A recently disclosed flaw in Signal’s calling software could allow another participant to keep hearing you after you hang up.

The vulnerability, tracked as CVE-2026-113380 (CVSS score 9.3 out of 10), affects RingRTC versions earlier than 2.72.0. RingRTC is the open-source library behind Signal’s voice and video calling functionality, providing calling components for its mobile and desktop applications.

The flaw concerns how Signal’s calling library shuts down a call. It does not affect how it encrypts conversations. According to the published vulnerability description, another participant could overwhelm a call’s internal event queue and interfere with the steps that should disconnect it when you end the call.

The main concern is unwanted listening after someone believes a conversation has ended. If a malicious call participant successfully triggered the flaw, they could potentially continue hearing audio that the other person no longer intended to share. That might include an offhand remark, a conversation with someone nearby, or other private background sound.

The vulnerability description also mentions that video might remain active, but does not confirm that behavior or explain what affected users would see on screen. It also doesn’t specify how long any continued transmission might last.

There are no known reports of exploitation in the wild. The vulnerability concerns only how a call is shut down. It does not involve stolen passwords, compromised accounts, or exposed message histories that would call for a password reset.

What to do

The developers updated the code to make shutdown more resilient when a call’s internal queue is full or another termination step fails.

Install any available Signal updates on your devices. The fix is available in the underlying RingRTC library, but the affected and first-fixed Signal app versions have not yet been confirmed publicly in the sources reviewed.

Personally, I found an update in the Google Play Store which brought my Android app to version 8.32.2. I did not find one in the Apple App Store, although this might be because I have automatic updates enabled. The current version on my iPad is listed as 8.32 (1910). While I think that means it’s all patched, this is hard to confirm from Signal’s website.

I’ve emailed Signal for clarification and will update this article when I hear back.

---

Scammers know more about you than you think. 

Malwarebytes Mobile Security protects you from phishing, scam texts, malicious sites, and more. With real-time AI-powered Scam Guard built right in. 

.wp-block-kadence-advancedbtn.kb-btns97520_6de029-2f{gap:var(--global-kb-gap-xs, 0.5rem );justify-content:flex-start;align-items:center;}.kt-btns97520_6de029-2f .kt-button{font-weight:normal;font-style:normal;}.kt-btns97520_6de029-2f .kt-btn-wrap-0{margin-right:5px;}.wp-block-kadence-advancedbtn.kt-btns97520_6de029-2f .kt-btn-wrap-0 .kt-button{color:#555555;border-color:#555555;}.wp-block-kadence-advancedbtn.kt-btns97520_6de029-2f .kt-btn-wrap-0 .kt-button:hover, .wp-block-kadence-advancedbtn.kt-btns97520_6de029-2f .kt-btn-wrap-0 .kt-button:focus{color:#ffffff;border-color:#444444;}.wp-block-kadence-advancedbtn.kt-btns97520_6de029-2f .kt-btn-wrap-0 .kt-button::before{display:none;}.wp-block-kadence-advancedbtn.kt-btns97520_6de029-2f .kt-btn-wrap-0 .kt-button:hover, .wp-block-kadence-advancedbtn.kt-btns97520_6de029-2f .kt-btn-wrap-0 .kt-button:focus{background:#444444;}

Affecting the open source calling library RingRTC, the bug prevented calls from ending properly.

The post Signal Vulnerability Lets Malicious Callers Block Hang-Ups appeared first on SecurityWeek.

Modern messaging apps allow users to link their phone accounts to their computer desktop. Eavesdroppers are taking advantage of this capability:

Apps such as WhatsApp Web and Signal Desktop allow people to use their accounts on other devices, such as laptops or desktop computers.

Germany’s Customs Office has been using these features to connect a police-controlled computer to a suspect’s account.

Once connected, messages can be delivered to that computer without the police having to crack the encryption protecting them.

Netzpoltik details that police are able to gain access in this way either through physical access to someone’s phone or by intercepting verification codes via a state-sanctioned phishing attack or intercepting SMS messages via telephone surveillance.

That last paragraph is important. Making this work requires user consent.

What we want is a feature that displays connected devices, so users could notice if a new device gets connected to their account.

404 Media reports (alternate site):

The FBI was able to forensically extract copies of incoming Signal messages from a defendant’s iPhone, even after the app was deleted, because copies of the content were saved in the device’s push notification database….

The news shows how forensic extraction—­when someone has physical access to a device and is able to run specialized software on it—­can yield sensitive data derived from secure messaging apps in unexpected places. Signal already has a setting that blocks message content from displaying in push notifications; the case highlights why such a feature might be important for some users to turn on.

“We learned that specifically on iPhones, if one’s settings in the Signal app allow for message notifications and previews to show up on the lock screen, [then] the iPhone will internally store those notifications/message previews in the internal memory of the device,” a supporter of the defendants who was taking notes during the trial told 404 Media.

EDITED TO ADD (4/24): Apple has patched this vulnerability.

Apple rolled out the security patches for dozens of iPhone and iPad models and generations.

The post Apple Patches iOS Flaw Allowing Recovery of Deleted Chats appeared first on SecurityWeek.