Living off the AI isn’t a hypothetical but a natural continuation of the tradecraft we’ve all been defending against, now mapped onto assistants, agents, and MCP.

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The startup aims to unify SOC, GRC, IAM, vulnerability management, IT, and business operations through its Agentic OS platform.

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Criminals are using AI to clone professional websites at an industrial scale. A new report shows how one AI-powered network grew to 150+ domains by hiding behind Cloudflare and rotating IP ranges.

The post Researchers Expose Network of 150 Cloned Law Firm Websites in AI-Powered Scam Campaign appeared first on SecurityWeek.

This latest infusion, led by SYN Ventures, brings the company’s total funding to $16.9 million.

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The vulnerability could allow attackers to execute arbitrary commands and steal credentials and other secrets.

The post Critical N8n Sandbox Escape Could Lead to Server Compromise appeared first on SecurityWeek.

Introduction

Stan Ghouls (also known as Bloody Wolf) is an cybercriminal group that has been launching targeted attacks against organizations in Russia, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan since at least 2023. These attackers primarily have their sights set on the manufacturing, finance, and IT sectors. Their campaigns are meticulously prepared and tailored to specific victims, featuring a signature toolkit of custom Java-based malware loaders and a sprawling infrastructure with resources dedicated to specific campaigns.

We continuously track Stan Ghouls’ activity, providing our clients with intel on their tactics, techniques, procedures, and latest campaigns. In this post, we share the results of our most recent deep dive into a campaign targeting Uzbekistan, where we identified roughly 50 victims. About 10 devices in Russia were also hit, with a handful of others scattered across Kazakhstan, Turkey, Serbia, and Belarus (though those last three were likely just collateral damage).

During our investigation, we spotted shifts in the attackers’ infrastructure – specifically, a batch of new domains. We also uncovered evidence suggesting that Stan Ghouls may have added IoT-focused malware to their arsenal.

Technical details

Threat evolution

Stan Ghouls relies on phishing emails packed with malicious PDF attachments as their initial entry point. Historically, the group’s weapon of choice was the remote access Trojan (RAT) STRRAT, also known as Strigoi Master. Last year, however, they switched strategies, opting to misuse legitimate software, NetSupport, to maintain control over infected machines.

Given Stan Ghouls’ targeting of financial institutions, we believe their primary motive is financial gain. That said, their heavy use of RATs may also hint at cyberespionage.

Like any other organized cybercrime groups, Stan Ghouls frequently refreshes its infrastructure. To track their campaigns effectively, you have to continuously analyze their activity.

Initial infection vector

As we’ve mentioned, Stan Ghouls’ primary – and currently only – delivery method is spear phishing. Specifically, they favor emails loaded with malicious PDF attachments. This has been backed up by research from several of our industry peers (1, 2, 3). Interestingly, the attackers prefer to use local languages rather than opting for international mainstays like Russian or English. Below is an example of an email spotted in a previous campaign targeting users in Kyrgyzstan.

The email is written in Kyrgyz and translates to: “The service has contacted you. Materials for review are attached. Sincerely”.

The attachment was a malicious PDF file titled “Постановление_Районный_суд_Кчрм_3566_28-01-25_OL4_scan.pdf” (the title, written in Russian, posed it as an order of district court).

During the most recent campaign, which primarily targeted victims in Uzbekistan, the attackers deployed spear-phishing emails written in Uzbek:

The email text can be translated as follows:

[redacted] AKMALZHON IBROHIMOVICH

You will receive a court notice. Application for retrial. The case is under review by the district court. Judicial Service.

Mustaqillik Street, 147 Uraboshi Village, Quva District.

The attachment, named E-SUD_705306256_ljro_varaqasi.pdf (MD5: 7556e2f5a8f7d7531f28508f718cb83d), is a standard one-page decoy PDF:

Notice that the attackers claim that the “case materials” (which are actually the malicious loader) can only be opened using the Java Runtime Environment.

They even helpfully provide a link for the victim to download and install it from the official website.

