The Meta-owned communications app is filing a federal court contempt order against NSO.
The post WhatsApp Catches Spyware Firm NSO Defying No-Hacking Court Order appeared first on SecurityWeek.
Unit 42 uncovers high-risk AI browser extensions. Disguised as productivity tools, they steal data, intercept prompts, and exfiltrate passwords. Protect your browser.
The post That AI Extension Helping You Write Emails? It’s Reading Them First appeared first on Unit 42.
ICE has admitted that it uses spyware from the Israeli company Graphite.
DarkSword and Coruna are two new tools for invisible attacks on iOS devices. These attacks require no user interaction and are already being actively used by bad actors in the wild. Before these threats emerged, most iPhone users didn’t have to lose sleep over their data security. Protection was really only a major concern for a narrow group — politicians, activists, diplomats, high-level business execs, and others who handle extremely sensitive data — who might be targeted by foreign intelligence agencies. We’ve covered sophisticated spyware used against such a group before — noting how hard to come by those tools were.
However, DarkSword and Coruna — discovered by researchers earlier this year — are total game-changers. This malware is being used for mass infections of everyday users. In this post, we dive into why this shift happened, why these tools are so dangerous, and how you can stay protected.
In mid-March 2026, three separate research teams coordinated the release of their findings on a new spyware strain called DarkSword. This tool is capable of silently hacking devices running iOS 18 without the user ever knowing something is wrong.
First, we should clear up some confusion: iOS 18 isn’t as vintage as it might sound. Even though the latest version is iOS 26, Apple recently overhauled its versioning system, which threw everyone for a loop. They decided to jump ahead eight versions — from 18 straight to 26 — so the OS number matches the current year. Despite the jump, Apple estimates that about a quarter of all active devices still run iOS 18 or older.
With that cleared up, let’s get back to DarkSword. Research shows that this malware infects victims when they visit perfectly legitimate websites that have been injected with malicious code. The spyware installs itself without any user interaction at all: you just have to land on a compromised page. This is what’s known as a zero-click infection technique. Researchers report that several thousand devices have already been hit this way.
To compromise a device, DarkSword uses a six-vulnerability exploit chain to escape the sandbox, escalate privileges, and execute code. Once it’s in, the malware harvests data from the infected device, including:
On top of all that, DarkSword lets attackers scoop up crypto-wallet data, making it essentially dual-purpose malware that functions as both a spy tool and a way to drain your crypto.
The only bit of good news is that the spyware doesn’t survive a reboot. DarkSword is fileless malware, meaning it lives in the device’s RAM, and never actually embeds itself into the file system.
Just two weeks before the DarkSword findings went public, researchers flagged another iOS threat dubbed Coruna. This malware is capable of compromising devices running older software — specifically iOS 13 through 17.2.1. Coruna uses the exact same playbook as DarkSword: victims visit a legitimate site injected with malicious code which then drops the malware onto the device. The whole process is completely invisible and requires zero user interaction.
A deep dive into Coruna’s code revealed it exploits a total of 23 different iOS vulnerabilities, several of which are tucked away in Apple’s WebKit. It’s worth reminding that, generally speaking (outside the EU), all iOS browsers are required to use the WebKit engine. This means these vulnerabilities don’t just affect Safari users — they’re a threat to anyone using a third-party browser on their iPhone as well.
The latest version of Coruna, much like DarkSword, includes modifications designed to drain crypto wallets. It also harvests photos and, in certain instances, email data. From what we can tell, stealing cryptocurrency seems to be the primary motive behind Coruna’s widespread deployment.
Code analysis of both tools suggests that Coruna and DarkSword were likely built by different developers. However, in both cases, we’re looking at software originally created by state-affiliated companies, possibly from the U.S. The high quality of the code points to this; these aren’t just Frankenstein kits cobbled together from random parts, but uniformly engineered exploits. Somewhere along the line, these tools leaked into the hands of cybercrime gangs.
Experts at Kaspersky’s GReAT analyzed all of Coruna’s components and confirmed that this exploit kit is actually an updated version of the framework used in Operation Triangulation. That earlier attack targeted Kaspersky employees, a story we covered in detail on this blog.
One theory suggests an employee at the company that developed Coruna sold it to hackers. Since then, the malware has been used to drain crypto wallets belonging to users in China; experts estimate that at least 42 000 devices were infected there alone.
