Researching Employment Scams
Researchers built a fake company to study fake employee scams.
Researchers built a fake company to study fake employee scams.
To subscribe to my monthly email newsletter, you have to enter your information on the webpage, and then reply to an automatically generated email. This is, of course, to prevent people from subscribing addresses other than their own.
Starting last weekend, I have been receiving a lot of individual responses to those emails. Always one line:
Thank you for the positive impact your emails have had on my life.
Your emails are a game-changer.
Your emails are a constant reminder of why I subscribed.
Your emails rock.
Thank you for the time and effort you put into creating these informative emails.
Thank you for the passion and enthusiasm you infuse into your email content.
Your emails consistently exceed my expectations. Thank you for the exceptional value!
I responded to the first few, because sometimes I do get these nice emails from readers and I hadnโt yet realized it was all fake. But so many, and all at onceโthis is obviously AI. And obviously a scam, except I canโt figure out what the scam is.
The addresses are things like:
jnnvcddghjgfdryhj67@gmail.com
nbhgdfhjedty896565@gmail.com
jesikawells6873@gmail.com
niffelatopserean92@gmail.com
reinareyes983@gmail.com
htfhtfhhjkgth@gmail.com
All Gmail. None of the addresses has actually subscribed to Crypto-Gram. They could; whoever is sending the emails could easily have confirmed the subscription.
My first thought was pig butcheringโwanting me to respond and turn this into a conversationโbut no one has responded to any of my responses. Anyone have any idea?
Learn how the Spring Ring campaign abuses Microsoft Teams and voice phishing to deploy malware and target enterprise domain controllers.
The post Spring Ring: An Inside Look at Voice Phishing Campaigns in Microsoft Teams appeared first on Unit 42.

This post assumes familiarity with envelope encryption and the AWS Encryption SDK.
When your encryption system generates millions of duplicate API calls per hour, costs spiral and performance degrades. Thatโs exactly the challenge NICE Actimize faced while operating their global-scale, event-driven financial crime detection platform on Amazon Web Services (AWS).
NICE Actimize, a leading provider of financial crime, risk, and compliance solutions, processes millions of encrypted messages daily across hundreds of tenants. By rethinking how they cache encryption keys, they reduced their AWS Key Management Service (AWS KMS) costs by 77% while maintaining strict security guarantees and per-tenant encryption isolation.
In this post, we explore the cache stampede problem that emerges when envelope encryption meets high-concurrency, multi-tenant architectures. We walk through two solutions: the AWS-recommended hierarchical keyring pattern and a custom caching approach that NICE Actimize built for their regulated environment. These patterns apply to multi-tenant software as a service (SaaS) environments and high-throughput systems where per-tenant encryption generates significant KMS API volume.
Financial services systems operate under strict regulatory requirements. You must encrypt data at rest and in transit. For multi-tenant SaaS providers, this requirement might go further: each tenantโs data must be encrypted with separate keys to provide complete cryptographic isolation. If one tenantโs key is compromised, no other tenantโs data is at risk.
Consider an enterprise SaaS environment built on an event-driven architecture using Amazon Managed Streaming for Apache Kafka (Amazon MSK), with many different databases for storing data and Amazon Simple Queue Service (Amazon SQS) for messaging. Messages flow continuously between producers and consumers, and each message must be encrypted with the correct tenant-specific key. At scale with millions of messages daily across hundreds of tenants, this creates a massive volume of encryption and decryption operations.
To handle this volume efficiently, the standard approach is envelope encryption: a two-tier model where an AWS KMS key encrypts short-lived data keys, and those data keys encrypt the actual data. Your application can encrypt large volumes of data locally without calling AWS KMS for every operation, reducing latency and costs.
Envelope encryption reduces AWS KMS calls, but it doesnโt eliminate them. Each encrypt operation still requires a data key, either generated fresh using GenerateDataKey or retrieved from a cache, and each decrypt operation must unwrap an encrypted data key (EDK) by calling Decrypt. In high-throughput systems processing millions of messages, these calls add up quickly.
The AWS Encryption SDK provides a built-in solution for this: the CachingCryptoMaterialsManager. This component caches data encryption materials (data keys) locally, so your application can reuse them across multiple operations without calling AWS KMS each time. You configure a time-to-live (TTL), a maximum message-use limit, and a local cache, and the SDK handles the rest.
This approach works well under moderate load when you partition the cache by tenant AWS KMS key Amazon Resource Name (ARN) so that each tenantโs encryption materials remain cryptographically isolated. However, a critical problem emerges as concurrency scales to hundreds of threads processing millions of encrypted messages in parallel: the cache stampede, also known as the thundering herd problem.
The CachingCryptoMaterialsManager caches the result of the SDKโs internal getMaterialsForEncrypt and decryptMaterials calls at the materials level. The cache stampede, however, happens at the KMS API call level. When a cached data key expires or a new, previously-unseen EDK arrives, the following sequence unfolds:
encrypt() for the same tenant. Each thread finds the cache entry expired and independently calls GenerateDataKey against AWS KMS. Instead of one thread generating a data key while others wait, N threads create N distinct data keys. Each new data key produces a unique EDK, which inflates the EDK cardinality across the system.Decrypt call to AWS KMS because the cache has no coordination mechanism to make competing threads wait for a single in-flight request.At enterprise SaaS scale, this compounding effect can generate millions of redundant AWS KMS GenerateDataKey and Decrypt calls per hour, even with the SDKโs built-in caching enabled. The following figure shows the pattern leading to a stampede.
Figure 1: Cache stampede โ multiple threads independently calling AWS KMS for the same encrypted data key, creating duplicate requests
The stampede follows this sequence on the encrypt side:
encrypt() for the same tenant concurrently.GenerateDataKey.On the decrypt side, the inflated EDK cardinality compounds the problem:
Decrypt call. AWS KMS returns the same plaintext data key N times, doing redundant work.We evaluated two approaches to solve the cache stampede problem. Each fits different architectural requirements and regulatory constraints.
AWS addresses the cache stampede challenge through the hierarchical keyring pattern, which introduces an additional level of key hierarchy that significantly reduces how often cache stampedes occur.
In this architecture, branch keys serve as intermediate wrapping keys stored in a DynamoDB table. This DynamoDB table acts as a shared cache layer that coordinates across all instances in your distributed fleet.
Figure 2: Hierarchical keyring architecture โ branch keys in DynamoDB coordinating across distributed instances
The architecture (shown in Figure 2) works as follows:
The key insight is that the cache is thread-aware. When the cache expires, threads coordinate to make a single request to refresh the cache. Only a single thread is used to make a call to the branch key, rather than all the threads acting independently. Additionally, by adding an additional key into the key hierarchy, branch keys donโt live within AWS KMS. This means cache misses and the stampedes they trigger interact with the branch key, and donโt make as many calls to the AWS KMS service at the top of the hierarchy:
The DynamoDB table acts as a coordination point. The first thread to request a missing branch key retrieves it from AWS KMS and stores it in DynamoDB (the Key Store table). Subsequent requests from instances in the fleet retrieve the cached branch key from DynamoDB instead of making duplicate AWS KMS calls.
Beyond reducing cache miss frequency, the hierarchical keyring provides built-in stampede protection within its local cache implementation. The SDK offers multiple cache types, and the Default cache, designed for heavily multi-threaded environments, prevents multiple threads from calling AWS KMS on cache expiry by notifying a single thread that the branch key materials entry is about to expire 10 seconds in advance. That one thread refreshes the cache while all other threads continue serving requests using the still-valid entry.
This solution integrates with the AWS Encryption SDK and requires minimal code changes to existing applications. For event-driven architectures processing encrypted Kafka streams, this approach reduces KMS call volume by orders of magnitude while preserving per-tenant cryptographic isolation.
While the hierarchical keyring (Option A) addresses the stampede by reducing how often cache misses occur, thereโs a complementary approach: eliminating the stampede at its source by caching KMS API responses directly, using atomic, single-flight cache loading that prevents concurrent threads from issuing duplicate calls. This is the path NICE Actimize took.
The IClientSupplier extension point in AWS Encryption SDK v3
In the AWS Encryption SDK v2, decorating the AWS KMS client on a per-request basis was possible through the RegionalClientSupplier interface, but it was an advanced and undocumented use case. Without explicit guidance or a supported pattern, caching strategies typically operated above the SDK layer, making it difficult to prevent duplicate KMS calls at their source. The AWS Encryption SDK v3 introduced the IClientSupplier interface, which the AwsKmsMrkMultiKeyring accepts at construction time. This interface is called by the SDK whenever it needs a KMS client for a given AWS Region, and you control what it returns, making it possible to insert a caching layer between the SDK and AWS KMS.
Architecture: A decorated KMS client with two Caffeine caches
The solution is a CachedKmsClientโa decorator that wraps the standard AWS SDK KmsClient and interposes two Caffeine LoadingCache instances between the application and AWS KMS:
| Cache | Key | Value | Purpose |
| GenerateDataKey cache | GenerateDataKeyRequest (tenant KMS key ARN and key spec) | GenerateDataKeyResponse (EDK and plaintext data key) | Ensures encrypt operations on the same node reuse the same data key for a given tenant KMS key during the cache window |
| Decrypt cache | DecryptRequest (EDK and key ARN) | DecryptResponse (plaintext data key) | Ensures decrypt operations for the same EDK share a single KMS call result |
Both caches are configured with refreshAfterWrite (default: 1 hour, configurable), which means:
LoadingCache.get() guarantees that exactly one thread executes the loader function (the actual KMS API call), while all other concurrent threads block and wait for that single result. This is the atomic, single-flight property that eliminates the stampede.Security consideration: Caching plaintext data keys in memory means the keys exist in process memory for the duration of the cache TTL. The TTL acts as a security control: shorter TTLs reduce the window of exposure in the event of a memory dump, while longer TTLs reduce KMS call volume. Choose a TTL that balances your security requirements with your cost and performance goals. Key rotation at the KMS key level remains unaffected by the cache, because rotated keys produce new data keys on the next cache refresh.
Integration with the AWS Encryption SDK v3
The integration is minimal. The IClientSupplier AWS Lambda function returns a CachedKmsClient singleton for each AWS Region, this singleton is passed into the AwsKmsMrkMultiKeyring at keyring construction time. From that point forward, each GenerateDataKey and Decrypt call the SDK makes flows through the caching decorator transparently, with no changes to the encrypt or decrypt call sites.
The CachedKmsClient is a singleton per Region (managed using a ConcurrentHashMap), so all tenants on the same node share the same caching layer but their data keys remain fully isolated because the cache keys include the tenant-specific AWS KMS key ARN.
Why Caffeine?
Caffeine is a high-performance, near-optimal Java caching library well-suited for this pattern for several reasons:
LoadingCache.get() guarantees that on a cache miss, only one thread executes the loader while others wait. This is the core property that eliminates the stampede.expireAfterWrite (which blocks all threads during refresh), refreshAfterWrite allows one thread to asynchronously reload the entry while other threads continue to serve the stale-but-valid cached value. This eliminates latency spikes during key rotation.The hierarchical keyring with DynamoDB (Option A) is a production-ready, AWS-recommended solution that reduces stampede frequency by introducing longer-lived branch keys. Itโs the best choice for most organizations. Particularly when starting fresh or when the operational overhead of an additional data store is acceptable.
NICE Actimize chose the custom caching approach (Option B) for a pragmatic reason: it avoided introducing a new infrastructure dependency into the encryption critical path. Their platform already operated at scale across hundreds of tenants, and adding a DynamoDB table as a key coordination layer would have meant taking on additional operational responsibility: provisioning, monitoring, backup, access control, and ensuring high availability for a component that sits directly in the encrypt/decrypt hot path. In a regulated financial services environment, each new stateful component in the security chain requires its own resilience planning, failure-mode analysis, and compliance review. The Caffeine cache used in Option B, by contrast, is an in-process library (a JAR on the classpath). It is stateless, requires no network calls, no provisioning and no operational overhead. It makes a lighter dependency than a managed cloud resource in the critical path. There is no shared state to lose, no additional infrastructure to protect, and no new failure mode beyond what already exists with AWS KMS itself. If a node restarts, the cache rebuilds on the next KMS call.
By implementing a rotation policy with the optimized caching approach, NICE Actimize achieved the following results:
The cache stampede problem compounds in multi-tenant encryption systems: excess data key generation on the encrypt side degrades cache hit ratios on the decrypt side, creating a feedback loop of redundant KMS calls. The AWS-recommended hierarchical keyring pattern with DynamoDB provides a production-ready solution that integrates with the AWS Encryption SDK with minimal code changes. For regulated environments requiring additional control, a custom caching approach can deliver similar results.
If you operate a multi-tenant SaaS platform or a high-throughput system with per-tenant encryption requirements, consider these patterns to optimize your encryption costs and performance.
To get started, explore the following resources:
If you have questions or feedback about this post, leave a comment in the Comments section.
Fortnite scam pages like the ones below appear by the dozen every day, recycled endlessly under different names and designs.
One version promises $50 from a fake superhero collaboration. Another claims it can calculate what your locker is worth. Both lead to the same destination: a fake Epic Games login page designed to steal your account. Itโs an old trick, but it still catches people out.
If a website promises free V-Bucks, cash, or a tool to calculate your lockerโs value, then asks you to log in with your Epic account to get it, itโs not run by Epic.
Epic doesnโt offer an official tool that values accounts, and no legitimate giveaway requires you to sign in through a third-party site. Youโre just handing your Epic username and password to scammers.
If you or your child entered your Epic login details on one of these sites, assume the account has been compromised. Change the password immediately, turn on two-factor authentication, and donโt reuse that password on any other accounts.
A stolen Fortnite account can be worth real money. Criminals can take over accounts with rare skins, spend any saved payment methods, sell the account on underground marketplaces, or use it to scam the ownerโs friends. They may also try the same username and password on other online accounts, hoping the password has been reused.
Fortnite still attracts around 110 million monthly players and has more than 650 million registered accounts. That alone makes it an attractive target for cybercriminals.
The audienceโs age matters too. In December 2022, the US Federal Trade Commission (FTC) fined Epic Games a record $520 million, after alleging that the company knew children made up a substantial share of its player base and left voice and text chat turned on by default, exposing them to strangers. The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) also cites industry experts who say young gamers are especially vulnerable to phishing because they spend more time on social media and are less familiar with social engineering.
The game is also built around visible status. Skins, emotes, and pickaxes cost real money, making the idea that โyour locker has a priceโ feel plausible. Rare or discontinued skins really do sell for hundreds of dollars on unofficial marketplaces, even though Epic offers no official way to cash out V-Bucks and selling accounts violates its terms of service. That kernel of truth is exactly what these locker-value scams exploit.
Thatโs also what makes them more convincing than a simple V-Bucks giveaway. Instead of promising something for nothing, they play on curiosity about something the player already owns. Thatโs probably why this version keeps coming back.
Some pages promise rewards:

