A convincing lookalike of the popular 7-Zip archiver site has been serving a trojanized installer that silently converts victims’ machines into residential proxy nodes—and it has been hiding in plain sight for some time.

“I’m so sick to my stomach”

A PC builder recently turned to Reddit’s r/pcmasterrace community in a panic after realizing they had downloaded 7‑Zip from the wrong website. Following a YouTube tutorial for a new build, they were instructed to download 7‑Zip from 7zip[.]com, unaware that the legitimate project is hosted exclusively at 7-zip.org.

In their Reddit post, the user described installing the file first on a laptop and later transferring it via USB to a newly built desktop. They encountered repeated 32‑bit versus 64‑bit errors and ultimately abandoned the installer in favor of Windows’ built‑in extraction tools. Nearly two weeks later, Microsoft Defender alerted on the system with a generic detection: Trojan:Win32/Malgent!MSR.

The experience illustrates how a seemingly minor domain mix-up can result in long-lived, unauthorized use of a system when attackers successfully masquerade as trusted software distributors.

A trojanized installer masquerading as legitimate software

This is not a simple case of a malicious download hosted on a random site. The operators behind 7zip[.]com distributed a trojanized installer via a lookalike domain, delivering a functional copy of functional 7‑Zip File Manager alongside a concealed malware payload.

The installer is Authenticode‑signed using a now‑revoked certificate issued to Jozeal Network Technology Co., Limited, lending it superficial legitimacy. During installation, a modified build of 7zfm.exe is deployed and functions as expected, reducing user suspicion. In parallel, three additional components are silently dropped:

• Uphero.exe—a service manager and update loader
• hero.exe—the primary proxy payload (Go‑compiled)
• hero.dll—a supporting library

All components are written to C:\Windows\SysWOW64\hero\, a privileged directory that is unlikely to be manually inspected.

An independent update channel was also observed at update.7zip[.]com/version/win-service/1.0.0.2/Uphero.exe.zip, indicating that the malware payload can be updated independently of the installer itself.

Abuse of trusted distribution channels

One of the more concerning aspects of this campaign is its reliance on third‑party trust. The Reddit case highlights YouTube tutorials as an inadvertent malware distribution vector, where creators incorrectly reference 7zip.com instead of the legitimate domain.

This shows how attackers can exploit small errors in otherwise benign content ecosystems to funnel victims toward malicious infrastructure at scale.

Execution flow: from installer to persistent proxy service

Behavioral analysis shows a rapid and methodical infection chain:

1. File deployment—The payload is installed into SysWOW64, requiring elevated privileges and signaling intent for deep system integration.

2. Persistence via Windows services—Both Uphero.exe and hero.exe are registered as auto‑start Windows services running under System privileges, ensuring execution on every boot.

3. Firewall rule manipulation—The malware invokes netsh to remove existing rules and create new inbound and outbound allow rules for its binaries. This is intended to reduce interference with network traffic and support seamless payload updates.

4. Host profiling—Using WMI and native Windows APIs, the malware enumerates system characteristics including hardware identifiers, memory size, CPU count, disk attributes, and network configuration. The malware communicates with iplogger[.]org via a dedicated reporting endpoint, suggesting it collects and reports device or network metadata as part of its proxy infrastructure.

Functional goal: residential proxy monetization

While initial indicators suggested backdoor‑style capabilities, further analysis revealed that the malware’s primary function is proxyware. The infected host is enrolled as a residential proxy node, allowing third parties to route traffic through the victim’s IP address.

The hero.exe component retrieves configuration data from rotating “smshero”‑themed command‑and‑control domains, then establishes outbound proxy connections on non‑standard ports such as 1000 and 1002. Traffic analysis shows a lightweight XOR‑encoded protocol (key 0x70) used to obscure control messages.

This infrastructure is consistent with known residential proxy services, where access to real consumer IP addresses is sold for fraud, scraping, ad abuse, or anonymity laundering.

Shared tooling across multiple fake installers

The 7‑Zip impersonation appears to be part of a broader operation. Related binaries have been identified under names such as upHola.exe, upTiktok, upWhatsapp, and upWire, all sharing identical tactics, techniques, and procedures:

• Deployment to SysWOW64
• Windows service persistence
• Firewall rule manipulation via netsh
• Encrypted HTTPS C2 traffic

Embedded strings referencing VPN and proxy brands suggest a unified backend supporting multiple distribution fronts.

Rotating infrastructure and encrypted transport

Memory analysis uncovered a large pool of hardcoded command-and-control domains using hero and smshero naming conventions. Active resolution during sandbox execution showed traffic routed through Cloudflare infrastructure with TLS‑encrypted HTTPS sessions.

The malware also uses DNS-over-HTTPS via Google’s resolver, reducing visibility for traditional DNS monitoring and complicating network-based detection.

Evasion and anti‑analysis features

The malware incorporates multiple layers of sandbox and analysis evasion:

• Virtual machine detection targeting VMware, VirtualBox, QEMU, and Parallels
• Anti‑debugging checks and suspicious debugger DLL loading
• Runtime API resolution and PEB inspection
• Process enumeration, registry probing, and environment inspection

Cryptographic support is extensive, including AES, RC4, Camellia, Chaskey, XOR encoding, and Base64, suggesting encrypted configuration handling and traffic protection.

Defensive guidance

Any system that has executed installers from 7zip.com should be considered compromised. While this malware establishes SYSTEM‑level persistence and modifies firewall rules, reputable security software can effectively detect and remove the malicious components. Malwarebytes is capable of fully eradicating known variants of this threat and reversing its persistence mechanisms. In high‑risk or heavily used systems, some users may still choose a full OS reinstall for absolute assurance, but it is not strictly required in all cases.

Users and defenders should:

• Verify software sources and bookmark official project domains
• Treat unexpected code‑signing identities with skepticism
• Monitor for unauthorized Windows services and firewall rule changes
• Block known C2 domains and proxy endpoints at the network perimeter

Researcher attribution and community analysis

This investigation would not have been possible without the work of independent security researchers who went deeper than surface-level indicators and identified the true purpose of this malware family.

• Luke Acha provided the first comprehensive analysis showing that the Uphero/hero malware functions as residential proxyware rather than a traditional backdoor. His work documented the proxy protocol, traffic patterns, and monetization model, and connected this campaign to a broader operation he dubbed upStage Proxy. Luke’s full write-up is available on his blog.
• s1dhy expanded on this analysis by reversing and decoding the custom XOR-based communication protocol, validating the proxy behavior through packet captures, and correlating multiple proxy endpoints across victim geolocations. Technical notes and findings were shared publicly on X (Twitter).
• Andrew Danis contributed additional infrastructure analysis and clustering, helping tie the fake 7-Zip installer to related proxyware campaigns abusing other software brands.

