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A 4X Gartner Magic Quadrant for EPP Leader. Built for the Agentic Era.

I am incredibly proud to share that Palo Alto Networks has been named a Leader in the 2026 Gartner® Magic Quadrant™ for Endpoint Protection Platforms for the fourth consecutive year. For us, this recognition is a testament to our team's relentless vision as we continue to define endpoint defense—from the pioneer days of XDR to the new frontier of agentic AI.

We believe our repeated recognition as a Leader is built on a single, uncompromising commitment to our customers and partners: empowering organizations with reduced overhead, rapid threat response, a strengthened security posture, and the resilient protection required to close the most critical security gaps. We are now leading the shift into the agentic era. While AI agents significantly boost enterprise productivity, they also introduce novel attack surfaces that legacy EDR tools are unable to protect. As the pioneer of XDR, we are committed to defining the next generation of cybersecurity by securing this new frontier.

Cortex® XDR is helping customers:

  • Secure Agentic AI with Koi: Gain unprecedented visibility, guardrails, and control over AI agents and agentic tools before they become a liability.
  • Stop the Unseen: Leverage battle-tested prevention powered by behavioral analytics, and industry-leading automation and response.
  • Unify Your Defense: Consolidate your endpoint and workspace security with a proven, four-time industry Leader.

We are incredibly proud to be recognized as a Leader once again, an acknowledgement that belongs just as much to our customers and partners as it does to us. Your trust, feedback, and real-world challenges keep us sharp and dictate our roadmap. At the end of the day, our continued leadership is built on one core promise: make each day more secure than the day before.

To get the full story and a comprehensive analysis of the endpoint security market, I invite you to read the 2026 Gartner Magic Quadrant report.

Get Your Complimentary Copy of the Report

Gartner, Magic Quadrant for Endpoint Protection Platforms, By Deepak Mishra, Evgeny Mirolyubov, Nikul Patel, May 29, 2026

Gartner and Magic Quadrant are trademarks of Gartner, Inc. and/or its affiliates. Gartner does not endorse any company, vendor, product or service depicted in its publications, and does not advise technology users to select only those vendors with the highest ratings or other designation. Gartner publications consist of the opinions of Gartner’s business and technology insights organization and should not be construed as statements of fact. Gartner disclaims all warranties, expressed or implied, with respect to this publication, including any warranties of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose.

The post A 4X Gartner Magic Quadrant for EPP Leader. Built for the Agentic Era. appeared first on Palo Alto Networks Blog.

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Report ‘phone hack’ to police or I will do it for you, Labour chair tells Farage

Anna Turley gives Reform leader 24 hours to report Russian hacking claim in ‘public and national interest’

The Labour chair has given Nigel Farage 24 hours to report to security services the claim that his phone was hacked by Russia-linked actors or the party will do it for him.

In a letter to the Reform UK leader, Anna Turley said it was “in the public and national interest” to ensure that a suspected overseas hack of a senior politician’s phone by a hostile state was properly investigated.

Continue reading...

© Photograph: Ryan Jenkinson/Getty Images

© Photograph: Ryan Jenkinson/Getty Images

© Photograph: Ryan Jenkinson/Getty Images

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Nigel Farage’s Russian hack claim ‘without any merit’, former NCSC chief says

Ciaran Martin says Reform UK leader’s allegation over Guardian report on £5m gift ‘entirely unsubstantiated’

Nigel Farage’s claim that a Russian hack was behind a Guardian report on the £5m gift he received from a crypto billionaire has been described as “without any merit” by a former head of the National Cyber Security Centre.

Ciaran Martin, founding chief executive of the agency, which is part of GCHQ, said Farage’s allegation, if true, would have major implications for UK policy towards Russia but that the Reform UK leader had yet to provide “a shred of evidence”.

Continue reading...

© Photograph: Jack Taylor/Reuters

© Photograph: Jack Taylor/Reuters

© Photograph: Jack Taylor/Reuters

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Biometrics, diagnoses, and bank details exposed in major healthcare breach

NYC Health + Hospitals (NYC H+H) posted a data breach notice about a months‑long breach via a third‑party vendor that exposed highly sensitive patient and employee data for at least 1.8 million people, including medical records, government IDs, geolocation data, and even fingerprint and palm‑print biometrics.

NYC H+H detected suspicious activity on February 2, 2026, and later confirmed that an unauthorized actor had access to parts of its network from roughly late November 2025 through February 2026.

During this window, attackers copied files containing personal, medical, financial, and biometric information. The incident was reported to the US Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) on March 24, 2026, and currently affects at least 1.8 million individuals, making it one of the largest healthcare breaches of 2026 so far.

HHS filing

NYC H+H attributes the intrusion to a breach at an unnamed third‑party vendor that had access to its systems. This fits the current pattern of supply-chain compromises, where a vendor becomes the entry point for attackers to gain access to their clients’ systems or data.

Incidents like these are a textbook example of how deeply personal health data can fuel long‑term fraud, stalkerware‑like abuse, and permanent privacy loss.


Digital Footprint Scan

See if your personal data has been exposed.


Types of data

According to NYC H+H’s notice and related write‑ups, the exposed dataset is unusually broad and detailed.

We can divide the data into three distinct layers:

  • Classical PII, which can be combined with other leaked datasets: Full names and contact details. Government‑issued identifiers, including Social Security Numbers, driver’s license and passport numbers, other government ID numbers, taxpayer IDs, and IRS identity protection PINs. The breach also exposed billing and payment records, plus bank and card data, which can be used for direct financial theft and highly convincing social engineering.
  • Medical and insurance data: Detailed diagnoses, medication lists, and test results expose conditions people may have kept private from employers, family, or insurers, enabling blackmail, targeted scams, and discrimination. Insurance and claims data can be abused to submit fraudulent claims, redirect reimbursements, or impersonate existing identities in healthcare systems.
  • Biometrics: These are at least as sensitive as medical history because they tend to stay with you for life. They are not easy to erase or replace. Once compromised, large biometric databases become long‑term liabilities for everyone who relies on them as trustworthy identifiers.

Unfortunately, this is part of a broader pattern. The FBI’s Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) reports that healthcare was the most targeted critical infrastructure sector for ransomware in 2025, with 460 ransomware incidents and 182 reported healthcare data breaches.

The Change Healthcare ransomware attack alone exposed medical and billing data for more than 190 million Americans, highlighting how a single healthcare intermediary can disrupt an entire system.

What to do if you’re involved

If you’ve interacted with NYC Health + Hospitals, there’s a possibility your personal information could be affected.

NYC Health + Hospitals is making identity theft prevention and mitigation services, including credit monitoring, available through Kroll Information Assurance, LLC for a period of 24 months at no cost to all individuals who have worked for or been a patient of NYC Health + Hospitals. For more details check its data breach notice.

If you think you’ve been affected by a data breach, here are steps you can take to protect yourself:

  • Check the company’s advice. Every breach is different, so check with the company to find out what’s happened and follow any specific advice it offers.
  • Change your password. You can make a stolen password useless to thieves by changing it. Choose a strong password that you don’t use for anything else. Better yet, let a password manager choose one for you.
  • Enable two-factor authentication (2FA). If you can, use a FIDO2-compliant hardware key, laptop, or phone as your second factor. Some forms of 2FA can be phished just as easily as a password, but 2FA that relies on a FIDO2 device can’t be phished.
  • Watch out for impersonators. The criminals may contact you posing as the breached platform. Check the official website to see if it’s contacting victims and verify the identity of anyone who contacts you using a different communication channel.
  • Take your time. Phishing attacks often impersonate people or brands you know, and use themes that require urgent attention, such as missed deliveries, account suspensions, and security alerts.
  • Consider not storing your card details. It’s definitely more convenient to let sites remember your card details, but it increases risk if a retailer suffers a breach.
  • Set up identity monitoring, which alerts you if your personal information is found being traded illegally online and helps you recover after.

Let’s face it, an incognito window can only do so much. 
 
Breaches, dark web trading, credit fraud. Malwarebytes Identity Theft Protection monitors for all of it, alerts you fast, and comes with identity theft insurance. 

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Biometrics, diagnoses, and bank details exposed in major healthcare breach

NYC Health + Hospitals (NYC H+H) posted a data breach notice about a months‑long breach via a third‑party vendor that exposed highly sensitive patient and employee data for at least 1.8 million people, including medical records, government IDs, geolocation data, and even fingerprint and palm‑print biometrics.

NYC H+H detected suspicious activity on February 2, 2026, and later confirmed that an unauthorized actor had access to parts of its network from roughly late November 2025 through February 2026.

During this window, attackers copied files containing personal, medical, financial, and biometric information. The incident was reported to the US Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) on March 24, 2026, and currently affects at least 1.8 million individuals, making it one of the largest healthcare breaches of 2026 so far.

HHS filing

NYC H+H attributes the intrusion to a breach at an unnamed third‑party vendor that had access to its systems. This fits the current pattern of supply-chain compromises, where a vendor becomes the entry point for attackers to gain access to their clients’ systems or data.

Incidents like these are a textbook example of how deeply personal health data can fuel long‑term fraud, stalkerware‑like abuse, and permanent privacy loss.


Digital Footprint Scan

See if your personal data has been exposed.


Types of data

According to NYC H+H’s notice and related write‑ups, the exposed dataset is unusually broad and detailed.

We can divide the data into three distinct layers:

  • Classical PII, which can be combined with other leaked datasets: Full names and contact details. Government‑issued identifiers, including Social Security Numbers, driver’s license and passport numbers, other government ID numbers, taxpayer IDs, and IRS identity protection PINs. The breach also exposed billing and payment records, plus bank and card data, which can be used for direct financial theft and highly convincing social engineering.
  • Medical and insurance data: Detailed diagnoses, medication lists, and test results expose conditions people may have kept private from employers, family, or insurers, enabling blackmail, targeted scams, and discrimination. Insurance and claims data can be abused to submit fraudulent claims, redirect reimbursements, or impersonate existing identities in healthcare systems.
  • Biometrics: These are at least as sensitive as medical history because they tend to stay with you for life. They are not easy to erase or replace. Once compromised, large biometric databases become long‑term liabilities for everyone who relies on them as trustworthy identifiers.

Unfortunately, this is part of a broader pattern. The FBI’s Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) reports that healthcare was the most targeted critical infrastructure sector for ransomware in 2025, with 460 ransomware incidents and 182 reported healthcare data breaches.

The Change Healthcare ransomware attack alone exposed medical and billing data for more than 190 million Americans, highlighting how a single healthcare intermediary can disrupt an entire system.

What to do if you’re involved

If you’ve interacted with NYC Health + Hospitals, there’s a possibility your personal information could be affected.

NYC Health + Hospitals is making identity theft prevention and mitigation services, including credit monitoring, available through Kroll Information Assurance, LLC for a period of 24 months at no cost to all individuals who have worked for or been a patient of NYC Health + Hospitals. For more details check its data breach notice.

If you think you’ve been affected by a data breach, here are steps you can take to protect yourself:

  • Check the company’s advice. Every breach is different, so check with the company to find out what’s happened and follow any specific advice it offers.
  • Change your password. You can make a stolen password useless to thieves by changing it. Choose a strong password that you don’t use for anything else. Better yet, let a password manager choose one for you.
  • Enable two-factor authentication (2FA). If you can, use a FIDO2-compliant hardware key, laptop, or phone as your second factor. Some forms of 2FA can be phished just as easily as a password, but 2FA that relies on a FIDO2 device can’t be phished.
  • Watch out for impersonators. The criminals may contact you posing as the breached platform. Check the official website to see if it’s contacting victims and verify the identity of anyone who contacts you using a different communication channel.
  • Take your time. Phishing attacks often impersonate people or brands you know, and use themes that require urgent attention, such as missed deliveries, account suspensions, and security alerts.
  • Consider not storing your card details. It’s definitely more convenient to let sites remember your card details, but it increases risk if a retailer suffers a breach.
  • Set up identity monitoring, which alerts you if your personal information is found being traded illegally online and helps you recover after.

Let’s face it, an incognito window can only do so much. 
 
Breaches, dark web trading, credit fraud. Malwarebytes Identity Theft Protection monitors for all of it, alerts you fast, and comes with identity theft insurance. 

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IT threat evolution in Q1 2026. Mobile statistics

IT threat evolution in Q1 2026. Mobile statistics
IT threat evolution in Q1 2026. Non-mobile statistics

In the third quarter of 2025, we updated the methodology for calculating statistical indicators based on the Kaspersky Security Network. These changes affected all sections of the report except for the statistics on installation packages, which remained unchanged.

To illustrate the differences between the reporting periods, we have also recalculated data for the previous quarters. Consequently, these figures may significantly differ from the previously published ones. However, subsequent reports will employ this new methodology, enabling precise comparisons with the data presented in this post.

The Kaspersky Security Network (KSN) is a global network for analyzing anonymized threat information, voluntarily shared by users of Kaspersky solutions. The statistics in this report are based on KSN data unless explicitly stated otherwise.

The quarter in numbers

According to Kaspersky Security Network, in Q1 2026:

  • More than 2.67 million attacks utilizing malware, adware, or unwanted mobile software were prevented.
  • The Trojan-Banker category was the prevalent mobile malware threat with a 52.96% share of total detected applications.
  • More than 306,000 malicious installation packages were discovered, including:
    • 162,275 packages related to mobile banking Trojans;
    • 439 packages related to mobile ransomware Trojans.

Quarterly highlights

The number of malware, adware, or unwanted software attacks on mobile devices decreased to 2,676,328 in Q1, down from 3,239,244 in the previous quarter.

Attacks on users of Kaspersky mobile solutions, Q3 2024 — Q1 2026 (download)

The overall drop in attack volume stems primarily from a reduction in adware and RiskTool detections. Nonetheless, this trend does not equate to a lower risk for mobile users. As shown later in this report, the number of unique users targeted by these threats remained relatively stable.

In Q1, Synthient researchers identified a link between the notorious Kimwolf botnet and the IPIDEA proxy network. This network was later taken down in cooperation with GTIG.

In early 2026, we discovered several apps on Google Play and the App Store that contained a new version of the SparkCat crypto stealer.

The Trojan code, meticulously concealed, was embedded into the infected Android apps. The obfuscated malicious Rust library was decrypted using a Dalvik-like virtual machine custom-built by the attackers. The iOS version of the malware also underwent several changes; specifically, the attackers began leveraging Apple’s proprietary Vision framework for optical character recognition (OCR).

Mobile threat statistics

The number of Android malware samples saw a slight increase compared to Q4 2025, reaching a total of 306,070.

Detected malicious and potentially unwanted installation packages, Q1 2025 — Q1 2026 (download)

The detected installation packages were distributed by type as follows:

Detected mobile apps by type, Q4 2025* — Q1 2026 (download)

* Data for the previous quarter may differ slightly from previously published figures due to certain verdicts being retrospectively revised.

Threat actors once again ramped up the production of new banking Trojans; as a result, this category overtook all others in volume, accounting for more than half of all installation packages.

Share* of users attacked by the given type of malicious or potentially unwanted app out of all targeted users of Kaspersky mobile products, Q4 2025 — Q1 2026 (download)

* The total percentage may exceed 100% if the same users encountered multiple attack types.

Following the surge in banking Trojan installation packages, the number of associated attacks also rose, causing Trojan-Banker apps to climb one spot in terms of their share of targeted users. Mamont variants emerged as the most prevalent banking Trojans, accounting for 73.5% of detections, with the rest of the users encountering Faketoken, Rewardsteal, Creduz, and other families.