Others skip the free-reward pitch and frame the locker itself as hidden value the player is owed:
Others frame it as competition instead of currency:
The hook changes, but the fake login page doesnโt. These sites all do the same thing. They ask you to sign in with your Epic account so they can steal your username and password.

This one borrows a real story. Epic did settle with the FTC for $520 million, and real payments are still going out in 2026. But the real settlement pays actual dollars through the FTCโs own process, not in-game V-Bucks through an โEpic Games Locker,โ and the claim window closed in July 2025.
References to an โEU Regulatory Mandateโ and the case number shown on these pages donโt match any genuine legal action.
Fortnite scams change constantly, but the advice doesnโt.
Stop threats before they can do any harm.
Malwarebytes Browser Guard blocks phishing pages and malicious sites automatically. Free, one click to install. Add it to your browser โ
Fortnite scam pages like the ones below appear by the dozen every day, recycled endlessly under different names and designs.
One version promises $50 from a fake superhero collaboration. Another claims it can calculate what your locker is worth. Both lead to the same destination: a fake Epic Games login page designed to steal your account. Itโs an old trick, but it still catches people out.
If a website promises free V-Bucks, cash, or a tool to calculate your lockerโs value, then asks you to log in with your Epic account to get it, itโs not run by Epic.
Epic doesnโt offer an official tool that values accounts, and no legitimate giveaway requires you to sign in through a third-party site. Youโre just handing your Epic username and password to scammers.
If you or your child entered your Epic login details on one of these sites, assume the account has been compromised. Change the password immediately, turn on two-factor authentication, and donโt reuse that password on any other accounts.
A stolen Fortnite account can be worth real money. Criminals can take over accounts with rare skins, spend any saved payment methods, sell the account on underground marketplaces, or use it to scam the ownerโs friends. They may also try the same username and password on other online accounts, hoping the password has been reused.
Fortnite still attracts around 110 million monthly players and has more than 650 million registered accounts. That alone makes it an attractive target for cybercriminals.
The audienceโs age matters too. In December 2022, the US Federal Trade Commission (FTC) fined Epic Games a record $520 million, after alleging that the company knew children made up a substantial share of its player base and left voice and text chat turned on by default, exposing them to strangers. The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) also cites industry experts who say young gamers are especially vulnerable to phishing because they spend more time on social media and are less familiar with social engineering.
The game is also built around visible status. Skins, emotes, and pickaxes cost real money, making the idea that โyour locker has a priceโ feel plausible. Rare or discontinued skins really do sell for hundreds of dollars on unofficial marketplaces, even though Epic offers no official way to cash out V-Bucks and selling accounts violates its terms of service. That kernel of truth is exactly what these locker-value scams exploit.
Thatโs also what makes them more convincing than a simple V-Bucks giveaway. Instead of promising something for nothing, they play on curiosity about something the player already owns. Thatโs probably why this version keeps coming back.
Some pages promise rewards:

Others skip the free-reward pitch and frame the locker itself as hidden value the player is owed:
Others frame it as competition instead of currency:
The hook changes, but the fake login page doesnโt. These sites all do the same thing. They ask you to sign in with your Epic account so they can steal your username and password.

This one borrows a real story. Epic did settle with the FTC for $520 million, and real payments are still going out in 2026. But the real settlement pays actual dollars through the FTCโs own process, not in-game V-Bucks through an โEpic Games Locker,โ and the claim window closed in July 2025.
References to an โEU Regulatory Mandateโ and the case number shown on these pages donโt match any genuine legal action.
Fortnite scams change constantly, but the advice doesnโt.
Stop threats before they can do any harm.
Malwarebytes Browser Guard blocks phishing pages and malicious sites automatically. Free, one click to install. Add it to your browser โ
A whole industry has sprung up around selling TikTok โgrowth.โ
Cheap views by the hundred, pre-made ad accounts, and polished sales pages promising a repeatable path to serious revenue.
None of it is officially sanctioned by TikTok, and depending on what youโre buying, you could end up wasting money, losing your account, or handing your login details to scammers.
Sites selling bulk engagement all look remarkably similar.
They offer small bundles of views, likes, or followers for a few pounds, usually alongside identical packages for YouTube, Instagram, and other platforms.
The sales pitch is almost always the same: โ100% real profiles,โ โno bots, no click farms,โ and โcompletely safe.โ
Those claims are worth reading carefully because theyโre addressing the biggest concern buyers already have.
At this price point, bulk engagement is usually generated through bots, click farms, or other artificial meansโthe very thing these sites insist they donโt use.
Even if your engagement numbers increase initially, TikTokโs fraud detection systems can remove artificial engagement, and accounts that repeatedly use these services risk being flagged or restricted.
Another common offer is bulk TikTok Ads accounts sold as โagedโ or โtrusted,โ often bundled with a replacement guarantee if an account stops working. The pitch is that you skip the hassle of setting up and verifying a new advertising account.