As for DarkSword, cybercriminals have already used it to compromise users in Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Malaysia. The problem is exacerbated by the fact that the attackers who first deployed DarkSword left the full source code on infected websites, meaning it could easily be picked up by other criminal groups.
The code also includes detailed comments in English explaining exactly what each component does, which supports the theory of its Western origins. These step-by-step instructions make it easy for other hackers to adapt the tool for their own purposes.
Serious malware that allows for the mass infection of iPhones while requiring zero interaction from the user has now landed in the hands of an essentially unlimited pool of cybercriminals. To pick up Coruna or DarkSword, you simply have to visit the wrong site at the wrong time. So this is one of those cases where every user needs to take iOS security seriously — not just those in high-risk groups.
The best thing you can do to protect yourself from Coruna and DarkSword is to update your devices to the latest version of iOS or iPadOS 26, as soon as you can. If you can’t update to the newest software — for instance, if your device is older and doesn’t support iOS 26 — you should still install the latest version available to you. Specifically, look for versions 15.8.7, 16.7.15, or 18.7.7. In a rare move, Apple patched a wide range of older operating systems.
To protect your Apple devices from similar malware that will likely pop up in the future, we recommend the following:
The idea that Apple devices are bulletproof is a myth. They’re vulnerable to zero-click attacks, Trojans, and ClickFix infection techniques — and we’ve even seen malicious apps slip into the App Store more than once. Read more here:
The percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked has been decreasing since the beginning of 2024. In Q4 2025, it was 19.7%. Over the past three years, the percentage has decreased by 1.36 times, and by 1.25 times since Q4 2023.
Percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked, Q1 2023–Q4 2025
Regionally, in Q4 2025, the percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked ranged from 8.5% in Northern Europe to 27.3% in Africa.
Regions ranked by percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked
Four regions saw an increase in the percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked. The most notable increases occurred in Southern Europe and South Asia. In Q3 2025, East Asia experienced a sharp increase triggered by the local spread of malicious scripts, but the figure has since returned to normal.
Changes in percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked, Q4 2025
In Q4 2025, the percentage of ICS computers on which wormsinemailattachments were blocked increasedinallregions of the world.
Many of the blocked threats were related to the worm Backdoor.MSIL.XWorm. This malware is designed to persist on the system and then remotely control it.
Interestingly, this threat was not detected on ICS computers in the previous quarter, yet it appeared in all regions in Q4 2025.
A study found that the active spread of Backdoor.MSIL.XWorm via phishing emails was likely linked to the use by hackers of another malware obfuscation technique that was actively used during massive phishing campaigns in Q4 2025. These campaigns have been known since 2024 as “Curriculum-vitae-catalina”.
The attackers distributed phishing emails to HR managers, recruiters, and employees responsible for hiring. The messages were disguised as responses from job applicants with subjects such as “Resume” or “Attached Resume” and contained a malicious executable file under the guise of a curriculum vitae. Typically, the file was named Curriculum Vitae-Catalina.exe. When executed, it infected the system.
In Q4 2025, the threat spread across regions in two waves — one in October and another in November. Russia, Western Europe, South America, and North America (Canada) were attacked in October. A spike in Backdoor.MSIL.XWorm blocking was observed in other regions in November. The attack subsided in all regions in December.
The highest percentage of ICS computers on which Backdoor.MSIL.XWorm was blocked was observed in regions where threats from email clients had been historically blocked at high rates on ICS computers: Southern Europe, South America, and the Middle East.
At the same time, in Africa, where USB storage media are still actively used, the threat was also detected when removable devices were connected to ICS computers.
The biometrics sector has historically led the rankings of industries and OT infrastructures surveyed in this report in terms of the percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked.
These systems are characterized by accessibility to and from the internet, as well as minimal cybersecurity controls by the consumer organization.
Rankings of industries and OT infrastructure by percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked
In Q4 2025, the percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked increased only in one sector: oil and gas. The corresponding figures increased in two regions: Russia, and Central Asia and the South Caucasus.
However, if we look at a broader time span, there is a downward trend in all the surveyed industries.
Percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked in selected industries
In Q4 2025, Kaspersky protection solutions blocked malware from 10,142 different malware families of various categories on industrial automation systems.
Percentage of ICS computers on which the activity of malicious objects from various categories was blocked
In Q4 2025, there was an increase in the percentage of ICS computers on which worms, and miners in the form of executable files for Windows were blocked. These were the only categories that exhibited an increase.
