The cybercriminals in control of Kimwolf — a disruptive botnet that has infected more than 2 million devices — recently shared a screenshot indicating they’d compromised the control panel for Badbox 2.0, a vast China-based botnet powered by malicious software that comes pre-installed on many Android TV streaming boxes. Both the FBI and Google say they are hunting for the people behind Badbox 2.0, and thanks to bragging by the Kimwolf botmasters we may now have a much clearer idea about that.

Our first story of 2026, The Kimwolf Botnet is Stalking Your Local Network, detailed the unique and highly invasive methods Kimwolf uses to spread. The story warned that the vast majority of Kimwolf infected systems were unofficial Android TV boxes that are typically marketed as a way to watch unlimited (pirated) movie and TV streaming services for a one-time fee.

Our January 8 story, Who Benefitted from the Aisuru and Kimwolf Botnets?, cited multiple sources saying the current administrators of Kimwolf went by the nicknames “Dort” and “Snow.” Earlier this month, a close former associate of Dort and Snow shared what they said was a screenshot the Kimwolf botmasters had taken while logged in to the Badbox 2.0 botnet control panel.

That screenshot, a portion of which is shown below, shows seven authorized users of the control panel, including one that doesn’t quite match the others: According to my source, the account “ABCD” (the one that is logged in and listed in the top right of the screenshot) belongs to Dort, who somehow figured out how to add their email address as a valid user of the Badbox 2.0 botnet.

Badbox has a storied history that well predates Kimwolf’s rise in October 2025. In July 2025, Google filed a “John Doe” lawsuit (PDF) against 25 unidentified defendants accused of operating Badbox 2.0, which Google described as a botnet of over ten million unsanctioned Android streaming devices engaged in advertising fraud. Google said Badbox 2.0, in addition to compromising multiple types of devices prior to purchase, also can infect devices by requiring the download of malicious apps from unofficial marketplaces.

Google’s lawsuit came on the heels of a June 2025 advisory from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), which warned that cyber criminals were gaining unauthorized access to home networks by either configuring the products with malware prior to the user’s purchase, or infecting the device as it downloads required applications that contain backdoors — usually during the set-up process.

The FBI said Badbox 2.0 was discovered after the original Badbox campaign was disrupted in 2024. The original Badbox was identified in 2023, and primarily consisted of Android operating system devices (TV boxes) that were compromised with backdoor malware prior to purchase.

KrebsOnSecurity was initially skeptical of the claim that the Kimwolf botmasters had hacked the Badbox 2.0 botnet. That is, until we began digging into the history of the qq.com email addresses in the screenshot above.

CATHEAD

An online search for the address 34557257@qq.com (pictured in the screenshot above as the user “Chen“) shows it is listed as a point of contact for a number of China-based technology companies, including:

–Beijing Hong Dake Wang Science & Technology Co Ltd.
–Beijing Hengchuang Vision Mobile Media Technology Co. Ltd.
–Moxin Beijing Science and Technology Co. Ltd.

The website for Beijing Hong Dake Wang Science is asmeisvip[.]net, a domain that was flagged in a March 2025 report by HUMAN Security as one of several dozen sites tied to the distribution and management of the Badbox 2.0 botnet. Ditto for moyix[.]com, a domain associated with Beijing Hengchuang Vision Mobile.

A search at the breach tracking service Constella Intelligence finds 34557257@qq.com at one point used the password “cdh76111.” Pivoting on that password in Constella shows it is known to have been used by just two other email accounts: daihaic@gmail.com and cathead@gmail.com.

Constella found cathead@gmail.com registered an account at jd.com (China’s largest online retailer) in 2021 under the name “陈代海,” which translates to “Chen Daihai.” According to DomainTools.com, the name Chen Daihai is present in the original registration records (2008) for moyix[.]com, along with the email address cathead@astrolink[.]cn.

Incidentally, astrolink[.]cn also is among the Badbox 2.0 domains identified in HUMAN Security’s 2025 report. DomainTools finds cathead@astrolink[.]cn was used to register more than a dozen domains, including vmud[.]net, yet another Badbox 2.0 domain tagged by HUMAN Security.

XAVIER

A cached copy of astrolink[.]cn preserved at archive.org shows the website belongs to a mobile app development company whose full name is Beijing Astrolink Wireless Digital Technology Co. Ltd. The archived website reveals a “Contact Us” page that lists a Chen Daihai as part of the company’s technology department. The other person featured on that contact page is Zhu Zhiyu, and their email address is listed as xavier@astrolink[.]cn.

