First discovered in April 2026, CastleStealer is a C#-based information-stealing malware that has continued to add new capabilities since its emergence. Newer samples analyzed by Flashpoint can bypass app-bound encryption in Chromium-based browsers, execute commands remotely, and exfiltrate stolen information in small encrypted transmissions rather than a single large archive.

While Flashpoint has not yet identified a large influx of threat actors using CastleStealer, its continued development makes it an emerging threat worth watching. 

What We Know About CastleStealer

CastleStealer was first publicly identified in April 2026, when it was observed using ClickFix social engineering to deliver a Python script that executed a loader referred to as “CastleLoader.”

By June, the malware had appeared in a different distribution campaign. Threat actors used malicious advertisements to direct victims to fake Node.js installation websites, where a batch script masquerading as an installer ultimately downloaded and executed a newer loader known as OXLOADER.

OXLOADER employs several techniques designed to make analysis and detection more difficult, including multiple rounds of self-decryption, obfuscated API resolution, sandbox checks, and in-memory execution. Flashpoint analysts assess that the loaders used to deliver CastleStealer appear to be developed in-house and demonstrate significant technical ability around anti-analysis and stealth. 

But the delivery chain is only one part of CastleStealer’s evolution. Newer samples show that the infostealer itself has continued to expand what it can collect and what threat actors can do after a system is compromised.

What Data Does CastleStealer Target?

Once executed, CastleStealer first checks the system’s Multilingual User Interface (MUI) languages for Russian (ru-RU). It then connects to its command-and-control (C2) infrastructure and sends a handshake packet containing its build UUID and basic information about the infected host. After establishing the connection, it gathers additional information about the victim machine and sends it to the C2. 

From there, CastleStealer begins searching for sensitive information across browsers, applications, and files on the victim’s system.

For Chromium-based browsers, CastleStealer collects login data, cookies, browsing history, web data, and information stored by browser extensions. That includes extension IDs, IndexedDB data, and extension storage. 

The malware also targets:

• Firefox: Login data, cookies, browsing history, and form history.
• Steam: Files including config.vdf, loginusers.vdf, and local.vdf, which can contain sensitive account information and settings.
• Discord and Telegram: CastleStealer searches APPDATA for directories associated with both applications.
• Files on the victim system: The malware broadly collects files while excluding several file types and files containing “backup.” It places particular emphasis on files containing “wallet” in their names.

That browser targeting has also become more capable since CastleStealer was first discovered.

Bypassing App-Bound Encryption

One of the clearest examples of CastleStealer’s evolution is its ability to target data protected by newer browser security controls.

Earlier analysis found that CastleStealer could not steal data from updated browsers using app-bound encryption. Newer samples analyzed by Flashpoint now use Chrome’s IElevator COM interface to bypass that protection, a technique also used by other modern infostealers.

The change closes a meaningful limitation present in earlier CastleStealer samples and expands the browser data available to the malware.

From Infostealer to Remote Access

Newer CastleStealer samples also give threat actors capabilities beyond stealing information from an infected machine.

CastleStealer contains basic remote shell functionality that allows an operator to send a shell command to the victim system, provide a file for execution, or send the URL of another payload that CastleStealer will download and execute. 

That capability gives an attacker additional options after the initial compromise. Instead of ending the operation once targeted information has been collected, an operator can interact with the infected system and introduce additional payloads.

How CastleStealer Exfiltrates Stolen Data

CastleStealer also differs from many other infostealers in how it sends stolen information back to its operators.

Rather than collecting stolen data into an archive and transmitting it to a C2 server or Telegram channel, CastleStealer sends smaller amounts of collected data over raw TCP. The transmissions are encrypted using AES.

Flashpoint analysts assess that transmitting data this way may help CastleStealer avoid network detections associated with a single spike caused by a large data transfer. 

The network packets follow a straightforward structure:

{4-byte size} → {AES IV} → {Encrypted Data}

Once CastleStealer completes its activity, it deletes itself using a common ping-delay self-deletion technique.

Protect Against Emerging Infostealers Using Flashpoint

CastleStealer’s development since its discovery illustrates how quickly an emerging infostealer can mature. Its operators have changed how the malware reaches victims, while the stealer itself has gained the ability to bypass browser protections, remotely execute commands and additional payloads, and exfiltrate stolen data in smaller encrypted transmissions.

CastleStealer has not yet seen the widespread adoption associated with more established infostealer families. But its trajectory makes it one to watch as its developers continue to improve both its collection capabilities and what operators can do after compromising a victim.

Flashpoint continuously monitors emerging malware, illicit communities, and threat actor infrastructure to identify these shifts as they happen. Request a demo to learn how Flashpoint’s primary source intelligence and analyst research help security teams identify emerging threats and respond before they become widespread.

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Following Operation Epic Fury, regional kinetic operations have transitioned into direct, persistent threats against commercial shipping, energy infrastructure, and critical supply chains.

The Flashpoint Threat Intelligence Brief: Middle East cuts through headline noise to deliver tactical, ground-level intelligence for government agencies, corporate security leads, and global logistics teams—turning Flashpoint’s primary source intelligence into proactive risk mitigation.

Here is what your security operations team needs to track this week.

Operational SITREP: Executive Summary

Between October 16 and October 22, Ansarallah (the Houthi movement) expanded its operations against Yemeni government forces, striking the Al-Alam training center in Shabwa governorate with three ballistic missiles on October 19. Local officials reported at least 53 people killed and more than 200 wounded. Houthi forces also reportedly advanced into western Taiz city and claimed additional attacks against Saudi-aligned forces.

The United Kingdom announced it would deploy Royal Air Force (RAF) Typhoon fighter jets, an A400M transport aircraft, and military advisers to strengthen Saudi Arabia’s defenses against Houthi missile and drone attacks. The deployment comes as Saudi authorities continue responding to strikes against aviation infrastructure and other targets.

Inside Iran, reports of renewed US military strikes against Iranian facilities remained disputed. Iranian sources alleged attacks on the Kenarak naval base and an Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) anti-ship missile unit in Sirik, although a US official rejected the Kenarak account and neither incident has been independently confirmed. Iran also placed border forces on maximum alert, conducted ballistic missile launches, and reinforced preparations for potential renewed hostilities.

Regional tensions extended into Iraq’s Kurdistan region, where Iranian ballistic missiles and drones struck Kurdish opposition positions near Erbil on October 21. Iraq began closing its border crossings with Iran the same day, following Pakistan’s closure of its second crossing earlier in the reporting period.

Maritime attacks continued in the Strait of Hormuz and waters off Saudi Arabia, with UKMTO reporting a tanker damaged by unknown projectiles northeast of Jubail.

In the cyber domain, Iranian authorities issued binding directives to cut domestic access to the international internet if another war begins. Separately, the Handala Hack Team claimed breaches of Israeli military units and personnel, while new research documented the use of online advertising infrastructure to deliver Candiru spyware.

Kinetic & Maritime Risk

The expansion of Houthi operations into southern Yemen adds another front to an already sustained campaign against Saudi Arabia. Beyond the October 19 strike in Shabwa, Ansarallah forces reportedly advanced into western Taiz, approaching the Old Airport neighborhood and Taiz University. The group also claimed to have downed a Saudi military helicopter near Najran, although Saudi authorities have not confirmed the loss. Meanwhile, the UK’s deployment of RAF Typhoon fighter jets and military advisers will provide additional defensive support to Saudi Arabia while increasing the number of Western military assets exposed to Houthi attacks.

Preparations for potential renewed hostilities between Iran and Israel also intensified. Iran’s reported “Code 100” maximum border alert coincided with ballistic missile activity near Urmia and an Israeli long-range strike exercise involving dozens of fighter jets and reported US aerial refueling support. Iranian sources separately alleged US strikes against military facilities at Kenarak and Sirik, although neither incident has been independently confirmed and a US official disputed the Kenarak account. Together, these developments point to heightened military readiness, even as the timing and likelihood of renewed large-scale operations remain uncertain.

Iran’s strikes against Kurdish opposition positions near Erbil introduce additional security concerns for organizations operating in Iraq’s Kurdistan region. The attacks followed Iranian statements concerning the potential expulsion or transfer of Kurdish opposition members from Iraq, while the closure of border crossings by Iraq and Pakistan further complicates overland movement and commercial logistics.

At sea, the threat extends beyond the Strait of Hormuz to waters off Saudi Arabia. UKMTO reported a tanker damaged by unknown projectiles northeast of Jubail, while separate reporting identified another tanker struck in the Red Sea. Iranian claims of additional incidents, including a purported mine strike in the Strait of Hormuz, remain unverified. The continued attacks across multiple maritime corridors complicate transit planning for commercial shipping and energy operators.

Cyber and Hybrid Risk

New research from Citizen Lab and another research group identified how Israeli digital advertising agency Discover-Tech used a capability known as AdFection to track individuals and deliver Candiru spyware through ordinary online advertisements. The operation reportedly used advertising infrastructure spanning more than 120,000 websites and 75,000 applications, with targeted devices potentially compromised simply by loading a malicious advertisement. Targets included dozens of Al Jazeera journalists, while the advertisements also reached networks associated with the UN, NATO, the International Criminal Court, and the Pentagon.

The Handala Hack Team also claimed new compromises of Israeli military entities, including a media-monitoring and analysis center it associated with Unit 8200 and the commander of the IDF’s Yahalam combat engineering unit. The group published more than 500 purportedly classified documents and tens of thousands of alleged internal messages, attributing its access in part to sensitive operational information stored on personal devices. These claims have not been independently verified.

Meanwhile, Iranian authorities issued binding directives requiring domestic access to the international internet to be cut immediately if another war begins. The order raises the prospect of significant communications disruptions for businesses and personnel operating inside Iran. A Ukrainian intelligence assessment also reported cooperation between Russian and Iranian hacking groups targeting Israeli infrastructure, while Iranian opposition activists warned of a suspicious Telegram account impersonating Israeli military intelligence to solicit personal information and documents.

Recommended Risk Posture and Protective Controls

Organizations with personnel, facilities, or operations exposed to the conflict should reassess physical security, travel arrangements, maritime operations, and cyber defenses.

Cyber Defense

• Reduce exposure to malicious advertising: Review browser and network-level ad blocking, mobile device security, and spyware response procedures, particularly for journalists, government personnel, and other high-risk individuals.
• Prepare for hack-and-leak activity: Organizations with Israeli government or defense ties should review incident-response and communications plans and reinforce policies against storing sensitive operational information on unmanaged personal devices.
• Establish contingency communications: Organizations with staff, contractors, or partners in Iran should prepare alternate communication and check-in procedures that do not rely on international internet connectivity.
• Reinforce impersonation awareness: Personnel interacting with Iranian civil-society or diaspora communities should verify the identities of accounts claiming intelligence affiliations before sharing sensitive information.

Physical and Operational Defense

• Maintain heightened maritime security: Monitor UKMTO advisories and review transit risks in the Strait of Hormuz, waters near Jubail, and the Red Sea off Saudi Arabia.
• Review Saudi Arabia travel and facility security: Confirm flight availability, maintain alternate travel arrangements, and review shelter procedures amid continued missile and drone activity.
• Reassess operations near Erbil and regional border crossings: Review proximity to Iranian Kurdish opposition facilities, update emergency plans, and account for disruptions associated with Iraqi and Pakistani border closures.
• Review security at Western-linked facilities: Organizations associated with US or allied government operations should assess physical security and incident-reporting procedures in light of Iranian statements identifying Western political and infrastructure targets as potential objectives in renewed hostilities.

Strategic Outlook: Operational Forecast

Over the next 48–72 hours, Ansarallah is likely to sustain missile and drone pressure on Saudi cities and infrastructure while continuing operations against Yemeni government forces in Taiz, Shabwa, and Aden. The deployment of RAF Typhoon aircraft strengthens Saudi air defenses but also places additional UK personnel and equipment within range of potential Houthi attacks.

Iran’s maximum border alert, ballistic missile activity, and preparations for communications restrictions indicate heightened readiness for a possible resumption of large-scale hostilities. Israel’s recent long-range strike exercise reinforces concerns about further escalation, although renewed US-Israeli military action remains uncertain. Iranian strikes near Erbil and the closure of Iraqi and Pakistani border crossings also raise the possibility of further disruption to regional security and logistics.

Commercial shipping is likely to remain exposed to attacks in the Strait of Hormuz and surrounding waterways, while competing claims about responsibility will continue complicating incident assessments. In the cyber domain, Handala may release additional material it claims to have obtained from Israeli military sources, and intelligence collection, impersonation activity, and competing information narratives are likely to persist alongside physical threats.

Enhance Threat Intelligence Using Flashpoint

As the conflict continues to affect military operations, commercial shipping, regional infrastructure, and digital communications, security teams need timely intelligence to assess emerging risks and protect their organizations.