Depending on the threat detection and blocking scenario, it is not always possible to reliably identify the source. The circumstantial evidence for a specific source can be the blocked threat’s type (category).
The internet (visiting malicious or compromised internet resources; malicious content distributed via messengers; cloud data storage and processing services and CDNs), email clients (phishing emails), and removable storage devices remain the primary sources of threats to computers in an organization’s technology infrastructure.
In Q4 2025, the percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects from various sources were blocked decreased. All sources except email clients saw their lowest levels in three years.
Percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects from various sources were blocked
The same computer can be attacked by several categories of malware from the same source during a quarter. That computer is counted when calculating the percentage of attacked computers for each threat category, but is only counted once for the threat source (we count unique attacked computers). In addition, it is not always possible to accurately determine the initial infection attempt. Therefore, the total percentage of ICS computers on which various categories of threats from a certain source were blocked can exceed the percentage of computers affected by the source itself.
Typical attacks blocked within an OT network are multi-step sequences of malicious activities, where each subsequent step of the attackers is aimed at increasing privileges and/or gaining access to other systems by exploiting the security problems of industrial enterprises, including OT infrastructures.
In Q4 2025, the percentage of ICS computers on which denylisted internet resources were blocked decreased to 3.26%. This is the lowest quarterly figure since the beginning of 2022, and it has decreased by 1.8 times since Q2 2025.
Percentage of ICS computers on which denylisted internet resources were blocked, Q1 2023–Q4 2025
Regionally, the percentage of ICS computers on which denylisted internet resources were blocked ranged from 1.74% in Northern Europe to 3.93% in Southeast Asia, which displaced Africa from first place. Russia rounded out the top three regions for this indicator.
The percentage of ICS computers on which malicious documents were blocked increased for three consecutive quarters. However, in Q4 2025 it decreased by 0.22 pp to 1.76%.
Percentage of ICS computers on which malicious documents were blocked, Q1 2023–Q4 2025
Regionally, the percentage ranged from 0.46% in Northern Europe to 3.82% in Southern Europe. In Q4 2025, the indicator increased in Eastern Europe, Russia, and Western Europe.
The percentage of ICS computers on which malicious scripts and phishing pages were blocked decreased to 6.58%. Despite the decline, this category led the rankings of threat categories in terms of the percentage of ICS computers on which they were blocked.
Percentage of ICS computers on which malicious scripts and phishing pages were blocked, Q1 2023–Q4 2025
Regionally, the percentage ranged from 2.52% in Northern Europe to 10.50% in South Asia. The indicator increased in South Asia, South America, Southern Europe, and Africa. South Asia saw the most notable increase, at 3.47 pp.
Malicious objects used to initially infect computers deliver next-stage malware — spyware, ransomware, and miners — to victims’ computers. As a rule, the higher the percentage of ICS computers on which the initial infection malware is blocked, the higher the percentage for next-stage malware.
In Q4 2025, the percentage of ICS computers on which spyware, ransomware and web miners were blocked decreased. The rates were:
The percentage of ICS computers on which miners in the form of executable files for Windows were blocked increased to 0.60% (up 0.03 pp).
Self-propagating malware (worms and viruses) is a category unto itself. Worms and virus-infected files were originally used for initial infection, but as botnet functionality evolved, they took on next-stage characteristics.
To spread across ICS networks, viruses and worms rely on removable media and network folders and are distributed in the form of infected files, such as archives with backups, office documents, pirated games and hacked applications. In rarer and more dangerous cases, web pages with network equipment settings, as well as files stored in internal document management systems, product lifecycle management (PLM) systems, resource management (ERP) systems and other web services are infected.
In Q4 2025, the percentage of ICS computers on which worms were blocked increased by 1.6 times to 1.60%. As mentioned above, this increase is related to a global phishing attack that spread the Backdoor.MSIL.XWorm backdoor worm across all regions of the world. The percentage increased in all regions. The biggest increase (up by 2.16 times) was in Southern Europe. The malware was primary distributed through email clients, and Southern Europe led the way in terms of the percentage of ICS computers on which threats from email clients were blocked.
The percentage of ICS computers on which viruses were blocked decreased to 1.33%.
This category of malware can spread in a variety of ways, so it does not belong to a specific group.
After an increase in the previous quarter, the percentage of ICS computers on which AutoCAD malware was blocked decreased to 0.29% in Q4 2025.
For more information on industrial threats see the full version of the report.
The percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked has been decreasing since the beginning of 2024. In Q4 2025, it was 19.7%. Over the past three years, the percentage has decreased by 1.36 times, and by 1.25 times since Q4 2023.
Percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked, Q1 2023–Q4 2025
Regionally, in Q4 2025, the percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked ranged from 8.5% in Northern Europe to 27.3% in Africa.
Regions ranked by percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked
Four regions saw an increase in the percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked. The most notable increases occurred in Southern Europe and South Asia. In Q3 2025, East Asia experienced a sharp increase triggered by the local spread of malicious scripts, but the figure has since returned to normal.
Changes in percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked, Q4 2025
In Q4 2025, the percentage of ICS computers on which wormsinemailattachments were blocked increasedinallregions of the world.
Many of the blocked threats were related to the worm Backdoor.MSIL.XWorm. This malware is designed to persist on the system and then remotely control it.
Interestingly, this threat was not detected on ICS computers in the previous quarter, yet it appeared in all regions in Q4 2025.
A study found that the active spread of Backdoor.MSIL.XWorm via phishing emails was likely linked to the use by hackers of another malware obfuscation technique that was actively used during massive phishing campaigns in Q4 2025. These campaigns have been known since 2024 as “Curriculum-vitae-catalina”.
The attackers distributed phishing emails to HR managers, recruiters, and employees responsible for hiring. The messages were disguised as responses from job applicants with subjects such as “Resume” or “Attached Resume” and contained a malicious executable file under the guise of a curriculum vitae. Typically, the file was named Curriculum Vitae-Catalina.exe. When executed, it infected the system.
In Q4 2025, the threat spread across regions in two waves — one in October and another in November. Russia, Western Europe, South America, and North America (Canada) were attacked in October. A spike in Backdoor.MSIL.XWorm blocking was observed in other regions in November. The attack subsided in all regions in December.
The highest percentage of ICS computers on which Backdoor.MSIL.XWorm was blocked was observed in regions where threats from email clients had been historically blocked at high rates on ICS computers: Southern Europe, South America, and the Middle East.
At the same time, in Africa, where USB storage media are still actively used, the threat was also detected when removable devices were connected to ICS computers.
The biometrics sector has historically led the rankings of industries and OT infrastructures surveyed in this report in terms of the percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked.
These systems are characterized by accessibility to and from the internet, as well as minimal cybersecurity controls by the consumer organization.
Rankings of industries and OT infrastructure by percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked
In Q4 2025, the percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked increased only in one sector: oil and gas. The corresponding figures increased in two regions: Russia, and Central Asia and the South Caucasus.
However, if we look at a broader time span, there is a downward trend in all the surveyed industries.
Percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked in selected industries
In Q4 2025, Kaspersky protection solutions blocked malware from 10,142 different malware families of various categories on industrial automation systems.
Percentage of ICS computers on which the activity of malicious objects from various categories was blocked
In Q4 2025, there was an increase in the percentage of ICS computers on which worms, and miners in the form of executable files for Windows were blocked. These were the only categories that exhibited an increase.
Depending on the threat detection and blocking scenario, it is not always possible to reliably identify the source. The circumstantial evidence for a specific source can be the blocked threat’s type (category).
The internet (visiting malicious or compromised internet resources; malicious content distributed via messengers; cloud data storage and processing services and CDNs), email clients (phishing emails), and removable storage devices remain the primary sources of threats to computers in an organization’s technology infrastructure.
In Q4 2025, the percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects from various sources were blocked decreased. All sources except email clients saw their lowest levels in three years.
Percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects from various sources were blocked
The same computer can be attacked by several categories of malware from the same source during a quarter. That computer is counted when calculating the percentage of attacked computers for each threat category, but is only counted once for the threat source (we count unique attacked computers). In addition, it is not always possible to accurately determine the initial infection attempt. Therefore, the total percentage of ICS computers on which various categories of threats from a certain source were blocked can exceed the percentage of computers affected by the source itself.
Typical attacks blocked within an OT network are multi-step sequences of malicious activities, where each subsequent step of the attackers is aimed at increasing privileges and/or gaining access to other systems by exploiting the security problems of industrial enterprises, including OT infrastructures.
In Q4 2025, the percentage of ICS computers on which denylisted internet resources were blocked decreased to 3.26%. This is the lowest quarterly figure since the beginning of 2022, and it has decreased by 1.8 times since Q2 2025.
