoft Purview
• Specialized Data Discovery and Data Security Posture Management solutions
• Automated analysis of inventory logs, such as S3 Inventory

Unfortunately, these tools are of limited use if a contractor creates a data store within its own infrastructure. Controlling that situation requires contractual stipulations granting the organization’s security team access to the relevant contractor storage, supplemented by threat intelligence services capable of detecting any publicly exposed or stolen datasets associated with the company’s brand.

Response: analyze access logs and integrate the discovered storage into your DLP and CASB tools to monitor its usage — or to confirm it’s truly abandoned. Use available tools to securely isolate access to the storage. If necessary, create a secure backup, then delete the data. At the organizational policy level, it’s crucial to establish retention periods for different data types, mandating their automatic archiving and deletion upon expiry. Policies must also define procedures for registering new storage systems, and explicitly prohibit the existence of ownerless data that’s accessible without restrictions, passwords, or encryption.

Unused applications and services on servers

Priority: medium. Vulnerabilities in these services increase the risk of successful cyberattacks, complicate patching efforts, and waste resources.

Prevalence: very high. services are often enabled by default during server installation, remain after testing and configuration work, and continue to run long after the business process they supported has become obsolete.

Detection: through regular audits of software configurations. For effective auditing, servers should adhere to a role-based access model, with each server role having a corresponding list of required software. In addition to the CMDB, a broad spectrum of tools helps with this audit: tools like OpenSCAP and Lynis — focused on policy compliance and system hardening; multi-purpose tools like OSQuery; vulnerability scanners such as OpenVAS; and network traffic analyzers.

Response: conduct a scheduled review of server functions with their business owners. Any unnecessary applications or services found running should be disabled. To minimize such occurrences, implement the principle of least privilege organization-wide and deploy hardened base images or server templates for standard server builds. This ensures no superfluous software is installed or enabled by default.

Outdated APIs

Priority: high. APIs are frequently exploited by attackers to exfiltrate large volumes of sensitive data, and to gain initial access into the organization. In 2024, the number of API-related attacks increased by 41%, with attackers specifically targeting outdated APIs, as these often provide data with fewer checks and restrictions. This was exemplified by the leak of 200 million records from X/Twitter.

Prevalence: high. When a service transitions to a new API version, the old one often remains operational for an extended period, particularly if it’s still used by customers or partners. These deprecated versions are typically no longer maintained, so security flaws and vulnerabilities in their components go unpatched.

Detection: at the WAF or NGFW level, it’s essential to monitor traffic to specific APIs. This helps detect anomalies that may indicate exploitation or data exfiltration, and also identify APIs that get minimal traffic.

Response: for the identified low-activity APIs, collaborate with business stakeholders to develop a decommissioning plan, and migrate any remaining users to newer versions.

For organizations with a large pool of services, this challenge is best addressed with an API management platform in conjunction with a formally approved API lifecycle policy. This policy should include well-defined criteria for deprecating and retiring outdated software interfaces.

Software with outdated dependencies and libraries

Priority: high. This is where large-scale, critical vulnerabilities like Log4Shell hide, leading to organizational compromise and regulatory compliance issues.

Prevalence: Very high, especially in large-scale enterprise management systems, industrial automation systems, and custom-built software.

Detection: use a combination of vulnerability management (VM/CTEM) systems and software composition analysis (SCA) tools. For in-house development, it’s mandatory to use scanners and comprehensive security systems integrated into the CI/CD pipeline to prevent software from being built with outdated components.

Response: company policies must require IT and development teams to systematically update software dependencies. When building internal software, dependency analysis should be part of the code review process. For third-party software, it’s crucial to regularly audit the status and age of dependencies.

For external software vendors, updating dependencies should be a contractual requirement affecting support timelines and project budgets. To make these requirements feasible, it’s essential to maintain an up-to-date software bill of materials (SBOM).

You can read more about timely and effective vulnerability remediation in a separate blog post.

Forgotten websites

Priority: medium. Forgotten web assets can be exploited by attackers for phishing, hosting malware, or running scams under the organization’s brand, damaging its reputation. In more serious cases, they can lead to data breaches, or serve as a launchpad for attacks against the given company. A specific subset of this problem involves forgotten domains that were used for one-time activities, expired, and weren’t renewed — making them available for purchase by anyone.

Prevalence: high — especially for sites launched for short-term campaigns or one-off internal activities.

Detection: the IT department must maintain a central registry of all public websites and domains, and verify the status of each with its owners on a monthly or quarterly basis. Additionally, scanners or DNS monitoring can be utilized to track domains associated with the company’s IT infrastructure. Another layer of protection is provided by threat intelligence services, which can independently detect any websites associated with the organization’s brand.