The problem is that you donโt know how those accounts were created. Many are built using stolen or synthetic identities, compromised payment details, or other deceptive methods. Buying one means inheriting that historyโand the very real risk that TikTok detects it and suspends the account, along with any campaigns or ad budget attached to it. A replacement guarantee wonโt help if your advertising is suddenly brought to a halt.
A third type of offer is less obviously a scam and more of a marketing funnel.
Slick landing pagesโoften hosted on free platforms and paired with an embedded videoโpromise a โproven blueprintโ for turning TikTok into a major source of income, usually backed by impressive but unverifiable claims about past clients.

The immediate goal is usually to collect your email address, and sometimes your phone number, before revealing whatโs actually for sale. That might be a paid course, a โdone-for-youโ management service, or a request for direct access to your TikTok Shop or Ads account.
What happens next varies, but the common thread is the same: youโre being asked to trust an unverified third party with your business, your money, or your account.
Not every TikTok marketing service is a scam. But if someoneโs offering thousands of views for a few pounds, bulk โagedโ ad accounts, or guaranteed growth, youโre in a very different part of the market.
These services promise shortcuts. What they often deliver is fake engagement, accounts with questionable histories, or requests for access to your own account.
At best, youโve wasted your money on engagement TikTok later strips away. At worst, youโre buying an account built on stolen information or giving an untrusted third party full access to your own.
None of this is unique to TikTok. The platformโs explosive growth has simply given a familiar ecosystem of low-effort scams a new audience.
Scammersย donโtย need to hack you. They just need you to click once.ย
Malwarebytes Identity Theft Protection catches suspicious activity before it becomes a problem.
A whole industry has sprung up around selling TikTok โgrowth.โ
Cheap views by the hundred, pre-made ad accounts, and polished sales pages promising a repeatable path to serious revenue.
None of it is officially sanctioned by TikTok, and depending on what youโre buying, you could end up wasting money, losing your account, or handing your login details to scammers.
Sites selling bulk engagement all look remarkably similar.
They offer small bundles of views, likes, or followers for a few pounds, usually alongside identical packages for YouTube, Instagram, and other platforms.
The sales pitch is almost always the same: โ100% real profiles,โ โno bots, no click farms,โ and โcompletely safe.โ
Those claims are worth reading carefully because theyโre addressing the biggest concern buyers already have.
At this price point, bulk engagement is usually generated through bots, click farms, or other artificial meansโthe very thing these sites insist they donโt use.
Even if your engagement numbers increase initially, TikTokโs fraud detection systems can remove artificial engagement, and accounts that repeatedly use these services risk being flagged or restricted.
Another common offer is bulk TikTok Ads accounts sold as โagedโ or โtrusted,โ often bundled with a replacement guarantee if an account stops working. The pitch is that you skip the hassle of setting up and verifying a new advertising account.

The problem is that you donโt know how those accounts were created. Many are built using stolen or synthetic identities, compromised payment details, or other deceptive methods. Buying one means inheriting that historyโand the very real risk that TikTok detects it and suspends the account, along with any campaigns or ad budget attached to it. A replacement guarantee wonโt help if your advertising is suddenly brought to a halt.
A third type of offer is less obviously a scam and more of a marketing funnel.
Slick landing pagesโoften hosted on free platforms and paired with an embedded videoโpromise a โproven blueprintโ for turning TikTok into a major source of income, usually backed by impressive but unverifiable claims about past clients.

The immediate goal is usually to collect your email address, and sometimes your phone number, before revealing whatโs actually for sale. That might be a paid course, a โdone-for-youโ management service, or a request for direct access to your TikTok Shop or Ads account.
What happens next varies, but the common thread is the same: youโre being asked to trust an unverified third party with your business, your money, or your account.
Not every TikTok marketing service is a scam. But if someoneโs offering thousands of views for a few pounds, bulk โagedโ ad accounts, or guaranteed growth, youโre in a very different part of the market.
These services promise shortcuts. What they often deliver is fake engagement, accounts with questionable histories, or requests for access to your own account.
At best, youโve wasted your money on engagement TikTok later strips away. At worst, youโre buying an account built on stolen information or giving an untrusted third party full access to your own.
None of this is unique to TikTok. The platformโs explosive growth has simply given a familiar ecosystem of low-effort scams a new audience.
Scammersย donโtย need to hack you. They just need you to click once.ย
Malwarebytes Identity Theft Protection catches suspicious activity before it becomes a problem.
Shoppers browsing on their phones are landing on convincing Walmart lookalike sites offering name-brand liquor at 40% to 70% off, only to be led straight to a checkout page asking for a full credit card number, expiry date, and CVV.
The sites have no connection to Walmart. Theyโre part of a network of more than 120 near-identical domains built to look like a legitimate retailer just long enough to steal your card details.
The name โWalmartโ is doing most of the work here. Itโs one of the most recognized retailers in the world, and itโs that familiarity that makes people lower their guard. A shopper whoโd hesitate on an unfamiliar website may think nothing of an unusually large discount because the logo, colours, and layout look familiar.
That trust hasnโt been earned by the site. Itโs borrowed from a brand that has nothing to do with it.
If youโve entered your card details on one of these pages, the safest assumption is that your card has been compromised.
The scam follows a simple pattern: a Walmart-branded homepage, category pages stacked with heavily discounted liquor, and a checkout form asking for full card details.
The discounts do much of the persuading. Seeing premium brands advertised at 60% or 70% off encourages people to buy first and ask questions later.



The same WordPress/WooCommerce template powers every site in the network. They share the same product catalogue, prices, and images. The only differences are fabricated US business addresses and phone numbers that are swapped out for each domain.
.shop domain.The simplest defence is also the most effective: if a retailer needs a lookalike domain to sell you something, itโs probably a scam.
allgoodscenter.shop, allneedsbay.shop, allneedslane.shop, allneedsmarket.shop, allneedsstore.shop, allpurposebay.shop, basketandmore.shop, broadbasket.shop, broadbasketbay.shop, broadbasketco.shop, broadbasketlane.shop, broadbasketplace.shop, broadbasketway.shop, broadchoice.shop, broadgoodsbay.shop, broadgoodscenter.shop, broadgoodsplace.shop, broadgoodsway.shop, broadmarketplacehub.shop, broadutility.shop, broadutilityhub.shop, broadvalue.shop, broadvaluebay.shop, broadvalueplace.shop, cartandcrate.shop, completehomegoods.shop, dailybasketport.shop, dailybasketway.shop, dailychoiceway.shop, dailycrate.shop, dailyfindslane.shop, dailygoodscrest.shop, dailygoodsfield.shop, dailygoodspark.shop, dailygoodsridge.shop, dailygoodsway.shop, dailygoodswayhub.shop, dailyhomemarket.shop, dailyutilitybay.shop, dailyutilityway.shop, everydaycartshop.shop, everydayneedsco.shop, everydayvaluebay.shop, generalcart.shop, generalcartlane.shop, generalgoodsport.shop, generalgoodsridge.shop, generalgoodsway.shop, generalgoodsyard.shop, generalmarketbay.shop, generalmarketfield.shop, generalneedsplace.shop, generalvaluebay.shop, goodsandhomebay.shop, goodsandhomeco.shop, goodsandhomehub.shop, goodsandlivinghub.shop, goodsandmoreco.shop, goodsandvaluehub.shop, goodsdistrict.shop, goodslanding.shop, goodsmeadow.shop, goodsroute.shop, goodsvalley.shop, homeandutility.shop, homebasketlane.shop, homebasketway.shop, homecartcenter.shop, homefieldmarket.shop, homefindsco.shop, homegoodscrate.shop, homegoodsport.shop, homegoodsway.shop, homelivinggoods.shop, homeneedslane.shop, homeneedsmarket.shop, homeparcel.shop, homesteadmart.shop, homeutilitystore.shop, homevaluebay.shop, homevalueplace.shop, homevalueway.shop, marketbasketcenter.shop, marketcanvas.shop, marketchoicebay.shop, marketchoiceplace.shop, marketfieldhub.shop, marketfindsbay.shop, marketfoundry.shop, marketgrovehub.shop, markethomeplace.shop, marketpillar.shop, marketpine.shop, marketridge.shop, markettrailway.shop, marketwarehouse.shop, modernsupplyhub.shop, smartbasketplace.shop, smartdailygoods.shop, smartneedshub.shop, smartutilityhub.shop, smartvaluebay.shop, trustedgoods.shop, usefulbasketlane.shop, usefulcartcenter.shop, usefulchoicebay.shop, usefuldailyhub.shop, usefulgoodsbay.shop, usefulgoodscenter.shop, usefulgoodspark.shop, usefulgoodsway.shop, usefulgoodswayhub.shop, usefulgoodsyard.shop, usefulmarket.shop, usefulmarketbay.shop, usefulshelf.shop, usefulutility.shop, usefulvalueplace.shop, utilitygoods.shop, valuechoicebay.shop, valuegoodspark.shop, valuegoodsridge.shop, valuegrove.shop, valueparcel.shop
Stop threats before they can do any harm.
Malwarebytes Browser Guard blocks phishing pages and malicious sites automatically. Free, one click to install. Add it to your browser โ
Shoppers browsing on their phones are landing on convincing Walmart lookalike sites offering name-brand liquor at 40% to 70% off, only to be led straight to a checkout page asking for a full credit card number, expiry date, and CVV.
The sites have no connection to Walmart. Theyโre part of a network of more than 120 near-identical domains built to look like a legitimate retailer just long enough to steal your card details.
The name โWalmartโ is doing most of the work here. Itโs one of the most recognized retailers in the world, and itโs that familiarity that makes people lower their guard. A shopper whoโd hesitate on an unfamiliar website may think nothing of an unusually large discount because the logo, colours, and layout look familiar.
That trust hasnโt been earned by the site. Itโs borrowed from a brand that has nothing to do with it.
If youโve entered your card details on one of these pages, the safest assumption is that your card has been compromised.
The scam follows a simple pattern: a Walmart-branded homepage, category pages stacked with heavily discounted liquor, and a checkout form asking for full card details.
The discounts do much of the persuading. Seeing premium brands advertised at 60% or 70% off encourages people to buy first and ask questions later.