Additional technical validation and dynamic analysis were published by researchers at RaichuLab on Qiita and WizSafe Security on IIJ.

Their collective work highlights the importance of open, community-driven research in uncovering long-running abuse campaigns that rely on trust and misdirection rather than exploits.

Closing thoughts

This campaign demonstrates how effective brand impersonation combined with technically competent malware can operate undetected for extended periods. By abusing user trust rather than exploiting software vulnerabilities, attackers bypass many traditional security assumptions—turning everyday utility downloads into long‑lived monetization infrastructure.

Malwarebytes detects and blocks known variants of this proxyware family and its associated infrastructure.

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

File paths

• C:\Windows\SysWOW64\hero\Uphero.exe
• C:\Windows\SysWOW64\hero\hero.exe
• C:\Windows\SysWOW64\hero\hero.dll

File hashes (SHA-256)

• e7291095de78484039fdc82106d191bf41b7469811c4e31b4228227911d25027 (Uphero.exe)
• b7a7013b951c3cea178ece3363e3dd06626b9b98ee27ebfd7c161d0bbcfbd894 (hero.exe)
• 3544ffefb2a38bf4faf6181aa4374f4c186d3c2a7b9b059244b65dce8d5688d9 (hero.dll)

Network indicators

Domains:

• soc.hero-sms[.]co
• neo.herosms[.]co
• flux.smshero[.]co
• nova.smshero[.]ai
• apex.herosms[.]ai
• spark.herosms[.]io
• zest.hero-sms[.]ai
• prime.herosms[.]vip
• vivid.smshero[.]vip
• mint.smshero[.]com
• pulse.herosms[.]cc
• glide.smshero[.]cc
• svc.ha-teams.office[.]com
• iplogger[.]org

Observed IPs (Cloudflare-fronted):

• 104.21.57.71
• 172.67.160.241

Host-based indicators

• Windows services with image paths pointing to C:\Windows\SysWOW64\hero\
• Firewall rules named Uphero or hero (inbound and outbound)
• Mutex: Global\3a886eb8-fe40-4d0a-b78b-9e0bcb683fb7

---

We don’t just report on threats—we remove them

Cybersecurity risks should never spread beyond a headline. Keep threats off your devices by downloading Malwarebytes today.

A convincing lookalike of the popular 7-Zip archiver site has been serving a trojanized installer that silently converts victims’ machines into residential proxy nodes—and it has been hiding in plain sight for some time.

“I’m so sick to my stomach”

A PC builder recently turned to Reddit’s r/pcmasterrace community in a panic after realizing they had downloaded 7‑Zip from the wrong website. Following a YouTube tutorial for a new build, they were instructed to download 7‑Zip from 7zip[.]com, unaware that the legitimate project is hosted exclusively at 7-zip.org.

In their Reddit post, the user described installing the file first on a laptop and later transferring it via USB to a newly built desktop. They encountered repeated 32‑bit versus 64‑bit errors and ultimately abandoned the installer in favor of Windows’ built‑in extraction tools. Nearly two weeks later, Microsoft Defender alerted on the system with a generic detection: Trojan:Win32/Malgent!MSR.

The experience illustrates how a seemingly minor domain mix-up can result in long-lived, unauthorized use of a system when attackers successfully masquerade as trusted software distributors.

A trojanized installer masquerading as legitimate software

This is not a simple case of a malicious download hosted on a random site. The operators behind 7zip[.]com distributed a trojanized installer via a lookalike domain, delivering a functional copy of functional 7‑Zip File Manager alongside a concealed malware payload.

The installer is Authenticode‑signed using a now‑revoked certificate issued to Jozeal Network Technology Co., Limited, lending it superficial legitimacy. During installation, a modified build of 7zfm.exe is deployed and functions as expected, reducing user suspicion. In parallel, three additional components are silently dropped:

• Uphero.exe—a service manager and update loader
• hero.exe—the primary proxy payload (Go‑compiled)
• hero.dll—a supporting library

All components are written to C:\Windows\SysWOW64\hero\, a privileged directory that is unlikely to be manually inspected.

An independent update channel was also observed at update.7zip[.]com/version/win-service/1.0.0.2/Uphero.exe.zip, indicating that the malware payload can be updated independently of the installer itself.

Abuse of trusted distribution channels

One of the more concerning aspects of this campaign is its reliance on third‑party trust. The Reddit case highlights YouTube tutorials as an inadvertent malware distribution vector, where creators incorrectly reference 7zip.com instead of the legitimate domain.

This shows how attackers can exploit small errors in otherwise benign content ecosystems to funnel victims toward malicious infrastructure at scale.

Execution flow: from installer to persistent proxy service

Behavioral analysis shows a rapid and methodical infection chain:

1. File deployment—The payload is installed into SysWOW64, requiring elevated privileges and signaling intent for deep system integration.

2. Persistence via Windows services—Both Uphero.exe and hero.exe are registered as auto‑start Windows services running under System privileges, ensuring execution on every boot.

3. Firewall rule manipulation—The malware invokes netsh to remove existing rules and create new inbound and outbound allow rules for its binaries. This is intended to reduce interference with network traffic and support seamless payload updates.

4. Host profiling—Using WMI and native Windows APIs, the malware enumerates system characteristics including hardware identifiers, memory size, CPU count, disk attributes, and network configuration. The malware communicates with iplogger[.]org via a dedicated reporting endpoint, suggesting it collects and reports device or network metadata as part of its proxy infrastructure.

Functional goal: residential proxy monetization

While initial indicators suggested backdoor‑style capabilities, further analysis revealed that the malware’s primary function is proxyware. The infected host is enrolled as a residential proxy node, allowing third parties to route traffic through the victim’s IP address.

The hero.exe component retrieves configuration data from rotating “smshero”‑themed command‑and‑control domains, then establishes outbound proxy connections on non‑standard ports such as 1000 and 1002. Traffic analysis shows a lightweight XOR‑encoded protocol (key 0x70) used to obscure control messages.

This infrastructure is consistent with known residential proxy services, where access to real consumer IP addresses is sold for fraud, scraping, ad abuse, or anonymity laundering.

Shared tooling across multiple fake installers

The 7‑Zip impersonation appears to be part of a broader operation. Related binaries have been identified under names such as upHola.exe, upTiktok, upWhatsapp, and upWire, all sharing identical tactics, techniques, and procedures:

• Deployment to SysWOW64
• Windows service persistence
• Firewall rule manipulation via netsh
• Encrypted HTTPS C2 traffic

Embedded strings referencing VPN and proxy brands suggest a unified backend supporting multiple distribution fronts.