Response: establish a policy for scheduled website shutdown after a fixed period following the end of its active use. Implement an automated DNS registration and renewal system to prevent the loss of control over the company’s domains.

Unused network devices

Priority: high. Routers, firewalls, surveillance cameras, and network storage devices that are connected but left unmanaged and unpatched make for the perfect attack launchpad. These forgotten devices often harbor vulnerabilities, and almost never have proper monitoring — no EDR or SIEM integration — yet they hold a privileged position in the network, giving hackers an easy gateway to escalate attacks on servers and workstations.

Prevalence: medium. Devices get left behind during office moves, network infrastructure upgrades, or temporary workspace setups.

Detection: use the same network inventory tools mentioned in the forgotten servers section, as well as regular physical audits to compare network scans against what’s actually plugged in. Active network scanning can uncover entire untracked network segments and unexpected external connections.

Response: ownerless devices can usually be pulled offline immediately. But beware: cleaning them up requires the same care as scrubbing servers — to prevent leaks of network settings, passwords, office video footage, and so on.

News outlets recently reported that a threat actor was spreading an infostealer through free 3D model files for the Blender software. This is troubling enough on its own, but it highlights an even more serious problem: the business threat posed by free open source programs, uncontrolled by corporate infosec teams. And the danger comes not from vulnerabilities in the software, but from its very own standard features.

Why Blender and 3D model marketplaces pose a risk

Blender is a 3D graphics and animation suite used by visualization professionals across various industries. The software is free and open-source, and offers extensive functionality. Among Blender’s capabilities is support for executing Python scripts, which are used to automate tasks and add new features.

The package allows users to import external files from specialized marketplaces like CGTrader or Sketchfab. These platforms host both paid and free 3D models by artists and studios. Any of these model files potentially contain Python scripts.

This creates a concerning scenario: marketplaces where files can be uploaded by any user and may not be scanned for malicious content, combined with software that has an Auto Run Python Scripts feature. It allows files to automatically execute embedded Python scripts immediately upon opening — essentially running arbitrary code on the user’s computer in unattended mode.

 

How the StealC V2 infostealer spread via Blender files

The attackers posted free 3D models with the .blend file name extension on the popular CGTrader platform. These files contained a malicious Python script. If the user had the Auto Run Python Scripts feature enabled, downloading and opening the file in Blender triggered the script. It then established a connection to a remote server and downloaded a malware loader from the Cloudflare Workers domain.

The loader executed a PowerShell script, which in turn downloaded additional malicious payloads from the attackers’ servers. Ultimately, the victim’s computer was infected with the StealC infostealer, enabling the attackers to:

• Extract data from over 23 browsers.
• Harvest information from more than 100 browser extensions and 15 crypto wallet applications.
• Steal data from Telegram, Discord, Tox, Pidgin, ProtonVPN, OpenVPN, and email clients like Thunderbird.
• Use a User Account Control (UAC) bypass.

The danger of unmonitored work tools

The problem isn’t Blender itself — threat actors will inevitably try to exploit automation features in any popular software. Most end-users don’t consider the risks of enabling common automation features, nor do they typically dive deep into how these features work or how they could be exploited.

The core issue is that security teams aren’t always familiar with the capabilities of specialized tools used by various departments. They simply don’t account for this vector in their threat models.

How to avoid becoming a victim

If your company uses Blender, the first step is to disable the automatic execution of Python scripts (Auto Run Python Scripts feature). Here’s how to do it according to official documentation.

Furthermore, to prevent the sudden spread of threats via work tools, we recommend that corporate security teams:

• Prohibit the use of tools and extensions that haven’t been approved by the security team.
• Thoroughly vet permitted software, and assess risks before implementing any new services or platforms.
• Regularly train employees to recognize the risks associated with installing unknown software and using dangerous features. You can automate security awareness training with the Kaspersky Automated Security Awareness Platform.
• Enforce the use of secure configurations for all work tools.
• Protect all company-issued devices with modern security solutions.

On December 3, the coordinated elimination of the critical vulnerability CVE-2025-55182 (CVSSv3 — 10) became known. It was found in React server components (RSC), as well as in a number of derivative projects and frameworks: Next.js, React Router RSC preview, Redwood SDK, Waku, and RSC plugins Vite and Parcel. The vulnerability allows any unauthenticated attacker to send a request to a vulnerable server and execute arbitrary code. Considering that tens of millions of websites, including Airbnb and Netflix, are built on React and Next.js, and vulnerable versions of the components were found in approximately 39% of cloud infrastructures, the scale of exploitation could be very serious. Measures to protect your online services must be taken immediately.

