This blog is part of a series where we highlight new or fast-evolving threats in consumer security. This one focuses on how AI is being used to design more realistic campaigns, accelerate social engineering, and how AI agents can be used to target individuals.
Most cybercriminals stick with what works. But once a new method proves effective, it spreads quicklyβand new trends and types of campaigns follow.
In 2025, the rapid development of Artificial IntelligenceΒ (AI) and its use in cybercrime went hand in hand. In general, AI allows criminals to improve the scale, speed, and personalization of social engineering through realistic text, voice, and video. Victims face not only financial loss, but erosion of trust in digital communication and institutions.
Social engineering
Voice cloning
One of the main areas where AI improved was in the area of voice-cloning, which was immediately picked up by scammers. In the past, they would mostly stick to impersonating friends and relatives. In 2025, they went as far as impersonating senior US officials. The targets were predominantly current or former US federal or state government officials and their contacts.
In the course of these campaigns, cybercriminals used test messages as well asΒ AI-generated voice messages. At the same time, they did not abandon the distressed-family angle. A woman in Florida was tricked into handing over thousands of dollars to a scammer after her daughterβs voice was AI-cloned and used in a scam.
AI agents
Agentic AI is the term used for individualized AI agents designed to carry out tasks autonomously. One such task could be to search for publicly available or stolen information about an individual and use that information to compose a very convincing phishing lure.
These agents could also be used to extort victims by matching stolen data with publicly known email addresses or social media accounts, composing messages and sustaining conversations with people who believe a human attacker has direct access to their Social Security number, physical address, credit card details, and more.
Another use we see frequently is AI-assisted vulnerability discovery. These tools are in use by both attackers and defenders. For example, Google uses a project called Big Sleep, which has found several vulnerabilities in the Chrome browser.
Social media
As mentioned in the section on AI agents, combining data posted on social media with data stolen during breaches is a common tactic. Such freely provided data is also a rich harvesting ground for romance scams, sextortion, and holiday scams.
And then there are the vulnerabilities in public AI platforms such as ChatGPT, Perplexity, Claude, and many others. Researchers and criminals alike are still exploring ways to bypass the safeguards intended to limit misuse.
Prompt injection is the general term for when someone inserts carefully crafted input, in the form of an ordinary conversation or data, to nudge or force an AI into doing something it wasnβt meant to do.
Malware campaigns
In some cases, attackers have used AI platforms to write and spread malware. Researchers have documented campaign where attackers leveraged Claude AI to automate the entire attack lifecycle, from initial system compromise through to ransom note generation, targeting sectors such as government, healthcare, and emergency services.
AI is amplifying the capabilities of both defenders and attackers. Security teams can use it to automate detection, spot patterns faster, and scale protection. Cybercriminals, meanwhile, are using it to sharpen social engineering, discover vulnerabilities more quickly, and build end-to-end campaigns with minimal effort.
Looking toward 2026, the biggest shift may not be technical but psychological. As AI-generated content becomes harder to distinguish from the real thing, verifying voices, messages, and identities will matter more than ever.
We donβt just report on threatsβwe remove them
Cybersecurity risks should never spread beyond a headline. Keep threats off your devices byΒ downloading Malwarebytes today.
This blog is part of a series highlighting new and concerning trends we noticed over the last year. Trends matter because they almost always provide a good indication of whatβs coming next.
If thereβs one thing that became very clear in 2025, itβs that malware is no longer focused on Windows alone. Weβve seen some major developments, especially in campaigns targeting Android and macOS. Unfortunately, many people still donβt realize that protecting smartphones, tablets, and other connected devices is just as essential as securing their laptops.
Android
Banking Trojans on Android are not new, but their level of sophistication continues to rise. These threats continue to be a major problem in 2025, often disguising themselves as fake apps to steal credentials or stealthily take over devices. A recent wave of advanced banking Trojans, such as Herodotus, can mimic human typing behaviors to evade detection, highlighting just how refined these attacks have become. Android malware also includes adware that aggressively pushes intrusive ads through free apps, degrading both the user experience and overall security.
Several Trojans were found to use overlays, which are fake login screens appearing on top of real banking and cryptocurrency apps. They can read whatβs on the screen, so when someone enters their username and password, the malware steals them.
macOS
One of the most notable developments for Mac users was the expansion of the notorious ClickFix campaign to macOS. Early in 2025, I described how criminals used fake CAPTCHA sites and a clipboard hijacker to provide instructions that led visitors ro infect their own machines with the Lumma infostealer.
ClickFix is the name researchers have since given to this type of campaign, where users are tricked into running malicious commands themselves. On macOS, this technique is being used to distribute both AMOS stealers and the Rhadamanthys infostealer.
Cross-platform
Malware developers increasingly use cross-platform languages such as Rust and Go to create malware that can run on Windows, macOS, Linux, mobile, and even Internet of Things (IoT) devices. This enables flexible targeting and expands the number of potential victims. Malware-as-a-Service (MaaS) models are on the rise, offering these tools for rent or purchase on underground markets, further professionalizing malware development and distribution.
Weβve also seen consistent growth in Remote Access Trojan (RAT) activity, often used as an initial infection method. Thereβs also been a rise in finance-focused attacks, including cryptocurrency and banking-related targets, alongside widespread stealer malware driving data breaches.
What does this mean for 2026?
Taken together, these trends point to a clear shift. Cybercriminals are increasingly focusing on operating systems beyond Windows, combining advanced techniques and social engineering tailored specifically to mobile and macOS.
We donβt just report on threatsβwe remove them
Cybersecurity risks should never spread beyond a headline. Keep threats off your devices byΒ downloading Malwarebytes today.
A SIEM is a complex system offering broad and flexible threat detection capabilities. Due to its complexity, its effectiveness heavily depends on how it is configured and what data sources are connected to it. A one-time SIEM setup during implementation is not enough: both the organizationβs infrastructure and attackersβ techniques evolve over time. To operate effectively, the SIEM system must reflect the current state of affairs.
We provide customers with services to assess SIEM effectiveness, helping to identify issues and offering options for system optimization. In this article, we examine typical SIEM operational pitfalls and how to address them. For each case, we also include methods for independent verification.
This material is based on an assessment of Kaspersky SIEM effectiveness; therefore, all specific examples, commands, and field names are taken from that solution. However, the assessment methodology, issues we identified, and ways to enhance system effectiveness can easily be extrapolated to any other SIEM.
Methodology for assessing SIEM effectiveness
The primary audience for the effectiveness assessment report comprises the SIEM support and operation teams within an organization. The main goal is to analyze how well the usage of SIEM aligns with its objectives. Consequently, the scope of checks can vary depending on the stated goals. A standard assessment is conducted across the following areas:
Composition and scope of connected data sources
Coverage of data sources
Data flows from existing sources
Correctness of data normalization
Detection logic operability
Detection logic accuracy
Detection logic coverage
Use of contextual data
SIEM technical integration into SOC processes
SOC analystsβ handling of alerts in the SIEM
Forwarding of alerts, security event data, and incident information to other systems
Deployment architecture and documentation
At the same time, these areas are examined not only in isolation but also in terms of their potential influence on one another. Here are a couple of examples illustrating this interdependence:
Issues with detection logic due to incorrect data normalization. A correlation rule with the condition deviceCustomString1Β notΒ containsΒ <string> triggers a large number of alerts. The detection logic itself is correct: the specific event and the specific field it targets should not generate a large volume of data matching the condition. Our review revealed the issue was in the data ingested by the SIEM, where incorrect encoding caused the string targeted by the rule to be transformed into a different one. Consequently, all events matched the condition and generated alerts.
When analyzing coverage for a specific source type, we discovered that the SIEM was only monitoring 5% of all such sources deployed in the infrastructure. However, extending that coverage would increase system load and storage requirements. Therefore, besides connecting additional sources, it would be necessary to scale resources for specific modules (storage, collectors, or the correlator).
The effectiveness assessment consists of several stages:
Collect and analyze documentation, if available. This allows assessing SIEM objectives, implementation settings (ideally, the deployment settings at the time of the assessment), associated processes, and so on.
Interview system engineers, analysts, and administrators. This allows assessing current tasks and the most pressing issues, as well as determining exactly how the SIEM is being operated. Interviews are typically broken down into two phases: an introductory interview, conducted at project start to gather general information, and a follow-up interview, conducted mid-project to discuss questions arising from the analysis of previously collected data.
Gather information within the SIEM and then analyze it. This is the most extensive part of the assessment, during which Kaspersky experts are granted read-only access to the system or a part of it to collect factual data on its configuration, detection logic, data flows, and so on.
The assessment produces a list of recommendations. Some of these can be implemented almost immediately, while others require more comprehensive changes driven by process optimization or a transition to a more structured approach to system use.
Issues arising from SIEM operations
The problems we identify during a SIEM effectiveness assessment can be divided into three groups:
Performance issues, meaning operational errors in various system components. These problems are typically resolved by technical support, but to prevent them, it is worth periodically checking system health status.
Efficiency issues β when the system functions normally but seemingly adds little value or is not used to its full potential. This is usually due to the customer using the system capabilities in a limited way, incorrectly, or not as intended by the developer.
