Attackers are increasingly abusing Microsoft’s decades-old MSHTA utility to stealthily deliver stealers, loaders, and persistent malware through phishing, fake software downloads, and LOLBIN-based attack chains.
The post Legacy Windows Tool MSHTA Fuels Surge in Silent Malware Attacks appeared first on SecurityWeek.
IT threat evolution in Q1 2026. Mobile statistics
IT threat evolution in Q1 2026. Non-mobile statistics
In the third quarter of 2025, we updated the methodology for calculating statistical indicators based on the Kaspersky Security Network. These changes affected all sections of the report except for the statistics on installation packages, which remained unchanged.
To illustrate the differences between the reporting periods, we have also recalculated data for the previous quarters. Consequently, these figures may significantly differ from the previously published ones. However, subsequent reports will employ this new methodology, enabling precise comparisons with the data presented in this post.
The Kaspersky Security Network (KSN) is a global network for analyzing anonymized threat information, voluntarily shared by users of Kaspersky solutions. The statistics in this report are based on KSN data unless explicitly stated otherwise.
According to Kaspersky Security Network, in Q1 2026:
The number of malware, adware, or unwanted software attacks on mobile devices decreased to 2,676,328 in Q1, down from 3,239,244 in the previous quarter.
Attacks on users of Kaspersky mobile solutions, Q3 2024 — Q1 2026 (download)
The overall drop in attack volume stems primarily from a reduction in adware and RiskTool detections. Nonetheless, this trend does not equate to a lower risk for mobile users. As shown later in this report, the number of unique users targeted by these threats remained relatively stable.
In Q1, Synthient researchers identified a link between the notorious Kimwolf botnet and the IPIDEA proxy network. This network was later taken down in cooperation with GTIG.
In early 2026, we discovered several apps on Google Play and the App Store that contained a new version of the SparkCat crypto stealer.
The Trojan code, meticulously concealed, was embedded into the infected Android apps. The obfuscated malicious Rust library was decrypted using a Dalvik-like virtual machine custom-built by the attackers. The iOS version of the malware also underwent several changes; specifically, the attackers began leveraging Apple’s proprietary Vision framework for optical character recognition (OCR).
The number of Android malware samples saw a slight increase compared to Q4 2025, reaching a total of 306,070.
Detected malicious and potentially unwanted installation packages, Q1 2025 — Q1 2026 (download)
The detected installation packages were distributed by type as follows:
Detected mobile apps by type, Q4 2025* — Q1 2026 (download)
* Data for the previous quarter may differ slightly from previously published figures due to certain verdicts being retrospectively revised.
Threat actors once again ramped up the production of new banking Trojans; as a result, this category overtook all others in volume, accounting for more than half of all installation packages.
Share* of users attacked by the given type of malicious or potentially unwanted app out of all targeted users of Kaspersky mobile products, Q4 2025 — Q1 2026 (download)
* The total percentage may exceed 100% if the same users encountered multiple attack types.
Following the surge in banking Trojan installation packages, the number of associated attacks also rose, causing Trojan-Banker apps to climb one spot in terms of their share of targeted users. Mamont variants emerged as the most prevalent banking Trojans, accounting for 73.5% of detections, with the rest of the users encountering Faketoken, Rewardsteal, Creduz, and other families.
Yet banking Trojans were still outpaced by adware and RiskTool-type unwanted apps when measured by the total number of affected users. Despite a decrease in their share of installation packages, these two app types retained their positions as the top two threats by attack volume. The most common adware detections involved HiddenAd (44.9%) and MobiDash (38.1%), while most frequently seen RiskTool apps were Revpn (67%) and SpyLoan (20.5%).
Note that the malware rankings below exclude riskware or potentially unwanted software, such as RiskTool or adware.
| Verdict | %* Q4 2025 | %* Q1 2026 | Difference in p.p. | Change in ranking |
| Backdoor.AndroidOS.Triada.ag | 2.62 | 7.09 | +4.48 | +10 |
| DangerousObject.Multi.Generic. | 6.75 | 5.84 | -0.92 | -1 |
| DangerousObject.AndroidOS.GenericML. | 3.52 | 5.51 | +1.99 | +6 |
| Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Mamont.jo | 0.00 | 5.28 | +5.28 | |
| Trojan.AndroidOS.Fakemoney.v | 5.40 | 3.44 | -1.96 | -1 |
| Trojan-Downloader.AndroidOS.Keenadu.l | 0.00 | 3.35 | +3.35 | |
| Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Mamont.jx | 0.00 | 3.09 | +3.09 | |
| Backdoor.AndroidOS.Triada.z | 4.87 | 3.08 | -1.79 | -2 |
| Trojan.AndroidOS.Triada.fe | 5.01 | 2.98 | -2.02 | -4 |
| Backdoor.AndroidOS.Keenadu.a | 2.07 | 2.73 | +0.66 | +6 |
| Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Mamont.jg | 0.34 | 2.37 | +2.03 | |
| Trojan.AndroidOS.Triada.hf | 2.15 | 2.23 | +0.07 | +3 |
| Trojan.AndroidOS.Boogr.gsh | 2.35 | 2.15 | -0.20 | 0 |
| Trojan.AndroidOS.Triada.ii | 5.68 | 2.07 | -3.60 | -11 |
| Backdoor.AndroidOS.Triada.ae | 1.91 | 1.76 | -0.16 | +3 |
| Backdoor.AndroidOS.Triada.ab | 1.79 | 1.72 | -0.08 | +3 |
| Trojan.AndroidOS.Triada.gn | 2.38 | 1.58 | -0.80 | -5 |
| Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Mamont.gg | 1.56 | 1.50 | -0.06 | +2 |
| Trojan.AndroidOS.Triada.ga | 1.48 | 1.50 | +0.01 | +4 |
| Backdoor.AndroidOS.Triada.ad | 0.53 | 1.40 | +0.87 | +44 |
* Unique users who encountered this malware as a percentage of all attacked users of Kaspersky mobile solutions.
The pre-installed Triada.ag backdoor rose to the top spot; it is similar to the older Triada.z version we documented previously. Because the same variant was pre-installed across a wide range of devices, the total number of affected users is aggregated. Consequently, Triada outpaced even Mamont, as users encountered a variety of Mamont variants, causing the share of that banking Trojan to spread across multiple rows. Other pre-installed Triada variants (Triada.z, Triada.ae, Triada.ab, and Triada.ad) also made the rankings. Furthermore, we observed increasing activity from the Keenadu.a backdoor, while diverse variants of the embedded Triada Trojan remained in the rankings.
Q1 2026 saw a characteristic rise in mobile banking Trojan activity, with the number of packages totaling 162,275, a 50% increase compared to the prior quarter.
Number of installation packages for mobile banking Trojans detected by Kaspersky, Q1 2025 — Q1 2026 (download)
We saw a similar growth in the previous quarter, with banking Trojan volumes rising by 50% during that period as well. Various Mamont variants accounted for the absolute majority of packages and represented nearly every entry in the rankings of most frequent banking Trojans by affected user count.
| Verdict | %* Q4 2025 | %* Q1 2026 | Difference in p.p. | Change in ranking |
| Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Mamont.jo | 0.00 | 15.75 | +15.75 | |
| Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Mamont.jx | 0.00 | 9.22 | +9.22 | |
| Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Mamont.jg | 1.47 | 7.08 | +5.61 | +24 |
| Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Mamont.gg | 6.79 | 4.48 | -2.32 | -3 |
| Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Mamont.ks | 0.00 | 3.98 | +3.98 | |
| Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Agent.ws | 6.03 | 3.78 | -2.25 | -2 |
| Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Mamont.hl | 4.30 | 3.27 | -1.03 | +1 |
| Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Mamont.iv | 6.00 | 3.08 | -2.92 | -3 |
| Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Mamont.jb | 3.93 | 3.07 | -0.86 | +1 |
| Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Mamont.jv | 0.00 | 2.79 | +2.79 |
* Unique users who encountered this malware as a percentage of all users of Kaspersky mobile security solutions who encountered banking threats.
IT threat evolution in Q1 2026. Non-mobile statistics
IT threat evolution in Q1 2026. Mobile statistics
The statistics in this report are based on detection verdicts returned by Kaspersky products unless otherwise stated. The information was provided by Kaspersky users who consented to sharing statistical data.
In Q1 2026:
In January 2026, it was reported that the FBI had seized the domains of the RAMP cybercrime forum, a major platform used extensively by ransomware developers to advertise their RaaS programs and to recruit affiliates. There has been no official statement from the FBI, nor is it clear if RAMP servers were seized. In a post on an external website, a RAMP moderator mentioned law enforcement agencies gaining control over the forum. The takedown disrupted a key element of the RaaS ecosystem, creating ripple effects for ransomware operators, affiliates, and initial access brokers.
A man suspected of links to the Phobos group was apprehended in Poland. He was charged with the creation, acquisition, and distribution of software designed for unlawfully obtaining information, including data that facilitates unauthorized access to information stored within a computer system.
In March, a Phobos ransomware administrator pleaded guilty to the creation and distribution of the Trojan, which had been used in international attacks dating back to at least November 2020.
In March, the U.S. Department of Justice charged a man who had acted as a negotiator for ransomware groups. The company he worked for specializes in cyberincident investigations. The prosecution alleges the suspect colluded with the BlackCat threat actor to share privileged insights into the ongoing progress of negotiations. Additionally, the suspect is alleged to have had a prior direct role in BlackCat attacks, serving as an affiliate for the RaaS operation.
In a separate development this March, a U.S. court sentenced an initial access broker associated with the Yanluowang ransomware group to 81 months of imprisonment. According to the U.S. Department of Justice, the convict facilitated dozens of ransomware attacks across the United States, resulting in over $9 million in actual loss and more than $24 million in intended loss.