The malicious loader

The decoy document contains identical text in both Russian and Uzbek, featuring two links that point to the malicious loader:

• Uzbek link (“- Ish materiallari 09.12.2025 y”): hxxps://mysoliq-uz[.]com/api/v2/documents/financial/Q4-2025/audited/consolidated/with-notes/financials/reports/annual/2025/tashkent/statistical-statements/
• Russian link (“- Материалы дела 09.12.2025 г.”): hxxps://my-xb[.]com/api/v2/documents/financial/Q4-2025/audited/consolidated/with-notes/financials/reports/annual/2025/tashkent/statistical-statements/

Both links lead to the exact same JAR file (MD5: 95db93454ec1d581311c832122d21b20).

It’s worth noting that these attackers are constantly updating their infrastructure, registering new domains for every new campaign. In the relatively short history of this threat, we’ve already mapped out over 35 domains tied to Stan Ghouls.

The malicious loader handles three main tasks:

1. Displaying a fake error message to trick the user into thinking the application can’t run. The message in the screenshot translates to: “This application cannot be run in your OS. Please use another device.”
   

   Fake error message

2. Checking that the number of previous RAT installation attempts is less than three. If the limit is reached, the loader terminates and throws the following error: “Urinishlar chegarasidan oshildi. Boshqa kompyuterni tekshiring.” This translates to: “Attempt limit reached. Try another computer.”
   

   The limitCheck procedure for verifying the number of RAT download attempts

3. Downloading a remote management utility from a malicious domain and saving it to the victim’s machine. Stan Ghouls loaders typically contain a list of several domains and will iterate through them until they find one that’s live.
   

   The performanceResourceUpdate procedure for downloading the remote management utility

The loader fetches the following files, which make up the components of the NetSupport RAT: PCICHEK.DLL, client32.exe, advpack.dll, msvcr100.dll, remcmdstub.exe, ir50_qcx.dll, client32.ini, AudioCapture.dll, kbdlk41a.dll, KBDSF.DLL, tcctl32.dll, HTCTL32.DLL, kbdibm02.DLL, kbd101c.DLL, kbd106n.dll, ir50_32.dll, nskbfltr.inf, NSM.lic, pcicapi.dll, PCICL32.dll, qwave.dll. This list is hardcoded in the malicious loader’s body. To ensure the download was successful, it checks for the presence of the client32.exe executable. If the file is found, the loader generates a NetSupport launch script (run.bat), drops it into the folder with the other files, and executes it:

The loader also ensures NetSupport persistence by adding it to startup using the following three methods:

1. It creates an autorun script named SoliqUZ_Run.bat and drops it into the Startup folder (%APPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup):
   

   The generateAutorunScript procedure for creating the batch file and placing it in the Startup folder

2. It adds the run.bat file to the registry’s autorun key (HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\malicious_key_name).
   

   The registryStartupAdd procedure for adding the RAT launch script to the registry autorun key

3. It creates a scheduled task to trigger run.bat using the following command:
   schtasks Create /TN "[malicious_task_name]" /TR "[path_to_run.bat]" /SC ONLOGON /RL LIMITED /F /RU "[%USERNAME%]"
   

   The installStartupTask procedure for creating a scheduled task to launch the NetSupport RAT (via run.bat)

Once the NetSupport RAT is downloaded, installed, and executed, the attackers gain total control over the victim’s machine. While we don’t have enough telemetry to say with 100% certainty what they do once they’re in, the heavy focus on finance-related organizations suggests that the group is primarily after its victims’ money. That said, we can’t rule out cyberespionage either.

Malicious utilities for targeting IoT infrastructure

Previous Stan Ghouls attacks targeting organizations in Kyrgyzstan, as documented by Group-IB researchers, featured a NetSupport RAT configuration file client32.ini with the MD5 hash cb9c28a4c6657ae5ea810020cb214ff0. While reports mention the Kyrgyzstan campaign kicked off in June 2025, Kaspersky solutions first flagged this exact config file on May 16, 2025. At that time, it contained the following NetSupport RAT command-and-control server info:

...
[HTTP]
CMPI=60
GatewayAddress=hgame33[.]com:443
GSK=FN:L?ADAFI:F?BCPGD;N>IAO9J>J@N
Port=443
SecondaryGateway=ravinads[.]com:443
SecondaryPort=443

At the time of our January 2026 investigation, our telemetry showed that the domain specified in that config, hgame33[.]com, was also hosting the following files:

