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Hidden prompt turns Microsoft Copilot into an AI worm

30 July 2026 at 14:58

A security researcher has demonstrated how Microsoft Copilot for Word can be tricked into spreading a self‑propagating prompt‑injection β€œAI worm.” The attack silently alters documents and embeds its own hidden instructions into newly created files, allowing it to spread through normal document-sharing workflows without macros or traditional malware.

The technique allows an attacker to hide a JSON‑formatted prompt as white text on a white background inside a Word document. When someone asks Copilot for Word to draft or edit content based on that document, Copilot strips away the formatting, reads the hidden text, and treats the embedded instructions as part of the user’s request.

Copilot then modifies the active document and appends the full malicious prompt as hidden white text. That new document becomes a new carrier. Anyone who later uses it as source material for Copilot triggers the same behavior, allowing the prompt injection to spread to more documents. Because the documents are created and edited by legitimate users, the attack can be difficult to trace.

The researcher could still reproduce the full worm chain even after Microsoft rolled out multiple mitigations, including upgrades to newer GPT‑5.5 and 5.6 models.

At the time of writing, there is no complete mitigation for this broader class of attacks across comparable large language model (LLM)‑based products. It’s characterized as an architectural weakness of current LLM systems: attacker‑controlled content shares the same context window as trusted instructions. Attacks that exploit this behavior are known as prompt injection attacks and may never be fixed.

How to stay safe

Treat documents from outside your organization as untrusted, especially if you plan to use them with Copilot for Word.

Review any attached document before using it as Copilot source material, and carefully verify Copilot‑generated/edited documents before sharing or reusing them.

If you don’t use Copilot, you can disable it.

Malwarebytes users can turn off Copilot under Tools > System Tweaks > Miscellaneous.

Malwarebytes setting to disable Copilot
Malwarebytes setting to disable Copilot

Or in Word itself:

For individual users who don’t want Copilot in Word:

  • Open Word, go to File > Options > Copilot and clear the Enable Copilot checkbox, then restart Word.
    uncheck Enable Copilot in Word
  • In some versions of Word, the setting appears under File > Options > General in a Copilot section. In both cases, the key is unchecking the β€œEnable Copilot” setting.

You can also remove the Copilot icon from the ribbon by right‑clicking the ribbon, open the customization dialog, locate the Copilot/Assistance button, and removing it.

Alternatively, you can limit Copilot’s role by following these instructions:

  • In Word, go to File > Account > Account Privacy > Manage Settings, and uncheck Turn on optional connected experiences. This reduces certain cloud‑powered AI features, including Copilot‑related functions that rely on those services.
  • In the Microsoft 365 Admin Center, under Copilot > Settings, set Pin Microsoft 365 Copilot Chat to Do not pin Copilot chat in Microsoft 365 apps so the chat pane doesn’t appear by default in apps like Word.

This doesn’t remove Copilot entirely or stop these attacks, but it does reduce its visibility and limits some of its cloud‑assisted functionality.


From reporting threats to removing them.

Cybersecurity risks should never spread beyond a headline. Keep threats off your devices byΒ downloading Malwarebytes today.

Hidden prompt turns Microsoft Copilot into an AI worm

30 July 2026 at 14:58

A security researcher has demonstrated how Microsoft Copilot for Word can be tricked into spreading a self‑propagating prompt‑injection β€œAI worm.” The attack silently alters documents and embeds its own hidden instructions into newly created files, allowing it to spread through normal document-sharing workflows without macros or traditional malware.

The technique allows an attacker to hide a JSON‑formatted prompt as white text on a white background inside a Word document. When someone asks Copilot for Word to draft or edit content based on that document, Copilot strips away the formatting, reads the hidden text, and treats the embedded instructions as part of the user’s request.

Copilot then modifies the active document and appends the full malicious prompt as hidden white text. That new document becomes a new carrier. Anyone who later uses it as source material for Copilot triggers the same behavior, allowing the prompt injection to spread to more documents. Because the documents are created and edited by legitimate users, the attack can be difficult to trace.

The researcher could still reproduce the full worm chain even after Microsoft rolled out multiple mitigations, including upgrades to newer GPT‑5.5 and 5.6 models.

At the time of writing, there is no complete mitigation for this broader class of attacks across comparable large language model (LLM)‑based products. It’s characterized as an architectural weakness of current LLM systems: attacker‑controlled content shares the same context window as trusted instructions. Attacks that exploit this behavior are known as prompt injection attacks and may never be fixed.

How to stay safe

Treat documents from outside your organization as untrusted, especially if you plan to use them with Copilot for Word.

Review any attached document before using it as Copilot source material, and carefully verify Copilot‑generated/edited documents before sharing or reusing them.

If you don’t use Copilot, you can disable it.

Malwarebytes users can turn off Copilot under Tools > System Tweaks > Miscellaneous.

Malwarebytes setting to disable Copilot
Malwarebytes setting to disable Copilot

Or in Word itself:

For individual users who don’t want Copilot in Word:

  • Open Word, go to File > Options > Copilot and clear the Enable Copilot checkbox, then restart Word.
    uncheck Enable Copilot in Word
  • In some versions of Word, the setting appears under File > Options > General in a Copilot section. In both cases, the key is unchecking the β€œEnable Copilot” setting.

You can also remove the Copilot icon from the ribbon by right‑clicking the ribbon, open the customization dialog, locate the Copilot/Assistance button, and removing it.

Alternatively, you can limit Copilot’s role by following these instructions:

  • In Word, go to File > Account > Account Privacy > Manage Settings, and uncheck Turn on optional connected experiences. This reduces certain cloud‑powered AI features, including Copilot‑related functions that rely on those services.
  • In the Microsoft 365 Admin Center, under Copilot > Settings, set Pin Microsoft 365 Copilot Chat to Do not pin Copilot chat in Microsoft 365 apps so the chat pane doesn’t appear by default in apps like Word.

This doesn’t remove Copilot entirely or stop these attacks, but it does reduce its visibility and limits some of its cloud‑assisted functionality.


From reporting threats to removing them.

Cybersecurity risks should never spread beyond a headline. Keep threats off your devices byΒ downloading Malwarebytes today.

Threat landscape for industrial automation systems. Q1 2026

7 July 2026 at 12:00

All threats

The percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked continued to decrease, reaching 19.6% in Q1 2026. This is the lowest value in three years, and it is 1.4 times lower than in Q2 2023.

Percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked, Q2 2023–Q1 2026

Percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked, Q2 2023–Q1 2026

Regionally, the percentages ranged from 9.1% in Northern Europe to 27.4% in Africa.

Regions ranked by percentage of attacked ICS computers

Regions ranked by percentage of attacked ICS computers

The percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked increased in five regions over the quarter, most notably in Southern Europe, Northern Europe, and Russia.

In Q1 2026, Southern Europe led the way in growth for internet and email threats. The region also saw the fastest growth in spyware, as well as malicious scripts and phishing pages.

In Russia, the percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked exceeded the figures for the previous two quarters. Russia saw an increase in the percentage for threats from the internet, and a slight increase in the figure for threats from email clients (Russia is one of three regions where this figure did not decrease).

Among the threat categories, the greatest increases were observed in the percentages for denylisted internet resources, as well as spyware (distributed in the region via the internet and email clients).

Selected industries

Biometric systems (26.4%) traditionally rank top among the industries and OT infrastructure types covered in this report in terms of the percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked. These systems are characterized by internet access, extensive email use for data exchange and approvals (such as access granting), and, in many cases, minimal cybersecurity controls within the organizations that use these systems.

Industries ranked by the percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked

Industries ranked by the percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked

Biometric systems rank first among industries in terms of email threats. At the same time, unlike other industries, the percentage for email threats in biometric systems exceeds that for internet threats.

In all selected industries, the global average follows a downward trend. In Q1 2026, the percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked increased only in the manufacturing sector β€” by 1.0 pp. The percentages for this industry increased across 10 regions, with the most notable increases in Western Europe, Northern Europe, and Russia.

Threat categories

In Q1 2026, Kaspersky security solutions blocked malware from 10,052 different malware families of various categories on industrial automation systems.

Over the quarter, the percentage of ICS computers on which denylisted internet resources were blocked increased (after decreasing over the previous two quarters), and there was a slight increase in the percentage for AutoCAD malware.

Percentage of ICS computers on which the activity of malicious objects from various categories was prevented

Percentage of ICS computers on which the activity of malicious objects from various categories was prevented

Malicious scripts and phishing pages (JS and HTML)

Malicious scripts and phishing pages retained their to spot among threat categories by the percentage of ICS computers on which these threats were blocked. The global average in Q1 2026 was 6.56%.

Over the quarter, the percentages increased in four regions. The most significant change was observed in Southern Europe (9.85%, +0.94 pp). The figures for malicious scripts in the region increased over three consecutive quarters.

Among the selected industries, across all regions, the highest percentages for the malicious scripts and phishing pages category were recorded for biometric systems (19.59%) and building automation (15.43%) in Southern Europe. These same industries lead in similar rankings for malicious documents and spyware.

Spyware

The percentage of ICS computers on which spyware was blocked decreased over two consecutive quarters, dropping to 3.73%. Despite the decline, spyware has ranked second among threat categories by the percentage of attacked computers for three consecutive quarters.

The percentages increased in five regions over the quarter, most notably in Southern Europe (5.46%, +0.35 pp) and Russia (2.84%, +0.24 pp).

In Southern Europe, the percentage of ICS computers on which spyware was blocked increased in all the selected industries except manufacturing. The greatest increase was observed in biometric systems.