Yet banking Trojans were still outpaced by adware and RiskTool-type unwanted apps when measured by the total number of affected users. Despite a decrease in their share of installation packages, these two app types retained their positions as the top two threats by attack volume. The most common adware detections involved HiddenAd (44.9%) and MobiDash (38.1%), while most frequently seen RiskTool apps were Revpn (67%) and SpyLoan (20.5%).

TOP 20 most frequently detected types of mobile malware

Note that the malware rankings below exclude riskware or potentially unwanted software, such as RiskTool or adware.

Verdict %* Q4 2025 %* Q1 2026 Difference in p.p. Change in ranking
Backdoor.AndroidOS.Triada.ag 2.62 7.09 +4.48 +10
DangerousObject.Multi.Generic. 6.75 5.84 -0.92 -1
DangerousObject.AndroidOS.GenericML. 3.52 5.51 +1.99 +6
Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Mamont.jo 0.00 5.28 +5.28
Trojan.AndroidOS.Fakemoney.v 5.40 3.44 -1.96 -1
Trojan-Downloader.AndroidOS.Keenadu.l 0.00 3.35 +3.35
Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Mamont.jx 0.00 3.09 +3.09
Backdoor.AndroidOS.Triada.z 4.87 3.08 -1.79 -2
Trojan.AndroidOS.Triada.fe 5.01 2.98 -2.02 -4
Backdoor.AndroidOS.Keenadu.a 2.07 2.73 +0.66 +6
Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Mamont.jg 0.34 2.37 +2.03
Trojan.AndroidOS.Triada.hf 2.15 2.23 +0.07 +3
Trojan.AndroidOS.Boogr.gsh 2.35 2.15 -0.20 0
Trojan.AndroidOS.Triada.ii 5.68 2.07 -3.60 -11
Backdoor.AndroidOS.Triada.ae 1.91 1.76 -0.16 +3
Backdoor.AndroidOS.Triada.ab 1.79 1.72 -0.08 +3
Trojan.AndroidOS.Triada.gn 2.38 1.58 -0.80 -5
Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Mamont.gg 1.56 1.50 -0.06 +2
Trojan.AndroidOS.Triada.ga 1.48 1.50 +0.01 +4
Backdoor.AndroidOS.Triada.ad 0.53 1.40 +0.87 +44

* Unique users who encountered this malware as a percentage of all attacked users of Kaspersky mobile solutions.

The pre-installed Triada.ag backdoor rose to the top spot; it is similar to the older Triada.z version we documented previously. Because the same variant was pre-installed across a wide range of devices, the total number of affected users is aggregated. Consequently, Triada outpaced even Mamont, as users encountered a variety of Mamont variants, causing the share of that banking Trojan to spread across multiple rows. Other pre-installed Triada variants (Triada.z, Triada.ae, Triada.ab, and Triada.ad) also made the rankings. Furthermore, we observed increasing activity from the Keenadu.a backdoor, while diverse variants of the embedded Triada Trojan remained in the rankings.

Mobile banking Trojans

Q1 2026 saw a characteristic rise in mobile banking Trojan activity, with the number of packages totaling 162,275, a 50% increase compared to the prior quarter.

Number of installation packages for mobile banking Trojans detected by Kaspersky, Q1 2025 — Q1 2026 (download)

We saw a similar growth in the previous quarter, with banking Trojan volumes rising by 50% during that period as well. Various Mamont variants accounted for the absolute majority of packages and represented nearly every entry in the rankings of most frequent banking Trojans by affected user count.

TOP 10 mobile bankers

Verdict %* Q4 2025 %* Q1 2026 Difference in p.p. Change in ranking
Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Mamont.jo 0.00 15.75 +15.75
Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Mamont.jx 0.00 9.22 +9.22
Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Mamont.jg 1.47 7.08 +5.61 +24
Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Mamont.gg 6.79 4.48 -2.32 -3
Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Mamont.ks 0.00 3.98 +3.98
Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Agent.ws 6.03 3.78 -2.25 -2
Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Mamont.hl 4.30 3.27 -1.03 +1
Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Mamont.iv 6.00 3.08 -2.92 -3
Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Mamont.jb 3.93 3.07 -0.86 +1
Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Mamont.jv 0.00 2.79 +2.79

* Unique users who encountered this malware as a percentage of all users of Kaspersky mobile security solutions who encountered banking threats.

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IT threat evolution in Q1 2026. Non-mobile statistics

IT threat evolution in Q1 2026. Non-mobile statistics
IT threat evolution in Q1 2026. Mobile statistics

The statistics in this report are based on detection verdicts returned by Kaspersky products unless otherwise stated. The information was provided by Kaspersky users who consented to sharing statistical data.

Quarterly figures

In Q1 2026:

  • Kaspersky products blocked more than 343 million attacks that originated with various online resources.
  • Web Anti-Virus responded to 50 million unique links.
  • File Anti-Virus blocked nearly 15 million malicious and potentially unwanted objects.
  • 2938 new ransomware variants were detected.
  • More than 77,000 users experienced ransomware attacks.
  • 14% of all ransomware victims whose data was published on threat actors’ data leak sites (DLS) were victims of Clop.
  • More than 260,000 users were targeted by miners.

Ransomware

Quarterly trends and highlights

Law enforcement success

In January 2026, it was reported that the FBI had seized the domains of the RAMP cybercrime forum, a major platform used extensively by ransomware developers to advertise their RaaS programs and to recruit affiliates. There has been no official statement from the FBI, nor is it clear if RAMP servers were seized. In a post on an external website, a RAMP moderator mentioned law enforcement agencies gaining control over the forum. The takedown disrupted a key element of the RaaS ecosystem, creating ripple effects for ransomware operators, affiliates, and initial access brokers.

A man suspected of links to the Phobos group was apprehended in Poland. He was charged with the creation, acquisition, and distribution of software designed for unlawfully obtaining information, including data that facilitates unauthorized access to information stored within a computer system.

In March, a Phobos ransomware administrator pleaded guilty to the creation and distribution of the Trojan, which had been used in international attacks dating back to at least November 2020.

In March, the U.S. Department of Justice charged a man who had acted as a negotiator for ransomware groups. The company he worked for specializes in cyberincident investigations. The prosecution alleges the suspect colluded with the BlackCat threat actor to share privileged insights into the ongoing progress of negotiations. Additionally, the suspect is alleged to have had a prior direct role in BlackCat attacks, serving as an affiliate for the RaaS operation.

In a separate development this March, a U.S. court sentenced an initial access broker associated with the Yanluowang ransomware group to 81 months of imprisonment. According to the U.S. Department of Justice, the convict facilitated dozens of ransomware attacks across the United States, resulting in over $9 million in actual loss and more than $24 million in intended loss.

Vulnerabilities and attacks

The Interlock group has been heavily exploiting the CVE-2026-20131 zero-day vulnerability in Cisco Secure FMC firewall management software since at least January 26, 2026. The vulnerability enabled arbitrary Java code execution with root privileges on the affected device. This campaign demonstrates the ongoing reliance on zero-day vulnerabilities for initial access, a focus on network appliances as high-value entry points, and the rapid weaponization of new vulnerabilities within the ransomware ecosystem.

The most prolific groups

This section highlights the most prolific ransomware gangs by number of victims added to each group’s DLS. This quarter, the Clop ransomware (14.42%) returned to the top of the rankings, displacing Qilin (12.34%), which had held the leading position in the previous reporting period. Following closely is a new threat actor, The Gentlemen (9.25%). Emerging no later than July 2025, the group had already surpassed the activity levels of mainstays such as Akira (7.25%) and INC Ransom (6.13%).

Number of each group’s victims according to its DLS as a percentage of all groups’ victims published on all the DLSs under review during the reporting period (download)

Number of new variants

In Q1 2026, Kaspersky solutions detected six new ransomware families and 2938 new modifications. Volumes have returned to Q3 2025 levels following a surge in Q4 2025.

Number of new ransomware modifications, Q1 2025 — Q1 2026 (download)

Number of users attacked by ransomware Trojans

Throughout Q1, our solutions protected 77,319 unique users from ransomware. Ransomware activity was highest in March, with 35,056 unique users encountering such attacks during the month.

Number of unique users attacked by ransomware Trojans, Q1 2026 (download)

Attack geography

TOP 10 countries and territories attacked by ransomware Trojans

Country/territory* %**
1 Pakistan 0.79
2 South Korea 0.64
3 China 0.52
4 Tajikistan 0.40
5 Libya 0.38
6 Turkmenistan 0.36
7 Iraq 0.35
8 Bangladesh 0.33
9 Rwanda 0.30
10 Cameroon 0.28

* Excluded are countries and territories with relatively few (under 50,000) Kaspersky users.
** Unique users whose computers were attacked by ransomware Trojans as a percentage of all unique users of Kaspersky products in the country/territory.

TOP 10 most common families of ransomware Trojans

Name Verdict %*
1 (generic verdict) Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Gen 33.90
2 (generic verdict) Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Crypren 6.38
3 WannaCry Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Wanna 5.87
4 (generic verdict) Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Encoder 4.68
5 (generic verdict) Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Agent 3.80
6 LockBit Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Lockbit 2.80
7 (generic verdict) Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Phny 1.99
8 (generic verdict) Trojan-Ransom.MSIL.Agent 1.96
9 (generic verdict) Trojan-Ransom.Python.Agent 1.93
10 (generic verdict) Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Crypmod 1.89

* Unique Kaspersky users attacked by the specific ransomware Trojan family as a percentage of all unique users attacked by this type of threat.

Miners

Number of new variants

In Q1 2026, Kaspersky solutions detected 3485 new modifications of miners.

Number of new miner modifications, Q1 2026 (download)

Number of users attacked by miners

In Q1, we detected attacks using miner programs on the computers of 260,588 unique Kaspersky users worldwide.

Number of unique users attacked by miners, Q1 2026 (download)

Attack geography

TOP 10 countries and territories attacked by miners

Country/territory* %**
1 Senegal 3.19
2 Turkmenistan 3.06
3 Mali 2.63
4 Tanzania 1.62
5 Bangladesh 1.06
6 Ethiopia 0.95
7 Panama 0.88
8 Afghanistan 0.79
9 Kazakhstan 0.77
10 Bolivia 0.75

* Excluded are countries and territories with relatively few (under 50,000) Kaspersky users.
** Unique users whose computers were attacked by miners as a percentage of all unique users of Kaspersky products in the country/territory.

Attacks on macOS

In Q1 2026, Google uncovered a new cryptocurrency theft campaign. The scammers directed victims to a fraudulent video call, prompting them to execute malicious scripts under the guise of technical support fixes for connection problems.

In March, researchers with GTIG and iVerify reported the discovery of an in-the-wild exploit chain targeting both iOS and macOS devices. The exploit kit was apparently marketed on the dark web, providing threat actors with a suite of spyware capabilities alongside specialized cryptocurrency exfiltration modules. The exploit was delivered via drive-by downloads when victims visited various compromised websites. Our analysis confirmed that the toolkit included an updated version of a component previously identified in the Operation Triangulation attack chain.

Devices running macOS were similarly impacted by the high-profile supply chain attack targeting the Axios npm package, a widely used HTTP client for JavaScript. The installation of the infected package led to the deployment of a backdoor on macOS devices.

TOP 20 threats to macOS

Unique users* who encountered this malware as a percentage of all attacked users of Kaspersky security solutions for macOS (download)

* Data for the previous quarter may differ slightly from previously published data due to some verdicts being retrospectively revised.

The share of PasivRobber spyware attacks is beginning to decline, giving way to more traditional adware and Monitor-class software capable of tracking user activity. The popular Amos stealer also maintains its presence within the TOP 20.

Geography of threats to macOS

TOP 10 countries and territories by share of attacked users

Country/territory %* Q4 2025 %* Q1 2026
China 1.28 1.97
France 1.18 1.07
Brazil 1.13 0.98
Mexico 0.72 0.52
Germany 0.71 0.45
The Netherlands 0.62 0.75
Hong Kong 0.49 0.53
India 0.42 0.48
Russian Federation 0.34 0.37
Thailand 0.24 0.27

* Unique users who encountered threats to macOS as a percentage of all unique Kaspersky users in the country/territory.

IoT threat statistics

This section presents statistics on attacks targeting Kaspersky IoT honeypots. The geographic data on attack sources is based on the IP addresses of attacking devices.

In Q1 2026, the share of devices attacking Kaspersky honeypots via the SSH protocol saw a significant increase compared to the previous reporting period.

Distribution of attacked services by number of unique IP addresses of attacking devices (download)

The distribution of attacks between Telnet and SSH maintained the ratio observed in Q4 2025.

Distribution of attackers’ sessions in Kaspersky honeypots (download)

TOP 10 threats delivered to IoT devices

Share of each threat delivered to an infected device as a result of a successful attack, out of the total number of threats delivered (download)

The primary shifts in the IoT threat distribution are linked to the activity of various Mirai botnet variants, although members of this family continue to account for the majority of the list. Furthermore, a new variant, Mirai.kl, surfaced in the rankings. We also observed a significant decline in NyaDrop botnet activity during Q1.

Attacks on IoT honeypots

The United States, the Netherlands, and Germany accounted for the highest proportions of SSH-based attacks during this period.

Country/territory Q4 2025 Q1 2026
United States 16.10% 23.74%
The Netherlands 15.78% 17.57%
Germany 12.07% 10.34%
Panama 7.72% 6.34%
India 5.32% 6.05%
Romania 4.05% 5.82%
Australia 1.62% 4.61%
Vietnam 4.21% 3.50%
Russian Federation 3.79% 2.35%
Sweden 2.25% 2.09%

China continues to account for the largest proportion of Telnet attacks, though there was a marked increase in activity originating from Pakistan.

Country/territory Q4 2025 Q1 2026
China 53.64% 39.54%
Pakistan 14.27% 27.31%
Russian Federation 8.20% 8.25%
Indonesia 8.58% 6.71%
India 4.85% 4.66%
Brazil 0.06% 3.30%
Argentina 0.02% 2.51%
Nigeria 1.22% 1.38%
Thailand 0.01% 0.55%
Sweden 0.54% 0.55%

Attacks via web resources

The statistics in this section are based on detection verdicts by Web Anti-Virus, which protects users when suspicious objects are downloaded from malicious or infected web pages. These malicious pages are purposefully created by cybercriminals. Websites that host user-generated content, such as message boards, as well as compromised legitimate sites, can become infected.

TOP 10 countries and territories that served as sources of web-based attacks

The following statistics show the distribution by country/territory of the sources of internet attacks blocked by Kaspersky products on user computers (web pages redirecting to exploits, sites containing exploits and other malicious programs, botnet C&C centers, and so on). One or more web-based attacks could originate from each unique host.

To determine the geographic source of web attacks, we matched the domain name with the real IP address where the domain is hosted, then identified the geographic location of that IP address (GeoIP).

In Q1 2026, Kaspersky solutions blocked 343,823,407 attacks launched from internet resources worldwide. Web Anti-Virus was triggered by 49,983,611 unique URLs.

Web-based attacks by country/territory, Q1 2026 (download)

Countries and territories where users faced the greatest risk of online infection

To assess the risk of malware infection via the internet for users’ computers in different countries and territories, we calculated the share of Kaspersky users in each location on whose computers Web Anti-Virus was triggered during the reporting period. The resulting data provides an indication of the aggressiveness of the environment in which computers operate in different countries and territories.

This ranked list includes only attacks by malicious objects classified as Malware. Our calculations leave out Web Anti-Virus detections of potentially dangerous or unwanted programs, such as RiskTool or adware.