Rotating infrastructure and encrypted transport

Memory analysis uncovered a large pool of hardcoded command-and-control domains using hero and smshero naming conventions. Active resolution during sandbox execution showed traffic routed through Cloudflare infrastructure with TLS‑encrypted HTTPS sessions.

The malware also uses DNS-over-HTTPS via Google’s resolver, reducing visibility for traditional DNS monitoring and complicating network-based detection.

Evasion and anti‑analysis features

The malware incorporates multiple layers of sandbox and analysis evasion:

• Virtual machine detection targeting VMware, VirtualBox, QEMU, and Parallels
• Anti‑debugging checks and suspicious debugger DLL loading
• Runtime API resolution and PEB inspection
• Process enumeration, registry probing, and environment inspection

Cryptographic support is extensive, including AES, RC4, Camellia, Chaskey, XOR encoding, and Base64, suggesting encrypted configuration handling and traffic protection.

Defensive guidance

Any system that has executed installers from 7zip.com should be considered compromised. While this malware establishes SYSTEM‑level persistence and modifies firewall rules, reputable security software can effectively detect and remove the malicious components. Malwarebytes is capable of fully eradicating known variants of this threat and reversing its persistence mechanisms. In high‑risk or heavily used systems, some users may still choose a full OS reinstall for absolute assurance, but it is not strictly required in all cases.

Users and defenders should:

• Verify software sources and bookmark official project domains
• Treat unexpected code‑signing identities with skepticism
• Monitor for unauthorized Windows services and firewall rule changes
• Block known C2 domains and proxy endpoints at the network perimeter

Researcher attribution and community analysis

This investigation would not have been possible without the work of independent security researchers who went deeper than surface-level indicators and identified the true purpose of this malware family.

• Luke Acha provided the first comprehensive analysis showing that the Uphero/hero malware functions as residential proxyware rather than a traditional backdoor. His work documented the proxy protocol, traffic patterns, and monetization model, and connected this campaign to a broader operation he dubbed upStage Proxy. Luke’s full write-up is available on his blog.
• s1dhy expanded on this analysis by reversing and decoding the custom XOR-based communication protocol, validating the proxy behavior through packet captures, and correlating multiple proxy endpoints across victim geolocations. Technical notes and findings were shared publicly on X (Twitter).
• Andrew Danis contributed additional infrastructure analysis and clustering, helping tie the fake 7-Zip installer to related proxyware campaigns abusing other software brands.

Additional technical validation and dynamic analysis were published by researchers at RaichuLab on Qiita and WizSafe Security on IIJ.

Their collective work highlights the importance of open, community-driven research in uncovering long-running abuse campaigns that rely on trust and misdirection rather than exploits.

Closing thoughts

This campaign demonstrates how effective brand impersonation combined with technically competent malware can operate undetected for extended periods. By abusing user trust rather than exploiting software vulnerabilities, attackers bypass many traditional security assumptions—turning everyday utility downloads into long‑lived monetization infrastructure.

Malwarebytes detects and blocks known variants of this proxyware family and its associated infrastructure.

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

File paths

• C:\Windows\SysWOW64\hero\Uphero.exe
• C:\Windows\SysWOW64\hero\hero.exe
• C:\Windows\SysWOW64\hero\hero.dll

File hashes (SHA-256)

• e7291095de78484039fdc82106d191bf41b7469811c4e31b4228227911d25027 (Uphero.exe)
• b7a7013b951c3cea178ece3363e3dd06626b9b98ee27ebfd7c161d0bbcfbd894 (hero.exe)
• 3544ffefb2a38bf4faf6181aa4374f4c186d3c2a7b9b059244b65dce8d5688d9 (hero.dll)

Network indicators

Domains:

• soc.hero-sms[.]co
• neo.herosms[.]co
• flux.smshero[.]co
• nova.smshero[.]ai
• apex.herosms[.]ai
• spark.herosms[.]io
• zest.hero-sms[.]ai
• prime.herosms[.]vip
• vivid.smshero[.]vip
• mint.smshero[.]com
• pulse.herosms[.]cc
• glide.smshero[.]cc
• svc.ha-teams.office[.]com
• iplogger[.]org

Observed IPs (Cloudflare-fronted):

• 104.21.57.71
• 172.67.160.241

Host-based indicators

• Windows services with image paths pointing to C:\Windows\SysWOW64\hero\
• Firewall rules named Uphero or hero (inbound and outbound)
• Mutex: Global\3a886eb8-fe40-4d0a-b78b-9e0bcb683fb7

---

We don’t just report on threats—we remove them

Cybersecurity risks should never spread beyond a headline. Keep threats off your devices by downloading Malwarebytes today.

Cybercriminals behind a campaign dubbed DEAD#VAX are taking phishing one step further by delivering malware inside virtual hard disks that pretend to be ordinary PDF documents. Open the wrong “invoice” or “purchase order” and you won’t see a document at all. Instead, Windows mounts a virtual drive that quietly installs AsyncRAT, a backdoor Trojan that allows attackers to remotely monitor and control your computer.

It’s a remote access tool, which means attackers gain remote hands‑on‑keyboard control, while traditional file‑based defenses see almost nothing suspicious on disk.

From a high-level view, the infection chain is long, but every step looks just legitimate enough on its own to slip past casual checks.

Victims receive phishing emails that look like routine business messages, often referencing purchase orders or invoices and sometimes impersonating real companies. The email doesn’t attach a document directly. Instead, it links to a file hosted on IPFS (InterPlanetary File System), a decentralized storage network increasingly abused in phishing campaigns because content is harder to take down and can be accessed through normal web gateways.

The linked file is named as a PDF and has the PDF icon, but is actually a virtual hard disk (VHD) file. When the user double‑clicks it, Windows mounts it as a new drive (for example, drive E:) instead of opening a document viewer. Mounting VHDs is perfectly legitimate Windows behavior, which makes this step less likely to ring alarm bells.

Inside the mounted drive is what appears to be the expected document, but it’s actually a Windows Script File (WSF). When the user opens it, Windows executes the code in the file instead of displaying a PDF.

After some checks to avoid analysis and detection, the script injects the payload—AsyncRAT shellcode—into trusted, Microsoft‑signed processes such as RuntimeBroker.exe, OneDrive.exe, taskhostw.exe, or sihost.exe. The malware never writes an actual executable file to disk. It lives and runs entirely in memory inside these legitimate processes, making detection and eventually at a later stage, forensics much harder. It also avoids sudden spikes in activity or memory usage that could draw attention.