• hxxp://www.hgame33[.]com/00101010101001/morte.spc
• hxxp://hgame33[.]com/00101010101001/debug
• hxxp://www.hgame33[.]com/00101010101001/morte.x86
• hxxp://www.hgame33[.]com/00101010101001/morte.mpsl
• hxxp://www.hgame33[.]com/00101010101001/morte.arm7
• hxxp://www.hgame33[.]com/00101010101001/morte.sh4
• hxxp://hgame33[.]com/00101010101001/morte.arm
• hxxp://hgame33[.]com/00101010101001/morte.i686
• hxxp://hgame33[.]com/00101010101001/morte.arc
• hxxp://hgame33[.]com/00101010101001/morte.arm5
• hxxp://hgame33[.]com/00101010101001/morte.arm6
• hxxp://www.hgame33[.]com/00101010101001/morte.m68k
• hxxp://www.hgame33[.]com/00101010101001/morte.ppc
• hxxp://www.hgame33[.]com/00101010101001/morte.x86_64
• hxxp://hgame33[.]com/00101010101001/morte.mips

All of these files belong to the infamous IoT malware named Mirai. Since they are sitting on a server tied to the Stan Ghouls’ campaign targeting Kyrgyzstan, we can hypothesize – with a low degree of confidence – that the group has expanded its toolkit to include IoT-based threats. However, it’s also possible it simply shared its infrastructure with other threat actors who were the ones actually wielding Mirai. This theory is backed up by the fact that the domain’s registration info was last updated on July 4, 2025, at 11:46:11 – well after Stan Ghouls’ activity in May and June.

Attribution

We attribute this campaign to the Stan Ghouls (Bloody Wolf) group with a high degree of confidence, based on the following similarities to the attackers’ previous campaigns:

1. Substantial code overlaps were found within the malicious loaders. For example:
   

   Code snippet from sample 1acd4592a4eb0c66642cc7b07213e9c9584c6140210779fbc9ebb76a90738d5e, the loader from the Group-IB report

   

   Code snippet from sample 95db93454ec1d581311c832122d21b20, the NetSupport loader described here

2. Decoy documents in both campaigns look identical.
   

   Decoy document 5d840b741d1061d51d9786f8009c37038c395c129bee608616740141f3b202bb from the campaign reported by Group-IB

   

   Decoy document 106911ba54f7e5e609c702504e69c89a used in the campaign described here

3. In both current and past campaigns, the attackers utilized loaders written in Java. Given that Java has fallen out of fashion with malicious loader authors in recent years, it serves as a distinct fingerprint for Stan Ghouls.

Victims

We identified approximately 50 victims of this campaign in Uzbekistan, alongside 10 in Russia and a handful of others in Kazakhstan, Turkey, Serbia, and Belarus (we suspect the infections in these last three countries were accidental). Nearly all phishing emails and decoy files in this campaign were written in Uzbek, which aligns with the group’s track record of leveraging the native languages of their target countries.

Most of the victims are tied to industrial manufacturing, finance, and IT. Furthermore, we observed infection attempts on devices within government organizations, logistics companies, medical facilities, and educational institutions.

It is worth noting that over 60 victims is quite a high headcount for a sophisticated campaign. This suggests the attackers have enough resources to maintain manual remote control over dozens of infected devices simultaneously.

Takeaways

In this post, we’ve broken down the recent campaign by the Stan Ghouls group. The attackers set their sights on organizations in industrial manufacturing, IT, and finance, primarily located in Uzbekistan. However, the ripple effect also reached Russia, Kazakhstan, and a few, likely accidental, victims elsewhere.

With over 60 targets hit, this is a remarkably high volume for a sophisticated targeted campaign. It points to the significant resources these actors are willing to pour into their operations. Interestingly, despite this, the group sticks to a familiar toolkit including the legitimate NetSupport remote management utility and their signature custom Java-based loader. The only thing they seem to keep updating is their infrastructure. For this specific campaign, they employed two new domains to house their malicious loader and one new domain dedicated to hosting NetSupport RAT files.

One curious discovery was the presence of Mirai files on a domain linked to the group’s previous campaigns. This might suggest Stan Ghouls are branching out into IoT malware, though it’s still too early to call it with total certainty.