Flashpoint combines primary-source monitoring, open-source intelligence, and geospatial analysis to help organizations identify developing threats, assess operational exposure, and make informed security decisions.

Request a demo to learn how Flashpoint supports physical security intelligence, threat monitoring, and operational risk assessment.

Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)

What is the Flashpoint Physical Threat Intelligence Brief?

The Flashpoint Physical Threat Intelligence Brief: Middle East is a recurring threat intelligence update that translates raw primary-source open-source intelligence (OSINT) and geospatial data into actionable physical security analysis. It focuses on kinetic conflict developments, standoff weapon capabilities, maritime corridor security, and critical infrastructure risks across the Middle East.

How does Flashpoint gather physical security intelligence for the Middle East?

Flashpoint Physical Security Intelligence (PSI) gathers data by combining global open-source intelligence (OSINT), geolocated social media signals, satellite imagery, and primary-source threat monitoring. The platform uses AI-driven natural language processing and geospatial mapping to track kinetic developments, weapon strike radiuses, and physical security threats in real time.

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Unknowingly, a member of key personnel is living two separate lives. On the clock, they are a highly-trusted systems administrator, but in their personal time, they moonlight on the deep and dark web, advertising their trust and access to the highest bidder. One day, they get a simple offer: $15,000 in the crypto of their choice to approve a single push notification at 2 AM. They accept. By morning, the attacker walks away  with active domain admin credentials without the need for malware or cracking firewalls.

This is just one example of how insider threats lead to modern enterprise breaches. As perimeter security, EDR coverage, and other security tools mature, threat actors continue to target the human element, seeking employees and contractors willing to provide access to corporate systems or facilitate fraudulent activity.

In a threat landscape where identity is becoming the primary attack surface, monitoring illicit marketplaces and recruitment efforts is critical. This new monthly report leverages Flashpoint’s Primary Source Collection (PSC) to analyze insider threat tactics, tracking active recruitment and advertising on dark web forums and encrypted networks.

The Insider Threat Landscape: September 2026

In September 2026, Flashpoint analysts identified a total of 9,787 insider-related posts across 1,216 channels and 1,778 authors. While the volume of observed activity decreased, threat actors continued to actively seek and advertise insider access, particularly within industries where legitimate employee privileges can be exploited to facilitate fraud. These communications included threat actors attempting to recruit insiders at target organizations, insiders advertising their services, and general discussions involving insider-related threat activity.

Of these communications, Flashpoint observed 857 unique posts between September 1 and September 30, 2026.

The majority of these posts appeared in mid-tier English-language Telegram channels, where threat actors sought or advertised insider access to organizations across several industries. Much of the observed activity focused on recruiting insiders to facilitate fraud operations.

Where Insider Threat Activity is Concentrated

Retail, telecommunications, and financial services remained prominent targets for insider threat activity in September 2026. However, a significant portion of the observed activity could not be attributed to a specific industry.

Flashpoint found that 45.7% of unique insider posts fell into the “Unknown” category, meaning analysts could not determine the targeted organization or industry. Among posts with an identifiable industry, retail accounted for the largest share, followed by telecommunications, financial services, and technology.

Together, these four industries accounted for 419 unique posts, or nearly 49% of all unique insider-related activity observed during the month.

The concentration of activity in retail, telecommunications, and financial services reflects continued threat actor interest in insiders who may be positioned to facilitate fraud, provide access to customer accounts, or exploit legitimate organizational privileges.

The following table shows a breakdown of unique insider posts by industry in September 2026:

Industry	Posts
Other	392
Retail	135
Telecom	116
Financial	85
Technology	83
Public Sector	41
Healthcare	3
Media	2
Total	857

Insider Threats: Recruiting vs. Advertising

Active insider threats generally involve two types of activity: an insider is recruited by a malicious outside party, or an insider advertises their access and services to interested threat actors. These arrangements can enable adversaries to exfiltrate sensitive data, install malware, compromise accounts, or carry out fraudulent activities such as SIM swaps.

In September 2026, Flashpoint analysts identified 15 notable insider recruitment and advertising posts across underground communities and chat forums. Of these, nine involved threat actors attempting to recruit insiders, while six involved actors advertising insider services.

Telecommunications accounted for the largest number of notable posts, with five instances of recruitment or advertising. Retail and technology followed with three each, while financial services and the public sector accounted for two each.

These examples illustrate how threat actors continue to seek access across industries, with particular interest in employees and contractors who can facilitate fraud or provide privileged access to organizational systems.

Flashpoint also observed numerous insider solicitations repeated across multiple discussion threads, often with limited details about the access or services being offered. Analysts could not independently verify the legitimacy of the recruitment and advertising claims.

Protect Against Insider Threats Using Flashpoint

Insider threats are inherently difficult to detect using internal security controls alone because the malicious activity relies on valid credentials and legitimate access privileges. Relying solely on internal logs means security teams often only detect an insider threat after data exfiltration or system sabotage has already occurred.

Flashpoint protects organizations against insider threats through our Primary Source Collection (PSC) and specialized intelligence platforms:

• External Threat Intelligence & Early Warning: Flashpoint monitors deep and dark web forums, invite-only threat communities, and encrypted chat platforms to identify employee solicitations, stolen corporate domain mentions, and active recruitment attempts before an intrusion develops.
• Identity Protection & Infostealer Tracking: By tracking illicit marketplaces and infostealer activity, Flashpoint identifies compromised corporate credentials and active session tokens, preventing threat actors from utilizing purchased access.
• User & Entity Behavior Context: Flashpoint’s intelligence equips SOC, Security Operations, and Risk Management teams with adversary TTPs, enabling security operations to look for anomalous data downloads, off-hours access, or unauthorized software installation.

To learn more about how Flashpoint can help protect your enterprise from insider risk and monitor illicit underground communities, Request a Demo Today.

Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)

What is the Flashpoint Insider Threat Report?

The Flashpoint Insider Threat Report is a monthly intelligence brief that analyzes trends, volume, targeted industries, and tactics surrounding insider threat recruitment and illicit access advertising on the deep web, dark web, and encrypted chat channels.

How does Flashpoint collect insider threat data?

Flashpoint collects data using its Primary Source Collection (PSC) engine, which actively monitors thousands of dark web forums, illicit marketplaces, and underground chat networks where threat actors and malicious insiders communicate.

What is the difference between insider recruitment and insider advertising?

Insider recruitment occurs when an external cybercriminal attempts to entice a corporate employee into assisting with a cyberattack. Insider advertising occurs when an employee or contractor proactively lists their legitimate access or services for sale on illicit marketplaces.

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The Flashpoint Threat Intelligence Brief: Middle East

Flashpoint’s weekly analysis tracks shifting kinetic and cyber threat radiuses, geopolitical disruptions, and provides critical operational forecasts for the ongoing Middle East conflict.

Following Operation Epic Fury, regional kinetic operations have transitioned into direct, persistent threats against commercial shipping, energy infrastructure, and critical supply chains.

The Flashpoint Threat Intelligence Brief: Middle East cuts through headline noise to deliver tactical, ground-level intelligence for government agencies, corporate security leads, and global logistics teams—turning Flashpoint’s primary source intelligence into proactive risk mitigation.

Here is what your security operations team needs to track this week.

Operational SITREP: Executive Summary

Between September 25 and October 1, 2026, the Middle East conflict continued to expand geographically beyond the Gulf theater while diplomatic efforts stalled. Iranian intelligence activity reached European soil with the disruption of an alleged plot against a UK air base hosting US B-1 bombers, while US military forces completed their full withdrawal from Iraq.

In the Strait of Hormuz, IRGC-affiliated media claimed a massive anti-shipping campaign targeting 19 vessels over two days, though US officials disputed that any ships were struck during that window. On the diplomatic front, President Trump rejected Tehran’s seven-day proposal to reopen the strait in exchange for lifting the US naval blockade, signaling that renewed large-scale bombing of Iran after the November midterm elections remains possible.

In the digital domain, hacktivist collectives stepped up campaign activity under #OpIsrael and #OpUSA, and they have claimed to have compromised dozens of internet-exposed US CCTV systems and signaled imminent targeting of industrial control (SCADA) systems.

Kinetic and Maritime Risk

The physical conflict’s operational footprint has expanded into European staging locations. British police arrested five individuals near RAF Fairford over an alleged Iranian intelligence-backed plot to attack US B-1 bombers using vehicles laden with explosives. UK officials later said evidence indicated the possible linking of Iranian state actors to the attempt. In the Gulf, officials disclosed that eight US Marines sustained injuries—including possible traumatic brain injuries and smoke inhalation—during the September 14 Iranian strike on a US-contracted vessel.

In maritime chokepoints, conflict dynamics remain highly volatile. While IRGC-affiliated sources claimed 19 ships were targeted by anti-ship ballistic missiles and drones near Qeshm Island and Bandar Abbas, US officials disputed these numbers. Meanwhile, along the Red Sea, Ansarallah forces asserted control over key islands and the port of Mokha, prompting French naval escorts to shepherd commercial vessels through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait in recent weeks. Concurrently, US diplomatic pressure left roughly 20 empty Iranian oil tankers stranded off Sri Lanka running short of fuel or resupply.

Cyber and Hybrid Risk

Adversary operations across the cyber domain have shifted toward open-source reconnaissance, surveillance, and industrial control system (ICS) targeting.

Within the last week, a threat actor group published coordinates for an Israeli Air Force squadron and Field Intelligence site, alongside conducting Layer 7 DDoS attacks against US and Israeli targets. In parallel, Iranian state-aligned news outlets claimed cyberattacks had disrupted US-bound oil tankers and domestic refineries, while UAE authorities warned that attacks on port infrastructure were paired with cyber intrusions into connected industrial control systems.

Recommended Risk Posture and Protective Controls

To mitigate exposure across physical, maritime, and digital vectors, security operations leads should implement the following directive controls:

1. Tighten Perimeter Screening at European Installations: Facilities hosting US personnel or military assets across Europe should immediately review vehicle-screening protocols and reporting channels following the RAF Fairford plot.
2. Remove Exposed CCTV Portals & Segment SCADA/OT Networks: Industrial, energy, and logistics operators must take camera management interfaces off the public internet and enforce strict air-gapping/segmentation between IT networks and operational technology (OT/SCADA) environments.
3. Hardening Web Infrastructure Against Layer 7 DDoS: Organizations managing US or Israeli-facing web properties should activate origin-IP protections, Web Application Firewalls (WAFs), and aggressive rate-limiting against TLS-renegotiation and Layer 7 flooding tactics.
4. Reassess Non-Military Personnel Security in Iraq: Following the complete exit of US forces, commercial, diplomatic, and contractor entities in Iraq must update security postures to reflect the absence of co-located military quick-reaction forces.
5. Mitigate Doxxed Facility Exposure: Facilities linked to regional defense or security operations should review physical access controls and perimeter security, assuming published coordinate data is actively circulating among threat actors.

Strategic Outlook: Operational Forecast

The trajectory over the next 48 to 72 hours points to continued friction as diplomatic negotiations remain stalled. With Washington rejecting Iran’s seven-day proposal and signaling potential post-midterm strike campaigns, Iranian forces are likely to maintain high-profile messaging and anti-shipping operations in the Strait of Hormuz to demonstrate blockade-breaking capabilities.

In Europe, further disclosures regarding Iranian intelligence activity against Western staging bases remain probable. In the cyber domain, security teams should prepare for opportunistic probing against exposed SCADA and ICS interfaces, alongside continued low-impact hacktivist DDoS campaigns under #OpIsrael and #OpUSA.

Enhance Threat Intelligence Using Flashpoint

As hybrid threats unfold across the Middle East, passive monitoring is no longer enough to protect assets, personnel, and maritime operations. Rapidly shifting threat radiuses require security operations centers to operate on real-time, primary-source intelligence rather than delayed headline news.

Request a demo to see how Flashpoint equips government agencies, corporate security leads, and global logistics teams with real-time geolocated threat data, primary-source monitoring, and early-warning intelligence. By turning complex regional dynamics into clear, actionable risk indicators, Flashpoint empowers your team to harden defensive postures and mitigate hybrid threats before impact.

Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)

What is the Flashpoint Physical Threat Intelligence Brief?

The Flashpoint Physical Threat Intelligence Brief: Middle East is a recurring threat intelligence update that translates raw primary-source open-source intelligence (OSINT) and geospatial data into actionable physical security analysis. It focuses on kinetic conflict developments, standoff weapon capabilities, maritime corridor security, and critical infrastructure risks across the Middle East.

How does Flashpoint gather physical security intelligence for the Middle East?

Flashpoint Physical Security Intelligence (PSI) gathers data by combining global open-source intelligence (OSINT), geolocated social media signals, satellite imagery, and primary-source threat monitoring. The platform uses AI-driven natural language processing and geospatial mapping to track kinetic developments, weapon strike radiuses, and physical security threats in real time.