Among the selected industries, the highest percentage of spyware in Russia was recorded in biometric systems. That said, the percentage of ICS computers on which spyware was blocked increased in all industries in the region except construction. The percentage figure has been increasing for two consecutive quarters in the oil and gas industry (by a factor of 1.63 over six months), and for three consecutive quarters in engineering and ICS integration, as well as electric power. In the remaining sectors, the values have been fluctuating.

Percentage of ICS computers on which spyware was blocked in various industries in Russia, Q3 2025–Q1 2026

Percentage of ICS computers on which spyware was blocked in various industries in Russia, Q3 2025–Q1 2026

Denylisted internet resources

The percentage of ICS computers on which denylisted internet resources were blocked increased to 3.54%.

The most notable increase over the quarter occurred in Southeast Asia (4.58%, +0.65 pp). Among the industries in the region, the highest percentage figures for this threat category were recorded in electric power and construction. Over the quarter, the largest increases in percentages figures were observed in the electric power and manufacturing industries.

In North America (Canada), denylisted internet resources (2.14%) showed the greatest increase among all categories β€” by a factor of 1.22.

Among the selected industries across all regions, the highest percentage figures for the denylisted internet resources category were in the electric power (7.11%) and construction (6.25%) industries in Southeast Asia.

Malicious documents (Microsoft Office + PDF)

The percentage figure for this category decreased over two consecutive quarters, reaching its lowest value (1.56%) for the entire period of observations in Q1 2026. It increased just in two regions: Australia and New Zealand (1.12%, +0.04 pp), and Russia (0.62%, +0.01 pp).

Among the selected industries across all regions, the highest percentages for malicious documents were recorded for biometric systems (9.02%) and building automation (6.97%) in Southern Europe. These same industries also lead in similar rankings for malicious scripts and spyware.

Ransomware

The percentage of ICS computers on which ransomware was blocked has decreased for two consecutive quarters, dropping to 0.14%. This is the lowest value among all categories.

The percentage increased in two regions: North America (Canada) (0.11%, +0.04 pp) and slightly in Northern Europe (0.06%, +0.01 pp).

Among the selected industries across all regions, the highest percentages for ransomware were recorded in the oil and gas and manufacturing industries (0.92% and 0.65%, respectively) in Central Asia and the South Caucasus, and in biometric systems (0.89%) in Russia.

Miners in the form of executable files for Windows

The percentage of ICS computers on which miners in the form of executable files for Windows were blocked decreased to 0.59%.

The percentage increased in seven regions. The largest increase was observed in Africa (0.63%, +0.16 pp). Among the selected industries, the largest increases in the region were in the manufacturing and oil and gas industries.

Among the selected industries across all regions, the highest percentages for miners in the form of executable files were recorded in construction (1.99%), biometric systems (1.98%), and the oil and gas industry (1.97%) in Central Asia and the South Caucasus.

Web miners

The percentage of ICS computers on which web miners were blocked has been declining for a year, and in Q1 2026, it reached the lowest value for the entire period under review (0.22%).

At the same time, the percentage increased in seven regions. The largest increases were observed in South Asia (0.28%, +0.11 pp), the Middle East (0.31%, +0.09 pp), and Africa (0.34%, +0.08 pp). Despite the increases, the percentages in these regions for Q1 2026 did not exceed those observed in 2023–2024 and in Q1 2025.

Among the selected industries across all regions, the highest percentages for web miners were recorded for biometric systems (0.97%) in Russia. Biometric systems in South Asia (0.79%) ranked second, and the electric power sector in Southeast Asia (0.76%) ranked third.

Worms

The percentage of ICS computers on which worms were blocked decreased to 1.33%.

The percentage decreased across all regions following an increase in the previous quarter (due to a wave of phishing attacks that distributed the Backdoor.MSIL.XWorm backdoor worm across all regions of the world).

Among the selected industries across all regions, the highest percentage figure for worms was recorded for biometric systems (4.80%) in Central Asia and the South Caucasus. Two industries in Africa – biometric systems (4.04%) and electric power (3.53%) – took the second and third spots, respectively.

Viruses

The percentage of ICS computers on which viruses were blocked decreased to 1.31%.

The top 3 regions by this figure remained the same: Southeast Asia (6.11%, first by a wide margin), Africa (4.15%), and East Asia (2.97%). These same regions are also among the leaders by the percentage of systems affected by AutoCAD malware. The largest increase in this figure was observed in Africa (+0.41 pp).

Among the selected industries across all regions, the highest percentages for viruses were recorded in the construction industry (6.35%) and building automation (5.50%) in Southeast Asia.

Malware for AutoCAD

The percentage of ICS computers on which malware for AutoCAD was blocked increased to 0.30%.

The most notable increase over the quarter was observed in Africa, with the region’s percentage figure rising by 0.47 pp, a very significant increase for this category, and almost doubling (to 0.91%).

Among the selected industries across all regions, the highest percentages for AutoCAD malware were recorded in the construction industry in East Asia (5.58%) and Southeast Asia (3.87%).

Main threat sources

In Q1 2026, the average percentages across all threat sources, except threats from the internet, decreased globally.

Percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects from various sources were blocked

Percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects from various sources were blocked

Internet

The percentage of ICS computers on which threats from the internet were blocked increased to 7.88%. However, over the past three years, the percentage figure for internet threats has followed a downward trend.

The largest increases in the percentages were recorded in Southern Europe (8.59%, +0.59 pp), Southeast Asia (10.16%, +0.55 pp), and Northern Europe (4.47%, +0.51 pp).

Among the selected industries across all regions, the highest percentages for threats from the internet were recorded in electric power (13.16%) and construction (12.55%) in Southeast Asia, and in the engineering and ICS integration sector (12.33%) in South Asia.

Email clients

The percentage of ICS computers on which threats delivered via email clients were blocked decreased to 2.59%. This is a three-year low.

The percentage of this threat source increased in three regions: Southern Europe (6.54%, +0.2 pp), East Asia (1.5%, +0.09 pp), and slightly in Russia (0.7%, +0.04 pp).

Among the selected industries across all regions, the highest percentages for email threats were recorded for biometric systems (19.78%) and building automation (12.34%) in Southern Europe. In these two industries, the percentage of ICS computers on which email threats are blocked is higher than the percentage for threats from the internet. A similar situation was observed in two other instances, both in biometric systems (in South America and Southeast Asia).

Removable media

The percentage of ICS computers on which threats were detected when connecting removable media continued to decrease, reaching its lowest value for the period under review (0.26%).

Among the selected industries across all regions, the highest percentages for removable media threats blocked on ICS computers were observed in the electric power sector in Central Asia and the South Caucasus (1.45%), East Asia (1.34%), and Africa (1.16%).

Network folders

The percentage of ICS computers on which threats are blocked in network folders is steadily decreasing. In Q1 2026, it was the lowest for the period under review (0.029%).

East Asia has traditionally led by a wide margin. The percentage for East Asia (0.135%) is 27 times higher than the lowest regional value (recorded in Northern Europe).

The largest increases in the percentages for threats from network folders were observed in Africa (0.037%, +0.006 pp) and South America (0.013%, +0.006 pp).
Among the selected industries across all regions, the construction industry in East Asia, at 0.36%, holds the top positions in the ranking by the percentage of ICS computers on which threats are blocked in network folders.

For more information on industrial threats see the full version of the report.

Threat landscape for industrial automation systems. Q1 2026

7 July 2026 at 12:00

All threats

The percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked continued to decrease, reaching 19.6% in Q1 2026. This is the lowest value in three years, and it is 1.4 times lower than in Q2 2023.

Percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked, Q2 2023–Q1 2026

Percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked, Q2 2023–Q1 2026

Regionally, the percentages ranged from 9.1% in Northern Europe to 27.4% in Africa.

Regions ranked by percentage of attacked ICS computers

Regions ranked by percentage of attacked ICS computers

The percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked increased in five regions over the quarter, most notably in Southern Europe, Northern Europe, and Russia.

In Q1 2026, Southern Europe led the way in growth for internet and email threats. The region also saw the fastest growth in spyware, as well as malicious scripts and phishing pages.

In Russia, the percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked exceeded the figures for the previous two quarters. Russia saw an increase in the percentage for threats from the internet, and a slight increase in the figure for threats from email clients (Russia is one of three regions where this figure did not decrease).

Among the threat categories, the greatest increases were observed in the percentages for denylisted internet resources, as well as spyware (distributed in the region via the internet and email clients).

Selected industries

Biometric systems (26.4%) traditionally rank top among the industries and OT infrastructure types covered in this report in terms of the percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked. These systems are characterized by internet access, extensive email use for data exchange and approvals (such as access granting), and, in many cases, minimal cybersecurity controls within the organizations that use these systems.

Industries ranked by the percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked

Industries ranked by the percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked

Biometric systems rank first among industries in terms of email threats. At the same time, unlike other industries, the percentage for email threats in biometric systems exceeds that for internet threats.

In all selected industries, the global average follows a downward trend. In Q1 2026, the percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked increased only in the manufacturing sector β€” by 1.0 pp. The percentages for this industry increased across 10 regions, with the most notable increases in Western Europe, Northern Europe, and Russia.

Threat categories

In Q1 2026, Kaspersky security solutions blocked malware from 10,052 different malware families of various categories on industrial automation systems.

Over the quarter, the percentage of ICS computers on which denylisted internet resources were blocked increased (after decreasing over the previous two quarters), and there was a slight increase in the percentage for AutoCAD malware.

Percentage of ICS computers on which the activity of malicious objects from various categories was prevented

Percentage of ICS computers on which the activity of malicious objects from various categories was prevented

Malicious scripts and phishing pages (JS and HTML)

Malicious scripts and phishing pages retained their to spot among threat categories by the percentage of ICS computers on which these threats were blocked. The global average in Q1 2026 was 6.56%.