The Interlock group has been heavily exploiting the CVE-2026-20131 zero-day vulnerability in Cisco Secure FMC firewall management software since at least January 26, 2026. The vulnerability enabled arbitrary Java code execution with root privileges on the affected device. This campaign demonstrates the ongoing reliance on zero-day vulnerabilities for initial access, a focus on network appliances as high-value entry points, and the rapid weaponization of new vulnerabilities within the ransomware ecosystem.
This section highlights the most prolific ransomware gangs by number of victims added to each group’s DLS. This quarter, the Clop ransomware (14.42%) returned to the top of the rankings, displacing Qilin (12.34%), which had held the leading position in the previous reporting period. Following closely is a new threat actor, The Gentlemen (9.25%). Emerging no later than July 2025, the group had already surpassed the activity levels of mainstays such as Akira (7.25%) and INC Ransom (6.13%).
Number of each group’s victims according to its DLS as a percentage of all groups’ victims published on all the DLSs under review during the reporting period (download)
In Q1 2026, Kaspersky solutions detected six new ransomware families and 2938 new modifications. Volumes have returned to Q3 2025 levels following a surge in Q4 2025.
Number of new ransomware modifications, Q1 2025 — Q1 2026 (download)
Throughout Q1, our solutions protected 77,319 unique users from ransomware. Ransomware activity was highest in March, with 35,056 unique users encountering such attacks during the month.
Number of unique users attacked by ransomware Trojans, Q1 2026 (download)
| Country/territory* | %** | |
| 1 | Pakistan | 0.79 |
| 2 | South Korea | 0.64 |
| 3 | China | 0.52 |
| 4 | Tajikistan | 0.40 |
| 5 | Libya | 0.38 |
| 6 | Turkmenistan | 0.36 |
| 7 | Iraq | 0.35 |
| 8 | Bangladesh | 0.33 |
| 9 | Rwanda | 0.30 |
| 10 | Cameroon | 0.28 |
* Excluded are countries and territories with relatively few (under 50,000) Kaspersky users.
** Unique users whose computers were attacked by ransomware Trojans as a percentage of all unique users of Kaspersky products in the country/territory.
| Name | Verdict | %* | |
| 1 | (generic verdict) | Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Gen | 33.90 |
| 2 | (generic verdict) | Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Crypren | 6.38 |
| 3 | WannaCry | Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Wanna | 5.87 |
| 4 | (generic verdict) | Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Encoder | 4.68 |
| 5 | (generic verdict) | Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Agent | 3.80 |
| 6 | LockBit | Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Lockbit | 2.80 |
| 7 | (generic verdict) | Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Phny | 1.99 |
| 8 | (generic verdict) | Trojan-Ransom.MSIL.Agent | 1.96 |
| 9 | (generic verdict) | Trojan-Ransom.Python.Agent | 1.93 |
| 10 | (generic verdict) | Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Crypmod | 1.89 |
* Unique Kaspersky users attacked by the specific ransomware Trojan family as a percentage of all unique users attacked by this type of threat.
In Q1 2026, Kaspersky solutions detected 3485 new modifications of miners.
Number of new miner modifications, Q1 2026 (download)
In Q1, we detected attacks using miner programs on the computers of 260,588 unique Kaspersky users worldwide.
Number of unique users attacked by miners, Q1 2026 (download)
| Country/territory* | %** | |
| 1 | Senegal | 3.19 |
| 2 | Turkmenistan | 3.06 |
| 3 | Mali | 2.63 |
| 4 | Tanzania | 1.62 |
| 5 | Bangladesh | 1.06 |
| 6 | Ethiopia | 0.95 |
| 7 | Panama | 0.88 |
| 8 | Afghanistan | 0.79 |
| 9 | Kazakhstan | 0.77 |
| 10 | Bolivia | 0.75 |
* Excluded are countries and territories with relatively few (under 50,000) Kaspersky users.
** Unique users whose computers were attacked by miners as a percentage of all unique users of Kaspersky products in the country/territory.
In Q1 2026, Google uncovered a new cryptocurrency theft campaign. The scammers directed victims to a fraudulent video call, prompting them to execute malicious scripts under the guise of technical support fixes for connection problems.
In March, researchers with GTIG and iVerify reported the discovery of an in-the-wild exploit chain targeting both iOS and macOS devices. The exploit kit was apparently marketed on the dark web, providing threat actors with a suite of spyware capabilities alongside specialized cryptocurrency exfiltration modules. The exploit was delivered via drive-by downloads when victims visited various compromised websites. Our analysis confirmed that the toolkit included an updated version of a component previously identified in the Operation Triangulation attack chain.
Devices running macOS were similarly impacted by the high-profile supply chain attack targeting the Axios npm package, a widely used HTTP client for JavaScript. The installation of the infected package led to the deployment of a backdoor on macOS devices.
Unique users* who encountered this malware as a percentage of all attacked users of Kaspersky security solutions for macOS (download)
* Data for the previous quarter may differ slightly from previously published data due to some verdicts being retrospectively revised.
The share of PasivRobber spyware attacks is beginning to decline, giving way to more traditional adware and Monitor-class software capable of tracking user activity. The popular Amos stealer also maintains its presence within the TOP 20.
| Country/territory | %* Q4 2025 | %* Q1 2026 |
| China | 1.28 | 1.97 |
| France | 1.18 | 1.07 |
| Brazil | 1.13 | 0.98 |
| Mexico | 0.72 | 0.52 |
| Germany | 0.71 | 0.45 |
| The Netherlands | 0.62 | 0.75 |
| Hong Kong | 0.49 | 0.53 |
| India | 0.42 | 0.48 |
| Russian Federation | 0.34 | 0.37 |
| Thailand | 0.24 | 0.27 |
* Unique users who encountered threats to macOS as a percentage of all unique Kaspersky users in the country/territory.
This section presents statistics on attacks targeting Kaspersky IoT honeypots. The geographic data on attack sources is based on the IP addresses of attacking devices.
In Q1 2026, the share of devices attacking Kaspersky honeypots via the SSH protocol saw a significant increase compared to the previous reporting period.
Distribution of attacked services by number of unique IP addresses of attacking devices (download)
The distribution of attacks between Telnet and SSH maintained the ratio observed in Q4 2025.
Distribution of attackers’ sessions in Kaspersky honeypots (download)
Share of each threat delivered to an infected device as a result of a successful attack, out of the total number of threats delivered (download)
The primary shifts in the IoT threat distribution are linked to the activity of various Mirai botnet variants, although members of this family continue to account for the majority of the list. Furthermore, a new variant, Mirai.kl, surfaced in the rankings. We also observed a significant decline in NyaDrop botnet activity during Q1.
The United States, the Netherlands, and Germany accounted for the highest proportions of SSH-based attacks during this period.
| Country/territory | Q4 2025 | Q1 2026 |
| United States | 16.10% | 23.74% |
| The Netherlands | 15.78% | 17.57% |
| Germany | 12.07% | 10.34% |
| Panama | 7.72% | 6.34% |
| India | 5.32% | 6.05% |
| Romania | 4.05% | 5.82% |
| Australia | 1.62% | 4.61% |
| Vietnam | 4.21% | 3.50% |
| Russian Federation | 3.79% | 2.35% |
| Sweden | 2.25% | 2.09% |
China continues to account for the largest proportion of Telnet attacks, though there was a marked increase in activity originating from Pakistan.
| Country/territory | Q4 2025 | Q1 2026 |
| China | 53.64% | 39.54% |
| Pakistan | 14.27% | 27.31% |
| Russian Federation | 8.20% | 8.25% |
| Indonesia | 8.58% | 6.71% |
| India | 4.85% | 4.66% |
| Brazil | 0.06% | 3.30% |
| Argentina | 0.02% | 2.51% |
| Nigeria | 1.22% | 1.38% |
| Thailand | 0.01% | 0.55% |
| Sweden | 0.54% | 0.55% |
The statistics in this section are based on detection verdicts by Web Anti-Virus, which protects users when suspicious objects are downloaded from malicious or infected web pages. These malicious pages are purposefully created by cybercriminals. Websites that host user-generated content, such as message boards, as well as compromised legitimate sites, can become infected.
The following statistics show the distribution by country/territory of the sources of internet attacks blocked by Kaspersky products on user computers (web pages redirecting to exploits, sites containing exploits and other malicious programs, botnet C&C centers, and so on). One or more web-based attacks could originate from each unique host.
To determine the geographic source of web attacks, we matched the domain name with the real IP address where the domain is hosted, then identified the geographic location of that IP address (GeoIP).
In Q1 2026, Kaspersky solutions blocked 343,823,407 attacks launched from internet resources worldwide. Web Anti-Virus was triggered by 49,983,611 unique URLs.
Web-based attacks by country/territory, Q1 2026 (download)
To assess the risk of malware infection via the internet for users’ computers in different countries and territories, we calculated the share of Kaspersky users in each location on whose computers Web Anti-Virus was triggered during the reporting period. The resulting data provides an indication of the aggressiveness of the environment in which computers operate in different countries and territories.