Astute readers will notice that the user Mr.Zhu in the Badbox 2.0 panel used the email address xavierzhu@qq.com. Searching this address in Constella reveals a jd.com account registered in the name of Zhu Zhiyu. A rather unique password used by this account matches the password used by the address xavierzhu@gmail.com, which DomainTools finds was the original registrant of astrolink[.]cn.

ADMIN

The very first account listed in the Badbox 2.0 panel — “admin,” registered in November 2020 — used the email address 189308024@qq.com. DomainTools shows this email is found in the 2022 registration records for the domain guilincloud[.]cn, which includes the registrant name “Huang Guilin.”

Constella finds 189308024@qq.com is associated with the China phone number 18681627767. The open-source intelligence platform osint.industries reveals this phone number is connected to a Microsoft profile created in 2014 under the name Guilin Huang (桂林 黄). The cyber intelligence platform Spycloud says that phone number was used in 2017 to create an account at the Chinese social media platform Weibo under the username “h_guilin.”

The remaining three users and corresponding qq.com email addresses were all connected to individuals in China. However, none of them (nor Mr. Huang) had any apparent connection to the entities created and operated by Chen Daihai and Zhu Zhiyu — or to any corporate entities for that matter. Also, none of these individuals responded to requests for comment.

The mind map below includes search pivots on the email addresses, company names and phone numbers that suggest a connection between Chen Daihai, Zhu Zhiyu, and Badbox 2.0.

UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS

The idea that the Kimwolf botmasters could have direct access to the Badbox 2.0 botnet is a big deal, but explaining exactly why that is requires some background on how Kimwolf spreads to new devices. The botmasters figured out they could trick residential proxy services into relaying malicious commands to vulnerable devices behind the firewall on the unsuspecting user’s local network.

The vulnerable systems sought out by Kimwolf are primarily Internet of Things (IoT) devices like unsanctioned Android TV boxes and digital photo frames that have no discernible security or authentication built-in. Put simply, if you can communicate with these devices, you can compromise them with a single command.

Our January 2 story featured research from the proxy-tracking firm Synthient, which alerted 11 different residential proxy providers that their proxy endpoints were vulnerable to being abused for this kind of local network probing and exploitation.

Most of those vulnerable proxy providers have since taken steps to prevent customers from going upstream into the local networks of residential proxy endpoints, and it appeared that Kimwolf would no longer be able to quickly spread to millions of devices simply by exploiting some residential proxy provider.

However, the source of that Badbox 2.0 screenshot said the Kimwolf botmasters had an ace up their sleeve the whole time: Secret access to the Badbox 2.0 botnet control panel.

“Dort has gotten unauthorized access,” the source said. “So, what happened is normal proxy providers patched this. But Badbox doesn’t sell proxies by itself, so it’s not patched. And as long as Dort has access to Badbox, they would be able to load” the Kimwolf malware directly onto TV boxes associated with Badbox 2.0.

The source said it isn’t clear how Dort gained access to the Badbox botnet panel. But it’s unlikely that Dort’s existing account will persist for much longer: All of our notifications to the qq.com email addresses listed in the control panel screenshot received a copy of that image, as well as questions about the apparently rogue ABCD account.

The CNAPP company will use the fresh investment to scale its runtime-first cloud security offering across data, AI and code.

The post Upwind Raises $250 Million at $1.5 Billion Valuation appeared first on SecurityWeek.

TikTok has finalized a deal to create a new American entity, avoiding the looming threat of a ban in the United States.

The post TikTok Finalizes a Deal to Form a New American Entity appeared first on SecurityWeek.

Really interesting blog post from Anthropic:

In a recent evaluation of AI models’ cyber capabilities, current Claude models can now succeed at multistage attacks on networks with dozens of hosts using only standard, open-source tools, instead of the custom tools needed by previous generations. This illustrates how barriers to the use of AI in relatively autonomous cyber workflows are rapidly coming down, and highlights the importance of security fundamentals like promptly patching known vulnerabilities.

