A caller offers you a free phone upgrade or an exclusive deal from your mobile provider. A new phone arrives at your home. So far, everything seems to check out.
Then comes another call: There’s been a shipping mistake. You received the wrong phone, and the company needs you to send it back. You send it back, but the phone never reaches your provider, leaving you with a large charge or long-term contract to pay.
Now police are warning about this scheme after residents lost devices and were left facing the associated payments.
How phone return scams work
The scam usually starts with a call from a spoofed number. In the US we’re seeing several examples in anonymized Malwarebytes Scam Guard records of the impersonated company being Canadian mobile provider Rogers.
The Canadian Anti-Fraud Centre warns:
“After collecting personal information required for credit checks, they’ll order a new phone in your name.”
Next, a genuine device arrives through a legitimate delivery service. That delivery makes the next part of the story easier to believe.
The caller gets back in touch and claims something went wrong. Perhaps the company sent the wrong device, or an extra phone arrived by mistake. To put things right, you need to send it back using the label or shipping QR code they provide.
The shipping label is the real trick. Rather than directing the package to the provider’s returns facility, it sends the device to an address chosen by the criminals.
The result: You no longer have the phone, but your provider has not received it back. Victims can be left facing a contract, financing agreement, or monthly payments for the missing device.
How to stay safe
The most important protection against most types of scams is having someone you can trust and help you decide whether something is a scam. Malwarebytes Scam Guard can be that partner if you’re on your own.
You don’t need to decide on the spot about whether a caller sounds convincing. Break the conversation and verify the offer separately. Pause and check if you encounter any of the following:
An unexpected call offering a free phone, loyalty reward, or unusually attractive upgrade.
A caller asking for personal, financial, or account information to arrange the offer.
A follow-up call claiming the wrong device was shipped or that another delivery mistake needs correcting.
Instructions to use a return label or QR code supplied by that caller.
A return destination that you have not confirmed directly with your provider.
If you’ve already sent a phone, contact your mobile provider immediately using verified contact details. Explain that you believe you were targeted by a phone return scam, identify the affected orders, and ask for a fraud investigation.
If you shared your account password or PIN, change it through the provider’s official channels. Rogers advises customers who disclosed their credentials to reset them and contact customer service to check for unauthorized transactions.
Keep the evidence: messages, emails, the shipping label, tracking details, order confirmations, bills, and a timeline of the calls. These records can help support a billing complaint and fraud report.
Something feel off? Check it before you click.
Malwarebytes Scam Guard helps you analyze suspicious links, texts, and screenshots instantly.
Recently, our team exposed sophisticated scam kits designed to steal sensitive data and trick consumers. But underground marketplaces are not just for malware and stolen passwords. They also offer services designed to manipulate your opinion of the products and services you buy every day.
In our latest research, we examined cybercrime forums where sellers advertise illicit “reputation management” services. For the right price, these underground operators offer to flood a product with glowing, five-star ratings or remove negative reviews. This shadowy industry works both ways—artificially boosting reputations and deliberately hiding legitimate complaints.
A major shift we are seeing in this space is the adoption of new technology. We also found that cybercriminals are using AI to automate these fake review campaigns. This could allow them to quickly generate realistic, human-sounding feedback in large volumes without much manual effort.
5 stars as a service
In the first example, discovered on a major English-language underground forum, a seller operating under the handle “aqenova” advertises both five-star review generation and negative review removal services.
The seller’s operations span widely used platforms, including Google, Trustpilot, Yelp, and various mobile app stores. By simply asking prospective buyers, “Just tell me which platform reviews you need?” the seller presents reputation manipulation as something buyers can just order on demand.
Five-star reviews and removal services
Decoding the seller’s FAQ
Analyzing another seller’s (TrustForge) “Frequently Asked Questions” section revealed some surprising details about how these operations reportedly run behind the scenes.
First, the seller emphasizes that real people manually post these reviews, offering a guarantee for both successful delivery and “non-drop”—meaning the platform won’t flag and remove the feedback later.
Remember, a real person posting a review doesn’t mean they’re a real customer. The important question is whether they actually used the product or service and are describing an honest experience.
Second, it appears this is a well-coordinated team effort rather than a solo operation, as the seller charges an extra fee if a buyer wants the main operator to write the review text personally.
However, what caught our attention most was their confidence in beating platform checks. The seller guarantees their fake reviews will stay active, claiming they rely on a closely guarded “private method.” According to TrustForge’s own statements, this method has allowed them to post more than 10,000 fake reviews.
Reputation management FAQ
The clean-up crew: Making bad reviews disappear
A single negative review is often all it takes to create a bad first impression of a product or service. When those negative comments start to pile up, they can completely ruin a business’s reputation and bottom line.
Recognizing how desperate businesses can be to protect their image, our research team discovered underground services specifically offering to remove “fake” or “unfair” reviews from major platforms like Google and Trustpilot.
Of course, the boundary between what is genuinely fake and what a business simply considers “unfair” can be blurry. Businesses can legitimately challenge fabricated reviews, but these services raise concerns about whether genuine customer complaints could also be targeted.
If legitimate customer complaints disappear, consumers lose information that could help them decide where to spend their money.
An offer to remove “fake” or “unfair” Google reviewsAn offer to remove ”fake” or “unfair” review Google reviews
On average, having a single review removed through these underground services costs between $100 and $200. However, the pricing jumps dramatically depending on the platform.
For instance, one seller advertised Airbnb review removal for around $1,100 per review.
When you check a business’s reviews, you’re looking for patterns in other customers’ experiences. If genuine complaints disappear, you could miss repeated problems with refunds, product quality, or customer service.
$1,100 to remove a “fake” or “unfair” Airbnb review
Artificial intelligence, artificial reviews
During the last few months, our research team spotted an interesting thread on an underground forum where two users discussed using AI to mimic human E-E-A-T.
E-E-A-T stands for Experience, Expertise, Authoritativeness, and Trustworthiness. It is a quality evaluation framework outlined in Google’s Search Quality Rater Guidelines, which human evaluators use to assess content quality. E-E-A-T itself is not a direct ranking factor.
In the discussion we observed, one user asked the community if it was possible to use AI to effectively fake these qualities when writing product reviews and artificially boost website rankings. The answer was a resounding yes.
Another user claimed they had never experienced problems getting Google to index their completely AI-generated reviews.
AI vs. E-E-A-T
Behind the scenes: The IP addresses for fake reviews
To keep fake reviews from being flagged and deleted, scammers need to look like everyday consumers. To help do this, they can use something called “residential and mobile proxies,” which route their traffic through other internet connections to disguise where it comes from.
Think of an IP address as your computer’s caller ID. When scammers use bulk IP addresses from giant data centers, platforms may spot and block that traffic as coming from commercially hosted infrastructure. Residential proxies, on the other hand, route traffic through real, physical home internet connections—just like the Wi-Fi you use in your living room. Mobile proxies work the same way, but use real cellular networks.
Our team recently discovered a seller on an underground forum acting as a direct supplier of these residential and mobile connections. The seller explicitly advertises them as perfect for running fake review campaigns.
Residential and mobile proxiesadvertised for fake review campaigns
How to avoid being misled by fake reviews
The main goal of this research isn’t to make you panic or stop trusting every online review you read. We want to raise awareness about what happens behind the scenes, so you can make more informed buying decisions.
If a product or offer seems too good to be true, but is backed by a mountain of perfect five-star reviews, take a moment to pause. Scammers often use these artificially boosted ratings to make a bad deal look reassuring.
Read recent reviews and some of the middle-rated ones, rather than relying on the overall score. Look for recurring details about the things that matter to you, such as durability, delivery, or getting your money back.
Look for repeated wording or sudden bursts of glowing feedback. These signs don’t prove a review is fake, but they’re reasons to take a closer look. Check the seller’s contact details and return policy, too.
Malwarebytes Browser Guard can also help block scam, phishing, and malicious websites you may encounter while shopping.
Unsure about an offer, even with glowing reviews? Share the link or a screenshot with Malwarebytes Scam Guard for help checking for signs of a scam before you buy.
Stop threats before they can do any harm.
Malwarebytes Browser Guard blocks phishing pages and malicious sites automatically. Free, one click to install. Add it to your browser →
AI is becoming a third wheel in relationships, increasingly playing a role in the most intimate parts of our lives.
It shows up in the flirty first text, the polished dating profile, the therapized language we use with a partner after a fight, the strength we gather after heartbreak, and everywhere in between. For some, AI is a source of companionship itself. And even if you’re not personally an AI user, you may still be dating, loving, arguing with, or trusting someone who is.
As AI moves deeper into our relationships, it’s reshaping connection, blurring what feels authentic, and creating new ways for intimacy to be exploited.
AI is starting to replace human interaction
AI is moving into emotional territory once reserved for other people. For some, it’s no longer just a tool, but a source of support, companionship, and even romantic connection.
According to our recent research, about one in six have turned to a chatbot for companionship or emotional support. That climbs to about one in five among Gen Z and Millennials, and nearly one in four among regular AI users (those who use AI daily or multiple times a week). The more time people spend with AI, the more likely they are to humanize its role, making room for it as a friend, confidant, advisor, or even partner.
As AI takes on more intimate roles, it’s also starting to challenge the boundaries of real human relationships. More than one in three (37%) say having a romantic relationship with an AI chatbot while already in a committed relationship isn’t the same as cheating. That view is more common among men (46% versus 30% of women), Gen Z and Millennials (43% and 45%), and regular AI users (48%).
Whether the relationship is platonic or romantic, the more AI is treated like a human, the more personal the stakes become. Just like you have to be cautious when telling a human your deepest, darkest secrets, the experience is similar when using AI. Nearly two-thirds (65%) worry that private conversations they’ve had with AI could be exposed.
One survey respondent said:
“I have used a chatbot…for emotional support, and it is worrying to think those conversations could be leaked.”
The technology may be artificial, but the relationships people form with AI can feel very real. And as with any relationship, that means there are boundaries to work out, privacy to protect, and vulnerabilities to manage.
AI is creating new ways to weaponize intimacy
AI’s growing role in human intimacy also has a darker side. The same technology that can offer comfort, advice, or companionship can also be used to violate the most intimate parts of our lives.
Non-consensual image abuse, sextortion, and other forms of sexual abuse have long been part of the internet’s dark side. Generative AI has made that content easier to create. Someone trying to exploit another person no longer needs an actual intimate photo, video, or private exchange. A regular photo—or even just someone’s likeness—can be transformed into sexual content they never made, never shared, and never consented to.
Most people draw a clear line against that, but not everyone does. About one in six people say it’s acceptable to generate explicit images of someone without their permission for personal use. Another 14% are neutral, bringing the share who do not explicitly oppose the behavior to nearly one in three (31%).
Views differ sharply by age and sex:
Younger adults are more accepting of someone using AI to generate non-consensual content: nearly one in four Gen Z (24%) and Millennials (23%) say it’s okay, compared with 13% of Gen X and just 5% of Boomers+
Men are also more permissive: more than one in five (22%) say it’s okay, compared with 14% of women
Attitudes toward the behavior may vary, but the fear of becoming a target is far more widespread. Overall, nearly two-thirds of people (62%) worry someone could create fake nude or sexually explicit photos or videos of them. Women feel this threat more acutely: nearly seven in ten (69%) are concerned, compared with 57% of men.
For some, this fear has already become a reality:
One in ten say AI has been used to generate nude or sexually explicit imagery of them without permission
One in ten say someone has threatened to release AI-generated compromising or explicit imagery of them
As one respondent recounted:
“I had someone make fake nudes of me using AI on my photos from my social media and threaten to post them on Facebook…[it] made me more cautious about AI.”
The intimate material may be fake, but the fear, coercion, and potential for reputational, emotional, and financial damage are completely real.
AI is making it harder to know who you’re really talking to
The threat doesn’t stop with fabricated sexual content. AI is also making it harder to know whether the person on the other side of a screen is who they claim to be.
Humans have always edited themselves for other people. We choose the most flattering photo, write and rewrite the text before sending it, and present our most interesting selves—especially when forming new relationships. AI dramatically expands what that kind of self-editing can look like, and people aren’t shy about using it:
54% say AI helps them present the best version of themselves
47% say using AI to present your “best self” to employers, friends, or romantic partners does not present a false identity
That rises to 58% of both Gen Z and Millennials and 64% of regular AI users
But where does enhancement end and deception begin? Is an AI-polished dating profile still authentically you? What about a message you didn’t write? A photo that looks like you, only better?
There’s a flipside to using AI to make ourselves look or sound better: If we can do it, so can everyone else. And people are much less comfortable when they’re not the ones controlling the technology. Two-thirds (67%) worry that an online friend or romantic interest could use AI-generated images, videos, or other content to deceive them.
Catfishing, fake photos, and lies on dating profiles aren’t new. AI just makes the deception easier. Someone’s photos, backstory, messages, and even their voice can all be faked.
One person described leaving dating apps after realizing the person they were talking to had gone well beyond simply polishing their profile:
“[The] dating profile had fake pictures…[it] wasn’t just making true events sound interesting and more flirty, but creating completely false photos and information. Left the dating apps again and needed to reset.”
AI can distort identity in the other direction, too. It can also create a version of us we never chose to put into the world.
76% worry about someone creating a fake profile pretending to be them
70% worry about fake images or videos of themselves being created
71% worry AI-generated content could be used to damage their reputation
Relationships are built on mutual trust. AI can distort both sides of the connection: who we think the other person is, and who they think we are.
AI is quietly finding its way into the space between people
Not all of AI’s influence on intimacy is so dramatic. Much of it happens quietly, showing up in how people communicate with each other and navigate relationships:
More than one in three have used AI to help write or edit a message
About one in seven have turned to it for advice about a relationship or personal decision
One in ten say it has already changed how they date or communicate romantically—rising to nearly one in five among Gen Z
The survey responses show what this looks like in real life. For example, one respondent described using AI with their partner as a way to step outside their own point of view:
“Personally, it has helped me. We use AI in our relationship as a reflection tool, and it has sometimes helped us take on the perspective of the other.”
For another, AI helped them work through jealousy:
“So, I used to accuse my partner, and I got really territorial about them but once I talked to AI about it, they gave helpful advice and now we are stronger than ever.”
