This article was originally published in the second edition of the InfoSec Survival Guide. Find it free online HERE or order your $1 physical copy on the Spearphish General Store. […]
The post How to Perform and Combat Social Engineering appeared first on Black Hills Information Security, Inc..
This blog is part of a series where we highlight new or fast-evolving threats in consumer security. This one focuses on how AI is being used to design more realistic campaigns, accelerate social engineering, and how AI agents can be used to target individuals.
Most cybercriminals stick with what works. But once a new method proves effective, it spreads quickly—and new trends and types of campaigns follow.
In 2025, the rapid development of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and its use in cybercrime went hand in hand. In general, AI allows criminals to improve the scale, speed, and personalization of social engineering through realistic text, voice, and video. Victims face not only financial loss, but erosion of trust in digital communication and institutions.
One of the main areas where AI improved was in the area of voice-cloning, which was immediately picked up by scammers. In the past, they would mostly stick to impersonating friends and relatives. In 2025, they went as far as impersonating senior US officials. The targets were predominantly current or former US federal or state government officials and their contacts.
In the course of these campaigns, cybercriminals used test messages as well as AI-generated voice messages. At the same time, they did not abandon the distressed-family angle. A woman in Florida was tricked into handing over thousands of dollars to a scammer after her daughter’s voice was AI-cloned and used in a scam.
Agentic AI is the term used for individualized AI agents designed to carry out tasks autonomously. One such task could be to search for publicly available or stolen information about an individual and use that information to compose a very convincing phishing lure.
These agents could also be used to extort victims by matching stolen data with publicly known email addresses or social media accounts, composing messages and sustaining conversations with people who believe a human attacker has direct access to their Social Security number, physical address, credit card details, and more.
Another use we see frequently is AI-assisted vulnerability discovery. These tools are in use by both attackers and defenders. For example, Google uses a project called Big Sleep, which has found several vulnerabilities in the Chrome browser.
As mentioned in the section on AI agents, combining data posted on social media with data stolen during breaches is a common tactic. Such freely provided data is also a rich harvesting ground for romance scams, sextortion, and holiday scams.
Social media platforms are also widely used to peddle fake products, AI generated disinformation, dangerous goods, and drop-shipped goods.
And then there are the vulnerabilities in public AI platforms such as ChatGPT, Perplexity, Claude, and many others. Researchers and criminals alike are still exploring ways to bypass the safeguards intended to limit misuse.
Prompt injection is the general term for when someone inserts carefully crafted input, in the form of an ordinary conversation or data, to nudge or force an AI into doing something it wasn’t meant to do.
In some cases, attackers have used AI platforms to write and spread malware. Researchers have documented campaign where attackers leveraged Claude AI to automate the entire attack lifecycle, from initial system compromise through to ransom note generation, targeting sectors such as government, healthcare, and emergency services.
Since early 2024, OpenAI says it has disrupted more than 20 campaigns around the world that attempted to abuse its AI platform for criminal operations and deceptive campaigns.
AI is amplifying the capabilities of both defenders and attackers. Security teams can use it to automate detection, spot patterns faster, and scale protection. Cybercriminals, meanwhile, are using it to sharpen social engineering, discover vulnerabilities more quickly, and build end-to-end campaigns with minimal effort.
Looking toward 2026, the biggest shift may not be technical but psychological. As AI-generated content becomes harder to distinguish from the real thing, verifying voices, messages, and identities will matter more than ever.
We don’t just report on threats—we remove them
Cybersecurity risks should never spread beyond a headline. Keep threats off your devices by downloading Malwarebytes today.
This blog is part of a series where we highlight new or fast-evolving threats in consumer security. This one focuses on how AI is being used to design more realistic campaigns, accelerate social engineering, and how AI agents can be used to target individuals.
Most cybercriminals stick with what works. But once a new method proves effective, it spreads quickly—and new trends and types of campaigns follow.
In 2025, the rapid development of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and its use in cybercrime went hand in hand. In general, AI allows criminals to improve the scale, speed, and personalization of social engineering through realistic text, voice, and video. Victims face not only financial loss, but erosion of trust in digital communication and institutions.