Percentage of ICS computers on which denylisted internet resources were blocked, Q1 2023–Q4 2025
Regionally, the percentage of ICS computers on which denylisted internet resources were blocked ranged from 1.74% in Northern Europe to 3.93% in Southeast Asia, which displaced Africa from first place. Russia rounded out the top three regions for this indicator.
The percentage of ICS computers on which malicious documents were blocked increased for three consecutive quarters. However, in Q4 2025 it decreased by 0.22 pp to 1.76%.
Percentage of ICS computers on which malicious documents were blocked, Q1 2023–Q4 2025
Regionally, the percentage ranged from 0.46% in Northern Europe to 3.82% in Southern Europe. In Q4 2025, the indicator increased in Eastern Europe, Russia, and Western Europe.
The percentage of ICS computers on which malicious scripts and phishing pages were blocked decreased to 6.58%. Despite the decline, this category led the rankings of threat categories in terms of the percentage of ICS computers on which they were blocked.
Percentage of ICS computers on which malicious scripts and phishing pages were blocked, Q1 2023–Q4 2025
Regionally, the percentage ranged from 2.52% in Northern Europe to 10.50% in South Asia. The indicator increased in South Asia, South America, Southern Europe, and Africa. South Asia saw the most notable increase, at 3.47 pp.
Malicious objects used to initially infect computers deliver next-stage malware — spyware, ransomware, and miners — to victims’ computers. As a rule, the higher the percentage of ICS computers on which the initial infection malware is blocked, the higher the percentage for next-stage malware.
In Q4 2025, the percentage of ICS computers on which spyware, ransomware and web miners were blocked decreased. The rates were:
The percentage of ICS computers on which miners in the form of executable files for Windows were blocked increased to 0.60% (up 0.03 pp).
Self-propagating malware (worms and viruses) is a category unto itself. Worms and virus-infected files were originally used for initial infection, but as botnet functionality evolved, they took on next-stage characteristics.
To spread across ICS networks, viruses and worms rely on removable media and network folders and are distributed in the form of infected files, such as archives with backups, office documents, pirated games and hacked applications. In rarer and more dangerous cases, web pages with network equipment settings, as well as files stored in internal document management systems, product lifecycle management (PLM) systems, resource management (ERP) systems and other web services are infected.
In Q4 2025, the percentage of ICS computers on which worms were blocked increased by 1.6 times to 1.60%. As mentioned above, this increase is related to a global phishing attack that spread the Backdoor.MSIL.XWorm backdoor worm across all regions of the world. The percentage increased in all regions. The biggest increase (up by 2.16 times) was in Southern Europe. The malware was primary distributed through email clients, and Southern Europe led the way in terms of the percentage of ICS computers on which threats from email clients were blocked.
The percentage of ICS computers on which viruses were blocked decreased to 1.33%.
This category of malware can spread in a variety of ways, so it does not belong to a specific group.
After an increase in the previous quarter, the percentage of ICS computers on which AutoCAD malware was blocked decreased to 0.29% in Q4 2025.
For more information on industrial threats see the full version of the report.
In March 2026, we discovered an active campaign promoting previously unknown malware in private Telegram chats. The Trojan was offered as a MaaS (malware‑as‑a‑service) with three subscription tiers. It caught our attention because of its extensive arsenal of capabilities. On the panel provided to third‑party actors, in addition to the standard features of RAT‑like malware, a stealer, keylogger, clipper, and spyware are also available. Most surprisingly, it also includes prankware capabilities: a large set of features designed to trick, annoy, and troll the user. Such a combination of capabilities makes it a rather unique Trojan in its category.
Kaspersky’s products detect this threat as Backdoor.Win64.CrystalX.*, Trojan.Win64.Agent.*, Trojan.Win32.Agentb.gen.
The new malware was first mentioned in January 2026 in a private Telegram chat for developers of RAT malware. The author actively promoted their creation, called Webcrystal RAT, by attaching screenshots of the web panel. Many users observed that the panel layout was identical to that of the previously known WebRAT (also called Salat Stealer), leading them to label this malware as a copy. Additional similarities included the fact that the RAT was written in Go, and the messages from the bot selling access keys to the control panel closely matched those of the WebRAT bots.
After some time, this malware was rebranded and received a new name, CrystalX RAT. Its promotion moved to a corresponding new channel, which is quite busy and features marketing tricks, such as access key draws and polls. Moreover, it expanded beyond Telegram: a special YouTube channel was created, aimed at marketing promotion and already containing a video review of the capabilities of this malware.