Country/territory* %**
1 Venezuela 9.33
2 Hungary 8.16
3 Italy 7.58
4 Tajikistan 7.48
5 India 7.21
6 Greece 7.13
7 Portugal 7.10
8 France 7.05
9 Belgium 6.83
10 Slovakia 6.80
11 Vietnam 6.62
12 Bosnia and Herzegovina 6.57
13 Canada 6.56
14 Serbia 6.50
15 Tunisia 6.36
16 Qatar 6.01
17 Spain 5.95
18 Germany 5.95
19 Sri Lanka 5.89
20 Brazil 5.88

* Excluded are countries and territories with relatively few (under 10,000) Kaspersky users.
** Unique users targeted by web-based Malware attacks as a percentage of all unique users of Kaspersky products in the country/territory.

On average during the quarter, 4.73% of users’ computers worldwide were subjected to at least one Malware web attack.

Local threats

Statistics on local infections of user computers are an important indicator. They include objects that penetrated the target computer by infecting files or removable media, or initially made their way onto the computer in non-open form. Examples of the latter are programs in complex installers and encrypted files.

Data in this section is based on analyzing statistics produced by anti-virus scans of files on the hard drive at the moment they were created or accessed, and the results of scanning removable storage media. The statistics are based on detection verdicts from the On-Access Scan (OAS) and On-Demand Scan (ODS) modules of File Anti-Virus and include detections of malicious programs located on user computers or removable media connected to the computers, such as flash drives, camera memory cards, phones, or external hard drives.

In Q1 2026, our File Anti-Virus detected 15,831,319 malicious and potentially unwanted objects.

Countries and territories where users faced the highest risk of local infection

For each country and territory, we calculated the percentage of Kaspersky users whose computers had the File Anti-Virus triggered at least once during the reporting period. This statistic reflects the level of personal computer infection in different countries and territories around the world.

Note that this ranked list includes only attacks by malicious objects classified as Malware. Our calculations leave out File Anti-Virus detections of potentially dangerous or unwanted programs, such as RiskTool or adware.

Country/territory* %**
1 Turkmenistan 47.96
2 Tajikistan 31.48
3 Cuba 31.03
4 Yemen 29.59
5 Afghanistan 28.47
6 Burundi 26.93
7 Uzbekistan 24.81
8 Syria 23.08
9 Nicaragua 21.97
10 Cameroon 21.60
11 China 21.09
12 Mozambique 21.02
13 Algeria 20.64
14 Democratic Republic of the Congo 20.63
15 Bangladesh 20.44
16 Mali 20.35
17 Republic of the Congo 20.23
18 Madagascar 20.00
19 Belarus 19.78
20 Tanzania 19.52

* Excluded are countries and territories with relatively few (under 10,000) Kaspersky users.
** Unique users on whose computers local Malware threats were blocked, as a percentage of all unique users of Kaspersky products in the country/territory.

On average worldwide, Malware local threats were detected at least once on 11.55% of users’ computers during Q1.

Russia scored 11.92% in these rankings.

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IT threat evolution in Q1 2026. Mobile statistics

IT threat evolution in Q1 2026. Mobile statistics
IT threat evolution in Q1 2026. Non-mobile statistics

In the third quarter of 2025, we updated the methodology for calculating statistical indicators based on the Kaspersky Security Network. These changes affected all sections of the report except for the statistics on installation packages, which remained unchanged.

To illustrate the differences between the reporting periods, we have also recalculated data for the previous quarters. Consequently, these figures may significantly differ from the previously published ones. However, subsequent reports will employ this new methodology, enabling precise comparisons with the data presented in this post.

The Kaspersky Security Network (KSN) is a global network for analyzing anonymized threat information, voluntarily shared by users of Kaspersky solutions. The statistics in this report are based on KSN data unless explicitly stated otherwise.

The quarter in numbers

According to Kaspersky Security Network, in Q1 2026:

  • More than 2.67 million attacks utilizing malware, adware, or unwanted mobile software were prevented.
  • The Trojan-Banker category was the prevalent mobile malware threat with a 52.96% share of total detected applications.
  • More than 306,000 malicious installation packages were discovered, including:
    • 162,275 packages related to mobile banking Trojans;
    • 439 packages related to mobile ransomware Trojans.

Quarterly highlights

The number of malware, adware, or unwanted software attacks on mobile devices decreased to 2,676,328 in Q1, down from 3,239,244 in the previous quarter.

Attacks on users of Kaspersky mobile solutions, Q3 2024 — Q1 2026 (download)

The overall drop in attack volume stems primarily from a reduction in adware and RiskTool detections. Nonetheless, this trend does not equate to a lower risk for mobile users. As shown later in this report, the number of unique users targeted by these threats remained relatively stable.

In Q1, Synthient researchers identified a link between the notorious Kimwolf botnet and the IPIDEA proxy network. This network was later taken down in cooperation with GTIG.

In early 2026, we discovered several apps on Google Play and the App Store that contained a new version of the SparkCat crypto stealer.

The Trojan code, meticulously concealed, was embedded into the infected Android apps. The obfuscated malicious Rust library was decrypted using a Dalvik-like virtual machine custom-built by the attackers. The iOS version of the malware also underwent several changes; specifically, the attackers began leveraging Apple’s proprietary Vision framework for optical character recognition (OCR).

Mobile threat statistics

The number of Android malware samples saw a slight increase compared to Q4 2025, reaching a total of 306,070.

Detected malicious and potentially unwanted installation packages, Q1 2025 — Q1 2026 (download)

The detected installation packages were distributed by type as follows:

Detected mobile apps by type, Q4 2025* — Q1 2026 (download)

* Data for the previous quarter may differ slightly from previously published figures due to certain verdicts being retrospectively revised.

Threat actors once again ramped up the production of new banking Trojans; as a result, this category overtook all others in volume, accounting for more than half of all installation packages.

Share* of users attacked by the given type of malicious or potentially unwanted app out of all targeted users of Kaspersky mobile products, Q4 2025 — Q1 2026 (download)

* The total percentage may exceed 100% if the same users encountered multiple attack types.

Following the surge in banking Trojan installation packages, the number of associated attacks also rose, causing Trojan-Banker apps to climb one spot in terms of their share of targeted users. Mamont variants emerged as the most prevalent banking Trojans, accounting for 73.5% of detections, with the rest of the users encountering Faketoken, Rewardsteal, Creduz, and other families.

Yet banking Trojans were still outpaced by adware and RiskTool-type unwanted apps when measured by the total number of affected users. Despite a decrease in their share of installation packages, these two app types retained their positions as the top two threats by attack volume. The most common adware detections involved HiddenAd (44.9%) and MobiDash (38.1%), while most frequently seen RiskTool apps were Revpn (67%) and SpyLoan (20.5%).

TOP 20 most frequently detected types of mobile malware

Note that the malware rankings below exclude riskware or potentially unwanted software, such as RiskTool or adware.

Verdict %* Q4 2025 %* Q1 2026 Difference in p.p. Change in ranking
Backdoor.AndroidOS.Triada.ag 2.62 7.09 +4.48 +10
DangerousObject.Multi.Generic. 6.75 5.84 -0.92 -1
DangerousObject.AndroidOS.GenericML. 3.52 5.51 +1.99 +6
Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Mamont.jo 0.00 5.28 +5.28
Trojan.AndroidOS.Fakemoney.v 5.40 3.44 -1.96 -1
Trojan-Downloader.AndroidOS.Keenadu.l 0.00 3.35 +3.35
Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Mamont.jx 0.00 3.09 +3.09
Backdoor.AndroidOS.Triada.z 4.87 3.08 -1.79 -2
Trojan.AndroidOS.Triada.fe 5.01 2.98 -2.02 -4
Backdoor.AndroidOS.Keenadu.a 2.07 2.73 +0.66 +6
Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Mamont.jg 0.34 2.37 +2.03
Trojan.AndroidOS.Triada.hf 2.15 2.23 +0.07 +3
Trojan.AndroidOS.Boogr.gsh 2.35 2.15 -0.20 0
Trojan.AndroidOS.Triada.ii 5.68 2.07 -3.60 -11
Backdoor.AndroidOS.Triada.ae 1.91 1.76 -0.16 +3
Backdoor.AndroidOS.Triada.ab 1.79 1.72 -0.08 +3
Trojan.AndroidOS.Triada.gn 2.38 1.58 -0.80 -5
Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Mamont.gg 1.56 1.50 -0.06 +2
Trojan.AndroidOS.Triada.ga 1.48 1.50 +0.01 +4
Backdoor.AndroidOS.Triada.ad 0.53 1.40 +0.87 +44

* Unique users who encountered this malware as a percentage of all attacked users of Kaspersky mobile solutions.

The pre-installed Triada.ag backdoor rose to the top spot; it is similar to the older Triada.z version we documented previously. Because the same variant was pre-installed across a wide range of devices, the total number of affected users is aggregated. Consequently, Triada outpaced even Mamont, as users encountered a variety of Mamont variants, causing the share of that banking Trojan to spread across multiple rows. Other pre-installed Triada variants (Triada.z, Triada.ae, Triada.ab, and Triada.ad) also made the rankings. Furthermore, we observed increasing activity from the Keenadu.a backdoor, while diverse variants of the embedded Triada Trojan remained in the rankings.

Mobile banking Trojans

Q1 2026 saw a characteristic rise in mobile banking Trojan activity, with the number of packages totaling 162,275, a 50% increase compared to the prior quarter.

Number of installation packages for mobile banking Trojans detected by Kaspersky, Q1 2025 — Q1 2026 (download)

We saw a similar growth in the previous quarter, with banking Trojan volumes rising by 50% during that period as well. Various Mamont variants accounted for the absolute majority of packages and represented nearly every entry in the rankings of most frequent banking Trojans by affected user count.

TOP 10 mobile bankers

Verdict %* Q4 2025 %* Q1 2026 Difference in p.p. Change in ranking
Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Mamont.jo 0.00 15.75 +15.75
Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Mamont.jx 0.00 9.22 +9.22
Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Mamont.jg 1.47 7.08 +5.61 +24
Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Mamont.gg 6.79 4.48 -2.32 -3
Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Mamont.ks 0.00 3.98 +3.98
Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Agent.ws 6.03 3.78 -2.25 -2
Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Mamont.hl 4.30 3.27 -1.03 +1
Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Mamont.iv 6.00 3.08 -2.92 -3
Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Mamont.jb 3.93 3.07 -0.86 +1
Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Mamont.jv 0.00 2.79 +2.79

* Unique users who encountered this malware as a percentage of all users of Kaspersky mobile security solutions who encountered banking threats.

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IT threat evolution in Q1 2026. Non-mobile statistics

IT threat evolution in Q1 2026. Non-mobile statistics
IT threat evolution in Q1 2026. Mobile statistics

The statistics in this report are based on detection verdicts returned by Kaspersky products unless otherwise stated. The information was provided by Kaspersky users who consented to sharing statistical data.

Quarterly figures

In Q1 2026:

  • Kaspersky products blocked more than 343 million attacks that originated with various online resources.
  • Web Anti-Virus responded to 50 million unique links.
  • File Anti-Virus blocked nearly 15 million malicious and potentially unwanted objects.
  • 2938 new ransomware variants were detected.
  • More than 77,000 users experienced ransomware attacks.
  • 14% of all ransomware victims whose data was published on threat actors’ data leak sites (DLS) were victims of Clop.
  • More than 260,000 users were targeted by miners.

Ransomware

Quarterly trends and highlights

Law enforcement success

In January 2026, it was reported that the FBI had seized the domains of the RAMP cybercrime forum, a major platform used extensively by ransomware developers to advertise their RaaS programs and to recruit affiliates. There has been no official statement from the FBI, nor is it clear if RAMP servers were seized. In a post on an external website, a RAMP moderator mentioned law enforcement agencies gaining control over the forum. The takedown disrupted a key element of the RaaS ecosystem, creating ripple effects for ransomware operators, affiliates, and initial access brokers.

A man suspected of links to the Phobos group was apprehended in Poland. He was charged with the creation, acquisition, and distribution of software designed for unlawfully obtaining information, including data that facilitates unauthorized access to information stored within a computer system.

In March, a Phobos ransomware administrator pleaded guilty to the creation and distribution of the Trojan, which had been used in international attacks dating back to at least November 2020.

In March, the U.S. Department of Justice charged a man who had acted as a negotiator for ransomware groups. The company he worked for specializes in cyberincident investigations. The prosecution alleges the suspect colluded with the BlackCat threat actor to share privileged insights into the ongoing progress of negotiations. Additionally, the suspect is alleged to have had a prior direct role in BlackCat attacks, serving as an affiliate for the RaaS operation.

In a separate development this March, a U.S. court sentenced an initial access broker associated with the Yanluowang ransomware group to 81 months of imprisonment. According to the U.S. Department of Justice, the convict facilitated dozens of ransomware attacks across the United States, resulting in over $9 million in actual loss and more than $24 million in intended loss.

Vulnerabilities and attacks

The Interlock group has been heavily exploiting the CVE-2026-20131 zero-day vulnerability in Cisco Secure FMC firewall management software since at least January 26, 2026. The vulnerability enabled arbitrary Java code execution with root privileges on the affected device. This campaign demonstrates the ongoing reliance on zero-day vulnerabilities for initial access, a focus on network appliances as high-value entry points, and the rapid weaponization of new vulnerabilities within the ransomware ecosystem.

The most prolific groups

This section highlights the most prolific ransomware gangs by number of victims added to each group’s DLS. This quarter, the Clop ransomware (14.42%) returned to the top of the rankings, displacing Qilin (12.34%), which had held the leading position in the previous reporting period. Following closely is a new threat actor, The Gentlemen (9.25%). Emerging no later than July 2025, the group had already surpassed the activity levels of mainstays such as Akira (7.25%) and INC Ransom (6.13%).

Number of each group’s victims according to its DLS as a percentage of all groups’ victims published on all the DLSs under review during the reporting period (download)

Number of new variants

In Q1 2026, Kaspersky solutions detected six new ransomware families and 2938 new modifications. Volumes have returned to Q3 2025 levels following a surge in Q4 2025.

Number of new ransomware modifications, Q1 2025 — Q1 2026 (download)

Number of users attacked by ransomware Trojans

Throughout Q1, our solutions protected 77,319 unique users from ransomware. Ransomware activity was highest in March, with 35,056 unique users encountering such attacks during the month.

Number of unique users attacked by ransomware Trojans, Q1 2026 (download)

Attack geography

TOP 10 countries and territories attacked by ransomware Trojans

Country/territory* %**
1 Pakistan 0.79
2 South Korea 0.64
3 China 0.52
4 Tajikistan 0.40
5 Libya 0.38
6 Turkmenistan 0.36
7 Iraq 0.35
8 Bangladesh 0.33
9 Rwanda 0.30
10 Cameroon 0.28

* Excluded are countries and territories with relatively few (under 50,000) Kaspersky users.
** Unique users whose computers were attacked by ransomware Trojans as a percentage of all unique users of Kaspersky products in the country/territory.

TOP 10 most common families of ransomware Trojans

Name Verdict %*
1 (generic verdict) Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Gen 33.90
2 (generic verdict) Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Crypren 6.38
3 WannaCry Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Wanna 5.87
4 (generic verdict) Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Encoder 4.68
5 (generic verdict) Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Agent 3.80
6 LockBit Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Lockbit 2.80
7 (generic verdict) Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Phny 1.99
8 (generic verdict) Trojan-Ransom.MSIL.Agent 1.96
9 (generic verdict) Trojan-Ransom.Python.Agent 1.93
10 (generic verdict) Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Crypmod 1.89

* Unique Kaspersky users attacked by the specific ransomware Trojan family as a percentage of all unique users attacked by this type of threat.