This ranked list includes only attacks by malicious objects classified as Malware. Our calculations leave out Web Anti-Virus detections of potentially dangerous or unwanted programs, such as RiskTool or adware.
| Country/territory* | %** | |
| 1 | Venezuela | 9.33 |
| 2 | Hungary | 8.16 |
| 3 | Italy | 7.58 |
| 4 | Tajikistan | 7.48 |
| 5 | India | 7.21 |
| 6 | Greece | 7.13 |
| 7 | Portugal | 7.10 |
| 8 | France | 7.05 |
| 9 | Belgium | 6.83 |
| 10 | Slovakia | 6.80 |
| 11 | Vietnam | 6.62 |
| 12 | Bosnia and Herzegovina | 6.57 |
| 13 | Canada | 6.56 |
| 14 | Serbia | 6.50 |
| 15 | Tunisia | 6.36 |
| 16 | Qatar | 6.01 |
| 17 | Spain | 5.95 |
| 18 | Germany | 5.95 |
| 19 | Sri Lanka | 5.89 |
| 20 | Brazil | 5.88 |
* Excluded are countries and territories with relatively few (under 10,000) Kaspersky users.
** Unique users targeted by web-based Malware attacks as a percentage of all unique users of Kaspersky products in the country/territory.
On average during the quarter, 4.73% of users’ computers worldwide were subjected to at least one Malware web attack.
Statistics on local infections of user computers are an important indicator. They include objects that penetrated the target computer by infecting files or removable media, or initially made their way onto the computer in non-open form. Examples of the latter are programs in complex installers and encrypted files.
Data in this section is based on analyzing statistics produced by anti-virus scans of files on the hard drive at the moment they were created or accessed, and the results of scanning removable storage media. The statistics are based on detection verdicts from the On-Access Scan (OAS) and On-Demand Scan (ODS) modules of File Anti-Virus and include detections of malicious programs located on user computers or removable media connected to the computers, such as flash drives, camera memory cards, phones, or external hard drives.
In Q1 2026, our File Anti-Virus detected 15,831,319 malicious and potentially unwanted objects.
For each country and territory, we calculated the percentage of Kaspersky users whose computers had the File Anti-Virus triggered at least once during the reporting period. This statistic reflects the level of personal computer infection in different countries and territories around the world.
Note that this ranked list includes only attacks by malicious objects classified as Malware. Our calculations leave out File Anti-Virus detections of potentially dangerous or unwanted programs, such as RiskTool or adware.
| Country/territory* | %** | |
| 1 | Turkmenistan | 47.96 |
| 2 | Tajikistan | 31.48 |
| 3 | Cuba | 31.03 |
| 4 | Yemen | 29.59 |
| 5 | Afghanistan | 28.47 |
| 6 | Burundi | 26.93 |
| 7 | Uzbekistan | 24.81 |
| 8 | Syria | 23.08 |
| 9 | Nicaragua | 21.97 |
| 10 | Cameroon | 21.60 |
| 11 | China | 21.09 |
| 12 | Mozambique | 21.02 |
| 13 | Algeria | 20.64 |
| 14 | Democratic Republic of the Congo | 20.63 |
| 15 | Bangladesh | 20.44 |
| 16 | Mali | 20.35 |
| 17 | Republic of the Congo | 20.23 |
| 18 | Madagascar | 20.00 |
| 19 | Belarus | 19.78 |
| 20 | Tanzania | 19.52 |
* Excluded are countries and territories with relatively few (under 10,000) Kaspersky users.
** Unique users on whose computers local Malware threats were blocked, as a percentage of all unique users of Kaspersky products in the country/territory.
On average worldwide, Malware local threats were detected at least once on 11.55% of users’ computers during Q1.
Russia scored 11.92% in these rankings.
Have you ever tried to tally up how much you spend on subscriptions each month? Music, movies, gaming, language courses, delivery services, heated seats, and even the ability to chat with the Grok bot directly from your car — there’s a subscription for just about everything now. There’s even a subscription service specifically designed to… track your other subscriptions.
The number of subscriptions varies significantly depending on where you live, but statistically, 78% of adults worldwide have at least one paid subscription, with the average user juggling 5.6 active services. Furthermore, a large portion of these are family plans used by groups of close relatives… and sometimes other people: 37% of users share their subscriptions outside their immediate family.
Because subscription accounts, especially family plans, often contain sensitive personal data, they’ve become a prime target for cybercriminals. Today we look at how to manage your subscriptions securely, avoid having your accounts compromised, and keep from falling for scammers’ latest tricks.
Why would anyone want to hack your subscription? Even if the service only offers entertainment, your account almost certainly contains sensitive information: your name, address, email, phone number, the names of other members, and other personally identifiable information. This data is then sold on the dark web and used for further attacks.
Attackers compromise subscription accounts either through social engineering and phishing, or by taking advantage of many users’ reliance on weak or leaked passwords. As we recently highlighted in our research, nearly half of all passwords worldwide can be cracked in less than a minute. Scammers then either resell existing subscriptions or slots in a family group at a discount, or they sign the victim up for new services, hoping the extra charges go unnoticed.
Finally, some middlemen don’t bother with hacking at all; they simply buy bulk subscriptions for a large number of devices, where the per-unit cost is typically much lower. They then resell individual slots in these plans on online marketplaces. As a result, a single “family” account can end up filled with people who are complete strangers to one another.
Many subscription owners think nothing of sharing access with family and friends. What could possibly go wrong?
The worst-case scenario from a security standpoint is when a single account is purchased and the owner shares the login and password with other users. This usually happens when people try to save money on a family plan by buying an individual subscription and sharing it. Some services even allow for different profiles, but they are all tied to a single account, meaning the credentials are shared. This is how streaming platforms like Hulu and Disney+ operate.
Sharing one account among multiple people significantly increases the risk of your credentials falling into the wrong hands. There’s no way to guarantee that everyone else is storing those details securely or that their devices aren’t infected with malware. Even without malware, it’s incredibly easy to accidentally hand over a password to attackers simply by signing in to the subscription service over unprotected public Wi-Fi.
It’s entirely possible that the password you kindly shared with some friends has already surfaced in some corner of the dark web, and you may soon lose access to your account. Furthermore, if you reuse the same password across different sites and apps, your other accounts are now in the crosshairs as well.
The second scenario is when each group member has an individual account. Many services now allow you to add extra users to a subscription at no additional cost, and most owners are happy to give away these free slots. Even then, you shouldn’t let your guard down: a breach of just one of these accounts can still leak sensitive information, such as family members’ names, addresses, billing info, and other subscription-related data.
To keep your and your loved ones’ personal data private and your accounts under your control, follow these simple rules.
To do this, learn — and teach your friends and family — how to use password managers, two-factor authentication, or passkeys.
If you and your loved ones rely on memory to store passwords, there’s a high probability that you’re reusing the same one across multiple services. This is a major blunder: data breaches happen all the time, and a single compromised password gives attackers access to your other accounts.
The simplest solution is to use a password manager that generates and remembers complex, unique passwords for every site and service on your behalf. All you have to do is remember the single main password for its encrypted vault. Additionally, Kaspersky Password Manager doesn’t just store and create passwords; it can also check if they’ve appeared in leaked databases, and sync your credentials across all your devices.
Additionally, a password manager provides a robust defense against phishing: unlike a human, who can easily be misled by a sign-in form that looks almost identical to the real thing and is hosted on a look-alike domain, a password manager won’t fall for the trick. It’ll only offer to autofill your saved login and password on the specific site or service for which they were originally stored.
Avoid using browsers to store your passwords: unfortunately, attackers have long figured out how to extract browser-saved passwords in a matter of seconds.
Two-factor authentication (2FA) is an extra layer of verification the system requests after you enter your password — such as an SMS code or a one-time code from an authenticator app. Whenever technically possible, be sure to enable 2FA on every account linked to a subscription. This applies to the subscription services themselves, as well as any third-party accounts you use to sign in, such as Google, Apple, or Facebook.
We recommend storing your two-factor authentication tokens and generating the one-time codes — which refresh every 30 seconds — inside Kaspersky Password Manager. This significantly lowers the chances of someone hijacking your account. Even if an attacker somehow discovers or guesses your password, they won’t be able to get the code without physical access to your device.
Finally, you can ditch passwords (almost) entirely by switching to passkeys. We’ve previously covered what this password alternative looks like and the specifics of using it. Currently, this is the most breach-resistant authentication system out there. Its main drawback has been the difficulty of syncing passkeys across different ecosystems, like Windows and iOS, but the updated version of Kaspersky Password Manager can now save and sync passkeys across Windows, macOS, iOS, and Android devices, making that issue a thing of the past.
Even a complex password and 2FA aren’t reasons to let your guard down. An attacker can infect your device with an infostealer: malware designed to swipe things like session cookies from your browser, app configuration files, and other sensitive data. Session cookies allow you to stay signed in without re-entering your credentials every time; however, if scammers get their hands on them, they can sign in to the service as you — even without knowing your username or password. This makes a proactive approach essential, especially if you use Chrome, Edge, Opera, or other Chromium-based browsers on Windows. We recommend installing Kaspersky Premium on all your devices; it includes Kaspersky Password Manager in addition to comprehensive protection against cyberthreats.
Otherwise, you might be asking for trouble. For example, if you share a Steam subscription with a friend who cheats, both of your accounts could end up banned. Furthermore, never try to let someone else into your personal account or individual subscription. Sharing your password with others is usually a violation of the terms of service, and can result in your account being blocked.
To do this, periodically check active devices and sessions in your subscription settings. If you see an unrecognized device in the authorized list, terminate that session — or all of them — and change your account password immediately. Signing back in on a few devices is much easier than trying to recover a hijacked account.
And remember: don’t let your own habits compromise your security. If you’re visiting friends, on vacation, or on a business trip and use a local computer or smart TV — or if you sign in to your account from a public computer — don’t forget to sign out when you’re done. Otherwise, the next person to use that device might find themselves with free subscriptions or, even worse, access to your email or cloud photo stream.