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Process Parameter Poisoning: Inside a Novel EDR Evasion Technique

In this post, Flashpoint analysts examine Process Parameter Poisoning—a novel EDR evasion technique we validated in Rust—and detail how abusing undocumented process parameters allows attackers to inject code and bypass standard security products.

Modern Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) platforms have made traditional malware injection techniques significantly harder to execute. In most cases, if a threat actor attempts to write malicious code into a process, an alert will fire. However, that sense of security is being actively challenged as cybercriminals and red teams find new ways to blend malicious payloads into standard operating system routines.

Flashpoint’s Intelligence team built and tested a proof-of-concept for a newly disclosed technique known as Process Parameter Poisoning. By compiling a custom payload and layering evasion mechanics, our analysts demonstrated how easily traditional API hooks can be rendered blind in a laboratory environment—achieving zero alerts across tested EDR/XDR controls.

What is Process Parameter Poisoning?

Process Parameter Poisoning is a novel endpoint detection and response (EDR) evasion technique that combines process parameter spoofing and thread execution hijacking to inject code into foreign processes without triggering standard security detection mechanisms.

Discovered by researchers Max Hirschberger and Ogulcan Ugur, Process Parameter Poisoning is designed to inject code in foreign processes without relying on the conventional memory-manipulation workflows that modern security tooling monitors.

To execute process injection, historically security tools and threat actors alike have focused on a small set of well-known Windows application programming interfaces (APIs). Process Parameter Poisoning shifts away from these heavily watched routines entirely. Instead of calling memory-accessing APIs to allocate and write into a target process, the technique hides the malicious payload directly inside standard process initialization structures during the initial creation of a process. The result is a fundamental shift in defense evasion that effectively blinds traditional, API-hooking EDR agents during the initial stages of code execution.

How Does Process Parameter Poisoning Work?

Process Parameter Poisoning allows attackers to bypass suspicious memory-accessing Windows APIs, such as VirtualAllocEx(), WriteProcessMemory(), and MapViewOfFile2(). Security products heavily monitor these specific APIs due to their high rate of abuse in traditional process injection techniques. However, by avoiding these calls, an attacker effectively bypasses the initial primary triggers used by endpoint agents to flag malicious cross-process memory activity.

When using the Windows application programming interface (API), CreateProcessA/W(), the developer can specify parameters such as the command-line to be executed by the new process, environment variables for the new process, current working directory for the process, window title if it is a console application, create a hidden window, create the process in a suspended state, etc. Many of these parameters are passed into CreateProcessA/W() via the STARTUPINFOA/W structure.

Some entries are undocumented and labeled “reserved” by Microsoft. The discovering researchers found that data stored in STARTUPINFO->lpReserved ends up in the Process Environment Block once the new process is initialized in an entry called “ShellInfo.” Below is an example of placing data into the STARTUPINFOW->lpReserved entry in a test application and the data stored in ShellInfo while debugging the newly created process.

†

Validating Process Parameter Poisoning in Rust

Flashpoint analysts created a proof-of-concept (POC) in Rust to test this technique based on the POC C++ source code provided by the researchers:

1. First the necessary data structures are initialized and the shellcode is passed into the STARTUPINFO->lpReserved field.
2. The target process is created with the infected STARTUPINFO and then a short wait to let the program initialize.
3. NtQueryInformationProcess() is used to acquire PROCESS_BASIC_INFORMATION about the newly created process.
4. The PROCESS_BASIC_INFORMATION structure has an entry called PebBaseAddress that provides the location of the process’s Process Environment Block.
5. NtReadVirtualMemory() is used to read the memory address provided by PebBaseAddress to get the PEB for that process.
6. The PEB has an entry called ProcessParameters that holds the structure RTL_USER_PROCESS_PARAMETERS and is where the ShellInfo entry mentioned earlier is stored.
7. NtReadVirtualMemory() needs to be used again to read the RTL_USER_PROCESS_PARAMETERS structure and get the address of the ShellInfo.Buffer entry.

Flashpoint confirmed that after changing the memory to have executable permissions, the threat actors can perform thread hijacking by using GetThreadContext() to acquire information about the current running thread, change the instruction pointer to point to the ShellInfo.Buffer address, and then SetThreadContext() to apply the changes and execute the shellcode.

Flashpoint analysts further confirm that this technique also works with the WindowTitle entry, CommandLine entry using the same series of steps.

The technique also works with the Environment entry but requires additional steps. Environment blocks require a variable name and the variable data separated by an “=.” Environment blocks can contain multiple variable entries in which each entry is ended with a null terminator. Two null terminators are necessary to denote the end of the environment block. This means the payload needs to be embedded in a longer string with a “{NAME} = {VALUE}” format.

Flashpoint analysts note that four null terminators were appended to the shellcode bytes to denote the end of an environment block in Unicode. The resulting payload buffer is then passed into the lpEnvironment variable of CreateProcessW() along with the CREATE_UNICODE_ENVIRONMENT creation flag.

The rest of the process remains the same as reading the PEB and RTL_USER_PROCESS_PARAMETERS structure. The Environment entry is read, but at the offset of the embedded shellcode within the poisoned environment block string. Because four bytes were added to the beginning of the shellcode to make the Unicode environment block, execution needs to begin after four bytes from the beginning of the buffer to begin executing at the shellcode.

Flashpoint notes that the shellcode requires no NULL bytes, and, if using the PAGE_EXECUTE_READ flag, it cannot overwrite itself. This means automated shellcode generators such as MSFVenom might not work either because they contain NULL bytes or use encoders that perform memory writes during execution. Flashpoint analysts wrote custom shellcode to further test this technique. The shellcode downloads and executes an additional payload. The combination of this technique, custom shellcode, and the use of Rust as the programming language proved successful in minimizing initial static detections by security software.

Flashpoint tested this technique with a commonly-used open source EDR platform. The EDR platform itself failed to produce any alerts from executing the malicious binary. However, the XDR component blocked on the initial creation of a new process and COM interactions by the second stage payload.

Flashpoint analysts then combined this technique with the DLL unhooking technique and applied the non-Microsoft block DLL policy during the creation of the sacrificial process. Analysts observed no blocks from the XDR during execution and observed no alerts on the platform.

Associated MITRE ATT&CK

Tactic	Technique ID	Technique Name
Stealth	T1055	Process Injection
Stealth	T1055.003	Process Injection: Thread Execution Hijacking
Stealth	T1564.010	Hide Artifacts: Process Argument Spoofing

Security teams can leverage several detection strategies to identify Process Parameter Poisoning, though each approach carries distinct limitations:

• Analyzing Parameter Entropy and Argument Spoofing (MITRE ATT&CK T1564.010): Security tools can inspect initialization strings within process structures for unusually high entropy, which often indicates the presence of obfuscated or raw binary shellcode embedded within parameters.
• Monitoring Thread Execution Hijacking (MITRE ATT&CK T1055.003): Analysts can monitor for thread context manipulation; however, because Process Parameter Poisoning does not invoke explicit thread suspension or resumption APIs, specific detection rules that depend on those parameters will fail to trigger.
• Detecting Code Execution in Abnormal Memory Locations (MITRE ATT&CK T1055): Detections can flag execution attempts taking place outside the standard executable section, particularly when code executes directly within Process Environment Block (PEB) parameter buffers.
• Auditing Memory Permission Modifications: Tracking instances where memory region permissions are altered to executable states can reveal payload staging. However, enterprise security controls often tune down or avoid these specific alerts due to high volumes of false positives in normal software operations.

Stay Ahead of Process Parameter Poisoning Using Flashpoint

Process Parameter Poisoning demonstrates another advancement in stealthy process injection and the constantly evolving research into evading security products. By using the previously unknown purpose of the lpReserved field within the STARTUPINFOW structure to house shellcode, this technique bypasses standard security product triggers associated with common memory-allocation APIs. While this proof-of-concept was proven successful in lab testing, the technique has multiple opportunities for detection and will most likely require a combination of additional evasion techniques to achieve a higher success rate.

As threat actors continue to refine technique-stacking and exploit overlooked Windows internals, relying on traditional API hooks is no longer enough to protect your enterprise. Staying ahead of modern evasion mechanics requires proactive intelligence and deep visibility into emerging adversary TTPs.

Request a demo today to see how best-in-class threat intelligence can help security teams detect, prepare for, and neutralize advanced defense evasion techniques before they impact your network.

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The Evolution of Hacktivism in Hybrid Warfare: Modern Tactics and Real-World Impact

In this post we examine how modern hacktivism has evolved into a tool of global hybrid warfare, analyzing crowdsourced attack tactics, media-driven propaganda, and real-world impacts across Ukraine, the Middle East, European Union, and NATO nations.

Hacktivism used to be perceived as digital graffiti, with lone-wolf threat actors defacing government websites or temporarily crashing banking portals to make a political point. However, Flashpoint is tracking a fundamental shift in how these groups operate.

Modern hacktivism is evolving into a disciplined component of global hybrid warfare, capable of bridging digital disruptions with tangible real-world impact. Today, these operations blur the line between volunteer activism and coordinated state interest, leveraging crowdsourced infrastructure to disrupt critical utilities, manipulate media narratives, and target public infrastructure on a global scale. Unpacking these modern hacktivist collectives reveals what their tactics look like in practice and their far-reaching consequences across dozens of nations.

What is Hacktivism?

Hacktivism is the use of cyberattacks to promote or advance a particular political or social cause, leveraging a wide range of tactics such as website defacement, distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks, and data breaches. Modern hacktivist collectives serve as the loud, high-visibility arm of cyber conflict—frequently aligning with state geopolitical interests, as seen most prominently in recent pro-Russian operations and Iranian-aligned cyber campaigns.

These pro-Russian hacktivist groups, such as NoName057 and Killnet, alongside pro-Iranian collectives and proxy ecosystems like Handala Hack, often react to the news cycle and target countries designated by state media or ideological narratives as enemies. As such, modern hacktivist campaigns are opportunistic and tied to global events—from the escalation in the Middle East following military operations like Operation Epic Fury, to the Milan-Cortina Winter Olympics and new aid packages to Ukraine. These groups’ justification narratives typically mirror state messaging.

Modern Tactics: Gamifying Cyber Warfare

In tracking modern hacktivist groups, Flashpoint analysts identified a new method these groups are utilizing to convert ordinary devices into tools for hybrid warfare—the gamification of cyberattacks. Flashpoint has observed groups like NoName057 turning DDoS attacks into community-based “patriotic online games,” such as their “DDoSia Project,” with participants earning military-style ranks and cryptocurrency rewards for overloading the websites of government institutions, banks, and various infrastructure across various countries.

This model has enabled the scaling of operations by utilizing a large, low-skilled participant base rather than having to rely on sophisticated technical tradecraft. The model’s decentralized structure and ideological appeal continue to pose a significant challenge for international law enforcement.

The Propaganda Engine: Media Amplification and Validation

Beyond technical disruptions, publicity is the primary currency of modern hacktivism. Hacktivist groups demonstrate a consistent pattern of media-seeking behavior and self-promotion, likely intended to amplify their perceived impact and reinforce notoriety within the broader cyber threat landscape. Many of these groups repeatedly repost media coverage and news articles referencing themselves.

This serves as a curated self-promotion mechanism, allowing the group to selectively showcase external validation of its operations, including coverage from mainstream and security-focused outlets, to its followers. This behavior aligns with a broader trend observed with especially pro-Russian hacktivist collectives, in which media visibility is treated as a measure of operational success independent of verified technical impact. It also serves as a deliberate tactic for engagement and recruitment that reinforces “patriotic” branding and sustains participant morale and visibility.

Beyond Propaganda: Aligning Cyber Disruption with Military Objectives

In some cases, the digital targeting of hacktivist collectives is more aligned with kinetic objectives, rather than public perception or propaganda initiatives. This is especially true for Iranian-aligned hacktivists and proxy groups who are more deeply intertwined with military operations in the Middle East. These groups have expanded their operations from website disruptions into claims of large-scale data wipers, extortion, and cyberattacks targeting key infrastructure across the Gulf.

The Far Reach of Modern Hacktivism

Major geopolitical flashpoints in the Middle East have triggered waves of hacktivist activity that has spread across North America, with threat actors targeting supply chains, financial infrastructure, and operational technology and control systems.

Simultaneously, pro-Russian hacktivist groups, particularly NoName057, have been extremely prolific within the last year—carrying out two major illicit campaigns heavily targeting Ukraine, which then spilled over to more than 30 nations globally. The following breakdown contains statistics and targeting dynamics of pro-Russian hacktivist groups observed between July 2025 and 2026:

The Continuous Campaign Against Ukraine

Ukraine has been the primary target for pro-Russian hacktivist groups who seek to damage Ukrainian infrastructure and morale. Anti-Ukrainian content is constantly distributed through dedicated per-language channels, making it the most linguistically developed target spanning six languages. Involved channels each post near-identical translated content within minutes to hours of the Russian original, down to the same image file with identical SHA1 hashes, which suggests a sustained propaganda distribution operation.