For an individual user, falling for this phishing email can result in:

• Theft of saved and typed passwords, including for email, banking, and social media.
• Exposure of confidential documents, photos, or other sensitive files taken straight from the system.
• Surveillance via periodic screenshots or, where configured, webcam capture.
• Use of the machine as a foothold to attack other devices on the same home or office network.

How to stay safe

Because detection can be hard, it is crucial that users apply certain checks:

• Don’t open email attachments until after verifying, with a trusted source, that they are legitimate.
• Make sure you can see the actual file extensions. Unfortunately, Windows allows users to hide them. So, when in reality the file would be called invoice.pdf.vhd the user would only see invoice.pdf. To find out how to do this, see below.
• Use an up-to-date, real-time anti-malware solution that can detect malware hiding in memory.

Showing file extensions on Windows 10 and 11

To show file extensions in Windows 10 and 11:

• Open Explorer (Windows key + E)
• In Windows 10, select View and check the box for File name extensions.
• In Windows 11, this is found under View > Show > File name extensions.

Alternatively, search for File Explorer Options to uncheck Hide extensions for known file types.

For older versions of Windows, refer to this article.

---

We don’t just report on threats—we remove them

Cybersecurity risks should never spread beyond a headline. Keep threats off your devices by downloading Malwarebytes today.

Cybercriminals behind a campaign dubbed DEAD#VAX are taking phishing one step further by delivering malware inside virtual hard disks that pretend to be ordinary PDF documents. Open the wrong “invoice” or “purchase order” and you won’t see a document at all. Instead, Windows mounts a virtual drive that quietly installs AsyncRAT, a backdoor Trojan that allows attackers to remotely monitor and control your computer.

It’s a remote access tool, which means attackers gain remote hands‑on‑keyboard control, while traditional file‑based defenses see almost nothing suspicious on disk.

From a high-level view, the infection chain is long, but every step looks just legitimate enough on its own to slip past casual checks.

Victims receive phishing emails that look like routine business messages, often referencing purchase orders or invoices and sometimes impersonating real companies. The email doesn’t attach a document directly. Instead, it links to a file hosted on IPFS (InterPlanetary File System), a decentralized storage network increasingly abused in phishing campaigns because content is harder to take down and can be accessed through normal web gateways.

The linked file is named as a PDF and has the PDF icon, but is actually a virtual hard disk (VHD) file. When the user double‑clicks it, Windows mounts it as a new drive (for example, drive E:) instead of opening a document viewer. Mounting VHDs is perfectly legitimate Windows behavior, which makes this step less likely to ring alarm bells.

Inside the mounted drive is what appears to be the expected document, but it’s actually a Windows Script File (WSF). When the user opens it, Windows executes the code in the file instead of displaying a PDF.

After some checks to avoid analysis and detection, the script injects the payload—AsyncRAT shellcode—into trusted, Microsoft‑signed processes such as RuntimeBroker.exe, OneDrive.exe, taskhostw.exe, or sihost.exe. The malware never writes an actual executable file to disk. It lives and runs entirely in memory inside these legitimate processes, making detection and eventually at a later stage, forensics much harder. It also avoids sudden spikes in activity or memory usage that could draw attention.

For an individual user, falling for this phishing email can result in:

• Theft of saved and typed passwords, including for email, banking, and social media.
• Exposure of confidential documents, photos, or other sensitive files taken straight from the system.
• Surveillance via periodic screenshots or, where configured, webcam capture.
• Use of the machine as a foothold to attack other devices on the same home or office network.

How to stay safe

Because detection can be hard, it is crucial that users apply certain checks:

• Don’t open email attachments until after verifying, with a trusted source, that they are legitimate.
• Make sure you can see the actual file extensions. Unfortunately, Windows allows users to hide them. So, when in reality the file would be called invoice.pdf.vhd the user would only see invoice.pdf. To find out how to do this, see below.
• Use an up-to-date, real-time anti-malware solution that can detect malware hiding in memory.

Showing file extensions on Windows 10 and 11

To show file extensions in Windows 10 and 11:

• Open Explorer (Windows key + E)
• In Windows 10, select View and check the box for File name extensions.
• In Windows 11, this is found under View > Show > File name extensions.

Alternatively, search for File Explorer Options to uncheck Hide extensions for known file types.

For older versions of Windows, refer to this article.

---

We don’t just report on threats—we remove them

Cybersecurity risks should never spread beyond a headline. Keep threats off your devices by downloading Malwarebytes today.

Last week we talked about an app that promises users they can make money testing games, or even just by scrolling through TikTok.

Imagine our surprise when we ended up on a site promoting that same Freecash app while investigating a “cloud storage” phish. We’ve all probably seen one of those. They’re common enough and according to recent investigation by BleepingComputer, there’s a

“large-scale cloud storage subscription scam campaign targeting users worldwide with repeated emails falsely warning recipients that their photos, files, and accounts are about to be blocked or deleted due to an alleged payment failure.”

Based on the description in that article, the email we found appears to be part of this campaign.

The subject line of the email is:

“{Recipient}. Your Cloud Account has been locked on Sat, 24 Jan 2026 09:57:55 -0500. Your photos and videos will be removed!”

This matches one of the subject lines that BleepingComputer listed.

And the content of the email:

“Payment Issue – Cloud Storage

Dear User,

We encountered an issue while attempting to renew your Cloud Storage subscription.

Unfortunately, your payment method has expired. To ensure your Cloud continues without interruption, please update your payment details.

Subscription ID: 9371188

Product: Cloud Storage Premium

Expiration Date: Sat,24 Jan-2026

If you do not update your payment information, you may lose access to your Cloud Storage, which may prevent you from saving and syncing your data such as photos, videos, and documents.

Update Payment Details {link button}

Security Recommendations:

• Always access your account through our official website
• Never share your password with anyone
• Ensure your contact and billing information are up to date”

The link in the email leads to  https://storage.googleapis[.]com/qzsdqdqsd/dsfsdxc.html#/redirect.html, which helps the scammer establish a certain amount of trust because it points to Google Cloud Storage (GCS). GCS is a legitimate service that allows authorized users to store and manage data such as files, images, and videos in buckets. However, as in this case, attackers can abuse it for phishing.

The redirect carries some parameters to the next website.

The feed.headquartoonjpn[.]com domain was blocked by Malwarebytes. We’ve seen it before in an earlier campaign involving an Endurance-themed phish.

After a few more redirects, we ended up at hx5.submitloading[.]com, where a fake CAPTCHA triggered the last redirect to freecash[.]com, once it was solved.

The end goal of this phish likely depends on the parameters passed along during the redirects, so results may vary.

Rather than stealing credentials directly, the campaign appears designed to monetize traffic, funneling victims into affiliate offers where the operators get paid for sign-ups or conversions.

BleepingComputer noted that they were redirected to affiliate marketing websites for various products.