We’re keeping a close watch on Stan Ghouls and will continue to keep our customers in the loop regarding the group’s latest moves. Kaspersky products provide robust protection against this threat at every stage of the attack lifecycle.

Indicators of compromise

* Additional IoCs and a YARA rule for detecting Stan Ghouls activity are available to customers of our Threat Intelligence Reporting service. For more details, contact us at crimewareintel@kaspersky.com.

PDF decoys

B4FF4AA3EBA9409F9F1A5210C95DC5C3
AF9321DDB4BEF0C3CD1FF3C7C786F0E2
056B75FE0D230E6FF53AC508E0F93CCB
DB84FEBFD85F1469C28B4ED70AC6A638
649C7CACDD545E30D015EDB9FCAB3A0C
BE0C87A83267F1CE13B3F75C78EAC295
78CB3ABD00A1975BEBEDA852B2450873
51703911DC437D4E3910CE7F866C970E
FA53B0FCEF08F8FF3FFDDFEE7F1F4F1A
79D0EEAFB30AA2BD4C261A51104F6ACC
8DA8F0339D17E2466B3D73236D18B835
299A7E3D6118AD91A9B6D37F94AC685B
62AFACC37B71D564D75A58FC161900C3
047A600E3AFBF4286175BADD4D88F131
ED0CCADA1FE1E13EF78553A48260D932
C363CD87178FD660C25CDD8D978685F6
61FF22BA4C3DF7AE4A936FCFDEB020EA
B51D9EDC1DC8B6200F260589A4300009
923557554730247D37E782DB3BEA365D
60C34AD7E1F183A973FB8EE29DC454E8
0CC80A24841401529EC9C6A845609775
0CE06C962E07E63D780E5C2777A661FC

Malicious loaders

1b740b17e53c4daeed45148bfbee4f14
3f99fed688c51977b122789a094fec2e
8b0bbe7dc960f7185c330baa3d9b214c
95db93454ec1d581311c832122d21b20
646a680856f837254e6e361857458e17
8064f7ac9a5aa845ded6a1100a1d5752
d0cf8946acd3d12df1e8ae4bb34f1a6e
db796d87acb7d980264fdcf5e94757f0
e3cb4dafa1fb596e1e34e4b139be1b05
e0023eb058b0c82585a7340b6ed4cc06
0bf01810201004dcc484b3396607a483
4C4FA06BD840405FBEC34FE49D759E8D
A539A07891A339479C596BABE3060EA6
b13f7ccbedfb71b0211c14afe0815b36
f14275f8f420afd0f9a62f3992860d68
3f41091afd6256701dd70ac20c1c79fe
5c4a57e2e40049f8e8a6a74aa8085c80
7e8feb501885eff246d4cb43c468b411
8aa104e64b00b049264dc1b01412e6d9
8c63818261735ddff2fe98b3ae23bf7d

Malicious domains

mysoliq-uz[.]com
my-xb[.]com
xarid-uz[.]com
ach-uz[.]com
soliq-uz[.]com
minjust-kg[.]com
esf-kg[.]com
taxnotice-kg[.]com
notice-kg[.]com
proauditkg[.]com
kgauditcheck[.]com
servicedoc-kg[.]com
auditnotice-kg[.]com
tax-kg[.]com
rouming-uz[.]com
audit-kg[.]com
kyrgyzstanreview[.]com
salyk-notofocations[.]com

AI-powered cyber attacks are outpacing traditional defenses. Learn the four key threat categories and the new skills blue teams need to defend against them.

The post Defending Against AI-Powered Cyber Attacks: Why Your Blue Team Needs New Skills appeared first on OffSec.

Journalists decided to test whether the Grok chatbot still generates non‑consensual sexualized images, even after xAI, Elon Musk’s artificial intelligence company, and X, the social media platform formerly known as Twitter, promised tighter safeguards.

Unsurprisingly, it does.

After scrutiny from regulators all over the world—triggered by reports that Grok could generate sexualized images of minors—xAI framed it as an “isolated” lapse and said it was urgently fixing “lapses in safeguards.”

A Reuters retest suggests the core abuse pattern remains. Reuters had nine reporters run dozens of controlled prompts through Grok after X announced new limits on sexualized content and image editing. In the first round, Grok produced sexualized imagery in response to 45 of 55 prompts. In 31 of those 45, the reporters explicitly said the subject was vulnerable or would be humiliated by the pictures.