This has resulted in alleged data breaches impacting Ukrainian General Staff, military enlistment offices, medical, and morgue databases to push a casualty-count narrative. It also has resulted in the defacement or disruption of websites of regional capitals and administrative centers, energy plants, water and power-adjacent infrastructure, and many more.

Spilling Over: Impact Across EU and NATO Allies

However, Ukraine is not the sole casualty of modern hacktivism. Recent pro-Russian hacktivist campaigns have spread to other EU nations and NATO members. Germany, the United Kingdom, and Spain have been observed to be priority targets, with threat actors targeting public transportation, federal and security agencies, municipal government and utilities, financial markets, and other infrastructure. In some cases, hacktivist campaigns manifest in the real-world, with physical sticker drives on municipal streets, alongside doxxing operations releasing alleged personal data and automated scans hijacking exposed CCTV camera systems across Europe.

Defend Against the New Wave of Hacktivism Using Flashpoint

As hacktivist operations continue to blur the boundary between digital disruption and real-world interference, organizations can no longer view DDoS attacks or low-level intrusions as simple background noise. Protecting critical assets requires proactive visibility into threat actor networks, early detection of targeting narratives, and primary source threat intelligence.

Request a demo today to see how Flashpoint provides actionable intelligence to help security teams, government agencies, and infrastructure providers identify, monitor, and mitigate emerging hacktivist campaigns before they impact operations.

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Insider Threat Report: Dark Web Recruitment & Access Trends

Flashpoint’s monthly analysis of insider threat recruitment, illicit access advertising, and threat actor activity targeting enterprise environments.

Unknowingly, a member of key personnel is living two separate lives. On the clock, they are a highly-trusted systems administrator, but in their personal time, they moonlight on the deep and dark web, advertising their trust and access to the highest bidder. One day, they get a simple offer: $15,000 in the crypto of their choice to approve a single push notification at 2 AM. They accept. By morning, the attacker walks away  with active domain admin credentials without the need for malware or cracking firewalls.

This is just one example of how insider threats lead to modern enterprise breaches. This year, Flashpoint uncovered 7,282 unique insider threat posts, with an average of 34 unique posts being posted daily. As perimeter security, EDR coverage, and other security tools mature, threat actors are finding it faster—and cheaper—to target the human element and simply buy an insider’s credentials or pay an employee to open the front door.

In a threat landscape where identity is becoming the primary attack surface, monitoring illicit marketplaces and recruitment efforts is critical. This new monthly report leverages Flashpoint’s Primary Source Collection (PSC) to analyze insider threat tactics, tracking active recruitment and advertising on dark web forums and encrypted networks.

The Insider Threat Landscape: July 2026

In July 2026, Flashpoint analysts identified a total of 12,653 insider posts. These communications include both threat actors attempting to recruit insiders in target organizations, as well as insiders advertising their services on illicit forums and marketplaces.

Of these total communications, Flashpoint observed 1,132 unique posts in July 2026.

Where Insider Threat Activity is Concentrated

Historically, the Telecommunications, Retail, and Financial industries are most adversely affected by insider threat activity. However, July 2026 findings noticeably deviate from this trend. Flashpoint found 58.6% of total insider threat posts affected “Other” industries—suggesting adversaries are diversifying their target base. Threat actors may be attempting to recruit within supply chain partners, logistic hubs, manufacturing platforms, and specialized service providers to find alternative entry points into target networks.

The following table shows a breakdown of unique insider posts by industry in July 2026:

Industry	Posts
Other	663
Financial	150
Retail	112
Technology	84
Telecom	74
Public Sector	43
Healthcare	3
Media	3
Total	1,132

Insider Threats: Recruiting vs. Advertising

Active insider threats work in two ways: an insider is “recruited” by a malicious outside party, or a malicious insider “advertises” their access and skills to an interested threat actor. Regardless, by leveraging this connection, insiders assist adversaries by exfiltrating valuable data, installing malware, sabotaging IT systems, or performing SIM swaps.

In July 2026, Flashpoint found that over 75% of unique threat actor posts came from insiders advertising their access to malicious third parties. This indicates a highly motivated internal threat landscape where disgruntled employees actively seek out buyers for corporate data and network entry points.

Protect Against Insider Threats Using Flashpoint

Insider threats are inherently difficult to detect using internal security controls alone because the malicious activity relies on valid credentials and legitimate access privileges. Relying solely on internal logs means security teams often only detect an insider threat after data exfiltration or system sabotage has already occurred.

Flashpoint protects organizations against insider threats through our Primary Source Collection (PSC) and specialized intelligence platforms:

• External Threat Intelligence & Early Warning: Flashpoint monitors deep and dark web forums, invite-only threat communities, and encrypted chat platforms to identify employee solicitations, stolen corporate domain mentions, and active recruitment attempts before an intrusion develops.
• Identity Protection & Infostealer Tracking: By tracking illicit marketplaces and infostealer activity, Flashpoint identifies compromised corporate credentials and active session tokens, preventing threat actors from utilizing purchased access.
• User & Entity Behavior Context: Flashpoint’s intelligence equips SOC, Security Operations, and Risk Management teams with adversary TTPs, enabling security operations to look for anomalous data downloads, off-hours access, or unauthorized software installation.

To learn more about how Flashpoint can help protect your enterprise from insider risk and monitor illicit underground communities, Request a Demo Today.

Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)

What is the Flashpoint Insider Threat Report?

The Flashpoint Insider Threat Report is a monthly intelligence brief that analyzes trends, volume, targeted industries, and tactics surrounding insider threat recruitment and illicit access advertising on the deep web, dark web, and encrypted chat channels.

How does Flashpoint collect insider threat data?

Flashpoint collects data using its Primary Source Collection (PSC) engine, which actively monitors thousands of dark web forums, illicit marketplaces, and underground chat networks where threat actors and malicious insiders communicate.

What is the difference between insider recruitment and insider advertising?

Insider recruitment occurs when an external cybercriminal attempts to entice a corporate employee into assisting with a cyberattack. Insider advertising occurs when an employee or contractor proactively lists their legitimate access or services for sale on illicit marketplaces.

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Data Center Physical Security: Mitigating FPV Drone Threats

In this post, we explore how shifting online sentiment and low-cost First-Person View (FPV) technology are creating an unprecedented airborne threat vector for critical data center infrastructure.

Data centers have become a driving force in the modern digital economy—powering cloud services, global enterprise operations, and the explosive growth of artificial intelligence (AI). However, due to growing negative public discourse, data centers are facing a new physical threat vector: low-cost, payload-capable drones.

According to Flashpoint research, shifting public sentiment surrounding AI development, combined with the extreme accessibility of First-Person View (FPV) drone technology, is creating an unprecedented hybrid threat to physical critical infrastructure.

Here is what you need to know about this emerging threat landscape and what it means for physical security teams protecting critical assets.

Growing Online Sentiment and Anti-AI Hostility

Organizations tasked with protecting critical data infrastructure need to understand that this growing threat is not developing in a vacuum. Across both clearnet and Deep and Dark Web (DDW) forums, online discussions regarding data center expansion have intensified, with a significant portion bordering on hostility. Key drivers of negative sentiment include:

• Environmental & Local Concerns: Debates over massive energy consumption, water usage, noise, and localized quality-of-life impacts.
• Backlash against AI: Discontent directed at tech companies driving the rapid deployment of AI infrastructure.
• Perceived Regulatory Inaction: Frustration among activists who feel local and state governments are failing to halt or regulate new construction.

While much of the current online chatter currently revolves around organized protests and aspirational threats, Flashpoint analysts note a troubling uptick in rhetoric targeting corporate tech executives and data center infrastructure.

The Evolving Data Center Threat Landscape

Data centers across the United States are seeing a rapid increase in physical and operational threats. Vandalism and property destruction have become common topics in illicit online spaces when discussing data centers and their impact on everyday life. Flashpoint research highlights two primary force multipliers driving this threat:

DIY Drones & Low Barriers to Entry

Historically, kinetic airborne strikes required specialized equipment and advanced training. Today, that barrier to entry has virtually collapsed. Rapid improvements in drone manufacturing have made payload-capable aircraft extraordinarily accessible. In today’s market, an individual can purchase an off-the-shelf system or assemble a customized drone for under $1,000 USD.

Inspiration for these tactics is also readily available; widespread footage of FPV drones operating in conflict zones like Ukraine has demonstrated to online audiences how easily and effectively low-cost aircrafts can be weaponized. Threat actors view this as a high-yield investment, especially given the capability to deploy multiple drones in quick succession.

Protests as Cover for Physical Operations

Organized protests to stop data center development remain prevalent, and large crowds can easily overwhelm contracted security personnel, diminishing the effectiveness of a response to an aerial threat. A malicious actor could use a protest at a data center as cover to cause physical damage to the facility while security resources are spread thin. For example, on July 19, 2026, activists threw balloons filled with acetic acid at a data center construction site in Amsterdam. In its aftermath, Flashpoint analysts captured individuals online discussing the use of drones to deliver similar payloads.

Regulatory and Defense Measure Challenges

Current federal regulations limit the ability to effectively deter or stop an incoming drone threat because the US Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) classifies drones as aircraft. Therefore, organizations specializing in the physical security of data centers will likely need to increase their operational capabilities and advise companies on potential hardening to deter attacks.

Traditional foot patrols and monitoring perimeter access control points will be insufficient in mitigating overhead threats. The majority of data centers are currently not equipped with the specialized Counter-Unmanned Aircraft Systems (C-UAS) equipment, specialized training, or legal authorization needed to respond effectively to airborne incursions.

Protect Critical Infrastructure Using Flashpoint

Defending against aerial incursions requires moving from reactive security to proactive, intelligence-led physical protection. Physical security teams cannot afford to rely solely on ground-level surveillance when threat actors are leveraging open-source hardware and coordinating online.

Flashpoint Physical Security Intelligence (PSI) equips security teams and executive protection units with real-time visibility into emerging physical threats before they reach your perimeter:

• Early Warning Indicator Tracking: Monitor chatter across mainstream social platforms, fringe networks, and illicit DDW forums to identify probe attempts or the targeting of specific data center facilities and executives.
• Geospatial Threat Mapping: Overlay real-time intelligence onto physical assets using customizable geofencing to detect active incidents, protest activity, and drone-related discussions near sensitive sites.
• Actionable Counter-UAS Insights: Receive finished intelligence and analyst support to benchmark threat actor TTPs (Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures), enabling your organization to harden physical structures and justify operational investments.

To learn more about how Flashpoint helps safeguard critical infrastructure, executives, and high-value assets against physical and cyber threats, request a demo today.

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Understanding Illicit Ecosystems: Inside Rehub’s Rise as a Primary Ransomware Marketplace

As part of our ongoing series, Flashpoint intelligence tracks Rehub, breaking down its migration, infrastructure, and the various RaaS groups sponsoring and partnering with it.

What is Rehub?

Rehub, also known as ReHub or RehubCom, is a Russian-language cybercrime forum founded in August 2025 by a former XSS moderator following its shutdown in the summer of 2025. Rehub dedicates itself to the commercial and marketplace use of ransomware, while its counterpart, DamageLib, serves as a knowledge base archive and exchange.

Operating both on Clear Web domains and an onion domain, the forum positions itself as free from state and law enforcement interference, framing existing XSS iterations as compromised. After law enforcement seized the RAMP (RAMP4U) forum in January 2026, Rehub absorbed a significant portion of the displaced cybercriminal community and became one of the primary destinations for ransomware operators.

Who Are Known Members of Rehub?

There are many notable threat actors among Rehub moderators and users, including ransomware operators, vendors, and other prominent threat actors active across several illicit communities. Several current or ex-Rehub moderators were also maintainers of other illicit forums such as XSS, DamageLib, and RAMP.

Notably, Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) groups such as DragonForce have maintained an active presence on the platform to market their affiliate programs. Flashpoint assesses that DragonForce is likely the forum’s primary sponsor or partner, as their banner is permanently displayed on the forum’s home page, with both logos merged—similar to its previous placement on RAMP. 

Other active RaaS include:

• The Gentlemen
• CHAOS ransomware
• Anubis
• LockBit
• DevMan

What Does Rehub Infrastructure Look Like?

As of July 2026, Flashpoint intelligence observes over 8,300 active users, 15,000 posts, and nearly 3,000 threads. Despite being free to join, Rehub practices a zero trust policy, which was established in mid-April 2026. Under this system, the forum restricts newly registered users from accessing any section other than its Sandbox. Users can also purchase paid upgrades:

• Premium status (gold rank): Costing US $100 per year, this rank grants distinctive color, custom title, nickname changes, unlimited post editing/deletion, extended signature, unlocks all hidden text regardless of post count, likes, join date, ability to bump commercial threads, and inherits all lower-tier perks. 
• Patron status (pink/magenta rank): Costing US $5,000 per year, this rank grants custom title editing, a personal profile link, custom styling for posts, profile, and postbit, and inherits all “Premium” perks.