Watch out for phishing emails and messages spoofing legitimate services. If you receive a notification about a “need to update your billing details”, or a claim that a “new user has been added” to your family plan, don’t rush to click any links or open attachments. Links can lead to a phishing page, and attachments may hide malware. Scammers often use email addresses and domains that look nearly identical to the real ones — for instance, by swapping l (lowercase L) for I (uppercase i), or using a familiar name in a different domain zone.
Unfortunately, phishing pages are often indistinguishable from the originals now that AI is being used for high-quality design and layout. Since spotting every red flag yourself is increasingly difficult, it’s best to delegate anti-phishing protection to Kaspersky Premium. It will alert you to suspicious sites, saving your money and keeping your peace of mind.
Lastly, some scammers lure users in with freebies like fake gift subscriptions for Telegram Premium. The victim is asked to visit a phishing page mimicking the Telegram login screen and sign in to their account to claim the gift. The result isn’t hard to guess: instead of a premium subscription — a hijacked account. Recently, scammers have even learned to use mini-apps to steal credentials directly inside Telegram under various pretexts — ranging from gift giveaways to claims that you must move to a new chat because the old one was blocked.
You can often find subscription offers on marketplaces and retail platforms at prices significantly lower than what the official provider charges. More likely than not, that tempting price hides a hacked account or a family group that you could be kicked out of at any moment, because the family admin is either the seller or a random user. Furthermore, sharing a family plan with strangers from around the world is a violation of terms for many services.
Now that we’ve covered subscription security, what about those extra subscriptions that quietly eat away at your balance every month? Research shows that users typically underestimate how many active subscriptions they have and how much they spend on them; they also frequently forget to cancel auto-renewals for subscriptions they no longer use, or auto-charges after the trial period ends.
If you suspect you’re in that boat, start your investigation with your own bank statements. Recurring charges for the same amount can be a subscription you’ve forgotten about. Check who received the payment; if the name doesn’t ring a bell, do an online search on the company. It’s also worth searching your email box for the merchant name or the payment amount; this can help you track down subscription notifications and figure out what exactly you’re paying for. And don’t forget to check your spam folder, as that’s where subscription alerts often end up.
Now, let’s look at how to check and cancel active subscriptions purchased through the App Store and Google Play.
If you’re the family group manager, you’ll be able to see the purchase history for other family members.
Note: to manage your iCloud subscription, you’ll need to go to the specific iCloud section located just below Subscriptions. In the Family Sharing section, if you’re the one who set it up, you can view the subscription and purchase history for all family members.
Read more on subscriptions:
With International Anti-Ransomware Day taking place on May 12, Kaspersky presents its annual report on the evolving global and regional ransomware cyberthreat landscape.
Ransomware remains one of the most persistent and adaptive cyberthreats. In 2026:
According to Kaspersky Security Network, the share of organizations affected by ransomware decreased in 2025 across all regions compared to 2024.
Percentage of organizations affected by ransomware attacks by region, 2025 (download)
Despite the formal decrease, organizations across all sectors continue to face a high likelihood of attack, as ransomware operators refine their tactics and scale their operations with increasing efficiency. Kaspersky and VDC Research have found that in the manufacturing sector alone, ransomware attacks may have caused over $18 billion in losses in the first three quarters of the year.
In 2026, ransomware operators increasingly prioritize neutralizing endpoint defenses before executing their payloads. Tools commonly referred to as “EDR killers” have become a standard component of attack playbooks. This reflects a continuing trend toward more deliberate and methodical intrusions.
Attackers attempt to terminate security processes and disable monitoring agents, often by exploiting trusted components such as signed drivers. This technique is called Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD) and allows adversaries to blend into legitimate system activity while gradually degrading defensive visibility.
Thus, evasion is no longer an opportunistic step but a planned and repeatable phase of the attack lifecycle. As a result, organizations are increasingly challenged not just to detect ransomware but also to maintain control in environments where security controls themselves are actively targeted.
We predicted that quantum-resistant ransomware would appear in 2025. Looking back at the previous year, we see that advanced ransomware groups indeed started using post-quantum cryptography as quantum computing evolved. The encryption techniques used by this quantum-proof ransomware could be used to resist decryption attempts from both classical and quantum computers, making it nearly impossible for victims to decrypt their data without having to pay a ransom.
One example is the appearance of the PE32 ransomware family (link in Russian); it leverages the cutting-edge ML-KEM (Module-Lattice-Based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism) standard to secure its AES keys. This specific cryptographic framework was recently selected by NIST as the primary standard for post-quantum defense.
Within the PE32 ransomware architecture, this is realized through the Kyber1024 algorithm, a robust mechanism providing Level 5 security, roughly equivalent in strength to AES-256. Its primary function is the secure generation and transmission of shared secrets between parties, specifically engineered to withstand future quantum computing attacks. This shift toward post-quantum readiness is part of a broader industry trend; for instance, TLS 1.3 and QUIC protocols have already adopted the X25519Kyber768 hybrid model, which fuses classical encryption with quantum-resistant security.
In 2025, the share of ransoms paid dropped to 28%. As a response to this, one of the developments in the 2026 landscape is the growing prevalence of extortion incidents in which no file encryption takes place at all. Instead, attackers leave out the “ware” in “ransomware” and focus on extracting sensitive data and leveraging the threat of public disclosure as their primary means of extortion. ShinyHunters is an excellent example of such a group, using a data leak site to publicize its victims.
By avoiding encryption, attackers may aim at reducing the likelihood of immediate detection, shortening the duration of the attack, and eliminating dependencies on stable encryption routines. Often, this model is used alongside traditional tactics in so-called double extortion schemes, but an increasing number of campaigns rely exclusively on data theft.
For victims, this shift fundamentally changes the nature of the risk. While backups remain effective against encryption-based disruption, they provide no protection against data exposure, regulatory consequences, and reputational damage. Ransomware is therefore evolving from a business continuity issue into a broader data security and compliance challenge.
The ransomware ecosystem continues to evolve toward a highly industrialized and specialized model, with initial access remaining as one of its most critical components. In 2026, many ransomware operators keep relying on IABs (initial access brokers), a network of intermediaries who supply pre-compromised access to corporate environments, aiming to no longer perform full intrusions themselves.
This “access-as-a-service” model is fueled by credential theft operations, and the widespread availability of compromised accounts harvested through infostealers and phishing campaigns.
The primary access vectors offered for sale have not changed: RDP, VPN, and RDWeb are still the top access vectors. Consequently, remote access infrastructure remains the primary attack surface for initial access sales. In response to the measures against public exposure of RDP access points to the internet, attackers are now targeting RDWeb portals, which are frequently vulnerable and occasionally inadequately safeguarded.
The result is a threat landscape where unauthorized access is increasingly commoditized, and the barrier to launching ransomware attacks declines. This means that preventing initial compromise is only part of the challenge; equal emphasis must be placed on detecting misuse of legitimate credentials and limiting lateral movement within already-breached environments.
Telegram channels and underground forums increasingly function as platforms for the distribution and sale of compromised datasets and access credentials including those that were obtained as a result of ransomware attacks.
Advertisements posted on these resources typically include the nature of the access, a description of the exfiltrated or compromised data, price terms, and contact information for prospective buyers. In addition, some malicious actors mention their collaboration with other ransomware groups. Lesser-known gangs can use this name-dropping to promote themselves
Multiple threat actors not related to ransomware groups distribute datasets downloaded from ransomware blogs on underground forums and Telegram. By re-publishing download links and files, they spread compromised data as well as information on the ransomware attack within the community.
The ransomware itself is also sold or offered for subscription on the dark web platforms. The sellers underscore the uniqueness of their malware, as well as its encryption and defense evasion features.
Law enforcement agencies are actively shutting down dark web platforms and ransomware data leak sites. A major underground forum, RAMP, which also functioned as a platform for threat actors to advertise their ransomware services and publish service‑related updates, was seized by authorities in January 2026. Another underground forum, LeakBase, where malicious actors distributed exfiltrated and compromised data, was seized in March 2026. In 2025, law enforcement agencies seized well-known forums like Nulled, Cracked, and XSS. Also in 2025, the DLSs of BlackSuit and 8Base ransomware groups were seized. These takedowns cause inconvenience to ransomware coordination, specifically for initial access brokers and affiliates, though similar forums are expected to fill the void over time.
RansomHub’s sudden dormancy in 2025 marked a shift, and Qilin became the dominant player from Q2 onward. According to Kaspersky research, Qilin was the most active group executing targeted attacks in 2025.
Each group’s share of victims according to its data leak site (DLS) as a percentage of all reported victims of all groups during the period under review (download)
Qilin stands out as one of the fastest-growig and dominant RaaS platforms. Its combination of high-volume operations and structured affiliate model positions it as a central player in the current ecosystem.
Clop, the second most active group in 2025, is distinguished through its large-scale, supply-chain-style attacks, exploiting widely used file transfer and enterprise software to compromise hundreds of victims simultaneously. This one-to-many approach sets it apart from more traditional, single-target campaigns.
Third place is occupied by Akira, which remains notable for its consistency and operational stability, maintaining a steady stream of victims without major disruption. Its ability to sustain activity over time makes it one of the most reliable indicators of baseline ransomware threat levels.
Although no longer active, RansomHub stands out for its rapid rise and equally rapid disappearance in 2025, highlighting the volatility of the RaaS market. Its shutdown created a vacuum that significantly reshaped affiliate distribution across other groups.
DragonForce is also notable – not just for its own operations, but for its broader influence within the ransomware ecosystem, including reported involvement in infrastructure conflicts and possible links to the disruption of competing groups. Thus, the group claims that RansomHub “has moved to their infrastructure.” This positions it as more than just an operator and potentially an ecosystem-level actor.