AI is also showing up in other difficult relationship moments. One person said it helped them “stay calm and communicate” when problems came up with their partner; another said it allows them “to pause and refine [their] thoughts” before responding.
Sometimes the role is simpler. One respondent said AI gives them “new romantic words” for their partner, while another said they’ve asked AI for advice on how to make their partner smile. AI’s growing role in relationships may be unsettling, but the benefits people describe are definitely there.
AI isn’t just helping people find the right words. It’s also helping them decide what version of themselves to put forward in the first place. More than one in three say it’s okay to use AI to create or improve a dating profile; nearly two-thirds aren’t opposed. One respondent described using AI as a “creative advisor” to polish their profile and come up with conversation starters.
AI doesn’t have to replace a relationship to help shape it. It can influence how people communicate, what advice they take, and how they choose to present themselves.
AI’s intimacy problem is ultimately a trust problem
From connection to deception to outright harm, the same question keeps surfacing: Can I trust what’s in front of me? And would I know if I couldn’t?
Nearly nine in ten people (88%) say AI is making it harder to tell what online content is genuinely human or real. And 84% say even convincing video evidence no longer necessarily feels like proof. That uncertainty follows people into dating and relationships, where knowing what—and who—to trust is deeply personal.
AI may make it easier to start a conversation, smooth over a hard one, or feel connected when you’re lonely. But relationships and intimacy of all kinds still come down to trust, and AI is making that trust a little harder to take at face value.
About the research
The research in this article is based on a March 2026 survey about AI, identity, and the collapse of digital trust and was conducted among 1,500 respondents in the United States, United Kingdom, Germany, Austria, and Switzerland. The research was prepared by an independent research consultant and distributed via Forsta.
Something feel off? Check it before you click.
Malwarebytes Scam Guard helps you analyze suspicious links, texts, and screenshots instantly.
AI is becoming a third wheel in relationships, increasingly playing a role in the most intimate parts of our lives.
It shows up in the flirty first text, the polished dating profile, the therapized language we use with a partner after a fight, the strength we gather after heartbreak, and everywhere in between. For some, AI is a source of companionship itself. And even if you’re not personally an AI user, you may still be dating, loving, arguing with, or trusting someone who is.
As AI moves deeper into our relationships, it’s reshaping connection, blurring what feels authentic, and creating new ways for intimacy to be exploited.
AI is starting to replace human interaction
AI is moving into emotional territory once reserved for other people. For some, it’s no longer just a tool, but a source of support, companionship, and even romantic connection.
According to our recent research, about one in six have turned to a chatbot for companionship or emotional support. That climbs to about one in five among Gen Z and Millennials, and nearly one in four among regular AI users (those who use AI daily or multiple times a week). The more time people spend with AI, the more likely they are to humanize its role, making room for it as a friend, confidant, advisor, or even partner.
As AI takes on more intimate roles, it’s also starting to challenge the boundaries of real human relationships. More than one in three (37%) say having a romantic relationship with an AI chatbot while already in a committed relationship isn’t the same as cheating. That view is more common among men (46% versus 30% of women), Gen Z and Millennials (43% and 45%), and regular AI users (48%).
Whether the relationship is platonic or romantic, the more AI is treated like a human, the more personal the stakes become. Just like you have to be cautious when telling a human your deepest, darkest secrets, the experience is similar when using AI. Nearly two-thirds (65%) worry that private conversations they’ve had with AI could be exposed.
One survey respondent said:
“I have used a chatbot…for emotional support, and it is worrying to think those conversations could be leaked.”
The technology may be artificial, but the relationships people form with AI can feel very real. And as with any relationship, that means there are boundaries to work out, privacy to protect, and vulnerabilities to manage.
AI is creating new ways to weaponize intimacy
AI’s growing role in human intimacy also has a darker side. The same technology that can offer comfort, advice, or companionship can also be used to violate the most intimate parts of our lives.
Non-consensual image abuse, sextortion, and other forms of sexual abuse have long been part of the internet’s dark side. Generative AI has made that content easier to create. Someone trying to exploit another person no longer needs an actual intimate photo, video, or private exchange. A regular photo—or even just someone’s likeness—can be transformed into sexual content they never made, never shared, and never consented to.
Most people draw a clear line against that, but not everyone does. About one in six people say it’s acceptable to generate explicit images of someone without their permission for personal use. Another 14% are neutral, bringing the share who do not explicitly oppose the behavior to nearly one in three (31%).
Views differ sharply by age and sex:
Younger adults are more accepting of someone using AI to generate non-consensual content: nearly one in four Gen Z (24%) and Millennials (23%) say it’s okay, compared with 13% of Gen X and just 5% of Boomers+
Men are also more permissive: more than one in five (22%) say it’s okay, compared with 14% of women
Attitudes toward the behavior may vary, but the fear of becoming a target is far more widespread. Overall, nearly two-thirds of people (62%) worry someone could create fake nude or sexually explicit photos or videos of them. Women feel this threat more acutely: nearly seven in ten (69%) are concerned, compared with 57% of men.
For some, this fear has already become a reality:
One in ten say AI has been used to generate nude or sexually explicit imagery of them without permission
One in ten say someone has threatened to release AI-generated compromising or explicit imagery of them
As one respondent recounted:
“I had someone make fake nudes of me using AI on my photos from my social media and threaten to post them on Facebook…[it] made me more cautious about AI.”
The intimate material may be fake, but the fear, coercion, and potential for reputational, emotional, and financial damage are completely real.
AI is making it harder to know who you’re really talking to
The threat doesn’t stop with fabricated sexual content. AI is also making it harder to know whether the person on the other side of a screen is who they claim to be.
Humans have always edited themselves for other people. We choose the most flattering photo, write and rewrite the text before sending it, and present our most interesting selves—especially when forming new relationships. AI dramatically expands what that kind of self-editing can look like, and people aren’t shy about using it:
54% say AI helps them present the best version of themselves
47% say using AI to present your “best self” to employers, friends, or romantic partners does not present a false identity
That rises to 58% of both Gen Z and Millennials and 64% of regular AI users
But where does enhancement end and deception begin? Is an AI-polished dating profile still authentically you? What about a message you didn’t write? A photo that looks like you, only better?
There’s a flipside to using AI to make ourselves look or sound better: If we can do it, so can everyone else. And people are much less comfortable when they’re not the ones controlling the technology. Two-thirds (67%) worry that an online friend or romantic interest could use AI-generated images, videos, or other content to deceive them.
Catfishing, fake photos, and lies on dating profiles aren’t new. AI just makes the deception easier. Someone’s photos, backstory, messages, and even their voice can all be faked.
One person described leaving dating apps after realizing the person they were talking to had gone well beyond simply polishing their profile:
“[The] dating profile had fake pictures…[it] wasn’t just making true events sound interesting and more flirty, but creating completely false photos and information. Left the dating apps again and needed to reset.”
AI can distort identity in the other direction, too. It can also create a version of us we never chose to put into the world.
76% worry about someone creating a fake profile pretending to be them
70% worry about fake images or videos of themselves being created
71% worry AI-generated content could be used to damage their reputation
Relationships are built on mutual trust. AI can distort both sides of the connection: who we think the other person is, and who they think we are.
AI is quietly finding its way into the space between people
Not all of AI’s influence on intimacy is so dramatic. Much of it happens quietly, showing up in how people communicate with each other and navigate relationships:
More than one in three have used AI to help write or edit a message
About one in seven have turned to it for advice about a relationship or personal decision
One in ten say it has already changed how they date or communicate romantically—rising to nearly one in five among Gen Z
The survey responses show what this looks like in real life. For example, one respondent described using AI with their partner as a way to step outside their own point of view:
“Personally, it has helped me. We use AI in our relationship as a reflection tool, and it has sometimes helped us take on the perspective of the other.”
For another, AI helped them work through jealousy:
“So, I used to accuse my partner, and I got really territorial about them but once I talked to AI about it, they gave helpful advice and now we are stronger than ever.”
AI is also showing up in other difficult relationship moments. One person said it helped them “stay calm and communicate” when problems came up with their partner; another said it allows them “to pause and refine [their] thoughts” before responding.
Sometimes the role is simpler. One respondent said AI gives them “new romantic words” for their partner, while another said they’ve asked AI for advice on how to make their partner smile. AI’s growing role in relationships may be unsettling, but the benefits people describe are definitely there.
AI isn’t just helping people find the right words. It’s also helping them decide what version of themselves to put forward in the first place. More than one in three say it’s okay to use AI to create or improve a dating profile; nearly two-thirds aren’t opposed. One respondent described using AI as a “creative advisor” to polish their profile and come up with conversation starters.
AI doesn’t have to replace a relationship to help shape it. It can influence how people communicate, what advice they take, and how they choose to present themselves.
AI’s intimacy problem is ultimately a trust problem
From connection to deception to outright harm, the same question keeps surfacing: Can I trust what’s in front of me? And would I know if I couldn’t?
Nearly nine in ten people (88%) say AI is making it harder to tell what online content is genuinely human or real. And 84% say even convincing video evidence no longer necessarily feels like proof. That uncertainty follows people into dating and relationships, where knowing what—and who—to trust is deeply personal.
AI may make it easier to start a conversation, smooth over a hard one, or feel connected when you’re lonely. But relationships and intimacy of all kinds still come down to trust, and AI is making that trust a little harder to take at face value.
About the research
The research in this article is based on a March 2026 survey about AI, identity, and the collapse of digital trust and was conducted among 1,500 respondents in the United States, United Kingdom, Germany, Austria, and Switzerland. The research was prepared by an independent research consultant and distributed via Forsta.
Something feel off? Check it before you click.
Malwarebytes Scam Guard helps you analyze suspicious links, texts, and screenshots instantly.
.kadence-column476672_104e78-a1 > .kt-inside-inner-col{padding-top:20px;padding-right:20px;padding-bottom:10px;padding-left:20px;}.kadence-column476672_104e78-a1 > .kt-inside-inner-col{column-gap:var(--global-kb-gap-sm, 1rem);}.kadence-column476672_104e78-a1 > .kt-inside-inner-col{flex-direction:column;}.kadence-column476672_104e78-a1 > .kt-inside-inner-col > .aligncenter{width:100%;}.kadence-column476672_104e78-a1 > .kt-inside-inner-col{background-color:var(--color-red-10);}.kadence-column476672_104e78-a1 > .kt-inside-inner-col:before{opacity:0.3;background-color:var(--color-red-10);}.kadence-column476672_104e78-a1{position:relative;}@media all and (max-width: 1024px){.kadence-column476672_104e78-a1 > .kt-inside-inner-col{flex-direction:column;justify-content:center;}}@media all and (max-width: 767px){.kadence-column476672_104e78-a1 > .kt-inside-inner-col{flex-direction:column;justify-content:center;}}
In this article
Fake Amazon Music deals use real YouTube stats as bait.
Fake verification steals Google sign-in details, risking account takeovers.
Make sure to verify offers independently and check the browser address before signing in.
Already entered your details? Change your password and check account activity and channel permissions.
On August 27, YouTube announced that Amazon had joined its Shopping Affiliate Program. Eligible creators can now tag Amazon products in their videos and earn a commission on sales.
Weeks later, we found a wave of sites offering YouTube creators what looks like another Amazon opportunity: an invite-only advertising deal with Amazon Music. The site shows creators their own channel stats, then asks them to “verify” their channel with Google before it reveals a personalized offer.
That verification step is a phishing attempt designed to steal Google sign-in details, putting the creator’s account and YouTube channel at risk.
If you receive one of these offers, don’t enter your Google password or verification codes. If you already have, secure your Google account immediately using the steps below.
What the real Amazon and YouTube partnership looks like
The real partnership lets eligible creators in the YouTube Partner Program and YouTube Shopping affiliate program tag Amazon products in their videos, Shorts, and livestreams, and earn a commission when viewers buy. YouTube’s setup guidance also describes linking Amazon and YouTube accounts, with a notification in YouTube Studio once tagging is enabled.
The real program does include a step where you connect and verify your channel. But it happens inside an Amazon account you already have, on Amazon’s own site, and YouTube confirms it in YouTube Studio. It doesn’t involve invite-only Amazon Music ad campaigns, payout calculators, or a third-party “creator portal.”
An invite-only deal that doesn’t exist
The site, hosted at amazonyt[.]com, calls itself the “Amazon Artists Music — Creator Portal.” The name resembles Amazon’s real Amazon Music for Artists service, helping it feel familiar at first glance.
It promises “advertising collaborations with Amazon and Amazon Music,” describes the program as invitation-only, and tells visitors to use “the link from your Amazon Music Artists outreach email.”
There’s even an earnings calculator. You pick one of four packages (a Shorts package, an integration in a planned video, a dedicated video, or a “full campaign package”), set your average views, add “boosters” like extra Shorts or a livestream mention, and choose how exclusive the deal should be. The page then shows an “estimated payout” and compares it with the “endless back-and-forth and delayed payments” of ordinary brand outreach.
The calculator does real math on the numbers you enter. But a working calculator doesn’t make the payout real. The estimates give creators a reason to keep going before the site asks for their sign-in details.
The site is available in nine languages: English, Spanish, Indonesian, Portuguese, Russian, Urdu, Arabic, Hindi, and Thai, suggesting the operators are targeting creators across multiple countries.
Your own channel, used as bait
Next, the site asks for your YouTube channel link.
Once you paste it, a dashboard displays your real channel data: subscriber count, total views, recent and top-performing uploads, playlists, topics, and thumbnails. Seeing your own data on an Amazon-branded page makes the offer feel tailored to you.
To pull this data, the site queries YouTube’s own public API directly from your browser. The code includes 20 Google API keys and automatically switches to the next one if a key hits its usage limit or is rejected.
This data is public, so looking it up isn’t theft in itself. What it buys the criminals is credibility. A site that knows your subscriber count and your latest upload can look as though someone has already assessed your channel for a deal.
The offer itself stays locked until you “verify” your channel.
The fake “Continue with Google” button
To unlock it, you have to “complete the required step: Verify Your Channel.” The page says you need to sign in with Google to confirm you own the channel and “unlock your Amazon Music collaboration brief,” and shows a familiar white button with the colored Google logo: Continue with Google.