The same WordPress/WooCommerce template powers every site in the network. They share the same product catalogue, prices, and images. The only differences are fabricated US business addresses and phone numbers that are swapped out for each domain.
.shop domain.The simplest defence is also the most effective: if a retailer needs a lookalike domain to sell you something, itโs probably a scam.
allgoodscenter.shop, allneedsbay.shop, allneedslane.shop, allneedsmarket.shop, allneedsstore.shop, allpurposebay.shop, basketandmore.shop, broadbasket.shop, broadbasketbay.shop, broadbasketco.shop, broadbasketlane.shop, broadbasketplace.shop, broadbasketway.shop, broadchoice.shop, broadgoodsbay.shop, broadgoodscenter.shop, broadgoodsplace.shop, broadgoodsway.shop, broadmarketplacehub.shop, broadutility.shop, broadutilityhub.shop, broadvalue.shop, broadvaluebay.shop, broadvalueplace.shop, cartandcrate.shop, completehomegoods.shop, dailybasketport.shop, dailybasketway.shop, dailychoiceway.shop, dailycrate.shop, dailyfindslane.shop, dailygoodscrest.shop, dailygoodsfield.shop, dailygoodspark.shop, dailygoodsridge.shop, dailygoodsway.shop, dailygoodswayhub.shop, dailyhomemarket.shop, dailyutilitybay.shop, dailyutilityway.shop, everydaycartshop.shop, everydayneedsco.shop, everydayvaluebay.shop, generalcart.shop, generalcartlane.shop, generalgoodsport.shop, generalgoodsridge.shop, generalgoodsway.shop, generalgoodsyard.shop, generalmarketbay.shop, generalmarketfield.shop, generalneedsplace.shop, generalvaluebay.shop, goodsandhomebay.shop, goodsandhomeco.shop, goodsandhomehub.shop, goodsandlivinghub.shop, goodsandmoreco.shop, goodsandvaluehub.shop, goodsdistrict.shop, goodslanding.shop, goodsmeadow.shop, goodsroute.shop, goodsvalley.shop, homeandutility.shop, homebasketlane.shop, homebasketway.shop, homecartcenter.shop, homefieldmarket.shop, homefindsco.shop, homegoodscrate.shop, homegoodsport.shop, homegoodsway.shop, homelivinggoods.shop, homeneedslane.shop, homeneedsmarket.shop, homeparcel.shop, homesteadmart.shop, homeutilitystore.shop, homevaluebay.shop, homevalueplace.shop, homevalueway.shop, marketbasketcenter.shop, marketcanvas.shop, marketchoicebay.shop, marketchoiceplace.shop, marketfieldhub.shop, marketfindsbay.shop, marketfoundry.shop, marketgrovehub.shop, markethomeplace.shop, marketpillar.shop, marketpine.shop, marketridge.shop, markettrailway.shop, marketwarehouse.shop, modernsupplyhub.shop, smartbasketplace.shop, smartdailygoods.shop, smartneedshub.shop, smartutilityhub.shop, smartvaluebay.shop, trustedgoods.shop, usefulbasketlane.shop, usefulcartcenter.shop, usefulchoicebay.shop, usefuldailyhub.shop, usefulgoodsbay.shop, usefulgoodscenter.shop, usefulgoodspark.shop, usefulgoodsway.shop, usefulgoodswayhub.shop, usefulgoodsyard.shop, usefulmarket.shop, usefulmarketbay.shop, usefulshelf.shop, usefulutility.shop, usefulvalueplace.shop, utilitygoods.shop, valuechoicebay.shop, valuegoodspark.shop, valuegoodsridge.shop, valuegrove.shop, valueparcel.shop
Stop threats before they can do any harm.
Malwarebytes Browser Guard blocks phishing pages and malicious sites automatically. Free, one click to install. Add it to your browser โ
Choosing the right cryptographic key management service on Amazon Web Services (AWS) starts with understanding the difference between AWS Key Management Service (AWS KMS) and AWS CloudHSM. Both provide key storage backed by a hardware security module (HSM) but serve very different needs. AWS KMS is a fully managed service that integrates with all AWS services and all AWS Regions, making it the right choice for most key management workloads. AWS CloudHSM is a specialized option for use cases where you have strict requirements for dedicated HSM instances or must support legacy applications built around traditional HSM interfaces.
The following table shows the pricing, AWS Region availability, algorithms, and AWS service integrations as of July 2026.
| Criteria | AWS KMS | AWS CloudHSM |
| Best for | Most cloud-based key management needs | Lift-and-shift from on-premises applications and use of legacy algorithms |
| Deployment | AWS managed HSMs, accessed through API endpoints | Customer managed HSMs, accessed through an Elastic Network Interface (ENI) in your virtual private cloud (VPC) |
| Cost | Pay per use (symmetric and RSA 2048 operations): $1 per key plus $0.03 per 10,000 requests per month | Pay by the hour (us-east-1): $1.60 per HSM instance per hour |
| AWS integration | All AWS services | Custom integration with AWS services |
| Region coverage | All AWS Regions | 32 Regions |
Choose AWS KMS for most use cases. Choose AWS CloudHSM only if you require:
AWS KMS and AWS CloudHSM both provide robust encryption key management capabilities that help organizations meet their security and compliance requirements. While each service offers distinct features tailored to different use cases, they share several core benefits that make them valuable tools for protecting sensitive data in the cloud.
AWS KMS and AWS CloudHSM both provide tamper-resistant, HSM-based key management with physical data center controls. They secure administration and workloads with Transport Layer Security (TLS). Neither service allows AWS employees to access your key material. Both services deliver equivalent security through Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 140-3 Level 3 validated hardware and enforce strict cryptographic isolation of customer keys. Compliance frameworks such as the ones listed below validate security based on cryptographic boundaries rather than hardware or partition dedication. The multi-tenant architecture of AWS KMS provides the same security guarantees as the single-tenant model used by AWS CloudHSM while reducing operational complexity and cost. Customer security teams consistently approve AWS KMS adoption after confirming that cryptographic isolation meets their single-tenant security and compliance requirements.
AWS KMS and AWS CloudHSM meet major compliance certifications, including:
Both services protect data including personally identifiable information (PII) and Protected Health Information (PHI).
AWS KMS and AWS CloudHSM support standard cryptographic operations including AES-256, RSA, ECDSA, Ed25519, ECDH, ML-DSA, SHA-2, and HMAC. Both services are actively investing in post-quantum cryptography (PQC) to help customers prepare for future quantum computing threats and are committed to expanding PQC algorithm support as National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) standards are finalized.
AWS KMS supports a default request rate for cryptographic operations ranging from 10,000 transactions per second (TPS) to 100,000 TPS per account based on Region. You can request quota increases beyond the default limits. AWS CloudHSM requires explicit provisioning of additional instances for higher throughput. Customers typically provision at least one additional HSM instance to handle peak activity, which can be difficult to predict due to lack of utilization metrics.
AWS KMS and AWS CloudHSM both support high availability, durability, automatic backup, and software patching. AWS KMS is a Regional service with high availability and durability provided without any customer management required. AWS CloudHSM is a zonal service with customers required to manage high availability and durability.
Given these shared capabilities, the choice of which service to use depends on your specific requirements. The following sections outline decision points to help you choose.
AWS KMS offers a fully managed service that simplifies key management operations and reduces operational overhead compared to AWS CloudHSM. Organizations choose AWS KMS when they need seamless integration with AWS services, automatic key rotation, and a cost-effective solution that doesnโt require dedicated HSM management.
AWS KMS integrates with all AWS services across all major categories. These include AI platforms, storage, databases, and compute services. Most of these services support AWS KMS customer managed keys, giving you full control over the key using policies and access controls. For customers that value convenience over control, AWS services provide transparent encryption using AWS owned keys, eliminating the cost and lifecycle management overhead of customer-owned keys. Both customer managed and AWS owned keys are AWS KMS keys. AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM) enables least-privilege access controls, key policies to control access, and auditing all key usage through AWS CloudTrail.
AWS KMS handles all operational tasks including HSM instance provisioning and maintenance, automatic key rotation, auto-scaling, disaster recovery, and comprehensive audit logging. This eliminates the operational overhead required to maintain a solution based on AWS CloudHSM.
AWS KMS costs $1 per month per key plus $0.03 per 10,000 requests (symmetric and RSA 2048 operations). AWS CloudHSM costs approximately $1.60 per hour per HSM (approximately $1,152 per month), excluding the operational overhead for staff to manage the clusterโwhich further favors AWS KMS for most workloads.
Break-even analysis:
Note: Many AWS services cache Data Encryption Keys (DEKs) locally, significantly reducing the number of AWS KMS API calls. Actual AWS KMS costs at scale are often much lower than raw operation counts suggest. For example: A workload with 100 keys and 100 million monthly operations using two HSMs for high availability:
- AWS CloudHSM: Approximately $2,304 per month for two HSMs plus operational costs
- AWS KMS: $100 per month (keys) plus $300 per month in operational costs for a total of $400 per month
- Savings using AWS KMS: $1904 per month (83% reduction)
AWS KMS operates in every AWS Region, including all commercial Regions, GovCloud, China Regions, and the European Sovereign Cloud Region. AWS CloudHSM operates in 34 Regions, and AWS evaluates each new Region individually for AWS CloudHSM support.
AWS CloudHSM provides HSM-specific interfaces and support for legacy cryptographic algorithms that arenโt available from AWS KMS.
AWS CloudHSM supports traditional HSM interfaces such as PKCS#11, JCE, OpenSSL, and KSP, simplifying migration to AWS with minimal application changes. AWS is actively expanding AWS KMS integration options for these workloads. Contact AWS Support to discuss current alternatives.
AWS CloudHSM supports deprecated algorithms such as 3DES and PKCS#1 v1.5 padding with RSA. It also supports less commonly used operations such as AES key wrapping and AES with CTR or CBC modes.
For most organizations, AWS KMS delivers enterprise-grade security with lower costs and zero operational overhead. Choose AWS CloudHSM only if you have specific requirements for traditional HSM interfaces or less commonly used algorithms and can justify the additional cost and operational complexity.
Ready to get started? Use these guides to implement your chosen solution:
If you have feedback about this post, submit comments in the Comments section below.
Sextortion scammers are using email addresses from data leaked by the ShinyHunters hacking group to add some credibility to their feeble attempts to convince people they have embarrassing information about them.
Sextortion emails are messages claiming that the scammer recorded you through your webcam while you watched pornography and now demand payment. They have been around for years and keep evolving with small changes in wording and fake technical detail.
In this campaign, the scammers pretend to be ShinyHunters. What hasnโt changed is the basic truth: there is no malware, no recording, and no credible evidence behind the threat. Despite seeing countless versions of these emails over the years, Iโve yet to encounter one that was backed up by the evidence the sender claimed to have.
BleepingComputer reports thatย ShinyHunters data leaks are fueling a $2,000 sextortion email scam and shared the following example:

โSubject: Information about your online security
๏ปฟHello,
We are the ShinyHunters hacking group.
A few months ago, we gained access to your devices and started monitoring your online activities.What happened:
We gained access to the Amtrak.com database where you have an account and easily accessed your email.
You werenโt very careful about the links you opened.
A week later, we installed an exploit on your devices, including your phone, giving us access to your microphone,
camera, keyboard, and all your data.
We have your photos, browsing history, conversations, and contact list.Among other things, we discovered that you frequently visit adult websites and watch explicit videos.
We managed to record you and created videos of you pleasuring yourself.
With a few clicks, we can share these videos with your friends,
colleagues, and family or even make them public.Proposal:
Send us $2000 in Bitcoin to the following wallet:
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxWeโll delete everything immediately.
You have 48 hours from the moment you open this email.
Once the payment is received, weโll remove the malware from your devices.โ
BleepingComputer states it has seen data from the Amtrak, Hallmark, ADT, Substack, Betterment, CarGurus, Panera Bread, and McGraw Hill breaches used to target victims in this sextortion email campaign.
A California community college also issued a warning after seeing the campaign target people affected by the Canvas data breach.
They confirmed that the targeted email addresses had previously appeared in data leaked by ShinyHunters. They also contacted the group, which denied being behind the sextortion emails.
The increase to a $2,000 demand may suggest the scammers paid someone for the email lists. Although itโs more likely they simply downloaded the leaked data after ShinyHunters published it following failed extortion attempts.
A quick check of the Bitcoin address used in the email shows no activity.

Letโs keep it that way. With any luck, these dungeon dwellers will eventually give up trying to scare people out of their hard-earned money.
Some sextortion emails are badly written, but many have been polished by AI and look convincing. Regardless of how professional they look, they should be treated the same way: as unsubstantiated threats designed to scare victims into paying.
Pro tip: Malwarebytes Scam Guard recognized this email for what it is: sextortion. It can recognize scams and advise you how to proceed.

While these sextortion emails are almost always bluffs, if youโre concerned about webcam spying,ย Malwarebytes Webcam Monitoringย can alert you when applications attempt to access your camera.
Sextortion scammers are using email addresses from data leaked by the ShinyHunters hacking group to add some credibility to their feeble attempts to convince people they have embarrassing information about them.
Sextortion emails are messages claiming that the scammer recorded you through your webcam while you watched pornography and now demand payment. They have been around for years and keep evolving with small changes in wording and fake technical detail.
In this campaign, the scammers pretend to be ShinyHunters. What hasnโt changed is the basic truth: there is no malware, no recording, and no credible evidence behind the threat. Despite seeing countless versions of these emails over the years, Iโve yet to encounter one that was backed up by the evidence the sender claimed to have.
BleepingComputer reports thatย ShinyHunters data leaks are fueling a $2,000 sextortion email scam and shared the following example:

โSubject: Information about your online security
๏ปฟHello,
We are the ShinyHunters hacking group.
A few months ago, we gained access to your devices and started monitoring your online activities.What happened:
We gained access to the Amtrak.com database where you have an account and easily accessed your email.
You werenโt very careful about the links you opened.
A week later, we installed an exploit on your devices, including your phone, giving us access to your microphone,
camera, keyboard, and all your data.
We have your photos, browsing history, conversations, and contact list.Among other things, we discovered that you frequently visit adult websites and watch explicit videos.
We managed to record you and created videos of you pleasuring yourself.
With a few clicks, we can share these videos with your friends,
colleagues, and family or even make them public.Proposal:
Send us $2000 in Bitcoin to the following wallet:
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxWeโll delete everything immediately.
You have 48 hours from the moment you open this email.
Once the payment is received, weโll remove the malware from your devices.โ
BleepingComputer states it has seen data from the Amtrak, Hallmark, ADT, Substack, Betterment, CarGurus, Panera Bread, and McGraw Hill breaches used to target victims in this sextortion email campaign.
A California community college also issued a warning after seeing the campaign target people affected by the Canvas data breach.
They confirmed that the targeted email addresses had previously appeared in data leaked by ShinyHunters. They also contacted the group, which denied being behind the sextortion emails.
The increase to a $2,000 demand may suggest the scammers paid someone for the email lists. Although itโs more likely they simply downloaded the leaked data after ShinyHunters published it following failed extortion attempts.
A quick check of the Bitcoin address used in the email shows no activity.

Letโs keep it that way. With any luck, these dungeon dwellers will eventually give up trying to scare people out of their hard-earned money.
Some sextortion emails are badly written, but many have been polished by AI and look convincing. Regardless of how professional they look, they should be treated the same way: as unsubstantiated threats designed to scare victims into paying.
Pro tip: Malwarebytes Scam Guard recognized this email for what it is: sextortion. It can recognize scams and advise you how to proceed.

While these sextortion emails are almost always bluffs, if youโre concerned about webcam spying,ย Malwarebytes Webcam Monitoringย can alert you when applications attempt to access your camera.
Resin art has become a popular corner of TikTok, with some videos attracting millions of views. But not every glossy, colorful post is what it claims to be. Scammers are using the look of handmade resin art to trick buyers, collectors, and even fellow artists into sending money for work that either doesnโt exist or wasnโt created by the person posting it.
There are plenty of genuine resin artists on TikTok. Unfortunately, the platform has also attracted scammers who steal videos and impersonate legitimate creators.
The scam is fairly straightforward. A TikTok account presents itself as a resin artist, posts satisfying videos, and invites people to โDM to order.โ In some cases, the videos are stolen from other creators, the account has no real process footage, and the seller disappears after receiving payment.
One resin artist discovered that scammers were using their videos to impersonate them and scam TikTok users. They shared the following comment:
Ridiculous TikTok scammerโฆlol. Profile says theyโre a resin artist and to DM them to order, but none of the videos are theirs. When I wrote to them asking them to take down the many videos of mine that they posted, passing them off as their own with no credit, their answer was that they arenโt a resin artist and are just sharing videos they like
Literally about 1/4 of โtheirโ videos are mine
These scams often rely on trust and urgency. The account may show polished clips of poured resin, finished coasters, trays, jewelry, or wall art, then push buyers to move the conversation into direct messages. Once the buyer moves to a different platform, the scammer typically requests a deposit, full payment, or personal details with little chance of being held accountable.
And real artists donโt just get their work ripped off. A scammer may contact a creator claiming to want to buy, feature, or license their work, but the real goal is to extract fees, banking information, or other sensitive data. Social media art scams are often repetitive because they are built from the same templates and scripts.