One of the main areas where AI improved was in the area of voice-cloning, which was immediately picked up by scammers. In the past, they would mostly stick to impersonating friends and relatives. In 2025, they went as far as impersonating senior US officials. The targets were predominantly current or former US federal or state government officials and their contacts.
In the course of these campaigns, cybercriminals used test messages as well as AI-generated voice messages. At the same time, they did not abandon the distressed-family angle. A woman in Florida was tricked into handing over thousands of dollars to a scammer after her daughter’s voice was AI-cloned and used in a scam.
Agentic AI is the term used for individualized AI agents designed to carry out tasks autonomously. One such task could be to search for publicly available or stolen information about an individual and use that information to compose a very convincing phishing lure.
These agents could also be used to extort victims by matching stolen data with publicly known email addresses or social media accounts, composing messages and sustaining conversations with people who believe a human attacker has direct access to their Social Security number, physical address, credit card details, and more.
Another use we see frequently is AI-assisted vulnerability discovery. These tools are in use by both attackers and defenders. For example, Google uses a project called Big Sleep, which has found several vulnerabilities in the Chrome browser.
As mentioned in the section on AI agents, combining data posted on social media with data stolen during breaches is a common tactic. Such freely provided data is also a rich harvesting ground for romance scams, sextortion, and holiday scams.
Social media platforms are also widely used to peddle fake products, AI generated disinformation, dangerous goods, and drop-shipped goods.
And then there are the vulnerabilities in public AI platforms such as ChatGPT, Perplexity, Claude, and many others. Researchers and criminals alike are still exploring ways to bypass the safeguards intended to limit misuse.
Prompt injection is the general term for when someone inserts carefully crafted input, in the form of an ordinary conversation or data, to nudge or force an AI into doing something it wasn’t meant to do.
In some cases, attackers have used AI platforms to write and spread malware. Researchers have documented campaign where attackers leveraged Claude AI to automate the entire attack lifecycle, from initial system compromise through to ransom note generation, targeting sectors such as government, healthcare, and emergency services.
Since early 2024, OpenAI says it has disrupted more than 20 campaigns around the world that attempted to abuse its AI platform for criminal operations and deceptive campaigns.
AI is amplifying the capabilities of both defenders and attackers. Security teams can use it to automate detection, spot patterns faster, and scale protection. Cybercriminals, meanwhile, are using it to sharpen social engineering, discover vulnerabilities more quickly, and build end-to-end campaigns with minimal effort.
Looking toward 2026, the biggest shift may not be technical but psychological. As AI-generated content becomes harder to distinguish from the real thing, verifying voices, messages, and identities will matter more than ever.
We don’t just report on threats—we remove them
Cybersecurity risks should never spread beyond a headline. Keep threats off your devices by downloading Malwarebytes today.
In this post, we analyze the evolving bypass tactics threat actors are using to neutralize traditional security perimeters and fuel the global surge in infostealer infections.
Table Of Contents
Infostealer-driven credential theft in 2025 has surged, with Flashpoint observing a staggering 800% increase since the start of the year. With over 1.8 billion corporate and personal accounts compromised, the threat landscape finds itself in a paradox: while technical defenses have never been more advanced, the human attack surface has never been more vulnerable.
Information-stealing malware has become the most scalable entry point for enterprise breaches, but to truly defend against them, organizations must look beyond the malware itself. As teams move into 2026 security planning, it is critical to understand the deceptive initial access vectors—the latest tactics Flashpoint is seeing in the wild—that threat actors are using to manipulate users and bypass modern security perimeters.
Here are the latest methods threat actors are leveraging to facilitate infections:
Mark of the Web (MotW) is a critical Windows defense feature that tags files downloaded from the internet as “untrusted” by adding a hidden NTFS Alternate Data Stream (ADS) to the file. This tag triggers “Protected View” in Microsoft Office programs and prompts Windows SmartScreen warnings when a user attempts to execute an unknown file.
Flashpoint has observed a new social engineering method to bypass these protections through a simple drag-and-drop lure. Instead of asking a user to open a suspicious attachment directly, which would trigger an immediate MotW warning, threat actors are instead instructing the victim to drag the malicious image or file from a document onto their desktop to view it. This manual interaction is highly effective for two reasons:
Flashpoint analysts uncovered an illicit thread detailing a proof of concept for a client-side remote code execution (RCE) in the Google Web Designer for Windows, which was first discovered by security researcher Bálint Magyar.