While emerging actors generally operate on a smaller scale, they provide insight into the continuous churn and low barrier to entry within the ransomware ecosystem.
The Gentlemen group caught our attention in early 2026, as they managed to attack a significant number of victims over a short time. This actor is also notable for reflecting a broader shift toward professionalization and controlled operations within the ransomware ecosystem. Unlike many emerging groups that rely on opportunistic attacks and inconsistent leak activity, The Gentlemen demonstrate a more deliberate approach: structured intrusion workflows, selective targeting, and measured communication with victims. This signals a move away from chaotic, high-noise campaigns toward predictable, business-like execution models that are easier to scale and harder to disrupt. Their TTPs include the massive exploitation of hardware very common on big corporations, such as FortiOS/FortiProxy, SonicWall VPN, and Cisco ASA appliances. The group might be comprised of professional cybercriminals who left other prominent groups.
The group is also notable for its emphasis on data-centric extortion strategies, often prioritizing exfiltration and leverage over purely disruptive encryption. This aligns with one of the defining trends of 2026: ransomware evolving into a form of data breach monetization rather than just system denial. By focusing on controlled pressure and reputational risk instead of immediate operational damage, The Gentlemen exemplify how attackers are adapting to lower ransom payment rates and improved backup practices among victims.
Some other groups to take note of in 2026:
Although there is little to say about these groups at the time of writing this report, each of them may be equally likely to disappear from the threat landscape or grow into a prominent threat. That’s why it’s important to track them from their early days. Moreover, collectively, these groups illustrate how dynamic the ransomware landscape is, with new entrants constantly replenishing it.
Despite the growing effort by law enforcement agencies across the globe to seize and disrupt dark web platforms and threat actor infrastructures, ransomware operations remain stable, with new groups quickly taking the place of those who went silent. In 2026, we see a shift towards encryptionless extortion, with data leaks increasingly becoming the main threat to target organizations. At the same time, data encryption is also upgrading to the next level with the emergence of post-quantum ransomware.
To resist the evolving threat, Kaspersky recommends organizations:
Prioritize proactive prevention through patching and vulnerability management. Many ransomware attacks exploit unpatched systems, so organizations should implement automated patch management tools to ensure timely updates for operating systems, software, and drivers. For Windows environments, enabling Microsoft’s Vulnerable Driver Blocklist is critical to thwarting BYOVD attacks. Regularly scan for vulnerabilities and prioritize high-severity flaws, especially in widely used software.
Strengthen remote access: RDP and RDWeb connections should never be directly exposed to the internet, only through VPN or ZTNA (Zero Trust Network Access). It’s highly recommended to adopt multi-factor authentication on everything; the architecture may require continuous authentication for access, as one valid credential captured is enough to cause a breach. Monitoring the underground for stolen employee credentials is essential. Audit open ports across the entire attack surface. The adoption of the “Principle of Least Privilege” (PoLP), where users, systems, or processes are granted only the minimum access rights, such as read, write, or execute permissions, necessary to perform their specific job functions, is highly recommended.
Strengthen endpoint and network security with advanced detection and segmentation. Deploy robust endpoint detection and response solutions such as Kaspersky NEXT EDR to monitor for suspicious activity like driver loading or process termination. Network segmentation is equally important. Limit lateral movement by isolating critical systems and using firewalls to restrict traffic. Complete and immediate offboarding for employees is necessary as well as periodic permission reviews, with automatic revocation of unused access. Sessions with complete logging for privileged accounts are more than necessary. Monitoring the traffic divergence to new sites or even to legitimate endpoints can help the defenders to spot a new insider threat.
Invest in backups, training, and incident response planning. Maintain offline or immutable backups that are tested regularly to ensure rapid recovery without paying a ransom. Backups should cover critical data and systems and be stored in air-gapped environments to resist encryption or deletion. User education is essential to combatting phishing, which remains one of the top attack vectors. Conduct simulated phishing exercises and train employees to recognize AI-crafted emails. Kaspersky Global Emergency Response Team (GERT) can help develop and test an incident response plan to minimize potential downtime and costs.
The recommendation to avoid paying a ransom remains robust, especially given the risk of unavailable keys due to dismantled infrastructure, affiliate chaos, or malicious intent. By investing in backups, incident response, and preventive measures like patching and training, organizations can avoid funding criminals and mitigate the impact.
Kaspersky also offers free decryptors for certain ransomware families. If you get hit by ransomware, check to see if there’s a decryptor available for the ransomware family used against you.
IT threat evolution in Q1 2026. Mobile statistics
IT threat evolution in Q1 2026. Non-mobile statistics
In the third quarter of 2025, we updated the methodology for calculating statistical indicators based on the Kaspersky Security Network. These changes affected all sections of the report except for the statistics on installation packages, which remained unchanged.
To illustrate the differences between the reporting periods, we have also recalculated data for the previous quarters. Consequently, these figures may significantly differ from the previously published ones. However, subsequent reports will employ this new methodology, enabling precise comparisons with the data presented in this post.
The Kaspersky Security Network (KSN) is a global network for analyzing anonymized threat information, voluntarily shared by users of Kaspersky solutions. The statistics in this report are based on KSN data unless explicitly stated otherwise.
According to Kaspersky Security Network, in Q1 2026:
The number of malware, adware, or unwanted software attacks on mobile devices decreased to 2,676,328 in Q1, down from 3,239,244 in the previous quarter.
Attacks on users of Kaspersky mobile solutions, Q3 2024 — Q1 2026 (download)
The overall drop in attack volume stems primarily from a reduction in adware and RiskTool detections. Nonetheless, this trend does not equate to a lower risk for mobile users. As shown later in this report, the number of unique users targeted by these threats remained relatively stable.
In Q1, Synthient researchers identified a link between the notorious Kimwolf botnet and the IPIDEA proxy network. This network was later taken down in cooperation with GTIG.
In early 2026, we discovered several apps on Google Play and the App Store that contained a new version of the SparkCat crypto stealer.
The Trojan code, meticulously concealed, was embedded into the infected Android apps. The obfuscated malicious Rust library was decrypted using a Dalvik-like virtual machine custom-built by the attackers. The iOS version of the malware also underwent several changes; specifically, the attackers began leveraging Apple’s proprietary Vision framework for optical character recognition (OCR).
The number of Android malware samples saw a slight increase compared to Q4 2025, reaching a total of 306,070.
Detected malicious and potentially unwanted installation packages, Q1 2025 — Q1 2026 (download)
The detected installation packages were distributed by type as follows:
Detected mobile apps by type, Q4 2025* — Q1 2026 (download)
* Data for the previous quarter may differ slightly from previously published figures due to certain verdicts being retrospectively revised.
Threat actors once again ramped up the production of new banking Trojans; as a result, this category overtook all others in volume, accounting for more than half of all installation packages.
Share* of users attacked by the given type of malicious or potentially unwanted app out of all targeted users of Kaspersky mobile products, Q4 2025 — Q1 2026 (download)
* The total percentage may exceed 100% if the same users encountered multiple attack types.
Following the surge in banking Trojan installation packages, the number of associated attacks also rose, causing Trojan-Banker apps to climb one spot in terms of their share of targeted users. Mamont variants emerged as the most prevalent banking Trojans, accounting for 73.5% of detections, with the rest of the users encountering Faketoken, Rewardsteal, Creduz, and other families.
Yet banking Trojans were still outpaced by adware and RiskTool-type unwanted apps when measured by the total number of affected users. Despite a decrease in their share of installation packages, these two app types retained their positions as the top two threats by attack volume. The most common adware detections involved HiddenAd (44.9%) and MobiDash (38.1%), while most frequently seen RiskTool apps were Revpn (67%) and SpyLoan (20.5%).
Note that the malware rankings below exclude riskware or potentially unwanted software, such as RiskTool or adware.
| Verdict | %* Q4 2025 | %* Q1 2026 | Difference in p.p. | Change in ranking |
| Backdoor.AndroidOS.Triada.ag | 2.62 | 7.09 | +4.48 | +10 |
| DangerousObject.Multi.Generic. | 6.75 | 5.84 | -0.92 | -1 |
| DangerousObject.AndroidOS.GenericML. | 3.52 | 5.51 | +1.99 | +6 |
| Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Mamont.jo | 0.00 | 5.28 | +5.28 | |
| Trojan.AndroidOS.Fakemoney.v | 5.40 | 3.44 | -1.96 | -1 |
| Trojan-Downloader.AndroidOS.Keenadu.l | 0.00 | 3.35 | +3.35 | |
| Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Mamont.jx | 0.00 | 3.09 | +3.09 | |
| Backdoor.AndroidOS.Triada.z | 4.87 | 3.08 | -1.79 | -2 |
| Trojan.AndroidOS.Triada.fe | 5.01 | 2.98 | -2.02 | -4 |
| Backdoor.AndroidOS.Keenadu.a | 2.07 | 2.73 | +0.66 | +6 |
| Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Mamont.jg | 0.34 | 2.37 | +2.03 | |
| Trojan.AndroidOS.Triada.hf | 2.15 | 2.23 | +0.07 | +3 |
| Trojan.AndroidOS.Boogr.gsh | 2.35 | 2.15 | -0.20 | 0 |
| Trojan.AndroidOS.Triada.ii | 5.68 | 2.07 | -3.60 | -11 |
| Backdoor.AndroidOS.Triada.ae | 1.91 | 1.76 | -0.16 | +3 |
| Backdoor.AndroidOS.Triada.ab | 1.79 | 1.72 | -0.08 | +3 |
| Trojan.AndroidOS.Triada.gn | 2.38 | 1.58 | -0.80 | -5 |
| Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Mamont.gg | 1.56 | 1.50 | -0.06 | +2 |
| Trojan.AndroidOS.Triada.ga | 1.48 | 1.50 | +0.01 | +4 |
| Backdoor.AndroidOS.Triada.ad | 0.53 | 1.40 | +0.87 | +44 |
* Unique users who encountered this malware as a percentage of all attacked users of Kaspersky mobile solutions.