What are the Various Rehub Forum Sections?

Rehub sections, similar to other forums, are grouped by major activities, separating the knowledge base from commerce and from general discussions.

Sandbox

Serves as an entry-level general discussion area and a place for community questions. Main activity consists of queries about operational security, introductory networking, and entry-level fraud or malware logistics.

Technical

Covers threads ranging from traditional network infrastructure vulnerabilities to emerging technologies such as AI jailbreaking and deepfake social engineering. Highly active, most communications focus on network vulnerabilities and carding.

Programming (Development)

This is a dedicated space for discussions on software engineering, system administration, and web optimization within the forum. Primary activities include sharing programming language tutorials, comparing backend technologies, and developing specialized automation tools.

Library

Serves as a repository of resources for the forum, hosting the most threads and community engagement. Users share operational materials, leaked databases, and utility software. Additionally, this section aggregates cybersecurity and tech industry news and articles.

Supermarket

This is a commercial section featuring ransomware affiliate programs, compromised network access, malware tools, stolen financial data, bulk spam infrastructure, forged documents, anonymous hosting, and crypto laundering services.

Arbitration

Serves as the forum’s internal justice system, where members resolve financial disputes and flag scammers. The “Black List” subsection functions as a public record of bad actors and scam sites.

Administration

This is where forum staff post announcements, policy updates, and operational notices, including rules, official domains, forum news, moderator applications, and 2FA requirements. Members use it to ask questions, request escrow services, propose features, and raise concerns about the forum’s public image.

Monitor Illicit Marketplaces Using Flashpoint

Flashpoint will continue to monitor Rehub’s marketplace activity and infrastructure updates. Rehub’s rapid evolution from a post-XSS refuge to a heavily sponsored ransomware marketplaces demonstrates the resilience of the cybercrime ecosystem. 

Positioning itself as the primary ransomware marketplace, Rehub has built a high-barrier, high-reward environment for sophisticated threat actors. Request a demo to learn how Flashpoint delivers visibility into illicit communities—empowering security teams to track threat actors, identify exposed assets, and mitigate ransomware risks.

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Inside Qilin Ransomware: Custom Rust Loader and Kernel-Level EDR Killer

In this post we analyze Qilin ransomware’s new custom Rust loader, break down the inner workings of its sophisticated kernel-level EDR killer, and explore how organizations can defend against these aggressive defense evasion tactics. Flashpoint customers can access the full intelligence report—complete with deeper technical analysis and all associated IOCs—directly within Flashpoint Ignite.

Qilin ransomware is a highly active and sophisticated ransomware operation that has rapidly modernized its evasion techniques. Historically focused on file encryption, the ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) group has expanded its operations to include aggressive, kernel-level defense evasion. By deploying a specialized toolkit, Qilin now focuses heavily on blinding and permanently disabling endpoint security products before its main ransomware payload is executed on a victim’s network.

Flashpoint has observed Qilin quietly deploying a previously unreported custom packer, which has been actively observed in wild samples since May 2024, with continuous use detected as recently as last month.

Here’s how Qilin works:

How Qilin Ransomware Uses a Custom Rust Loader for Reflective PE Loading

Flashpoint analysts observed a custom Rust-written loader that performs reflective Portable Executable (PE) loading of the ransomware payload. After deobfuscation, the code execution jumps to the newly unpacked executable within the same process, avoiding noisier process injection techniques. The following is an overview of the decompiled unpacking routine:

The unpacking routine then reads each DWORD from the embedded bytes, allocates it on the heap, and performs multiple mathematical operations to deobfuscate. Flashpoint notes that the calculations and values used were unique to each sample, but the underlying methodology remained the same.

Manually performing the calculations in the sample confirms the presence of the embedded binary, with the first deobfuscated DWORD yielding an ‘MZ’ header in little-endian format.

To better understand Qilin, Flashpoint analysts created an automated unpacker and configuration extraction script that uses CPU emulation to address the issue of unique calculations per sample. This script uses pattern matching to locate the unpacking routine within the binary. It then reads the disassembly, identifying specific points in the code at which emulation should start and stop.

Reading the disassembly directly avoids issues arising from hardcoded offsets, such as when threat actors add or remove code, or when the compiler introduces changes. Additionally, it provides a smaller set of instructions for emulation, avoiding WinAPI calls and other invalid memory errors that often occur when emulating a full binary.

After additional setup, including mapping the sample into the emulator’s memory and creating a fake heap, the unpacking routine runs successfully.

The script then performs configuration extraction from the deobfuscated bytes produced by the CPU emulation, achieving a 100% success rate.

How Qilin’s New EDR Killer Blinds Security Products

An additional update with Qilin is its new endpoint detection and response (EDR) killer, which Flashpoint found to be sold on illicit marketplaces for US $2,000. This is packed via the Shanya packer—which was sold on XSS for US $100 to US $150 back in 2024. The packer is highly sophisticated, and uses several techniques that make it difficult to analyze, such as junk code, application programming interface (API) hashing, IAT hooking, pattern scanning, and VEH code execution flow.

Once unpacked, the EDR killer starts by using dynamic API hashing and PE walking to resolve a number of useful NTAPI functions it will use throughout the process, and stores them in a structure located within the GdiHandleBuffer within the Process Environment Block (PEB).

The structure stored in the PEB itself looks as follows:

The API hashing algorithm is simple: it performs a bitwise OR of each character of the API name with hexadecimal value 0x20 to convert any and all uppercase characters to lowercase, then performing additional simple calculations.

The EDR killer compares the returned locale to a known locale blacklist to avoid attacking any Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries such as Russia and Belarus.

The malware then attempts to give itself the following privileges by dynamically resolving and calling RtlAdjustPrivilege():

• SE_PROF_SINGLE_PROCESS_PRIVILEGE
  • Required to gather profile information for a single process.
  • Used later to create a map of the victim machine’s physical memory space.
• SE_DEBUG_PRIVILEGE
  • Required to debug and adjust the memory of a process owned by another account.
• SE_LOAD_DRIVER_PRIVILEGE
  • Required to load or unload a device driver.

Abusing Vulnerabilities to Map Physical Memory

The EDR killer then writes a vulnerable driver to disk and loads this driver via Service Manager. This driver is the ThrottleStop driver from TechPowerUp LLC’s free and legitimate application of the same name, used to bypass CPU throttling. However, the driver suffers from a vulnerability, allowing the malware to map physical memory to kernel-mode virtual memory to perform direct kernel read and write operations.

Qilin weaponizes this vulnerability by feeding its EDR killer physical memory addresses, as the driver relies on the API to map physical memory to a kernel-mode virtual address. To achieve this, the EDR killer builds a physical memory map using a Windows memory management service that preloads frequently used applications into RAM.

1. First it gathers baseline information about all physical memory blocks. Because memory pages (typically 4KB) are allocated to physical blocks, hundreds of virtual pages can point to a single physical range.
2. It then calls the service to obtain detailed Page Frame Number (PFN) details. The malware stores this complete mapping in a global variable, giving it a reliable, built-in translation table between virtual and physical memory spaces.

Bypassing Driver Signing Checks

To run its own malicious tools, the EDR killer must first bypass Windows’ driver signing enforcement. Normally, Windows uses a built-in verification check to block unsigned or blacklisted drivers from loading. The malware tricks Windows into disabling this gatekeeper using a simple swap:

1. The malware finds a specific kernel function and uses its physical memory map to pinpoint its location.
2. It commands the vulnerable driver to scan this memory area for a specific byte signature. This leads directly to the Code Integrity callback table.
3. Within this table, the malware locates the built-in verification check and “patches” it with a harmless, dummy function.

Blinding Security Products

With driver signing checks completely bypassed, the malware uses its read/write primitives to dismantle system callbacks, it identifies and targets:

• Process notify callbacks
• Thread notify callbacks
• Image load notify callbacks
• Registry callbacks and minifilters

Rather than conducting a blanket unlinking of all system callbacks, the EDR killer checks the address of each callback. If the address falls within a memory range owned by a security product on its hardcoded blacklist, Qilin surgically unlinks it by zeroing out the pointer with null bytes.

Next, the EDR killer drops and loads its own custom driver, which appears to Windows as purpose-built. Once loaded, the Qilin EDR killer gets all relevant running processes. For any processes running that match a hardcoded list, it stores the Process ID in a vector.

For every PID found, the malware sends a message to a driver. At a high level, the driver finds the full path of the target executable, makes it unreadable, unwriteable, and undeletable to any and all users, and then terminates the process.

Interestingly, the Qilin EDR killer performs a Discretionary Access Control List (DACL) modification on the target security product executable. The driver creates a new empty ACL header and sets the flag SE_DACL_PRESENT to TRUE. This is significant because a null DACL and empty DACL are not the same. A null DACL grants everyone access, whereas an empty DACL grants no access. This process makes it so that the security product’s executable can no longer be executed without needing to delete the file like other EDR Killers. Once the driver then terminates the executable, it can’t be restarted.

Once everything is completed, the EDR killer unpatches the Code Integrity Check to avoid triggering PatchGuard and then exits.

Defend Against Qilin Using Flashpoint

The sophisticated kernel-level manipulation highlights a rapidly expanding trend in the broader threat landscape: the proliferation of highly effective malware designed purely to disable enterprise-level security products. Qilin’s integration of these techniques demonstrates how the EDR killer market is maturing in the cybercrime underground, transitioning from a niche capability into a standard prerequisite for high-impact ransomware operations.

As security platforms continuously improve their detection mechanisms, Flashpoint believes the threat landscape surrounding anti-EDR tools will only grow larger and more aggressive, forcing organizations to focus on protecting the kernel and detecting rogue driver deployments. To learn more about Qilin and the latest advancements in ransomware, request a demo.

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Understanding Illicit Ecosystems: How Dark Web Forums Structure Cybercrime

As part of our ongoing series, we analyze how dark web forums operate, breaking down Flashpoint’s tiered classification system and examining how specialized, hybrid platforms function together as an interconnected cybercrime supply chain.

When a high-profile data breach hits headlines, the default assumption is often to view the dark web as a single, centralized marketplace where any illicit service or tool can be bought. While many illicit forums aspire to be seen as a “one-stop shop,” the reality is that the underground economy relies on an interconnected network of specialized hubs that each align with distinct phases of the cybercrime lifecycle.

To understand how cybercrime thrives, it is vital to learn how these online spaces survive and how they play their parts in graduating threat actors from entry-level novices to sophisticated adversaries.

Navigating the Cybercrime Ecosystem: Entry Barriers and Forum Tiering

An illicit community’s survival hinges on its operational value and culture, which is ultimately created by its supporters. In a low-trust environment filled with cybercriminals, hidden law enforcement, and security researchers, these digital spaces are inherently defensive. To protect their communities from competitors’ attacks, surveillance, and eventual takedowns, forums implement rigorous gatekeeping mechanisms.

As such, Flashpoint organizes the cybercrime ecosystem into a tiered structure, separating them into low, mid, or top-tier forums, defined by several key factors such as: 

• Entry Barriers: The financial or reputational requirements for a user to join the community, indicating the forum’s exclusivity.
• Technical Expertise: The collective technical skills and proficiency of the forum’s members.
• Trade Quality: The quality and value of illicit goods and services exchanged, such as advanced hacking tools or high-value data leaks.
• Operational Security (OP SEC): The extent to which the community upholds strict security protocols and practices.

By analyzing these vectors, the ecosystem naturally separates into three distinct operational tiers.

Low-Tier Forums

These communities are easily accessible, often requiring a small fee or completely free registration with little to no vetting. They host less sophisticated users, beginner hackers, and minor data brokers seeking free material. Because the technical barrier is low, these spaces primarily share low-cost, high-volume data, including large data leaks, generic phishing guides, unchecked stolen accounts, and cracked software.

Consequently, these environments face a persistently high risk of scams and poor quality data. Within low-tier forums, reputation is often built by sharing free data or purchasing a rank or upgrade which is viewable by other users.

Mid-Tier Forums

Moderately accessible via both Tor and the clearnet, entry into these spaces typically require a vouch from an existing member, a minimal registration fee, or an initial deposit. These platforms concentrate on large-scale fraudulent activity and the exchange of various datasets—including bulk carding data, stolen credentials, stealer logs, phishing kits, botnets, and various malware.

The user base includes a mix of vendors, experienced threat actors, affiliates of larger groups, and aspiring cybercriminals looking for training. To protect users from internal fraud, these forums heavily prioritize integrated escrow services and reputation systems, which can be improved by purchasing an internal high-tier status.

Top-Tier Forums

These are highly exclusive platforms dedicated to high-value, highly technical, and targeted criminal operations. New applicants face a stringent vetting process, typically demanding either a formal invitation or a substantial registration payment. This exclusive layer hosts highly skilled, professional threat actors, malware developers, and key decision-makers within major illicit groups.