Google Web Designer is an application used for creating dynamic ads for the Google Ads platform. Leveraging this vulnerability, attackers would be able to perform remote code execution through an internal API using CSS injection by targeting a configuration file related to ads documents.
Within this thread, threat actors were specifically interested in the execution of the payload using the chrome.exe process. This is because using chrome.exe to fetch and execute a file is likely to bypass several security restrictions as Chrome is already a trusted process. By utilizing specific command-line arguments, such as the –headless flag, threat actors showed how to force a browser to initiate a remote connection in the background without spawning a visible window. This can be used in conjunction with other malicious scripts to silently download additional payloads onto a victim’s systems.
As widely-used software becomes more hardened and secure, threat actors are instead pivoting to targeting lesser-known alternatives. These tools often lack robust macro-protections. By targeting vulnerabilities in secondary PDF viewers or Office alternatives, attackers are seeking to trick users into making remote server connections that would otherwise be flagged as suspicious.
Social engineering is one of the driving factors behind the infostealer lifecycle. Once an initial access vector is successful, the malware immediately begins harvesting the logs that fuel today’s identity-based digital attacks.
As detailed in The Proactive Defender’s Guide to Infostealers, the end goal is not just a password. Instead, attackers are prioritizing session cookies, which allow them to perform session hijacking. By importing these stolen cookies into anti-detect browsers, they bypass Multi-Factor Authentication and step directly into corporate environments, appearing as a legitimate, authenticated user.
Understanding how threat actors weaponize stolen data is the first step toward a proactive defense. For a deep dive into the most prolific stealer strains and strategies for managing the identity attack surface, download The Proactive Defender’s Guide to Infostealers today.
The post The Infostealer Gateway: Uncovering the Latest Methods in Defense Evasion appeared first on Flashpoint.
Social engineering is the manipulation of individuals into divulging confidential information, granting unauthorized access, or performing actions that benefit the attacker, all without the victim realizing they are being tricked.
The post How to Design and Execute Effective Social Engineering Attacks by Phone appeared first on Black Hills Information Security, Inc..
GoPhish provides a nice platform for creating and running phishing campaigns. This blog will guide you through installing GoPhish and creating a campaign.
The post Gone Phishing: Installing GoPhish and Creating a Campaign appeared first on Black Hills Information Security, Inc..
by moth Hard-coded cryptographic secrets? In my commercially purchased, closed-source software? It’s more likely than you think. Like, a lot more likely. This blog post details a true story of […]
The post Indecent Exposure: Your Secrets are Showing appeared first on Black Hills Information Security, Inc..
p:5+ have:behavior fs:30d+ not have:sigma
p:5+ (sandbox_name:"CAPE Sandbox" or sandbox_name:"Zenbox") fs:30d+ not have:sigma
p:5+ have:behavior fs:30d+ sigma_critical:0 sigma_high:0 sigma_medium:0 sigma_low:2-
Login
title: Detect The Execution Of More.com And Vbc.exe Related to Lummac Stealer
id: 19b3806e-46f2-4b4c-9337-e3d8653245ea
status: experimental
description: Detects the execution of more.com and vbc.exe in the process tree. This behaviors was observed by a set of samples related to Lummac Stealer. The Lummac payload is injected into the vbc.exe process.