Miners

Number of new variants

In Q1 2026, Kaspersky solutions detected 3485 new modifications of miners.

Number of new miner modifications, Q1 2026 (download)

Number of users attacked by miners

In Q1, we detected attacks using miner programs on the computers of 260,588 unique Kaspersky users worldwide.

Number of unique users attacked by miners, Q1 2026 (download)

Attack geography

TOP 10 countries and territories attacked by miners

Country/territory* %**
1 Senegal 3.19
2 Turkmenistan 3.06
3 Mali 2.63
4 Tanzania 1.62
5 Bangladesh 1.06
6 Ethiopia 0.95
7 Panama 0.88
8 Afghanistan 0.79
9 Kazakhstan 0.77
10 Bolivia 0.75

* Excluded are countries and territories with relatively few (under 50,000) Kaspersky users.
** Unique users whose computers were attacked by miners as a percentage of all unique users of Kaspersky products in the country/territory.

Attacks on macOS

In Q1 2026, Google uncovered a new cryptocurrency theft campaign. The scammers directed victims to a fraudulent video call, prompting them to execute malicious scripts under the guise of technical support fixes for connection problems.

In March, researchers with GTIG and iVerify reported the discovery of an in-the-wild exploit chain targeting both iOS and macOS devices. The exploit kit was apparently marketed on the dark web, providing threat actors with a suite of spyware capabilities alongside specialized cryptocurrency exfiltration modules. The exploit was delivered via drive-by downloads when victims visited various compromised websites. Our analysis confirmed that the toolkit included an updated version of a component previously identified in the Operation Triangulation attack chain.

Devices running macOS were similarly impacted by the high-profile supply chain attack targeting the Axios npm package, a widely used HTTP client for JavaScript. The installation of the infected package led to the deployment of a backdoor on macOS devices.

TOP 20 threats to macOS

Unique users* who encountered this malware as a percentage of all attacked users of Kaspersky security solutions for macOS (download)

* Data for the previous quarter may differ slightly from previously published data due to some verdicts being retrospectively revised.

The share of PasivRobber spyware attacks is beginning to decline, giving way to more traditional adware and Monitor-class software capable of tracking user activity. The popular Amos stealer also maintains its presence within the TOP 20.

Geography of threats to macOS

TOP 10 countries and territories by share of attacked users

Country/territory %* Q4 2025 %* Q1 2026
China 1.28 1.97
France 1.18 1.07
Brazil 1.13 0.98
Mexico 0.72 0.52
Germany 0.71 0.45
The Netherlands 0.62 0.75
Hong Kong 0.49 0.53
India 0.42 0.48
Russian Federation 0.34 0.37
Thailand 0.24 0.27

* Unique users who encountered threats to macOS as a percentage of all unique Kaspersky users in the country/territory.

IoT threat statistics

This section presents statistics on attacks targeting Kaspersky IoT honeypots. The geographic data on attack sources is based on the IP addresses of attacking devices.

In Q1 2026, the share of devices attacking Kaspersky honeypots via the SSH protocol saw a significant increase compared to the previous reporting period.

Distribution of attacked services by number of unique IP addresses of attacking devices (download)

The distribution of attacks between Telnet and SSH maintained the ratio observed in Q4 2025.

Distribution of attackers’ sessions in Kaspersky honeypots (download)

TOP 10 threats delivered to IoT devices

Share of each threat delivered to an infected device as a result of a successful attack, out of the total number of threats delivered (download)

The primary shifts in the IoT threat distribution are linked to the activity of various Mirai botnet variants, although members of this family continue to account for the majority of the list. Furthermore, a new variant, Mirai.kl, surfaced in the rankings. We also observed a significant decline in NyaDrop botnet activity during Q1.

Attacks on IoT honeypots

The United States, the Netherlands, and Germany accounted for the highest proportions of SSH-based attacks during this period.

Country/territory Q4 2025 Q1 2026
United States 16.10% 23.74%
The Netherlands 15.78% 17.57%
Germany 12.07% 10.34%
Panama 7.72% 6.34%
India 5.32% 6.05%
Romania 4.05% 5.82%
Australia 1.62% 4.61%
Vietnam 4.21% 3.50%
Russian Federation 3.79% 2.35%
Sweden 2.25% 2.09%

China continues to account for the largest proportion of Telnet attacks, though there was a marked increase in activity originating from Pakistan.

Country/territory Q4 2025 Q1 2026
China 53.64% 39.54%
Pakistan 14.27% 27.31%
Russian Federation 8.20% 8.25%
Indonesia 8.58% 6.71%
India 4.85% 4.66%
Brazil 0.06% 3.30%
Argentina 0.02% 2.51%
Nigeria 1.22% 1.38%
Thailand 0.01% 0.55%
Sweden 0.54% 0.55%

Attacks via web resources

The statistics in this section are based on detection verdicts by Web Anti-Virus, which protects users when suspicious objects are downloaded from malicious or infected web pages. These malicious pages are purposefully created by cybercriminals. Websites that host user-generated content, such as message boards, as well as compromised legitimate sites, can become infected.

TOP 10 countries and territories that served as sources of web-based attacks

The following statistics show the distribution by country/territory of the sources of internet attacks blocked by Kaspersky products on user computers (web pages redirecting to exploits, sites containing exploits and other malicious programs, botnet C&C centers, and so on). One or more web-based attacks could originate from each unique host.

To determine the geographic source of web attacks, we matched the domain name with the real IP address where the domain is hosted, then identified the geographic location of that IP address (GeoIP).

In Q1 2026, Kaspersky solutions blocked 343,823,407 attacks launched from internet resources worldwide. Web Anti-Virus was triggered by 49,983,611 unique URLs.

Web-based attacks by country/territory, Q1 2026 (download)

Countries and territories where users faced the greatest risk of online infection

To assess the risk of malware infection via the internet for users’ computers in different countries and territories, we calculated the share of Kaspersky users in each location on whose computers Web Anti-Virus was triggered during the reporting period. The resulting data provides an indication of the aggressiveness of the environment in which computers operate in different countries and territories.

This ranked list includes only attacks by malicious objects classified as Malware. Our calculations leave out Web Anti-Virus detections of potentially dangerous or unwanted programs, such as RiskTool or adware.

Country/territory* %**
1 Venezuela 9.33
2 Hungary 8.16
3 Italy 7.58
4 Tajikistan 7.48
5 India 7.21
6 Greece 7.13
7 Portugal 7.10
8 France 7.05
9 Belgium 6.83
10 Slovakia 6.80
11 Vietnam 6.62
12 Bosnia and Herzegovina 6.57
13 Canada 6.56
14 Serbia 6.50
15 Tunisia 6.36
16 Qatar 6.01
17 Spain 5.95
18 Germany 5.95
19 Sri Lanka 5.89
20 Brazil 5.88

* Excluded are countries and territories with relatively few (under 10,000) Kaspersky users.
** Unique users targeted by web-based Malware attacks as a percentage of all unique users of Kaspersky products in the country/territory.

On average during the quarter, 4.73% of users’ computers worldwide were subjected to at least one Malware web attack.

Local threats

Statistics on local infections of user computers are an important indicator. They include objects that penetrated the target computer by infecting files or removable media, or initially made their way onto the computer in non-open form. Examples of the latter are programs in complex installers and encrypted files.

Data in this section is based on analyzing statistics produced by anti-virus scans of files on the hard drive at the moment they were created or accessed, and the results of scanning removable storage media. The statistics are based on detection verdicts from the On-Access Scan (OAS) and On-Demand Scan (ODS) modules of File Anti-Virus and include detections of malicious programs located on user computers or removable media connected to the computers, such as flash drives, camera memory cards, phones, or external hard drives.

In Q1 2026, our File Anti-Virus detected 15,831,319 malicious and potentially unwanted objects.

Countries and territories where users faced the highest risk of local infection

For each country and territory, we calculated the percentage of Kaspersky users whose computers had the File Anti-Virus triggered at least once during the reporting period. This statistic reflects the level of personal computer infection in different countries and territories around the world.

Note that this ranked list includes only attacks by malicious objects classified as Malware. Our calculations leave out File Anti-Virus detections of potentially dangerous or unwanted programs, such as RiskTool or adware.

Country/territory* %**
1 Turkmenistan 47.96
2 Tajikistan 31.48
3 Cuba 31.03
4 Yemen 29.59
5 Afghanistan 28.47
6 Burundi 26.93
7 Uzbekistan 24.81
8 Syria 23.08
9 Nicaragua 21.97
10 Cameroon 21.60
11 China 21.09
12 Mozambique 21.02
13 Algeria 20.64
14 Democratic Republic of the Congo 20.63
15 Bangladesh 20.44
16 Mali 20.35
17 Republic of the Congo 20.23
18 Madagascar 20.00
19 Belarus 19.78
20 Tanzania 19.52

* Excluded are countries and territories with relatively few (under 10,000) Kaspersky users.
** Unique users on whose computers local Malware threats were blocked, as a percentage of all unique users of Kaspersky products in the country/territory.

On average worldwide, Malware local threats were detected at least once on 11.55% of users’ computers during Q1.

Russia scored 11.92% in these rankings.

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Exploits and vulnerabilities in Q1 2026

During Q1 2026, the exploit kits leveraged by threat actors to target user systems expanded once again, incorporating new exploits for the Microsoft Office platform, as well as Windows and Linux operating systems.

In this report, we dive into the statistics on published vulnerabilities and exploits, as well as the known vulnerabilities leveraged by popular C2 frameworks throughout Q1 2026.

Statistics on registered vulnerabilities

This section provides statistical data on registered vulnerabilities. The data is sourced from cve.org.

We examine the number of registered CVEs for each month starting from January 2022. The total volume of vulnerabilities continues rising and, according to current reports, the use of AI agents for discovering security issues is expected to further reinforce this upward trend.

Total published vulnerabilities per month from 2022 through 2026 (download)

Next, we analyze the number of new critical vulnerabilities (CVSS > 8.9) over the same period.

Total critical vulnerabilities published per month from 2022 through 2026 (download)

The graph indicates that while the volume of critical vulnerabilities slightly decreased compared to previous years, an upward trend remained clearly visible. At present, we attribute this to the fact that the end of last year was marked by the disclosure of several severe vulnerabilities in web frameworks. The current growth is driven by high-profile issues like React2Shell, the release of exploit frameworks for mobile platforms, and the uncovering of secondary vulnerabilities during the remediation of previously discovered ones. We will be able to test this hypothesis in the next quarter; if correct, the second quarter will show a significant decline, similar to the pattern observed in the previous year.

Exploitation statistics

This section presents statistics on vulnerability exploitation for Q1 2026. The data draws on open sources and our telemetry.

Windows and Linux vulnerability exploitation

In Q1 2026, threat actor toolsets were updated with exploits for new, recently registered vulnerabilities. However, we first examine the list of veteran vulnerabilities that consistently account for the largest share of detections:

  • CVE-2018-0802: a remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability in the Equation Editor component
  • CVE-2017-11882: another RCE vulnerability also affecting Equation Editor
  • CVE-2017-0199: a vulnerability in Microsoft Office and WordPad that allows an attacker to gain control over the system
  • CVE-2023-38831: a vulnerability resulting from the improper handling of objects contained within an archive
  • CVE-2025-6218: a vulnerability allowing the specification of relative paths to extract files into arbitrary directories, potentially leading to malicious command execution
  • CVE-2025-8088: a directory traversal bypass vulnerability during file extraction utilizing NTFS Streams

Among the newcomers, we have observed exploits targeting the Microsoft Office platform and Windows OS components. Notably, these new vulnerabilities exploit logic flaws arising from the interaction between multiple systems, making them technically difficult to isolate within a specific file or library. A list of these vulnerabilities is provided below:

  • CVE-2026-21509 and CVE-2026-21514: security feature bypass vulnerabilities: despite Protected View being enabled, a specially crafted file can still execute malicious code without the user’s knowledge. Malicious commands are executed on the victim’s system with the privileges of the user who opened the file.
  • CVE-2026-21513: a vulnerability in the Internet Explorer MSHTML engine, which is used to open websites and render HTML markup. The vulnerability involves bypassing rules that restrict the execution of files from untrusted network sources. Interestingly, the data provider for this vulnerability was an LNK file.

These three vulnerabilities were utilized together in a single chain during attacks on Windows-based user systems. While this combination is noteworthy, we believe the widespread use of the entire chain as a unified exploit will likely decline due to its instability. We anticipate that these vulnerabilities will eventually be applied individually as initial entry vectors in phishing campaigns.

Below is the trend of exploit detections on user Windows systems starting from Q1 2025.

Dynamics of the number of Windows users encountering exploits, Q1 2025 – Q1 2026. The number of users who encountered exploits in Q1 2025 is taken as 100% (download)

The vulnerabilities listed here can be leveraged to gain initial access to a vulnerable system and for privilege escalation. This underscores the critical importance of timely software updates.

On Linux devices, exploits for the following vulnerabilities were detected most frequently:

  • CVE-2022-0847: a vulnerability known as Dirty Pipe, which enables privilege escalation and the hijacking of running applications
  • CVE-2019-13272: a vulnerability caused by improper handling of privilege inheritance, which can be exploited to achieve privilege escalation
  • CVE-2021-22555: a heap out-of-bounds write vulnerability in the Netfilter kernel subsystem
  • CVE-2023-32233: a vulnerability in the Netfilter subsystem that allows for Use-After-Free conditions and privilege escalation through the improper processing of network requests

Dynamics of the number of Linux users encountering exploits, Q1 2025 – Q1 2026. The number of users who encountered exploits in Q1 2025 is taken as 100% (download)

In the first quarter of 2026, we observed a decrease in the number of detected exploits; however, the detection rates are on the rise relative to the same period last year. For the Linux operating system, the installation of security patches remains critical.

Most common published exploits

The distribution of published exploits by software type in Q1 2026 features an updated set of categories; once again, we see exploits targeting operating systems and Microsoft Office suites.

Distribution of published exploits by platform, Q1 2026 (download)

Vulnerability exploitation in APT attacks

We analyzed which vulnerabilities were utilized in APT attacks during Q1 2026. The ranking provided below includes data based on our telemetry, research, and open sources.

TOP 10 vulnerabilities exploited in APT attacks, Q1 2026 (download)

In Q1 2026, threat actors continued to utilize high-profile vulnerabilities registered in the previous year for APT attacks. The hypothesis we previously proposed has been confirmed: security flaws affecting web applications remain heavily exploited in real-world attacks. However, we are also observing a partial refresh of attacker toolsets. Specifically, during the first quarter of the year, APT campaigns leveraged recently discovered vulnerabilities in Microsoft Office products, edge networking device software, and remote access management systems. Although the most recent vulnerabilities are being exploited most heavily, their general characteristics continue to reinforce established trends regarding the categories of vulnerable software. Consequently, we strongly recommend applying the security patches provided by vendors.

C2 frameworks

In this section, we examine the most popular C2 frameworks used by threat actors and analyze the vulnerabilities targeted by the exploits that interacted with C2 agents in APT attacks.

The chart below shows the frequency of known C2 framework usage in attacks against users during Q1 2026, according to open sources.