Over the quarter, the percentages increased in four regions. The most significant change was observed in Southern Europe (9.85%, +0.94 pp). The figures for malicious scripts in the region increased over three consecutive quarters.

Among the selected industries, across all regions, the highest percentages for the malicious scripts and phishing pages category were recorded for biometric systems (19.59%) and building automation (15.43%) in Southern Europe. These same industries lead in similar rankings for malicious documents and spyware.

Spyware

The percentage of ICS computers on which spyware was blocked decreased over two consecutive quarters, dropping to 3.73%. Despite the decline, spyware has ranked second among threat categories by the percentage of attacked computers for three consecutive quarters.

The percentages increased in five regions over the quarter, most notably in Southern Europe (5.46%, +0.35 pp) and Russia (2.84%, +0.24 pp).

In Southern Europe, the percentage of ICS computers on which spyware was blocked increased in all the selected industries except manufacturing. The greatest increase was observed in biometric systems.

Among the selected industries, the highest percentage of spyware in Russia was recorded in biometric systems. That said, the percentage of ICS computers on which spyware was blocked increased in all industries in the region except construction. The percentage figure has been increasing for two consecutive quarters in the oil and gas industry (by a factor of 1.63 over six months), and for three consecutive quarters in engineering and ICS integration, as well as electric power. In the remaining sectors, the values have been fluctuating.

Percentage of ICS computers on which spyware was blocked in various industries in Russia, Q3 2025–Q1 2026

Percentage of ICS computers on which spyware was blocked in various industries in Russia, Q3 2025–Q1 2026

Denylisted internet resources

The percentage of ICS computers on which denylisted internet resources were blocked increased to 3.54%.

The most notable increase over the quarter occurred in Southeast Asia (4.58%, +0.65 pp). Among the industries in the region, the highest percentage figures for this threat category were recorded in electric power and construction. Over the quarter, the largest increases in percentages figures were observed in the electric power and manufacturing industries.

In North America (Canada), denylisted internet resources (2.14%) showed the greatest increase among all categories β€” by a factor of 1.22.

Among the selected industries across all regions, the highest percentage figures for the denylisted internet resources category were in the electric power (7.11%) and construction (6.25%) industries in Southeast Asia.

Malicious documents (Microsoft Office + PDF)

The percentage figure for this category decreased over two consecutive quarters, reaching its lowest value (1.56%) for the entire period of observations in Q1 2026. It increased just in two regions: Australia and New Zealand (1.12%, +0.04 pp), and Russia (0.62%, +0.01 pp).

Among the selected industries across all regions, the highest percentages for malicious documents were recorded for biometric systems (9.02%) and building automation (6.97%) in Southern Europe. These same industries also lead in similar rankings for malicious scripts and spyware.

Ransomware

The percentage of ICS computers on which ransomware was blocked has decreased for two consecutive quarters, dropping to 0.14%. This is the lowest value among all categories.

The percentage increased in two regions: North America (Canada) (0.11%, +0.04 pp) and slightly in Northern Europe (0.06%, +0.01 pp).

Among the selected industries across all regions, the highest percentages for ransomware were recorded in the oil and gas and manufacturing industries (0.92% and 0.65%, respectively) in Central Asia and the South Caucasus, and in biometric systems (0.89%) in Russia.

Miners in the form of executable files for Windows

The percentage of ICS computers on which miners in the form of executable files for Windows were blocked decreased to 0.59%.

The percentage increased in seven regions. The largest increase was observed in Africa (0.63%, +0.16 pp). Among the selected industries, the largest increases in the region were in the manufacturing and oil and gas industries.

Among the selected industries across all regions, the highest percentages for miners in the form of executable files were recorded in construction (1.99%), biometric systems (1.98%), and the oil and gas industry (1.97%) in Central Asia and the South Caucasus.

Web miners

The percentage of ICS computers on which web miners were blocked has been declining for a year, and in Q1 2026, it reached the lowest value for the entire period under review (0.22%).

At the same time, the percentage increased in seven regions. The largest increases were observed in South Asia (0.28%, +0.11 pp), the Middle East (0.31%, +0.09 pp), and Africa (0.34%, +0.08 pp). Despite the increases, the percentages in these regions for Q1 2026 did not exceed those observed in 2023–2024 and in Q1 2025.

Among the selected industries across all regions, the highest percentages for web miners were recorded for biometric systems (0.97%) in Russia. Biometric systems in South Asia (0.79%) ranked second, and the electric power sector in Southeast Asia (0.76%) ranked third.

Worms

The percentage of ICS computers on which worms were blocked decreased to 1.33%.

The percentage decreased across all regions following an increase in the previous quarter (due to a wave of phishing attacks that distributed the Backdoor.MSIL.XWorm backdoor worm across all regions of the world).

Among the selected industries across all regions, the highest percentage figure for worms was recorded for biometric systems (4.80%) in Central Asia and the South Caucasus. Two industries in Africa – biometric systems (4.04%) and electric power (3.53%) – took the second and third spots, respectively.

Viruses

The percentage of ICS computers on which viruses were blocked decreased to 1.31%.

The top 3 regions by this figure remained the same: Southeast Asia (6.11%, first by a wide margin), Africa (4.15%), and East Asia (2.97%). These same regions are also among the leaders by the percentage of systems affected by AutoCAD malware. The largest increase in this figure was observed in Africa (+0.41 pp).

Among the selected industries across all regions, the highest percentages for viruses were recorded in the construction industry (6.35%) and building automation (5.50%) in Southeast Asia.

Malware for AutoCAD

The percentage of ICS computers on which malware for AutoCAD was blocked increased to 0.30%.

The most notable increase over the quarter was observed in Africa, with the region’s percentage figure rising by 0.47 pp, a very significant increase for this category, and almost doubling (to 0.91%).

Among the selected industries across all regions, the highest percentages for AutoCAD malware were recorded in the construction industry in East Asia (5.58%) and Southeast Asia (3.87%).

Main threat sources

In Q1 2026, the average percentages across all threat sources, except threats from the internet, decreased globally.

Percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects from various sources were blocked

Percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects from various sources were blocked

Internet

The percentage of ICS computers on which threats from the internet were blocked increased to 7.88%. However, over the past three years, the percentage figure for internet threats has followed a downward trend.

The largest increases in the percentages were recorded in Southern Europe (8.59%, +0.59 pp), Southeast Asia (10.16%, +0.55 pp), and Northern Europe (4.47%, +0.51 pp).

Among the selected industries across all regions, the highest percentages for threats from the internet were recorded in electric power (13.16%) and construction (12.55%) in Southeast Asia, and in the engineering and ICS integration sector (12.33%) in South Asia.

Email clients

The percentage of ICS computers on which threats delivered via email clients were blocked decreased to 2.59%. This is a three-year low.

The percentage of this threat source increased in three regions: Southern Europe (6.54%, +0.2 pp), East Asia (1.5%, +0.09 pp), and slightly in Russia (0.7%, +0.04 pp).

Among the selected industries across all regions, the highest percentages for email threats were recorded for biometric systems (19.78%) and building automation (12.34%) in Southern Europe. In these two industries, the percentage of ICS computers on which email threats are blocked is higher than the percentage for threats from the internet. A similar situation was observed in two other instances, both in biometric systems (in South America and Southeast Asia).

Removable media

The percentage of ICS computers on which threats were detected when connecting removable media continued to decrease, reaching its lowest value for the period under review (0.26%).

Among the selected industries across all regions, the highest percentages for removable media threats blocked on ICS computers were observed in the electric power sector in Central Asia and the South Caucasus (1.45%), East Asia (1.34%), and Africa (1.16%).

Network folders

The percentage of ICS computers on which threats are blocked in network folders is steadily decreasing. In Q1 2026, it was the lowest for the period under review (0.029%).

East Asia has traditionally led by a wide margin. The percentage for East Asia (0.135%) is 27 times higher than the lowest regional value (recorded in Northern Europe).

The largest increases in the percentages for threats from network folders were observed in Africa (0.037%, +0.006 pp) and South America (0.013%, +0.006 pp).
Among the selected industries across all regions, the construction industry in East Asia, at 0.36%, holds the top positions in the ranking by the percentage of ICS computers on which threats are blocked in network folders.

For more information on industrial threats see the full version of the report.

The Mini Shai-Hulud Worm and the New Era of CI/CD Exploitation

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The Mini Shai-Hulud Worm and the New Era of CI/CD Exploitation

In this post we break down the technical mechanics of TeamPCP’s recent campaign, the impact on the developer ecosystem, and the urgent steps needed to secure software supply chains.

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May 28, 2026

The developer ecosystem recently faced one of its most significant architectural threats to date, with the threat actor group TeamPCP unleashing Mini Shai-Huludβ€”a self propagating worm and multi-ecosystem threat. Potentially affecting millions of developers and thousands of companies, Mini Shai-Hulud has fundamentally compromised the trust layer of modern CI/CD pipelines.

The operational tempo of Mini Shai-Hulud has accelerated with every campaign. What began as opportunistic credential theft has now evolved into a high-speed, automated operation that can compromise hundreds of packages in under thirty minutes. From the exfiltration of approximately 3,800 internal GitHub repositories to the poisoning of critical libraries like TanStack and AntV, TeamPCP’s campaign has been incredibly effective in exploiting developer tooling and identity infrastructure.

What is Mini Shai-Hulud?

Mini Shai-Hulud is deployed as a 498 KB obfuscated script executed using the Bun JavaScript runtime. The deliberate choice of Bun, rather than Node.js, is a tactical evasion technique as most endpoint detection and response (EDR) platforms and security information and event management (SIEM) solutions have behavioral rules tuned to Node.js execution patterns.