The pre-installed Triada.ag backdoor rose to the top spot; it is similar to the older Triada.z version we documented previously. Because the same variant was pre-installed across a wide range of devices, the total number of affected users is aggregated. Consequently, Triada outpaced even Mamont, as users encountered a variety of Mamont variants, causing the share of that banking Trojan to spread across multiple rows. Other pre-installed Triada variants (Triada.z, Triada.ae, Triada.ab, and Triada.ad) also made the rankings. Furthermore, we observed increasing activity from the Keenadu.a backdoor, while diverse variants of the embedded Triada Trojan remained in the rankings.
Q1 2026 saw a characteristic rise in mobile banking Trojan activity, with the number of packages totaling 162,275, a 50% increase compared to the prior quarter.
Number of installation packages for mobile banking Trojans detected by Kaspersky, Q1 2025 — Q1 2026 (download)
We saw a similar growth in the previous quarter, with banking Trojan volumes rising by 50% during that period as well. Various Mamont variants accounted for the absolute majority of packages and represented nearly every entry in the rankings of most frequent banking Trojans by affected user count.
| Verdict | %* Q4 2025 | %* Q1 2026 | Difference in p.p. | Change in ranking |
| Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Mamont.jo | 0.00 | 15.75 | +15.75 | |
| Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Mamont.jx | 0.00 | 9.22 | +9.22 | |
| Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Mamont.jg | 1.47 | 7.08 | +5.61 | +24 |
| Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Mamont.gg | 6.79 | 4.48 | -2.32 | -3 |
| Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Mamont.ks | 0.00 | 3.98 | +3.98 | |
| Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Agent.ws | 6.03 | 3.78 | -2.25 | -2 |
| Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Mamont.hl | 4.30 | 3.27 | -1.03 | +1 |
| Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Mamont.iv | 6.00 | 3.08 | -2.92 | -3 |
| Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Mamont.jb | 3.93 | 3.07 | -0.86 | +1 |
| Trojan-Banker.AndroidOS.Mamont.jv | 0.00 | 2.79 | +2.79 |
* Unique users who encountered this malware as a percentage of all users of Kaspersky mobile security solutions who encountered banking threats.
IT threat evolution in Q1 2026. Non-mobile statistics
IT threat evolution in Q1 2026. Mobile statistics
The statistics in this report are based on detection verdicts returned by Kaspersky products unless otherwise stated. The information was provided by Kaspersky users who consented to sharing statistical data.
In Q1 2026:
In January 2026, it was reported that the FBI had seized the domains of the RAMP cybercrime forum, a major platform used extensively by ransomware developers to advertise their RaaS programs and to recruit affiliates. There has been no official statement from the FBI, nor is it clear if RAMP servers were seized. In a post on an external website, a RAMP moderator mentioned law enforcement agencies gaining control over the forum. The takedown disrupted a key element of the RaaS ecosystem, creating ripple effects for ransomware operators, affiliates, and initial access brokers.
A man suspected of links to the Phobos group was apprehended in Poland. He was charged with the creation, acquisition, and distribution of software designed for unlawfully obtaining information, including data that facilitates unauthorized access to information stored within a computer system.
In March, a Phobos ransomware administrator pleaded guilty to the creation and distribution of the Trojan, which had been used in international attacks dating back to at least November 2020.
In March, the U.S. Department of Justice charged a man who had acted as a negotiator for ransomware groups. The company he worked for specializes in cyberincident investigations. The prosecution alleges the suspect colluded with the BlackCat threat actor to share privileged insights into the ongoing progress of negotiations. Additionally, the suspect is alleged to have had a prior direct role in BlackCat attacks, serving as an affiliate for the RaaS operation.
In a separate development this March, a U.S. court sentenced an initial access broker associated with the Yanluowang ransomware group to 81 months of imprisonment. According to the U.S. Department of Justice, the convict facilitated dozens of ransomware attacks across the United States, resulting in over $9 million in actual loss and more than $24 million in intended loss.
The Interlock group has been heavily exploiting the CVE-2026-20131 zero-day vulnerability in Cisco Secure FMC firewall management software since at least January 26, 2026. The vulnerability enabled arbitrary Java code execution with root privileges on the affected device. This campaign demonstrates the ongoing reliance on zero-day vulnerabilities for initial access, a focus on network appliances as high-value entry points, and the rapid weaponization of new vulnerabilities within the ransomware ecosystem.
This section highlights the most prolific ransomware gangs by number of victims added to each group’s DLS. This quarter, the Clop ransomware (14.42%) returned to the top of the rankings, displacing Qilin (12.34%), which had held the leading position in the previous reporting period. Following closely is a new threat actor, The Gentlemen (9.25%). Emerging no later than July 2025, the group had already surpassed the activity levels of mainstays such as Akira (7.25%) and INC Ransom (6.13%).
Number of each group’s victims according to its DLS as a percentage of all groups’ victims published on all the DLSs under review during the reporting period (download)
In Q1 2026, Kaspersky solutions detected six new ransomware families and 2938 new modifications. Volumes have returned to Q3 2025 levels following a surge in Q4 2025.
Number of new ransomware modifications, Q1 2025 — Q1 2026 (download)
Throughout Q1, our solutions protected 77,319 unique users from ransomware. Ransomware activity was highest in March, with 35,056 unique users encountering such attacks during the month.
Number of unique users attacked by ransomware Trojans, Q1 2026 (download)
| Country/territory* | %** | |
| 1 | Pakistan | 0.79 |
| 2 | South Korea | 0.64 |
| 3 | China | 0.52 |
| 4 | Tajikistan | 0.40 |
| 5 | Libya | 0.38 |
| 6 | Turkmenistan | 0.36 |
| 7 | Iraq | 0.35 |
| 8 | Bangladesh | 0.33 |
| 9 | Rwanda | 0.30 |
| 10 | Cameroon | 0.28 |
* Excluded are countries and territories with relatively few (under 50,000) Kaspersky users.
** Unique users whose computers were attacked by ransomware Trojans as a percentage of all unique users of Kaspersky products in the country/territory.
| Name | Verdict | %* | |
| 1 | (generic verdict) | Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Gen | 33.90 |
| 2 | (generic verdict) | Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Crypren | 6.38 |
| 3 | WannaCry | Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Wanna | 5.87 |
| 4 | (generic verdict) | Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Encoder | 4.68 |
| 5 | (generic verdict) | Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Agent | 3.80 |
| 6 | LockBit | Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Lockbit | 2.80 |
| 7 | (generic verdict) | Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Phny | 1.99 |
| 8 | (generic verdict) | Trojan-Ransom.MSIL.Agent | 1.96 |
| 9 | (generic verdict) | Trojan-Ransom.Python.Agent | 1.93 |
| 10 | (generic verdict) | Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Crypmod | 1.89 |
* Unique Kaspersky users attacked by the specific ransomware Trojan family as a percentage of all unique users attacked by this type of threat.
In Q1 2026, Kaspersky solutions detected 3485 new modifications of miners.
Number of new miner modifications, Q1 2026 (download)
In Q1, we detected attacks using miner programs on the computers of 260,588 unique Kaspersky users worldwide.
Number of unique users attacked by miners, Q1 2026 (download)
| Country/territory* | %** | |
| 1 | Senegal | 3.19 |
| 2 | Turkmenistan | 3.06 |
| 3 | Mali | 2.63 |
| 4 | Tanzania | 1.62 |
| 5 | Bangladesh | 1.06 |
| 6 | Ethiopia | 0.95 |
| 7 | Panama | 0.88 |
| 8 | Afghanistan | 0.79 |
| 9 | Kazakhstan | 0.77 |
| 10 | Bolivia | 0.75 |
* Excluded are countries and territories with relatively few (under 50,000) Kaspersky users.
** Unique users whose computers were attacked by miners as a percentage of all unique users of Kaspersky products in the country/territory.
In Q1 2026, Google uncovered a new cryptocurrency theft campaign. The scammers directed victims to a fraudulent video call, prompting them to execute malicious scripts under the guise of technical support fixes for connection problems.
In March, researchers with GTIG and iVerify reported the discovery of an in-the-wild exploit chain targeting both iOS and macOS devices. The exploit kit was apparently marketed on the dark web, providing threat actors with a suite of spyware capabilities alongside specialized cryptocurrency exfiltration modules. The exploit was delivered via drive-by downloads when victims visited various compromised websites. Our analysis confirmed that the toolkit included an updated version of a component previously identified in the Operation Triangulation attack chain.
Devices running macOS were similarly impacted by the high-profile supply chain attack targeting the Axios npm package, a widely used HTTP client for JavaScript. The installation of the infected package led to the deployment of a backdoor on macOS devices.
Unique users* who encountered this malware as a percentage of all attacked users of Kaspersky security solutions for macOS (download)
* Data for the previous quarter may differ slightly from previously published data due to some verdicts being retrospectively revised.