A second round, five days later, still yielded sexualized images in 29 of 43 prompts, even when reporters said the subjects had not consented.

Competing systems from OpenAI, Google, and Meta refused identical prompts and instead warned users against generating non‑consensual content.

The prompts were deliberately framed as real‑world abuse scenarios. Reporters told Grok the photos were of friends, co-workers, or strangers who were body‑conscious, timid, or survivors of abuse, and that they had not agreed to editing. Despite that, Grok often complied—for example, turning a “friend” into a woman in a revealing purple two‑piece or putting a male acquaintance into a small gray bikini, oiled up and posed suggestively. In only seven cases did Grok explicitly reject requests as inappropriate; in others it failed silently, returning generic errors or generating different people instead.

The result is a system illustrating the same lesson its creators say they’re trying to learn: if you ship powerful visual models without exhaustive abuse testing and robust guardrails, people will use them to sexualize and humiliate others, including children. Grok’s record so far suggests that lesson still hasn’t sunk in.

Grok limited AI image editing to paid users after the backlash. But paywalling image tools—and adding new curbs—looks more like damage control than a fundamental safety reset. Grok still accepts prompts that describe non‑consensual use, still sexualizes vulnerable subjects, and still behaves more permissively than rival systems when asked to generate abusive imagery. For victims, the distinction between “public” and private generations is meaningless if their photos can be weaponized in DMs or closed groups at scale.

Sharing images

If you’ve ever wondered why some parents post images of their children with a smiley emoji across their face, this is part of the reason.

Don’t make it easy for strangers to copy, reuse, or manipulate your photos.

This is another compelling reason to reduce your digital footprint. Think carefully before posting photos of yourself, your children, or other sensitive information on public social media accounts.

And treat everything you see online—images, voices, text—as potentially AI-generated unless they can be independently verified. They’re not only used to sway opinions, but also to solicit money, extract personal information, or create abusive material.

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Cybersecurity risks should never spread beyond a headline. Protect your social media accounts by using Malwarebytes Identity Theft Protection.

Some software providers have decided to lead by example and offer users a choice about the Artificial Intelligence (AI) features built into their products.

The latest example is Mozilla, which now offers users a one-click option to disable generative AI features in the Firefox browser.

Audiences are divided about the use of AI, or as Mozilla put it on their blog:

“AI is changing the web, and people want very different things from it. We’ve heard from many who want nothing to do with AI. We’ve also heard from others who want AI tools that are genuinely useful. Listening to our community, alongside our ongoing commitment to offer choice, led us to build AI controls.”

Mozilla is adding an AI Controls area to Firefox settings that centralizes the management of all generative AI features. This consists mainly of a master switch, “Block AI enhancements,” which lets users effectively run Firefox “without AI.” It blocks existing and future generative AI features and hides pop‑ups or prompts advertising them.

Once you set your AI preferences in Firefox, they stay in place across updates. You can also change them whenever you want.

Starting with Firefox 148, which rolls out on February 24, you’ll find a new AI controls section within the desktop browser settings.

You can turn everything off with one click or take a more granular approach. At launch, these features can be controlled individually:

• Translations, which help you browse the web in your preferred language.
• Alt text in PDFs, which add accessibility descriptions to images in PDF pages.
• AI-enhanced tab grouping, which suggests related tabs and group names.
• Link previews, which show key points before you open a link.
• An AI chatbot in the sidebar, which lets you use your chosen chatbot as you browse, including options like Anthropic Claude, ChatGPT, Microsoft Copilot, Google Gemini and Le Chat Mistral.

We applaud this move to give more control to the users. Other companies have done the same, including Mozilla’s competitor DuckDuckGo, which made AI optional after putting the decision to a user vote. Earlier, browser developer Vivaldi took a stand against incorporating AI altogether.

Open-source email service Tuta also decided not to integrate AI features. After only 3% of Tuta users requested them, Tuta removed an AI copilot from its development roadmap.

Even Microsoft seems to have recoiled from pushing AI to everyone, although so far it has focused on walking back defaults and tightening per‑feature controls rather than offering a single, global off switch.