How Mini Shai-Hulud Works

The worm propagates by stealing npm and GitHub authentication (OIDC) tokens from developer environments, then using those credentials to publish malicious versions of packages the compromised user maintains. To accomplish this, the worm scrapes runner process memory to extract short-lived identity tokens, which it then exchanges for per-package npm trusted-publisher tokens without requiring any long-lived npm secrets.

Credential Exfiltration and Command-and-Control

Mini Shai-Hulud targets credentials across 130 file paths, including npm tokens, GitHub personal access tokens, AWS, GCP, and Azure configuration files, Kubernetes kubeconfig files, Docker credentials, HashiCorp Vault tokens, 1Password and Bitwarden CLI vaults, SSH private keys, and Bitcoin wallet files.Β 

Exfiltration occurs across multiple channels: the Session Protocol network, the GitHub Git Data API using dynamically created Dune-themed repositories on victim accounts, HTTPS to the threat actor-controlled domain, and an api for GitHub Actions workflow exfiltration.

The worm uses a dead-drop command-and-control (C2) architecture via GitHub’s public commit search API. An installed daemon (kitty-monitor, deployed as a systemd service on Linux or a LaunchAgent on macOS) polls GitHub for commits containing the string β€œfiredalazer,” parses RSA-PSS-signed command payloads from matching commits, and executes them. This technique leverages GitHub as a trusted relay, making C2 traffic difficult to block without disrupting legitimate GitHub usage.

The worm then uses a persistence mechanism as a dead-man’s switch: a GitHub personal access token named β€œIfYouRevokeThisTokenItWillWipeTheComputerOfTheOwner” is created on compromised developer machines. If an operator revokes this token without first disabling the persistence mechanism, the worm destroys all home directory data on the compromised device.

AI Agent Hijacking

Beyond standard persistence mechanisms, Mini Shai-Hulud targets AI coding agents. The SafeDep analysis documents that the worm modifies Claude Code’s settings .json to insert a SessionStart hook, enabling the worm to be reinstated with full LLM API privileges even if the infected npm packages are later removed, or the npm cache is cleared. A similar technique targets Visual Studio Code’s tasks.json file using the β€œrunOn”: β€œfolderOpen” trigger, and Codex configuration files are also targeted.

These AI agent hijacking techniques represent a novel attack surface: by persisting within trusted AI tool configurations, the malware can exfiltrate all code and secrets processed by those tools during future development sessions.

Four Waves of Supply Chain Attacks

Flashpoint has observed at least four documented waves of TeamPCP npm and PyPI supply chain attacks in 2026, leveraging Mini Shai-Hulud to compromise developer tooling ecosystems and steal credentials, cloud keys, and source code across tens of thousands of organizations.Β 

The following timeline tracks the escalation of TeamPCP and the Mini Shai-Hulud waves throughout 2026:

Wave 1: Initial SAP Packages (April 2026)

The first documented wave of Mini Shai-Hulud attacks targeted a small number of SAP-ecosystem npm packages in April 2026. While TeamPCP had already proven their CI/CD attack capabilities in March 2026 by compromising Aqua Security’s Trivy scanner and Checkmarx KICS via GitHub Actions, this initial wave served primarily as a proof-of-concept for the self-propagation mechanism and a reconnaissance phase for TeamPCP’s access broker network. Further, these attacks demonstrated the group’s ability to compromise widely used security toolingβ€”a development that significantly undermines defenders’ ability to trust automated CI/CD pipeline scanning results.

Wave 2: TanStack, Mistral AI, and Guardrails AI (May 2026)

Leveraging a GitHub Actions cache-poisoning technique, TeamPCP published malicious versions of 42 TanStack packages across 84 releases, impacting a project with over 518 million cumulative downloads.Β 

The attack also compromised Mistral AI and Guardrails AI, extending the attack surface to the AI developer tools ecosystem. Forged commit authorship was used to blend the attacker’s commits into AI-assisted development environments where Claude Code is commonly deployed.

TeamPCP simultaneously listed Mistral AI source code for sale on BreachForums, claiming possession of approximately 5 GB of data across 450 internal Mistral repositories.

TeamPCP BreachForums posts advertising Mistral AI internal source code and repositories for sale, May 2026. (Source: Flashpoint)

Wave 3: AntV Ecosystem (May 2026)

Targeting AntV enterprise data visualization ecosystem, TeamPCP compromised the atool npm account, which held publishing rights across a broad catalog of AntV packages. In 22 minutes, 637 malicious versions were published across 323 packagesβ€”a scale and speed that overwhelmed standard security monitoring pipelines.

Each infected package contained the Mini Shai-Hulud worm, which, upon execution, created up to 2,500 compromised repositories on victim accounts within hours.

Wave 4: Co-Ownership of BreachForums and GitHub Breach

In the most recent wave, TeamPCP announced its assumption of co-ownership of BreachForums, the largest English-language cybercriminal forum currently active. This development significantly elevates TeamPCP’s standing and operational reach. As co-owners, the group stated it would manage platform operations, handle dispute resolution, staff and vet moderation personnel, and host monetary contests for the community. The announcement positions TeamPCP as both an active threat actor and a platform-level infrastructure operator, with the ability to shape forum policies, curate the availability of criminal tooling, and influence the broader access broker and ransomware ecosystem.

Additionally, by poisoning a GitHub employee’s development environment, TeamPCP exfiltrated approximately 3,800 internal GitHub repositories. Within the stolen data were highly sensitive codebases such as:

  • copilot-api and copilot-token-service
  • actions-runtime
  • billing-platform
  • enterprise-crypto
  • authentication
  • codeql-core
  • detection-engineering
  • csirt
  • azure-config
TeamPCP BreachForums posts advertising GitHub internal source code for sale. (Source: Flashpoint)

Recommended Immediate Actions

Critically, the theft of internal source code from one of the world’s most widely used code hosting platforms creates incredible downstream risk for organizations that depend on GitHub Copilot and GitHub Actions for their own software development pipelines. Organizations running AI coding agents such as Claude Code and VS Code with extensions in their CI/CD pipelines face heightened exposure. Security teams should treat AI agent configuration files as sensitive assets subject to integrity monitoring and change-control policies.

If your organization uses npm, PyPi, or AI-assisted development tools, Flashpoint recommends the following immediate steps:

  1. Audit and remove: Immediately audit CI/CD environments and remove all infected versions of AntV, TanStack, Mistral AI, and Bitwarden CLI packages.
  2. Rotate credentials: Rotate all cloud credentials (AWS, GCP, Azure) and npm tokens.
  3. Disable persistence first: Before revoking suspicious GitHub tokens, ensure the kitty-monitor daemon is disabled to avoid triggering the β€œdead-man’s switch” wiper.
  4. Lock down IDEs: Restrict the installation of VS Code extensions to an approved allow-list and monitor for unauthorized changes to settings.json or tasks.json.
  5. Block C2 infrastructure: Block all traffic to identified TeamPCP C2 domains.

Track TeamPCP and Defend against Mini Shai-Hulud Using Flashpoint

Flashpoint assesses with high confidence that TeamPCP will continue to scale its supply-chain attacks against npm, PyPI, and developer tooling ecosystems. The group’s shift from direct execution to orchestrating a broader ecosystem via BreachForums signals a maturation into a platform-layer criminal operation. While TeamPCP has hinted that the group may be approaching β€œretirement” due to law enforcement pressure, this should be treated with caution. Whether a misdirection or a genuine exit plan, the open-sourcing of Shai-Hulud means the tradecraft is available to the wider cybercriminal community.

Organizations should reference the OpenSSF npm Best Practices guidance for a practical baseline in hardening their package consumption posture. Flashpoint customers can gain access to known Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) and MITRE ATT&CK Mapping for Mini Shai-Hulud by logging into Flashpoint Ignite. To learn more about how Flashpoint tracks threat actor groups like TeamPCP and protects the software supply chain, request a demo.

Request a demo today.

The post The Mini Shai-Hulud Worm and the New Era of CI/CD Exploitation appeared first on Flashpoint.

Threat landscape for industrial automation systems in Q4 2025

15 April 2026 at 14:30

Statistics across all threats

The percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked has been decreasing since the beginning of 2024. In Q4 2025, it was 19.7%. Over the past three years, the percentage has decreased by 1.36 times, and by 1.25 times since Q4 2023.

Percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked, Q1 2023–Q4 2025

Percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked, Q1 2023–Q4 2025

Regionally, in Q4 2025, the percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked ranged from 8.5% in Northern Europe to 27.3% in Africa.

Regions ranked by percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked

Regions ranked by percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked

Four regions saw an increase in the percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked. The most notable increases occurred in Southern Europe and South Asia. In Q3 2025, East Asia experienced a sharp increase triggered by the local spread of malicious scripts, but the figure has since returned to normal.

Changes in percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked, Q4 2025

Changes in percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked, Q4 2025

Feature of the quarter: worms in email

In Q4 2025, the percentage of ICS computers on which wormsinemailattachments were blocked increasedinallregions of the world.

Many of the blocked threats were related to the worm Backdoor.MSIL.XWorm. This malware is designed to persist on the system and then remotely control it.

Interestingly, this threat was not detected on ICS computers in the previous quarter, yet it appeared in all regions in Q4 2025.

A study found that the active spread of Backdoor.MSIL.XWorm via phishing emails was likely linked to the use by hackers of another malware obfuscation technique that was actively used during massive phishing campaigns in Q4 2025. These campaigns have been known since 2024 as β€œCurriculum-vitae-catalina”.