By default, the malware control panel provides third parties with an auto‑builder featuring a wide range of configurations, such as selective geoblocking by country, anti‑analysis functions, an executable icon, and others. Each implant is compressed using zlib and then encrypted with ChaCha20 and a hard‑coded 32‑byte key with a 12‑byte nonce. The malware has basic anti‑debugging functionality combined with additional optional capabilities:
LoginHKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings, blacklisting names of certain processes (Fiddler, Burp Suite, mitmproxy, etc.), and verifying the presence of installed certificates for the corresponding programsAmsiScanBuffer, EtwEventWrite, MiniDumpWriteDumpWhen launched, the malware establishes a connection to its C2 using a hard‑coded URL over the WebSocket protocol. It performs an initial collection of system information, after which all data is sent in JSON format as plain text. Then the malware executes the stealer function, doing so either once or at predefined intervals depending on the build options. The stealer extracts the victim’s credentials for Steam, Discord, and Telegram from the system. It also gathers data from Chromium‑based browsers using the popular ChromeElevator utility. To do this, it decodes and decompresses the utility using base64 and gunzip and saves it to %TEMP%\svc[rndInt].exe, then creates a directory %TEMP%\co[rndInt], where the collected data is stored, and finally runs ChromeElevator with all available options.
The collected data is exfiltrated to the C2. For Yandex and Opera browsers, the stealer has a separate proprietary implementation with base decryption directly on the victim’s system. Notably, the builds created at the time the article was written lack the stealer functionality. OSINT results show that the author intentionally removed it with the aim to update the stealer arsenal before enabling it again.
Another option of the RAT is the keylogger. All user input is instantly transmitted via WebSocket to the C2, where it is assembled into a coherent text suitable for analysis. Additionally, the malware allows the attacker to read and modify the victim’s clipboard by issuing appropriate commands from the control panel. Moreover, it can inject a malicious clipper into the Chrome or Edge browser. This happens according to the following algorithm:
clipper:set:[ADDR1,...] with the attackers’ crypto‑wallets addresses passed as arguments launches the clipper injection thread.%LOCALAPPDATA%\Microsoft\Edge\ExtSvc directory is created (regardless whether Edge or Chrome is the target of the injection), in which a malicious extension is stored, consisting of a manifest and a single JS script named content.js.content.js script is dynamically generated, containing regular expressions for crypto wallet addresses (such as Bitcoin, Litecoin, Monero, Avalanche, Doge, and others) and substitution values.Page.addScriptToEvaluateOnNewDocument.The final script looks as follows:
The malware has a large set of commands for remote access to the victim’s system. The attacker can upload arbitrary files, execute any commands using cmd.exe, and also browse the file system, including all available drives. Moreover, the RAT includes its own VNC that allows the attacker to view the victim’s screen and control it remotely. Since both the attacker and the victim use the same session, the panel provides a number of buttons to block user input so that the attacker can perform necessary actions unhindered. The malware can also capture the audio stream from the microphone and the video stream from the camera in the background.
The finishing touch is a separate section of the panel named “Rofl” with commands whose functions consist of various pranks on the victim.
cmd.exe.Moreover, the attacker can send a message to the victim, after which a dialog window will open in the system, allowing a bidirectional chat.
The sheer variety of available RATs has perpetuated demand, as actors prioritize flexibility of existing malware and its infrastructure. Thus, CrystalX RAT represents a highly functional MaaS platform that is not limited to espionage capabilities – spyware, keylogging and remote control – but includes unique stealer and prankware features. At the moment, the vector of the initial infection is not precisely known, but it affects dozens of victims. Although to date, we have only seen infection attempts in Russia, the MaaS itself has no regional restrictions meaning it may attack anywhere around the globe. Moreover, our telemetry has recorded new implant versions, which indicates that this malware is still being actively developed and maintained. Combined with the growing PR campaign for CrystalX RAT, it can be concluded that the number of victims can increase significantly in the near future.