Detection issues β when the SIEM is operational and continuously evolving according to defined processes and approaches, but alerts are mostly false positives, and the system misses incidents. For the most part, these problems are related to the approach taken in developing detection logic.
Key observations from the assessment
Event source inventory
When building the inventory of event sources for a SIEM, we follow the principle of layered monitoring: the system should have information about all detectable stages of an attack. This principle enables the detection of attacks even if individual malicious actions have gone unnoticed, and allows for retrospective reconstruction of the full attack chain, starting from the attackersβ point of entry.
Problem: During effectiveness assessments, we frequently find that the inventory of connected source types is not updated when the infrastructure changes. In some cases, it has not been updated since the initial SIEM deployment, which limits incident detection capabilities. Consequently, certain types of sources remain completely invisible to the system.
We have also encountered non-standard cases of incomplete source inventory. For example, an infrastructure contains hosts running both Windows and Linux, but monitoring is configured for only one family of operating systems.
How to detect: To identify the problems described above, determine the list of source types connected to the SIEM and compare it against what actually exists in the infrastructure. Identifying the presence of specific systems in the infrastructure requires an audit. However, this task is one of the most critical for many areas of cybersecurity, and we recommend running it on a periodic basis.
We have compiled a reference sheet of system types commonly found in most organizations. Depending on the organization type, infrastructure, and threat model, we may rearrange priorities. However, a good starting point is as follows:
High PriorityΒ β sources associated with:
Remote access provision
External services accessible from the internet
External perimeter
Endpoint operating systems
Information security tools
Medium PriorityΒ β sources associated with:
Remote access management within the perimeter
Internal network communication
Infrastructure availability
Virtualization and cloud solutions
Low PriorityΒ β sources associated with:
Business applications
Internal IT services
Applications used by various specialized teams (HR, Development, PR, IT, and so on)
Monitoring data flow from sources
Regardless of how good the detection logic is, it cannot function without telemetry from the data sources.
Problem: The SIEM core is not receiving events from specific sources or collectors. Based on all assessments conducted, the average proportion of collectors that are configured with sources but are not transmitting events is 38%. Correlation rules may exist for these sources, but they will, of course, never trigger. It is also important to remember that a single collector can serve hundreds of sources (such as workstations), so the loss of data flow from even one collector can mean losing monitoring visibility for a significant portion of the infrastructure.
How to detect: The process of locating sources that are not transmitting data can be broken down into two components.
Checking collector health. Find the status of collectors (see the support website for the steps to do this in Kaspersky SIEM) and identify those with a status of Offline, Stopped, Disabled, and so on.
Checking the event flow. In Kaspersky SIEM, this can be done by gathering statistics using the following query (counting the number of events received from each collector over a specific time period):
SELECT count(ID), CollectorID, CollectorName FROM `events` GROUP BY CollectorID, CollectorName ORDER BY count(ID)
It is essential to specify an optimal time range for collecting these statistics. Too large a range can increase the load on the SIEM, while too small a range may provide inaccurate information for a one-time check β especially for sources that transmit telemetry relatively infrequently, say, once a week. Therefore, it is advisable to choose a smaller time window, such as 2β4 days, but run several queries for different periods in the past.
Additionally, for a more comprehensive approach, it is recommended to use built-in functionality or custom logic implemented via correlation rules and lists to monitor event flow. This will help automate the process of detecting problems with sources.
Event source coverage
Problem: The system is not receiving events from all sources of a particular type that exist in the infrastructure. For example, the company uses workstations and servers running Windows. During SIEM deployment, workstations are immediately connected for monitoring, while the server segment is postponed for one reason or another. As a result, the SIEM receives events from Windows systems, the flow is normalized, and correlation rules work, but an incident in the unmonitored server segment would go unnoticed.
How to detect: Below are query variations that can be used to search for unconnected sources.
SELECT count(distinct, DeviceAddress), DeviceVendor, DeviceProduct FROM events GROUP BY DeviceVendor, DeviceProduct ORDER BY count(ID)
SELECT count(distinct, DeviceHostName), DeviceVendor, DeviceProduct FROM events GROUP BY DeviceVendor, DeviceProduct ORDER BY count(ID)
We have split the query into two variations because, depending on the source and the DNS integration settings, some events may contain either a DeviceAddress or DeviceHostName field.
These queries will help determine the number of unique data sources sending logs of a specific type. This count must be compared against the actual number of sources of that type, obtained from the system owners.
Retaining raw data
Raw data can be useful for developing custom normalizers or for storing events not used in correlation that might be needed during incident investigation. However, careless use of this setting can cause significantly more harm than good.
Problem: Enabling the Keep raw event option effectively doubles the event size in the database, as it stores two copies: the original and the normalized version. This is particularly critical for high-volume collectors receiving events from sources like NetFlow, DNS, firewalls, and others. It is worth noting that this option is typically used for testing a normalizer but is often forgotten and left enabled after its configuration is complete.
How to detect: This option is applied at the normalizer level. Therefore, it is necessary to review all active normalizers and determine whether retaining raw data is required for their operation.
Normalization
As with the absence of events from sources, normalization issues lead to detection logic failing, as this logic relies on finding specific information in a specific event field.
Problem: Several issues related to normalization can be identified:
The event flow is not being normalized at all.
Events are only partially normalized β this is particularly relevant for custom, non-out-of-the-box normalizers.
The normalizer being used only parses headers, such as syslog_headers, placing the entire event body into a single field, this field most often being Message.
An outdated default normalizer is being used.
How to detect: Identifying normalization issues is more challenging than spotting source problems due to the high volume of telemetry and variety of parsers. Here are several approaches to narrowing the search:
First, check which normalizers supplied with the SIEM the organization uses and whether their versions are up to date. In our assessments, we frequently encounter auditd events being normalized by the outdated normalizer, Linux audit and iptables syslog v2 for Kaspersky SIEM. The new normalizer completely reworks and optimizes the normalization schema for events from this source.
Execute the query:
SELECT count(ID), DeviceProduct, DeviceVendor, CollectorName FROM `events` GROUP BY DeviceProduct, DeviceVendor, CollectorName ORDER BY count(ID)
This query gathers statistics on events from each collector, broken down by the DeviceVendor and DeviceProduct fields. While these fields are not mandatory, they are present in almost any normalization schema. Therefore, their complete absence or empty values may indicate normalization issues. We recommend including these fields when developing custom normalizers.
To simplify the identification of normalization problems when developing custom normalizers, you can implement the following mechanism. For each successfully normalized event, add a Name field, populated from a constant or the event itself. For a final catch-all normalizer that processes all unparsed events, set the constant value: Name = unparsed event. This will later allow you to identify non-normalized events through a simple search on this field.
Detection logic coverage
Collected events alone are, in most cases, only useful for investigating an incident that has already been identified. For a SIEM to operate to its full potential, it requires detection logic to be developed to uncover probable security incidents.
Problem: The mean correlation rule coverage of sources, determined across all our assessments, is 43%. While this figure is only a ballpark figure β as different source types provide different information β to calculate it, we defined βcoverageβ as the presence of at least one correlation rule for a source. This means that for more than half of the connected sources, the SIEM is not actively detecting. Meanwhile, effort and SIEM resources are spent on connecting, maintaining, and configuring these sources. In some cases, this is formally justified, for instance, if logs are only needed for regulatory compliance. However, this is an exception rather than the rule.
We do not recommend solving this problem by simply not connecting sources to the SIEM. On the contrary, sources should be connected, but this should be done concurrently with the development of corresponding detection logic. Otherwise, it can be forgotten or postponed indefinitely, while the source pointlessly consumes system resources.
How to detect: This brings us back to auditing, a process that can be greatly aided by creating and maintaining a register of developed detection logic. Given that not every detection logic rule explicitly states the source type from which it expects telemetry, its description should be added to this register during the development phase.
If descriptions of the correlation rules are not available, you can refer to the following:
The name of the detection logic. With a standardized approach to naming correlation rules, the name can indicate the associated source or at least provide a brief description of what it detects.
The use of fields within the rules, such as DeviceVendor, DeviceProduct (another argument for including these fields in the normalizer), Name, DeviceAction, DeviceEventCategory, DeviceEventClassID, and others. These can help identify the actual source.
Excessive alerts generated by the detection logic
One criterion for correlation rules effectiveness is a low false positive rate.
Problem: Detection logic generates an abnormally high number of alerts that are physically impossible to process, regardless of the size of the SOC team.
How to detect: First and foremost, detection logic should be tested during development and refined to achieve an acceptable false positive rate. However, even a well-tuned correlation rule can start producing excessive alerts due to changes in the event flow or connected infrastructure. To identify these rules, we recommend periodically running the following query:
SELECT count(ID), Name FROM `events` WHERE Type = 3 GROUP BY Name ORDER BY count(ID)
In Kaspersky SIEM, a value of 3 in the Type field indicates a correlation event.
Subsequently, for each identified rule with an anomalous alert count, verify the correctness of the logic it uses and the integrity of the event stream on which it triggered.
Depending on the issue you identify, the solution may involve modifying the detection logic, adding exceptions (for example, it is often the case that 99% of the spam originates from just 1β5 specific objects, such as an IP address, a command parameter, or a URL), or adjusting event collection and normalization.