The attackers distributed phishing emails to HR managers, recruiters, and employees responsible for hiring. The messages were disguised as responses from job applicants with subjects such as β€œResume” or β€œAttached Resume” and contained a malicious executable file under the guise of a curriculum vitae. Typically, the file was named Curriculum Vitae-Catalina.exe. When executed, it infected the system.

In Q4 2025, the threat spread across regions in two waves β€” one in October and another in November. Russia, Western Europe, South America, and North America (Canada) were attacked in October. A spike in Backdoor.MSIL.XWorm blocking was observed in other regions in November. The attack subsided in all regions in December.

The highest percentage of ICS computers on which Backdoor.MSIL.XWorm was blocked was observed in regions where threats from email clients had been historically blocked at high rates on ICS computers: Southern Europe, South America, and the Middle East.

At the same time, in Africa, where USB storage media are still actively used, the threat was also detected when removable devices were connected to ICS computers.

Selected industries

The biometrics sector has historically led the rankings of industries and OT infrastructures surveyed in this report in terms of the percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked.

These systems are characterized by accessibility to and from the internet, as well as minimal cybersecurity controls by the consumer organization.

Rankings of industries and OT infrastructure by percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked

Rankings of industries and OT infrastructure by percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked

In Q4 2025, the percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked increased only in one sector: oil and gas. The corresponding figures increased in two regions: Russia, and Central Asia and the South Caucasus.

However, if we look at a broader time span, there is a downward trend in all the surveyed industries.

Percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked in selected industries

Percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked in selected industries

Diversity of detected malicious objects

In Q4 2025, Kaspersky protection solutions blocked malware from 10,142 different malware families of various categories on industrial automation systems.

Percentage of ICS computers on which the activity of malicious objects from various categories was blocked

Percentage of ICS computers on which the activity of malicious objects from various categories was blocked

In Q4 2025, there was an increase in the percentage of ICS computers on which worms, and miners in the form of executable files for Windows were blocked. These were the only categories that exhibited an increase.

Main threat sources

Depending on the threat detection and blocking scenario, it is not always possible to reliably identify the source. The circumstantial evidence for a specific source can be the blocked threat’s type (category).

The internet (visiting malicious or compromised internet resources; malicious content distributed via messengers; cloud data storage and processing services and CDNs), email clients (phishing emails), and removable storage devices remain the primary sources of threats to computers in an organization’s technology infrastructure.

In Q4 2025, the percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects from various sources were blocked decreased. All sources except email clients saw their lowest levels in three years.

Percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects from various sources were blocked

Percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects from various sources were blocked

The same computer can be attacked by several categories of malware from the same source during a quarter. That computer is counted when calculating the percentage of attacked computers for each threat category, but is only counted once for the threat source (we count unique attacked computers). In addition, it is not always possible to accurately determine the initial infection attempt. Therefore, the total percentage of ICS computers on which various categories of threats from a certain source were blocked can exceed the percentage of computers affected by the source itself.

  • In Q4 2025, the percentage of ICS computers on which threats from the internet were blocked decreased to 7.67% and reached its lowest level since the beginning of 2023. The main categories of internet threats are malicious scripts and phishing pages, and denylisted internet resources. The percentage ranged from 3.96% in Northern Europe to 11.33% in South Asia.
  • The main categories of threats from email clients blocked on ICS computers were malicious scripts and phishing pages, spyware, and malicious documents. Most of the spyware detected in phishing emails was delivered as a password archive or a multi-layered script embedded in office document files. The percentage of ICS computers on which threats from email clients were blocked ranged from 0.64% in Northern Europe to 6.34% in Southern Europe.
  • The main categories of threats that were blocked when removable media was connected to ICS computers were worms, viruses, and spyware. The percentage of ICS computers on which threats from removable media were blocked ranged from 0.05% in Australia and New Zealand to 1.41% in Africa.
  • The main categories of threats that spread through network folders in Q4 2025 were viruses, AutoCAD malware, worms, and spyware. The percentage of ICS computers on which threats from network folders were blocked ranged from 0.01% in Northern Europe to 0.18% in East Asia.

Threat categories

Typical attacks blocked within an OT network are multi-step sequences of malicious activities, where each subsequent step of the attackers is aimed at increasing privileges and/or gaining access to other systems by exploiting the security problems of industrial enterprises, including OT infrastructures.

Malicious objects used for initial infection

In Q4 2025, the percentage of ICS computers on which denylisted internet resources were blocked decreased to 3.26%. This is the lowest quarterly figure since the beginning of 2022, and it has decreased by 1.8 times since Q2 2025.

Percentage of ICS computers on which denylisted internet resources were blocked, Q1 2023–Q4 2025

Percentage of ICS computers on which denylisted internet resources were blocked, Q1 2023–Q4 2025

Regionally, the percentage of ICS computers on which denylisted internet resources were blocked ranged from 1.74% in Northern Europe to 3.93% in Southeast Asia, which displaced Africa from first place. Russia rounded out the top three regions for this indicator.

The percentage of ICS computers on which malicious documents were blocked increased for three consecutive quarters. However, in Q4 2025 it decreased by 0.22 pp to 1.76%.

Percentage of ICS computers on which malicious documents were blocked, Q1 2023–Q4 2025

Percentage of ICS computers on which malicious documents were blocked, Q1 2023–Q4 2025

Regionally, the percentage ranged from 0.46% in Northern Europe to 3.82% in Southern Europe. In Q4 2025, the indicator increased in Eastern Europe, Russia, and Western Europe.

The percentage of ICS computers on which malicious scripts and phishing pages were blocked decreased to 6.58%. Despite the decline, this category led the rankings of threat categories in terms of the percentage of ICS computers on which they were blocked.

Percentage of ICS computers on which malicious scripts and phishing pages were blocked, Q1 2023–Q4 2025

Percentage of ICS computers on which malicious scripts and phishing pages were blocked, Q1 2023–Q4 2025

Regionally, the percentage ranged from 2.52% in Northern Europe to 10.50% in South Asia. The indicator increased in South Asia, South America, Southern Europe, and Africa. South Asia saw the most notable increase, at 3.47 pp.

Next-stage malware

Malicious objects used to initially infect computers deliver next-stage malware β€” spyware, ransomware, and miners β€” to victims’ computers. As a rule, the higher the percentage of ICS computers on which the initial infection malware is blocked, the higher the percentage for next-stage malware.

In Q4 2025, the percentage of ICS computers on which spyware, ransomware and web miners were blocked decreased. The rates were:

  • Spyware: 3.80% (down 0.24 pp). For the second quarter in a row, spyware took second place in the rankings of threat categories in terms of the percentage of ICS computers on which it was blocked.
  • Ransomware: 0.16% (down 0.01 pp).
  • Web miners: 0.24% (down 0.01 pp), this is the lowest level observed thus far in the period under review.

The percentage of ICS computers on which miners in the form of executable files for Windows were blocked increased to 0.60% (up 0.03 pp).

Self-propagating malware

Self-propagating malware (worms and viruses) is a category unto itself. Worms and virus-infected files were originally used for initial infection, but as botnet functionality evolved, they took on next-stage characteristics.

To spread across ICS networks, viruses and worms rely on removable media and network folders and are distributed in the form of infected files, such as archives with backups, office documents, pirated games and hacked applications. In rarer and more dangerous cases, web pages with network equipment settings, as well as files stored in internal document management systems, product lifecycle management (PLM) systems, resource management (ERP) systems and other web services are infected.

In Q4 2025, the percentage of ICS computers on which worms were blocked increased by 1.6 times to 1.60%. As mentioned above, this increase is related to a global phishing attack that spread the Backdoor.MSIL.XWorm backdoor worm across all regions of the world. The percentage increased in all regions. The biggest increase (up by 2.16 times) was in Southern Europe. The malware was primary distributed through email clients, and Southern Europe led the way in terms of the percentage of ICS computers on which threats from email clients were blocked.

The percentage of ICS computers on which viruses were blocked decreased to 1.33%.

AutoCAD malware

This category of malware can spread in a variety of ways, so it does not belong to a specific group.

After an increase in the previous quarter, the percentage of ICS computers on which AutoCAD malware was blocked decreased to 0.29% in Q4 2025.

For more information on industrial threats see the full version of the report.

Threat landscape for industrial automation systems in Q4 2025

15 April 2026 at 14:30

Statistics across all threats

The percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked has been decreasing since the beginning of 2024. In Q4 2025, it was 19.7%. Over the past three years, the percentage has decreased by 1.36 times, and by 1.25 times since Q4 2023.

Percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked, Q1 2023–Q4 2025

Percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked, Q1 2023–Q4 2025

Regionally, in Q4 2025, the percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked ranged from 8.5% in Northern Europe to 27.3% in Africa.

Regions ranked by percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked

Regions ranked by percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked

Four regions saw an increase in the percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked. The most notable increases occurred in Southern Europe and South Asia. In Q3 2025, East Asia experienced a sharp increase triggered by the local spread of malicious scripts, but the figure has since returned to normal.

Changes in percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked, Q4 2025

Changes in percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked, Q4 2025

Feature of the quarter: worms in email

In Q4 2025, the percentage of ICS computers on which wormsinemailattachments were blocked increasedinallregions of the world.

Many of the blocked threats were related to the worm Backdoor.MSIL.XWorm. This malware is designed to persist on the system and then remotely control it.

Interestingly, this threat was not detected on ICS computers in the previous quarter, yet it appeared in all regions in Q4 2025.

A study found that the active spread of Backdoor.MSIL.XWorm via phishing emails was likely linked to the use by hackers of another malware obfuscation technique that was actively used during massive phishing campaigns in Q4 2025. These campaigns have been known since 2024 as β€œCurriculum-vitae-catalina”.