[…]

A notable development during the testing of Claude Sonnet 4.5 is that the model can now succeed on a minority of the networks without the custom cyber toolkit needed by previous generations. In particular, Sonnet 4.5 can now exfiltrate all of the (simulated) personal information in a high-fidelity simulation of the Equifax data breach—­one of the costliest cyber attacks in history—­using only a Bash shell on a widely-available Kali Linux host (standard, open-source tools for penetration testing; not a custom toolkit). Sonnet 4.5 accomplishes this by instantly recognizing a publicized CVE and writing code to exploit it without needing to look it up or iterate on it. Recalling that the original Equifax breach happened by exploiting a publicized CVE that had not yet been patched, the prospect of highly competent and fast AI agents leveraging this approach underscores the pressing need for security best practices like prompt updates and patches.

Read the whole thing. Automatic exploitation will be a major change in cybersecurity. And things are happening fast. There have been significant developments since I wrote this in October.

Cyber security is often framed as a problem for enterprises, governments, and seasoned professionals. But by the time organizations begin searching for talent, the damage has often already been done. Threat actors don’t wait for workforce pipelines to catch up and our approach to cyber security education shouldn’t either. Today’s digital threats target schools, hospitals, municipalities, and small businesses just as aggressively as large enterprises. Ransomware attacks shut down classrooms. Phishing campaigns exploit young users as easily as experienced employees. Yet cyber security education is still treated as a late-stage specialization, introduced only when individuals enter the workforce or pursue […]

The post Building Cyber Readiness Early: Why Youth Education Is a Security Necessity appeared first on Check Point Blog.

The exploitation of the authentication bypass vulnerability started two days after patches were released.

The post Fresh SmarterMail Flaw Exploited for Admin Access appeared first on SecurityWeek.

How Ripley's Fight for Survival Became My Blueprint for SOC Transformation

I'll admit it. I wasn't planning to rewatch science fiction horror films when I sat down to write about modern cybersecurity challenges. But there I was, staring at yet another draft about SOC modernization when our content team threw out a wild idea: What if we explained threat actors through the lens of a Science Fiction movie like Alien?

Yo, Hicks. I think we got something here!

Against my better judgment, I queued up the original 1979 film. Somewhere between the chest-burster scene and Ripley's desperate attempt to purge the Nostromo's systems, it hit me: This crew had every problem a modern security operations center faces daily.

Stay with me here.

The Unknown Threat Aboard Your Ship

In the original Alien, the crew of the Nostromo responds to what they think is a distress signal. Spoiler alert: It's not. By the time they realize they've brought something deadly aboard, it's already loose in the ship's ventilation system, moving freely through areas they can't monitor.

Sound familiar? That's exactly how modern breaches unfold. Threat actors don't announce themselves with flashing lights and alarm bells. They exploit a vulnerability, establish a foothold, and move laterally through your environment while remaining undetected. According to recent Unit 42^® research, the mean time to exfiltrate has dropped from nine days in 2021 to just two days in 2023. Some incidents now occur in under 30 minutes. The xenomorph's (the alien’s) rapid lifecycle has nothing on modern ransomware operators.

The Nostromo crew's problem wasn't just the alien. It was that their ship's systems couldn't tell them where the threat actually was. Their motion trackers picked up movement, but couldn't distinguish between crew members, the cat or the xenomorph. Legacy SIEM systems have the same problem, generating thousands of alerts without the context to determine which ones represent actual threats.

"I Can't Lie About Your Chances, But You Have My Sympathies"

One of the most chilling moments in Alien comes when Ash, the science officer, reveals he's actually a synthetic programmed by the company to prioritize retrieving the alien specimen over crew survival. "I can't lie to you about your chances, but... you have my sympathies."

This is what alert fatigue feels like in a modern SOC.

Security teams face an overwhelming reality:

• Managing up to 45 different security tools on average.
• Coordinating responses across approximately 19 different consoles.
• Processing thousands of alerts daily, most of which are false positives.
• 66% of organizations use 25 or fewer security products yet still struggle with complexity.

Like the Nostromo crew discovering their systems were working against them, security analysts often find their tools generate more noise than signal. Traditional SIEMs bombard teams with redundant alerts while real threats slip through undetected. Analysts spend their days triaging false positives instead of hunting actual threats. Basically, they’re sorting through motion tracker pings while the xenomorph stalks the corridors.

The Company Knew (And Your Attack Surface Knows Too)

From Aliens (the 1986 sequel), we learn that the Weyland-Yutani Corporation knew about the xenomorph threat all along. They had information about LV-426, but that intelligence never reached the colonists who needed it. The result? An entire colony was lost because critical threat intelligence wasn't properly shared and acted upon.