Lack of integration with indicators of compromise
SIEM integrations with other systems are generally a critical part of both event processing and alert enrichment. In at least one specific case, their presence directly impacts detection performance: integration with technical Threat Intelligence data or IoCs (indicators of compromise).
A SIEM allows conveniently checking objects against various reputation databases or blocklists. Furthermore, there are numerous sources of this data that are ready to integrate natively with a SIEM or require minimal effort to incorporate.
Problem: There is no integration with TI data.
How to detect: Generally, IoCs are integrated into a SIEM at the system configuration level during deployment or subsequent optimization. The use of TI within a SIEM can be implemented at various levels:
At the data source level. Some sources, such as NGFWs, add this information to events involving relevant objects.
At the SIEM native functionality level. For example, Kaspersky SIEM integrates with CyberTrace indicators, which add object reputation information at the moment of processing an event from a source.
At the detection logic level. Information about IoCs is stored in various active lists, and correlation rules match objects against these to enrich the event.
Furthermore, TI data does not appear in a SIEM out of thin air. It is either provided by external suppliers (commercially or in an open format) or is part of the built-in functionality of the security tools in use. For instance, various NGFW systems can additionally check the reputation of external IP addresses or domains that users are accessing. Therefore, the first step is to determine whether you are receiving information about indicators of compromise and in what form (whether external providersβ feeds have been integrated and/or the deployed security tools have this capability). It is worth noting that receiving TI data only at the security tool level does not always cover all types of IoCs.
If data is being received in some form, the next step is to verify that the SIEM is utilizing it. For TI-related events coming from security tools, the SIEM needs a correlation rule developed to generate alerts. Thus, checking integration in this case involves determining the capabilities of the security tools, searching for the corresponding events in the SIEM, and identifying whether there is detection logic associated with these events. If events from the security tools are absent, the source audit configuration should be assessed to see if the telemetry type in question is being forwarded to the SIEM at all. If normalization is the issue, you should assess parsing accuracy and reconfigure the normalizer.
If TI data comes from external providers, determine how it is processed within the organization. Is there a centralized system for aggregating and managing threat data (such as CyberTrace), or is the information stored in, say, CSV files?
In the former case (there is a threat data aggregation and management system) you must check if it is integrated with the SIEM. For Kaspersky SIEM and CyberTrace, this integration is handled through the SIEM interface. Following this, SIEM event flows are directed to the threat data aggregation and management system, where matches are identified and alerts are generated, and then both are sent back to the SIEM. Therefore, checking the integration involves ensuring that all collectors receiving events that may contain IoCs are forwarding those events to the threat data aggregation and management system. We also recommend checking if the SIEM has a correlation rule that generates an alert based on matching detected objects with IoCs.
In the latter case (threat information is stored in files), you must confirm that the SIEM has a collector and normalizer configured to load this data into the system as events. Also, verify that logic is configured for storing this data within the SIEM for use in correlation. This is typically done with the help of lists that contain the obtained IoCs. Finally, check if a correlation rule exists that compares the event flow against these IoC lists.
As the examples illustrate, integration with TI in standard scenarios ultimately boils down to developing a final correlation rule that triggers an alert upon detecting a match with known IoCs. Given the variety of integration methods, creating and providing a universal out-of-the-box rule is difficult. Therefore, in most cases, to ensure IoCs are connected to the SIEM, you need to determine if the company has developed that rule (the existence of the rule) and if it has been correctly configured. If no correlation rule exists in the system, we recommend creating one based on the TI integration methods implemented in your infrastructure. If a rule does exist, its functionality must be verified: if there are no alerts from it, analyze its trigger conditions against the event data visible in the SIEM and adjust it accordingly.
The SIEM is not kept up to date
For a SIEM to run effectively, it must contain current data about the infrastructure it monitors and the threats itβs meant to detect. Both elements change over time: new systems and software, users, security policies, and processes are introduced into the infrastructure, while attackers develop new techniques and tools. It is safe to assume that a perfectly configured and deployed SIEM system will no longer be able to fully see the altered infrastructure or the new threats after five years of running without additional configuration. Therefore, practically all components β event collection, detection, additional integrations for contextual information, and exclusions β must be maintained and kept up to date.
Furthermore, it is important to acknowledge that it is impossible to cover 100% of all threats. Continuous research into attacks, development of detection methods, and configuration of corresponding rules are a necessity. The SOC itself also evolves. As it reaches certain maturity levels, new growth opportunities open up for the team, requiring the utilization of new capabilities.
Problem: The SIEM has not evolved since its initial deployment.
How to detect: Compare the original statement of work or other deployment documentation against the current state of the system. If there have been no changes, or only minimal ones, it is highly likely that your SIEM has areas for growth and optimization. Any infrastructure is dynamic and requires continuous adaptation.
Other issues with SIEM implementation and operation
In this article, we have outlined the primary problems we identify during SIEM effectiveness assessments, but this list is not exhaustive. We also frequently encounter:
Mismatch between license capacity and actual SIEM load. The problem is almost always the absence of events from sources, rather than an incorrect initial assessment of the organizationβs needs.
Lack of user rights management within the system (for example, every user is assigned the administrator role).
Poor organization of customizable SIEM resources (rules, normalizers, filters, and so on). Examples include chaotic naming conventions, non-optimal grouping, and obsolete or test content intermixed with active content. We have encountered confusing resource names like [dev] test_Add user to admin group_final2.
Use of out-of-the-box resources without adaptation to the organizationβs infrastructure. To maximize a SIEMβs value, it is essential at a minimum to populate exception lists and specify infrastructure parameters: lists of administrators and critical services and hosts.
Disabled native integrations with external systems, such as LDAP, DNS, and GeoIP.
Generally, most issues with SIEM effectiveness stem from the natural degradation (accumulation of errors) of the processes implemented within the system. Therefore, in most cases, maintaining effectiveness involves structuring these processes, monitoring the quality of SIEM engagement at all stages (source onboarding, correlation rule development, normalization, and so on), and conducting regular reviews of all system components and resources.
Conclusion
A SIEM is a powerful tool for monitoring and detecting threats, capable of identifying attacks at various stages across nearly any point in an organizationβs infrastructure. However, if improperly configured and operated, it can become ineffective or even useless while still consuming significant resources. Therefore, it is crucial to periodically audit the SIEMβs components, settings, detection rules, and data sources.
If a SOC is overloaded or otherwise unable to independently identify operational issues with its SIEM, we offer Kaspersky SIEM platform users a service to assess its operation. Following the assessment, we provide a list of recommendations to address the issues we identify. That being said, it is important to clarify that these are not strict, prescriptive instructions, but rather highlight areas that warrant attention and analysis to improve the productβs performance, enhance threat detection accuracy, and enable more efficient SIEM utilization.
I recently participated in a security leader roundtable hosted by Cybersecurity Tribe. During this session, I got to hear firsthand from security leaders at major organizations including BNP Paribas, the NFL, ION Group, and half a dozen other global enterprises.
Across industries and maturity levels, their priorities were remarkably consistent. When it comes to AI-powered SOC platforms, these are the seven capabilities every CISO is asking for.
1. Trust and traceability
If there was one theme that came up more than anything else, it was trust. Security leaders donβt want βmysteriousβ AI. They want transparency.
They repeatedly insisted that AI outputs must be auditable, explainable, and reproducible. They need to show the work, for compliance auditors, for internal governance boards, and increasingly to address emerging legal and regulatory risk.
Black-box decisions wonβt cut it. AI must generate evidence, not just conclusions.
2. Reduction of alert fatigue (operational efficiency)
Every leader I spoke with is wrestling with alert overload. Even mature SOCs are drowning in low-value notifications and pseudo-incidents.
A measurable reduction in alerts escalated to humans is now a top KPI for evaluating AI platforms. Leaders want an environment where analysts spend their time on exploitable, high-impact threats, not noise.
If AI can remove repetitive triage work, thatβs not just helpful,Β itβs transformational.
4. Safe automation with human-in-the-loop for high-impact actions
Most leaders are open to selective autonomous remediation, but only in narrow, well-defined, high-confidence scenarios.
For example:
Rapid ransomware containment
Isolation of clearly compromised endpoints
Automatic execution of repeatable hygiene tasks
But for broader or higher-impact actions, CISOs still want human review. The tone was clear: AI should move fast where appropriate, but never at the expense of control.
5. Integration and practical telemetry coverage
Every leader emphasized that an AI platform is only as good as the data it can consume.
The must-have list included:
Cloud telemetry (AWS, Azure, GCP)
Identity providers (Okta, Entra ID, Ping)
EDR/XDR
SIEM logs
Ticketing/ITSM
Custom threat intelligence feeds
They donβt want a magical AI that promises answers without good data. They want a connected system that can see across the entire environment.
6. Executive & board alignment with demonstrable ROI
CISOs arenβt implementing AI in a vacuum. Their boards and executive leadership teams are pressuring them from two very different angles:
Some are mandating AI adoption as a strategic priority.
Others are slowing everything down with extensive governance, risk, and compliance processes.