TOP 10 C2 frameworks used by APTs to compromise user systems, Q1 2026 (download)

Metasploit has returned to the top of the list of the most common C2 frameworks, displacing Sliver, which now shares the second position with Havoc. These are followed by Covenant and Mythic, the latter of which previously saw greater popularity. After studying open sources and analyzing samples of malicious C2 agents that contained exploits, we determined that the following vulnerabilities were utilized in APT attacks involving the C2 frameworks mentioned above:

  • CVE-2023-46604: an insecure deserialization vulnerability allowing for arbitrary code execution within the server process context if the Apache ActiveMQ service is running
  • CVE-2024-12356 and CVE-2026-1731: command injection vulnerabilities in BeyondTrust software that allow an attacker to send malicious commands even without system authentication
  • CVE-2023-36884: a vulnerability in the Windows Search component that enables command execution on the system, bypassing security mechanisms built into Microsoft Office applications
  • CVE-2025-53770: an insecure deserialization vulnerability in Microsoft SharePoint that allows for unauthenticated command execution on the server
  • CVE-2025-8088 and CVE-2025-6218: similar directory traversal vulnerabilities that allow files to be extracted from an archive to a predefined path, potentially without the archiving utility displaying any alerts to the user

The nature of the described vulnerabilities indicates that they were exploited to gain initial access to the system. Notably, the majority of these security issues are targeted to bypass authentication mechanisms. This is likely due to the fact that C2 agents are being detected effectively, prompting threat actors to reduce the probability of discovery by utilizing bypass exploits.

Notable vulnerabilities

This section highlights the most significant vulnerabilities published in Q1 2026 that have publicly available descriptions.

CVE-2026-21519: Desktop Window Manager vulnerability

At the core of this vulnerability is a Type Confusion flaw. By attempting to access a resource within the Desktop Window Manager subsystem, an attacker can achieve privilege escalation. A necessary condition for exploiting this issue is existing authorization on the system.

It is worth noting that the DWM subsystem has been under close scrutiny by threat actors for quite some time. Historically, the primary attack vector involves interacting with the NtDComposition* function set.

RegPwn (CVE-2026-21533): a system settings access control vulnerability

CVE-2026-21533 is essentially a logic vulnerability that enables privilege escalation. It stems from the improper handling of privileges within Remote Desktop Services (RDS) components. By modifying service parameters in the registry and replacing the configuration with a custom key, an attacker can elevate privileges to the SYSTEM level. This vulnerability is likely to remain a fixture in threat actor toolsets as a method for establishing persistence and gaining high-level privileges.

CVE-2026-21514: a Microsoft Office vulnerability

This vulnerability was discovered in the wild during attacks on user systems. Notably, an LNK file is used to initiate the exploitation process. CVE-2026-21514 is also a logic issue that allows for bypassing OLE technology restrictions on malicious code execution and the transmission of NetNTLM authentication requests when processing untrusted input.

Clawdbot (CVE-2026-25253): an OpenClaw vulnerability

This vulnerability in the AI agent leaks credentials (authentication tokens) when queried via the WebSocket protocol. It can lead to the compromise of the infrastructure where the agent is installed: researchers have confirmed the ability to access local system data and execute commands with elevated privileges. The danger of CVE-2026-25253 is further compounded by the fact that its exploitation has generated numerous attack scenarios, including the use of prompt injections and ClickFix techniques to install stealers on vulnerable systems.

CVE-2026-34070: LangChain framework vulnerability

LangChain is an open-source framework designed for building applications powered by large language models (LLMs). A directory traversal vulnerability allowed attackers to access arbitrary files within the infrastructure where the framework was deployed. The core of CVE-2026-34070 lies in the fact that certain functions within langchain_core/prompts/loading.py handled configuration files insecurely. This could potentially lead to the processing of files containing malicious data, which could be leveraged to execute commands and expose critical system information or other sensitive files.

CVE-2026-22812: an OpenCode vulnerability

CVE-2026-22812 is another vulnerability identified in AI-assisted coding software. By default, the OpenCode agent provided local access for launching authorized applications via an HTTP server that did not require authentication. Consequently, attackers could execute malicious commands on a vulnerable device with the privileges of the current user.

Conclusion and advice

We observe that the registration of vulnerabilities is steadily gaining momentum in Q1 2026, a trend driven by the widespread development of AI tools designed to identify security flaws across various software types. This trajectory is likely to result not only in a higher volume of registered vulnerabilities but also in an increase in exploit-driven attacks, further reinforcing the critical necessity of timely security patch deployment. Additionally, organizations must prioritize vulnerability management and implement effective defensive technologies to mitigate the risks associated with potential exploitation.

To ensure the rapid detection of threats involving exploit utilization and to prevent their escalation, it is essential to deploy a reliable security solution. Key features of such a tool include continuous infrastructure monitoring, proactive protection, and vulnerability prioritization based on real-world relevance. These mechanisms are integrated into Kaspersky Next, which also provides endpoint security and protection against cyberattacks of any complexity.

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Exploits and vulnerabilities in Q1 2026

During Q1 2026, the exploit kits leveraged by threat actors to target user systems expanded once again, incorporating new exploits for the Microsoft Office platform, as well as Windows and Linux operating systems.

In this report, we dive into the statistics on published vulnerabilities and exploits, as well as the known vulnerabilities leveraged by popular C2 frameworks throughout Q1 2026.

Statistics on registered vulnerabilities

This section provides statistical data on registered vulnerabilities. The data is sourced from cve.org.

We examine the number of registered CVEs for each month starting from January 2022. The total volume of vulnerabilities continues rising and, according to current reports, the use of AI agents for discovering security issues is expected to further reinforce this upward trend.

Total published vulnerabilities per month from 2022 through 2026 (download)

Next, we analyze the number of new critical vulnerabilities (CVSS > 8.9) over the same period.

Total critical vulnerabilities published per month from 2022 through 2026 (download)

The graph indicates that while the volume of critical vulnerabilities slightly decreased compared to previous years, an upward trend remained clearly visible. At present, we attribute this to the fact that the end of last year was marked by the disclosure of several severe vulnerabilities in web frameworks. The current growth is driven by high-profile issues like React2Shell, the release of exploit frameworks for mobile platforms, and the uncovering of secondary vulnerabilities during the remediation of previously discovered ones. We will be able to test this hypothesis in the next quarter; if correct, the second quarter will show a significant decline, similar to the pattern observed in the previous year.

Exploitation statistics

This section presents statistics on vulnerability exploitation for Q1 2026. The data draws on open sources and our telemetry.

Windows and Linux vulnerability exploitation

In Q1 2026, threat actor toolsets were updated with exploits for new, recently registered vulnerabilities. However, we first examine the list of veteran vulnerabilities that consistently account for the largest share of detections:

  • CVE-2018-0802: a remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability in the Equation Editor component
  • CVE-2017-11882: another RCE vulnerability also affecting Equation Editor
  • CVE-2017-0199: a vulnerability in Microsoft Office and WordPad that allows an attacker to gain control over the system
  • CVE-2023-38831: a vulnerability resulting from the improper handling of objects contained within an archive
  • CVE-2025-6218: a vulnerability allowing the specification of relative paths to extract files into arbitrary directories, potentially leading to malicious command execution
  • CVE-2025-8088: a directory traversal bypass vulnerability during file extraction utilizing NTFS Streams

Among the newcomers, we have observed exploits targeting the Microsoft Office platform and Windows OS components. Notably, these new vulnerabilities exploit logic flaws arising from the interaction between multiple systems, making them technically difficult to isolate within a specific file or library. A list of these vulnerabilities is provided below:

  • CVE-2026-21509 and CVE-2026-21514: security feature bypass vulnerabilities: despite Protected View being enabled, a specially crafted file can still execute malicious code without the user’s knowledge. Malicious commands are executed on the victim’s system with the privileges of the user who opened the file.
  • CVE-2026-21513: a vulnerability in the Internet Explorer MSHTML engine, which is used to open websites and render HTML markup. The vulnerability involves bypassing rules that restrict the execution of files from untrusted network sources. Interestingly, the data provider for this vulnerability was an LNK file.

These three vulnerabilities were utilized together in a single chain during attacks on Windows-based user systems. While this combination is noteworthy, we believe the widespread use of the entire chain as a unified exploit will likely decline due to its instability. We anticipate that these vulnerabilities will eventually be applied individually as initial entry vectors in phishing campaigns.

Below is the trend of exploit detections on user Windows systems starting from Q1 2025.

Dynamics of the number of Windows users encountering exploits, Q1 2025 – Q1 2026. The number of users who encountered exploits in Q1 2025 is taken as 100% (download)

The vulnerabilities listed here can be leveraged to gain initial access to a vulnerable system and for privilege escalation. This underscores the critical importance of timely software updates.

On Linux devices, exploits for the following vulnerabilities were detected most frequently:

  • CVE-2022-0847: a vulnerability known as Dirty Pipe, which enables privilege escalation and the hijacking of running applications
  • CVE-2019-13272: a vulnerability caused by improper handling of privilege inheritance, which can be exploited to achieve privilege escalation
  • CVE-2021-22555: a heap out-of-bounds write vulnerability in the Netfilter kernel subsystem
  • CVE-2023-32233: a vulnerability in the Netfilter subsystem that allows for Use-After-Free conditions and privilege escalation through the improper processing of network requests

Dynamics of the number of Linux users encountering exploits, Q1 2025 – Q1 2026. The number of users who encountered exploits in Q1 2025 is taken as 100% (download)

In the first quarter of 2026, we observed a decrease in the number of detected exploits; however, the detection rates are on the rise relative to the same period last year. For the Linux operating system, the installation of security patches remains critical.

Most common published exploits

The distribution of published exploits by software type in Q1 2026 features an updated set of categories; once again, we see exploits targeting operating systems and Microsoft Office suites.

Distribution of published exploits by platform, Q1 2026 (download)

Vulnerability exploitation in APT attacks

We analyzed which vulnerabilities were utilized in APT attacks during Q1 2026. The ranking provided below includes data based on our telemetry, research, and open sources.

TOP 10 vulnerabilities exploited in APT attacks, Q1 2026 (download)

In Q1 2026, threat actors continued to utilize high-profile vulnerabilities registered in the previous year for APT attacks. The hypothesis we previously proposed has been confirmed: security flaws affecting web applications remain heavily exploited in real-world attacks. However, we are also observing a partial refresh of attacker toolsets. Specifically, during the first quarter of the year, APT campaigns leveraged recently discovered vulnerabilities in Microsoft Office products, edge networking device software, and remote access management systems. Although the most recent vulnerabilities are being exploited most heavily, their general characteristics continue to reinforce established trends regarding the categories of vulnerable software. Consequently, we strongly recommend applying the security patches provided by vendors.

C2 frameworks

In this section, we examine the most popular C2 frameworks used by threat actors and analyze the vulnerabilities targeted by the exploits that interacted with C2 agents in APT attacks.

The chart below shows the frequency of known C2 framework usage in attacks against users during Q1 2026, according to open sources.

TOP 10 C2 frameworks used by APTs to compromise user systems, Q1 2026 (download)

Metasploit has returned to the top of the list of the most common C2 frameworks, displacing Sliver, which now shares the second position with Havoc. These are followed by Covenant and Mythic, the latter of which previously saw greater popularity. After studying open sources and analyzing samples of malicious C2 agents that contained exploits, we determined that the following vulnerabilities were utilized in APT attacks involving the C2 frameworks mentioned above:

  • CVE-2023-46604: an insecure deserialization vulnerability allowing for arbitrary code execution within the server process context if the Apache ActiveMQ service is running
  • CVE-2024-12356 and CVE-2026-1731: command injection vulnerabilities in BeyondTrust software that allow an attacker to send malicious commands even without system authentication
  • CVE-2023-36884: a vulnerability in the Windows Search component that enables command execution on the system, bypassing security mechanisms built into Microsoft Office applications
  • CVE-2025-53770: an insecure deserialization vulnerability in Microsoft SharePoint that allows for unauthenticated command execution on the server
  • CVE-2025-8088 and CVE-2025-6218: similar directory traversal vulnerabilities that allow files to be extracted from an archive to a predefined path, potentially without the archiving utility displaying any alerts to the user

The nature of the described vulnerabilities indicates that they were exploited to gain initial access to the system. Notably, the majority of these security issues are targeted to bypass authentication mechanisms. This is likely due to the fact that C2 agents are being detected effectively, prompting threat actors to reduce the probability of discovery by utilizing bypass exploits.

Notable vulnerabilities

This section highlights the most significant vulnerabilities published in Q1 2026 that have publicly available descriptions.

CVE-2026-21519: Desktop Window Manager vulnerability

At the core of this vulnerability is a Type Confusion flaw. By attempting to access a resource within the Desktop Window Manager subsystem, an attacker can achieve privilege escalation. A necessary condition for exploiting this issue is existing authorization on the system.

It is worth noting that the DWM subsystem has been under close scrutiny by threat actors for quite some time. Historically, the primary attack vector involves interacting with the NtDComposition* function set.

RegPwn (CVE-2026-21533): a system settings access control vulnerability

CVE-2026-21533 is essentially a logic vulnerability that enables privilege escalation. It stems from the improper handling of privileges within Remote Desktop Services (RDS) components. By modifying service parameters in the registry and replacing the configuration with a custom key, an attacker can elevate privileges to the SYSTEM level. This vulnerability is likely to remain a fixture in threat actor toolsets as a method for establishing persistence and gaining high-level privileges.

CVE-2026-21514: a Microsoft Office vulnerability

This vulnerability was discovered in the wild during attacks on user systems. Notably, an LNK file is used to initiate the exploitation process. CVE-2026-21514 is also a logic issue that allows for bypassing OLE technology restrictions on malicious code execution and the transmission of NetNTLM authentication requests when processing untrusted input.

Clawdbot (CVE-2026-25253): an OpenClaw vulnerability

This vulnerability in the AI agent leaks credentials (authentication tokens) when queried via the WebSocket protocol. It can lead to the compromise of the infrastructure where the agent is installed: researchers have confirmed the ability to access local system data and execute commands with elevated privileges. The danger of CVE-2026-25253 is further compounded by the fact that its exploitation has generated numerous attack scenarios, including the use of prompt injections and ClickFix techniques to install stealers on vulnerable systems.

CVE-2026-34070: LangChain framework vulnerability

LangChain is an open-source framework designed for building applications powered by large language models (LLMs). A directory traversal vulnerability allowed attackers to access arbitrary files within the infrastructure where the framework was deployed. The core of CVE-2026-34070 lies in the fact that certain functions within langchain_core/prompts/loading.py handled configuration files insecurely. This could potentially lead to the processing of files containing malicious data, which could be leveraged to execute commands and expose critical system information or other sensitive files.

CVE-2026-22812: an OpenCode vulnerability

CVE-2026-22812 is another vulnerability identified in AI-assisted coding software. By default, the OpenCode agent provided local access for launching authorized applications via an HTTP server that did not require authentication. Consequently, attackers could execute malicious commands on a vulnerable device with the privileges of the current user.

Conclusion and advice

We observe that the registration of vulnerabilities is steadily gaining momentum in Q1 2026, a trend driven by the widespread development of AI tools designed to identify security flaws across various software types. This trajectory is likely to result not only in a higher volume of registered vulnerabilities but also in an increase in exploit-driven attacks, further reinforcing the critical necessity of timely security patch deployment. Additionally, organizations must prioritize vulnerability management and implement effective defensive technologies to mitigate the risks associated with potential exploitation.

To ensure the rapid detection of threats involving exploit utilization and to prevent their escalation, it is essential to deploy a reliable security solution. Key features of such a tool include continuous infrastructure monitoring, proactive protection, and vulnerability prioritization based on real-world relevance. These mechanisms are integrated into Kaspersky Next, which also provides endpoint security and protection against cyberattacks of any complexity.