This is the attack surface management problem in a nutshell.

You can't protect what you can't see. Like the colonial marines arriving at LV-426 with incomplete intelligence, security teams often lack comprehensive visibility across their cloud environments, hybrid infrastructures and sprawling IoT deployments.

Modern attack surface management addresses this:

• Providing continuous assessment of your external attack surface.
• Identifying abandoned, rogue or misconfigured assets before attackers find them.
• Monitoring for vulnerable systems proactively.
• Unifying visibility across network, endpoint, cloud and identity.

Think of it as having the schematics and sensor data Ripley desperately needed – a complete picture of where threats could hide and how they might move through your environment.

The Power Loader Moment: Amplifying Human Response with Automation

In the climactic scene of Aliens, Ripley straps into a power loader exosuit to fight the alien queen. She's still human, still making the decisions, but now she's augmented with technology that amplifies her capabilities and response speed.

This is exactly what AI-driven security operations should do.

Legacy SIEM is like facing the xenomorph queen with your bare hands. Modern AI-driven platforms are the power loader, they don't replace the human operator, but they dramatically amplify what that human can accomplish.

Platforms like Cortex XSIAM^® can process over 1 million events per second while reducing the number of incidents requiring human investigation to single digits per day. The technology handles the heavy lifting:

• Automated data integration and normalization across all security tools
• Machine learning models that detect anomalies in user behavior
• Intelligent alert correlation that groups related events into single incidents
• Automated response workflows that contain threats in minutes, not hours

Organizations using AI-driven SOC platforms report automating up to 98% of Tier 1 operations. Your analysts still make the critical decisions, they're just equipped with vastly better tools to execute those decisions at machine speed.

The Danger of Fragmented Systems

Throughout the Alien franchise, crew members are constantly struggling with fragmented information. The motion tracker shows movement, but not identity. The door controls are on a different system than life support. Communications are spotty. When seconds count, they're wasting precious time switching between systems and trying to piece together incomplete information.

This is the daily reality in most security operations centers.

The same attack generates alerts in multiple interfaces: your SIEM, EDR console, cloud security platform, identity provider. It’s like seeing the xenomorph's tail in one system, hearing its hiss in another, and detecting acid blood in a third, but never getting the full picture until it's too late.

The engineering challenge isn't just buying better sensors. It's creating a unified data foundation where security-relevant information is collected, stored and normalized together. When all your security data lives in a single data lake, AI models can recognize patterns that would never surface in siloed systems. It’s like understanding that the motion tracker ping, the door malfunctioning and the broken steam pipe are all connected to the same threat.

What this unified approach enables:

• Cross-data analytics that correlate threats across different data sources.
• Complete context of an attack from initial entry to lateral movement.
• Automated response that addresses root causes, not just symptoms.
• Seamless collaboration between SOC analysts, threat hunters and incident responders.

"Nuke It From Orbit! It's the Only Way to Be Sure"

In Aliens, the solution to an overwhelming infestation is drastic: orbital bombardment. While we don't recommend that approach for cybersecurity (your compliance team will object), there's a lesson here about the importance of decisive, automated response.

When the colonial marines discover the scope of the xenomorph infestation, their problem isn't just detection, it's that their response capabilities can't match the threat's speed and scale. By the time they've cleared one corridor, the aliens have flanked them through the ceiling.

Modern threats move at similar speeds. Attackers can pivot from initial compromise to data exfiltration faster than human analysts can investigate and coordinate responses across multiple tools. This is where automation becomes essential, not as a replacement for human judgment, but as the mechanism that executes decisions at the speed threats actually move.

The key is having the right response capabilities:

• Fast enough to outpace attacker movement.
• Comprehensive enough to address root causes.
• Automated enough to execute without human bottlenecks.
• Intelligent enough to avoid collateral damage.

You don't need to nuke your network from orbit. You need response automation that contains threats before they spread.

The Survivor (And Why Human Expertise Still Matters)

Ellen Ripley survives the Alien franchise through a combination of factors: technical competence, situational awareness, decisive action and refusal to give up. But here's what's critical. She's effective not because she's superhuman, but because she's highly trained, learns from experience, and adapts her approach as threats evolve.

The same principles apply to security operations.

AI and automation dramatically improve efficiency and response times, but skilled security professionals remain essential. The goal isn't to replace analysts. It's to free them from repetitive tasks so they can focus on what humans do best: creative problem-solving, threat hunting, strategic thinking.