The site does contain genuine Google sign-in code, the same kind legitimate sites use. But it’s inactive: the setting that would connect it to Google is empty, so it never runs.
Instead, clicking the button opens a full-screen frame on top of the page. The frame loads content from a second domain, youtubechannelverification[.]com. Its background is almost completely transparent, so whatever the second site draws appears to sit over the Amazon page. Meanwhile, your browser’s address bar still shows amazonyt[.]com.
This is similar to what we described in our recent look at a fake Claude Max giveaway: when the sign-in window lives inside the page, the criminals control nearly everything you see.
The second-stage code shows what it’s after. In the version we analyzed, it sent the email address and password entered into the form to its own server, and it supported steps for multi-factor authentication (MFA) challenges. In other words, it’s built to collect not just your password but also verification codes that could help the criminals get past an additional layer of account protection.
A fake offer to keep you reassured
What happens next depends on how the second stage responds.
The fake window has no close button of its own. It closes only when the second-stage site tells it to. When that happens, the page displays, “Verification failed. Please try again.”
However, the second-stage configuration we analyzed also pointed to a “success” address back on amazonyt[.]com. Visiting that page marks your channel as verified and returns you to the dashboard, where the offer is now unlocked: a fit score, campaign tier, budget band, estimated reach, and a pitch that quotes your recent average views back to you.
You can even negotiate. A counter-offer editor lets you choose deliverables, toggle social media usage rights, and leave a note for “Amazon Music.” When you click Request this collaboration or submit your counter-offer, a “Request received” screen says the Amazon Music partnership team will review your channel and reach out with next steps.
For the creator who reaches this screen, everything appears to have worked. They verified their channel, saw a convincing offer, and sent a request. That reassuring ending may give the criminals more time before the victim suspects anything.
Why this campaign stands out
Fake sponsorship offers have targeted creators for years. This one combines several features that make the trap more convincing:
The password collection happens on a second domain. The amazonyt[.]com page itself doesn’t contain the sign-in form. That form is loaded from youtubechannelverification[.]com only after you click. A split like this can make the first page look cleaner to anyone checking it, and it lets the operators change the second stage without touching the lure.
The success page is designed to evade suspicion. Victims who hand over their details aren’t left at an error page. They’re returned to an unlocked offer and a “Request received” confirmation, giving them a reason to wait for a reply.
Personalization is automatic. Every visitor gets a dashboard and offer built from their own channel’s real numbers.
It may be part of a reusable kit. The code contains leftover error messages that have nothing to do with this site, like “Please enter the product ID” and “This channel is not in the list, please connect the invited channel.” The link to the second stage also carries a ref value, which the second-stage code we analyzed stored as a workerCode. That could mean more than one person sends traffic to it, though we can’t confirm how the kit is shared.
Why criminals want YouTube channels
YouTube creators have been a target for years. In 2021, Google’s Threat Analysis Group described a campaign that lured creators with fake collaboration offers, used malware to take over their channels, and then sold them on or used them to broadcast cryptocurrency scams.
A hijacked channel comes with an audience that already trusts it. That gives criminals a ready-made platform for reaching potential victims.
How to spot a fake sponsorship offer
Treat “verify your channel” requests with caution. Legitimate services may use Google’s official sign-in to confirm channel ownership. The important distinction is where you sign in: Your Google password and verification codes belong on Google’s genuine sign-in page.
Check the browser’s real address bar. If you’re asked for your Google password, the actual browser tab or separate browser window should show accounts.google.com. An address bar drawn inside the webpage can be faked.
Check the domain, not the logo. The domains amazonyt[.]com and youtubechannelverification[.]com are part of this phishing campaign. Familiar branding and accurate channel stats don’t make them official.
Know what the real program offers. The Amazon and YouTube Shopping partnership lets eligible creators earn commissions on tagged products. A supposed Amazon Music sponsorship needs to be verified separately.
Verify the offer independently. Contact the company through its official website, using contact details you find yourself rather than those supplied in the message.
If you already entered your details
Change your Google password through Google’s official site. Review your devices and sign out of unfamiliar sessions in your Google Account security settings, and remove any third-party apps you don’t recognize. Also check that your recovery email address and phone number haven’t changed.
If you entered an MFA code or approved a sign-in prompt, treat your account as potentially compromised.
In YouTube Studio, check Settings > Permissions for anyone you didn’t add. If your channel is connected to a Brand Account, check that account’s permissions too. If you’ve lost access, follow YouTube’s guidance for recovering a hacked channel, starting with the Google account associated with it.
How Malwarebytes spots scams like this
Once a phishing page loads, the criminals control almost everything you see, which is why it’s best to stop it before it opens.
Malwarebytes Browser Guard blocks phishing and scam domains before the page can load. If you’re unsure about a sponsorship offer, you can ask Malwarebytes Scam Guard to check it before you reply or click anything.
Indicators of compromise
amazonyt[.]com
youtubechannelverification[.]com
Stop threats before they can do any harm.
Malwarebytes Browser Guard blocks phishing pages and malicious sites automatically. Free, one click to install. Add it to your browser →
.kadence-column476672_104e78-a1 > .kt-inside-inner-col{padding-top:20px;padding-right:20px;padding-bottom:10px;padding-left:20px;}.kadence-column476672_104e78-a1 > .kt-inside-inner-col{column-gap:var(--global-kb-gap-sm, 1rem);}.kadence-column476672_104e78-a1 > .kt-inside-inner-col{flex-direction:column;}.kadence-column476672_104e78-a1 > .kt-inside-inner-col > .aligncenter{width:100%;}.kadence-column476672_104e78-a1 > .kt-inside-inner-col{background-color:var(--color-red-10);}.kadence-column476672_104e78-a1 > .kt-inside-inner-col:before{opacity:0.3;background-color:var(--color-red-10);}.kadence-column476672_104e78-a1{position:relative;}@media all and (max-width: 1024px){.kadence-column476672_104e78-a1 > .kt-inside-inner-col{flex-direction:column;justify-content:center;}}@media all and (max-width: 767px){.kadence-column476672_104e78-a1 > .kt-inside-inner-col{flex-direction:column;justify-content:center;}}
In this article
Fake Amazon Music deals use real YouTube stats as bait.
Fake verification steals Google sign-in details, risking account takeovers.
Make sure to verify offers independently and check the browser address before signing in.
Already entered your details? Change your password and check account activity and channel permissions.
On August 27, YouTube announced that Amazon had joined its Shopping Affiliate Program. Eligible creators can now tag Amazon products in their videos and earn a commission on sales.
Weeks later, we found a wave of sites offering YouTube creators what looks like another Amazon opportunity: an invite-only advertising deal with Amazon Music. The site shows creators their own channel stats, then asks them to “verify” their channel with Google before it reveals a personalized offer.
That verification step is a phishing attempt designed to steal Google sign-in details, putting the creator’s account and YouTube channel at risk.
If you receive one of these offers, don’t enter your Google password or verification codes. If you already have, secure your Google account immediately using the steps below.
What the real Amazon and YouTube partnership looks like
The real partnership lets eligible creators in the YouTube Partner Program and YouTube Shopping affiliate program tag Amazon products in their videos, Shorts, and livestreams, and earn a commission when viewers buy. YouTube’s setup guidance also describes linking Amazon and YouTube accounts, with a notification in YouTube Studio once tagging is enabled.
The real program does include a step where you connect and verify your channel. But it happens inside an Amazon account you already have, on Amazon’s own site, and YouTube confirms it in YouTube Studio. It doesn’t involve invite-only Amazon Music ad campaigns, payout calculators, or a third-party “creator portal.”
An invite-only deal that doesn’t exist
The site, hosted at amazonyt[.]com, calls itself the “Amazon Artists Music — Creator Portal.” The name resembles Amazon’s real Amazon Music for Artists service, helping it feel familiar at first glance.
It promises “advertising collaborations with Amazon and Amazon Music,” describes the program as invitation-only, and tells visitors to use “the link from your Amazon Music Artists outreach email.”
There’s even an earnings calculator. You pick one of four packages (a Shorts package, an integration in a planned video, a dedicated video, or a “full campaign package”), set your average views, add “boosters” like extra Shorts or a livestream mention, and choose how exclusive the deal should be. The page then shows an “estimated payout” and compares it with the “endless back-and-forth and delayed payments” of ordinary brand outreach.
The calculator does real math on the numbers you enter. But a working calculator doesn’t make the payout real. The estimates give creators a reason to keep going before the site asks for their sign-in details.
The site is available in nine languages: English, Spanish, Indonesian, Portuguese, Russian, Urdu, Arabic, Hindi, and Thai, suggesting the operators are targeting creators across multiple countries.
Your own channel, used as bait
Next, the site asks for your YouTube channel link.
Once you paste it, a dashboard displays your real channel data: subscriber count, total views, recent and top-performing uploads, playlists, topics, and thumbnails. Seeing your own data on an Amazon-branded page makes the offer feel tailored to you.
To pull this data, the site queries YouTube’s own public API directly from your browser. The code includes 20 Google API keys and automatically switches to the next one if a key hits its usage limit or is rejected.
This data is public, so looking it up isn’t theft in itself. What it buys the criminals is credibility. A site that knows your subscriber count and your latest upload can look as though someone has already assessed your channel for a deal.
The offer itself stays locked until you “verify” your channel.
The fake “Continue with Google” button
To unlock it, you have to “complete the required step: Verify Your Channel.” The page says you need to sign in with Google to confirm you own the channel and “unlock your Amazon Music collaboration brief,” and shows a familiar white button with the colored Google logo: Continue with Google.
The site does contain genuine Google sign-in code, the same kind legitimate sites use. But it’s inactive: the setting that would connect it to Google is empty, so it never runs.
Instead, clicking the button opens a full-screen frame on top of the page. The frame loads content from a second domain, youtubechannelverification[.]com. Its background is almost completely transparent, so whatever the second site draws appears to sit over the Amazon page. Meanwhile, your browser’s address bar still shows amazonyt[.]com.
This is similar to what we described in our recent look at a fake Claude Max giveaway: when the sign-in window lives inside the page, the criminals control nearly everything you see.
The second-stage code shows what it’s after. In the version we analyzed, it sent the email address and password entered into the form to its own server, and it supported steps for multi-factor authentication (MFA) challenges. In other words, it’s built to collect not just your password but also verification codes that could help the criminals get past an additional layer of account protection.
A fake offer to keep you reassured
What happens next depends on how the second stage responds.
The fake window has no close button of its own. It closes only when the second-stage site tells it to. When that happens, the page displays, “Verification failed. Please try again.”
However, the second-stage configuration we analyzed also pointed to a “success” address back on amazonyt[.]com. Visiting that page marks your channel as verified and returns you to the dashboard, where the offer is now unlocked: a fit score, campaign tier, budget band, estimated reach, and a pitch that quotes your recent average views back to you.
You can even negotiate. A counter-offer editor lets you choose deliverables, toggle social media usage rights, and leave a note for “Amazon Music.” When you click Request this collaboration or submit your counter-offer, a “Request received” screen says the Amazon Music partnership team will review your channel and reach out with next steps.
For the creator who reaches this screen, everything appears to have worked. They verified their channel, saw a convincing offer, and sent a request. That reassuring ending may give the criminals more time before the victim suspects anything.
Why this campaign stands out
Fake sponsorship offers have targeted creators for years. This one combines several features that make the trap more convincing:
The password collection happens on a second domain. The amazonyt[.]com page itself doesn’t contain the sign-in form. That form is loaded from youtubechannelverification[.]com only after you click. A split like this can make the first page look cleaner to anyone checking it, and it lets the operators change the second stage without touching the lure.
The success page is designed to evade suspicion. Victims who hand over their details aren’t left at an error page. They’re returned to an unlocked offer and a “Request received” confirmation, giving them a reason to wait for a reply.
Personalization is automatic. Every visitor gets a dashboard and offer built from their own channel’s real numbers.
It may be part of a reusable kit. The code contains leftover error messages that have nothing to do with this site, like “Please enter the product ID” and “This channel is not in the list, please connect the invited channel.” The link to the second stage also carries a ref value, which the second-stage code we analyzed stored as a workerCode. That could mean more than one person sends traffic to it, though we can’t confirm how the kit is shared.
Why criminals want YouTube channels
YouTube creators have been a target for years. In 2021, Google’s Threat Analysis Group described a campaign that lured creators with fake collaboration offers, used malware to take over their channels, and then sold them on or used them to broadcast cryptocurrency scams.
A hijacked channel comes with an audience that already trusts it. That gives criminals a ready-made platform for reaching potential victims.
How to spot a fake sponsorship offer
Treat “verify your channel” requests with caution. Legitimate services may use Google’s official sign-in to confirm channel ownership. The important distinction is where you sign in: Your Google password and verification codes belong on Google’s genuine sign-in page.
Check the browser’s real address bar. If you’re asked for your Google password, the actual browser tab or separate browser window should show accounts.google.com. An address bar drawn inside the webpage can be faked.
Check the domain, not the logo. The domains amazonyt[.]com and youtubechannelverification[.]com are part of this phishing campaign. Familiar branding and accurate channel stats don’t make them official.
Know what the real program offers. The Amazon and YouTube Shopping partnership lets eligible creators earn commissions on tagged products. A supposed Amazon Music sponsorship needs to be verified separately.
Verify the offer independently. Contact the company through its official website, using contact details you find yourself rather than those supplied in the message.
If you already entered your details
Change your Google password through Google’s official site. Review your devices and sign out of unfamiliar sessions in your Google Account security settings, and remove any third-party apps you don’t recognize. Also check that your recovery email address and phone number haven’t changed.
If you entered an MFA code or approved a sign-in prompt, treat your account as potentially compromised.
In YouTube Studio, check Settings > Permissions for anyone you didn’t add. If your channel is connected to a Brand Account, check that account’s permissions too. If you’ve lost access, follow YouTube’s guidance for recovering a hacked channel, starting with the Google account associated with it.
How Malwarebytes spots scams like this
Once a phishing page loads, the criminals control almost everything you see, which is why it’s best to stop it before it opens.