Choices

Many people are happy to use AI features, and as long as you’re aware of the risks and the pitfalls, that’s fine. But pushing these features on users who don’t want them is likely to backfire on software publishers.

Which is only right. After all, you’re paying the bill, so you should have a choice. Before installing a new browser, inform yourself not only about its privacy policy, but also about what control you’ll have over AI features.

Looking at recent voting results, I think it’s safe to say that in the AI gold rush, the real premium feature isn’t a chatbot button—it’s the off switch.

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Privacy risks should never spread beyond a headline. Keep your online privacy yours by using Malwarebytes Privacy VPN.

Bondu’s AI plush toy exposed a web console that let anyone with a Gmail account read about 50,000 private chats between children and their cuddly toys.

Bondu’s toy is marketed as:

“A soft, cuddly toy powered by AI that can chat, teach, and play with your child.”

What it doesn’t say is that anyone with a Gmail account could read the transcripts from virtually every child who used a Bondu toy. Without any actual hacking, simply by logging in with an arbitrary Google account, two researchers found themselves looking at children’s private conversations.

What Bondu has to say about safety does not mention security or privacy:

“Bondu’s safety and behavior systems were built over 18 months of beta testing with thousands of families. Thanks to rigorous review processes and continuous monitoring, we did not receive a single report of unsafe or inappropriate behavior from Bondu throughout the entire beta period.”

Bondu’s emphasis on successful beta testing is understandable. Remember the AI teddy bear marketed by FoloToy that quickly veered from friendly chat into sexual topics and unsafe household advice?

The researchers were stunned to find the company’s public-facing web console allowed anyone to log in with their Google account. The chat logs between children and their plushies revealed names, birth dates, family details, and intimate conversations. The only conversations not available were those manually deleted by parents or company staff.

Potentially, these chat logs could been a burglar’s or kidnapper’s dream, offering insight into household routines and upcoming events.

Bondu took the console offline within minutes of disclosure, then relaunched it with authentication. The CEO said fixes were completed within hours, they saw “no evidence” of other access, and they brought in a security firm and added monitoring.

In the past, we’ve pointed out that AI-powered stuffed animals may not be a good alternative for screen time. Critics warn that when a toy uses personalized, human‑like dialogue, it risks replacing aspects of the caregiver–child relationship. One Curio founder even described their plushie as a stimulating sidekick so parents, “don’t feel like you have to be sitting them in front of a TV.”

So, whether it’s a foul-mouth, a blabbermouth, or just a feeble replacement for real friends, we don’t encourage using Artificial Intelligence in children’s toys—unless we ever make it to a point where they can be used safely, privately, securely, and even then, sparingly.

How to stay safe

AI-powered toys are coming, like it or not. But being the first or the cutest doesn’t mean they’re safe. The lesson history keeps teaching us is this: oversight, privacy, and a healthy dose of skepticism are the best defenses parents have.

• Turn off what you can. If the toy has a removable AI component, consider disabling it when you’re not able to supervise directly.
• Read the privacy policy. Yes, I know, all of it. Look for what will be recorded, stored, and potentially shared. Pay particular attention to sensitive data, like voice recordings, video recordings (if the toy has a camera), and location data.
• Limit connectivity. Avoid toys that require constant Wi-Fi or cloud interaction if possible.
• Monitor conversations. Regularly check in with your kids about what the toy says and supervise play where practical.
• Keep personal info private. Teach kids to never share their names, addresses, or family details, even with their plush friend.
• Trust your instincts. If a toy seems to cross boundaries or interfere with natural play, don’t be afraid to step in or simply say no.

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Privacy risks should never spread beyond a headline. Keep your online privacy yours by using Malwarebytes Privacy VPN.

OpenClaw (aka Moltbot and Clawdbot) is vulnerable to one-click remote code execution attacks.

The post Vulnerability Allows Hackers to Hijack OpenClaw AI Assistant  appeared first on SecurityWeek.

There’s a new report about two AI coding assistants, used by 1.5 million developers, that are surreptitiously sending a copy of everything they ingest to China.

Maybe avoid using them.

Security leaders share how artificial intelligence is changing malware, ransomware, and identity-led intrusions, and how defenses must evolve.

The post Cyber Insights 2026: Malware and Cyberattacks in the Age of AI appeared first on SecurityWeek.