“Products promoted in this phishing campaign include VPN services, little-known security software, and other subscription-based offerings with no connection to cloud storage.”

How to stay safe

Ironically, the phishing email itself includes some solid advice:

• Always access your account through our official website.
• Never share your password with anyone.

We’d like to add:

• Never click on links in unsolicited emails without verifying with a trusted source.
• Use an up-to-date, real-time anti-malware solution with a web protection component.
• Do not engage with websites that attract visitors like this.

Pro tip: Malwarebytes Scam Guard would have helped you identify this email as a scam and provided advice on how to proceed.

Redirect flow (IOCs)

storage.googleapis[.]com/qzsdqdqsd/dsfsdxc.html

feed.headquartoonjpn[.]com

revivejudgemental[.]com

hx5.submitloading[.]com

freecash[.]com

Update February 5, 2026

Almedia GmbH, the company behind the Freecash platform, reached out to us for information about the chain of redirects that lead to their platform. And after an investigation they notified us that:

“Following Malwarebytes’ reporting and the additional information they shared with us, we investigated the issue and identified an affiliate operating in breach of our policies. That partner has been removed from our network.

Almedia does not sell user data, and we take compliance, user trust, and responsible advertising seriously.”

---

We don’t just report on scams—we help detect them

Cybersecurity risks should never spread beyond a headline. If something looks dodgy to you, check if it’s a scam using Malwarebytes Scam Guard, a feature of our mobile protection products. Submit a screenshot, paste suspicious content, or share a text or phone number, and we’ll tell you if it’s a scam or legit. Download Malwarebytes Mobile Security for iOS or Android and try it today!

Last week we talked about an app that promises users they can make money testing games, or even just by scrolling through TikTok.

Imagine our surprise when we ended up on a site promoting that same Freecash app while investigating a “cloud storage” phish. We’ve all probably seen one of those. They’re common enough and according to recent investigation by BleepingComputer, there’s a

“large-scale cloud storage subscription scam campaign targeting users worldwide with repeated emails falsely warning recipients that their photos, files, and accounts are about to be blocked or deleted due to an alleged payment failure.”

Based on the description in that article, the email we found appears to be part of this campaign.

The subject line of the email is:

“{Recipient}. Your Cloud Account has been locked on Sat, 24 Jan 2026 09:57:55 -0500. Your photos and videos will be removed!”

This matches one of the subject lines that BleepingComputer listed.

And the content of the email:

“Payment Issue – Cloud Storage

Dear User,

We encountered an issue while attempting to renew your Cloud Storage subscription.

Unfortunately, your payment method has expired. To ensure your Cloud continues without interruption, please update your payment details.

Subscription ID: 9371188

Product: Cloud Storage Premium

Expiration Date: Sat,24 Jan-2026

If you do not update your payment information, you may lose access to your Cloud Storage, which may prevent you from saving and syncing your data such as photos, videos, and documents.

Update Payment Details {link button}

Security Recommendations:

• Always access your account through our official website
• Never share your password with anyone
• Ensure your contact and billing information are up to date”

The link in the email leads to  https://storage.googleapis[.]com/qzsdqdqsd/dsfsdxc.html#/redirect.html, which helps the scammer establish a certain amount of trust because it points to Google Cloud Storage (GCS). GCS is a legitimate service that allows authorized users to store and manage data such as files, images, and videos in buckets. However, as in this case, attackers can abuse it for phishing.

The redirect carries some parameters to the next website.

The feed.headquartoonjpn[.]com domain was blocked by Malwarebytes. We’ve seen it before in an earlier campaign involving an Endurance-themed phish.

After a few more redirects, we ended up at hx5.submitloading[.]com, where a fake CAPTCHA triggered the last redirect to freecash[.]com, once it was solved.

The end goal of this phish likely depends on the parameters passed along during the redirects, so results may vary.

Rather than stealing credentials directly, the campaign appears designed to monetize traffic, funneling victims into affiliate offers where the operators get paid for sign-ups or conversions.

BleepingComputer noted that they were redirected to affiliate marketing websites for various products.

“Products promoted in this phishing campaign include VPN services, little-known security software, and other subscription-based offerings with no connection to cloud storage.”

How to stay safe

Ironically, the phishing email itself includes some solid advice:

• Always access your account through our official website.
• Never share your password with anyone.

We’d like to add:

• Never click on links in unsolicited emails without verifying with a trusted source.
• Use an up-to-date, real-time anti-malware solution with a web protection component.
• Do not engage with websites that attract visitors like this.

Pro tip: Malwarebytes Scam Guard would have helped you identify this email as a scam and provided advice on how to proceed.

Redirect flow (IOCs)

storage.googleapis[.]com/qzsdqdqsd/dsfsdxc.html

feed.headquartoonjpn[.]com

revivejudgemental[.]com

hx5.submitloading[.]com

freecash[.]com

Update February 5, 2026

Almedia GmbH, the company behind the Freecash platform, reached out to us for information about the chain of redirects that lead to their platform. And after an investigation they notified us that:

“Following Malwarebytes’ reporting and the additional information they shared with us, we investigated the issue and identified an affiliate operating in breach of our policies. That partner has been removed from our network.

Almedia does not sell user data, and we take compliance, user trust, and responsible advertising seriously.”

---

We don’t just report on scams—we help detect them

Cybersecurity risks should never spread beyond a headline. If something looks dodgy to you, check if it’s a scam using Malwarebytes Scam Guard, a feature of our mobile protection products. Submit a screenshot, paste suspicious content, or share a text or phone number, and we’ll tell you if it’s a scam or legit. Download Malwarebytes Mobile Security for iOS or Android and try it today!

“You’re invited!” 

It sounds friendly, familiar and quite harmless. But in a scam we recently spotted, that simple phrase is being used to trick victims into installing a full remote access tool on their Windows computers—giving attackers complete control of the system. 

What appears to be a casual party or event invitation leads to the silent installation of ScreenConnect, a legitimate remote support tool quietly installed in the background and abused by attackers. 

Here’s how the scam works, why it’s effective, and how to protect yourself. 

The email: A party invitation 

Victims receive an email framed as a personal invitation—often written to look like it came from a friend or acquaintance. The message is deliberately informal and social, lowering suspicion and encouraging quick action. 

In the screenshot below, the email arrived from a friend whose email account had been hacked, but it could just as easily come from a sender you don’t know.

So far, we’ve only seen this campaign targeting people in the UK, but there’s nothing stopping it from expanding elsewhere. 

Clicking the link in the email leads to a polished invitation page hosted on an attacker-controlled domain. 