To navigate this dynamic, CISOs need clear, defensible ROI:
Reduced operating costs
Faster mean-time-to-respond
Fewer escalations
More predictable outcomes
AI without measurable value is no longer acceptable. They need something they can put in front of the board and say, βHereβs the impact.β
7. Accountability and legal clarity
Before enterprises allow AI to autonomously take security actions, CISOs need a fundamental question answered:
βWho is accountable when the AI acts?β
This isnβt just a theoretical concern. Itβs a gating requirement for adoption.
Until there is clear guidance on liability, responsibility, and governance, many organizations will keep AI on a tight leash.
Closing thoughts
Across all of these conversations, the message was consistent: AI in the SOC is inevitable, but it must be safe, transparent, integrated, and measurable.
CISOs arenβt looking for science fiction. Theyβre looking for credible, operational AI that enhances their teams, strengthens their defenses, and aligns with business realities.
Surfacing Threats Before They Scale: Why Primary Source Collection Changes Intelligence
This blog explores how Primary Source Collection (PSC) enables intelligence teams to surface emerging fraud and threat activity before it reaches scale.
Spend enough time investigating fraud and threat activity, and a familiar pattern emerges. Before a tactic shows up at scaleβbefore credential stuffing floods login pages or counterfeit checks hit customersβthere is almost always a quieter formation phase. Threat actors test ideas, trade techniques, and refine playbooks in small, often closed communities before launching coordinated campaigns.
The signals are there. The challenge is that most organizations never see them.
For years, intelligence programs have leaned heavily on static feeds: prepackaged streams of indicators, alerts, and reports delivered on a fixed cadence. These feeds validate what is already known, but they rarely surface what is still taking shape. They are designed to summarize activity after it has matured, not to discover it while it is still evolving.
Meanwhile, the real innovation in fraud and threat ecosystems happens elsewhere in invite-only Telegram channels, dark web marketplaces, and regional-language forums that update in real time. By the time a static feed flags a new technique, it is often already widespread.
This disconnect has consequences. When intelligence arrives too late, teams are left responding to impact rather than shaping outcomes.
How Threats Actually Evolve
Fraudsters and threat actors do not work in isolation, they collaborate. In closed forums and encrypted channels, one actor experiments with a new login bypass, another tests two-factor authentication evasion, and a third packages those ideas into a tool or service. What begins as a handful of screenshots or code snippets quickly becomes a repeatable process.
These shared processes often take the form of playbooks that act as step-by-step guides that document how to execute a fraud scheme or exploit a weakness. Once a playbook begins circulating, scale is inevitable. Techniques that started as limited tests turn into thousands of coordinated attempts almost overnight.
Every intelligence or fraud analyst has experienced the moment when an unfamiliar tactic suddenly overwhelms detection systems. The frustrating reality is that the warning signs were often visible weeks earlier, they simply never made it into the static feeds teams were relying on.
Why Static Collection Falls Short
Static collection creates a sense of coverage, but that coverage is often shallow. Sources are fixed. Cadence is slow. Context is stripped away.
A feed might tell you that a domain, handle, or email address is associated with a known tactic, but not how that tactic was developed, who is promoting it, or whether it has any relevance to your organizationβs specific exposure. You are seeing the exhaust, not the engine.
This lag matters. The window between a tactic being tested in a small community and being deployed at scale is often the most valuable moment for intervention. Miss that window, and response becomes exponentially more expensive.
As threats accelerate and collaboration among adversaries increases, intelligence programs that depend solely on static inputs struggle to keep pace.
A Different Model: Primary Source Collection
Primary Source Collection (PSC) changes how intelligence is gathered by starting with the questions that matter most and collecting directly from the original environments where those answers exist.
Rather than relying on a predefined list of sources or vendor-determined priorities, PSC begins with a defined intelligence requirement. Collection is then shaped around that requirement, directing analysts to the forums, marketplaces, and channels where relevant activity is actively unfolding.
This means monitoring closed communities advertising check alteration services. It means observing invite-only groups trading identity fraud tutorials. It means collecting original posts, screenshots, files, and discussions while they are still part of an active conversation instead of weeks later in summarized form. When actors begin discussing a new bypass technique or sharing proof-of-concept screenshots, that is the moment to act, not weeks later when the same method is being resold across marketplaces.
Primary Source Collection provides that window. It surfaces the conversations, artifacts, and early indicators that reveal what is coming next and gives teams the time they need to intervene before campaigns scale.
This does not replace analytics, automation, or baseline monitoring. It strengthens them by feeding earlier, richer insight into downstream systems. It ensures that detection and response are informed by how threats are actually developing, not just how they appear after the fact.
In one case, a financial institution using this approach identified counterfeit checks featuring its brand being advertised in underground marketplaces weeks before customers began reporting losses. By collecting directly from those spaces, analysts flagged the images, traced sellers, and alerted internal teams early enough to prevent further exploitation.
That is what early warning looks like when collection is aligned with purpose.
Making Intelligence Taskable
One of the most important shifts enabled by Primary Source Collection is tasking.
Traditional intelligence programs operate like autopilot. They deliver a steady stream of data, but that stream reflects the providerβs priorities rather than the organizationβs evolving needs. Analysts spend valuable time triaging irrelevant information while emerging risks go unnoticed.
In classified intelligence environments, this problem has long been addressed through tasking. Every collection effort begins with a clearly defined requirement and priorities drive collection, not the other way around.
PSC applies that same discipline to open-source and commercial intelligence. Teams define Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIRs), such as identifying actors testing bypass methods for specific login flows, and immediately direct collection toward those needs. As priorities change, tasking changes with them.
This transforms intelligence from a passive stream into an operational capability. Analysts are no longer waiting for someone elseβs update cycle. They are shaping visibility in real time, testing hypotheses, validating concerns, and uncovering tactics before they mature.
For leadership, this provides something more valuable than indicators: confidence that critical developments are not happening just out of sight.
How Taskable Collection Works in Practice
A taskable Primary Source Collection framework is dynamic by design. As stakeholder priorities shift due to a new campaign, incident, or geopolitical development, collection pivots immediately.
In practice, this approach includes:
Source discovery: Identifying new, relevant sources as they emerge, using a combination of analyst expertise and automated tooling.
Secure access: Entering closed or restricted spaces safely and ethically through controlled environments and vetted identities.
Direct collection: Capturing original content directly from threat actor environments, including posts, images, and files.
Processing and enrichment: Applying techniques such as optical character recognition, entity extraction, and metadata tagging to transform raw material into usable intelligence.
Delivery and collaboration: Routing outputs into investigative workflows or directly to stakeholders to accelerate response.
Intelligence can then mirror the agility of modern threats instead of lagging behind them.
Why This Shift Matters Now
Threat and fraud operations are moving faster than ever. Barriers to entry are lower. Tooling is more accessible. Collaboration rivals legitimate software development cycles.
Defenders cannot afford to move slower than the adversaries they are trying to stop.
Primary Source Collection is how intelligence teams keep pace. It aligns collection with mission needs, enables real-time tasking, and delivers insight early enough to change outcomes instead of just documenting them.
The signals have always been there. What has changed is the ability to surface them while they still matter.
By Troy Wojewoda During a recent Breach Assessment engagement, BHIS discovered a highly stealthy and persistent intrusion technique utilized by a threat actor to maintain Command-and-Control (C2) within the clientβs [β¦]
What happens when you ditch the tiered ticket queues and replace them withΒ collaboration, agility, and real-time response? In this interview, Hayden Covington takes us behind the scenes of the BHIS Security Operations Center, which isΒ where analystsΒ donβtΒ escalateΒ tickets,Β they solve them.
The Security Operations Center (SOC) has always been the heart of enterprise defense, but in 2026, itβs evolving faster than ever.
The rise of AI-driven SOC platforms, often referred to as Agentic AI SOCs, is redefining how enterprises detect, investigate, and respond to threats.
For years, security teams relied on a mix of SIEM, EDR, and MDR vendors to stay ahead of attacks. But these stacks often created their own problems: endless alert noise, long investigation times, and an overworked analyst team stuck in repetitive triage.
The new generation of AI SOC platforms changes that. They leverage large language models (LLMs), enabling SOCs to automatically triage and investigate every alert in minutes, not hours.
In this guide, weβll break down the Top 15 AI SOC platforms to watch in 2026, ranked by how they balance speed, accuracy, explainability, and coverage across modern enterprise environments.
What is an Agentic AI SOC?
βAgenticβ AI refers to systems that donβt just respond, they act. In cybersecurity, anAgentic AI SOC is capable of performing end-to-end investigations, drawing conclusions, and recommending (or executing) responses based on forensic evidence and reasoning.
These platforms are trained not only to summarize alerts but to understand their context, correlating data across endpoints, identities, networks, and cloud systems.
The best AI SOCs of 2026 are explainable, autonomous, and fast, providing the confidence enterprises need to trust machine-led decision-making.