The attackers distributed phishing emails to HR managers, recruiters, and employees responsible for hiring. The messages were disguised as responses from job applicants with subjects such as β€œResume” or β€œAttached Resume” and contained a malicious executable file under the guise of a curriculum vitae. Typically, the file was named Curriculum Vitae-Catalina.exe. When executed, it infected the system.

In Q4 2025, the threat spread across regions in two waves β€” one in October and another in November. Russia, Western Europe, South America, and North America (Canada) were attacked in October. A spike in Backdoor.MSIL.XWorm blocking was observed in other regions in November. The attack subsided in all regions in December.

The highest percentage of ICS computers on which Backdoor.MSIL.XWorm was blocked was observed in regions where threats from email clients had been historically blocked at high rates on ICS computers: Southern Europe, South America, and the Middle East.

At the same time, in Africa, where USB storage media are still actively used, the threat was also detected when removable devices were connected to ICS computers.

Selected industries

The biometrics sector has historically led the rankings of industries and OT infrastructures surveyed in this report in terms of the percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked.

These systems are characterized by accessibility to and from the internet, as well as minimal cybersecurity controls by the consumer organization.

Rankings of industries and OT infrastructure by percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked

Rankings of industries and OT infrastructure by percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked

In Q4 2025, the percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked increased only in one sector: oil and gas. The corresponding figures increased in two regions: Russia, and Central Asia and the South Caucasus.

However, if we look at a broader time span, there is a downward trend in all the surveyed industries.

Percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked in selected industries

Percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked in selected industries

Diversity of detected malicious objects

In Q4 2025, Kaspersky protection solutions blocked malware from 10,142 different malware families of various categories on industrial automation systems.

Percentage of ICS computers on which the activity of malicious objects from various categories was blocked

Percentage of ICS computers on which the activity of malicious objects from various categories was blocked

In Q4 2025, there was an increase in the percentage of ICS computers on which worms, and miners in the form of executable files for Windows were blocked. These were the only categories that exhibited an increase.

Main threat sources

Depending on the threat detection and blocking scenario, it is not always possible to reliably identify the source. The circumstantial evidence for a specific source can be the blocked threat’s type (category).

The internet (visiting malicious or compromised internet resources; malicious content distributed via messengers; cloud data storage and processing services and CDNs), email clients (phishing emails), and removable storage devices remain the primary sources of threats to computers in an organization’s technology infrastructure.

In Q4 2025, the percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects from various sources were blocked decreased. All sources except email clients saw their lowest levels in three years.

Percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects from various sources were blocked

Percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects from various sources were blocked

The same computer can be attacked by several categories of malware from the same source during a quarter. That computer is counted when calculating the percentage of attacked computers for each threat category, but is only counted once for the threat source (we count unique attacked computers). In addition, it is not always possible to accurately determine the initial infection attempt. Therefore, the total percentage of ICS computers on which various categories of threats from a certain source were blocked can exceed the percentage of computers affected by the source itself.

  • In Q4 2025, the percentage of ICS computers on which threats from the internet were blocked decreased to 7.67% and reached its lowest level since the beginning of 2023. The main categories of internet threats are malicious scripts and phishing pages, and denylisted internet resources. The percentage ranged from 3.96% in Northern Europe to 11.33% in South Asia.
  • The main categories of threats from email clients blocked on ICS computers were malicious scripts and phishing pages, spyware, and malicious documents. Most of the spyware detected in phishing emails was delivered as a password archive or a multi-layered script embedded in office document files. The percentage of ICS computers on which threats from email clients were blocked ranged from 0.64% in Northern Europe to 6.34% in Southern Europe.
  • The main categories of threats that were blocked when removable media was connected to ICS computers were worms, viruses, and spyware. The percentage of ICS computers on which threats from removable media were blocked ranged from 0.05% in Australia and New Zealand to 1.41% in Africa.
  • The main categories of threats that spread through network folders in Q4 2025 were viruses, AutoCAD malware, worms, and spyware. The percentage of ICS computers on which threats from network folders were blocked ranged from 0.01% in Northern Europe to 0.18% in East Asia.

Threat categories

Typical attacks blocked within an OT network are multi-step sequences of malicious activities, where each subsequent step of the attackers is aimed at increasing privileges and/or gaining access to other systems by exploiting the security problems of industrial enterprises, including OT infrastructures.

Malicious objects used for initial infection

In Q4 2025, the percentage of ICS computers on which denylisted internet resources were blocked decreased to 3.26%. This is the lowest quarterly figure since the beginning of 2022, and it has decreased by 1.8 times since Q2 2025.

Percentage of ICS computers on which denylisted internet resources were blocked, Q1 2023–Q4 2025

Percentage of ICS computers on which denylisted internet resources were blocked, Q1 2023–Q4 2025

Regionally, the percentage of ICS computers on which denylisted internet resources were blocked ranged from 1.74% in Northern Europe to 3.93% in Southeast Asia, which displaced Africa from first place. Russia rounded out the top three regions for this indicator.

The percentage of ICS computers on which malicious documents were blocked increased for three consecutive quarters. However, in Q4 2025 it decreased by 0.22 pp to 1.76%.

Percentage of ICS computers on which malicious documents were blocked, Q1 2023–Q4 2025

Percentage of ICS computers on which malicious documents were blocked, Q1 2023–Q4 2025

Regionally, the percentage ranged from 0.46% in Northern Europe to 3.82% in Southern Europe. In Q4 2025, the indicator increased in Eastern Europe, Russia, and Western Europe.

The percentage of ICS computers on which malicious scripts and phishing pages were blocked decreased to 6.58%. Despite the decline, this category led the rankings of threat categories in terms of the percentage of ICS computers on which they were blocked.

Percentage of ICS computers on which malicious scripts and phishing pages were blocked, Q1 2023–Q4 2025

Percentage of ICS computers on which malicious scripts and phishing pages were blocked, Q1 2023–Q4 2025

Regionally, the percentage ranged from 2.52% in Northern Europe to 10.50% in South Asia. The indicator increased in South Asia, South America, Southern Europe, and Africa. South Asia saw the most notable increase, at 3.47 pp.

Next-stage malware

Malicious objects used to initially infect computers deliver next-stage malware β€” spyware, ransomware, and miners β€” to victims’ computers. As a rule, the higher the percentage of ICS computers on which the initial infection malware is blocked, the higher the percentage for next-stage malware.

In Q4 2025, the percentage of ICS computers on which spyware, ransomware and web miners were blocked decreased. The rates were:

  • Spyware: 3.80% (down 0.24 pp). For the second quarter in a row, spyware took second place in the rankings of threat categories in terms of the percentage of ICS computers on which it was blocked.
  • Ransomware: 0.16% (down 0.01 pp).
  • Web miners: 0.24% (down 0.01 pp), this is the lowest level observed thus far in the period under review.

The percentage of ICS computers on which miners in the form of executable files for Windows were blocked increased to 0.60% (up 0.03 pp).

Self-propagating malware

Self-propagating malware (worms and viruses) is a category unto itself. Worms and virus-infected files were originally used for initial infection, but as botnet functionality evolved, they took on next-stage characteristics.

To spread across ICS networks, viruses and worms rely on removable media and network folders and are distributed in the form of infected files, such as archives with backups, office documents, pirated games and hacked applications. In rarer and more dangerous cases, web pages with network equipment settings, as well as files stored in internal document management systems, product lifecycle management (PLM) systems, resource management (ERP) systems and other web services are infected.

In Q4 2025, the percentage of ICS computers on which worms were blocked increased by 1.6 times to 1.60%. As mentioned above, this increase is related to a global phishing attack that spread the Backdoor.MSIL.XWorm backdoor worm across all regions of the world. The percentage increased in all regions. The biggest increase (up by 2.16 times) was in Southern Europe. The malware was primary distributed through email clients, and Southern Europe led the way in terms of the percentage of ICS computers on which threats from email clients were blocked.

The percentage of ICS computers on which viruses were blocked decreased to 1.33%.

AutoCAD malware

This category of malware can spread in a variety of ways, so it does not belong to a specific group.

After an increase in the previous quarter, the percentage of ICS computers on which AutoCAD malware was blocked decreased to 0.29% in Q4 2025.

For more information on industrial threats see the full version of the report.

β€˜CanisterWorm’ Springs Wiper Attack Targeting Iran

23 March 2026 at 16:43

A financially motivated data theft and extortion group is attempting to inject itself into the Iran war, unleashing a worm that spreads through poorly secured cloud services and wipes data on infected systems that use Iran’s time zone or have Farsi set as the default language.

Experts say the wiper campaign against Iran materialized this past weekend and came from a relatively new cybercrime group known as TeamPCP. In December 2025, the group began compromising corporate cloud environments using a self-propagating worm that went after exposed Docker APIs, Kubernetes clusters, Redis servers, and the React2Shell vulnerability. TeamPCP then attempted to move laterally through victim networks, siphoning authentication credentials and extorting victims over Telegram.

A snippet of the malicious CanisterWorm that seeks out and destroys data on systems that match Iran’s timezone or have Farsi as the default language. Image: Aikido.dev.

In a profile of TeamPCP published in January, the security firm FlareΒ said the group weaponizes exposed control planes rather than exploiting endpoints, predominantly targeting cloud infrastructure over end-user devices, with Azure (61%) and AWS (36%) accounting for 97% of compromised servers.

β€œTeamPCP’s strength does not come from novel exploits or original malware, but from the large-scale automation and integration of well-known attack techniques,” Flare’s Assaf Morag wrote. β€œThe group industrializes existing vulnerabilities, misconfigurations, and recycled tooling into a cloud-native exploitation platform that turns exposed infrastructure into a self-propagating criminal ecosystem.”