This is the ecosystem where adversaries build trust through valuable technical contributions or community reputation points and execute complex money laundering schemes, trade zero-day exploits, facilitate ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) partnerships, and conduct large-scale initial access broker sales.

What Are the Different Types of Dark Web Forums?

Once a community establishes its tier, it usually functions as a specialized hub linked to a specific stage in the overall cybercrime lifecycle. They do this to cultivate talent and expertise, which naturally bridges communities together, creating a supply chain where different forums handle distinct operational and structural needs.

General Information and Community Boards

Modeled after surface-web sites like Reddit, these platforms serve as social and informational hubs. Discussions prioritize coordination, reputation management, and the propagation of best practices regarding OPSEC. Users share news about cybercriminal arrests, look for advice on how to remain anonymous, report potential exit-scams, and provide detailed reviews of specific vendors, particularly those selling illicit drugs.

Financial Theft and Carding Forums

These semi-structured environments blend marketplaces with social networks, utilizing a professionalized supply chain for selling stolen cards, dumps, and fullz. To reduce internal fraud, they rely heavily on reputation-building tools like verified seller statuses and integrated refund systems for invalid data. To ensure operational longevity, they are typically hosted on bulletproof infrastructure located in states that do not comply with international takedown requests, such as the Russian Federation.

Data Leak Forums

Depositories for stolen databases where raw breach information is structured into a tradeable commodity. Leaks are listed by victim name and sector, allowing actors to quickly find credentials or corporate records to repurpose for credential stuffing, extortion, or identity fraud.

Cracking and Hacking Tutorials (Knowledge Bases)

Existing entirely for knowledge exchange and offensive techniques, threat actors share methods, tutorials, fraudulent schemes, and bypass techniques, often encouraging educational sharing through competitions.

High-Skill Exploit and Access Forums

Top-tier platforms hosting the “upper echelons” of the community, such as initial access brokers, exploit developers, and malware creators. They rely heavily on strict arbitration systems, mandatory vendor deposits, and escrow mechanisms to safely conduct high-impact transactions and corporate intrusions.

Low-Barrier Retail Forum

High-traffic segments trading mass-market digital goods like cracked subscription accounts, premium software, and online gaming assets. Characterized by an exceedingly low barrier to entry and a relatively young user base seeking quick profit without the capability for advanced, complex operations.

Map the Illicit Pipeline Using Flashpoint

What makes the cybercriminal ecosystem truly cohesive is that the lines between these various types of forums and communities constantly blur. Most illicit communities are hybrid and transitional, intentionally or naturally blending categories to cater to each other’s needs and boost monetization.

Hybrid forums frequently connect the how-to tutorials with actual stolen data and network access, effectively creating a structural pipeline for threat actor progression. Platforms like BreachForums combine the attention-grabbing aspect of a data leak site with a structured marketplace for selling logs and other sensitive data. This type of hybridization allows a threat actor to progress from a beginner reading tutorials to an active criminal deploying stolen data.

Monitoring these fluid structures and transitions is the only way to understand how threat actors develop, and how the interconnected cybercrime landscape shifts over time. Therefore, it is essential for security teams to look beyond cyber threats as isolated, and recognize the multi-platform strategies these actors employ. Request a demo to gain visibility into these threat actor communities and proactively defend your organization from across the entire cybercrime supply chain.

Check out the rest of our “Understanding Illicit Ecosystems” series:

Understanding Illicit Ecosystems: The Hybrid Threat of “The Com”

Understanding Illicit Ecosystems: XSS and the Current State of the Russian-Speaking Underground

Understanding Illicit Ecosystems: Weaponizing Mainstream Apps and Social Infrastructure

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Remus Stealer: A New, Not-So-New Infostealer

In this post, we explore the emergence of Remus Stealer, analyzing its structural and behavioral similarities to the infamous Lumma malware.

The underground marketplace rarely stays quiet for long. A new information-stealing malware dubbed Remus Stealer has surfaced in the cybercrime underground, exhibiting significant similarities to the notorious Lumma malware family across its administration panel, stolen log files, and core code structure.

Despite parallels in its code and functionality, threat actors are eagerly buying into the platform. In addition to its familiar features, it provides attackers with a distinct, modern command and control (C2) and networking infrastructure designed to slip past current security perimeters.

What We Know About Remus

Flashpoint first observed Remus appearing for sale within illicit communities in March 2026. The malware listing offers similar functionality to other popular Malware-as-a-Service (MaaS) offerings, including Google OAuth cookie restoration and Telegram channel integration for logs.

Much like the Lumma malware family, the Remus subscription service operates on a three-tiered access model:

• Basic: US$250
• Pro: US$500
• Enterprise: US$1,000

At this time, Remus has no additional channels or automated bots associated with its sale or distribution. Despite undeniable similarities to Lumma, its developer claims to not be a rebrand of the Lumma project.

Since March 2026, Remus has continued its operations mostly unhindered by negative associations associated with Lumma—particularly the doxxing of its panel in August 2025.

Similarities to Lumma

Similarities can be observed in the Remus and Lumma panels in both aesthetics and functionality. Both panels use similar assets for tab icons and have embedded advertisements for other illicit services such as packers and log clouds. Harvested logs also share extremely similar directory structures in log files, including unique identifiers.

Code-Level Overlaps

Remus is a 64-bit compiled binary, and Lumma was a 32-bit binary. However, major similarities between the code bases of both malware can be observed.

Upon execution of an unpacked sample, both Remus and Lumma will send warning messages to the user that the build is unpacked. This was a unique phenomenon first established by Lumma several years ago. In both Remus and Lumma samples, the pack check and window message are performed before the main functionality of the malware.

In both Remus and Lumma, a function is used first to check if the sample is packed, and a second function is used to send the window error message.

Remus uses similar string obfuscation methods to Lumma, in which each string has been uniquely encoded and then decoded during runtime. Deobfuscation occurs by looping byte by byte through encoded blobs. Each encoded string is obfuscated by a unique pattern. This can be seen in the code samples below:

Of note, both samples have at least one NOP instruction between the encoded blob being moved onto the stack and the deobfuscation loop.

Another unique feature of Lumma is the presence of a plaintext identifier string used to link customers to specific build generations. In Lumma, this string was referred to as the LID (Lumma ID), and this ID method appears in Remus as well as a “tag.”

Like the Lumma LID string, the Remus tag could be leveraged to attribute variant builds and campaigns to single threat actors or groups.

Additionally, both Remus and Lumma exhibit similar control flow obfuscation by replacing direct jumps with indirect jumps read from offsets that have been moved onto the stack, jumps computed from a jump table, and jumps resolved by a pointer.

Differentiators of Remus

Although Remus bears remarkable similarities to Lumma, its main differences lie in its C2 beaconing.

Before performing main stealer functionality, Remus will beacon out to its C2 infrastructure. It will attempt to resolve several domain:port combinations via POST requests, and attempt a final connection to find the C2 server using EtherHiding. If it is unable to connect, the malware will terminate.

After a connection is established, the stealer sends a POST request to the C2 in order to receive an access token. Once received and decoded, this access token is used to receive encrypted config data used by Remus to target assets on the victim system. Data collected for logs is then exfiltrated as encrypted POST data.

Protect Against Infostealers Using Flashpoint

Remus stealer represents a sophisticated continuation of the MaaS infostealer model left behind by Lumma’s collapse. While the developer asserts independence, the overwhelming code overlaps, matching obfuscation techniques, and administrative panels indicate that Remus is either heavily inspired by, or derived from the Lumma codebase. These traits have allowed it to thrive, providing threat actors with a familiar, robust alternative that sidesteps the reputational baggage and law enforcement scrutiny of its predecessors.

Flashpoint continuously tracks the latest developments in illicit communities, hard-to-reach adversary spaces, and malware repositories to identify emerging threats. Request a demo to learn how Flashpoint’s primary source collections and analyst insights empowers your security teams.

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America250 Fourth of July Threat Assessment

In this post we break down the intersecting cyber risks, physical security strains, and operational challenges shaping the security landscape for the historic Semiquincentennial celebrations.

As the United States prepares to mark its 250th anniversary this Fourth of July, the convergence of historic national celebrations, sprawling public events, and simultaneous high-profile sports tournaments is creating an exceptionally complex threat landscape. The multiyear national initiative “America250,” features over 1,200 synchronized grassroots gatherings under the “America’s Block Party” umbrella, with flagship events taking place in Washington DC, Philadelphia, Boston, New York, and Los Angeles.

Key Takeaways

While public sentiment surrounding America250 remains broadly positive, Flashpoint analysts have assessed the physical, cyber, and operational threat vectors that organizations, security teams, and municipalities must navigate during this high-visibility holiday weekend.

America250 Threats & Security Challenges:

1. Distributed Physical & Infrastructure Strain: Massive tourism influxes will collide with ongoing 2026 FIFA World Cup matches in Houston and Philadelphia on July 4, putting historic operational pressure on metropolitan transit grids and soft targets.
2. Elevated Iconicity and “City of Concern” Status: Although no specific, credible plots have been confirmed, the National Mall events in Washington, DC have received their first-ever National Special Security Event (NSSE) designation. Meanwhile, the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) has officially designated Philadelphia a “city of concern” due to the volume of synchronized events.
3. Ideological Protest Dynamics: Activist groups are organizing a significant anti-authoritarian march in Philadelphia. While expected to be peaceful, open-source chatter indicates a portion of attendees plan to exercise their license to carry firearms.
4. Disruption & Cyber Threat Vectors: Cyber threat groups, ransomware operators, and hacktivists are expected to attempt to exploit thin holiday IT staffing. Threat vectors range from mass public-transit ticketing fraud to high-consequence digital hoaxes involving rogue cellular infrastructure.

Physical Threat Vectors

Transportation and Infrastructure

Flashpoint assesses that “lone wolf” actors motivated by various ideological grievances, including those inspired by foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs), pose the most likely threat of disruptions to transportation infrastructure during America250 events. This threat is likely to apply to all major transport hubs during the event, including Washington DC, Philadelphia, New York City, and Boston. Attendees can expect to see an increased police and military presence near transit hubs at major events.

Event Threats

While no specific credible threats targeting America250 events have been identified, the July 4th events taking place on the National Mall in Washington DC, have been given a National Special Security Event designation, which is typically reserved for events deemed potential targets for terrorism or other criminal activity. This is the first time such a designation has been given to July 4th celebrations on the National Mall.

Memos released by the National Counterterrorism Center to security agencies also identified Philadelphia as a “city of concern” regarding potential targets for terror attacks due to the number and scale of events taking place on July 4th. Law enforcement officials have indicated that while no specific threats have been identified, increased security measures will be in place throughout the city.

Planned Protest

The Fayetteville Resistance Coalition, alongside Veterans Against Fascism, and the Women’s March is organizing an anti-authoritatian protest march in Philadelphia on July 4th—being the largest mobilization of military veterans in decades.

Flashpoint has identified chatter indicating that march attendees may be armed. However, Flashpoint has not identified any calls for violence at this protest and deem that actions will likely remain peaceful. Despite this, arrests may be possible if attendees gather in unauthorized areas or engage in civil disobedience.

Cyber Threat Vectors

Ransomware and Operational Technology (OT) Disruptions

Financially motivated threat actors frequently deploy ransomware during major US holiday weekends when corporate and municipal IT security staffing is historically thin.

Flashpoint analysts assess that attackers could target automated ticketing systems, regional rail signaling, and digital municipal transit grids. Disruption to public transit during the high-density travel window surrounding major events could induce logistical gridlock. Secondary targets include municipal water treatment facilities, local power grids, and emergency response (911) dispatch systems in primary host cities.

Hactivism

With hundreds of thousands of spectators gathering at prominent national landmarks, hacktivist groups seeking political leverage or global media visibility pose an elevated threat to public messaging infrastructure.

Compromising the digital billboards, stadium screens, or viewing decks used for America250 events presents an attractive vector for defacement. Adversaries may attempt to display political propaganda, anti-war messaging, or explicit content to captive, high-density crowds.

Event App Vulnerabilities and Data Harvesting

The decentralized nature of “America’s Block Party,” featuring over 1,200 grassroots events managed via localized apps, introduces software supply chain vulnerabilities.

Cybercriminals may target the ticketing infrastructure of high-profile, restricted-access events. Phishing campaigns, credential stuffing, or application programming interface (API) vulnerabilities within event-specific mobile applications could result in mass ticketing fraud, legitimate attendees being locked out, or crowd-control issues at venue gates.

Additionally, malicious actors frequently deploy spoofed public Wi-Fi networks around high-density tourist hubs to harvest sensitive personal data, financial credentials, and biometric profiles from unsuspecting attendees.