The cybersecurity labor shortage continues to grow, and analysts experience burnout from manual processes that consume time better spent on high-value activities. Modern platforms address this by automating routine work while augmenting human decision-making. Instead of spending hours manually correlating events and switching between consoles, analysts receive high-fidelity incidents with complete context.

Ripley didn't survive because she had the best equipment (though the power loader helped). She survived because she understood the threat, adapted her tactics, and made smart decisions under pressure. Your security team needs the same combination: World-class tools that amplify their capabilities and free them to do the strategic thinking that actually stops sophisticated threats.

What Ripley Would Do With Modern SecOps

Imagine what the Nostromo crew could have done if they had access to modern security operations technology:

• Detected the alien's presence immediately through behavioral analytics instead of relying on motion trackers.
• Tracked its movement through integrated sensor data across the entire ship.
• Automatically sealed compartments and adjusted life support to contain the threat.
• Had complete visibility into every system, eliminating hiding spots and blind spots.

Your organization shouldn't face threats with 1970s technology while attackers use 2025 capabilities. The evolution from traditional log management to AI-driven security operations isn't just about buying new tools. It's about fundamentally transforming how your security team operates, moving from reactive alert management to proactive threat hunting, from fragmented tools to unified platforms, from manual response to intelligent automation.

The xenomorph was a perfect organism: efficient, deadly, focused solely on survival and reproduction. Modern threat actors are similarly evolved, using AI and automation to attack at machine speed. Your defenses need to match that evolution.

In Space, No One Can Hear You Scream, But Your SOC Platform Can

Modern security operations require more than collecting logs and hoping someone notices the anomalies. You need unified visibility, AI-driven analytics and automated response capabilities that can keep pace with threats that move at the speed of code.

Whether you're drowning in alerts, struggling with tool sprawl, or trying to defend against attackers moving faster than human reaction times, there's a better way forward. And unlike the Nostromo crew, you don't have to face it alone with outdated equipment and fragmented systems.

Just comprehensive security, delivered at the speed of AI.

Because in cybersecurity, everyone can hear you scream when your SIEM fails. The question is whether your security operations platform can stop the threat before it gets that far.

Take the Next Step

If you're ready to move from fragmented tools to unified security operations, download our whitepaper, Endpoint First: Charting the Course to AI-Driven Security Operations to break down the practical steps to get there.

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Key Takeaways

1. Stop Drowning in Alerts (AKA: Your SIEM Shouldn't Feel Like a Motion Tracker): Legacy Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) systems generate thousands of alerts without the necessary context. The modern approach requires moving past redundant alerts to a system that can accurately distinguish between noise and actual threats, a necessity driven by the rapidly decreasing time attackers take to exfiltrate data.
2. Get the Full Ship Schematics (Because You Can't Fight What You Can't See): Many organizations lack comprehensive visibility across their environments (cloud, hybrid, IoT). A unified approach, which includes continuous attack surface management and a single data foundation, is essential to connect disparate alerts and gain a complete picture of an attack across all security tools.
3. Give Your Analysts a Power Loader (Not a Pink Slip): AI-driven security operations (SecOps) platforms do not replace human analysts but dramatically amplify their capabilities and response speed, enabling automated data integration, intelligent alert correlation and rapid response workflows to contain threats at "machine speed" before human bottlenecks are reached.

The post What the Alien Franchise Taught Me About Cybersecurity appeared first on Palo Alto Networks Blog.

A team of researchers from the Graz University of Technology in Austria has revived page Linux page cache attacks.

The post Old Attack, New Speed: Researchers Optimize Page Cache Exploits appeared first on SecurityWeek.

See how modern AI-driven detection can block sophisticated attacks that traditional tools miss

The post Webinar Today: Rethinking Email Security for Mid-Sized Organizations appeared first on SecurityWeek.

Overview This report describes a phishing campaign in which attackers abuse Microsoft Teams functionality to distribute phishing content that appears to originate from legitimate Microsoft services. The attack leverages guest invitations and phishing-themed team names to impersonate billing and subscription notifications, encouraging victims to contact a fraudulent support phone number. Campaign scale Total phishing messages: 12,866 Daily average: 990 Affected customers: 6,135 Method of attack The attacker begins by creating a new team in Microsoft Teams and assigning it a malicious, finance-themed name designed to resemble an urgent billing or subscription notice. An example of the naming pattern observed includes […]

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