references:
- https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/14d886517fff2cc8955844b252c985ab59f2f95b2849002778f03a8f07eb8aef
- https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/more.com-EDB3046610020EE614B5B81B0439895E.html
- https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/vbc.exe-A731372E6F6978CE25617AE01B143351.html
author: Joseliyo Sanchez, @Joseliyo_Jstnk
date: 2024-11-14
tags:
- attack.defense-evasion
- attack.t1055
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
# VT Query: behaviour_processes:"C:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\more.com" behaviour_processes:"C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework\\v4.0.30319\\vbc.exe"
selection_parent:
ParentImage|endswith: '\more.com'
selection_child:
- Image|endswith: '\vbc.exe'
- OriginalFileName: 'vbc.exe'
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
{
"System": {
"Provider": {
"Guid": "{5770385F-C22A-43E0-BF4C-06F5698FFBD9}",
"Name": "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon"
},
"EventID": 1,
"Version": 5,
"Level": 4,
"Task": 1,
"Opcode": 0,
"Keywords": "0x8000000000000000",
"TimeCreated": {
"SystemTime": "2024-11-26T16:23:05.132539500Z"
},
"EventRecordID": 692861,
"Correlation": {},
"Execution": {
"ProcessID": 2396,
"ThreadID": 3116
},
"Channel": "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational",
"Computer": "DESKTOP-B0T93D6",
"Security": {
"UserID": "S-1-5-18"
}
},
"EventData": {
"RuleName": "-",
"UtcTime": "2024-11-26 16:23:05.064",
"ProcessGuid": "{C784477D-F5E9-6745-6006-000000003F00}",
"ProcessId": 4184,
"Image": "C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework\\v4.0.30319\\vbc.exe",
"FileVersion": "14.8.3761.0",
"Description": "Visual Basic Command Line Compiler",
"Product": "Microsoft® .NET Framework",
"Company": "Microsoft Corporation",
"OriginalFileName": "vbc.exe",
"CommandLine": "C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework\\v4.0.30319\\vbc.exe",
"CurrentDirectory": "C:\\Users\\george\\AppData\\Roaming\\comlocal\\RUYCLAXYVMFJ\\",
"User": "DESKTOP-B0T93D6\\george",
"LogonGuid": "{C784477D-9D9B-66FF-6E87-050000000000}",
"LogonId": "0x5876e",
"TerminalSessionId": 1,
"IntegrityLevel": "High",
"Hashes": {
"SHA1": "61F4D9A9EE38DBC72E840B3624520CF31A3A8653",
"MD5": "FCCB961AE76D9E600A558D2D0225ED43",
"SHA256": "466876F453563A272ADB5D568670ECA98D805E7ECAA5A2E18C92B6D3C947DF93",
"IMPHASH": "1460E2E6D7F8ECA4240B7C78FA619D15"
},
"ParentProcessGuid": "{C784477D-F5D4-6745-5E06-000000003F00}",
"ParentProcessId": 6572,
"ParentImage": "C:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\more.com",
"ParentCommandLine": "C:\\Windows\\SysWOW64\\more.com",
"ParentUser": "DESKTOP-B0T93D6\\george"
}
}
title: File Creation Related To RAT Clients
id: 2f3039c8-e8fe-43a9-b5cf-dcd424a2522d
status: experimental
description: File .conf created related to VenomRAT, AsyncRAT and Lummac samples observed in the wild.
references:
- https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/c9f9f193409217f73cc976ad078c6f8bf65d3aabcf5fad3e5a47536d47aa6761
- https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/e96a0c1bc5f720d7f0a53f72e5bb424163c943c24a437b1065957a79f5872675
author: Joseliyo Sanchez, @Joseliyo_Jstnk
date: 2024-11-15
tags:
- attack.execution
logsource:
category: file_event
product: windows
detection:
# VT Query: behaviour_files:"\\AppData\\Roaming\\DataLogs\\DataLogs.conf"
# VT Query: behaviour_files:"DataLogs.conf" or behaviour_files:"hvnc.conf" or behaviour_files:"dcrat.conf"
selection_required:
TargetFilename|contains: '\AppData\Roaming\'
selection_variants:
TargetFilename|endswith:
- '\datalogs.conf'
- '\hvnc.conf'
- '\dcrat.conf'
TargetFilename|contains:
- '\mydata\'
- '\datalogs\'
- '\hvnc\'
- '\dcrat\'
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Legitimate software creating a file with the same name
level: high
{
"System": {
"Provider": {
"Guid": "{5770385F-C22A-43E0-BF4C-06F5698FFBD9}",
"Name": "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon"
},
"EventID": 11,
"Version": 2,
"Level": 4,
"Task": 11,
"Opcode": 0,
"Keywords": "0x8000000000000000",
"TimeCreated": {
"SystemTime": "2024-12-02T00:52:23.072811600Z"
},
"EventRecordID": 1555690,
"Correlation": {},
"Execution": {
"ProcessID": 2624,
"ThreadID": 3112
},
"Channel": "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational",
"Computer": "DESKTOP-B0T93D6",
"Security": {
"UserID": "S-1-5-18"
}
},
"EventData": {
"RuleName": "-",
"UtcTime": "2024-12-02 00:52:23.059",
"ProcessGuid": "{C784477D-04C6-674D-5C06-000000004B00}",
"ProcessId": 7592,
"Image": "C:\\Users\\george\\Desktop\\ezzz.exe",
"TargetFilename": "C:\\Users\\george\\AppData\\Roaming\\MyData\\DataLogs.conf",
"CreationUtcTime": "2024-12-02 00:52:23.059",
"User": "DESKTOP-B0T93D6\\george"
}
sigma_rule:a1021d4086a92fd3782417a54fa5c5141d1e75c8afc9e73dc6e71ef9e1ae2e9c
sigma_rule:8f179585d5c1249ab1ef8cec45a16d112a53f91d143aa2b0b6713602b1d19252
This webcast was originally published on November 8, 2024. In this video, Hayden Covington discusses the detection engineering process and how to apply the scientific method to improve the quality […]
The post The Detection Engineering Process appeared first on Black Hills Information Security, Inc..