Top AI SOC platforms in 2026 comparison table
Platform
Best for
Key strength
Intezer (Forensic AI SOC)
Large Enterprises
Forensic-level, explainable investigations
7AI
Enterprises exploring multi-agent automation
Multi-agent orchestration
AiStrike
Mid-market SOCs
Affordable automated triage
SentinelOne (Purple AI)
Enterprises using SentinelOne EDR
Integrated SOC automation
CrowdStrike (Charlotte AI)
Falcon ecosystem users
Generative AI for summaries
BlinkOps
Security automation teams
Playbook-based automation
Bricklayer AI
Startups
Lightweight triage and reporting
Conifers.ai
Cloud-native companies
Cloud-first visibility
Vectra AI
Mature SOCs
Network threat detection
Dropzone AI
SOC automation innovators
Human-in-the-loop design
Exaforce
Minimizing SIEM Cost
Alert routing and prioritization
Legion Security
SOCs with expert analysts
Workflow management
Prophet.ai
Predictive threat modeling
Proactive threat detection
Qevlar AI
LLM-driven SOCs
AI triage experiments
Radiant Security
Mid-market enterprises
Response recommendations
1. Intezer: Best AI SOC platform for enterprise SOCs
Best for: Large enterprises that prioritize speed, accuracy, and complete alert coverage.
Intezer AI SOC is built for enterprise and MSSPs, trusted by global brands including NVIDIA, Salesforce, MGM Resorts, Equifax, and Ferguson. Intezer investigates 100% of alerts in under two minutes with 98% accuracy.
Unlike other platforms that rely solely on LLM-generated heuristics, Intezer fuses human-like reasoning with multiple AI models and deterministic forensic methods,Β including code analysis, sandboxing, reverse engineering, and memory forensics. The result is evidence-backed, explainable verdicts that eliminate the guesswork for SOC analysts.
For enterprises managing millions of alerts across SIEM, EDR, cloud, and identity systems, Intezer delivers full alert coverage and eliminates the low-severity blind spots that MDRs often ignore.
With endpoint-based pricing, Intezer removes the βalert taxβ of data-ingest models and helps SOC leaders prove ROI to their boards, without expanding headcount.
Why enterprises choose Intezer
100% alert investigation coverage across SIEM, EDR, phishing, identity, and cloud
7AI is one of the most experimental platforms in the 2026 AI SOC space. It focuses on multi-agent orchestration, where separate AI agents collaborate to triage, enrich, and investigate alerts across different domains.
While its architecture is impressive, 7AI is best suited for innovation-driven security teams that have strong engineering capacity and want to customize workflows. It performs well in large-scale EDR and cloud environments but requires fine-tuning for reliability.
Best for: Enterprises exploring multi-agent SOC architectures.
3. AiStrike: Best for mid-market SOCs
AiStrike targets the mid-market segment with a focus on cost-effective AI triage. It offers a simple, clean dashboard that connects with EDR and SIEM tools to automatically prioritize alerts. While its forensic depth is limited compared to enterprise-grade solutions, AiStrike delivers solid speed and automation for smaller SOCs.
Best for: Mid-market SOCs that want affordable, plug-and-play AI investigations.
4. SentinelOne (Purple AI): Best for endpoint-centric SOCs
SentinelOneβs Purple AI brings native AI investigation and response into the SentinelOne platform. Itβs tightly integrated with SentinelOneβs EDR and XDR stack, which makes it a strong option for organizations already using the SentinelOneβs stack.
While Purple AI provides quick, summarized threat analysis and remediation recommendations, it focuses heavily on endpoints rather than full enterprise coverage.
Best for: Enterprises deeply invested in SentinelOneβs ecosystem that want integrated AI triage.
5. CrowdStrike (Charlotte AI): Best for AI-driven summarization
CrowdStrikeβs Charlotte AIis the generative assistant within the Falcon platform, built to help analysts ask natural-language questions and interpret alerts faster.
While not a fully autonomous SOC, Charlotte AI improves analyst experience and productivity by summarizing incidents and surfacing relevant insights. Itβs ideal for teams that want to augment analysts rather than automate full investigations.
Best for: Enterprises using the CrowdStrike Falcon suite that want faster analyst assistance.
6. BlinkOps: Best for automation engineers
BlinkOps focuses on workflow automation, not investigations per se. It enables security teams to build playbooks and automation pipelines that connect multiple tools (SIEM, EDR, IAM, etc.).
While it doesnβt deliver forensic-level verdicts, BlinkOps is popular among DevSecOps teams that want custom automation flexibility.
Best for: Security engineers looking to automate existing SOC workflows.
7. Bricklayer AI: Best for startups and lean SOCs
Bricklayer AI provides lightweight alert triage and reporting capabilities. Itβs built for smaller organizations that want to reduce alert fatigue without complex integrations. Its simplicity and affordability make it a solid entry point for teams without mature SOC processes.
Best for: Startups building early SOC capabilities on a budget.
8. Conifers.ai: Best for cloud-native companies
Conifers.ai specializes in cloud-first security visibility across AWS, Azure, and Google Cloud. Its AI models excel at correlating identity, network, and workload activity to flag potential breaches.
Itβs not a full SOC replacement, but it significantly enhances cloud investigation and response.
Best for: Cloud-first organizations seeking AI-enhanced detection and context.
9. Vectra AI: Best for network and identity threat detection
Vectra AI has long been a leader in AI-driven network detection and response (NDR). Its platform now extends into AI SOC territory, combining real-time detection with contextual identity analysis.
Vectra is strong in hybrid environments but remains specialized in network telemetry rather than full-stack coverage.
Best for: Enterprises prioritizing network and identity visibility.
10. Dropzone AI: Best for SOC automation innovators
Dropzone AI represents the new wave of human-in-the-loop SOC automation. It allows analysts to supervise and approve actions initiated by AI, blending human expertise with autonomous investigation.
While not as proven in large enterprises as Intezer, Dropzoneβs agentic architecture makes it an intriguing option for forward-thinking SOCs.
Best for: SOCs experimenting with supervised AI autonomy.
Exaforce uses a multi-model AI engine to reduce alert overload, accelerate investigations, and expand detection coverage without relying on a traditional SIEM. Its AI stack, combining data-ingestion models, behavioral machine learning, and large language models, analyzes real-time telemetry while cutting SIEM-related storage and licensing costs.
The platform adapts quickly through feedback loops and natural-language business context, continuously refining accuracy and reducing false positives. With investigative graph visualizations and flexible deployment options, Exaforce helps streamline complex investigations.
Best for: Companies struggling with excessive SIEM spend.
12. Legion Security: Best for companies with expert human analysts
Legion automates SOC investigations by capturing and operationalizing real analyst decision-making. Its browser-based agent records every step of an analystβs workflow such as data reviewed, actions taken, judgments made and then creating reusable investigative logic.
These recordings evolve into living agents that can be replayed, tested, refined, and re-executed across new alerts. Legion offers flexible deployment options including cloud, hybrid, or customer-hosted to support diverse security and compliance requirements.Β
Best for: Organizations with expert human analysts, looking to create custom AI agents that can mirror their in-house best practices and knowledge.Β
13. Prophet Security: Best for predictive SOCs
Prophet focuses on automated alert resolution using agentic reasoning that mirrors how experienced analysts assess user behavior, asset context, and threat indicators. It enriches alerts with data from endpoints, cloud systems, identity platforms, and threat intelligence to deliver high-confidence dispositions without relying on static rules. The platform supports flexible automation, from fully automated closure of benign alerts to analyst-in-the-loop escalation, and includes a copilot-style natural language interface for deeper investigation and threat hunting.Β
Best for: Enterprises investing in predictive threat modeling and trend forecasting.
14. Qevlar AI: Best for experimental SOCs
Qevlar is an AI-powered investigation co-pilot that enhances analyst workflows by replicating the reasoning and research steps of human investigators. It ingests alerts from various tools and produces structured, evidence-backed reports with clear verdicts, confidence levels, and referenced data sources. Instead of suppressing or prioritizing alerts, Qevlar enriches and interprets them while preserving full analyst oversight. It also offers an automated documentation engine and support for on-prem deployment.
Best for: SOCs experimenting with AI-based triage prototypes.
15. Radiant Security: Best for mid-market enterprises
Radiant Security positions itself as an AI SOC for the mid-market and differentiates itself with claims of adaptive AI that can learn how to handle never-seen-before alerts as well as a built-in, affordable logging solution leveraging customersβ own archive storage.Β
Best for: Mid-market companies looking to eliminate expensive SIEM costs.Β
The future of Agentic AI SOCs
The next evolution of SOC automation goes beyond alert management. In 2026 and beyond, Agentic AI SOCs will not only investigate but also take verified actions, quarantining hosts, isolating sessions, and orchestrating containment based on evidence and policy.
This shift demands trust, explainability, and speed. Enterprises can no longer afford βblack-boxβ AI that delivers vague suggestions. They need platforms capable of forensic reasoning, auditability, and full coverage, exactly what Intezer Forensic AI SOC delivers.
SOC leaders who adopt these systems early will gain measurable efficiency, lower operational risk, and stronger security posture, without expanding headcount.
Final thoughts
AI SOC platforms are transforming how enterprises defend against modern threats. While each platform on this list has unique strengths, Intezer stands out as the clear enterprise choice for those who demand accuracy, speed, and complete visibility.
See how Fortune 500 SOCs cut through the noise, reduce risk, and reclaim their time with Intezer.Β
Modern SOC teams face some real challenges. They are drowning in alert volume, short on experienced analysts, and facing a new generation of AI-driven attacks that operate faster than humans can respond. This combination is eroding SOC effectiveness, slowing response times, and creating blind spots where real threats hide in low-severity alerts that teams no longer have the time or capacity to investigate.