Malwarebytes Browser Guard blocks phishing and scam domains before the page can load. If you’re unsure about a sponsorship offer, you can ask Malwarebytes Scam Guard to check it before you reply or click anything.
Indicators of compromise
amazonyt[.]com
youtubechannelverification[.]com
Stop threats before they can do any harm.
Malwarebytes Browser Guard blocks phishing pages and malicious sites automatically. Free, one click to install. Add it to your browser →
We found 70 websites that impersonate legitimate crypto projects that invite visitors to vote on the date of an upcoming rewards distribution.
The pages copy the look of the real sites closely, and on most of them the offer is small and believable: Cast a vote, and as an active voter you get a 1.25x boost when the rewards are paid out.
However, the vote is fake and clicking the Vote now button opens a wallet connection prompt. It’s the first step toward requests that could trick visitors into authorizing access to their tokens.
The brands being copied include xStocks from Kraken, Pendle, Zama, Kinetiq, Yield Basis, Firelight, and smaller platforms including Umia, Keeta, and NetNet. None of these pages are affiliated with the projects they imitate.
Copies of familiar brands
Each site is a close copy of the project it targets, down to the logo, menus, and colors. The Firelight copy even carries a real announcement about the protocol’s deposit cap, suggesting the pages were copied from the live sites rather than rebuilt from scratch.
Most use the same wording about voting on the rewards date to earn a boost, though a few vary the pitch. The Pendle copy adds fake dates and a countdown to create urgency, the Keeta copy promises points instead of a boost, and the NetNet copy skips the vote and warns that unclaimed tokens will be burned after 48 hours.
Why these brands
The choice of targets does not appear to be random. Several of the impersonated projects have held a token launch, airdrop, or public token sale within the past year. Others run points or rewards programs. Their communities are used to hearing about rewards, claims, and allocations, and are primed to act on them.
Zama ran a public token auction in January, and its token began trading in February. Kinetiq launched its governance token alongside an airdrop to early users in November 2025. Umia’s token auction ran from August 29 to September 2, only weeks ago. Firelight awards points to early depositors, and Pendle launched on Robinhood Chain on September 4.
A message about rewards from one of these projects would not sound strange to someone who follows it. The lure appears designed to appeal to people who already hold the token or have used the protocol, because they’re the ones who might expect a distribution and want a bigger share.
What happens when you click vote
The Vote button does not lead to a ballot. It opens a Connect Wallet window that is the same regardless of which brand the page imitates. It lists WalletConnect, MetaMask, Trust Wallet, OKX Wallet, Binance Wallet, Bitget Wallet, and Rabby, along with an option to browse more than 28 others.
This window resembles the connection prompts people see on legitimate crypto sites, which may make the request seem routine.
Connecting a wallet on its own shares the wallet’s address, allowing the site to look up its holdings. At this point, it does not give the site permission to spend your tokens.
The damage typically comes from what the site asks for next. In wallet-draining scams, a page may follow the connection with a request to sign a message or approve a transaction, presented as confirming the action the visitor came to take. A malicious approval or signature can give the attacker permission to move tokens out of the wallet without further confirmation.
Blockchain transactions generally cannot be reversed, so stolen funds are very difficult to recover.
Signs of a single operation
Several details suggest a shared operation or phishing kit. All of the domains listed at the end of this article follow the same pattern: sitemu followed by a string of apparently random characters, on the .xyz top-level domain.
The same templates are reused across several different brands, with the text appearing almost word for word whether the page is dressed up as Zama, Firelight, or Yield Basis—right down to writing the boost as 1,25x, with a comma in place of the decimal point. The wallet connection window behind the Vote button is identical across the brands as well.
Random domain names spare the operator the work of coming up with a convincing lookalike address for each brand, and losing any single site costs them little. They also make the address bar one of the clearest giveaways on these pages.
How to protect your wallet
Check any claimed vote or rewards distribution through the project’s official channels before connecting your wallet. A familiar logo is easy to copy.
Check the address, not the design. These pages closely copy the real thing, so branding alone cannot establish that they are genuine. If the domain is not the one the project officially uses, close the tab.
Go to the project directly. If a vote or a reward is genuine, it will be on the project’s official site or announced on its established social accounts. Use a bookmark or type the address yourself rather than following a link from a message, ad, or reply.
Read what your wallet asks you to sign. Voting should not require you to approve spending of your tokens. If a signature or transaction request mentions approvals, permits, or transfers, reject it. Wallets that preview the outcome of a transaction can help, but do not approve a request you cannot understand.
Be wary of boosts, bonuses, and deadlines. Promises of extra rewards and warnings that unclaimed tokens will be burned can pressure you to act before checking.
Keep most of your funds in a separate wallet. Use a wallet with a small balance for unfamiliar sites, and keep long-term holdings in a wallet that you don’t use for those connections.
If you already connected, disconnect from the site. If you also signed a message or approved a transaction, use your wallet’s approval-management feature or a trusted token approval checker to review and revoke suspicious permissions. Disconnecting alone does not revoke token approvals. If you suspect your recovery phrase or private key was exposed, move remaining funds to a new wallet created with a new recovery phrase.
How Malwarebytes helps
Malwarebytes Browser Guard can block known phishing and scam sites before you interact with them. That is useful in campaigns like this one, where the fake page closely resembles the real thing.
If you receive a link to a rewards vote, claim page, or airdrop and are unsure about it, Malwarebytes Scam Guard can help assess the link before you connect your wallet. Check the offer through the project’s official channels too.
We found 70 websites that impersonate legitimate crypto projects that invite visitors to vote on the date of an upcoming rewards distribution.
The pages copy the look of the real sites closely, and on most of them the offer is small and believable: Cast a vote, and as an active voter you get a 1.25x boost when the rewards are paid out.
However, the vote is fake and clicking the Vote now button opens a wallet connection prompt. It’s the first step toward requests that could trick visitors into authorizing access to their tokens.
The brands being copied include xStocks from Kraken, Pendle, Zama, Kinetiq, Yield Basis, Firelight, and smaller platforms including Umia, Keeta, and NetNet. None of these pages are affiliated with the projects they imitate.
Copies of familiar brands
Each site is a close copy of the project it targets, down to the logo, menus, and colors. The Firelight copy even carries a real announcement about the protocol’s deposit cap, suggesting the pages were copied from the live sites rather than rebuilt from scratch.
Most use the same wording about voting on the rewards date to earn a boost, though a few vary the pitch. The Pendle copy adds fake dates and a countdown to create urgency, the Keeta copy promises points instead of a boost, and the NetNet copy skips the vote and warns that unclaimed tokens will be burned after 48 hours.
Why these brands
The choice of targets does not appear to be random. Several of the impersonated projects have held a token launch, airdrop, or public token sale within the past year. Others run points or rewards programs. Their communities are used to hearing about rewards, claims, and allocations, and are primed to act on them.
Zama ran a public token auction in January, and its token began trading in February. Kinetiq launched its governance token alongside an airdrop to early users in November 2025. Umia’s token auction ran from August 29 to September 2, only weeks ago. Firelight awards points to early depositors, and Pendle launched on Robinhood Chain on September 4.
A message about rewards from one of these projects would not sound strange to someone who follows it. The lure appears designed to appeal to people who already hold the token or have used the protocol, because they’re the ones who might expect a distribution and want a bigger share.
What happens when you click vote
The Vote button does not lead to a ballot. It opens a Connect Wallet window that is the same regardless of which brand the page imitates. It lists WalletConnect, MetaMask, Trust Wallet, OKX Wallet, Binance Wallet, Bitget Wallet, and Rabby, along with an option to browse more than 28 others.
This window resembles the connection prompts people see on legitimate crypto sites, which may make the request seem routine.
Connecting a wallet on its own shares the wallet’s address, allowing the site to look up its holdings. At this point, it does not give the site permission to spend your tokens.
The damage typically comes from what the site asks for next. In wallet-draining scams, a page may follow the connection with a request to sign a message or approve a transaction, presented as confirming the action the visitor came to take. A malicious approval or signature can give the attacker permission to move tokens out of the wallet without further confirmation.
Blockchain transactions generally cannot be reversed, so stolen funds are very difficult to recover.
Signs of a single operation
Several details suggest a shared operation or phishing kit. All of the domains listed at the end of this article follow the same pattern: sitemu followed by a string of apparently random characters, on the .xyz top-level domain.
The same templates are reused across several different brands, with the text appearing almost word for word whether the page is dressed up as Zama, Firelight, or Yield Basis—right down to writing the boost as 1,25x, with a comma in place of the decimal point. The wallet connection window behind the Vote button is identical across the brands as well.
Random domain names spare the operator the work of coming up with a convincing lookalike address for each brand, and losing any single site costs them little. They also make the address bar one of the clearest giveaways on these pages.
How to protect your wallet
Check any claimed vote or rewards distribution through the project’s official channels before connecting your wallet. A familiar logo is easy to copy.
Check the address, not the design. These pages closely copy the real thing, so branding alone cannot establish that they are genuine. If the domain is not the one the project officially uses, close the tab.
Go to the project directly. If a vote or a reward is genuine, it will be on the project’s official site or announced on its established social accounts. Use a bookmark or type the address yourself rather than following a link from a message, ad, or reply.
Read what your wallet asks you to sign. Voting should not require you to approve spending of your tokens. If a signature or transaction request mentions approvals, permits, or transfers, reject it. Wallets that preview the outcome of a transaction can help, but do not approve a request you cannot understand.
Be wary of boosts, bonuses, and deadlines. Promises of extra rewards and warnings that unclaimed tokens will be burned can pressure you to act before checking.
Keep most of your funds in a separate wallet. Use a wallet with a small balance for unfamiliar sites, and keep long-term holdings in a wallet that you don’t use for those connections.
If you already connected, disconnect from the site. If you also signed a message or approved a transaction, use your wallet’s approval-management feature or a trusted token approval checker to review and revoke suspicious permissions. Disconnecting alone does not revoke token approvals. If you suspect your recovery phrase or private key was exposed, move remaining funds to a new wallet created with a new recovery phrase.
How Malwarebytes helps
Malwarebytes Browser Guard can block known phishing and scam sites before you interact with them. That is useful in campaigns like this one, where the fake page closely resembles the real thing.
If you receive a link to a rewards vote, claim page, or airdrop and are unsure about it, Malwarebytes Scam Guard can help assess the link before you connect your wallet. Check the offer through the project’s official channels too.
Free Mobile, one of France’s main cellular providers, was fined €27 million by France’s data protection regulator, the CNIL, in January over failures to protect customer data. The October 2024 breach allowed an unauthorized party to access sensitive customer records, including bank account details and login information. Since the breach, we’ve seen many poorly written scam campaigns targeting Free Mobile customers.
However, over the past few weeks, a well-written scam has appeared, closely copying the design of the official Free Mobile website and email templates.
One of our employees, who is a Free Mobile customer, received this phishing email on Wednesday, September 30. The message used the same logo and template as legitimate emails from the company, but came from the suspicious email address freemobile-regularisation[@]knowledgegrowthcenter[.]help. It included a link that appeared to point to regularisation.free.fr :
The email tells the user that an invoice of €9.99 needs to be paid to avoid having the customer’s service suspended. Clicking the link opens a redirection chain:
Malwarebytes can help protect you from these threats, but treat unexpected messages about your accounts and invoices with caution:
Don’t follow links in unsolicited emails. If a message concerns your account, open the official Free Mobile app or website directly, or call the official help line at 3244.
Check the actual domain in your browser’s address bar to see if it matches what you expect—https://mobile.free.fr in this case.
Free Mobile, one of France’s main cellular providers, was fined €27 million by France’s data protection regulator, the CNIL, in January over failures to protect customer data. The October 2024 breach allowed an unauthorized party to access sensitive customer records, including bank account details and login information. Since the breach, we’ve seen many poorly written scam campaigns targeting Free Mobile customers.
However, over the past few weeks, a well-written scam has appeared, closely copying the design of the official Free Mobile website and email templates.
One of our employees, who is a Free Mobile customer, received this phishing email on Wednesday, September 30. The message used the same logo and template as legitimate emails from the company, but came from the suspicious email address freemobile-regularisation[@]knowledgegrowthcenter[.]help. It included a link that appeared to point to regularisation.free.fr :
The email tells the user that an invoice of €9.99 needs to be paid to avoid having the customer’s service suspended. Clicking the link opens a redirection chain:
Malwarebytes can help protect you from these threats, but treat unexpected messages about your accounts and invoices with caution:
Don’t follow links in unsolicited emails. If a message concerns your account, open the official Free Mobile app or website directly, or call the official help line at 3244.
Check the actual domain in your browser’s address bar to see if it matches what you expect—https://mobile.free.fr in this case.
Apple announced its first foldable iPhone on September 9, and scammers were ready to ‘deliver’ one before anyone could buy it.
Most of what we found around the launch of the iPhone Duo and iPhone 18 Pro was familiar fraud.
But one fake preorder page was different.
The fake Apple-style page offers a $500 voucher and a ticking preorder deadline.
Behind its Apple-style design and $500 voucher, the page uses the leaked DarkSword exploit chain to try to break into vulnerable iPhones. If it succeeds, a separate payload attempts to steal saved credentials, cryptocurrency wallet data, and notes.
You don’t have to fill in the form, tap a download, or approve anything. Opening the page is enough to start the attempt.
The form asks for contact details and offers Duo models and colors that do not match Apple’s.
But Apple doesn’t open iPhone Duo preorders until October 16. You cannot place an Apple preorder now. It offers 6.3-inch and 6.9-inch models in colors Apple doesn’t sell for the Duo. Its countdown starts over whenever the page loads, and its privacy, terms, and sales policy links go nowhere.
In the version we captured, submitting the form doesn’t place an order. Its submission handler doesn’t read or send the details entered, and the page generates its own “Pre-Order Successful” message. The exploit attempt has already begun in the background.
How the attack starts when the page opens
Visitors using browsers the script doesn’t recognize as Safari see a “Browser Restricted” notice. On iPhones, the page also tries to reopen the link in Safari, the browser the exploit chain targets. That steers visitors toward the intended browser, although background resources may still load in others.
Visitors shown this notice are urged to open the page in Safari.