The share of PasivRobber spyware attacks is beginning to decline, giving way to more traditional adware and Monitor-class software capable of tracking user activity. The popular Amos stealer also maintains its presence within the TOP 20.
| Country/territory | %* Q4 2025 | %* Q1 2026 |
| China | 1.28 | 1.97 |
| France | 1.18 | 1.07 |
| Brazil | 1.13 | 0.98 |
| Mexico | 0.72 | 0.52 |
| Germany | 0.71 | 0.45 |
| The Netherlands | 0.62 | 0.75 |
| Hong Kong | 0.49 | 0.53 |
| India | 0.42 | 0.48 |
| Russian Federation | 0.34 | 0.37 |
| Thailand | 0.24 | 0.27 |
* Unique users who encountered threats to macOS as a percentage of all unique Kaspersky users in the country/territory.
This section presents statistics on attacks targeting Kaspersky IoT honeypots. The geographic data on attack sources is based on the IP addresses of attacking devices.
In Q1 2026, the share of devices attacking Kaspersky honeypots via the SSH protocol saw a significant increase compared to the previous reporting period.
Distribution of attacked services by number of unique IP addresses of attacking devices (download)
The distribution of attacks between Telnet and SSH maintained the ratio observed in Q4 2025.
Distribution of attackers’ sessions in Kaspersky honeypots (download)
Share of each threat delivered to an infected device as a result of a successful attack, out of the total number of threats delivered (download)
The primary shifts in the IoT threat distribution are linked to the activity of various Mirai botnet variants, although members of this family continue to account for the majority of the list. Furthermore, a new variant, Mirai.kl, surfaced in the rankings. We also observed a significant decline in NyaDrop botnet activity during Q1.
The United States, the Netherlands, and Germany accounted for the highest proportions of SSH-based attacks during this period.
| Country/territory | Q4 2025 | Q1 2026 |
| United States | 16.10% | 23.74% |
| The Netherlands | 15.78% | 17.57% |
| Germany | 12.07% | 10.34% |
| Panama | 7.72% | 6.34% |
| India | 5.32% | 6.05% |
| Romania | 4.05% | 5.82% |
| Australia | 1.62% | 4.61% |
| Vietnam | 4.21% | 3.50% |
| Russian Federation | 3.79% | 2.35% |
| Sweden | 2.25% | 2.09% |
China continues to account for the largest proportion of Telnet attacks, though there was a marked increase in activity originating from Pakistan.
| Country/territory | Q4 2025 | Q1 2026 |
| China | 53.64% | 39.54% |
| Pakistan | 14.27% | 27.31% |
| Russian Federation | 8.20% | 8.25% |
| Indonesia | 8.58% | 6.71% |
| India | 4.85% | 4.66% |
| Brazil | 0.06% | 3.30% |
| Argentina | 0.02% | 2.51% |
| Nigeria | 1.22% | 1.38% |
| Thailand | 0.01% | 0.55% |
| Sweden | 0.54% | 0.55% |
The statistics in this section are based on detection verdicts by Web Anti-Virus, which protects users when suspicious objects are downloaded from malicious or infected web pages. These malicious pages are purposefully created by cybercriminals. Websites that host user-generated content, such as message boards, as well as compromised legitimate sites, can become infected.
The following statistics show the distribution by country/territory of the sources of internet attacks blocked by Kaspersky products on user computers (web pages redirecting to exploits, sites containing exploits and other malicious programs, botnet C&C centers, and so on). One or more web-based attacks could originate from each unique host.
To determine the geographic source of web attacks, we matched the domain name with the real IP address where the domain is hosted, then identified the geographic location of that IP address (GeoIP).
In Q1 2026, Kaspersky solutions blocked 343,823,407 attacks launched from internet resources worldwide. Web Anti-Virus was triggered by 49,983,611 unique URLs.
Web-based attacks by country/territory, Q1 2026 (download)
To assess the risk of malware infection via the internet for users’ computers in different countries and territories, we calculated the share of Kaspersky users in each location on whose computers Web Anti-Virus was triggered during the reporting period. The resulting data provides an indication of the aggressiveness of the environment in which computers operate in different countries and territories.
This ranked list includes only attacks by malicious objects classified as Malware. Our calculations leave out Web Anti-Virus detections of potentially dangerous or unwanted programs, such as RiskTool or adware.
| Country/territory* | %** | |
| 1 | Venezuela | 9.33 |
| 2 | Hungary | 8.16 |
| 3 | Italy | 7.58 |
| 4 | Tajikistan | 7.48 |
| 5 | India | 7.21 |
| 6 | Greece | 7.13 |
| 7 | Portugal | 7.10 |
| 8 | France | 7.05 |
| 9 | Belgium | 6.83 |
| 10 | Slovakia | 6.80 |
| 11 | Vietnam | 6.62 |
| 12 | Bosnia and Herzegovina | 6.57 |
| 13 | Canada | 6.56 |
| 14 | Serbia | 6.50 |
| 15 | Tunisia | 6.36 |
| 16 | Qatar | 6.01 |
| 17 | Spain | 5.95 |
| 18 | Germany | 5.95 |
| 19 | Sri Lanka | 5.89 |
| 20 | Brazil | 5.88 |
* Excluded are countries and territories with relatively few (under 10,000) Kaspersky users.
** Unique users targeted by web-based Malware attacks as a percentage of all unique users of Kaspersky products in the country/territory.
On average during the quarter, 4.73% of users’ computers worldwide were subjected to at least one Malware web attack.
Statistics on local infections of user computers are an important indicator. They include objects that penetrated the target computer by infecting files or removable media, or initially made their way onto the computer in non-open form. Examples of the latter are programs in complex installers and encrypted files.
Data in this section is based on analyzing statistics produced by anti-virus scans of files on the hard drive at the moment they were created or accessed, and the results of scanning removable storage media. The statistics are based on detection verdicts from the On-Access Scan (OAS) and On-Demand Scan (ODS) modules of File Anti-Virus and include detections of malicious programs located on user computers or removable media connected to the computers, such as flash drives, camera memory cards, phones, or external hard drives.
In Q1 2026, our File Anti-Virus detected 15,831,319 malicious and potentially unwanted objects.
For each country and territory, we calculated the percentage of Kaspersky users whose computers had the File Anti-Virus triggered at least once during the reporting period. This statistic reflects the level of personal computer infection in different countries and territories around the world.
Note that this ranked list includes only attacks by malicious objects classified as Malware. Our calculations leave out File Anti-Virus detections of potentially dangerous or unwanted programs, such as RiskTool or adware.
| Country/territory* | %** | |
| 1 | Turkmenistan | 47.96 |
| 2 | Tajikistan | 31.48 |
| 3 | Cuba | 31.03 |
| 4 | Yemen | 29.59 |
| 5 | Afghanistan | 28.47 |
| 6 | Burundi | 26.93 |
| 7 | Uzbekistan | 24.81 |
| 8 | Syria | 23.08 |
| 9 | Nicaragua | 21.97 |
| 10 | Cameroon | 21.60 |
| 11 | China | 21.09 |
| 12 | Mozambique | 21.02 |
| 13 | Algeria | 20.64 |
| 14 | Democratic Republic of the Congo | 20.63 |
| 15 | Bangladesh | 20.44 |
| 16 | Mali | 20.35 |
| 17 | Republic of the Congo | 20.23 |
| 18 | Madagascar | 20.00 |
| 19 | Belarus | 19.78 |
| 20 | Tanzania | 19.52 |
* Excluded are countries and territories with relatively few (under 10,000) Kaspersky users.
** Unique users on whose computers local Malware threats were blocked, as a percentage of all unique users of Kaspersky products in the country/territory.
On average worldwide, Malware local threats were detected at least once on 11.55% of users’ computers during Q1.
Russia scored 11.92% in these rankings.
At least one threat actor has adopted the recently released malware source code in attacks against NPM developers.
The post First Shai-Hulud Worm Clones Emerge appeared first on SecurityWeek.
With International Anti-Ransomware Day taking place on May 12, Kaspersky presents its annual report on the evolving global and regional ransomware cyberthreat landscape.
Ransomware remains one of the most persistent and adaptive cyberthreats. In 2026:
According to Kaspersky Security Network, the share of organizations affected by ransomware decreased in 2025 across all regions compared to 2024.
Percentage of organizations affected by ransomware attacks by region, 2025 (download)
Despite the formal decrease, organizations across all sectors continue to face a high likelihood of attack, as ransomware operators refine their tactics and scale their operations with increasing efficiency. Kaspersky and VDC Research have found that in the manufacturing sector alone, ransomware attacks may have caused over $18 billion in losses in the first three quarters of the year.
In 2026, ransomware operators increasingly prioritize neutralizing endpoint defenses before executing their payloads. Tools commonly referred to as “EDR killers” have become a standard component of attack playbooks. This reflects a continuing trend toward more deliberate and methodical intrusions.
Attackers attempt to terminate security processes and disable monitoring agents, often by exploiting trusted components such as signed drivers. This technique is called Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD) and allows adversaries to blend into legitimate system activity while gradually degrading defensive visibility.
Thus, evasion is no longer an opportunistic step but a planned and repeatable phase of the attack lifecycle. As a result, organizations are increasingly challenged not just to detect ransomware but also to maintain control in environments where security controls themselves are actively targeted.
We predicted that quantum-resistant ransomware would appear in 2025. Looking back at the previous year, we see that advanced ransomware groups indeed started using post-quantum cryptography as quantum computing evolved. The encryption techniques used by this quantum-proof ransomware could be used to resist decryption attempts from both classical and quantum computers, making it nearly impossible for victims to decrypt their data without having to pay a ransom.
One example is the appearance of the PE32 ransomware family (link in Russian); it leverages the cutting-edge ML-KEM (Module-Lattice-Based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism) standard to secure its AES keys. This specific cryptographic framework was recently selected by NIST as the primary standard for post-quantum defense.