To meet this moment, Intezer is proud to unveil Intezer Forensic AI SOC, the only AI SOC platform battle-tested inside some of the worldβs most targeted and security-mature organizations. Already trusted by more than 150 enterprises, including 15 of the Fortune 500, the platform brings forensic-grade accuracy, full alert coverage, and sub-minute triage to modern security operations.
Why enterprises need a Forensic AI SOC
As attack surfaces grow, many organizations turn to MDR providers for 24/7 alert triage. But MDRs often operate as black boxes with inconsistent quality, high escalation rates, and limited visibility, leaving low-severity alerts unaddressed and creating gaps adversaries can exploit.
Most βAI SOCβ tools depend entirely on AI agents for alert triage and investigation. This leads to surface-level results, slower performance, and higher compute usage, limiting their ability to process large alert volumes, especially low-severity signals where threats frequently hide.
The way forward requires an approach that removes SOC bottlenecks while delivering stronger, more reliable security outcomes.Β
Why this matters now
The recent Anthropic AI espionage report marks a turning point. Threat actors are now weaponizing AI agents to automate full intrusion chains at machine speed.
These attacks often leave behind subtle, low-severity breadcrumbs that traditional SOCs and MDRs overlook. Without full alert coverage and forensic-grade triage, organizations cannot detect or contain AI-driven campaigns before they escalate.
This is precisely the gap Intezerβs Forensic AI SOC was built to close.
Intezer Forensic AI SOC flips the AI SOC model on its head. Instead of solely relying on AI Agents and LLMs, our platform combines AI agents and automated orchestration ofΒ deterministic forensic tools, to mimicthe triage and investigation methods used by elite responders and perform deep, accurate investigations at speed and scale.
Every alert is examined through a forensic lens using Intezerβs battle-tested capabilities, including endpoint forensics, reverse engineering, network artifact analysis, sandboxing, and other proprietary methods. These are paired with the adaptive research and reasoning of multiple LLMs to ensure both depth and flexibility in every investigation.
Intezer Forensic AI delivers:
100% alert coverage, including low-severity alerts often ignored by SOCs and MDRs
Fewer than 4% of alerts escalated for human review
98% accurate, consistent verdicts backed by deterministic evidence
1-minute median triage time
Predictable, scalable pricing tied to endpoints, not alert volume or costly model usage
Enterprises get both the intelligence of AI and the rigor of forensics, without sacrificing speed, cost, or accuracy.
Proven in the worldβs most targeted enterprises
Intezer supports over 150 enterprises, including 15 of the Fortune 500, across verticals such as finance, tech, pharma, critical infrastructure, hospitality and more. These organizations operate some of the most complex and heavily targeted environments in the world and rely on Intezer to keep their businesses secure.Β
βIntezerβs AI-driven triage has been transformative for our SOC. It integrates seamlessly with our existing systems and delivers analyst-level investigations at scale, giving our team the confidence that every alert is handled with forensic accuracy.β
Branden Newman, CTO, MGM Resorts International
Built for the growing demands of enterprise SOCs
Enterprise SOCs must respond not only to rising alert volume, but also to increasing business pressure for speed, consistency, and measurable risk reduction. Companies using Intezer Forensic AI SOC enjoy:
Lower business risk Every alert, including low-severity signals used by modern attackers, is investigated with dramatically shortened MTTR.
Predictable, cost-efficient pricing Pricing aligned to endpoints avoids the unpredictable costs of LLM-heavy AI SOCs.
Instant time to value Hundreds of integrations enable rapid deployment and immediate time-to-value without training models on customer data.
Doing more with less Reduce MDR dependence and automate analyst workloads to optimize budgets and expand SOC output.
Built by security experts, for security experts
Intezer was founded and shaped by world-class SecOps leaders, security researchers and incident responders who have spent their careers defending some of the most targeted organizations and building foundational cybersecurity technologies.
Our leadership team includes pioneers who helped create and scale major cybersecurity companies. This firsthand experience responding to advanced threats, operating high-pressure SOC environments, and building products used by thousands of security teams worldwide directly informs how Intezer designs its technology.
We understand what analysts need, speed, accuracy, transparency, and trustworthy automation, because weβve lived those challenges ourselves.
Intezer Forensic AI SOC reflects that operational DNA with a platform built not by generic AI engineers, but by practitioners who have spent years reverse engineering malware, hunting nation-state adversaries, leading global IR engagements, and building tools that analysts rely on every day.
Join the future of the SOC, today!
The SOC is entering a new era. Machine-scaled attacks demand an approach grounded in both forensic rigor and adaptive AI enabling consistent, accurate investigations to defend the enterprise.Β
tl;dr Greater productivity β greater security outcomes. Kinda like why being able to accelerate from 0-60 MPH doesnβt help when the ice is cracking under your wheels.
And now, the full version.
AI SOC shouldnβt just βaugment workflowsβ, thatβs a productivity-locked perspective. The goal and the delivery capability that exists right now is to deliver full-scale enterprise triage of 100% of alerts with forensicly-accurate verdicts. That looks like streamlined triage, explainable verdicts, measurable accuracy, and operational resilience. Thereβs already an AI SOC platform that has operationalized what Gartner calls βemergingβ.
While recent Gartner reports on βAI SOC Agentsβ and βSecOps Workflow Augmentationβ succeed in elevating the conversation, they also reveal how incomplete that conversation still is. Both documents frame AI in the SOC as a promising but premature experiment, a toolset meant to make analysts more productive, not organizations more secure. That framing misses the point. AI isnβt about automation for automationβs sake; itβs about turning expert knowledge, data, context, and expertise into repeatable, scalable decision-making that covers every alert with confidence and context.
The bias in todayβs AI SOC conversation
Gartnerβs reports argue that AI SOC agents should be treated as βworkflow augmentation toolsβ to reduce analyst fatigue and improve response efficiency. They recommend cautious adoption, structured pilots, and human-in-the-loop validation. Pragmatic? When LLMs are relied upon solely, sure. But the underlying assumption that enterprise-proven AI is not yet mature enough to deliver reliable outcomes is outdated.
In practice, this mindset anchors the market in productivity metrics, not security performance. It evaluates how efficiently teams work, not how effectively they defend. The focus stays on βmean time to detectβ and βmean time to respond,β rather than the more critical questions:
Are ALL alerts being triaged?
Are verdicts, not just investigations, consistently accurate?
Are we actually reducing risk, not just improving the process?
Are alerts triaged in seconds & minutes for true containment & response?
Thatβs where the emerging class of true AI SOC platforms breaks away from the Gartner lens.
Workflow augmentation isnβt security
The distinction matters. Augmentation is an operational improvement; outcomes are a security transformation. Most vendors today build tools that accelerate investigation but still depend on human oversight for every meaningful decision. Those are SOAR 2.0 platforms: automation-centric, workflow-obsessed, and still fundamentally enrichment, not triage.
A true AI SOC, by contrast, triages every alert across the stack autonomously, determines a verdict with auditable reasoning, and escalates only when necessary, typically less than four percent of the time. This isnβt a co-pilot; itβs a teammate that already performs at the level of a seasoned analyst and identifies the needles without the haystack. This is incredible for the SOC analysts that are focused on looking at real alerts.
Security outcome execution is the critical requirement any true AI SOC should provide:
Resolve millions of alerts monthly across distributed environments with <4% escalation rates.
Deliver verdict accuracy above 97.7% through hybrid deterministic and AI reasoning.
Provide explainable decisions, validated by periodic human review and forensic evidence.
Uncover real threats in seconds & minutes, not hours.
The βemergingβ technology thatβs already operational
Gartner describes AI SOC agents as an βemerging technologyβ that promises to evolve beyond playbook-driven automation. The irony is that enterprise SOCs are already running on these systems today. Fortune 10 environments and thousands of organizations worldwide are triaging every single alert, not just the critical and high-severity ones, through AI that emulates human reasoning at scale.
These systems donβt βpilotβ AI; they operationalize it. They deliver 24/7 SOC capability, instant triage, and consistent decision-making grounded in explainable logic, not black-box inference. They prove that an AI SOC is no longer a future-state concept. Itβs production-grade infrastructure thatβs rewriting what operational maturity means, and has been for years now.
The difference between Gartnerβs caution and whatβs happening in practice is simple: proof.
Measuring what actually matters
The reports fixate on efficiency β MTTD, MTTR, analyst satisfaction, but those metrics only tell half the story especially for antiquated SOCs. The next generation of AI SOCs defines success through security outcome metrics, including:
Total alert coverage β Every alert analyzed, across all severities and sources.
Verdict accuracy β The supermajority of decisions must be right, consistently and explainably.
Escalation rate β Only the rarest cases should reach human review.
Explainability β Every verdict is clearly backed by evidence: memory scans, forensic traces, and contextual reasoning.
Feedback velocity β Every corrected verdict feeds back into the detection logic, closing the learning loop.
When you measure what truly matters, accuracy, coverage, trust, the difference between AI that βhelpsβ and AI that defends becomes obvious.