The safest approach is the boring one: verify before you pay. If the artwork looks amazing but the sellerโs identity is vague, the risk is real.
Before ordering, look for signs that the artist is genuine:
If you do click through to a website, spend a few minutes checking it before you buy:
Not every resin art account is a scam. Many belong to genuine artists, and thatโs why impersonation scams can be so convincing.
If youโre unsure, paste the website address into Malwarebytes Scam Guard and ask whether it shows signs of being fraudulent. It can help identify suspiciously new domains and other common scam indicators.

Use real-time web protection to block known fraudulent and malicious websites, like Browser Guard did for this web shop:

Both are freeโmaking them much cheaper than sending money to a scammer.
Malwarebytes Scam Guardย helps youย analyzeย suspicious links, texts, and screenshots instantly.ย ย
Available withย Malwarebytes Premium Securityย for all your devices, and in theย Malwarebytes app for iOS and Android.ย ย
Resin art has become a popular corner of TikTok, with some videos attracting millions of views. But not every glossy, colorful post is what it claims to be. Scammers are using the look of handmade resin art to trick buyers, collectors, and even fellow artists into sending money for work that either doesnโt exist or wasnโt created by the person posting it.
There are plenty of genuine resin artists on TikTok. Unfortunately, the platform has also attracted scammers who steal videos and impersonate legitimate creators.
The scam is fairly straightforward. A TikTok account presents itself as a resin artist, posts satisfying videos, and invites people to โDM to order.โ In some cases, the videos are stolen from other creators, the account has no real process footage, and the seller disappears after receiving payment.
One resin artist discovered that scammers were using their videos to impersonate them and scam TikTok users. They shared the following comment:
Ridiculous TikTok scammerโฆlol. Profile says theyโre a resin artist and to DM them to order, but none of the videos are theirs. When I wrote to them asking them to take down the many videos of mine that they posted, passing them off as their own with no credit, their answer was that they arenโt a resin artist and are just sharing videos they like
Literally about 1/4 of โtheirโ videos are mine
These scams often rely on trust and urgency. The account may show polished clips of poured resin, finished coasters, trays, jewelry, or wall art, then push buyers to move the conversation into direct messages. Once the buyer moves to a different platform, the scammer typically requests a deposit, full payment, or personal details with little chance of being held accountable.
And real artists donโt just get their work ripped off. A scammer may contact a creator claiming to want to buy, feature, or license their work, but the real goal is to extract fees, banking information, or other sensitive data. Social media art scams are often repetitive because they are built from the same templates and scripts.

The safest approach is the boring one: verify before you pay. If the artwork looks amazing but the sellerโs identity is vague, the risk is real.
Before ordering, look for signs that the artist is genuine:
If you do click through to a website, spend a few minutes checking it before you buy:
Not every resin art account is a scam. Many belong to genuine artists, and thatโs why impersonation scams can be so convincing.
If youโre unsure, paste the website address into Malwarebytes Scam Guard and ask whether it shows signs of being fraudulent. It can help identify suspiciously new domains and other common scam indicators.

Use real-time web protection to block known fraudulent and malicious websites, like Browser Guard did for this web shop:

Both are freeโmaking them much cheaper than sending money to a scammer.
Malwarebytes Scam Guardย helps youย analyzeย suspicious links, texts, and screenshots instantly.ย ย
Available withย Malwarebytes Premium Securityย for all your devices, and in theย Malwarebytes app for iOS and Android.ย ย
Starting last year, Android users have been seeing the โnumber is now verifiedโ system notification more frequently. And in some cases people even find mysterious outgoing text messages in their history that they never sent.
These messages often cause confusion and even anxiety: has a virus infected the phone? Are tech giants spying on our phone numbers? Letโs break down how this feature works, and what potential risks it poses to your privacy.
The notification pops up whenever Googleโs phone number verification feature is triggered on your device.
Its main job is to make sure that the SIM card tied to a specific phone number is physically inside the phone. Once verified, that phone number automatically links to all active Google accounts on the device.
There are several key services that rely on the verification. Most importantly, it drives Rich Communication Services (RCS)ย โ the modern standard for โrichโ messaging right inside your standard text messaging app. It feels like a popular chat app, but without the need to install anything extra. Unlike iMessage, which is locked to Appleโs ecosystem, RCS works across compatible smartphones on various platforms since itโs an industry standard set by carriers rather than tech giants. Since recently, both Apple and Android users have been able to exchange RCS messages. For this feature to work in the Google Messages app, Google needs ongoing confirmation that your SIM card is active. If you pull out your SIM card, RCS chats will keep working for about eight days before turning off automatically.
According to Google, phone number verification serves several other purposes as well:
Google also recently confirmed that this data is used to counter scams. Verification helps block calls or text messages from spoofed numbers if both the real owner of the number and the recipient are using Android devices with verified phone numbers.
Phone number verification technology has been around on Android for quite some timeย โ Google was sending test SMS messages as far back as in 2019. However, it became widely visible to most users following a Google system update in September 2025. The process was baked deeper into the operating system, with number verification now running by default during initial phone setup, and re-running periodically in the background.
There are two main technical methods for the verification process. Which one your device uses depends on your mobile carrier and your version of Android.
The older method relies on hidden text messages. In the background, your smartphone sends a specialized technical text message to Googleโs servers. The operating system intercepts this message before you ever see it, which is why it rarely appears in your standard text messaging app. However, due to software glitches or Android customization quirks, these texts occasionally surface in sent messages, startling users. They typically look like this: โ(string of letters and numbers) Google is re-verifying the phone# of this device.โ Google explicitly notes in its help documentation that standard messaging rates from your carrier may apply.
In recent years, direct carrier verification (via carrier APIs) has become the primary verification method. This approach is more modern and secure than previous ones. The smartphone sends an encrypted token containing device and SIM card identifiers to the mobile carrier, and the carrier responds with the confirmed phone number. The whole process takes just a couple of seconds and runs completely unnoticed by the user. Both global telecom giants and smaller providers have connected to this verification network. Notably, third-party apps can also tap into the results of this check through Firebase Phone Number Verification, getting confirmation from your mobile carrier about which phone number is active on the device.
In its official documentation, Google notes that device identifiers and SIM card data may be collected during verification. In practice, this refers to unique identifiers for the SIM card and its subscriber profile (ICCID and IMSI), as well as technical device identifiers needed to run mobile networks. Google also explicitly states that it does not sell your personal information, including your phone number, to anyone.
Naturally, sending additional unique identifiers to Googleย โ especially given the scale of its advertising businessย โ always raises concern among privacy-conscious users. Hereโs what you should keep in mind:
Metadata collection. To run RCS, Google exchanges data with your mobile carrier. Even when the content of RCS messages is encrypted, metadataย โ such as who is messaging whom and whenย โ can still be stored on your carrierโs servers, and in some cases, on Googleโs servers. As cybersecurity experts at the Electronic Frontier Foundation point out, if privacy is your top priority, youโre better off sticking to dedicated encrypted messaging apps.
Linked accounts. If you have both a personal and a work Google account (or a personal and a family account) set up on the same phone, the verified number will automatically link to both profiles. The operating system does not offer built-in tools to separate numbers for different accounts on a single device.
Phone number leaks. Apps on your device can already access various user identifiers, including your phone number. However, this verification system makes it easier to link multiple phone numbers to a user who has multiple Google accounts. And while Google states that it never sells phone numbers, you cannot say the same with confidence about obscure third-party Android developers.
On by default. The feature is enabled out of the box, and most users have no idea their device is silently querying their carrier in the background. While you can opt out in your Google settings once you notice it, thereโs no guarantee that any data already collected will actually be deleted.
For most users, verification is genuinely helpful. It simplifies account recovery, makes finding a lost phone easier, powers modern text messaging features, and assists emergency services when every second counts.
However, if you want to minimize the amount of metadata sent to Google, mobile carriers, and other data brokers, you can manually disable the feature. Hereโs how:
If you also want to disable Better sharing on Google, go to Settings โ Google โ Manage your Google Account โ Personal info โ Contact info โ Phone, select your number, and turn off the setting.
If you have multiple Google accounts on your phone, youโll need to repeat these steps for each one. Unfortunately, verification sometimes turns itself back on automatically, and thereโs no reliable way to prevent this on standard consumer phones with stock software.
Keep in mind that disabling verification means losing access to RCS chats in Google Messagesย โ forcing you to fall back on basic SMS, or switch to alternative secure messaging apps. You also wonโt be able to use that number for quick account recovery should you forget your password.
To thoughtfully customize your privacy settings across all your devices โ regardless of the operating system, browser, or app โ check out our free online tool, Privacy Checker.
Curious about other privacy risks you might not even know exist? Check out our other deep dives, here:





The percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked continued to decrease, reaching 19.6% in Q1 2026. This is the lowest value in three years, and it is 1.4 times lower than in Q2 2023.
Regionally, the percentages ranged from 9.1% in Northern Europe to 27.4% in Africa.
The percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked increased in five regions over the quarter, most notably in Southern Europe, Northern Europe, and Russia.
In Q1 2026, Southern Europe led the way in growth for internet and email threats. The region also saw the fastest growth in spyware, as well as malicious scripts and phishing pages.
In Russia, the percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked exceeded the figures for the previous two quarters. Russia saw an increase in the percentage for threats from the internet, and a slight increase in the figure for threats from email clients (Russia is one of three regions where this figure did not decrease).
Among the threat categories, the greatest increases were observed in the percentages for denylisted internet resources, as well as spyware (distributed in the region via the internet and email clients).
Biometric systems (26.4%) traditionally rank top among the industries and OT infrastructure types covered in this report in terms of the percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked. These systems are characterized by internet access, extensive email use for data exchange and approvals (such as access granting), and, in many cases, minimal cybersecurity controls within the organizations that use these systems.
Biometric systems rank first among industries in terms of email threats. At the same time, unlike other industries, the percentage for email threats in biometric systems exceeds that for internet threats.
In all selected industries, the global average follows a downward trend. In Q1 2026, the percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked increased only in the manufacturing sector โ by 1.0 pp. The percentages for this industry increased across 10 regions, with the most notable increases in Western Europe, Northern Europe, and Russia.
In Q1 2026, Kaspersky security solutions blocked malware from 10,052 different malware families of various categories on industrial automation systems.
Over the quarter, the percentage of ICS computers on which denylisted internet resources were blocked increased (after decreasing over the previous two quarters), and there was a slight increase in the percentage for AutoCAD malware.