Within the PE32 ransomware architecture, this is realized through the Kyber1024 algorithm, a robust mechanism providing Level 5 security, roughly equivalent in strength to AES-256. Its primary function is the secure generation and transmission of shared secrets between parties, specifically engineered to withstand future quantum computing attacks. This shift toward post-quantum readiness is part of a broader industry trend; for instance, TLS 1.3 and QUIC protocols have already adopted the X25519Kyber768 hybrid model, which fuses classical encryption with quantum-resistant security.
In 2025, the share of ransoms paid dropped to 28%. As a response to this, one of the developments in the 2026 landscape is the growing prevalence of extortion incidents in which no file encryption takes place at all. Instead, attackers leave out the “ware” in “ransomware” and focus on extracting sensitive data and leveraging the threat of public disclosure as their primary means of extortion. ShinyHunters is an excellent example of such a group, using a data leak site to publicize its victims.
By avoiding encryption, attackers may aim at reducing the likelihood of immediate detection, shortening the duration of the attack, and eliminating dependencies on stable encryption routines. Often, this model is used alongside traditional tactics in so-called double extortion schemes, but an increasing number of campaigns rely exclusively on data theft.
For victims, this shift fundamentally changes the nature of the risk. While backups remain effective against encryption-based disruption, they provide no protection against data exposure, regulatory consequences, and reputational damage. Ransomware is therefore evolving from a business continuity issue into a broader data security and compliance challenge.
The ransomware ecosystem continues to evolve toward a highly industrialized and specialized model, with initial access remaining as one of its most critical components. In 2026, many ransomware operators keep relying on IABs (initial access brokers), a network of intermediaries who supply pre-compromised access to corporate environments, aiming to no longer perform full intrusions themselves.
This “access-as-a-service” model is fueled by credential theft operations, and the widespread availability of compromised accounts harvested through infostealers and phishing campaigns.
The primary access vectors offered for sale have not changed: RDP, VPN, and RDWeb are still the top access vectors. Consequently, remote access infrastructure remains the primary attack surface for initial access sales. In response to the measures against public exposure of RDP access points to the internet, attackers are now targeting RDWeb portals, which are frequently vulnerable and occasionally inadequately safeguarded.
The result is a threat landscape where unauthorized access is increasingly commoditized, and the barrier to launching ransomware attacks declines. This means that preventing initial compromise is only part of the challenge; equal emphasis must be placed on detecting misuse of legitimate credentials and limiting lateral movement within already-breached environments.
Telegram channels and underground forums increasingly function as platforms for the distribution and sale of compromised datasets and access credentials including those that were obtained as a result of ransomware attacks.
Advertisements posted on these resources typically include the nature of the access, a description of the exfiltrated or compromised data, price terms, and contact information for prospective buyers. In addition, some malicious actors mention their collaboration with other ransomware groups. Lesser-known gangs can use this name-dropping to promote themselves
Multiple threat actors not related to ransomware groups distribute datasets downloaded from ransomware blogs on underground forums and Telegram. By re-publishing download links and files, they spread compromised data as well as information on the ransomware attack within the community.
The ransomware itself is also sold or offered for subscription on the dark web platforms. The sellers underscore the uniqueness of their malware, as well as its encryption and defense evasion features.
Law enforcement agencies are actively shutting down dark web platforms and ransomware data leak sites. A major underground forum, RAMP, which also functioned as a platform for threat actors to advertise their ransomware services and publish service‑related updates, was seized by authorities in January 2026. Another underground forum, LeakBase, where malicious actors distributed exfiltrated and compromised data, was seized in March 2026. In 2025, law enforcement agencies seized well-known forums like Nulled, Cracked, and XSS. Also in 2025, the DLSs of BlackSuit and 8Base ransomware groups were seized. These takedowns cause inconvenience to ransomware coordination, specifically for initial access brokers and affiliates, though similar forums are expected to fill the void over time.
RansomHub’s sudden dormancy in 2025 marked a shift, and Qilin became the dominant player from Q2 onward. According to Kaspersky research, Qilin was the most active group executing targeted attacks in 2025.
Each group’s share of victims according to its data leak site (DLS) as a percentage of all reported victims of all groups during the period under review (download)
Qilin stands out as one of the fastest-growig and dominant RaaS platforms. Its combination of high-volume operations and structured affiliate model positions it as a central player in the current ecosystem.
Clop, the second most active group in 2025, is distinguished through its large-scale, supply-chain-style attacks, exploiting widely used file transfer and enterprise software to compromise hundreds of victims simultaneously. This one-to-many approach sets it apart from more traditional, single-target campaigns.
Third place is occupied by Akira, which remains notable for its consistency and operational stability, maintaining a steady stream of victims without major disruption. Its ability to sustain activity over time makes it one of the most reliable indicators of baseline ransomware threat levels.
Although no longer active, RansomHub stands out for its rapid rise and equally rapid disappearance in 2025, highlighting the volatility of the RaaS market. Its shutdown created a vacuum that significantly reshaped affiliate distribution across other groups.
DragonForce is also notable – not just for its own operations, but for its broader influence within the ransomware ecosystem, including reported involvement in infrastructure conflicts and possible links to the disruption of competing groups. Thus, the group claims that RansomHub “has moved to their infrastructure.” This positions it as more than just an operator and potentially an ecosystem-level actor.
While emerging actors generally operate on a smaller scale, they provide insight into the continuous churn and low barrier to entry within the ransomware ecosystem.
The Gentlemen group caught our attention in early 2026, as they managed to attack a significant number of victims over a short time. This actor is also notable for reflecting a broader shift toward professionalization and controlled operations within the ransomware ecosystem. Unlike many emerging groups that rely on opportunistic attacks and inconsistent leak activity, The Gentlemen demonstrate a more deliberate approach: structured intrusion workflows, selective targeting, and measured communication with victims. This signals a move away from chaotic, high-noise campaigns toward predictable, business-like execution models that are easier to scale and harder to disrupt. Their TTPs include the massive exploitation of hardware very common on big corporations, such as FortiOS/FortiProxy, SonicWall VPN, and Cisco ASA appliances. The group might be comprised of professional cybercriminals who left other prominent groups.
The group is also notable for its emphasis on data-centric extortion strategies, often prioritizing exfiltration and leverage over purely disruptive encryption. This aligns with one of the defining trends of 2026: ransomware evolving into a form of data breach monetization rather than just system denial. By focusing on controlled pressure and reputational risk instead of immediate operational damage, The Gentlemen exemplify how attackers are adapting to lower ransom payment rates and improved backup practices among victims.
Some other groups to take note of in 2026:
Although there is little to say about these groups at the time of writing this report, each of them may be equally likely to disappear from the threat landscape or grow into a prominent threat. That’s why it’s important to track them from their early days. Moreover, collectively, these groups illustrate how dynamic the ransomware landscape is, with new entrants constantly replenishing it.
Despite the growing effort by law enforcement agencies across the globe to seize and disrupt dark web platforms and threat actor infrastructures, ransomware operations remain stable, with new groups quickly taking the place of those who went silent. In 2026, we see a shift towards encryptionless extortion, with data leaks increasingly becoming the main threat to target organizations. At the same time, data encryption is also upgrading to the next level with the emergence of post-quantum ransomware.
To resist the evolving threat, Kaspersky recommends organizations:
Prioritize proactive prevention through patching and vulnerability management. Many ransomware attacks exploit unpatched systems, so organizations should implement automated patch management tools to ensure timely updates for operating systems, software, and drivers. For Windows environments, enabling Microsoft’s Vulnerable Driver Blocklist is critical to thwarting BYOVD attacks. Regularly scan for vulnerabilities and prioritize high-severity flaws, especially in widely used software.
Strengthen remote access: RDP and RDWeb connections should never be directly exposed to the internet, only through VPN or ZTNA (Zero Trust Network Access). It’s highly recommended to adopt multi-factor authentication on everything; the architecture may require continuous authentication for access, as one valid credential captured is enough to cause a breach. Monitoring the underground for stolen employee credentials is essential. Audit open ports across the entire attack surface. The adoption of the “Principle of Least Privilege” (PoLP), where users, systems, or processes are granted only the minimum access rights, such as read, write, or execute permissions, necessary to perform their specific job functions, is highly recommended.
Strengthen endpoint and network security with advanced detection and segmentation. Deploy robust endpoint detection and response solutions such as Kaspersky NEXT EDR to monitor for suspicious activity like driver loading or process termination. Network segmentation is equally important. Limit lateral movement by isolating critical systems and using firewalls to restrict traffic. Complete and immediate offboarding for employees is necessary as well as periodic permission reviews, with automatic revocation of unused access. Sessions with complete logging for privileged accounts are more than necessary. Monitoring the traffic divergence to new sites or even to legitimate endpoints can help the defenders to spot a new insider threat.
Invest in backups, training, and incident response planning. Maintain offline or immutable backups that are tested regularly to ensure rapid recovery without paying a ransom. Backups should cover critical data and systems and be stored in air-gapped environments to resist encryption or deletion. User education is essential to combatting phishing, which remains one of the top attack vectors. Conduct simulated phishing exercises and train employees to recognize AI-crafted emails. Kaspersky Global Emergency Response Team (GERT) can help develop and test an incident response plan to minimize potential downtime and costs.
The recommendation to avoid paying a ransom remains robust, especially given the risk of unavailable keys due to dismantled infrastructure, affiliate chaos, or malicious intent. By investing in backups, incident response, and preventive measures like patching and training, organizations can avoid funding criminals and mitigate the impact.
Kaspersky also offers free decryptors for certain ransomware families. If you get hit by ransomware, check to see if there’s a decryptor available for the ransomware family used against you.
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