The invite: The landing page that leads to an installer 

The landing page leans heavily into the party theme, but instead of showing event details, the page nudges the user toward opening a file. None of them look dangerous on their own, but together they keep the user focused on the “invitation” file: 

• A bold “You’re Invited!” headline 
• The suggestion that a friend had sent the invitation 
• A message saying the invitation is best viewed on a Windows laptop or desktop
• A countdown suggesting your invitation is already “downloading” 
• A message implying urgency and social proof (“I opened mine and it was so easy!”) 

Within seconds, the browser is redirected to download RSVPPartyInvitationCard.msi 

The page even triggers the download automatically to keep the victim moving forward without stopping to think. 

This MSI file isn’t an invitation. It’s an installer. 

The guest: What the MSI actually does 

When the user opens the MSI file, it launches msiexec.exe and silently installs ScreenConnect Client, a legitimate remote access tool often used by IT support teams.  

There’s no invitation, RSVP form, or calendar entry. 

What happens instead: 

• ScreenConnect binaries are installed under C:\Program Files (x86)\ScreenConnect Client\ 
• A persistent Windows service is created (for example, ScreenConnect Client 18d1648b87bb3023) 
• ScreenConnect installs multiple .NET-based components 
• There is no clear user-facing indication that a remote access tool is being installed 

From the victim’s perspective, very little seems to happen. But at this point, the attacker can now remotely access their computer. 

The after-party: Remote access is established 

Once installed, the ScreenConnect client initiates encrypted outbound connections to ScreenConnect’s relay servers, including a uniquely assigned instance domain.

That connection gives the attacker the same level of access as a remote IT technician, including the ability to: 

• See the victim’s screen in real time
• Control the mouse and keyboard 
• Upload or download files 
• Keep access even after the computer is restarted 

Because ScreenConnect is legitimate software commonly used for remote support, its presence isn’t always obvious. On a personal computer, the first signs are often behavioral, such as unexplained cursor movement, windows opening on their own, or a ScreenConnect process the user doesn’t remember installing. 

Why this scam works 

This campaign is effective because it targets normal, predictable human behavior. From a behavioral security standpoint, it exploits our natural curiosity and appears to be a low risk. 

Most people don’t think of invitations as dangerous. Opening one feels passive, like glancing at a flyer or checking a message, not installing software. 

Even security-aware users are trained to watch out for warnings and pressure. A friendly “you’re invited” message doesn’t trigger those alarms. 

By the time something feels off, the software is already installed. 

Signs your computer may be affected 

Watch for: 

• A download or executed file named RSVPPartyInvitationCard.msi 
• An unexpected installation of ScreenConnect Client 
• A Windows service named ScreenConnect Client with random characters  
• Your computer makes outbound HTTPS connections to ScreenConnect relay domains 
• Your system resolves the invitation-hosting domain used in this campaign, xnyr[.]digital 

How to stay safe  

This campaign is a reminder that modern attacks often don’t break in—they’re invited in. Remote access tools give attackers deep control over a system. Acting quickly can limit the damage.  

For individuals 

If you receive an email like this: 

• Be suspicious of invitations that ask you to download or open software 
• Never run MSI files from unsolicited emails 
• Verify invitations through another channel before opening anything 

If you already clicked or ran the file:  

• Disconnect from the internet immediately 
• Check for ScreenConnect and uninstall it if present 
• Run a full security scan 
• Change important passwords from a clean, unaffected device 

For organisations (especially in the UK) 

• Alert on unauthorized ScreenConnect installations
• Restrict MSI execution where feasible 
• Treat “remote support tools” as high-risk software
• Educate users: invitations don’t come as installers 

This scam works by installing a legitimate remote access tool without clear user intent. That’s exactly the gap Malwarebytes is designed to catch.

Malwarebytes now detects newly installed remote access tools and alerts you when one appears on your system. You’re then given a choice: confirm that the tool is expected and trusted, or remove it if it isn’t.

---

We don’t just report on threats—we remove them

Cybersecurity risks should never spread beyond a headline. Keep threats off your devices by downloading Malwarebytes today.

“You’re invited!” 

It sounds friendly, familiar and quite harmless. But in a scam we recently spotted, that simple phrase is being used to trick victims into installing a full remote access tool on their Windows computers—giving attackers complete control of the system. 

What appears to be a casual party or event invitation leads to the silent installation of ScreenConnect, a legitimate remote support tool quietly installed in the background and abused by attackers. 

Here’s how the scam works, why it’s effective, and how to protect yourself. 

The email: A party invitation 

Victims receive an email framed as a personal invitation—often written to look like it came from a friend or acquaintance. The message is deliberately informal and social, lowering suspicion and encouraging quick action. 

In the screenshot below, the email arrived from a friend whose email account had been hacked, but it could just as easily come from a sender you don’t know.

So far, we’ve only seen this campaign targeting people in the UK, but there’s nothing stopping it from expanding elsewhere. 

Clicking the link in the email leads to a polished invitation page hosted on an attacker-controlled domain. 

The invite: The landing page that leads to an installer 

The landing page leans heavily into the party theme, but instead of showing event details, the page nudges the user toward opening a file. None of them look dangerous on their own, but together they keep the user focused on the “invitation” file: 

• A bold “You’re Invited!” headline 
• The suggestion that a friend had sent the invitation 
• A message saying the invitation is best viewed on a Windows laptop or desktop
• A countdown suggesting your invitation is already “downloading” 
• A message implying urgency and social proof (“I opened mine and it was so easy!”) 

Within seconds, the browser is redirected to download RSVPPartyInvitationCard.msi 

The page even triggers the download automatically to keep the victim moving forward without stopping to think. 

This MSI file isn’t an invitation. It’s an installer. 

The guest: What the MSI actually does 

When the user opens the MSI file, it launches msiexec.exe and silently installs ScreenConnect Client, a legitimate remote access tool often used by IT support teams.  

There’s no invitation, RSVP form, or calendar entry. 

What happens instead: 

• ScreenConnect binaries are installed under C:\Program Files (x86)\ScreenConnect Client\ 
• A persistent Windows service is created (for example, ScreenConnect Client 18d1648b87bb3023) 
• ScreenConnect installs multiple .NET-based components 
• There is no clear user-facing indication that a remote access tool is being installed 

From the victim’s perspective, very little seems to happen. But at this point, the attacker can now remotely access their computer. 

The after-party: Remote access is established 

Once installed, the ScreenConnect client initiates encrypted outbound connections to ScreenConnect’s relay servers, including a uniquely assigned instance domain.

That connection gives the attacker the same level of access as a remote IT technician, including the ability to: 

• See the victim’s screen in real time
• Control the mouse and keyboard 
• Upload or download files 
• Keep access even after the computer is restarted 

Because ScreenConnect is legitimate software commonly used for remote support, its presence isn’t always obvious. On a personal computer, the first signs are often behavioral, such as unexplained cursor movement, windows opening on their own, or a ScreenConnect process the user doesn’t remember installing. 