A separate CVE-2025-66478 was initially created for the Next.js vulnerability, but it was deemed a duplicate, so the Next.js defect also falls under CVE-2025-55182.

Where and how does the React4Shell vulnerability work?

React is a popular JavaScript library for creating user interfaces for web applications. Thanks to RSC components, which appeared in React 18 in 2020, part of the work of assembling a web page is performed not in the browser, but on the server. The web page code can call React functions that will run on the server, get the execution result from them, and insert it into the web page. This allows some websites to run faster — the browser doesn’t need to load unnecessary code. RSC divides the application into server and client components, where the former can perform server operations (database queries, access to secrets, complex calculations), while the latter remains interactive on the user’s machine. A special lightweight HTTP-based protocol called Flight is used for fast streaming of serialized information between the client and server.

CVE-2025-55182 lies in the processing of Flight requests, or to be more precise — in the unsafe deserialization of data streams. React Server Components versions 19.0.0, 19.1.0, 19.1.1, 19.2.0 — or, more specifically, the react-server-dom-parcel, react-server-dom-turbopack, and react-server-dom-webpack packages — are vulnerable. Vulnerable versions of Next.js are: 15.0.4, 15.1.8, 15.2.5, 15.3.5, 15.4.7, 15.5.6, and 16.0.6.

To exploit the vulnerability, an attacker can send a simple HTTP request to the server, and even before authentication and any checks, this request can initiate the launch of a process on the server with React privileges.

There’s no data on the exploitation of CVE-2025-55182 in the wild yet, but experts agree that it’s possible, and will most likely be large-scale. Wiz claims that its test RCE exploit works with almost 100% reliability. A prototype of the exploit is already available on GitHub, so it won’t be difficult for attackers to adopt it and launch mass attacks.

React was originally designed to create client-side code that runs in a browser; server-side components containing vulnerabilities are relatively new. Many projects built on older versions of React, or projects where React server-side components are disabled, are not affected by this vulnerability.

However, if a project doesn’t use server-side functions, this doesn’t mean it’s protected — RSCs may still be active. Websites and services built on recent versions of React with default settings (for example, an application on Next.js built using create-next-app) will be vulnerable.

Protective measures against exploitation of CVE-2025-55182

Updates. React users should update to the versions 19.0.1, 19.1.2 or 19.2.1. Next.js users should update to versions 15.1.9, 15.2.6, 15.3.6, 15.4.8, 15.5.7, or 16.0.7. Detailed instructions for updating the react-server component for React Router, Expo, Redwood SDK, Waku, and other projects are provided in the React blog.

Cloud provider protection. Major providers have released rules for their application-level web filters (WAF) to prevent exploitation of vulnerabilities:

• Akamai (rules for App & API Protector users);
• AWS (AWS WAF rules are included in the standard set, but require manual activation);
• Cloudflare (protects all customers, including those on the free plan. Works if traffic to the React application is proxied through Cloudflare WAF. Customers on professional or enterprise plans should verify that the rule is active);
• Google Cloud (Cloud Armor rules for Firebase Hosting and Firebase App Hosting are applied automatically);
• Vercel (rules are applied automatically).

However, all providers emphasize that WAF protection only buys time for scheduled patching, and RSC components still need to be updated on all projects.

Protecting web services on your own servers. The least invasive solution would be to apply detection rules that prevent exploitation to your WAF or firewall. Most vendors have already released the necessary rule sets, but you can also prepare them yourself — for example, based on our list of dangerous POST requests.

If granular analysis and filtering of web traffic isn’t possible in your environment, identify all servers on which RSC (server function endpoints) are available, and significantly restrict access to them. For internal services, you can block requests from all untrusted IP ranges; for public services, you can strengthen IP reputation filtering and rate limiting.

An additional layer of protection will be provided by an EPP/EDR agent on servers with RSC. It will help detect anomalies in react-server behavior after the vulnerability has been exploited, and prevent the attack from developing.

In-depth investigation. Although information about exploitation of the vulnerability in the wild hasn’t been confirmed yet, it cannot be ruled out that it’s already happening. It’s recommended to study the logs of network traffic and cloud environments, and if suspicious requests are detected, to carry out a full response — including the rotation of keys and other secrets available on the server. Signs of post-exploitation activity to look for first: reconnaissance of the server environment, searches for secrets (.env, CI/CD tokens, etc.), and installation of web shells.

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