An invisible frame checks the visitor’s iOS version and selects the next code to load. DarkSword then attempts to get past the iPhone’s protections and, if successful, gain deep access to the phone. It doesn’t wait for a button press or form submission.
What attackers could take from an iPhone
If the exploit succeeds, the payload attempts to contact its server. Its first message includes a device identifier, device information, and status. It also attempts to send a list of installed apps and the contents of Apple Notes.
The code looks for cryptocurrency wallets, including MetaMask, Phantom, Trust Wallet, Coinbase Wallet, Exodus, and Tonkeeper. It also attempts to recover saved credentials from the phone’s keychain. If it finds a targeted wallet and the first exchanges with its server succeed, it attempts to upload wallet files, recovered keychain data, and photo thumbnails. Exposure of wallet files or credentials could put funds at risk.
The captured code checks for installed cryptocurrency wallet apps. This is part of the list.
The payload also tries to access files containing messages, call history, contacts, voicemail, email, calendar entries, and cached location data.
The payload can then repeatedly contact its server for instructions. Its commands can list directories, retrieve files and full-size photos, gather app information, and run JavaScript supplied by the server. The payload also tries to cover its tracks by deleting diagnostic reports that could help investigators spot the attack.
The beacon sends a device identifier, device information and status to the configured server. The command loop uses the response to obtain instructions.
The code is designed to run inside a system process, but may stop before the phone restarts. We found no mechanism that automatically brings it back after a reboot.
We analyzed the captured code, but did not test it on an iPhone or observe data leaving one.
Which iPhones could be at risk?
Several parts of the captured code match the DarkSword chain described by Google in March. Apple has patched the vulnerabilities Google reported.
When DarkSword was disclosed in March, iVerify estimated that up to 270 million devices were running the iOS 18.4 through 18.6.2 versions targeted by the variant it analyzed. That is not a current count or a measure of how many phones this page could compromise. We haven’t confirmed this page’s exact range; its files also contain code for older iOS versions.
The lure fits the exploit: someone considering a new iPhone may still be using an older, unpatched one. That could make them vulnerable simply by opening the preorder page.
Keep your iPhone updated. Go to Settings > General > Software Update and install the latest version available. Turn on Automatic Updates there too. Apple says updated devices are protected against the reported DarkSword attacks.
Check offers without opening unfamiliar links. Go directly to Apple or a retailer you know by typing its address yourself. A preorder link in an ad, message, or social post could start an exploit attempt as soon as the page opens.
Opened this page? Restart your iPhone after updating it. We found no code that automatically brings the payload back after a reboot. Restarting cannot undo any data already taken.
Keep a cryptocurrency wallet on that phone? Take precautions from a trusted device. If the phone may have been compromised and you keep a wallet on it, create a new wallet with a new recovery phrase and move the funds. For an exchange account, secure the account and contact the exchange.
Change potentially exposed passwords from a trusted device. Start with email, your Apple Account, banking, and crypto accounts, and turn on two-factor authentication.
Report the page. Save its URL and any screenshots without reopening it, and report it to your national cybercrime reporting service.
Check a suspicious offer before you act.Scam Guard can give a verdict on a screenshot or link. On desktop, Browser Guard blocks the fake preorder page we analyzed; web protection in Malwarebytes Premium blocks it too.
Indicators of compromise
pnmrud[.]cc — command-and-control and collection server
cloud[.]cmatgldn[.]click — ad click and conversion tracker
“One of the best cybersecurity suites on the planet.”
Apple announced its first foldable iPhone on September 9, and scammers were ready to ‘deliver’ one before anyone could buy it.
Most of what we found around the launch of the iPhone Duo and iPhone 18 Pro was familiar fraud.
But one fake preorder page was different.
The fake Apple-style page offers a $500 voucher and a ticking preorder deadline.
Behind its Apple-style design and $500 voucher, the page uses the leaked DarkSword exploit chain to try to break into vulnerable iPhones. If it succeeds, a separate payload attempts to steal saved credentials, cryptocurrency wallet data, and notes.
You don’t have to fill in the form, tap a download, or approve anything. Opening the page is enough to start the attempt.
The form asks for contact details and offers Duo models and colors that do not match Apple’s.
But Apple doesn’t open iPhone Duo preorders until October 16. You cannot place an Apple preorder now. It offers 6.3-inch and 6.9-inch models in colors Apple doesn’t sell for the Duo. Its countdown starts over whenever the page loads, and its privacy, terms, and sales policy links go nowhere.
In the version we captured, submitting the form doesn’t place an order. Its submission handler doesn’t read or send the details entered, and the page generates its own “Pre-Order Successful” message. The exploit attempt has already begun in the background.
How the attack starts when the page opens
Visitors using browsers the script doesn’t recognize as Safari see a “Browser Restricted” notice. On iPhones, the page also tries to reopen the link in Safari, the browser the exploit chain targets. That steers visitors toward the intended browser, although background resources may still load in others.
Visitors shown this notice are urged to open the page in Safari.
An invisible frame checks the visitor’s iOS version and selects the next code to load. DarkSword then attempts to get past the iPhone’s protections and, if successful, gain deep access to the phone. It doesn’t wait for a button press or form submission.
What attackers could take from an iPhone
If the exploit succeeds, the payload attempts to contact its server. Its first message includes a device identifier, device information, and status. It also attempts to send a list of installed apps and the contents of Apple Notes.
The code looks for cryptocurrency wallets, including MetaMask, Phantom, Trust Wallet, Coinbase Wallet, Exodus, and Tonkeeper. It also attempts to recover saved credentials from the phone’s keychain. If it finds a targeted wallet and the first exchanges with its server succeed, it attempts to upload wallet files, recovered keychain data, and photo thumbnails. Exposure of wallet files or credentials could put funds at risk.
The captured code checks for installed cryptocurrency wallet apps. This is part of the list.
The payload also tries to access files containing messages, call history, contacts, voicemail, email, calendar entries, and cached location data.
The payload can then repeatedly contact its server for instructions. Its commands can list directories, retrieve files and full-size photos, gather app information, and run JavaScript supplied by the server. The payload also tries to cover its tracks by deleting diagnostic reports that could help investigators spot the attack.
The beacon sends a device identifier, device information and status to the configured server. The command loop uses the response to obtain instructions.
The code is designed to run inside a system process, but may stop before the phone restarts. We found no mechanism that automatically brings it back after a reboot.
We analyzed the captured code, but did not test it on an iPhone or observe data leaving one.
Which iPhones could be at risk?
Several parts of the captured code match the DarkSword chain described by Google in March. Apple has patched the vulnerabilities Google reported.
When DarkSword was disclosed in March, iVerify estimated that up to 270 million devices were running the iOS 18.4 through 18.6.2 versions targeted by the variant it analyzed. That is not a current count or a measure of how many phones this page could compromise. We haven’t confirmed this page’s exact range; its files also contain code for older iOS versions.
The lure fits the exploit: someone considering a new iPhone may still be using an older, unpatched one. That could make them vulnerable simply by opening the preorder page.
Keep your iPhone updated. Go to Settings > General > Software Update and install the latest version available. Turn on Automatic Updates there too. Apple says updated devices are protected against the reported DarkSword attacks.
Check offers without opening unfamiliar links. Go directly to Apple or a retailer you know by typing its address yourself. A preorder link in an ad, message, or social post could start an exploit attempt as soon as the page opens.
Opened this page? Restart your iPhone after updating it. We found no code that automatically brings the payload back after a reboot. Restarting cannot undo any data already taken.
Keep a cryptocurrency wallet on that phone? Take precautions from a trusted device. If the phone may have been compromised and you keep a wallet on it, create a new wallet with a new recovery phrase and move the funds. For an exchange account, secure the account and contact the exchange.
Change potentially exposed passwords from a trusted device. Start with email, your Apple Account, banking, and crypto accounts, and turn on two-factor authentication.
Report the page. Save its URL and any screenshots without reopening it, and report it to your national cybercrime reporting service.
Check a suspicious offer before you act.Scam Guard can give a verdict on a screenshot or link. On desktop, Browser Guard blocks the fake preorder page we analyzed; web protection in Malwarebytes Premium blocks it too.
Indicators of compromise
pnmrud[.]cc — command-and-control and collection server
cloud[.]cmatgldn[.]click — ad click and conversion tracker
“One of the best cybersecurity suites on the planet.”
We discovered an undocumented remote-access Trojan (RAT) called Kothamine Agent. It supports more than 30 commands and it gives attackers control of an infected Windows computer: they can run commands, read and change files, and add new capabilities. Some versions can also steal browser data and record through the camera and microphone.
We found Kothamine linked to malicious npm packages, which could put users and developers who install those packages at risk. In recent versions, the malware uses tailcat, an open-source tool from Tailscale, to receive commands over an encrypted connection. That makes its communications harder to inspect and gives defenders no conventional command-and-control (C2) domain to block.
Based on VirusTotal uploads and GitHub commits, Kothamine appears to have been in development or distribution since at least July. Earlier versions used the Tailscale VPN instead of tailcat. Depending on the build, the malware includes the networking tools or downloads them from sources including GitHub.
How to stay safe
Before installing an unfamiliar npm package, check its repository, maintainers, dependencies, and recent releases. Search for reports of malicious activity, and favor packages with an established history and regular maintenance.
Check the name carefully. Make sure you aren’t downloading a fake package with a similar name.
Check the developer or organization and make sure the publisher appears legitimate. Check, for example, if it has a website or a GitHub repository.
Read some reviews, issues and reports. Search for the package name on Google and check for reports of detected potential malware.
Look at how popular it is. A package with many downloads and users is generally easier to verify than a brand-new package with almost no history.
Technical analysis
Kothamine and the malicious npm packages
Kothamine is written in C and C++. In the majority of the samples we analyzed, it consists of an injector and a DLL containing the agent. The agent supports more than 30 commands, allowing the operator to control the infected system and load additional DLLs to extend its capabilities.
Kothamine Agent execution
Kothamine Agent has undergone some changes over time. Earlier versions we found on VirusTotal used the Tailscale VPN rather than tailcat, and the strings were not encrypted. Some features, including a User Account Control (UAC) bypass and stealer commands, were detected only in certain builds.
In some versions, Kothamine downloaded Tailscale files from the official Tailscale website or a GitHub repository instead of including them in the agent.
The same GitHub repository is cited in an advisory about a malicious npm package named dotnet-runtime-base. The package download npm-sc-legit.exe from that repository. At the time of writing, two other packages published by the same developer had been removed.
The developer’s removed npm packages
The authors behind these campaigns made a mistake and published instructions for compiling kothamine-stub-cpp in one of the packages. The guide also discusses loading .NET assemblies, which we did not observe in the samples we analyzed.
Instructions for compiling and publishing Kothamine
The npm-sc-legit.exe executable is a compiled version of Kothamine that also contains commands for stealing data. We did not find a panel or builder for Kothamine, but the features present across different builds suggest that operators can enable particular functions and commands as needed.
Executables and DLL hosted on GitHub
The following analysis focuses on a recent Kothamine Agent sample that uses tailcat for C2 communication.
How Kothamine Agent works
In the analyzed versions, an executable internally referred to as Kothamine Injector injects the Kothamine Agent DLL, typically into explorer.exe. We also refer to earlier versions to show how the agent has changed.
1. Kothamine Injector
Kothamine Injector performs the following operations:
Adds Windows Defender exclusions using PowerShell
Copies itself to %ROAMING%\MicrosoftEdgeUpdateCore.exe
Extracts the agent DLL to %ROAMING%\MicrosoftEdgeUpdateCore.dll
Creates up.ps1 in %TEMP% for persistence
Injects the agent DLL into explorer.exe using OpenProcess, VirtualAllocEx, WriteProcessMemory, CreateRemoteThread, and LoadLibraryA
The Kothamine Agent DLL injected into explorer.exe
The up.ps1 script creates a scheduled task to achieve persistence using the Injector executable:
Some of the detected builds do not have encrypted strings. Others, however, have strings encrypted using a simple XOR operation and a dedicated XOR key for each string.
An earlier version with unobfuscated strings showing executed commandsPartial output of the script that decrypts the strings in recent versions
C2 communication using tailcat
The distinctive feature of Kothamine is not technical complexity, the agent functionality or obfuscation, but its use of tailcat and Tailscale VPN to receive commands to execute. This gives the agent a resilient, encrypted communication channel.
Tailcat is a recent open-source project released by the Tailscale team. Tailcat uses Tailscale’s data plane (WireGuard, NAT traversal and DERP) but without its control plane. According to official documentation, this means that tailcat has no IP addresses, accounts, admins, users, administrative controls, or governance. These characteristics therefore make it an attractive tool for use in malware.
Unlike Tailscale VPN, tailcat does not require an account or device registration. Its developers designed it for short-lived connections.
Since there are no accounts, access is based on possession of a tailcat address and the public keys used to identify the connecting devices. This does not make the connection completely anonymous: hosted relays may retain metadata logs.
The tc-address passed with the forward flag enables the client to obtain the information necessary to correctly route the request. In addition, tailcat does not require privileged access to the machine, as it uses the CLI tool and userspace libraries.
In recent Kothamine versions, the agent extracts tailcat from its resources and saves it as %ROAMING%\TailscalePortable\tailcat.exe.
Kothamine Agent extracting tailcat from its resources
The tailcat executable is launched with the CreateProcessA function and the following parameters (internally referred to as spawn_tailcat_forward phase):
This command makes tailcat server ports available as standard local TCP ports (18080 in this case) and the requests are forwarded to the port 4444 of the operator’s node. Kothamine uses socket functions to connect to 127.0.0.1:18080, where tailcat is listening.
If the agent ID string is not empty, the agent sends a profile request encrypted containing the following information (run_c2_loopphase):
After, the agent enters an infinite loop to receive commands to execute from the C2 (run_c2_loop phase). The agent waits for new commands to execute using the select socket function and periodically sends KEEP-ALIVE messages if a command is not received.
The messages exchanged with the C2 are encrypted and decrypted using AES-GCM (aes_encrypt phase).