Why this scam works 

This campaign is effective because it targets normal, predictable human behavior. From a behavioral security standpoint, it exploits our natural curiosity and appears to be a low risk. 

Most people don’t think of invitations as dangerous. Opening one feels passive, like glancing at a flyer or checking a message, not installing software. 

Even security-aware users are trained to watch out for warnings and pressure. A friendly “you’re invited” message doesn’t trigger those alarms. 

By the time something feels off, the software is already installed. 

Signs your computer may be affected 

Watch for: 

• A download or executed file named RSVPPartyInvitationCard.msi 
• An unexpected installation of ScreenConnect Client 
• A Windows service named ScreenConnect Client with random characters  
• Your computer makes outbound HTTPS connections to ScreenConnect relay domains 
• Your system resolves the invitation-hosting domain used in this campaign, xnyr[.]digital 

How to stay safe  

This campaign is a reminder that modern attacks often don’t break in—they’re invited in. Remote access tools give attackers deep control over a system. Acting quickly can limit the damage.  

For individuals 

If you receive an email like this: 

• Be suspicious of invitations that ask you to download or open software 
• Never run MSI files from unsolicited emails 
• Verify invitations through another channel before opening anything 

If you already clicked or ran the file:  

• Disconnect from the internet immediately 
• Check for ScreenConnect and uninstall it if present 
• Run a full security scan 
• Change important passwords from a clean, unaffected device 

For organisations (especially in the UK) 

• Alert on unauthorized ScreenConnect installations
• Restrict MSI execution where feasible 
• Treat “remote support tools” as high-risk software
• Educate users: invitations don’t come as installers 

This scam works by installing a legitimate remote access tool without clear user intent. That’s exactly the gap Malwarebytes is designed to catch.

Malwarebytes now detects newly installed remote access tools and alerts you when one appears on your system. You’re then given a choice: confirm that the tool is expected and trusted, or remove it if it isn’t.

---

We don’t just report on threats—we remove them

Cybersecurity risks should never spread beyond a headline. Keep threats off your devices by downloading Malwarebytes today.

After the viral AI assistant Clawdbot was forced to rename to Moltbot due to a trademark dispute, opportunists moved quickly. Within days, typosquat domains and a cloned GitHub repository appeared—impersonating the project’s creator and positioning infrastructure for a potential supply-chain attack.

The code is clean. The infrastructure is not. With the GitHub downloads and star rating rapidly rising, we took a deep dive into how fake domains target viral open source projects.

The background: Why was Clawdbot renamed?

In early 2026, Peter Steinberger’s Clawdbot became one of the fastest-growing open source projects on GitHub. The self-hosted assistant—described as “Claude with hands”—allowed users to control their computer through WhatsApp, Telegram, Discord, and similar platforms.

Anthropic later objected to the name. Steinberger complied and rebranded the project to Moltbot (“molt” being what lobsters do when they shed their shell).

During the rename, both the GitHub organization and X (formerly Twitter) handle were briefly released before being reclaimed. Attackers monitoring the transition grabbed them within seconds.

“Had to rename our accounts for trademark stuff and messed up the GitHub rename and the X rename got snatched by crypto shills.” — Peter Steinberger

That brief gap was enough.

Impersonation infrastructure emerged

While investigating a suspicious repository, I uncovered a coordinated set of assets designed to impersonate Moltbot.

Domains

• moltbot[.]you
• clawbot[.]ai
• clawdbot[.]you

Repository

• github[.]com/gstarwd/clawbot — a cloned repository using a typosquatted variant of the former Clawdbot project name

Website

A polished marketing site featuring:

• professional design closely matching the real project
• SEO optimization and structured metadata
• download buttons, tutorials, and FAQs
• claims of 61,500+ GitHub stars lifted from the real repository

Evidence of impersonation

False attribution: The site’s schema.org metadata falsely claims authorship by Peter Steinberger, linking directly to his real GitHub and X profiles. This is explicit identity misrepresentation.

Misdirection to an unauthorized repository: “View on GitHub” links send users to gstarwd/clawbot, not the official moltbot/moltbot repository.

Stolen credibility:The site prominently advertises tens of thousands of stars that belong to the real project. The clone has virtually none (although at the time of writing, that number is steadily rising).

Mixing legitimate and fraudulent links: Some links point to real assets, such as official documentation or legitimate binaries. Others redirect to impersonation infrastructure. This selective legitimacy defeats casual verification and appears deliberate.

Full SEO optimization: Canonical tags, Open Graph metadata, Twitter cards, and analytics are all present—clearly intended to rank the impersonation site ahead of legitimate project resources.

The ironic security warning: The impersonation site even warns users about scams involving fake cryptocurrency tokens—while itself impersonating the project.

---

Code analysis: Clean by design

I performed a static audit of the gstarwd/clawbot repository:

• no malicious npm scripts
• no credential exfiltration
• no obfuscation or payload staging
• no cryptomining
• no suspicious network activity

The code is functionally identical to the legitimate project, which is not reassuring.

The threat model

The absence of malware is the strategy. Nothing here suggests an opportunistic malware campaign. Instead, the setup points to early preparation for a supply-chain attack.

The likely chain of events:

A user searches for “clawbot GitHub” or “moltbot download” and finds moltbot[.]you or gstarwd/clawbot.

The code looks legitimate and passes a security audit.

The user installs the project and configures it, adding API keys and messaging tokens. Trust is established.

At a later point, a routine update is pulled through npm update or git pull. A malicious payload is delivered into an installation the user already trusts.

An attacker can then harvest:

• Anthropic API keys
• OpenAI API keys
• WhatsApp session credentials
• Telegram bot tokens
• Discord OAuth tokens
• Slack credentials
• Signal identity keys
• full conversation histories
• command execution access on the compromised machine

What’s malicious, and what isn’t

Clearly malicious

• false attribution to a real individual
• misrepresentation of popularity metrics
• deliberate redirection to an unauthorized repository

Deceptive but not yet malware

• typosquat domains
• SEO manipulation
• cloned repositories with clean code

Not present (yet)

• active malware
• data exfiltration
• cryptomining

Clean code today lowers suspicion tomorrow.

A familiar pattern

This follows a well-known pattern in open source supply-chain attacks.

A user searches for a popular project and lands on a convincing-looking site or cloned repository. The code appears legitimate and passes a security audit.

They install the project and configure it, adding API keys or messaging tokens so it can work as intended. Trust is established.