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How a simple consumer data breach spiralled into a national security crisis in US-South Korea relations

Washington’s focus on online retailer Coupang has led to accusations that the Trump administration is tying issues of national security to domestic corporate matters

When South Korea’s biggest online retailer revealed last year that a data breach had compromised tens of millions of customer accounts, it appeared to be a corporate crisis. But five months later the issue has grown into a diplomatic storm, threatening to further degrade relations between Seoul and the Trump administration.

Coupang, often described as South Korea’s answer to Amazon, is a US-incorporated company whose business is overwhelmingly based in South Korea. Headquartered in Seattle and listed on the New York Stock Exchange, it is run by Korean-American billionaire Bom Kim. In November last year the company disclosed that a former employee had stolen an internal security key, enabling unauthorised access to data from 33.7 million users.

Continue reading...

© Photograph: Anthony Wallace/AFP/Getty Images

© Photograph: Anthony Wallace/AFP/Getty Images

© Photograph: Anthony Wallace/AFP/Getty Images

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Private health records of half a million Britons offered for sale on Chinese website

Technology minister tells Commons ‘de-identified’ information from UK Biobank advertised for sale on Alibaba

The confidential health records of half a million British volunteers have been offered for sale on Chinese website Alibaba, the UK government has confirmed.

The “de-identified” data, belonging to participants in the UK Biobank project, was found for sale on three separate listings last week. Ian Murray, the technology minister, told the Commons on Thursday that, after working with the Chinese government and Alibaba, the records had now been removed. It is not believed any sales were made.

Continue reading...

© Photograph: Dave Guttridge/UK Biobank/PA

© Photograph: Dave Guttridge/UK Biobank/PA

© Photograph: Dave Guttridge/UK Biobank/PA

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Threat landscape for industrial automation systems in Q4 2025

Statistics across all threats

The percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked has been decreasing since the beginning of 2024. In Q4 2025, it was 19.7%. Over the past three years, the percentage has decreased by 1.36 times, and by 1.25 times since Q4 2023.

Percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked, Q1 2023–Q4 2025

Percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked, Q1 2023–Q4 2025

Regionally, in Q4 2025, the percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked ranged from 8.5% in Northern Europe to 27.3% in Africa.

Regions ranked by percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked

Regions ranked by percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked

Four regions saw an increase in the percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked. The most notable increases occurred in Southern Europe and South Asia. In Q3 2025, East Asia experienced a sharp increase triggered by the local spread of malicious scripts, but the figure has since returned to normal.

Changes in percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked, Q4 2025

Changes in percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked, Q4 2025

Feature of the quarter: worms in email

In Q4 2025, the percentage of ICS computers on which wormsinemailattachments were blocked increasedinallregions of the world.

Many of the blocked threats were related to the worm Backdoor.MSIL.XWorm. This malware is designed to persist on the system and then remotely control it.

Interestingly, this threat was not detected on ICS computers in the previous quarter, yet it appeared in all regions in Q4 2025.

A study found that the active spread of Backdoor.MSIL.XWorm via phishing emails was likely linked to the use by hackers of another malware obfuscation technique that was actively used during massive phishing campaigns in Q4 2025. These campaigns have been known since 2024 as “Curriculum-vitae-catalina”.

The attackers distributed phishing emails to HR managers, recruiters, and employees responsible for hiring. The messages were disguised as responses from job applicants with subjects such as “Resume” or “Attached Resume” and contained a malicious executable file under the guise of a curriculum vitae. Typically, the file was named Curriculum Vitae-Catalina.exe. When executed, it infected the system.

In Q4 2025, the threat spread across regions in two waves — one in October and another in November. Russia, Western Europe, South America, and North America (Canada) were attacked in October. A spike in Backdoor.MSIL.XWorm blocking was observed in other regions in November. The attack subsided in all regions in December.

The highest percentage of ICS computers on which Backdoor.MSIL.XWorm was blocked was observed in regions where threats from email clients had been historically blocked at high rates on ICS computers: Southern Europe, South America, and the Middle East.

At the same time, in Africa, where USB storage media are still actively used, the threat was also detected when removable devices were connected to ICS computers.

Selected industries

The biometrics sector has historically led the rankings of industries and OT infrastructures surveyed in this report in terms of the percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked.

These systems are characterized by accessibility to and from the internet, as well as minimal cybersecurity controls by the consumer organization.

Rankings of industries and OT infrastructure by percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked

Rankings of industries and OT infrastructure by percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked

In Q4 2025, the percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked increased only in one sector: oil and gas. The corresponding figures increased in two regions: Russia, and Central Asia and the South Caucasus.

However, if we look at a broader time span, there is a downward trend in all the surveyed industries.

Percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked in selected industries

Percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked in selected industries

Diversity of detected malicious objects

In Q4 2025, Kaspersky protection solutions blocked malware from 10,142 different malware families of various categories on industrial automation systems.

Percentage of ICS computers on which the activity of malicious objects from various categories was blocked

Percentage of ICS computers on which the activity of malicious objects from various categories was blocked

In Q4 2025, there was an increase in the percentage of ICS computers on which worms, and miners in the form of executable files for Windows were blocked. These were the only categories that exhibited an increase.

Main threat sources

Depending on the threat detection and blocking scenario, it is not always possible to reliably identify the source. The circumstantial evidence for a specific source can be the blocked threat’s type (category).

The internet (visiting malicious or compromised internet resources; malicious content distributed via messengers; cloud data storage and processing services and CDNs), email clients (phishing emails), and removable storage devices remain the primary sources of threats to computers in an organization’s technology infrastructure.

In Q4 2025, the percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects from various sources were blocked decreased. All sources except email clients saw their lowest levels in three years.

Percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects from various sources were blocked

Percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects from various sources were blocked

The same computer can be attacked by several categories of malware from the same source during a quarter. That computer is counted when calculating the percentage of attacked computers for each threat category, but is only counted once for the threat source (we count unique attacked computers). In addition, it is not always possible to accurately determine the initial infection attempt. Therefore, the total percentage of ICS computers on which various categories of threats from a certain source were blocked can exceed the percentage of computers affected by the source itself.

  • In Q4 2025, the percentage of ICS computers on which threats from the internet were blocked decreased to 7.67% and reached its lowest level since the beginning of 2023. The main categories of internet threats are malicious scripts and phishing pages, and denylisted internet resources. The percentage ranged from 3.96% in Northern Europe to 11.33% in South Asia.
  • The main categories of threats from email clients blocked on ICS computers were malicious scripts and phishing pages, spyware, and malicious documents. Most of the spyware detected in phishing emails was delivered as a password archive or a multi-layered script embedded in office document files. The percentage of ICS computers on which threats from email clients were blocked ranged from 0.64% in Northern Europe to 6.34% in Southern Europe.
  • The main categories of threats that were blocked when removable media was connected to ICS computers were worms, viruses, and spyware. The percentage of ICS computers on which threats from removable media were blocked ranged from 0.05% in Australia and New Zealand to 1.41% in Africa.
  • The main categories of threats that spread through network folders in Q4 2025 were viruses, AutoCAD malware, worms, and spyware. The percentage of ICS computers on which threats from network folders were blocked ranged from 0.01% in Northern Europe to 0.18% in East Asia.

Threat categories

Typical attacks blocked within an OT network are multi-step sequences of malicious activities, where each subsequent step of the attackers is aimed at increasing privileges and/or gaining access to other systems by exploiting the security problems of industrial enterprises, including OT infrastructures.

Malicious objects used for initial infection

In Q4 2025, the percentage of ICS computers on which denylisted internet resources were blocked decreased to 3.26%. This is the lowest quarterly figure since the beginning of 2022, and it has decreased by 1.8 times since Q2 2025.

Percentage of ICS computers on which denylisted internet resources were blocked, Q1 2023–Q4 2025

Percentage of ICS computers on which denylisted internet resources were blocked, Q1 2023–Q4 2025

Regionally, the percentage of ICS computers on which denylisted internet resources were blocked ranged from 1.74% in Northern Europe to 3.93% in Southeast Asia, which displaced Africa from first place. Russia rounded out the top three regions for this indicator.

The percentage of ICS computers on which malicious documents were blocked increased for three consecutive quarters. However, in Q4 2025 it decreased by 0.22 pp to 1.76%.

Percentage of ICS computers on which malicious documents were blocked, Q1 2023–Q4 2025

Percentage of ICS computers on which malicious documents were blocked, Q1 2023–Q4 2025

Regionally, the percentage ranged from 0.46% in Northern Europe to 3.82% in Southern Europe. In Q4 2025, the indicator increased in Eastern Europe, Russia, and Western Europe.

The percentage of ICS computers on which malicious scripts and phishing pages were blocked decreased to 6.58%. Despite the decline, this category led the rankings of threat categories in terms of the percentage of ICS computers on which they were blocked.

Percentage of ICS computers on which malicious scripts and phishing pages were blocked, Q1 2023–Q4 2025

Percentage of ICS computers on which malicious scripts and phishing pages were blocked, Q1 2023–Q4 2025

Regionally, the percentage ranged from 2.52% in Northern Europe to 10.50% in South Asia. The indicator increased in South Asia, South America, Southern Europe, and Africa. South Asia saw the most notable increase, at 3.47 pp.

Next-stage malware

Malicious objects used to initially infect computers deliver next-stage malware — spyware, ransomware, and miners — to victims’ computers. As a rule, the higher the percentage of ICS computers on which the initial infection malware is blocked, the higher the percentage for next-stage malware.

In Q4 2025, the percentage of ICS computers on which spyware, ransomware and web miners were blocked decreased. The rates were:

  • Spyware: 3.80% (down 0.24 pp). For the second quarter in a row, spyware took second place in the rankings of threat categories in terms of the percentage of ICS computers on which it was blocked.
  • Ransomware: 0.16% (down 0.01 pp).
  • Web miners: 0.24% (down 0.01 pp), this is the lowest level observed thus far in the period under review.

The percentage of ICS computers on which miners in the form of executable files for Windows were blocked increased to 0.60% (up 0.03 pp).

Self-propagating malware

Self-propagating malware (worms and viruses) is a category unto itself. Worms and virus-infected files were originally used for initial infection, but as botnet functionality evolved, they took on next-stage characteristics.

To spread across ICS networks, viruses and worms rely on removable media and network folders and are distributed in the form of infected files, such as archives with backups, office documents, pirated games and hacked applications. In rarer and more dangerous cases, web pages with network equipment settings, as well as files stored in internal document management systems, product lifecycle management (PLM) systems, resource management (ERP) systems and other web services are infected.

In Q4 2025, the percentage of ICS computers on which worms were blocked increased by 1.6 times to 1.60%. As mentioned above, this increase is related to a global phishing attack that spread the Backdoor.MSIL.XWorm backdoor worm across all regions of the world. The percentage increased in all regions. The biggest increase (up by 2.16 times) was in Southern Europe. The malware was primary distributed through email clients, and Southern Europe led the way in terms of the percentage of ICS computers on which threats from email clients were blocked.

The percentage of ICS computers on which viruses were blocked decreased to 1.33%.

AutoCAD malware

This category of malware can spread in a variety of ways, so it does not belong to a specific group.

After an increase in the previous quarter, the percentage of ICS computers on which AutoCAD malware was blocked decreased to 0.29% in Q4 2025.

For more information on industrial threats see the full version of the report.

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Threat landscape for industrial automation systems in Q4 2025

Statistics across all threats

The percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked has been decreasing since the beginning of 2024. In Q4 2025, it was 19.7%. Over the past three years, the percentage has decreased by 1.36 times, and by 1.25 times since Q4 2023.

Percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked, Q1 2023–Q4 2025

Percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked, Q1 2023–Q4 2025

Regionally, in Q4 2025, the percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked ranged from 8.5% in Northern Europe to 27.3% in Africa.

Regions ranked by percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked

Regions ranked by percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked

Four regions saw an increase in the percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked. The most notable increases occurred in Southern Europe and South Asia. In Q3 2025, East Asia experienced a sharp increase triggered by the local spread of malicious scripts, but the figure has since returned to normal.

Changes in percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked, Q4 2025

Changes in percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked, Q4 2025

Feature of the quarter: worms in email

In Q4 2025, the percentage of ICS computers on which wormsinemailattachments were blocked increasedinallregions of the world.

Many of the blocked threats were related to the worm Backdoor.MSIL.XWorm. This malware is designed to persist on the system and then remotely control it.

Interestingly, this threat was not detected on ICS computers in the previous quarter, yet it appeared in all regions in Q4 2025.

A study found that the active spread of Backdoor.MSIL.XWorm via phishing emails was likely linked to the use by hackers of another malware obfuscation technique that was actively used during massive phishing campaigns in Q4 2025. These campaigns have been known since 2024 as “Curriculum-vitae-catalina”.

The attackers distributed phishing emails to HR managers, recruiters, and employees responsible for hiring. The messages were disguised as responses from job applicants with subjects such as “Resume” or “Attached Resume” and contained a malicious executable file under the guise of a curriculum vitae. Typically, the file was named Curriculum Vitae-Catalina.exe. When executed, it infected the system.

In Q4 2025, the threat spread across regions in two waves — one in October and another in November. Russia, Western Europe, South America, and North America (Canada) were attacked in October. A spike in Backdoor.MSIL.XWorm blocking was observed in other regions in November. The attack subsided in all regions in December.

The highest percentage of ICS computers on which Backdoor.MSIL.XWorm was blocked was observed in regions where threats from email clients had been historically blocked at high rates on ICS computers: Southern Europe, South America, and the Middle East.

At the same time, in Africa, where USB storage media are still actively used, the threat was also detected when removable devices were connected to ICS computers.

Selected industries

The biometrics sector has historically led the rankings of industries and OT infrastructures surveyed in this report in terms of the percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked.

These systems are characterized by accessibility to and from the internet, as well as minimal cybersecurity controls by the consumer organization.

Rankings of industries and OT infrastructure by percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked

Rankings of industries and OT infrastructure by percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked

In Q4 2025, the percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked increased only in one sector: oil and gas. The corresponding figures increased in two regions: Russia, and Central Asia and the South Caucasus.

However, if we look at a broader time span, there is a downward trend in all the surveyed industries.

Percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked in selected industries

Percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked in selected industries

Diversity of detected malicious objects

In Q4 2025, Kaspersky protection solutions blocked malware from 10,142 different malware families of various categories on industrial automation systems.

Percentage of ICS computers on which the activity of malicious objects from various categories was blocked

Percentage of ICS computers on which the activity of malicious objects from various categories was blocked

In Q4 2025, there was an increase in the percentage of ICS computers on which worms, and miners in the form of executable files for Windows were blocked. These were the only categories that exhibited an increase.

Main threat sources

Depending on the threat detection and blocking scenario, it is not always possible to reliably identify the source. The circumstantial evidence for a specific source can be the blocked threat’s type (category).

The internet (visiting malicious or compromised internet resources; malicious content distributed via messengers; cloud data storage and processing services and CDNs), email clients (phishing emails), and removable storage devices remain the primary sources of threats to computers in an organization’s technology infrastructure.

In Q4 2025, the percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects from various sources were blocked decreased. All sources except email clients saw their lowest levels in three years.

Percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects from various sources were blocked

Percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects from various sources were blocked

The same computer can be attacked by several categories of malware from the same source during a quarter. That computer is counted when calculating the percentage of attacked computers for each threat category, but is only counted once for the threat source (we count unique attacked computers). In addition, it is not always possible to accurately determine the initial infection attempt. Therefore, the total percentage of ICS computers on which various categories of threats from a certain source were blocked can exceed the percentage of computers affected by the source itself.