Protect People Using Flashpoint

To ensure attendee safety, safeguard operations, and protect public-facing brands, Flashpoint recommends implementing the following proactive measures:

1. Secure Public-Facing and Display Infrastructure: Implement strict access controls, multi-factor authentication (MFA), and offline fail-safes for all internet-connected digital signage, stadium screens, and public notification systems to prevent hacktivist defacements.
2. Audit Event Applications and Mobile Endpoints: Conduct rigorous vulnerability scans on event-specific APIs and ticket validation platforms. Advise personnel and contractors against posting photographs of official credentials, badges, or operational passes on public social media channels.
3. Establish Out-of-Band Incident Response Protocols: Prepare alternative communication channels and verified public-address messaging to immediately counter potential rogue emergency broadcasts, digital hoaxes, or localized telecom disruptions that could cause public panic.
4. Monitor High-Risk Overlap Zones: Cross-reference physical security deployment schedules in cities like Philadelphia where World Cup traffic, official America250 parades, and armed protest routes intersect near major transit networks.

Ensure your security team has full visibility into the cyber and physical threat vectors shaping this historic holiday weekend. Request a demo and see how Flashpoint equips organizations with the intelligence needed to detect, analyze, and mitigate emerging risks.

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Understanding Illicit Ecosystems: Weaponizing Mainstream Apps and Social Infrastructure

As part of our ongoing series, we focus on the shared infrastructure that fuels threat actors; the intersection of mainstream social media, open-source messaging platforms, and gaming communities.

Threat actors and their illicit communities do not exist in a vacuum. To scale their operations, coordinate financial fraud, deploy malware, and recruit new talent, threat actors must interface with the broader digital world. This means leveraging everyday, public digital spaces to facilitate illicit activity, effectively hiding in plain sight.

The Clearnet Threat Landscape: Hiding in Plain Sight

When conceptualizing the cybercriminal underground, it is easy to focus exclusively on Tor-based onion sites or restricted-access dark web forums and marketplaces. However, a massive portion of modern illicit activity thrives on the clearnet. Threat actors heavily utilize commercial social media and public messaging networks to coordinate fraud, deploy malware, and run public relations campaigns for their operations.

At first glance, conducting illicit operations on highly monitored, mainstream platforms seems counterintuitive. However, the massive, continuous volume of legitimate traffic on the clearnet provides a form of operational security. By blending into the noise, threat actors can maintain a highly accessible digital presence. This visibility is crucial for their business models: it allows them to maintain a low barrier to entry for potential recruits and targets who know exactly what markers to look for, or who are systematically funneled into these spaces.

How Threat Actors Weaponize Consumer Platforms

The misuse of mainstream communication tools has changed how threat actors interact. Rather than waiting for users to seek out the dark web, cybercriminals are actively meeting their targets or co-conspirators on platforms designed for daily socialization.

Discord

Originally built to connect gaming communities, Discord’s rapid growth and robust infrastructure have inadvertently made it a target for malicious activity. Cybercriminals treat the platform as a multi-functional tool for both technical infrastructure, social engineering, and radicalization.

On a technical level, advanced persistent threats (APTs) and other threat actors exploit Discord’s content delivery network (CDN) to host and distribute malware. Because traffic to Discord domains is generally trusted by corporate networks, threat actors can potentially use it to deliver payloads—such as infostealers and remote access trojans (RATs)—bypassing standard security perimeters.

Beyond hosting malware, extremist groups across various ideological spectrums often target the platform’s demographic, which skews heavily towards younger tech-savvy users. This group provides an impressionable pool of adolescents who may be susceptible to grooming, indoctrination, and recruitment into illicit operations.

Case Study: The Targeting and Recruitment Mechanics of “The Com”

While monitoring The Com, Flashpoint analysts have observed the systematic use of platforms like Discord, Roblox, and Minecraft to run predatory extortion pipelines. The mechanics of this ecosystem takes place through a multi-phase methodology:

1. Platform Scouting: Recruiters patrol servers on popular youth-centric gaming platforms, such as Discord, Roblox, and Minecraft. They look for minors showing signs of social isolation, depression, disordered eating, or a desire to belong.
2. Building Trust and “Love Bombing”: Initial engagements are seemingly harmless. However, trust is built quickly to establish a sense of indebtedness. Recruiters offer gifts such as in-game perks/currency, premium subscriptions, or other digital items. In some cases, a romantic facade is used to establish a connection. In either scenario, “love bombing” creates an immediate feeling of psychological obligation in the target.
3. Platform Migration: Once rapport is established, the recruiter moves the target away from the game and into an encrypted app or private Discord server, following a public-to-private strategy. By moving the interaction away from the original platform’s safety controls, the recruiter can isolate the target in a more controlled environment.

Once isolated, perpetrators coerce victims into sending sensitive imagery or CSAM. This material is immediately compiled and weaponized as leverage for blackmail via doxxing. This creates a severe psychological trap in which the victim feels compelled to partake in escalating illegal activity to keep their previous actions hidden. This drives the victim to transition from a victim into an aggressor to escape their own abuse.

Telegram

While many social media and messaging platforms can serve as an initial funnel for engagement, Telegram has been known to be used from time to time as an operational hub for the broader illicit ecosystem. Since the arrest of Pavel Durov, Telegram has begun working more closely with law enforcement, leading to several key arrests and major disruptions due to their cooperation. 

The platform occupies a unique space in threat intelligence and open source intelligence (OSINT). While the vast majority of its user base is entirely benign, its minimal moderation policy and robust channel architecture have made it vital to public and private intelligence gathering.

Telegram functions as an open marketplace and real-time coordination center for a vast spectrum of threat actors. Flashpoint has observed it being used by:

1. State-sponsored APT groups and hacktivists
2. Geopolitical actors and mercenary groups distributing battlefield intelligence and propaganda
3. Cybercriminal syndicates coordinating financial fraud schemes, check fraud, and the sale of compromised data.

Furthermore, threat actors routinely use other public-facing platforms like X (formerly Twitter) alongside Telegram to amplify their impact. They leverage the broad reach of social media to broadcast proof of their compromises, hype up ransomware leaks, and exert public pressure on corporate victims during extortion cycles. Concurrently, Telegram often acts as the backend repository where the stolen data is hosted, discussed, and monetized.

Monitor the Clearnet Using Flashpoint

The evolution of illicit ecosystems demonstrates that the lines between the dark web and the clearnet have intersected. Whether analyzing the activities of extremist and threat actor groups or tracking the predatory pipelines of The Com, defenders must look beyond traditional intelligence sources.

Because malicious actors rely heavily on consumer messaging apps and social platforms to coordinate attacks, leak data, and target people, monitoring these public-to-private pipelines is an essential component of threat intelligence. Uncovering these physical and cyber threats requires best-in-class threat intelligence and OSINT investigations capable of parsing the massive noise of the clearnet to find the signals of illicit coordination.

Request a demo to see how Flashpoint empowers security teams to monitor these decentralized threat landscapes to proactively protect their critical assets.

Check out the rest of our “Understanding Illicit Ecosystems” series:

Understanding Illicit Ecosystems: The Hybrid Threat of “The Com”

Understanding Illicit Ecosystems: XSS and the Current State of the Russian-Speaking Underground

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Understanding Illicit Ecosystems: XSS and the Current State of the Russian-Speaking Underground

In this post, we explore XSS’ shift from a unified forum to a scattered community spread across several competing factions.

What is XSS?

For more than two decades, XSS was the gathering ground for the Russian-speaking cybercriminal underground. Evolving from its former name, DaMaGeLaB, XSS evolved from a mid-tier message board into a top-tier hacking forum.

XSS is home to vendors of various crime types, including loaders, phishing, scamming, carding, malware development, distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) bots, and related services. It also facilitates the trade of illicit goods and services, while simultaneously serving as a networking and recruitment hub for threat actors.

XSS forum content falls within the following main sections:

• “Underground”: Includes most noncommercial content, such as sharing information on malware, vulnerabilities, and exploits, phishing, fraud, open source intelligence, artificial intelligence, and machine learning.
• “Programming, Development”: Includes posts and articles about programming languages and administration.
• “Library”: Includes news articles, databases, and discussions around software and tools. Users also post about vulnerabilities and exploits.
• “Business Decisions”: Users discuss different investments, the sale of digital goods, trading, start-ups of fraudulent businesses, and news about cryptocurrencies.
• “Lounge Zone, Resting”: Content involves lifestyle discussions, hobbies, and cybercriminal community rumors and scandals.
• “Trading Platform”: Users sell and look to buy network access, malware, counterfeit documents, and advertise their services. This is where users hire and look for work or partners.
• “People’s Court”: Used for complaints and arbitration and contains lists of phishing forums and scammers.
• “Ours”: Contains information about the XSS project, discussions on issues, suggestions, and initiatives for forum improvement.
• “Private: Underground”: Closed section for only forum members.

XSS Disruption: July 2025 Takedown

On July 23, 2025, law enforcement organizations reportedly seized XSS as part of a multinational operation with Ukrainian authorities, French police, and Europol. Alongside the domain seizure, French authorities reported the arrest of XSS’s longtime administrator in Ukraine.

This arrest triggered an immediate chain reaction that has had lasting effects on the Russian-speaking underground—with the XSS ecosystem splintering into several competing factions.

The Current State of the Russian-Speaking Underground

While the original XSS architecture was severely disrupted, the surrounding Russian-speaking cybercriminal ecosystem remains intensely active. However, instead of a centralized hub, the XSS ecosystem is spread out through competing environments that emerged directly from the fallout of the takedown.

DamageLib

Launched by the legacy moderators of XSS, DamageLib represents a structural pivot away from standard illicit forums. Concluding that the old XSS site was compromised by law enforcement, the moderators launched a new model that completely abandons commerce—shutting down all buying, selling, and auctions entirely—-to eliminate user tracking and surveillance. Instead, it focuses strictly on technical materials and tutorials.

Rehub

Recognizing that displaced cybercriminals still required a commercial venue to trade, a former XSS moderator launched Rehub quickly after the emergence of DamageLib. Rehub immediately integrated a commercial platform, successfully recruiting prominent threat actors into its moderation team to establish underground credibility.

The forum is still in its development stage, with its content being populated, and an active member base being built.

XSS[.pro]

In early August 2025, an unknown entity launched an alleged resurrection of the forum on a new domain [.pro], utilizing old backups that preserved legacy user data, threads, and forum deposits. However, this new version has been met with significant distrust from Exploit and DamageLib, believing the [.pro] domain to be a honeypot controlled by law enforcement.

XSSF Forum

Started by a pro-Russian Telegram hacking group, this community actively targets EU and Ukrainian digital infrastructure. According to user discussions on DamageLib, this forum is not related to XSS. In addition, Flashpoint analysts note that targeting Ukrainian infrastructure directly contradicts its original community rules. The authenticity of this forum and its ownership has not been verified.

Monitor a Fractured Underground Using Flashpoint

While law enforcement achieved a significant victory over XSS, they did not eliminate the Russian-speaking cybercriminal underground. Instead, they broke the foundational trust mechanics that had kept it centralized for twenty years.

This has left the Russian-speaking underground in a deeply fractured state that is still intensely active and highly adaptive. For defenders and analysts, this threat has not diminished—it has diversified. Tracking this ecosystem no longer means watching a single centralized community, but rather actively mapping out the live migrations, shifting rules, and behavioral patterns across these splintered groups.

Request a demo to learn how Flashpoint helps security teams aggregate intelligence from these scattered factions into a single source of truth, empowering your organization to proactively monitor and intercept emerging threats.

Request a demo today.

AI agents are moving deeper into offensive cyber operations. In a campaign highlighted in September reporting, a Chinese-speaking operator reportedly deployed multiple open-source AI agent frameworks to find and exploit vulnerabilities across several targets, automating work that would ordinarily require hands-on effort from an attacker.

The reported activity illustrates how AI tools are being applied to increasingly complex stages of an attack, including tasks that traditionally require substantial technical expertise and hands-on effort.

Meanwhile, the volume of AI-related activity across illicit communities continues to climb.

In September 2026, Flashpoint analysts identified 8,837,186 posts discussing artificial intelligence in the context of illicit activity, up from 7,461,908 in August. That represents an approximately 18% increase in a single month.

Across forums, marketplaces, and chat services, threat actors continue to advertise AI services, exchange techniques, and explore ways to incorporate AI into fraud, identity verification bypass, social engineering, and offensive cyber operations.

To track these developments, Flashpoint’s monthly AI Threat Report analyzes primary source communities across forums, marketplaces, and chat services. This month’s intelligence highlights a sharp increase in AI-enabled identity verification bypass activity, continued demand for malicious AI capabilities, and emerging examples of AI agent tooling being used in offensive operations.

Where AI Activity Is Concentrated

Telegram remained the dominant source of observed AI service advertisements in September, with 6,309,872 posts, up from 4,899,407 in August. That represents an approximately 29% month-over-month increase.