The 32-byte AES key is base64-decoded from the string (c2_key phase):
mrowPsW2P5kzFGCNWeKAd+kYpo8Yy5c2pzaOSRuzisU=
Supported commands
In this build, the Kothamine agent supports 30 commandsrelated to:
Interaction with processes
Interaction with file and directory
Execute shell commands
Extend agent capability based on received DLLs
Command Name
Description
sysinfo/systeminfo, curpid
Return system information, such as PID, current path, hostname, and OS (hardcoded).
tasklist, kill
Returns the processes obtained via “tasklist /FO CSV /NH“. Terminates the process specified by the PID using “taskkill /F /PID”.
ping
Liveness check, “Pong” returns to C2.
ipconfig
Executes the “ipconfig /all” command and returns the result.
exec, shell_exec
Executes shell commands with _popen() and send the output back.
Writes and loads a base-64 encoded DLL received. The DLL is loaded using LoadLibraryA, and the “GetFeatureApi” method, resolved via GetProcAddress, is executed. Save the function pointers required to execute the function.
It interacts with loaded features to view, execute, or remove them.
Given that the other commands are common to the other agents, the focus of the analysis is on the “plugin” system that allows the operator to receive DLLs and extend the agent’s functionality.
Plugin system
To load a new DLL, the operator uses the command:
load_feature
At a high level, the process works as follows. The code and variable names below are reconstructed from usage and output logs.
First, the agent checks whether the functionality has already been loaded and unloads it if so:
if (g_features.find(name) != g_features.end()) {
send_text("[!] " + name + " already loaded, unloading first");
unload_feature(name);
}
It attempts to create the received DLL in a location obtained through GetTempPath or SHGetFolderPathA, or in the hardcoded path C:\Windows\Temp. It writes the decoded DLL and loads it with LoadLibraryA.
Resolves and executes the GetFeatureApi method of the loaded DLL:
pGFA = GetProcAddress(hModDLL, "GetFeatureApi");
if (!pGFA) {
send_text("[!] GetProcAddress(GetFeatureApi) failed, lastError= …");
FreeLibrary(hMod);
return 0;
}
api = pGFA();
We did not find a DLL that would allow us to fully analyze the structure returned by GetFeatureApi. However, by analyzing the code and the strings, we identified these fields:
/* Function used for C2 callback */
typedef void (*FeatureSendCb)(void *data, int len);
struct FeatureApi {
char *version;
char *name;
void (*init)(FeatureSendCb send);
void (*exec)(char *args, FeatureSendCb send);
void (*cleanup)(void);
};
The pointers to the loaded DLL and the returned structure are saved in the globalvariable internally called g_features, using this structure:
struct LoadedFeature {
void *hModule; /* Loaded DLL */
struct FeatureApi *api; /* Pointer returned by GetFeatureApi() */
};
Executes the init function contained in the returned structure, passing it the function used for C2 communication:
After the feature is loaded, the operator can execute the loaded feature using the command:
exec_feature [args]
Code that retrieves the structure and executes the exec function
Different Kothamine builds: Tailscale VPN, UAC Bypass and stealer commands
As previously mentioned, we detected versions of Kothamine with different capabilities.
Earlier versions used the Tailscale VPN before tailcat was released. They downloaded and ran the installer from the Tailscale website with the /quiet and /silent flags, or downloaded the required files directly from GitHub. These included tailscaled.exe, tailscale.exe, tailscale-ipn.exe, and wintun.dll.
A Kothamine version that downloads executables and DLLs from GitHub
Some versions bypass User Account Control (UAC) using fodhelper.exe to run elevated.ps1. In the example below, the PowerShell script starts a Tailscale VPN connection:
The agent then connects to port 4444 at a Tailscale network IP address (100.x.x.x) and starts receiving and executing commands.
A Kothamine version that bypasses UAC using fodhelper.exe
Finally, as we mentioned earlier, different builds of Kothamine support other commands. For instance, the version uploaded to GitHub includes additional commands including getdiscord, getsessions, screenshot, screenshare, and camera. These allow operators to:
Steal cookies from various browsers
Steal gaming-related JSON files, including files associated with Steam and Minecraft
Take screenshots and record through the camera and microphone
Access clipboard contents
Indicators of compromise
SHA-256 hashes
ec4219a7ecf132c29080fbb20e4ab410c57faa85aeed7acade1eb15d905a6ee0: Kothamine Injector analyzed in the blog
74eca3973ad72a6ddc9397aff8250d9ee287211fc9a055d5ee290d01cf76a70c: Kothamine Agent analyzed in the blog
URLs
https://github[.]com/cphc811-ui/: Repository used to download executables and DLLs associated with the Tailscale VPN
Thanks to Malwarebytes research engineer Stefan Dasic for his help with this article.
A name like ShipmentsFree suggests a way to save on shipping. The service does offer shipping rebates, but its Better Business Bureau (BBB)complaint record shows that some customers did not realize they had also signed up for recurring charges.
We found a number of very similar websites (which triggered our spidey senses), so we investigated.
Related shipping-themed domains use ShipmentsFree or ShipmentFree branding, similar account pages, overlapping policy language, and shared support details.
For example, freeshpmts.com and shipmentsfreezone.com both direct users to a “ShipmentFree – My Account” page, while shipmentsfreezone.com lists dataprotectionofficer@shipmentsfree.com as its data protection contact.
While their layouts and color schemes vary, the websites that were still live followed the same general pattern.
ShipmentsFree is a rebate service, not a shipping company. The ShipmentsFree FAQ says members can claim up to $100 per month in shipping and return rebates, provided they submit proof of the eligible costs. The service is also a paid, auto-renewing subscription, according to its Terms and Conditions.
When we checked, ShipmentsFree’s BBB profile listed 529 complaints in the previous three years, including 179 classified as billing issues. The BBB is not a regulator or court, and complaint totals should be read with some caution. But they show that billing has been a recurring point of friction.
Several complaints describe a similar experience: Someone notices a recurring $25 charge, doesn’t recall knowingly signing up, and tries to work out where it came from. One complainant said they “did not understand” they were enrolling in a paid membership or authorizing the monthly charge.
Customer complaint on Facebook
The route from a rebate offer to a recurring charge may be hard for a customer to retrace. Someone who signed up through a retailer promotion, browser pop-up, checkout offer, app, or one shipping-themed domain may later see a name on their statement that they don’t recognize.
There definitely seems to be a lack of clear communication. A shipping rebate is useful only if you understand what you are joining, what it costs, and how to leave. When consumers say they expected money back but found a recurring charge instead, that is worth taking seriously.
How to stay safe
Forewarned is forearmed, as they say. Before entering your payment details for a rebate offer:
Make sure you understand what you’re signing up for. Read the terms, conditions, and privacy policy (or let an AI chatbot analyze it for you).
Save the offer page and confirmation email in case you need to refer to it later.
Look for the company name, business address, terms, and contact details you can independently check.
Use a reversible payment method that offers consumer protection.
What if you get charged?
If you find a charge from ShipmentsFree, FreeShipments, ShipmentFree, or other unfamiliar variation, don’t assume it is a one-time shipping fee.
Check the original purchase confirmation, inbox, spam folder, and browser history for the date you first entered payment details.
Save screenshots of the charge, the name on your statement, the offer page if available, confirmation emails, and any cancellation attempt.
If you have a membership you do not want, cancel through the provider’s official account or support channel and keep the confirmation.
Ask the company for the enrollment date, the sign-up and consent records, and an itemized list of charges.
Contact your card issuer or bank promptly if you didn’t authorize the enrollment, believe the offer was misleading, or continue to be charged after cancellation.
Monitor the card for other unfamiliar recurring charges. They can be easy to miss when the name on your statement differs from the brand you remember.
Domains
URLs
We found these shipping-themed domains during our research:
free-shipments[.]com
freeshipments[.]com
freeshpmts[.]com
myshipmentsfree[.]com
shipmentfree[.]com
shipmentsfree[.]com
shipmentsfreeclub[.]com
shipmentsfreezone[.]com
Telephone number
A telephone number listed for several of these services:
0800 524 2165
App
We also found a ShipmentsFree app in the App Store: https://apps.apple.com/us/app/shipmentsfree/id1658146882
“One of the best cybersecurity suites on the planet.”
Phishing follows whatever people want at the moment, and right now that includes AI subscriptions they don’t have to pay for. We recently uncovered a new variation on this theme: A fake Claude Max giveaway that uses a convincing Google sign-in window to steal login information.
Claude’s paid plans start at $20 a month and cost considerably more for higher usage limits, while free accounts have stricter limits. That makes the promise of a free upgrade an attractive lure.
Microsoft reported in June that it had seen a growing number of phishing, malicious advertising, and search-based campaigns impersonating services such as ChatGPT, Claude, DeepSeek and Copilot. Some claim that a payment has failed and send you to a fake checkout. Others offer an app download that installs malware.
The campaign we found takes a different approach. There is no form to collect card details and no download. Instead, it offers a free upgrade and asks you to sign in with your Google account.
The fake giveaway claims that only a limited number of free Claude Max subscriptions remain.
What the page shows you and what it collects
The site announces that Anthropic has passed 100 million users and is thanking people by giving away 10,000 free one-month subscriptions to Claude Max, its highest-usage plan.
The presentation is careful, down to the real logo and colors, invented five-star reviews, and a long footer whose links lead almost entirely to genuine Anthropic pages. This is probably the most effective trust signal on the site, and it cost the operator nothing.
A counter claims that fewer than 750 of the 10,000 slots remain, dropping by a few every several seconds. Nothing is actually being counted. The number is generated inside your browser and resets when you reload the page, so every visitor sees the same manufactured shortage.
The frequently asked questions repeatedly promise that no payment details are needed. That part is true, which helps make the offer persuasive. Many people associate scams with requests for card details, and this page never asks for them.
What it wants instead is your Google login. Two sign-in options appear, but only one works. The Apple button produces a pre-written notice saying that the method is temporarily unavailable. The email box discards whatever you type into it and triggers the Google button instead. Every route leads to the same place, and the prize is far bigger than the lure suggests.
A Google account can provide access to email, documents, and the password-reset messages for other accounts. If you use Google to sign in to Claude, it could also give the criminals a route into your Claude account. Paid AI accounts are valuable in their own right because their usage allowances cost money. Last month, our research covered infostealers hijacking Claude accounts and using the victims’ paid allowances.
The fake sign-in form steers visitors toward Google by claiming that Apple sign-in is unavailable.
Why this sample is notable
Clicking the Google button doesn’t open a real Google sign-in window. Instead, the page draws a browser window inside the existing tab, complete with a padlock and a correctly spelled Google sign-in address. It can even be dragged around the page.
The address bar, padlock, and everything inside the supposed window belong to the phishing page, not Google. It begins with a human-verification step rather than a password box, which may reassure visitors while helping to keep automated scanners away from the next stage.
The page displays a fake Google verification window with a fraudulent address bar and padlock.
Researchers have documented this “browser-in-the-browser” technique since 2022. Unit 42 reported a campaign in June that used draggable fake browser windows to target Microsoft 365 users.
What makes this sample instructive is how little the operator had to do. The malicious functionality is loaded through a single line of code from an outside service that presents itself as a reusable sign-in widget and provides installation instructions.
Comments inside the code are written in Russian and refer to the target as the victim. One explains that dark-themed fake windows used to flash white while loading, so the widget now fetches the correct color in advance to remove the flicker. The code appears to be a maintained, reusable product rather than something built for this one campaign.
How to spot a fake browser window
The design assumes you will check the wrong address bar. People have been taught to look for a padlock and the correct address on a login page, so this attack draws both inside a window that does not really exist.
The only address bar that matters is the one belonging to your actual browser at the top of the screen. Throughout this process, it continues to show the phishing site’s domain.
Try to drag the sign-in window beyond the edge of the webpage. A real popup is a separate browser window and can be moved anywhere on your screen. A fake one is trapped inside the page that created it and stops at its edge. It takes two seconds and is the most reliable test a non-technical user has.
Let your password manager decide. It checks the real web address rather than what the page displays. It should not offer to fill your Google password on a site that does not belong to Google. If it stays silent where it normally fills, believe it over your own eyes.
Don’t arrive through links. If a promotion is real, you should also be able to find it on the company’s own site. Type the address or use a bookmark and look for the offer there.
Treat countdowns and slot counters as decoration. Any page can show a number falling toward zero. It does not prove that an offer is limited.
Be suspicious when only one sign-in option works. Claiming that one provider is temporarily unavailable can steer everyone toward the path the attacker built.
If you already signed in, secure the account. Change your password through the provider’s real website, sign out of all other sessions, and review connected apps and unfamiliar devices. Closing the tab does not undo a login.
How Malwarebytes helps
Malwarebytes Browser Guard blocks phishing and scam domains before the page can load. In an attack like this, once the page is open, the criminals control nearly every visual cue you would normally use to judge whether it’s legitimate.
If you’ve been sent an offer and you’re unsure, Scam Guard can assess it before you engage and advise you on what to do next.
“One of the best cybersecurity suites on the planet.”
We discovered an undocumented remote-access Trojan (RAT) called Kothamine Agent. It supports more than 30 commands and it gives attackers control of an infected Windows computer: they can run commands, read and change files, and add new capabilities. Some versions can also steal browser data and record through the camera and microphone.
We found Kothamine linked to malicious npm packages, which could put users and developers who install those packages at risk. In recent versions, the malware uses tailcat, an open-source tool from Tailscale, to receive commands over an encrypted connection. That makes its communications harder to inspect and gives defenders no conventional command-and-control (C2) domain to block.
Based on VirusTotal uploads and GitHub commits, Kothamine appears to have been in development or distribution since at least July. Earlier versions used the Tailscale VPN instead of tailcat. Depending on the build, the malware includes the networking tools or downloads them from sources including GitHub.
How to stay safe
Before installing an unfamiliar npm package, check its repository, maintainers, dependencies, and recent releases. Search for reports of malicious activity, and favor packages with an established history and regular maintenance.
Check the name carefully. Make sure you aren’t downloading a fake package with a similar name.
Check the developer or organization and make sure the publisher appears legitimate. Check, for example, if it has a website or a GitHub repository.
Read some reviews, issues and reports. Search for the package name on Google and check for reports of detected potential malware.
Look at how popular it is. A package with many downloads and users is generally easier to verify than a brand-new package with almost no history.