  • In Q4 2025, the percentage of ICS computers on which threats from the internet were blocked decreased to 7.67% and reached its lowest level since the beginning of 2023. The main categories of internet threats are malicious scripts and phishing pages, and denylisted internet resources. The percentage ranged from 3.96% in Northern Europe to 11.33% in South Asia.
  • The main categories of threats from email clients blocked on ICS computers were malicious scripts and phishing pages, spyware, and malicious documents. Most of the spyware detected in phishing emails was delivered as a password archive or a multi-layered script embedded in office document files. The percentage of ICS computers on which threats from email clients were blocked ranged from 0.64% in Northern Europe to 6.34% in Southern Europe.
  • The main categories of threats that were blocked when removable media was connected to ICS computers were worms, viruses, and spyware. The percentage of ICS computers on which threats from removable media were blocked ranged from 0.05% in Australia and New Zealand to 1.41% in Africa.
  • The main categories of threats that spread through network folders in Q4 2025 were viruses, AutoCAD malware, worms, and spyware. The percentage of ICS computers on which threats from network folders were blocked ranged from 0.01% in Northern Europe to 0.18% in East Asia.

Threat categories

Typical attacks blocked within an OT network are multi-step sequences of malicious activities, where each subsequent step of the attackers is aimed at increasing privileges and/or gaining access to other systems by exploiting the security problems of industrial enterprises, including OT infrastructures.

Malicious objects used for initial infection

In Q4 2025, the percentage of ICS computers on which denylisted internet resources were blocked decreased to 3.26%. This is the lowest quarterly figure since the beginning of 2022, and it has decreased by 1.8 times since Q2 2025.

Percentage of ICS computers on which denylisted internet resources were blocked, Q1 2023–Q4 2025

Percentage of ICS computers on which denylisted internet resources were blocked, Q1 2023–Q4 2025

Regionally, the percentage of ICS computers on which denylisted internet resources were blocked ranged from 1.74% in Northern Europe to 3.93% in Southeast Asia, which displaced Africa from first place. Russia rounded out the top three regions for this indicator.

The percentage of ICS computers on which malicious documents were blocked increased for three consecutive quarters. However, in Q4 2025 it decreased by 0.22 pp to 1.76%.

Percentage of ICS computers on which malicious documents were blocked, Q1 2023–Q4 2025

Percentage of ICS computers on which malicious documents were blocked, Q1 2023–Q4 2025

Regionally, the percentage ranged from 0.46% in Northern Europe to 3.82% in Southern Europe. In Q4 2025, the indicator increased in Eastern Europe, Russia, and Western Europe.

The percentage of ICS computers on which malicious scripts and phishing pages were blocked decreased to 6.58%. Despite the decline, this category led the rankings of threat categories in terms of the percentage of ICS computers on which they were blocked.

Percentage of ICS computers on which malicious scripts and phishing pages were blocked, Q1 2023–Q4 2025

Percentage of ICS computers on which malicious scripts and phishing pages were blocked, Q1 2023–Q4 2025

Regionally, the percentage ranged from 2.52% in Northern Europe to 10.50% in South Asia. The indicator increased in South Asia, South America, Southern Europe, and Africa. South Asia saw the most notable increase, at 3.47 pp.

Next-stage malware

Malicious objects used to initially infect computers deliver next-stage malware — spyware, ransomware, and miners — to victims’ computers. As a rule, the higher the percentage of ICS computers on which the initial infection malware is blocked, the higher the percentage for next-stage malware.

In Q4 2025, the percentage of ICS computers on which spyware, ransomware and web miners were blocked decreased. The rates were:

  • Spyware: 3.80% (down 0.24 pp). For the second quarter in a row, spyware took second place in the rankings of threat categories in terms of the percentage of ICS computers on which it was blocked.
  • Ransomware: 0.16% (down 0.01 pp).
  • Web miners: 0.24% (down 0.01 pp), this is the lowest level observed thus far in the period under review.

The percentage of ICS computers on which miners in the form of executable files for Windows were blocked increased to 0.60% (up 0.03 pp).

Self-propagating malware

Self-propagating malware (worms and viruses) is a category unto itself. Worms and virus-infected files were originally used for initial infection, but as botnet functionality evolved, they took on next-stage characteristics.

To spread across ICS networks, viruses and worms rely on removable media and network folders and are distributed in the form of infected files, such as archives with backups, office documents, pirated games and hacked applications. In rarer and more dangerous cases, web pages with network equipment settings, as well as files stored in internal document management systems, product lifecycle management (PLM) systems, resource management (ERP) systems and other web services are infected.

In Q4 2025, the percentage of ICS computers on which worms were blocked increased by 1.6 times to 1.60%. As mentioned above, this increase is related to a global phishing attack that spread the Backdoor.MSIL.XWorm backdoor worm across all regions of the world. The percentage increased in all regions. The biggest increase (up by 2.16 times) was in Southern Europe. The malware was primary distributed through email clients, and Southern Europe led the way in terms of the percentage of ICS computers on which threats from email clients were blocked.

The percentage of ICS computers on which viruses were blocked decreased to 1.33%.

AutoCAD malware

This category of malware can spread in a variety of ways, so it does not belong to a specific group.

After an increase in the previous quarter, the percentage of ICS computers on which AutoCAD malware was blocked decreased to 0.29% in Q4 2025.

For more information on industrial threats see the full version of the report.

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A framework for securely collecting forensic artifacts into S3 buckets

When customers experience a security incident, they need to acquire forensic artifacts to identify root cause, extract indicators of compromise (IoCs), and validate remediation efforts. NIST 800-86, Guide to Integrating Forensic Techniques into Incident Response, defines digital forensics as a process comprised of four basic phases: collection, examination, analysis, and reporting. This blog post focuses on the first phase—collection—and provides best practices for implementing least privilege during the forensic evidence collection processes that collect evidence and store the artifacts in Amazon Simple Storage Service (Amazon S3) buckets. The architecture presented in this post can be used to collect forensic evidence from both Amazon Web Services (AWS) and non-AWS compute resources.

It’s important to consider the security of the forensic artifact collection process because it involves communicating with potentially compromised resources. The collection methodology itself should be designed to avoid adding additional risks to infrastructure or other forensic investigation processes. At the same time, the collection of forensic artifacts requires the use of specialized tools that are difficult to change or adapt to new security requirements.

This post outlines factors that you should consider when creating an evidence collection capability and introduces an architecture that implements the best practices for least privilege and integrating with (instead of changing or adapting) existing forensic tools that support uploading artifacts to S3 buckets by using AWS security credentials.

Solution architecture

The architecture presented in this post demonstrates the following AWS best practices:

  1. Least privilege – Use AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM) policies to provide least privilege access to upload forensic artifacts to an S3 location dedicated to a specific forensic collection task. The locked down credentials cannot be used to view or modify any other forensic collections.
  2. Time-limited credentials – Use AWS Security Token Service (AWS STS) to provide time limited credentials, reducing the potential for an unauthorized user to abuse credentials while they’re visible on the target machine during the artifact collection process.
  3. Compatibility with third-party tools – Forensic tools are specialized and changing a forensic collection process to adapt to different collection methods might not be possible. To avoid the risk of needing to change tools, maximize compatibility with any third-party tools that support uploading to S3 buckets. The method introduced in this post to generate time-limited, scoped down credentials can be used with most third-party forensic tools that support uploading to S3 buckets.
  4. Credential vending – Use time-limited tokens, which can be vended on demand through an automated process, eliminating the need for forensic investigators to use the AWS Management Console, understand least privilege, or have any access to the AWS control plane. Forensic investigators can focus on the process of collecting and analyzing evidence.
  5. Process automation – Deploy the process as infrastructure as code (IaC) and automate it through AWS services, reducing the burden on security teams to manually perform runbook steps during an active security incident.

This post starts with an overview of the digital forensic process, provides best practices for using Amazon S3 to store forensic artifacts, details how you can create time-limited, least privilege tokens to provide secure access to upload forensic artifacts to S3 buckets, and introduces a sample architecture that automates the end-to-end process.

The digital forensic process

Organizations need to have practices and resources in place to support a digital forensic investigation environment before an incident occurs. AWS has published several resources, including Forensic investigation environment strategies in the AWS Cloud and AWS prescriptive guidance: Security Reference Architecture, Cyber forensics, to provide best practices for organizing your AWS accounts using AWS Organizations to support forensic clean-room environments. Creating segregated AWS accounts and resources for your security teams is critical to provide your incident responders a location to store and analyze any digital forensic evidence collected during an investigation.

After you’ve established a landing zone for performing digital forensics, you’re ready to collect and process digital forensic evidence. AWS supports the collection of digital forensics through extensive logging of control plane events in AWS CloudTrail, and metrics and application logs that can be stored in Amazon CloudWatch. In addition, AWS core compute services, such as Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud (Amazon EC2), support forensics operations through snapshots of the underlying Amazon Elastic Block Storage (Amazon EBS) volume. An example architecture to demonstrate how to automate the collection of EBS volume snapshots for forensic investigations can be found in How to automate forensic disk collection in AWS.

You might want to use the same AWS infrastructure to collect, examine, analyze, and report on forensic incidents that occur on other resources, such as corporate laptops. You can use existing forensic tooling to perform live response, collecting specific artifacts such as Windows NT File System (NTFS) Master File Table (MFT), logs from Linux machines, volatile memory images, or other artifacts that are specified as part of your organization’s incident response plan. These tools can be provided by third parties or built in-house, and many support uploading to S3 buckets using AWS security credentials.

Using Amazon S3 for forensic artifact collection

Amazon S3 provides the foundational requirements for collecting and storing forensic artifacts. Digital forensics requires highly available, durable, and secure storage of artifacts collected from potentially compromised systems. Amazon S3 is designed for 11 nines of durability and can be configured to provide protection against modification, deletion, and unauthorized access to sensitive forensic artifacts. You can also use S3 to store forensic artifacts of almost any size—from one byte to 5 TB—in an S3 object.

S3 buckets used to store forensic artifacts require custom configuration to provide additional security. You should configure the S3 bucket that you use to store forensic artifacts to enable the following security and governance features:

  1. Encryption in transit. You can require the use of encryption in transit and specify acceptable TLS versions using the aws:SecureTransport and s3:TlsVersion condition keys on the S3 bucket policy.
  2. Encryption at rest using a customer managed key. You can automatically encrypt all objects uploaded to the bucket using a specified customer managed key by specifying a default server-side encryption key in the bucket’s configuration. For this post, we encourage you to use a customer managed key rather than relying upon an AWS managed key, so you can control the associated key policy.
    1. Encryption at rest provides an additional layer of protection, because only entities that have both the permission to read from the bucket and permission to use the AWS Key Management Service (AWS KMS) key for decryption can download the forensic artifact from the S3 bucket.
    2. You need to adjust the example KMS policies in this post if the evidence collection S3 bucket uses the S3 Bucket Key feature.
  3. Audit logs of all S3 data event activity. You can turn on CloudTrail data events for any S3 buckets that contain forensic artifacts to provide a comprehensive audit trail of S3 object-level API activity. This helps provide a chain of custody of any artifacts stored in your forensic buckets.
  4. Fine-grained access control using IAM permissions. You can define the set of entities (both human and machine) that have access to the artifacts in the S3 bucket. This post includes how to create time-limited, least privilege access using IAM permissions for uploading files into an S3 bucket. The permissions are fine-grained enough to scope down access to specific object names or object prefixes in an S3 bucket. Additionally, access to read the artifacts can be controlled through IAM permissions and access to the encryption-at-rest KMS key.
  5. Protections against data modification and deletion. S3 provides features, such as S3 object versioning, to provide assurances that data hasn’t been modified or removed after it’s been collected. This is an additional layer of protection beyond the fine-grained access permissions, so even if an authorized entity attempts to overwrite or delete an object in the S3 bucket, the previous version of the object is still available.
  6. There are additional options that you can configure on the S3 bucket to protect your data against modification and deletion, including S3 Object Lock and multi-factor authentication (MFA) delete.

In addition to the preceding configuration, consider how to organize forensic artifacts in the S3 bucket. This post introduces a folder structure using S3 object prefixes to segregate each forensic artifact collection task into its own S3 object namespace. An example S3 namespace structure for an S3 bucket is shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1 – S3 namespace structure for an S3 forensics artifact bucket using object prefixes

Figure 1: S3 namespace structure for an S3 forensics artifact bucket using object prefixes

By separating each forensic collection task by its own prefix, you can use fine-grained IAM permissions to permit object uploads only into the active collection task. For example, scoped down credentials can be generated to only allow uploads into buckets with the CASE-0001 prefix using an IAM permission as shown in the following code example. Temporary security credentials can be generated using these limited permissions and the key is then used by the forensic acquisition tool to upload the artifacts into the S3 bucket.

{
	"Sid": "UploadToCase0001",
	"Effect": "Allow",
	"Action": [
		"s3:PutObject",
		"s3:AbortMultipartUpload"
	],
"	Resource": "arn:aws:s3:::mycompany-forensics-collection/CASE-0001/*"
}

Manually creating temporary IAM credentials for each forensic collection activity can be error-prone and time-consuming. Therefore, this post demonstrates how to use AWS tooling to automate the process of generating time-limited, scoped-down credentials.

Adapt existing forensic tools for AWS best security practices

Existing forensic tools typically use IAM access keys to perform S3 operations. Using a static IAM user secret access key isn’t a best practice. Even if the static key is associated with an IAM user that has been scoped down to only have access to the forensic collection S3 bucket as described previously, that means anyone with access to that key can potentially upload objects into that bucket. Therefore, the best practice is to create a time-limited temporary security credential unique to each collection activity, scoped down to only allow uploading files to a specific prefix in the target S3 bucket.

The examples in this post use the following resource names. Because these names will change based on your deployment, substitute your resource names in place of the names in the example code.

  1. The evidence S3 bucket is named mycompany-forensics-collection
  2. The forensics AWS account number is 112233445566. For the purposes of this example, all resources will live within this account.
  3. The customer managed key used to encrypt the forensic artifacts at rest is ForensicsEvidenceKey
  4. The IAM role that incident responders will assume when signing in to their AWS account is ForensicsUserRole
  5. The IAM role that incident responders will use for generating S3 file upload temporary credentials is ForensicsUploadRole
  6. The example uses the us-east-1 AWS Region

The following steps show you how to configure the IAM policies associated with the customer managed key ForensicsEvidenceKey and the IAM role ForensicsUploadRole.
Before you begin, create the evidence S3 bucket configured as described in Using S3 for artifact collection and a customer managed key to encrypt the forensic artifacts at rest. Configure the evidence S3 bucket to use the KMS key by opening the S3 bucket’s properties tab in the Amazon S3 console and setting the new KMS key as the default encryption key for the bucket.

Next, create an IAM role that incident responders will assume through the AWS STS AssumeRole API to generate the temporary credentials. This role will define the maximum set of permissions allowed to upload artifacts to your evidence S3 bucket. This role, ForensicsUploadRole, created using the following example code, defines the maximum allowable permissions: the ability to upload objects into the evidence S3 bucket and to use the KMS key to encrypt those uploads. The effective permissions available to the forensic tool will be scoped down even further to the specific object prefix when the AWS STS temporary security credential is generated.

Note that the policy allows the forensics upload role Decrypt permission in addition to Encrypt; this is required when uploading files larger than 5 GB using the multi-part S3 file upload feature.