On March 19, TeamPCP executed a supply chain attack against the vulnerability scanner Trivy from Aqua Security, injecting credential-stealing malware into official releases on GitHub actions. Aqua Security said it has since removed the harmful files, but the security firm Wiz notes the attackers were able to publish malicious versions that snarfed SSH keys, cloud credentials, Kubernetes tokens and cryptocurrency wallets from users.

Over the weekend, the same technical infrastructure TeamPCP used in the Trivy attack was leveraged to deploy a new malicious payload which executes a wiper attack if the user’s timezone and locale are determined to correspond to Iran, said Charlie Eriksen, a security researcher at Aikido. In a blog post published on Sunday, EriksenΒ said if the wiper component detects that the victim is in Iran and has access to a Kubernetes cluster, it will destroy data on every node in that cluster.

β€œIf it doesn’t it will just wipe the local machine,” Eriksen told KrebsOnSecurity.

Image: Aikido.dev.

Aikido refers to TeamPCP’s infrastructure as β€œCanisterWorm” because the group orchestrates their campaigns using an Internet Computer Protocol (ICP) canister β€” a system of tamperproof, blockchain-based β€œsmart contracts” that combine both code and data. ICP canisters can serve Web content directly to visitors, and their distributed architecture makes them resistant to takedown attempts. These canisters will remain reachable so long as their operators continue to pay virtual currency fees to keep them online.

Eriksen said the people behind TeamPCP are bragging about their exploits in a group on Telegram and claim to have used the worm to steal vast amounts of sensitive data from major companies, including a large multinational pharmaceutical firm.

β€œWhen they compromised Aqua a second time, they took a lot of GitHub accounts and started spamming these with junk messages,” Eriksen said. β€œIt was almost like they were just showing off how much access they had. Clearly, they have an entire stash of these credentials, and what we’ve seen so far is probably a small sample of what they have.”

Security experts say the spammed GitHub messages could be a way for TeamPCP to ensure that any code packages tainted with their malware will remain prominent in GitHub searches. In a newsletter published today titled GitHub is Starting to Have a Real Malware Problem, Risky Business reporter Catalin Cimpanu writes that attackers often are seen pushing meaningless commits to their repos or using online services that sell GitHub stars and β€œlikes” to keep malicious packages at the top of the GitHub search page.

This weekend’s outbreak is the second major supply chain attack involving Trivy in as many months. At the end of February, Trivy was hit as part of an automated threat called HackerBot-Claw, which mass exploited misconfigured workflows in GitHub Actions to steal authentication tokens.

Eriksen said it appears TeamPCP used access gained in the first attack on Aqua Security to perpetrate this weekend’s mischief. But he said there is no reliable way to tell whether TeamPCP’s wiper actually succeeded in trashing any data from victim systems, and that the malicious payload was only active for a short time over the weekend.

β€œThey’ve been taking [the malicious code] up and down, rapidly changing it adding new features,” Eriksen said, noting that when the malicious canister wasn’t serving up malware downloads it was pointing visitors to a Rick Roll video on YouTube.

β€œIt’s a little all over the place, and there’s a chance this whole Iran thing is just their way of getting attention,” Eriksen said. β€œI feel like these people are really playing this Chaotic Evil role here.”

Cimpanu observed that supply chain attacks have increased in frequency of late as threat actors begin to grasp just how efficient they can be, and his post documents an alarming number of these incidents since 2024.

β€œWhile security firms appear to be doing a good job spotting this, we’re also gonna need GitHub’s security team to step up,” Cimpanu wrote. β€œUnfortunately, on a platform designed to copy (fork) a project and create new versions of it (clones), spotting malicious additions to clones of legitimate repos might be quite the engineering problem to fix.”

Update, 2:40 p.m. ET: Wiz is reporting that TeamPCP also pushed credential stealing malware to the KICS vulnerability scanner from Checkmarx, and that the scanner’s GitHub Action was compromised between 12:58 and 16:50 UTC today (March 23rd).

Threat landscape for industrial automation systems in Q3 2025

25 December 2025 at 11:00

Statistics across all threats

In Q3 2025, the percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked decreased from the previous quarter by 0.4 pp to 20.1%. This is the lowest level for the observed period.

Percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked, Q3 2022–Q3 2025

Percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked, Q3 2022–Q3 2025

Regionally, the percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked ranged from 9.2% in Northern Europe to 27.4% in Africa.

Regions ranked by percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked

Regions ranked by percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked

In Q3 2025, the percentage increased in five regions. The most notable increase occurred in East Asia, triggered by the local spread of malicious scripts in the OT infrastructure of engineering organizations and ICS integrators.

Changes in the percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked, Q3 2025

Changes in the percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked, Q3 2025

Selected industries

The biometrics sector traditionally led the rankings of the industries and OT infrastructures surveyed in this report in terms of the percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked.

Rankings of industries and OT infrastructures by percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked

Rankings of industries and OT infrastructures by percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked

In Q3 2025, the percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked increased in four of the seven surveyed industries. The most notable increases were in engineering and ICS integrators, and manufacturing.

Percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked in selected industries

Percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked in selected industries

Diversity of detected malicious objects

In Q3 2025, Kaspersky protection solutions blocked malware from 11,356 different malware families of various categories on industrial automation systems.

Percentage of ICS computers on which the activity of malicious objects of various categories was blocked

Percentage of ICS computers on which the activity of malicious objects of various categories was blocked

In Q3 2025, there was a decrease in the percentage of ICS computers on which denylisted internet resources and miners of both categories were blocked. These were the only categories that exhibited a decrease.

Main threat sources

Depending on the threat detection and blocking scenario, it is not always possible to reliably identify the source. The circumstantial evidence for a specific source can be the blocked threat’s type (category).

The internet (visiting malicious or compromised internet resources; malicious content distributed via messengers; cloud data storage and processing services and CDNs), email clients (phishing emails), and removable storage devices remain the primary sources of threats to computers in an organization’s technology infrastructure.

In Q3 2025, the percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects from various sources were blocked decreased.

Percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects from various sources were blocked

Percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects from various sources were blocked

The same computer can be attacked by several categories of malware from the same source during a quarter. That computer is counted when calculating the percentage of attacked computers for each threat category, but is only counted once for the threat source (we count unique attacked computers). In addition, it is not always possible to accurately determine the initial infection attempt. Therefore, the total percentage of ICS computers on which various categories of threats from a certain source were blocked can exceed the percentage of threats from the source itself.

  • The main categories of threats from the internet blocked on ICS computers in Q3 2025 were malicious scripts and phishing pages, and denylisted internet resources. The percentage ranged from 4.57% in Northern Europe to 10.31% in Africa.
  • The main categories of threats from email clients blocked on ICS computers were malicious scripts and phishing pages, spyware, and malicious documents. Most of the spyware detected in phishing emails was delivered as a password-protected archive or a multi-layered script embedded in an office document. The percentage of ICS computers on which threats from email clients were blocked ranged from 0.78% in Russia to 6.85% in Southern Europe.
  • The main categories of threats that were blocked when removable media was connected to ICS computers were worms, viruses, and spyware. The percentage of ICS computers on which threats from this source were blocked ranged from 0.05% in Australia and New Zealand to 1.43% in Africa.
  • The main categories of threats that spread through network folders were viruses, AutoCAD malware, worms, and spyware. The percentages of ICS computers where threats from this source were blocked ranged from 0.006% in Northern Europe to 0.20% in East Asia.

Threat categories

Typical attacks blocked within an OT network are multi-step sequences of malicious activities, where each subsequent step of the attackers is aimed at increasing privileges and/or gaining access to other systems by exploiting the security problems of industrial enterprises, including technological infrastructures.

Malicious objects used for initial infection

In Q3 2025, the percentage of ICS computers on which denylisted internet resources were blocked decreased to 4.01%. This is the lowest quarterly figure since the beginning of 2022.

Percentage of ICS computers on which denylisted internet resources were blocked, Q3 2022–Q3 2025

Percentage of ICS computers on which denylisted internet resources were blocked, Q3 2022–Q3 2025

Regionally, the percentage of ICS computers on which denylisted internet resources were blocked ranged from 2.35% in Australia and New Zealand to 4.96% in Africa. Southeast Asia and South Asia were also among the top three regions for this indicator.

The percentage of ICS computers on which malicious documents were blocked has grown for three consecutive quarters, following a decline at the end of 2024. In Q3 2025, it reached 1,98%.

Percentage of ICS computers on which malicious documents were blocked, Q3 2022–Q3 2025

Percentage of ICS computers on which malicious documents were blocked, Q3 2022–Q3 2025

The indicator increased in four regions: South America, East Asia, Southeast Asia, and Australia and New Zealand. South America saw the largest increase as a result of a large-scale phishing campaign in which attackers used new exploits for an old vulnerability (CVE-2017-11882) in Microsoft Office Equation Editor to deliver various spyware to victims’ computers. It is noteworthy that the attackers in this phishing campaign used localized Spanish-language emails disguised as business correspondence.

In Q3 2025, the percentage of ICS computers on which malicious scripts and phishing pages were blocked increased to 6.79%. This category led the rankings of threat categories in terms of the percentage of ICS computers on which they were blocked.