Why βAI SOC Agentβ β βAI SOC Platformβ
The reports conflate two very different things. An βAI SOC agentβ is a single use case, an assistant. An βAI SOC platformβ is a full operating model: triage, investigation, and response fused into a continuous feedback loop back to detection engineering. One optimizes efficiency; the other drives security transformation.
Thatβs the real inflection point the industry is standing at. SOCs that treat AI as a productivity booster will get marginal gains, which is a great thing for the industry. SOCs that rebuild around AI as a core operating principle will experience exponential gains with real risk reduction.
In other words: this isnβt about speeding up analysts, itβs about scaling their expertise across the entire alert surface.
From AI promise to proof
The challenge now isnβt technology, itβs perception. The AI SOC has already proven it can outperform legacy models built on manual triage and brittle playbooks. It has shown that full alert coverage, explainable verdicts, and continuous learning can coexist with human oversight and compliance.
The industry doesnβt need another year of pilots to βvalidate the promise.β It needs a new standard of performance.
The next evolution of the SOC will be measured not by how well it augments workflows, but by how confidently it can:
Detect and triage every signal.
Deliver verdicts with explainable evidence.
Quantify accuracy in measurable, repeatable terms.
Strengthen analyst trust through transparency.
Thatβs the AI SOC outcome model, here today.
Final thoughts
Gartnerβs perspective is valuable for shaping the taxonomy of an emerging market. But the reality on the ground has already overtaken the research. The world doesnβt need another whitepaper on βpotential.β It needs proof ofperformance, and it exists.
The future SOC isnβt augmented.
Itβs autonomous, accurate, and accountable for strategic security outcomes that CISOs and leaders require, either now or in the next few months with the executive leadership push to operationalize AI.
The worldβs largest enterprises today already benefit from the real market-defining traits of a forensic AI SOC.
This is the first time we have a public, detailed report of a campaign where AI was used at this scale and with this level of sophistication, moving the threat from a collection of AI-assisted tasks to a largely autonomous, orchestrated operation.
This report is a significant new benchmark for our industry. Itβs not a reason to panic β itβs a reason to prepare. It provides the first detailed case study of a state-sponsored attack with three critical distinctions:
It was βagenticβ: This wasnβt just an attacker using AI for help. This was an AI system executing 80-90% of the attack largely on its own.
It targeted high-value entities: The campaign was aimed at approximately 30 major technology corporations, financial institutions, and government agencies.
It had successful intrusions: Anthropic confirmed the campaign resulted in βa handful of successful intrusionsβ and obtained access to βconfirmed high-value targets for intelligence collectionβ.
Together, these distinctions show why this case matters. A high-level, autonomous, and successful AI-driven attack is no longer a future theory. It is a documented, current-day reality.
2. What Actually Happened: A Summary of the Attack
The attack (designated GTG-1002) was a βhighly sophisticated cyber espionage operationβ detected in mid-September 2025.
AI Autonomy: The attacker used Anthropicβs Claude Code as an autonomous agent, which independently executed 80-90% of all tactical work.
Human Role: Human operators acted as βstrategic supervisorsβ. They set the initial targets and authorized critical decisions, like escalating to active exploitation or approving final data exfiltration.
Bypassing Safeguards: The operators bypassed AI safety controls using simple βsocial engineeringβ. The report notes, βThe key was role-play: the human operators claimed that they were employees of legitimate cybersecurity firms and convinced Claude that it was being used in defensive cybersecurity testingβ.
Full Lifecycle: The AI autonomously executed the entire attack chain: reconnaissance, vulnerability discovery, exploitation, lateral movement, credential harvesting, and data collection.
Timeline: After detecting the activity, Anthropicβs team launched an investigation, banned the accounts, and notified partners and affected entities over the βfollowing ten daysβ.
To have a credible discussion, we must also look at what wasnβt new. This attack wasnβt about secret, magical weapons.
The report is clear that the attackβs sophistication came from orchestration, not novelty.
No Zero-Days: The report does not mention the use of novel zero-day exploits.
Commodity Tools: The report states, βThe operational infrastructure relied overwhelmingly on open source penetration testing tools rather than custom malware developmentβ.
This matters because defenders often look for new exploit types or malware indicators. But the shift here is operational, not technical. The attackers didnβt invent a new weapon, they built a far more effective way to use the ones we already know.
4. The New Reality: Why This Is an Evolving Threat
So, if the tools arenβt new, what is? The execution model. And we must assume this new model is here to stay.
This new attack method is a natural evolution of technology. We should not expect it to be βstoppedβ at the source for two main reasons:
Commercial Safeguards are Limited: AI vendors like Anthropic are building strong safety controls β itβs how this was detected in the first place. But as the report notes, malicious actors are continually trying to find ways around them. No vendor can be expected to block 100% of all malicious activity.
The Open-Source Factor: This is the larger trend. Attackers donβt need to use a commercial, monitored service. With powerful open-source AI models and orchestration frameworks β such as LLaMA, self-hosted inference stacks, and LangChain/LangGraph agents β attackers can build private AI systems on their own infrastructure. This leaves no vendor in the middle to monitor or prevent the abuse.
The attack surface is not necessarily growing, but the attackerβs execution engine is accelerating.
5. Detection: Key Patterns to Hunt For
While the techniques were familiar, their execution creates a different kind of detection challenge. An AI-driven attack doesnβt generate one βsmoking gunβ alert, like a unique malware hash or a known-bad IP. Instead, it generates a storm of low-fidelity signals. The key is to hunt for the patterns within this noise:
Anomalous Request Volumes: The AI operated at βphysically impossible request ratesβ with βpeak activity included thousands of requests, representing sustained request rates of multiple operations per secondβ. This is a classic low-fidelity, high-volume signal that is often just seen as noise.
Commodity and Open-Source Penetration Testing Tools: The attack utilized a combination of βstandard security utilitiesβ and βopen source penetration testing toolsβ.
Traffic from Browser Automation: The report explicitly calls out βBrowser automation for web application reconnaissanceβ to βsystematically catalog target infrastructureβ and βanalyze authentication mechanismsβ.
Automated Stolen Credential Testing: The AI didnβt just test one password, it βsystematically tested authentication against internal APIs, database systems, container registries, and logging infrastructureβ. This automated, broad, and rapid testing looks very different from a humanβs manual attempts.
Audit for Unauthorized Account Creation: This is a critical, high-confidence post-exploitation signal. In one successful compromise, the AIβs autonomous actions included the creation of a βpersistent backdoor userβ.
6. The Defenderβs Challenge: A Flood of Low-Fidelity Noise
The detection patterns listed above create the central challenge of defending against AI-orchestrated attacks. The problem isnβt just alert volume, itβs that these attacks generate a massive volume of low-fidelity alerts.
This new execution model creates critical blind spots:
The Volume Blind Spot: The AIβs automated nature creates a flood of low-confidence alerts. No human-only SOC can manually triage this volume.
The Temporal (Speed) Blind Spot: A human-led intrusion might take days or weeks. Here, the AI compressed a full database extraction β from authentication to data parsing β into just 2-6 hours. Our human-based detection and response loops are often too slow to keep up.
The Context Blind Spot: The AIβs real power is connecting many small, seemingly unrelated signals (a scan, a login failure, a data query) into a single, coherent attack chain. A human analyst, looking at these alerts one by one, would likely miss the larger pattern.
7. The Importance of Autonomous Triage and Investigation
When the attack is autonomous, the defense must also have autonomous capabilities.
We cannot hire our way out of this speed and scale problem. The security operations model must shift. The goal of autonomous triage is not just to add context, but to handle the entire investigation process for every single alert, especially the thousands of low-severity signals that AI-driven attacks create.
An autonomous system can automatically investigate these signals at machine speed, determine which ones are irrelevant noise, and suppress them.
This is the true value: the system escalates only the high-confidence, confirmed incidents that actually matter. This frees your human analysts from chasing noise and allows them to focus on real, complex threats.
This is exactly the type of challenge autonomous triage systems like the one weβve built at Intezer were designed to solve. As Anthropicβs own report concludes, βSecurity teams should experiment with applying AI for defense in areas like SOC automation, threat detectionβ¦ and incident responseβ.
8. Evolving Your Offensive Security Program
To defend against this threat, we must be able to test our defenses against it. All offensive security activities, internal red teams, external penetration tests, and attack simulations, must evolve.
It is no longer enough for offensive security teams to manually simulate attacks. To truly test your defenses, your red teams or external pentesters must adopt agentic AI frameworks themselves.
The new mandate is to simulate the speed, scale, and orchestration of an AI-driven attack, similar to the one detailed in the Anthropic report. Only then can you validate whether your defensive systems and automated processes can withstand this new class of automated onslaught. Naturally, all such simulations must be done safely and ethically to prevent any real-world risk.
9. Conclusion: When the Threat Model Changes, Our Processes Must, Too.
The Anthropic report doesnβt introduce a new magic exploit. It introduces a new execution model that we now need to design our defenses around.
Letβs summarize the key, practical takeaways:
AI-orchestrated attacks are a proven, documented reality.
The primary threat is speed and scale, which is designed to overwhelm manual security processes.
Security leaders must prioritize automating investigation and triage to suppress the noise and escalate what matters.
We must evolve offensive security testing to simulate this new class of autonomous threat.