Technical analysis
Kothamine and the malicious npm packages
Kothamine is written in C and C++. In the majority of the samples we analyzed, it consists of an injector and a DLL containing the agent. The agent supports more than 30 commands, allowing the operator to control the infected system and load additional DLLs to extend its capabilities.
Kothamine Agent execution
Kothamine Agent has undergone some changes over time. Earlier versions we found on VirusTotal used the Tailscale VPN rather than tailcat, and the strings were not encrypted. Some features, including a User Account Control (UAC) bypass and stealer commands, were detected only in certain builds.
In some versions, Kothamine downloaded Tailscale files from the official Tailscale website or a GitHub repository instead of including them in the agent.
The same GitHub repository is cited in an advisory about a malicious npm package named dotnet-runtime-base. The package download npm-sc-legit.exe from that repository. At the time of writing, two other packages published by the same developer had been removed.
The developer’s removed npm packages
The authors behind these campaigns made a mistake and published instructions for compiling kothamine-stub-cpp in one of the packages. The guide also discusses loading .NET assemblies, which we did not observe in the samples we analyzed.
Instructions for compiling and publishing Kothamine
The npm-sc-legit.exe executable is a compiled version of Kothamine that also contains commands for stealing data. We did not find a panel or builder for Kothamine, but the features present across different builds suggest that operators can enable particular functions and commands as needed.
Executables and DLL hosted on GitHub
The following analysis focuses on a recent Kothamine Agent sample that uses tailcat for C2 communication.
How Kothamine Agent works
In the analyzed versions, an executable internally referred to as Kothamine Injector injects the Kothamine Agent DLL, typically into explorer.exe. We also refer to earlier versions to show how the agent has changed.
1. Kothamine Injector
Kothamine Injector performs the following operations:
Adds Windows Defender exclusions using PowerShell
Copies itself to %ROAMING%\MicrosoftEdgeUpdateCore.exe
Extracts the agent DLL to %ROAMING%\MicrosoftEdgeUpdateCore.dll
Creates up.ps1 in %TEMP% for persistence
Injects the agent DLL into explorer.exe using OpenProcess, VirtualAllocEx, WriteProcessMemory, CreateRemoteThread, and LoadLibraryA
The Kothamine Agent DLL injected into explorer.exe
The up.ps1 script creates a scheduled task to achieve persistence using the Injector executable:
Some of the detected builds do not have encrypted strings. Others, however, have strings encrypted using a simple XOR operation and a dedicated XOR key for each string.
An earlier version with unobfuscated strings showing executed commandsPartial output of the script that decrypts the strings in recent versions
C2 communication using tailcat
The distinctive feature of Kothamine is not technical complexity, the agent functionality or obfuscation, but its use of tailcat and Tailscale VPN to receive commands to execute. This gives the agent a resilient, encrypted communication channel.
Tailcat is a recent open-source project released by the Tailscale team. Tailcat uses Tailscale’s data plane (WireGuard, NAT traversal and DERP) but without its control plane. According to official documentation, this means that tailcat has no IP addresses, accounts, admins, users, administrative controls, or governance. These characteristics therefore make it an attractive tool for use in malware.
Unlike Tailscale VPN, tailcat does not require an account or device registration. Its developers designed it for short-lived connections.
Since there are no accounts, access is based on possession of a tailcat address and the public keys used to identify the connecting devices. This does not make the connection completely anonymous: hosted relays may retain metadata logs.
The tc-address passed with the forward flag enables the client to obtain the information necessary to correctly route the request. In addition, tailcat does not require privileged access to the machine, as it uses the CLI tool and userspace libraries.
In recent Kothamine versions, the agent extracts tailcat from its resources and saves it as %ROAMING%\TailscalePortable\tailcat.exe.
Kothamine Agent extracting tailcat from its resources
The tailcat executable is launched with the CreateProcessA function and the following parameters (internally referred to as spawn_tailcat_forward phase):
This command makes tailcat server ports available as standard local TCP ports (18080 in this case) and the requests are forwarded to the port 4444 of the operator’s node. Kothamine uses socket functions to connect to 127.0.0.1:18080, where tailcat is listening.
If the agent ID string is not empty, the agent sends a profile request encrypted containing the following information (run_c2_loopphase):
After, the agent enters an infinite loop to receive commands to execute from the C2 (run_c2_loop phase). The agent waits for new commands to execute using the select socket function and periodically sends KEEP-ALIVE messages if a command is not received.
The messages exchanged with the C2 are encrypted and decrypted using AES-GCM (aes_encrypt phase).
The 32-byte AES key is base64-decoded from the string (c2_key phase):
mrowPsW2P5kzFGCNWeKAd+kYpo8Yy5c2pzaOSRuzisU=
Supported commands
In this build, the Kothamine agent supports 30 commandsrelated to:
Interaction with processes
Interaction with file and directory
Execute shell commands
Extend agent capability based on received DLLs
Command Name
Description
sysinfo/systeminfo, curpid
Return system information, such as PID, current path, hostname, and OS (hardcoded).
tasklist, kill
Returns the processes obtained via “tasklist /FO CSV /NH“. Terminates the process specified by the PID using “taskkill /F /PID”.
ping
Liveness check, “Pong” returns to C2.
ipconfig
Executes the “ipconfig /all” command and returns the result.
exec, shell_exec
Executes shell commands with _popen() and send the output back.
Writes and loads a base-64 encoded DLL received. The DLL is loaded using LoadLibraryA, and the “GetFeatureApi” method, resolved via GetProcAddress, is executed. Save the function pointers required to execute the function.
It interacts with loaded features to view, execute, or remove them.
Given that the other commands are common to the other agents, the focus of the analysis is on the “plugin” system that allows the operator to receive DLLs and extend the agent’s functionality.
Plugin system
To load a new DLL, the operator uses the command:
load_feature
At a high level, the process works as follows. The code and variable names below are reconstructed from usage and output logs.
First, the agent checks whether the functionality has already been loaded and unloads it if so:
if (g_features.find(name) != g_features.end()) {
send_text("[!] " + name + " already loaded, unloading first");
unload_feature(name);
}
It attempts to create the received DLL in a location obtained through GetTempPath or SHGetFolderPathA, or in the hardcoded path C:\Windows\Temp. It writes the decoded DLL and loads it with LoadLibraryA.
Resolves and executes the GetFeatureApi method of the loaded DLL:
pGFA = GetProcAddress(hModDLL, "GetFeatureApi");
if (!pGFA) {
send_text("[!] GetProcAddress(GetFeatureApi) failed, lastError= …");
FreeLibrary(hMod);
return 0;
}
api = pGFA();
We did not find a DLL that would allow us to fully analyze the structure returned by GetFeatureApi. However, by analyzing the code and the strings, we identified these fields:
/* Function used for C2 callback */
typedef void (*FeatureSendCb)(void *data, int len);
struct FeatureApi {
char *version;
char *name;
void (*init)(FeatureSendCb send);
void (*exec)(char *args, FeatureSendCb send);
void (*cleanup)(void);
};
The pointers to the loaded DLL and the returned structure are saved in the globalvariable internally called g_features, using this structure:
struct LoadedFeature {
void *hModule; /* Loaded DLL */
struct FeatureApi *api; /* Pointer returned by GetFeatureApi() */
};
Executes the init function contained in the returned structure, passing it the function used for C2 communication:
After the feature is loaded, the operator can execute the loaded feature using the command:
exec_feature [args]
Code that retrieves the structure and executes the exec function
Different Kothamine builds: Tailscale VPN, UAC Bypass and stealer commands
As previously mentioned, we detected versions of Kothamine with different capabilities.
Earlier versions used the Tailscale VPN before tailcat was released. They downloaded and ran the installer from the Tailscale website with the /quiet and /silent flags, or downloaded the required files directly from GitHub. These included tailscaled.exe, tailscale.exe, tailscale-ipn.exe, and wintun.dll.
A Kothamine version that downloads executables and DLLs from GitHub
Some versions bypass User Account Control (UAC) using fodhelper.exe to run elevated.ps1. In the example below, the PowerShell script starts a Tailscale VPN connection:
The agent then connects to port 4444 at a Tailscale network IP address (100.x.x.x) and starts receiving and executing commands.
A Kothamine version that bypasses UAC using fodhelper.exe
Finally, as we mentioned earlier, different builds of Kothamine support other commands. For instance, the version uploaded to GitHub includes additional commands including getdiscord, getsessions, screenshot, screenshare, and camera. These allow operators to:
Steal cookies from various browsers
Steal gaming-related JSON files, including files associated with Steam and Minecraft
Take screenshots and record through the camera and microphone
Access clipboard contents
Indicators of compromise
SHA-256 hashes
ec4219a7ecf132c29080fbb20e4ab410c57faa85aeed7acade1eb15d905a6ee0: Kothamine Injector analyzed in the blog
74eca3973ad72a6ddc9397aff8250d9ee287211fc9a055d5ee290d01cf76a70c: Kothamine Agent analyzed in the blog
URLs
https://github[.]com/cphc811-ui/: Repository used to download executables and DLLs associated with the Tailscale VPN
Thanks to Malwarebytes research engineer Stefan Dasic for his help with this article.
A name like ShipmentsFree suggests a way to save on shipping. The service does offer shipping rebates, but its Better Business Bureau (BBB)complaint record shows that some customers did not realize they had also signed up for recurring charges.
We found a number of very similar websites (which triggered our spidey senses), so we investigated.
Related shipping-themed domains use ShipmentsFree or ShipmentFree branding, similar account pages, overlapping policy language, and shared support details.
For example, freeshpmts.com and shipmentsfreezone.com both direct users to a “ShipmentFree – My Account” page, while shipmentsfreezone.com lists dataprotectionofficer@shipmentsfree.com as its data protection contact.
While their layouts and color schemes vary, the websites that were still live followed the same general pattern.
ShipmentsFree is a rebate service, not a shipping company. The ShipmentsFree FAQ says members can claim up to $100 per month in shipping and return rebates, provided they submit proof of the eligible costs. The service is also a paid, auto-renewing subscription, according to its Terms and Conditions.
When we checked, ShipmentsFree’s BBB profile listed 529 complaints in the previous three years, including 179 classified as billing issues. The BBB is not a regulator or court, and complaint totals should be read with some caution. But they show that billing has been a recurring point of friction.
Several complaints describe a similar experience: Someone notices a recurring $25 charge, doesn’t recall knowingly signing up, and tries to work out where it came from. One complainant said they “did not understand” they were enrolling in a paid membership or authorizing the monthly charge.
Customer complaint on Facebook
The route from a rebate offer to a recurring charge may be hard for a customer to retrace. Someone who signed up through a retailer promotion, browser pop-up, checkout offer, app, or one shipping-themed domain may later see a name on their statement that they don’t recognize.
There definitely seems to be a lack of clear communication. A shipping rebate is useful only if you understand what you are joining, what it costs, and how to leave. When consumers say they expected money back but found a recurring charge instead, that is worth taking seriously.
How to stay safe
Forewarned is forearmed, as they say. Before entering your payment details for a rebate offer:
Make sure you understand what you’re signing up for. Read the terms, conditions, and privacy policy (or let an AI chatbot analyze it for you).
Save the offer page and confirmation email in case you need to refer to it later.
Look for the company name, business address, terms, and contact details you can independently check.
Use a reversible payment method that offers consumer protection.
What if you get charged?
If you find a charge from ShipmentsFree, FreeShipments, ShipmentFree, or other unfamiliar variation, don’t assume it is a one-time shipping fee.
Check the original purchase confirmation, inbox, spam folder, and browser history for the date you first entered payment details.
Save screenshots of the charge, the name on your statement, the offer page if available, confirmation emails, and any cancellation attempt.
If you have a membership you do not want, cancel through the provider’s official account or support channel and keep the confirmation.
Ask the company for the enrollment date, the sign-up and consent records, and an itemized list of charges.
Contact your card issuer or bank promptly if you didn’t authorize the enrollment, believe the offer was misleading, or continue to be charged after cancellation.
Monitor the card for other unfamiliar recurring charges. They can be easy to miss when the name on your statement differs from the brand you remember.
Domains
URLs
We found these shipping-themed domains during our research:
free-shipments[.]com
freeshipments[.]com
freeshpmts[.]com
myshipmentsfree[.]com
shipmentfree[.]com
shipmentsfree[.]com
shipmentsfreeclub[.]com
shipmentsfreezone[.]com
Telephone number
A telephone number listed for several of these services:
0800 524 2165
App
We also found a ShipmentsFree app in the App Store: https://apps.apple.com/us/app/shipmentsfree/id1658146882
“One of the best cybersecurity suites on the planet.”
Phishing follows whatever people want at the moment, and right now that includes AI subscriptions they don’t have to pay for. We recently uncovered a new variation on this theme: A fake Claude Max giveaway that uses a convincing Google sign-in window to steal login information.
Claude’s paid plans start at $20 a month and cost considerably more for higher usage limits, while free accounts have stricter limits. That makes the promise of a free upgrade an attractive lure.
Microsoft reported in June that it had seen a growing number of phishing, malicious advertising, and search-based campaigns impersonating services such as ChatGPT, Claude, DeepSeek and Copilot. Some claim that a payment has failed and send you to a fake checkout. Others offer an app download that installs malware.
The campaign we found takes a different approach. There is no form to collect card details and no download. Instead, it offers a free upgrade and asks you to sign in with your Google account.
The fake giveaway claims that only a limited number of free Claude Max subscriptions remain.
What the page shows you and what it collects
The site announces that Anthropic has passed 100 million users and is thanking people by giving away 10,000 free one-month subscriptions to Claude Max, its highest-usage plan.
The presentation is careful, down to the real logo and colors, invented five-star reviews, and a long footer whose links lead almost entirely to genuine Anthropic pages. This is probably the most effective trust signal on the site, and it cost the operator nothing.
A counter claims that fewer than 750 of the 10,000 slots remain, dropping by a few every several seconds. Nothing is actually being counted. The number is generated inside your browser and resets when you reload the page, so every visitor sees the same manufactured shortage.
The frequently asked questions repeatedly promise that no payment details are needed. That part is true, which helps make the offer persuasive. Many people associate scams with requests for card details, and this page never asks for them.