From an Anthropic blog post:

In a recent evaluation of AI models’ cyber capabilities, current Claude models can now succeed at multistage attacks on networks with dozens of hosts using only standard, open-source tools, instead of the custom tools needed by previous generations. This illustrates how barriers to the use of AI in relatively autonomous cyber workflows are rapidly coming down, and highlights the importance of security fundamentals like promptly patching known vulnerabilities.

[…]

A notable development during the testing of Claude Sonnet 4.5 is that the model can now succeed on a minority of the networks without the custom cyber toolkit needed by previous generations. In particular, Sonnet 4.5 can now exfiltrate all of the (simulated) personal information in a high-fidelity simulation of the Equifax data breach—one of the costliest cyber attacks in history­­using only a Bash shell on a widely-available Kali Linux host (standard, open-source tools for penetration testing; not a custom toolkit). Sonnet 4.5 accomplishes this by instantly recognizing a publicized CVE and writing code to exploit it without needing to look it up or iterate on it. Recalling that the original Equifax breach happened by exploiting a publicized CVE that had not yet been patched, the prospect of highly competent and fast AI agents leveraging this approach underscores the pressing need for security best practices like prompt updates and patches.

AI models are getting better at this faster than I expected. This will be a major power shift in cybersecurity.

Meta plans to test exclusive features that will be incorporated in paid versions of Facebook, Instagram, and WhatsApp. It confirmed these plans to TechCrunch.

But these plans are not to be confused with the ad-free subscription options that Meta introduced for Facebook and Instagram in the EU, the European Economic Area, and Switzerland in late 2023 and framed as a way to comply with General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and Digital Markets Act requirements.

From November 2023, users in those regions could either keep using the services for free with personalized ads or pay a monthly fee for an ad‑free experience. European rules require Meta to get users’ consent in order to show them targeted ads, so this was an obvious attempt to recoup advertising revenue when users declined to give that consent.

This year, users in the UK were given the same choice: use Meta’s products for free or subscribe to use them without ads. But only grudgingly, judging by the tone in the offer… “As part of laws in your region, you have a choice.”

That ad-free option, however, is not what Meta is talking about now.

The newly announced plans are not about ads, and they are also separate from Meta Verified, which starts at around $15 a month and focuses on creators and businesses, offering a verification badge, better support, and anti‑impersonation protection.

Instead, these new subscriptions are likely to focus on additional features—more control over how users share and connect, and possibly tools such as expanded AI capabilities, unlimited audience lists, seeing who you follow that doesn’t follow you back, or viewing stories without the poster knowing it was you.

These examples are unconfirmed. All we know for sure is that Meta plans to test new paid features to see which ones users are willing to pay for and how much they can charge.

Meta has said these features will focus on productivity, creativity, and expanded AI.

My opinion

Unfortunately, this feels like another refusal to listen.

Most of us aren’t asking for more AI in our feeds. We’re asking for a basic sense of control: control over who sees us, what’s tracked about us, and how our data is used to feed an algorithm designed to keep us scrolling.

Users shouldn’t have to choose between being mined for behavioral data or paying a monthly fee just to be left alone. The message baked into “pay or be profiled” is that privacy is now a luxury good, not a default right. But while regulators keep saying the model is unlawful, the experience on the ground still nudges people toward the path of least resistance: accept the tracking and move on.

Even then, this level of choice is only available to users in Europe.

Why not offer the same option to users in the US? Or will it take stronger US privacy regulation to make that happen?

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An LLMjacking operation has been targeting exposed LLMs and MCPs at scale, for commercial monetization.

The post LLMs Hijacked, Monetized in ‘Operation Bizarre Bazaar’ appeared first on SecurityWeek.

The announcement comes just weeks after Palo Alto Networks and Google Cloud announced a multibillion-dollar AI and cloud security deal.

The post PwC and Google Cloud Ink $400 Million Deal to Scale AI-Powered Defense appeared first on SecurityWeek.

Researchers discovered 16 malicious browser extensions for Google Chrome and Microsoft Edge that steal ChatGPT session tokens, giving attackers access to accounts, including conversation history and metadata.

The 16 malicious extensions (15 for Chrome and 1 for Edge) claim to improve and optimize ChatGPT, but instead siphon users’ session tokens to attackers. Together, they have been downloaded around 900 times, a relatively small number compared to other malicious extensions.