Percentage of ICS computers on which the activity of malicious objects from various categories was prevented
Malicious scripts and phishing pages retained their to spot among threat categories by the percentage of ICS computers on which these threats were blocked. The global average in Q1 2026 was 6.56%.
Over the quarter, the percentages increased in four regions. The most significant change was observed in Southern Europe (9.85%, +0.94 pp). The figures for malicious scripts in the region increased over three consecutive quarters.
Among the selected industries, across all regions, the highest percentages for the malicious scripts and phishing pages category were recorded for biometric systems (19.59%) and building automation (15.43%) in Southern Europe. These same industries lead in similar rankings for malicious documents and spyware.
The percentage of ICS computers on which spyware was blocked decreased over two consecutive quarters, dropping to 3.73%. Despite the decline, spyware has ranked second among threat categories by the percentage of attacked computers for three consecutive quarters.
The percentages increased in five regions over the quarter, most notably in Southern Europe (5.46%, +0.35 pp) and Russia (2.84%, +0.24 pp).
In Southern Europe, the percentage of ICS computers on which spyware was blocked increased in all the selected industries except manufacturing. The greatest increase was observed in biometric systems.
Among the selected industries, the highest percentage of spyware in Russia was recorded in biometric systems. That said, the percentage of ICS computers on which spyware was blocked increased in all industries in the region except construction. The percentage figure has been increasing for two consecutive quarters in the oil and gas industry (by a factor of 1.63 over six months), and for three consecutive quarters in engineering and ICS integration, as well as electric power. In the remaining sectors, the values have been fluctuating.

Percentage of ICS computers on which spyware was blocked in various industries in Russia, Q3 2025โQ1 2026
The percentage of ICS computers on which denylisted internet resources were blocked increased to 3.54%.
The most notable increase over the quarter occurred in Southeast Asia (4.58%, +0.65 pp). Among the industries in the region, the highest percentage figures for this threat category were recorded in electric power and construction. Over the quarter, the largest increases in percentages figures were observed in the electric power and manufacturing industries.
In North America (Canada), denylisted internet resources (2.14%) showed the greatest increase among all categories โ by a factor of 1.22.
Among the selected industries across all regions, the highest percentage figures for the denylisted internet resources category were in the electric power (7.11%) and construction (6.25%) industries in Southeast Asia.
The percentage figure for this category decreased over two consecutive quarters, reaching its lowest value (1.56%) for the entire period of observations in Q1 2026. It increased just in two regions: Australia and New Zealand (1.12%, +0.04 pp), and Russia (0.62%, +0.01 pp).
Among the selected industries across all regions, the highest percentages for malicious documents were recorded for biometric systems (9.02%) and building automation (6.97%) in Southern Europe. These same industries also lead in similar rankings for malicious scripts and spyware.
The percentage of ICS computers on which ransomware was blocked has decreased for two consecutive quarters, dropping to 0.14%. This is the lowest value among all categories.
The percentage increased in two regions: North America (Canada) (0.11%, +0.04 pp) and slightly in Northern Europe (0.06%, +0.01 pp).
Among the selected industries across all regions, the highest percentages for ransomware were recorded in the oil and gas and manufacturing industries (0.92% and 0.65%, respectively) in Central Asia and the South Caucasus, and in biometric systems (0.89%) in Russia.
The percentage of ICS computers on which miners in the form of executable files for Windows were blocked decreased to 0.59%.
The percentage increased in seven regions. The largest increase was observed in Africa (0.63%, +0.16 pp). Among the selected industries, the largest increases in the region were in the manufacturing and oil and gas industries.
Among the selected industries across all regions, the highest percentages for miners in the form of executable files were recorded in construction (1.99%), biometric systems (1.98%), and the oil and gas industry (1.97%) in Central Asia and the South Caucasus.
The percentage of ICS computers on which web miners were blocked has been declining for a year, and in Q1 2026, it reached the lowest value for the entire period under review (0.22%).
At the same time, the percentage increased in seven regions. The largest increases were observed in South Asia (0.28%, +0.11 pp), the Middle East (0.31%, +0.09 pp), and Africa (0.34%, +0.08 pp). Despite the increases, the percentages in these regions for Q1 2026 did not exceed those observed in 2023โ2024 and in Q1 2025.
Among the selected industries across all regions, the highest percentages for web miners were recorded for biometric systems (0.97%) in Russia. Biometric systems in South Asia (0.79%) ranked second, and the electric power sector in Southeast Asia (0.76%) ranked third.
The percentage of ICS computers on which worms were blocked decreased to 1.33%.
The percentage decreased across all regions following an increase in the previous quarter (due to a wave of phishing attacks that distributed the Backdoor.MSIL.XWorm backdoor worm across all regions of the world).
Among the selected industries across all regions, the highest percentage figure for worms was recorded for biometric systems (4.80%) in Central Asia and the South Caucasus. Two industries in Africa โ biometric systems (4.04%) and electric power (3.53%) โ took the second and third spots, respectively.
The percentage of ICS computers on which viruses were blocked decreased to 1.31%.
The top 3 regions by this figure remained the same: Southeast Asia (6.11%, first by a wide margin), Africa (4.15%), and East Asia (2.97%). These same regions are also among the leaders by the percentage of systems affected by AutoCAD malware. The largest increase in this figure was observed in Africa (+0.41 pp).
Among the selected industries across all regions, the highest percentages for viruses were recorded in the construction industry (6.35%) and building automation (5.50%) in Southeast Asia.
The percentage of ICS computers on which malware for AutoCAD was blocked increased to 0.30%.
The most notable increase over the quarter was observed in Africa, with the regionโs percentage figure rising by 0.47 pp, a very significant increase for this category, and almost doubling (to 0.91%).
Among the selected industries across all regions, the highest percentages for AutoCAD malware were recorded in the construction industry in East Asia (5.58%) and Southeast Asia (3.87%).
In Q1 2026, the average percentages across all threat sources, except threats from the internet, decreased globally.
The percentage of ICS computers on which threats from the internet were blocked increased to 7.88%. However, over the past three years, the percentage figure for internet threats has followed a downward trend.
The largest increases in the percentages were recorded in Southern Europe (8.59%, +0.59 pp), Southeast Asia (10.16%, +0.55 pp), and Northern Europe (4.47%, +0.51 pp).
Among the selected industries across all regions, the highest percentages for threats from the internet were recorded in electric power (13.16%) and construction (12.55%) in Southeast Asia, and in the engineering and ICS integration sector (12.33%) in South Asia.
The percentage of ICS computers on which threats delivered via email clients were blocked decreased to 2.59%. This is a three-year low.
The percentage of this threat source increased in three regions: Southern Europe (6.54%, +0.2 pp), East Asia (1.5%, +0.09 pp), and slightly in Russia (0.7%, +0.04 pp).
Among the selected industries across all regions, the highest percentages for email threats were recorded for biometric systems (19.78%) and building automation (12.34%) in Southern Europe. In these two industries, the percentage of ICS computers on which email threats are blocked is higher than the percentage for threats from the internet. A similar situation was observed in two other instances, both in biometric systems (in South America and Southeast Asia).
The percentage of ICS computers on which threats were detected when connecting removable media continued to decrease, reaching its lowest value for the period under review (0.26%).
Among the selected industries across all regions, the highest percentages for removable media threats blocked on ICS computers were observed in the electric power sector in Central Asia and the South Caucasus (1.45%), East Asia (1.34%), and Africa (1.16%).
The percentage of ICS computers on which threats are blocked in network folders is steadily decreasing. In Q1 2026, it was the lowest for the period under review (0.029%).
East Asia has traditionally led by a wide margin. The percentage for East Asia (0.135%) is 27 times higher than the lowest regional value (recorded in Northern Europe).
The largest increases in the percentages for threats from network folders were observed in Africa (0.037%, +0.006 pp) and South America (0.013%, +0.006 pp).
Among the selected industries across all regions, the construction industry in East Asia, at 0.36%, holds the top positions in the ranking by the percentage of ICS computers on which threats are blocked in network folders.
For more information on industrial threats see the full version of the report.





The percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked continued to decrease, reaching 19.6% in Q1 2026. This is the lowest value in three years, and it is 1.4 times lower than in Q2 2023.
Regionally, the percentages ranged from 9.1% in Northern Europe to 27.4% in Africa.
The percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked increased in five regions over the quarter, most notably in Southern Europe, Northern Europe, and Russia.
In Q1 2026, Southern Europe led the way in growth for internet and email threats. The region also saw the fastest growth in spyware, as well as malicious scripts and phishing pages.
In Russia, the percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked exceeded the figures for the previous two quarters. Russia saw an increase in the percentage for threats from the internet, and a slight increase in the figure for threats from email clients (Russia is one of three regions where this figure did not decrease).
Among the threat categories, the greatest increases were observed in the percentages for denylisted internet resources, as well as spyware (distributed in the region via the internet and email clients).
Biometric systems (26.4%) traditionally rank top among the industries and OT infrastructure types covered in this report in terms of the percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked. These systems are characterized by internet access, extensive email use for data exchange and approvals (such as access granting), and, in many cases, minimal cybersecurity controls within the organizations that use these systems.
Biometric systems rank first among industries in terms of email threats. At the same time, unlike other industries, the percentage for email threats in biometric systems exceeds that for internet threats.
In all selected industries, the global average follows a downward trend. In Q1 2026, the percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked increased only in the manufacturing sector โ by 1.0 pp. The percentages for this industry increased across 10 regions, with the most notable increases in Western Europe, Northern Europe, and Russia.
In Q1 2026, Kaspersky security solutions blocked malware from 10,052 different malware families of various categories on industrial automation systems.
Over the quarter, the percentage of ICS computers on which denylisted internet resources were blocked increased (after decreasing over the previous two quarters), and there was a slight increase in the percentage for AutoCAD malware.

Percentage of ICS computers on which the activity of malicious objects from various categories was prevented
Malicious scripts and phishing pages retained their to spot among threat categories by the percentage of ICS computers on which these threats were blocked. The global average in Q1 2026 was 6.56%.
Over the quarter, the percentages increased in four regions. The most significant change was observed in Southern Europe (9.85%, +0.94 pp). The figures for malicious scripts in the region increased over three consecutive quarters.
Among the selected industries, across all regions, the highest percentages for the malicious scripts and phishing pages category were recorded for biometric systems (19.59%) and building automation (15.43%) in Southern Europe. These same industries lead in similar rankings for malicious documents and spyware.
The percentage of ICS computers on which spyware was blocked decreased over two consecutive quarters, dropping to 3.73%. Despite the decline, spyware has ranked second among threat categories by the percentage of attacked computers for three consecutive quarters.
The percentages increased in five regions over the quarter, most notably in Southern Europe (5.46%, +0.35 pp) and Russia (2.84%, +0.24 pp).
In Southern Europe, the percentage of ICS computers on which spyware was blocked increased in all the selected industries except manufacturing. The greatest increase was observed in biometric systems.
Among the selected industries, the highest percentage of spyware in Russia was recorded in biometric systems. That said, the percentage of ICS computers on which spyware was blocked increased in all industries in the region except construction. The percentage figure has been increasing for two consecutive quarters in the oil and gas industry (by a factor of 1.63 over six months), and for three consecutive quarters in engineering and ICS integration, as well as electric power. In the remaining sectors, the values have been fluctuating.

Percentage of ICS computers on which spyware was blocked in various industries in Russia, Q3 2025โQ1 2026
The percentage of ICS computers on which denylisted internet resources were blocked increased to 3.54%.
The most notable increase over the quarter occurred in Southeast Asia (4.58%, +0.65 pp). Among the industries in the region, the highest percentage figures for this threat category were recorded in electric power and construction. Over the quarter, the largest increases in percentages figures were observed in the electric power and manufacturing industries.
In North America (Canada), denylisted internet resources (2.14%) showed the greatest increase among all categories โ by a factor of 1.22.
Among the selected industries across all regions, the highest percentage figures for the denylisted internet resources category were in the electric power (7.11%) and construction (6.25%) industries in Southeast Asia.
The percentage figure for this category decreased over two consecutive quarters, reaching its lowest value (1.56%) for the entire period of observations in Q1 2026. It increased just in two regions: Australia and New Zealand (1.12%, +0.04 pp), and Russia (0.62%, +0.01 pp).
Among the selected industries across all regions, the highest percentages for malicious documents were recorded for biometric systems (9.02%) and building automation (6.97%) in Southern Europe. These same industries also lead in similar rankings for malicious scripts and spyware.
The percentage of ICS computers on which ransomware was blocked has decreased for two consecutive quarters, dropping to 0.14%. This is the lowest value among all categories.
The percentage increased in two regions: North America (Canada) (0.11%, +0.04 pp) and slightly in Northern Europe (0.06%, +0.01 pp).
Among the selected industries across all regions, the highest percentages for ransomware were recorded in the oil and gas and manufacturing industries (0.92% and 0.65%, respectively) in Central Asia and the South Caucasus, and in biometric systems (0.89%) in Russia.
The percentage of ICS computers on which miners in the form of executable files for Windows were blocked decreased to 0.59%.
The percentage increased in seven regions. The largest increase was observed in Africa (0.63%, +0.16 pp). Among the selected industries, the largest increases in the region were in the manufacturing and oil and gas industries.
Among the selected industries across all regions, the highest percentages for miners in the form of executable files were recorded in construction (1.99%), biometric systems (1.98%), and the oil and gas industry (1.97%) in Central Asia and the South Caucasus.
The percentage of ICS computers on which web miners were blocked has been declining for a year, and in Q1 2026, it reached the lowest value for the entire period under review (0.22%).
At the same time, the percentage increased in seven regions. The largest increases were observed in South Asia (0.28%, +0.11 pp), the Middle East (0.31%, +0.09 pp), and Africa (0.34%, +0.08 pp). Despite the increases, the percentages in these regions for Q1 2026 did not exceed those observed in 2023โ2024 and in Q1 2025.
Among the selected industries across all regions, the highest percentages for web miners were recorded for biometric systems (0.97%) in Russia. Biometric systems in South Asia (0.79%) ranked second, and the electric power sector in Southeast Asia (0.76%) ranked third.
The percentage of ICS computers on which worms were blocked decreased to 1.33%.
The percentage decreased across all regions following an increase in the previous quarter (due to a wave of phishing attacks that distributed the Backdoor.MSIL.XWorm backdoor worm across all regions of the world).
Among the selected industries across all regions, the highest percentage figure for worms was recorded for biometric systems (4.80%) in Central Asia and the South Caucasus. Two industries in Africa โ biometric systems (4.04%) and electric power (3.53%) โ took the second and third spots, respectively.
The percentage of ICS computers on which viruses were blocked decreased to 1.31%.
The top 3 regions by this figure remained the same: Southeast Asia (6.11%, first by a wide margin), Africa (4.15%), and East Asia (2.97%). These same regions are also among the leaders by the percentage of systems affected by AutoCAD malware. The largest increase in this figure was observed in Africa (+0.41 pp).
Among the selected industries across all regions, the highest percentages for viruses were recorded in the construction industry (6.35%) and building automation (5.50%) in Southeast Asia.
The percentage of ICS computers on which malware for AutoCAD was blocked increased to 0.30%.
The most notable increase over the quarter was observed in Africa, with the regionโs percentage figure rising by 0.47 pp, a very significant increase for this category, and almost doubling (to 0.91%).
Among the selected industries across all regions, the highest percentages for AutoCAD malware were recorded in the construction industry in East Asia (5.58%) and Southeast Asia (3.87%).
In Q1 2026, the average percentages across all threat sources, except threats from the internet, decreased globally.
The percentage of ICS computers on which threats from the internet were blocked increased to 7.88%. However, over the past three years, the percentage figure for internet threats has followed a downward trend.
The largest increases in the percentages were recorded in Southern Europe (8.59%, +0.59 pp), Southeast Asia (10.16%, +0.55 pp), and Northern Europe (4.47%, +0.51 pp).
Among the selected industries across all regions, the highest percentages for threats from the internet were recorded in electric power (13.16%) and construction (12.55%) in Southeast Asia, and in the engineering and ICS integration sector (12.33%) in South Asia.
The percentage of ICS computers on which threats delivered via email clients were blocked decreased to 2.59%. This is a three-year low.
The percentage of this threat source increased in three regions: Southern Europe (6.54%, +0.2 pp), East Asia (1.5%, +0.09 pp), and slightly in Russia (0.7%, +0.04 pp).
Among the selected industries across all regions, the highest percentages for email threats were recorded for biometric systems (19.78%) and building automation (12.34%) in Southern Europe. In these two industries, the percentage of ICS computers on which email threats are blocked is higher than the percentage for threats from the internet. A similar situation was observed in two other instances, both in biometric systems (in South America and Southeast Asia).
The percentage of ICS computers on which threats were detected when connecting removable media continued to decrease, reaching its lowest value for the period under review (0.26%).
Among the selected industries across all regions, the highest percentages for removable media threats blocked on ICS computers were observed in the electric power sector in Central Asia and the South Caucasus (1.45%), East Asia (1.34%), and Africa (1.16%).
The percentage of ICS computers on which threats are blocked in network folders is steadily decreasing. In Q1 2026, it was the lowest for the period under review (0.029%).
East Asia has traditionally led by a wide margin. The percentage for East Asia (0.135%) is 27 times higher than the lowest regional value (recorded in Northern Europe).
The largest increases in the percentages for threats from network folders were observed in Africa (0.037%, +0.006 pp) and South America (0.013%, +0.006 pp).
Among the selected industries across all regions, the construction industry in East Asia, at 0.36%, holds the top positions in the ranking by the percentage of ICS computers on which threats are blocked in network folders.
For more information on industrial threats see the full version of the report.




Attackers can exploit LLM domain hallucinations through phantom squatting to target supply chains. Read the analysis to learn more.
The post Phantom Squatting: AI-Hallucinated Domains as a Software Supply Chain Vector appeared first on Unit 42.