What it wants instead is your Google login. Two sign-in options appear, but only one works. The Apple button produces a pre-written notice saying that the method is temporarily unavailable. The email box discards whatever you type into it and triggers the Google button instead. Every route leads to the same place, and the prize is far bigger than the lure suggests.
A Google account can provide access to email, documents, and the password-reset messages for other accounts. If you use Google to sign in to Claude, it could also give the criminals a route into your Claude account. Paid AI accounts are valuable in their own right because their usage allowances cost money. Last month, our research covered infostealers hijacking Claude accounts and using the victims’ paid allowances.
The fake sign-in form steers visitors toward Google by claiming that Apple sign-in is unavailable.
Why this sample is notable
Clicking the Google button doesn’t open a real Google sign-in window. Instead, the page draws a browser window inside the existing tab, complete with a padlock and a correctly spelled Google sign-in address. It can even be dragged around the page.
The address bar, padlock, and everything inside the supposed window belong to the phishing page, not Google. It begins with a human-verification step rather than a password box, which may reassure visitors while helping to keep automated scanners away from the next stage.
The page displays a fake Google verification window with a fraudulent address bar and padlock.
Researchers have documented this “browser-in-the-browser” technique since 2022. Unit 42 reported a campaign in June that used draggable fake browser windows to target Microsoft 365 users.
What makes this sample instructive is how little the operator had to do. The malicious functionality is loaded through a single line of code from an outside service that presents itself as a reusable sign-in widget and provides installation instructions.
Comments inside the code are written in Russian and refer to the target as the victim. One explains that dark-themed fake windows used to flash white while loading, so the widget now fetches the correct color in advance to remove the flicker. The code appears to be a maintained, reusable product rather than something built for this one campaign.
How to spot a fake browser window
The design assumes you will check the wrong address bar. People have been taught to look for a padlock and the correct address on a login page, so this attack draws both inside a window that does not really exist.
The only address bar that matters is the one belonging to your actual browser at the top of the screen. Throughout this process, it continues to show the phishing site’s domain.
Try to drag the sign-in window beyond the edge of the webpage. A real popup is a separate browser window and can be moved anywhere on your screen. A fake one is trapped inside the page that created it and stops at its edge. It takes two seconds and is the most reliable test a non-technical user has.
Let your password manager decide. It checks the real web address rather than what the page displays. It should not offer to fill your Google password on a site that does not belong to Google. If it stays silent where it normally fills, believe it over your own eyes.
Don’t arrive through links. If a promotion is real, you should also be able to find it on the company’s own site. Type the address or use a bookmark and look for the offer there.
Treat countdowns and slot counters as decoration. Any page can show a number falling toward zero. It does not prove that an offer is limited.
Be suspicious when only one sign-in option works. Claiming that one provider is temporarily unavailable can steer everyone toward the path the attacker built.
If you already signed in, secure the account. Change your password through the provider’s real website, sign out of all other sessions, and review connected apps and unfamiliar devices. Closing the tab does not undo a login.
How Malwarebytes helps
Malwarebytes Browser Guard blocks phishing and scam domains before the page can load. In an attack like this, once the page is open, the criminals control nearly every visual cue you would normally use to judge whether it’s legitimate.
If you’ve been sent an offer and you’re unsure, Scam Guard can assess it before you engage and advise you on what to do next.
“One of the best cybersecurity suites on the planet.”
We found more than 100 subscription websites linked through the same toolkit and closely related developer details. Some impersonate existing products, including GPT-6 Astra, DaVinci Resolve, PixAI, and OpenCut. Another uses the name of Omegle, the chat service that shut down in 2023. Others promote unfamiliar brands with little verifiable information about who operates them.
The sites we examined did not use fake password forms or push malware downloads. Instead, they used polished product pages and genuine Google sign-in screens before directing visitors to paid plans. Someone visiting an imitation site could believe they were buying from the genuine provider. With the unfamiliar brands, it is difficult to establish who is selling the subscription or independently verify the claims being made.
Despite their different names and designs, the sites share identical underlying files and closely related developer email addresses. This suggests that a single operator, or closely connected group, is behind the network.
What the sites show you
At first glance, these sites don’t look suspicious. They use secure connections, professional designs, and the confident language you would expect from an established software company.
The secure connection and padlock only show that traffic between you and the site is encrypted. They do not confirm who operates it.
Some show performance comparisons, star ratings, and precise user numbers. One claimed to have more than 12 million users. Another displayed the names of well-known companies as customers, although we found no evidence that those businesses were connected to it.
A website owner can add any rating, customer number, testimonial, or test result to a page. None of these claims should be treated as independent evidence that a product is genuine or widely used.
Behind the Sign in or Get started button is a subscription service. Visitors are asked to sign in with Google and are then shown paid plans, usage credits, and payment histories. Prices range from less than $10 a month to more than $2,000 a year. Several sites also ask users to upload documents, recordings, or other files for the advertised service to process.
The fake GPT-6 Astra site offers plans costing $89, $169, or $249 a month.
On the sites we examined, there was no way to test the advertised product before paying. Controls on the landing pages did nothing until we signed in, and signing in led to a pricing page rather than the tool itself.
Many legitimate services require payment before use, so that alone does not prove that a site is unsafe. The concern here is the lack of reliable information about the company selling the subscription. There are no independent reviews or official product listings to compare with the claims on the page.
Different brands, the same website kit
The sites advertise a wide range of products, including voice-cloning tools, video editors, study apps, and general-purpose AI assistants. Underneath their different designs, however, they use the same commercial website starter kit.
A fake PixAI anime generator site
A fake GPT-6 Astra site
Astra AI claims that more than 12 million students use its study tools
A site using the Omegle name offers text and video chats with strangers
A fake site using the DaVinci Resolve video editor name
A fake OpenCut video editor site
VoicesCloning claims it can copy a voice from a ten-second recording
The kit is a legitimate product designed to help people launch online services quickly. It includes an account system, billing, file storage, and administrative tools. The buyer supplies the branding and the product being advertised.
This explains why apparently unrelated services have identical checkout pages and account settings. The underlying system is the same even when the colors, typefaces, and product names are different.
The kit costs $249 as a one-time purchase, while additional templates cost about $2 each. Its vendor advertises that customers can launch a product in an hour. Once the first site has been created, producing more versions requires relatively little time or money. Building another site may require little more than a new domain, design, and product description—which might explain how the network grew to this scale.
Several sites still contain demonstration material supplied with the starter kit. This includes the kit’s brand name, promotional banners, generic menu entries, and testimonials from named people and companies with no apparent connection to the advertised service.
One site had relabeled a demonstration list of businesses as its own customers. On another, the word “boilerplate,” a term for reusable starter code, remained in the name of a paid subscription plan.
Signing in with Google
These sites send visitors to a genuine Google sign-in page. The web address belongs to Google, and the password is entered on Google’s website rather than on the service being advertised.
The sites we examined requested basic information such as the user’s name, email address, and profile picture. They did not ask for access to Gmail or Google Drive.
The Google consent screen used by the fake GPT-6 Astra site requests a name, email address, and profile picture.
However, a genuine Google sign-in page does not confirm that the service is official or connected to the brand it displays. It only confirms that Google is handling the login and passing the approved information to an outside application.
The fake GPT-6 Astra site asks visitors to sign in with Google
Astra AI places its study tools behind Google sign-in
The Omegle-branded site asks visitors to sign in before continuing
The fake DaVinci Resolve site uses the same Google sign-in process
The fake PixAI site asks visitors to continue with Google
The fake OpenCut site requires Google sign-in before visitors can try the service
VoicesCloning asks visitors to sign in with Google
Google’s consent screen identifies the application requesting access and provides developer details. Check these against the website and product you intended to use. If those names don’t match, you may not be dealing with the company you thought you were.
You can also open the developer information shown by Google. On the sites we examined, the support contacts were free webmail addresses rather than addresses belonging to the brands displayed on the websites.
Google’s developer information shows a free Gmail support address behind one of the sites.
A free email address is not proof of wrongdoing, but it should raise questions when a service claims to have millions of users or presents itself as an established company.
How the sites are connected
Websites load files containing the code they need to work. The system used by these sites gives some of those files names based on their contents. When the contents change, the filenames generally change too.
Across the sites we examined, many of these filenames were identical. This indicates that the sites were running the same version of the same underlying software. On its own, this could simply mean that different people bought the same starter kit.
The Google developer details provide a stronger connection. The developer contacts use free webmail accounts containing the same name, with only small differences such as the numbers added to the address.
Because these addresses are provided when the applications are registered with Google, rather than being automatically supplied by the starter kit, they suggest that the sites are operated by one party or by closely connected people.
What you agree to when you subscribe
The sites provide little information about the business selling the subscription. We found no registered company names, business addresses, or other independently verifiable ownership details. In many cases, the only contact method was an email address using the site’s own domain.
This could make it difficult to request a refund, challenge a charge, or resolve a problem with the subscription.
Some of the subscriptions are substantial. Alongside monthly plans, the sites sell annual access charged as a single payment, with one plan costing more than $2,000. Some plans state that unused credits expire after a set period.
Depending on the payment system used, card details may be handled by a third-party payment provider rather than given directly to the website operator. Users may still share account information and potentially sensitive material with a service whose owner they cannot identify.
How to spot sites like these
A polished design, real Google sign-in page, and impressive-looking reviews do not prove that a service is trustworthy.
Check the web address. Make sure it belongs to the company or product you intended to use. Don’t rely on the logo or product name alone.
Find out who runs the site. Look for a company name, business address, privacy policy, terms, and reliable contact details that can be independently checked.
Read the Google consent screen. Check the application name, domain, developer details, and information it wants to access before selecting Continue.
Be cautious if you cannot test the product. A service that offers no trial or working demonstration is asking you to pay before you can confirm that it does what it claims.
Check independent sources. Search for the product separately and look for an official website or app-store listing. Do not rely on ratings and testimonials displayed by the seller.
Don’t upload sensitive files until you know who operates the service. Documents, photos, recordings, and prompts may contain private information.
Check your statements after subscribing. Contact the payment provider or your bank promptly if you see a charge you do not recognize.
Remove connections you no longer trust. Visit the connections page in your Google Account and remove services you do not recognize or use. This prevents future access, but it does not delete information already shared with the operator.
How Malwarebytes can help
Malwarebytes Browser Guard blocks malicious, phishing, scam, and fraudulent websites, including pages reached through deceptive adverts or search results.
If you’re unsure about a site, Malwarebytes Scam Guard can assess its web address or a screenshot and help you identify warning signs.
These particular sites centred on accounts and subscriptions rather than phone calls. If a suspicious service directs you to a support number, you can check it with Malwarebytes Scam Number Check before calling.
Stop threats before they can do any harm.
Malwarebytes Browser Guard blocks phishing pages and malicious sites automatically. Free, one click to install. Add it to your browser →
Parcel delivery phishing campaigns appear around the world under different courier names. In the United States, the messages commonly impersonate USPS and claim that a package has an invalid address or could not be delivered. Similar messages impersonate Colissimo and Chronopost in France, Correos in Spain, Poste Italiane in Italy, and PostNL in the Netherlands.
The details vary, but the aim is usually the same: to persuade you to visit a fake courier website and provide personal and financial information.
A fake bpost delivery email
A recent campaign targeting customers of the Belgian postal service bpost begins with an email claiming that a package could not be delivered because €4.95 in customs duties has not been paid.
A phishing email, in Dutch, pretending to be from bpost.
In English, the subject and message read:
Undelivered package—customs duties due (tracking no. 3232116291*******).
Your package could not be delivered on September 9, 2026, because the customs duties (€4.95) have not been paid.
The amount is small enough that recipients may pay without giving it much thought. However, the website does not stop at collecting the supposed fee. It asks for personal information, card details, and banking information.
How the scam works
The link first passes through a URL-shortening service (hxxps://qr[.]paps[.]jp/1GWsa) before redirecting to a fake bpost site. The campaign used several fake bpost domains, including:
bpost[.]center, which is the domain shown in the screenshots below.
The page copies bpost’s branding and displays security claims such as “Secure SSL connection,” “256-bit SSL,” “SEPA compliant,” and “Secure payment.” These labels were added by the scammers and do not prove that the page or payment is secure.
We’ve translated the screenshots below from the original Dutch into English.
The first page asks for the recipient’s name, phone number, email address, and age:
That reference to receiving funds does not match the email’s claim that a customs fee must be paid. The next page asks for an IBAN, card number, expiry date, and payment amount:
Then it asks for the real target: full card and bank details.
The original Dutch version contained another mistake: One of its buttons read “Indian search” instead of “Betaal,” the Dutch word for “Pay.” Mistakes like this can expose a scam, but many phishing pages are built carefully enough that there will be no obvious typo or mistranslation.
Once submitted, card details may be used for fraudulent purchases or sold to other criminals. The personal and banking information may also be used to make later scams more convincing.
How to protect yourself
Check delivery claims independently. Open the courier’s official app or type its website address into your browser, then use your tracking number to check the delivery.
Check the sender and destination. A message may use a courier’s name while coming from an unrelated email address or linking to a different domain.
Be wary of unexpected fees or refunds. A small payment or promised refund can be used to persuade you to provide much more valuable information.
Be wary of requests for extensive financial information. A request for an IBAN as well as card details should be treated with suspicion, particularly when it supposedly relates to a small delivery fee.
If you entered your card or banking information on a suspicious site, contact your bank or card provider immediately. Freeze the affected card if your banking app allows it, monitor your accounts for unfamiliar transactions, and change any password you entered on the site.
Malwarebytes tracks and blocks these campaigns as they appear. If you’re unsure about a message, Scam Guard—built into Malwarebytes for Windows, Mac, Android, and iOS—can check it for you. Paste in the message or link, or upload a screenshot, for an instant assessment.
Scam Guard can analyze a suspicious email, text, link, or screenshot and tell you whether it may be a scam.
Something feel off? Check it before you click.
Malwarebytes Scam Guard helps you analyze suspicious links, texts, and screenshots instantly.
Login
![FreeShipments[.]com website](https://www.malwarebytes.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2026/09/website2.png?w=1024)