Despite benign descriptions and, in some cases, a “featured” badge, the real goal of these extensions is to hijack ChatGPT identities by stealing session authentication tokens and sending them to attacker-controlled backends.

Possession of these tokens gives attackers the same level of access as the user, including conversation history and metadata.

In addition to your ChatGPT session token, the extensions also send extra details about themselves (such as their version and language settings), along with information about how they’re used, and special keys they get from their own online service.

Taken together, this allows the attackers to build a picture of who you are and how you work online. They can use it to keep recognizing you over time, build a profile of your behavior, and maintain access to your ChatGPT-connected services for much longer. This increases the privacy impact and means a single compromised extension can cause broader harm if its servers are abused or breached.

According to the researchers, this campaign coincides with a broader trend:

“The rapid growth in adoption of AI-powered browser extensions, aimed at helping users with their everyday productivity needs. While most of them are completely benign, many of these extensions mimic known brands to gain users’ trust, particularly those designed to enhance interaction with large language models.”

How to stay safe

Although we always advise people to install extensions only from official web stores, this case proves once again that not all extensions available there are safe. That said, installing extensions from outside official web stores carries an even higher risk.

Extensions listed in official stores undergo a review process before being approved. This process, which combines automated and manual checks, assesses the extension’s safety, policy compliance, and overall user experience. The goal is to protect users from scams, malware, and other malicious activity. However, this review process is not foolproof.

Microsoft and Google have been notified about the abuse. However, extensions that are already installed may remain active in Chrome and Edge until users manually remove them.

Malicious extensions

These are the browser extensions you should remove. They are listed by Name — Publisher — Extension ID:

• ChatGPT bulk delete, Chat manager — ChatGPT Mods — gbcgjnbccjojicobfimcnfjddhpphaod
• ChatGPT export, Markdown, JSON, images — ChatGPT Mods — hljdedgemmmkdalbnmnpoimdedckdkhm
• ChatGPT folder, voice download, prompt manager, free tools — ChatGPT Mods — lmiigijnefpkjcenfbinhdpafehaddag
• ChatGPT message navigator, history scroller — ChatGPT Mods — ifjimhnbnbniiiaihphlclkpfikcdkab
• ChatGPT Mods — Folder Voice Download & More Free Tools — jhohjhmbiakpgedidneeloaoloadlbdj
• ChatGPT pin chat, bookmark — ChatGPT Mods — kefnabicobeigajdngijnnjmljehknjl
• ChatGPT Prompt Manager, Folder, Library, Auto Send — ChatGPT Mods — ioaeacncbhpmlkediaagefiegegknglc
• ChatGPT prompt optimization — ChatGPT Mods — mmjmcfaejolfbenlplfoihnobnggljij
• ChatGPT search history, locate specific messages — ChatGPT Mods — ipjgfhcjeckaibnohigmbcaonfcjepmb
• ChatGPT Timestamp Display — ChatGPT Mods — afjenpabhpfodjpncbiiahbknnghabdc
• ChatGPT Token counter — ChatGPT Mods — hfdpdgblphooommgcjdnnmhpglleaafj
• ChatGPT model switch, save advanced model uses — ChatGPT Mods — pfgbcfaiglkcoclichlojeaklcfboieh
• ChatGPT voice download, TTS download — ChatGPT Mods — območbankihdfckkbfnoglefmdgmblcld (original: obdobankihdfckkbfnoglefmdgmblcld)
• Collapsed message — ChatGPT Mods — lechagcebaneoafonkbfkljmbmaaoaec
• Multi-Profile Management & Switching — ChatGPT Mods — nhnfaiiobkpbenbbiblmgncgokeknnno
• Search with ChatGPT — ChatGPT Mods — hpcejjllhbalkcmdikecfngkepppoknd

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The fastest way to squander the promise of AI is to mistake automation for assurance, and novelty for resilience.

The post Why We Can’t Let AI Take the Wheel of Cyber Defense appeared first on SecurityWeek.

Quantum computers are coming, with a potential computing power almost beyond comprehension.

The post Cyber Insights 2026: Quantum Computing and the Potential Synergy With Advanced AI appeared first on SecurityWeek.