Activity across other platforms was substantially lower. Flashpoint identified 20,361 posts on GitHub Gist, followed by Pastebin (6,288), Signal (6,123), and Reddit (5,882). Smaller volumes were observed across 4chan, BlackHatWorld, Discord, Mastodon, and other sources.

As with previous months, these figures do not represent unique advertisements or services. Threat actors frequently repeat or distribute the same messages across multiple channels and platforms to maximize exposure.

Telegram’s continued dominance underscores its importance as a distribution channel for illicit AI services. Other platforms provide additional avenues for sharing technical material, advertising capabilities, and discussing methods.

The distribution of activity also reinforces why post volume requires context. Repeated advertisements can inflate overall counts, making it important to examine the underlying services and techniques being promoted alongside changes in activity.

AI-Enabled Fraud and Identity Verification Bypass

Discussions of AI-enabled identity verification bypass continued to accelerate in September.

Flashpoint analysts observed 1,171,914 posts advertising or discussing Know Your Customer (KYC) bypass methods using AI technology, including deepfake technology. That compares with 751,644 posts in August, representing an approximately 56% month-over-month increase.

The increase is particularly noteworthy given the growth already observed in August, when KYC-related activity nearly doubled from July. Across the past two months, the number of observed posts has nearly tripled, rising from 394,567 in July to more than 1.17 million in September.

These discussions are concentrated in Telegram channels advertising methods designed to circumvent identity verification controls through generative AI, including deepfake technology.

For financial institutions and other organizations that rely on digital identity verification, this activity warrants close attention. AI-enabled impersonation can create additional challenges for onboarding, account recovery, and other processes that depend on verifying a user’s identity.

The sustained increase in underground discussion also provides security and fraud teams with an important signal about where threat actor interest is concentrated, even when repeated advertisements contribute to the overall volume.

Malicious LLM Usage and Prompt-Based Workflows

Malicious and unrestricted large language models (LLMs) remained part of the AI-related activity observed across Flashpoint Collections in September.

Threat actors continue to develop their own models or seek ways to bypass safeguards imposed by mainstream AI services. These capabilities can support phishing, social engineering, harmful code generation, and the creation of malicious or offensive content.

The availability of malicious and unrestricted LLMs gives threat actors additional options for incorporating AI into existing workflows. Models designed or modified to circumvent safety restrictions can be used to generate content and technical material that mainstream services would ordinarily reject.

These tools also introduce challenges for security teams assessing how AI-enabled threats are evolving. Understanding which models are being discussed, how they are marketed, and the capabilities being sought by threat actors can provide insight into emerging areas of interest across illicit communities.

Notable AI-Related Activity Observed in September

Flashpoint identified several notable developments involving AI infrastructure and the growing use of AI in offensive cyber operations.

September reporting highlighted a Chinese-speaking operator reportedly using three open-source AI agent frameworks, including Strix and Cairn, to automate vulnerability discovery and exploitation across multiple targets, according to The Register, citing Gambit.

These developments highlight two areas of concern: the targeting of proprietary AI infrastructure and the potential for agent-based tools to accelerate offensive operations. For security teams, both reinforce the importance of protecting AI development environments and addressing exploitable weaknesses before attackers can capitalize on them.

What Security Teams Should Take Away

September’s intelligence points to continued growth in AI-related criminal activity, with particularly sharp increases in discussions surrounding identity verification bypass.

Flashpoint observed more than 8.8 million posts discussing AI and criminal activity, while KYC bypass discussions exceeded 1.17 million posts for the first time in the three-month period examined.

At the same time, reported activity involving AI agent frameworks illustrates how automation is extending into more complex offensive workflows. Threat actors are exploring ways to apply AI to vulnerability discovery and exploitation, alongside its established uses in fraud, impersonation, and social engineering.

For security teams, these developments reinforce the importance of maintaining visibility into the communities where new capabilities are discussed, advertised, and tested. Tracking changes in activity and understanding how tools are being applied can help organizations identify emerging risks and better prioritize their defenses.

To see how Flashpoint can help your team identify and respond to emerging threats, request a demo.

Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ)

What is the Flashpoint AI Threat Report?

The Flashpoint AI Threat Report is a monthly intelligence analysis tracking how threat actors use and discuss artificial intelligence across illicit communities. Built on Flashpoint’s primary source collection, the report provides visibility into underground forums, chat services, marketplaces, and other environments where AI-related criminal activity is discussed and advertised.

How are threat actors currently using AI in cybercrime?

Threat actors are using or exploring AI capabilities across a range of criminal activities, including identity verification bypass, phishing, social engineering, malicious code generation, and vulnerability discovery.

September reporting also highlighted the use of AI agent frameworks to automate elements of offensive cyber operations, including vulnerability discovery and exploitation.

How rapidly is illicit AI activity growing in cybercrime communities?

Flashpoint analysts identified 8,837,186 posts discussing AI and criminal activities in September 2026, compared with 7,461,908 in August. This represents an approximately 18% month-over-month increase.

Activity related to AI-enabled KYC bypass also grew substantially, reaching 1,171,914 posts in September, an increase of approximately 56% from August.

These figures measure observed posts, rather than unique threat actors, services, or confirmed attacks.

Which messaging platforms and forums host the most illicit AI chatter?

Telegram continues to account for the largest concentration of observed AI service advertisements. Flashpoint identified more than 6.3 million posts advertising AI services on Telegram in September.

Other sources included GitHub Gist, Pastebin, Signal, Reddit, 4chan, BlackHatWorld, Discord, and Mastodon.

What are malicious LLMs?

Malicious LLMs are AI models developed, modified, or marketed for purposes that mainstream AI services typically restrict. Threat actors may use these models to generate phishing content, assist with social engineering, create harmful code, or support other criminal activities.

Flashpoint continues to track discussion of these models across illicit communities to understand how their capabilities and use cases are evolving.

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The Phishing-as-a-Service Pipeline: How a Scalable Fraud Ecosystem Is Driving Global Attacks

In this post, we examine how phishing-as-a-service (PhaaS) has evolved into a structured cybercrime ecosystem, how threat actors collaborate across infrastructure, delivery, and monetization layers, and why this model continues to drive large-scale financial fraud targeting global organizations.

Phishing is no longer a standalone tactic. It has matured into a service-based ecosystem where specialized actors provide each component of an attack lifecycle, from infrastructure and delivery to credential harvesting and cash-out.

Flashpoint analysts, working with partner financial institutions, have observed a growing number of PhaaS operations operating with a level of coordination and specialization more commonly associated with legitimate software platforms. These ecosystems bring together phishing kit developers, infrastructure providers, spam delivery services, and financially motivated actors into a single, scalable pipeline for fraud.

This shift has significantly lowered the barrier to entry for cybercriminals while increasing the scale, efficiency, and success rate of phishing campaigns.

From Phishing Kits to a Service-Based Fraud Economy

PhaaS emerged from early phishing kits into a full cybercrime-as-a-service model built on commercialization, modular tooling, and operational scalability.

Early phishing activity relied on standalone kits — basic login pages and scripts that allowed attackers to collect credentials. Over time, operators began centralizing these capabilities into subscription-based platforms offering hosting, domain management, campaign tooling, and ongoing support.

Modern PhaaS platforms now operate similarly to legitimate SaaS providers:

• Subscription-based pricing models
  
• Prebuilt templates for major brands and services
  
• Integrated delivery mechanisms (email, SMS, QR phishing)
  
• Real-time dashboards for campaign tracking and credential harvesting
  

This model has made sophisticated phishing accessible to low-skill actors. Kits can cost as little as US$10, while full platforms enable large-scale campaigns for relatively modest monthly fees.

MFA Bypass and AI Are Reshaping Phishing Capabilities

As organizations adopted multifactor authentication (MFA), PhaaS operators adapted.

Modern platforms increasingly rely on adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) techniques, using reverse proxy infrastructure to intercept login sessions in real time. This allows attackers to capture not only credentials, but also MFA tokens and session cookies, effectively bypassing traditional authentication controls.

At the same time, AI is accelerating the scale and effectiveness of phishing campaigns.

Threat actors are using AI to:

• Generate convincing, localized phishing lures
  
• Clone brand interfaces with high fidelity
  
• Optimize campaigns through automated testing and iteration
  

This combination of MFA bypass and AI-driven automation has transformed phishing from a volume-based tactic into a precision-driven access vector.

The PhaaS Pipeline: How the Ecosystem Operates

What distinguishes modern phishing operations is not just tooling, but coordination.

A typical PhaaS campaign follows a structured lifecycle:

This pipeline is supported by a network of specialized providers, each responsible for a different stage of the attack lifecycle.

Infrastructure, Delivery, and Exfiltration Are Increasingly Specialized

Flashpoint analysis highlights how different actors focus on distinct parts of the ecosystem.

Infrastructure and Kit Development

Phishing kit developers provide increasingly sophisticated tooling, including:

• Reverse proxy (AiTM) capabilities for MFA bypass
  
• Anti-bot protections to evade researchers
  
• “Live panels” enabling real-time interaction with victims
  

Platforms such as GhostFrame, Rapid Pages, and MUH Pro Admin illustrate how these tools are being productized and distributed at scale.

SMS Delivery and Spoofing

Smishing has become a critical delivery vector.

Threat actors operate dedicated SMS gateway services capable of sending large volumes of messages via APIs or bulk uploads. Others actively seek advanced spoofing capabilities to bypass authentication controls such as SPF, DKIM, and DMARC, enabling phishing messages to appear legitimate at the protocol level.

Credential Exfiltration and Telegram Integration

Credential collection is increasingly automated and centralized.

Many campaigns exfiltrate stolen credentials directly to Telegram bots or channels, enabling real-time access to victim data. This infrastructure also allows for rapid scaling and coordination across actors participating in the same campaign or ecosystem.

From Credential Theft to Financial Monetization

The ultimate goal of PhaaS operations is monetization.

Stolen credentials are used to enable account takeover (ATO), which allows attackers to:

• Access financial accounts
  
• Lock out legitimate users
  
• Initiate fraudulent transactions
  
• Launch follow-on scams
  

Flashpoint analysis of actors such as “JUN JUN,” associated with the Squirtle group, illustrates how these operations extend into structured financial fraud and laundering.

Observed activity shows a progression from acquiring phishing logs (“fish material”) to targeting high-value accounts and ultimately laundering funds through complex mechanisms, including tax fraud and credit card repayment schemes designed to recycle illicit funds.

This highlights how phishing is only the entry point into a broader fraud pipeline.

A Distributed Ecosystem of Threat Actors

The PhaaS landscape is not controlled by a single group, but by a network of loosely connected actors and clusters.

Examples include:

• Fluffy Spider: Focused on large-scale infrastructure deployment and domain generation
  
• IVAN: A more exclusive, high-tier operation leveraging SEO poisoning and advanced evasion techniques
  
• Smishing Triad: A highly coordinated group conducting global SMS phishing campaigns
  
• System Bot: A modular phishing toolkit with credential harvesting and OTP bypass capabilities
  

These actors operate across different regions and languages but demonstrate comparable levels of technical capability and operational maturity.

Many of these groups function with enterprise-like structures, including support teams, affiliate models, and performance-based operations, further reinforcing the industrialization of phishing-driven fraud.

Law Enforcement Pressure Is Increasing, but the Model Persists

Recent takedowns, including operations targeting platforms such as Tycoon 2FA, demonstrate growing coordination between public and private sector defenders.

These efforts have:

• Disrupted infrastructure
  
• Increased operational costs for threat actors
  
• Accelerated collaboration between intelligence providers and law enforcement

However, the underlying PhaaS model remains resilient.

Even as major platforms are dismantled, operators frequently rebrand, migrate infrastructure, or fragment into smaller services. The demand for scalable, low-cost phishing capabilities continues to sustain the ecosystem.

What This Means for Security Teams

Phishing-as-a-service has evolved from a tactic to an ecosystem that industrializes fraud.

Flashpoint assesses that the increasing coordination between phishing kit developers, infrastructure providers, and financial fraud actors will continue to drive large-scale credential harvesting and account takeover activity targeting global organizations.

For defenders, this means that effective mitigation requires more than user awareness and traditional controls. Organizations must account for:

• MFA bypass techniques such as AiTM
  
• Rapid infrastructure rotation and evasion
  
• The integration of phishing into broader fraud and access broker pipelines
  

Protecting Your Organization from the PhaaS Ecosystem

Understanding how phishing ecosystems operate — from infrastructure and delivery to monetization — is critical for disrupting attacks before they result in fraud.

Flashpoint provides intelligence that helps organizations track phishing campaigns, identify emerging threat actors, and detect compromised credentials in real time. By correlating activity across the full attack lifecycle, security teams can better anticipate threats and respond before they escalate.

To learn how Flashpoint can support your team with actionable intelligence on phishing and fraud ecosystems, schedule a demo.

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