{
	"Version": "2012-10-17",
	"Statement": [
			{
				"Sid": "BasePermissionsForS3Upload",
				"Effect": "Allow",
				"Action": [
					"s3:PutObject",
					"s3:AbortMultipartUpload"
				],
				"Resource": "arn:aws:s3:::mycompany-forensics-collection/*"
		},
		{
			"Sid": "KeyAccessToS3Upload",
			"Effect": "Allow",
			"Action": [
				"kms:GenerateDataKey",
				"kms:Encrypt",
				"kms:Decrypt"
			],
			"Resource": "arn:aws:kms:us-east-1:112233445566:alias/ForensicsEvidenceKey",
			"Condition": {
				"StringLike": {
					"kms:EncryptionContext:aws:s3:arn": "arn:aws:s3:::mycompany-forensics-collection/*"
				}
			}
		}
	]
}

Next, you need to provide an ability to assume this role and generate AWS STS tokens using the role’s permissions. This is accomplished by creating a trust relationship associated with the IAM role you just created. The trust relationship shown in the following code sample describes which AWS principals are allowed to assume the role—in this case, you will allow any user who has federated into the ForensicsUserRole IAM role to be able to generate AWS STS tokens for forensic artifact collection.

{
	"Version": "2012-10-17",
	"Statement": [
		{
			"Sid": "Statement1",
			"Effect": "Allow",
			"Principal": {
				"AWS": "arn:aws:iam::112233445566:role/ForensicsUserRole"
			},
			"Action": "sts:AssumeRole"
		}
	]
}

After the role is established and access to the encryption key is granted, you can use the AWS STS AssumeRole API to create temporary credentials using this role. You can call this API using the AWS Command Line Interface (AWS CLI) or programmatically from a script. To scope down the token’s access to only provide permission to upload to the specific evidence object prefix, you must include a session policy as part of your AssumeRole API request to AWS STS. The following is an example session policy to restrict access to only upload objects into the CASE-0001 prefix.

[
	{
		"Effect": "Allow",
		"Action": [
			"s3:PutObject", 
			"s3:AbortMultipartUpload"
		],
		"Resource": "arn:aws:s3:::mycompany-forensics-collection/CASE-0001/*"
	},
	{
		"Effect": "Allow",
		"Action": [
			"kms:GenerateDataKey", 
			"kms:Encrypt", 
			"kms:Decrypt"
		],
		"Resource": "*",
		"Condition": {
			"StringLike": {
				"kms:EncryptionContext:aws:s3:arn": "arn:aws:s3:::mycompany-forensics-collection/CASE-0001/*"
			}
		}
	}
]

The effective permissions available to the session role will be the intersection of permissions available in the role policy (ForensicsUploadRole), the resource policy (in this case, mandating TLS-encrypted connections to the bucket), and the session policy that’s created on demand for every forensic collection (only allowing access to upload objects into the CASE-0001 prefix, as shown in the preceding example). Pictorially, this looks like the Venn diagram shown in Figure 2.

Figure 2 – Intersection of IAM policies determine the effective permissions for the restricted forensic session role.

Figure 2: Intersection of IAM policies determine the effective permissions for the restricted forensic session role.

Test the temporary credentials

Now that the bucket has been created and the AWS KMS key and roles configured, you can use AWS STS to create a temporary security credential for a collection on CASE-0001. You can use the AWS CLI to do this manually or you can write a script to automate this process using the AWS API. The IAM access key, secret access key, and session token returned by this call can then be used by any tool that can use AWS access keys to upload files into the specified S3 bucket.

The following example shows an AWS CLI call to AssumeRole using the example ForensicsUploadRole and a case named CASE-0001. The --duration-seconds parameter defines the period, in seconds, that the temporary credentials are valid; the default of 3600 seconds will provide temporary credentials that are valid for one hour.

$ aws sts assume-role \
	--role-arn arn:aws:iam::112233445566:role/ForensicsUploadRole \
	--role-session-name CASE-0001 \
	--duration-seconds 3600 \
	--policy '{"Version": "2012-10-17", "Statement": [{"Effect": "Allow", "Action": ["s3:PutObject", "s3:AbortMultipartUpload"], "Resource": "arn:aws:s3:::mycompany-forensics-collection/CASE-0001/*"}, {"Sid": "BasePermissionsForS3Upload", "Effect": "Allow", "Action": ["kms:GenerateDataKey", "kms:Encrypt", "kms:Decrypt"], "Resource": "*"}]}'

{
	"Credentials": {
		"AccessKeyId": "ASIAXXXX",
		"SecretAccessKey": "XXXX",
		"SessionToken": "XXXX",
		"Expiration": "2025-04-10T17:16:13+00:00"
	},
	"AssumedRoleUser": {
		"AssumedRoleId": "AROXXXX:CASE-0001",
		"Arn": "arn:aws:sts::112233445566:assumed-role/ForensicsUploadRole/CASE-0001"
	},
	"PackedPolicySize": 39
}

Now that you have obtained temporary credentials from AWS STS, you can use those credentials to upload a file into Amazon S3:

$ AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID=ASIAXXXX \
	AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY=XXXX \
	AWS_SESSION_TOKEN=XXXX \
	aws s3 cp evidence.zip s3://mycompany-forensics-collection/CASE-0001/evidence.zip

upload: evidence.zip to s3://mycompany-forensics-collection/CASE-0001/evidence.zip

You can also verify that you can’t use those credentials to upload a file into any other object prefixes or S3 buckets. For example, if you change CASE-0001 to CASE-0004 in the Amazon S3 upload command, you will receive an AccessDenied error because you’re trying to upload an object outside of the allowed key prefix.

$ AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID=ASIAXXXX \
	AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY=XXXX \
	AWS_SESSION_TOKEN=XXXX \
	aws s3 cp evidence.zip s3://mycompany-forensics-collection/CASE-0004/evidence.zip

upload failed: evidence.zip to s3://mycompany-forensics-collection/cases/CASE-0004/evidence.zip
An error occurred (AccessDenied) when calling the PutObject operation: User: arn:aws:sts::112233445566:assumed-role/ForensicsUploadRole/CASE-0001 is not authorized to perform: s3:PutObject on resource: "arn:aws:s3:::mycompany-forensics-collection/CASE-0004/evidence.zip" because no session policy allows the s3:PutObject action

Additionally, if you wait more than the lifetime of the token (1 hour in this case), attempting to upload a file into the bucket will fail, because the token will no longer be valid:

$ AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID=ASIAXXXX \
	AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY=XXXX \
	AWS_SESSION_TOKEN=XXXX \
	aws s3 cp evidence.zip s3://mycompany-forensics-collection/CASE-0001/evidence.zip

upload failed: evidence.zip to s3://mycompany-forensics-collection/CASE-0001/evidence.zip

An error occurred (ExpiredToken) when calling the PutObject operation: The provided token has expired.

Create an automated process to vend temporary credentials on demand

After you’ve verified the security benefits of creating temporary credentials for S3 uploads and validated that the credentials work with your forensic software of choice, you can now use them as part of an automated process.

A sample automated architecture is shown in Figure 3.

Figure 3: Architecture to automate S3 credential vending and forensic artifact collection.

Figure 3: Architecture to automate S3 credential vending and forensic artifact collection.

The workflow depicted in Figure 3 includes the following steps:

  1. The workflow is triggered by an alert from a detection source or a manual trigger from an incident responder.
  2. The workflow input is added to an Amazon Simple Queue Service (Amazon SQS) queue.
  3. The Amazon SQS queue invokes an AWS Lambda function which in turn executes a Step Functions state machine to orchestrate the workflow.
  4. First, the Step Functions workflow determines whether the target system is managed by AWS Systems Manager.
    1. If the target system isn’t managed by Systems Manager, an error is noted, and the execution is abandoned.
    2. If the target system is managed by Systems Manager, the Step Functions workflow determines the operating system (OS) of the target system and proceeds with the flow of execution.
  5. The workflow then continues by executing the Systems Manager documents that implement the forensic collection process:
    1. Downloads tooling:
      1. Generates dynamically scoped IAM temporary credentials that provide access to download the OS-specific tooling to be executed on the target system from the tooling S3 bucket. These credentials are tightly scoped to only allow downloads from the S3 prefix that corresponds to the tooling for the target system’s OS.
      2. Executes a Systems Manager command on the target system that uses the credentials generated from the previous step to download the OS tooling on the target system.
    2. Runs forensic tools:
  • Executes a Systems Manager command on the target system to execute the OS tooling on the target system.
  • The Systems Manager commands run on the target system, which in this case is an EC2 instance.
  • Results are uploaded to the evidence S3 bucket:
    1. Generates dynamically scoped IAM temporary credentials (as described previously) that provide access to upload the output of the previously executed tooling to the evidence S3 bucket. These credentials are tightly scoped to only allow uploads to a particular S3 prefix corresponding to the alert prefix.
    2. Executes a Systems Manager command on the target system to upload the output of the previously executed tooling to the evidence S3 bucket. After the upload is complete, it cleans up both the output and the evidence tooling from the target system.
    3. The evidence S3 bucket is tightly locked down to a subset of identities within the AWS security account. Access attempts from identities that aren’t allow listed trigger an Amazon EventBridge rule to alert the security team through an Amazon Simple Notification Service (Amazon SNS) topic.
  • When the workflow is complete, related details and metrics are recorded in an Amazon DynamoDB table.
  • The forensic analysis can be performed on a separate EC2 instance that has access to read from the evidence S3 bucket.
  • Deploying the example solution

    You can use the AWS Cloud Development Kit (AWS CDK) repository to implement the architecture shown in Figure 3.

    The AWS CDK solution is split into three stacks:

    1. SecurityStack: This stack contains the basic forensic artifact workflow orchestration infrastructure described in this post, including the Step Functions workflow, Lambda functions, AWS SQS queues, IAM roles, and S3 buckets.
    2. AlertStack: This stack contains the EventBridge workflow to notify administrators of anomalous activity in the evidence S3 bucket.
    3. CustomerStack: This stack contains the SSM documents that are executed for the forensic artifact workflow and an IAM role assumed by the SecurityStack when the workflow is invoked. It’s deployed into each child AWS account containing EC2 instances from which the security account is authorized to collect forensic artifacts.

    Configuration

    Before deploying the solution, there are several variables in the config.ts file that must be modified for the environment:

    1. SECURITY_ACCOUNT: Security Tooling AWS account ID.
    2. CUSTOMER_ACCOUNTS: Target AWS account IDs (the Child AWS account in the architecture diagram).
    3. ALERT_EMAIL_RECIPIENTS: List of email addresses that receive alerts when there is unexpected access to the evidence S3 bucket.
    4. ALLOW_LISTED_ROLE_NAMES: Roles allowed to access the evidence S3 bucket. Any other identities accessing the evidence S3 bucket will result in an alarm.

    Deployment

    After you’ve updated the config.ts file to reflect the account numbers, email recipients, and role names, the stacks can be deployed into your AWS infrastructure.

    1. Set Up AWS credentials using the AWS CLI:
      aws configure
    2. Install dependencies and configure constants:
      1. Clone the repository.
      2. Navigate to the project directory.
      3. Install project dependencies:
        npm install
      4. Configure constants in constants/config.ts with the required information:
        export const SECURITY_ACCOUNT = "123456789012"; // Your security tooling account ID 
        export const CUSTOMER_ACCOUNTS = ["234567890123", "345678901234"]; // Target account IDs 
        export const ALLOW_LISTED_ROLE_NAMES = ["SecurityAnalystRole"];// Roles allowed to access evidence S3 bucket 
        export const ALERT_EMAIL_RECIPIENTS = ["soc_team@company.com"];// Email addresses for alerts

    3. Bootstrap AWS CDK in your accounts (if it hasn’t been done already):
      1. Example: cdk bootstrap aws://456789012345/us-east-1 (example security AWS account).
      2. Then bootstrap if necessary in any target AWS accounts.
    4. Deploy the AWS CDK Stacks:
      1. Synthesize the CloudFormation template:
        cdk synth
      2. Deploy the security and alert stacks in your security account:
        cdk deploy SecurityStack AlertStack
      3. Deploy the customer stacks in your workload accounts:
        cdk deploy CustomerStack-ACCOUNT_ID
    5. Set up your email alerts:
      1. After the AlertStack is deployed, it will email all addresses listed in ALERT_EMAIL_RECIPIENTS. Choose the embedded link to accept the AWS SNS topic in each of those accounts.

    Testing

    With deployment complete, it’s time to test the solution.

    1. Trigger an analysis
      1. Make sure you have a Linux EC2 instance running in one of your customer accounts and in the AWS Region where you deployed the preceding customer stack.
      2. Because this example uses Systems Manager to orchestrate the collection script, make sure that the EC2 instance is visible in Systems Manager either by checking the Systems Manager console, or by using the AWS CLI:
        1. Console: In the AWS Systems Manager console, choose Managed instances in the left navigation pane and verify your instance appears in the list. For more information, see Managed Instances in the AWS Systems Manager User Guide.
        2. AWS CLI: Run the following command to verify the instance is managed:
          aws ssm describe-instance-information --filters “Key=InstanceIds,Values=<instance-id>
          If the command returns instance information with PingStatus: Online, the instance is properly connected to Systems Manager.
      3. Post a message in your security account to the Amazon SQS queue to start the Step Functions workflow. Note that the values in angle brackets (for example <accountID>) are placeholders that you must update with relevant AWS account ID, tracking ticket ID, AWS Region, and EC2 instance ID values:
        aws sqs send-message --queue-url --message-body ‘{ “account”: “”, “ticket_id”: “”, “region”: “>”, “instance_id”: “” }’
    2. Go to the Step Functions console to view the successful execution of the workflow:
      Figure 4 – Workflow as shown in the Step Functions console

      Figure 4: Workflow as shown in the Step Functions console

    3. View the DynamoDB table to see the metadata for the results.
    4. Check the evidence S3 bucket to see the uploaded files from the forensic collection.

    Conclusion

    Collecting forensic artifacts securely is a critical component of any digital forensics investigation. This post demonstrated how to implement least privilege access controls and time-limited credentials for forensic evidence collection workflows that use Amazon S3 for artifact storage. By combining IAM session policies with AWS STS temporary credentials, you can provide forensic tools with secure, scoped-down access to upload artifacts without exposing long-lived credentials or granting overly permissive access.

    The architecture presented in this post automates the process of generating temporary credentials, collecting forensic artifacts from both AWS and non-AWS resources, and securely storing them in S3 buckets with appropriate encryption, access controls, and audit logging. With this approach, your security teams can focus on analyzing evidence instead of managing credentials and permissions during active security incidents.To get started with this solution, deploy the example AWS CDK stacks provided in the collect forensic artifacts repository and customize them for your organization’s forensic investigation requirements. For more information about related AWS forensic investigation architectures, review the Automated Forensics Orchestrator for EC2 and How to build forensic kernel modules for Linux EC2 instances resources.

    If you have feedback about this post, submit comments in the Comments section below. If you have questions about this post, contact AWS Support.

    Jason Garman

    Jason Garman

    Jason is a principal security specialist solutions architect at AWS. He has 30 years of cybersecurity experience including incident response, reverse engineering, identity, and data protection. At AWS, he helps large organizations adopt the latest cloud and AI technologies while maintaining a high bar for data governance, security, and safety.

    Vaishnav Murthy

    Vaishnav Murthy

    Vaishnav is a Senior Security Engineer with AWS CloudResponse. He has an extensive background in incident response and security automation and enjoys building automated solutions that help AWS customers investigate and respond to security incidents at scale.

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