In this video, Michael Allen discusses adversary-in-the-middle post-exploitation techniques and processes.
The post Adversary in the Middle (AitM): Post-Exploitation appeared first on Black Hills Information Security, Inc..
Changes to the msds-KeyCredentialLink attribute are not audited/logged with standard audit configurations. This required serious investigations and a partner firm in infosec provided us the answer: TrustedSec. So, credit where […]
The post Enable Auditing of Changes to msDS-KeyCredentialLink appeared first on Black Hills Information Security, Inc..
This article originally featured in the very first issue of our PROMPT# zine — Choose Wisely. You can find that issue (and all the others) here: https://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/prompt-zine/ I remember a […]
The post Red Teaming: A Story From the Trenches appeared first on Black Hills Information Security, Inc..
Human Trust Most people associated with information technology roles understand the application of technical controls like the use of firewalls, encryption, and security products for defenses against digital threats. Proper […]
The post The Human Element in Cybersecurity: Understanding Trust and Social Engineering appeared first on Black Hills Information Security, Inc..
I previously blogged about spoofing Microsoft 365 using the direct send feature enabled by default when creating a business 365 Exchange Online instance (https://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/spoofing-microsoft-365-like-its-1995/). Using the direct send feature, it […]
The post Spamming Microsoft 365 Like It’s 1995 appeared first on Black Hills Information Security, Inc..
rvrsh3ll // Introduction This blog post is intended to give a light overview of device codes, access tokens, and refresh tokens. Here, I focus on the technical how-to for standing […]
The post Dynamic Device Code Phishing appeared first on Black Hills Information Security, Inc..
Every Android application has a “manifest.xml” file located in the root directory of the APK. (Remember APKs are just zip files.) The manifest file is like a guide to the application.
The post Field Guide to the Android Manifest File appeared first on Black Hills Information Security, Inc..
Hannah Cartier // Social engineering, especially phishing, is becoming increasingly prevalent in red team engagements as well as real-world attacks. As security awareness improves and systems become more locked down, […]
The post Phishing Made Easy(ish) appeared first on Black Hills Information Security, Inc..
Jordan Drysdale // Summary! There are tons of security event management (SIEM) solutions available these days, but this blog will focus on Microsoft Sentinel. Sentinel is easy to deploy, logs […]
The post Geopolitical Cyber-Detection Lures for Attribution with Microsoft Sentinel appeared first on Black Hills Information Security, Inc..
Raymond Felch // Preface: I began my exploration of reverse-engineering firmware a few weeks back (see “JTAG – Micro-Controller Debugging“), and although I made considerable progress finding and identifying the […]
The post How to Hack Hardware using UART appeared first on Black Hills Information Security, Inc..
Beau Bullock & Mike Felch// Strategically targeting a corporation requires deep knowledge of their technologies and employees. Successfully compromising an organization can depend on the quality of reconnaissance a tester […]
The post Podcast: Weaponizing Corporate Intel. This Time, It’s Personal! appeared first on Black Hills Information Security, Inc..