Later, a routine update arrives through a standard npm update or git pull. That update introduces a malicious payload into an installation the user already trusts.

From there, an attacker can harvest credentials, conversation data, and potentially execute commands on the compromised system.

No exploit is required. The entire chain relies on trust rather than technical vulnerabilities.

How to stay safe

Impersonation infrastructure like this is designed to look legitimate long before anything malicious appears. By the time a harmful update arrives—if it arrives at all—the software may already be widely installed and trusted.

That’s why basic source verification still matters, especially when popular projects rename or move quickly.

Advice for users

• Verify GitHub organization ownership
• Bookmark official repositories directly
• Treat renamed projects as higher risk during transitions

Advice for maintainers

• Pre-register likely typosquat domains before public renames
• Coordinate renames and handle changes carefully
• Monitor for cloned repositories and impersonation sites

Pro tip: Malwarebytes customers are protected. Malwarebytes is actively blocking all known indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with this impersonation infrastructure, preventing users from accessing the fraudulent domains and related assets identified in this investigation.

---

We don’t just report on threats—we remove them

Cybersecurity risks should never spread beyond a headline. Keep threats off your devices by downloading Malwarebytes today.

After the viral AI assistant Clawdbot was forced to rename to Moltbot due to a trademark dispute, opportunists moved quickly. Within days, typosquat domains and a cloned GitHub repository appeared—impersonating the project’s creator and positioning infrastructure for a potential supply-chain attack.

The code is clean. The infrastructure is not. With the GitHub downloads and star rating rapidly rising, we took a deep dive into how fake domains target viral open source projects.

The background: Why was Clawdbot renamed?

In early 2026, Peter Steinberger’s Clawdbot became one of the fastest-growing open source projects on GitHub. The self-hosted assistant—described as “Claude with hands”—allowed users to control their computer through WhatsApp, Telegram, Discord, and similar platforms.

Anthropic later objected to the name. Steinberger complied and rebranded the project to Moltbot (“molt” being what lobsters do when they shed their shell).

During the rename, both the GitHub organization and X (formerly Twitter) handle were briefly released before being reclaimed. Attackers monitoring the transition grabbed them within seconds.

“Had to rename our accounts for trademark stuff and messed up the GitHub rename and the X rename got snatched by crypto shills.” — Peter Steinberger

That brief gap was enough.

Impersonation infrastructure emerged

While investigating a suspicious repository, I uncovered a coordinated set of assets designed to impersonate Moltbot.

Domains

• moltbot[.]you
• clawbot[.]ai
• clawdbot[.]you

Repository

• github[.]com/gstarwd/clawbot — a cloned repository using a typosquatted variant of the former Clawdbot project name

Website

A polished marketing site featuring:

• professional design closely matching the real project
• SEO optimization and structured metadata
• download buttons, tutorials, and FAQs
• claims of 61,500+ GitHub stars lifted from the real repository

Evidence of impersonation

False attribution: The site’s schema.org metadata falsely claims authorship by Peter Steinberger, linking directly to his real GitHub and X profiles. This is explicit identity misrepresentation.

Misdirection to an unauthorized repository: “View on GitHub” links send users to gstarwd/clawbot, not the official moltbot/moltbot repository.

Stolen credibility:The site prominently advertises tens of thousands of stars that belong to the real project. The clone has virtually none (although at the time of writing, that number is steadily rising).

Mixing legitimate and fraudulent links: Some links point to real assets, such as official documentation or legitimate binaries. Others redirect to impersonation infrastructure. This selective legitimacy defeats casual verification and appears deliberate.

Full SEO optimization: Canonical tags, Open Graph metadata, Twitter cards, and analytics are all present—clearly intended to rank the impersonation site ahead of legitimate project resources.

The ironic security warning: The impersonation site even warns users about scams involving fake cryptocurrency tokens—while itself impersonating the project.

---

Code analysis: Clean by design

I performed a static audit of the gstarwd/clawbot repository:

• no malicious npm scripts
• no credential exfiltration
• no obfuscation or payload staging
• no cryptomining
• no suspicious network activity

The code is functionally identical to the legitimate project, which is not reassuring.

The threat model

The absence of malware is the strategy. Nothing here suggests an opportunistic malware campaign. Instead, the setup points to early preparation for a supply-chain attack.

The likely chain of events:

A user searches for “clawbot GitHub” or “moltbot download” and finds moltbot[.]you or gstarwd/clawbot.

The code looks legitimate and passes a security audit.

The user installs the project and configures it, adding API keys and messaging tokens. Trust is established.

At a later point, a routine update is pulled through npm update or git pull. A malicious payload is delivered into an installation the user already trusts.

An attacker can then harvest:

• Anthropic API keys
• OpenAI API keys
• WhatsApp session credentials
• Telegram bot tokens
• Discord OAuth tokens
• Slack credentials
• Signal identity keys
• full conversation histories
• command execution access on the compromised machine

What’s malicious, and what isn’t

Clearly malicious

• false attribution to a real individual
• misrepresentation of popularity metrics
• deliberate redirection to an unauthorized repository

Deceptive but not yet malware

• typosquat domains
• SEO manipulation
• cloned repositories with clean code

Not present (yet)

• active malware
• data exfiltration
• cryptomining

Clean code today lowers suspicion tomorrow.

A familiar pattern

This follows a well-known pattern in open source supply-chain attacks.

A user searches for a popular project and lands on a convincing-looking site or cloned repository. The code appears legitimate and passes a security audit.

They install the project and configure it, adding API keys or messaging tokens so it can work as intended. Trust is established.

Later, a routine update arrives through a standard npm update or git pull. That update introduces a malicious payload into an installation the user already trusts.

From there, an attacker can harvest credentials, conversation data, and potentially execute commands on the compromised system.

No exploit is required. The entire chain relies on trust rather than technical vulnerabilities.

How to stay safe

Impersonation infrastructure like this is designed to look legitimate long before anything malicious appears. By the time a harmful update arrives—if it arrives at all—the software may already be widely installed and trusted.

That’s why basic source verification still matters, especially when popular projects rename or move quickly.

Advice for users

• Verify GitHub organization ownership
• Bookmark official repositories directly
• Treat renamed projects as higher risk during transitions

Advice for maintainers

• Pre-register likely typosquat domains before public renames
• Coordinate renames and handle changes carefully
• Monitor for cloned repositories and impersonation sites

Pro tip: Malwarebytes customers are protected. Malwarebytes is actively blocking all known indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with this impersonation infrastructure, preventing users from accessing the fraudulent domains and related assets identified in this investigation.

---

We don’t just report on threats—we remove them

Cybersecurity risks should never spread beyond a headline. Keep threats off your devices by downloading Malwarebytes today.