Percentage of ICS computers on which malicious scripts and phishing pages were blocked, Q3 2022–Q3 2025

Percentage of ICS computers on which malicious scripts and phishing pages were blocked, Q3 2022–Q3 2025

Regionally, the percentage of ICS computers on which malicious scripts and phishing pages were blocked ranged from 2.57% in Northern Europe to 9.41% in Africa. The top three regions for this indicator were Africa, East Asia, and South America. The indicator increased the most in East Asia (by a dramatic 5.23 pp) as a result of the local spread of malicious spyware scripts loaded into the memory of popular torrent clients including MediaGet.

Next-stage malware

Malicious objects used to initially infect computers deliver next-stage malware β€” spyware, ransomware, and miners β€” to victims’ computers. As a rule, the higher the percentage of ICS computers on which the initial infection malware is blocked, the higher the percentage for next-stage malware.
In Q3 2025, the percentage of ICS computers on which spyware and ransomware were blocked increased. The rates were:

  • spyware: 4.04% (up 0.20 pp);
  • ransomware: 0.17% (up 0.03 pp).

The percentage of ICS computers on which miners of both categories were blocked decreased. The rates were:

  • miners in the form of executable files for Windows: 0.57% (down 0.06 pp), it’s the lowest level since Q3 2022;
  • web miners: 0.25% (down 0.05 pp). This is the lowest level since Q3 2022.

Self-propagating malware

Self-propagating malware (worms and viruses) is a category unto itself. Worms and virus-infected files were originally used for initial infection, but as botnet functionality evolved, they took on next-stage characteristics.

To spread across ICS networks, viruses and worms rely on removable media and network folders in the form of infected files, such as archives with backups, office documents, pirated games and hacked applications. In rarer and more dangerous cases, web pages with network equipment settings, as well as files stored in internal document management systems, product lifecycle management (PLM) systems, resource management (ERP) systems and other web services are infected.

In Q3 2025, the percentage of ICS computers on which worms and viruses were blocked increased to 1.26% (by 0.04 pp) and 1.40% (by 0.11 pp), respectively.

AutoCAD malware

This category of malware can spread in a variety of ways, so it does not belong to a specific group.

In Q3 2025, the percentage of ICS computers on which AutoCAD malware was blocked slightly increased to 0.30% (by 0.01 pp).

For more information on industrial threats see the full version of the report.

Threat landscape for industrial automation systems in Q3 2025

25 December 2025 at 11:00

Statistics across all threats

In Q3 2025, the percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked decreased from the previous quarter by 0.4 pp to 20.1%. This is the lowest level for the observed period.

Percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked, Q3 2022–Q3 2025

Percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked, Q3 2022–Q3 2025

Regionally, the percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked ranged from 9.2% in Northern Europe to 27.4% in Africa.

Regions ranked by percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked

Regions ranked by percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked

In Q3 2025, the percentage increased in five regions. The most notable increase occurred in East Asia, triggered by the local spread of malicious scripts in the OT infrastructure of engineering organizations and ICS integrators.

Changes in the percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked, Q3 2025

Changes in the percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked, Q3 2025

Selected industries

The biometrics sector traditionally led the rankings of the industries and OT infrastructures surveyed in this report in terms of the percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked.

Rankings of industries and OT infrastructures by percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked

Rankings of industries and OT infrastructures by percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked

In Q3 2025, the percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked increased in four of the seven surveyed industries. The most notable increases were in engineering and ICS integrators, and manufacturing.

Percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked in selected industries

Percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked in selected industries

Diversity of detected malicious objects

In Q3 2025, Kaspersky protection solutions blocked malware from 11,356 different malware families of various categories on industrial automation systems.

Percentage of ICS computers on which the activity of malicious objects of various categories was blocked

Percentage of ICS computers on which the activity of malicious objects of various categories was blocked

In Q3 2025, there was a decrease in the percentage of ICS computers on which denylisted internet resources and miners of both categories were blocked. These were the only categories that exhibited a decrease.

Main threat sources

Depending on the threat detection and blocking scenario, it is not always possible to reliably identify the source. The circumstantial evidence for a specific source can be the blocked threat’s type (category).

The internet (visiting malicious or compromised internet resources; malicious content distributed via messengers; cloud data storage and processing services and CDNs), email clients (phishing emails), and removable storage devices remain the primary sources of threats to computers in an organization’s technology infrastructure.

In Q3 2025, the percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects from various sources were blocked decreased.

Percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects from various sources were blocked

Percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects from various sources were blocked

The same computer can be attacked by several categories of malware from the same source during a quarter. That computer is counted when calculating the percentage of attacked computers for each threat category, but is only counted once for the threat source (we count unique attacked computers). In addition, it is not always possible to accurately determine the initial infection attempt. Therefore, the total percentage of ICS computers on which various categories of threats from a certain source were blocked can exceed the percentage of threats from the source itself.

  • The main categories of threats from the internet blocked on ICS computers in Q3 2025 were malicious scripts and phishing pages, and denylisted internet resources. The percentage ranged from 4.57% in Northern Europe to 10.31% in Africa.
  • The main categories of threats from email clients blocked on ICS computers were malicious scripts and phishing pages, spyware, and malicious documents. Most of the spyware detected in phishing emails was delivered as a password-protected archive or a multi-layered script embedded in an office document. The percentage of ICS computers on which threats from email clients were blocked ranged from 0.78% in Russia to 6.85% in Southern Europe.
  • The main categories of threats that were blocked when removable media was connected to ICS computers were worms, viruses, and spyware. The percentage of ICS computers on which threats from this source were blocked ranged from 0.05% in Australia and New Zealand to 1.43% in Africa.
  • The main categories of threats that spread through network folders were viruses, AutoCAD malware, worms, and spyware. The percentages of ICS computers where threats from this source were blocked ranged from 0.006% in Northern Europe to 0.20% in East Asia.

Threat categories

Typical attacks blocked within an OT network are multi-step sequences of malicious activities, where each subsequent step of the attackers is aimed at increasing privileges and/or gaining access to other systems by exploiting the security problems of industrial enterprises, including technological infrastructures.

Malicious objects used for initial infection

In Q3 2025, the percentage of ICS computers on which denylisted internet resources were blocked decreased to 4.01%. This is the lowest quarterly figure since the beginning of 2022.

Percentage of ICS computers on which denylisted internet resources were blocked, Q3 2022–Q3 2025

Percentage of ICS computers on which denylisted internet resources were blocked, Q3 2022–Q3 2025

Regionally, the percentage of ICS computers on which denylisted internet resources were blocked ranged from 2.35% in Australia and New Zealand to 4.96% in Africa. Southeast Asia and South Asia were also among the top three regions for this indicator.

The percentage of ICS computers on which malicious documents were blocked has grown for three consecutive quarters, following a decline at the end of 2024. In Q3 2025, it reached 1,98%.

Percentage of ICS computers on which malicious documents were blocked, Q3 2022–Q3 2025

Percentage of ICS computers on which malicious documents were blocked, Q3 2022–Q3 2025

The indicator increased in four regions: South America, East Asia, Southeast Asia, and Australia and New Zealand. South America saw the largest increase as a result of a large-scale phishing campaign in which attackers used new exploits for an old vulnerability (CVE-2017-11882) in Microsoft Office Equation Editor to deliver various spyware to victims’ computers. It is noteworthy that the attackers in this phishing campaign used localized Spanish-language emails disguised as business correspondence.

In Q3 2025, the percentage of ICS computers on which malicious scripts and phishing pages were blocked increased to 6.79%. This category led the rankings of threat categories in terms of the percentage of ICS computers on which they were blocked.

Percentage of ICS computers on which malicious scripts and phishing pages were blocked, Q3 2022–Q3 2025

Percentage of ICS computers on which malicious scripts and phishing pages were blocked, Q3 2022–Q3 2025

Regionally, the percentage of ICS computers on which malicious scripts and phishing pages were blocked ranged from 2.57% in Northern Europe to 9.41% in Africa. The top three regions for this indicator were Africa, East Asia, and South America. The indicator increased the most in East Asia (by a dramatic 5.23 pp) as a result of the local spread of malicious spyware scripts loaded into the memory of popular torrent clients including MediaGet.

Next-stage malware

Malicious objects used to initially infect computers deliver next-stage malware β€” spyware, ransomware, and miners β€” to victims’ computers. As a rule, the higher the percentage of ICS computers on which the initial infection malware is blocked, the higher the percentage for next-stage malware.
In Q3 2025, the percentage of ICS computers on which spyware and ransomware were blocked increased. The rates were:

  • spyware: 4.04% (up 0.20 pp);
  • ransomware: 0.17% (up 0.03 pp).

The percentage of ICS computers on which miners of both categories were blocked decreased. The rates were:

  • miners in the form of executable files for Windows: 0.57% (down 0.06 pp), it’s the lowest level since Q3 2022;
  • web miners: 0.25% (down 0.05 pp). This is the lowest level since Q3 2022.

Self-propagating malware

Self-propagating malware (worms and viruses) is a category unto itself. Worms and virus-infected files were originally used for initial infection, but as botnet functionality evolved, they took on next-stage characteristics.

To spread across ICS networks, viruses and worms rely on removable media and network folders in the form of infected files, such as archives with backups, office documents, pirated games and hacked applications. In rarer and more dangerous cases, web pages with network equipment settings, as well as files stored in internal document management systems, product lifecycle management (PLM) systems, resource management (ERP) systems and other web services are infected.

In Q3 2025, the percentage of ICS computers on which worms and viruses were blocked increased to 1.26% (by 0.04 pp) and 1.40% (by 0.11 pp), respectively.

AutoCAD malware

This category of malware can spread in a variety of ways, so it does not belong to a specific group.

In Q3 2025, the percentage of ICS computers on which AutoCAD malware was blocked slightly increased to 0.30% (by 0.01 pp).

For more information on industrial threats see the full version of the report.

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