This report is a clear signal. The threat model has officially changed. Your security architecture, processes, and playbooks must change with it. The same applies if you rely on an MSSP, verify theyβre evolving their detection and triage capabilities for this new model. This shift isnβt hype, itβs a practical change in execution speed. With the right adjustments and automation, defenders can meet this challenge.
Gartnerβs recent Innovation Insight: AI SOC Agents report is an encouraging signal that the concept of an βAI-powered SOCβ has reached mainstream awareness. The report recognizes the potential of AI technologies to transform how security operations centers function, especially in augmenting analysts through automation and intelligent workflows.
Yet, while Gartnerβs analysis succeeds in capturing the momentum of this space, it falls short in clarifying how and where AI actually fits within the security operations stack. By treating βAI SOCβ as a monolithic, undifferentiated category, the report overlooks the crucial distinctions between detection, triage and response, each of which requires a very different kind of AI capability and delivers very different value.
A closer look at Gartnerβs analysisΒ
Gartnerβs report provides a valuable overview of how AI SOC can assist with detection, alert investigation, and even response recommendation. We wholeheartedly agree with Gartnerβs advice that CISOs should evaluate which security activities are βvolumetric, troublesome, or low-performing, and which would benefit the most from augmentation with the application of AIβ. However, presenting all of the AI SOC functions (and vendors) as part of a single undifferentiated security ecosystem, can be confusing.Β
This broad framing misses the fact that an AI model designed to improve SIEM detection logic operates on entirely different data, architecture, and feedback loops than one built to support analyst decision-making or response automation. The result is a flattening of a nuanced market into one monolithic category, useful for taxonomy, but not for decision-making.
For CISOs, this lack of segmentation makes it hard to answer the key strategic question: Where should we apply AI first to get tangible operational value?
By contrast, our view is that organizations should start by identifying which part of their operations needs augmentation most, then evaluate AI solutions purpose-built for that domain.
A clearer way to frame the AI SOC market
To understand where AI truly fits in and how it can deliver measurable outcomes, it helps to zoom out and look at the broader security operations stack. As we described in a previous blog post, βMaking sense of the AI SOC marketβ, we see three main layers where AI can add value:
Detection (SIEM, XDR)
The first layer converts raw telemetry into actionable alerts. Here, AI can strengthen correlation logic, improve detection models, and reduce false positives. This is largely about data pattern recognition and automation of repetitive analysis.
Triage and Investigation (SOC / MDR)
The middle layer is where human analysts determine which alerts are real incidents worth escalating. This is where AI can truly emulate analyst reasoning, gathering context, cross-referencing intelligence, and presenting likely root causes. Done well, AI here acts as a co-analyst, not a replacement.
Response and Case Management (SOAR)
The final layer coordinates remediation and manages incident workflows. AI can accelerate playbook creation, automate routine case handling, and improve overall response time through dynamic decision logic.
Each layer offers opportunities for AIβbut they are fundamentally different problems to solve. When vendors use the term βAI SOCβ without specifying which layer theyβre addressing, it creates confusion and unrealistic expectations.
A more practical evaluation framework
To move the conversation forward, we recommend a more structured approach to evaluating AI SOC solutions.
Step 1: Identify your target layer
Ask: Which layer of our operations needs the most improvement. Is it detection (SIEM/XDR/Cloud), triage (SOC/MDR), or response (SOAR)?Β
This helps narrow the field to the right class of solutions rather than chasing the broad βAI SOCβ label.
Step 2: Define measurable outcomes
Especially for alert triage and investigation (which is usually handled by an internal SOC or external MDR), establish metrics to compare performance, such as:
Reduction in mean time to detect (MTTD)
Noise reduction rate
Scale of alert coverage
Consistency across SOC shifts or analyst tiers
Triage accuracy
These metrics allow organizations to compare vendors on tangible outcomes, not vague AI promises.
Step 3: Evaluate transparency and integration
An effective AI SOC solution should clearly explain its reasoning, integrate easily with your existing tools, and allow human oversight. The goal is augmentation, not opacity.
Gartner deserves credit for bringing visibility to an emerging market, but their analysis underscores how early and fluid this space still is. The future of the AI SOC isnβt one product category. Itβs a set of AI capabilities applied intelligently across the detectionβtriageβresponse continuum.
Organizations that treat AI as a modular capability rather than a monolithic product will see the most success. The key is knowing your operational priorities and matching them to the layer where AI can have the greatest impact.
Conclusion
AI is not a magic βSOC-in-a-box.β Itβs a set of technologies that, when properly targeted, can transform specific parts of security operations. Gartnerβs latest report captures the enthusiasm, but not yet the structure, of this market.
At Intezer, we believe the path forward starts with clarity. Understanding the distinct layers of the SOC, the role AI plays in each, and the outcomes that matter most. Only then can organizations cut through the noise and choose the right AI SOC partner for their needs.
Thereβs been an explosion of buzz around the AI SOC market. More than 40 vendors are now claiming to do something in this space, but as with many emerging technology categories, the result is a lot of excitement and a lot of confusion.
In this video and in the article below it, I want to provide some clarity. What exactly is βAI SOCβ? Where did this category come from? And how can security teams cut through the noise to find real value?
The origins of the AI SOC: An old problem meets new tech
The rise of the AI SOC stems from two converging forces. A very old problem and a very new technology.
The old problem is the persistent talent shortage in cybersecurity combined with the overwhelming volume of security alerts. Security teams have been drowning in these alerts for years, struggling to keep up with investigation and response.
The new technology is AI, especially large language models (LLMs) and adjacent innovations, which open up an opportunity to finally address that shortage by automating some of the human decision-making process.
The 3 layers of security operations
To understand where AI fits in and how it can help, letβs zoom out and look at the broader security operations stack.Β
There are three main layers:
Detection (SIEM, XDR) is the first level which handles converting raw logs and other telemetry data into actionable alerts.
Triage and investigation (SOC) is the middle layer where human analysts determine which alerts are real incidents worth escalating.
Response and case management (SOAR) is the final layer that manages incident remediation with case assignment, and workflow automation.
Each layer presents opportunities for AI. For example, in SIEM/XDR, AI can improve detection logic and reduce false positives. For SOC, AI can simulate the investigative reasoning of human analysts. And when applied to SOAR, AI can accelerate workflow creation and automate routine case handling.
In each of these areas, vendors are loosely using the term AI SOC to describe what they are doing. And that is why itβs important to know what problem you are trying to solve and which βAI SOCβ solution is appropriate for you.
All that said, when people refer to AI SOC, theyβre usually talking about that middle layer. The part focused on automated alert triage, investigation, and escalation.
Thatβs where Intezer focuses: providing 24/7 managed alert triage, investigation, and response powered by a decade of deep forensic analysis tooling combined with flexible and adaptable LLMs.
Our system automatically investigates alerts, surfaces only what truly requires attention, and escalates only up to 4% of alerts to human analysts.
This is where the marketβs energy, and customer need, are currently concentrated. Teams want to scale their response capabilities without adding headcount, and AI SOCs make that possible.
How to evaluate AI SOC vendors
With so many vendors entering the field, itβs important to evaluate them based on clear, measurable criteria. Some of the key metrics that Iβm hearing from our customers and prospect that they consider, include:
Accuracy: How precise are the AI-driven investigations?
Speed: How quickly can alerts be triaged?
Scale and coverage: Can the system handle all your alerts in a timely fashion?
Noise reduction: What percentage of alerts still require human review?
Context and transparency: Can you understand how the AI reached its conclusions, or is it a black box?
AI SOC is one of the most exciting and fast-evolving categories in cybersecurity. Itβs also one of the messiest, but thatβs often a sign of real innovation happening.
For years, the industry has been searching for a way to truly solve the alert overload and talent shortage problem. With the arrival of AI-driven investigation technology, weβre finally seeing that vision come to life.
A recent SACR market analysis report examined these metrics across leading AI SOC vendors which can be very helpful for evaluating which solution is right for you. And I definitely recommend reading about Intezer in the report π.Β
At Intezer, weβre proud to help security teams reduce noise, focus on real threats, and scale their operations intelligently.
If youβre exploring this space, weβd love to be your partner in building a smarter SOC.
The email security landscape is increasingly shaped by robust protocols for authentication, data protection, and secure communication. Among these, MTA-STS is emerging as a critical standard, strengthening the enforcement of encrypted channels for email delivery.Β
One tool that I can't live without when performing a penetration test in an Active Directory environment is called NetExec. Being able to efficiently authenticate against multiple systems in the network is crucial, and NetExec is an incredibly powerful tool that helps automate a lot of this activity.
Phishing attacks, which trick users into revealing sensitive information or installing malware, have grown more sophisticated and localized. Putting it simple: the frauds you'll get in Portugal are completely different from US, Singapore or any other place.Β
As the largest players in the email space acknowledge the need for DMARC, the entire ecosystem will become restricted to the ones following the rules.Β
This webcast originally aired on February 27, 2025. Join us for a very special free one-hour Black Hills Information Security webcast with Corey Ham & Kelli Tarala on why your [β¦]
Phishing attacks are becoming more sophisticated than ever in 2025, leveraging cutting-edge technology to deceive individuals and organizations. Here are the new and most prevalent trends to consider when defending against the number one cyber attack vector.