# C2 infrastructure
webcrystal[.]lol
webcrystal[.]sbs
crystalxrat[.]top
# CrystalX RAT implants
47ACCB0ECFE8CCD466752DDE1864F3B0
2DBE6DE177241C144D06355C381B868C
49C74B302BFA32E45B7C1C5780DD0976
88C60DF2A1414CBF24430A74AE9836E0
E540E9797E3B814BFE0A82155DFE135D
1A68AE614FB2D8875CB0573E6A721B46
In March 2026, we discovered an active campaign promoting previously unknown malware in private Telegram chats. The Trojan was offered as a MaaS (malware‑as‑a‑service) with three subscription tiers. It caught our attention because of its extensive arsenal of capabilities. On the panel provided to third‑party actors, in addition to the standard features of RAT‑like malware, a stealer, keylogger, clipper, and spyware are also available. Most surprisingly, it also includes prankware capabilities: a large set of features designed to trick, annoy, and troll the user. Such a combination of capabilities makes it a rather unique Trojan in its category.
Kaspersky’s products detect this threat as Backdoor.Win64.CrystalX.*, Trojan.Win64.Agent.*, Trojan.Win32.Agentb.gen.
The new malware was first mentioned in January 2026 in a private Telegram chat for developers of RAT malware. The author actively promoted their creation, called Webcrystal RAT, by attaching screenshots of the web panel. Many users observed that the panel layout was identical to that of the previously known WebRAT (also called Salat Stealer), leading them to label this malware as a copy. Additional similarities included the fact that the RAT was written in Go, and the messages from the bot selling access keys to the control panel closely matched those of the WebRAT bots.
After some time, this malware was rebranded and received a new name, CrystalX RAT. Its promotion moved to a corresponding new channel, which is quite busy and features marketing tricks, such as access key draws and polls. Moreover, it expanded beyond Telegram: a special YouTube channel was created, aimed at marketing promotion and already containing a video review of the capabilities of this malware.
By default, the malware control panel provides third parties with an auto‑builder featuring a wide range of configurations, such as selective geoblocking by country, anti‑analysis functions, an executable icon, and others. Each implant is compressed using zlib and then encrypted with ChaCha20 and a hard‑coded 32‑byte key with a 12‑byte nonce. The malware has basic anti‑debugging functionality combined with additional optional capabilities:
HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings, blacklisting names of certain processes (Fiddler, Burp Suite, mitmproxy, etc.), and verifying the presence of installed certificates for the corresponding programsAmsiScanBuffer, EtwEventWrite, MiniDumpWriteDumpWhen launched, the malware establishes a connection to its C2 using a hard‑coded URL over the WebSocket protocol. It performs an initial collection of system information, after which all data is sent in JSON format as plain text. Then the malware executes the stealer function, doing so either once or at predefined intervals depending on the build options. The stealer extracts the victim’s credentials for Steam, Discord, and Telegram from the system. It also gathers data from Chromium‑based browsers using the popular ChromeElevator utility. To do this, it decodes and decompresses the utility using base64 and gunzip and saves it to %TEMP%\svc[rndInt].exe, then creates a directory %TEMP%\co[rndInt], where the collected data is stored, and finally runs ChromeElevator with all available options.
The collected data is exfiltrated to the C2. For Yandex and Opera browsers, the stealer has a separate proprietary implementation with base decryption directly on the victim’s system. Notably, the builds created at the time the article was written lack the stealer functionality. OSINT results show that the author intentionally removed it with the aim to update the stealer arsenal before enabling it again.
Another option of the RAT is the keylogger. All user input is instantly transmitted via WebSocket to the C2, where it is assembled into a coherent text suitable for analysis. Additionally, the malware allows the attacker to read and modify the victim’s clipboard by issuing appropriate commands from the control panel. Moreover, it can inject a malicious clipper into the Chrome or Edge browser. This happens according to the following algorithm:
clipper:set:[ADDR1,...] with the attackers’ crypto‑wallets addresses passed as arguments launches the clipper injection thread.%LOCALAPPDATA%\Microsoft\Edge\ExtSvc directory is created (regardless whether Edge or Chrome is the target of the injection), in which a malicious extension is stored, consisting of a manifest and a single JS script named content.js.content.js script is dynamically generated, containing regular expressions for crypto wallet addresses (such as Bitcoin, Litecoin, Monero, Avalanche, Doge, and others) and substitution values.Page.addScriptToEvaluateOnNewDocument.The final script looks as follows:
The malware has a large set of commands for remote access to the victim’s system. The attacker can upload arbitrary files, execute any commands using cmd.exe, and also browse the file system, including all available drives. Moreover, the RAT includes its own VNC that allows the attacker to view the victim’s screen and control it remotely. Since both the attacker and the victim use the same session, the panel provides a number of buttons to block user input so that the attacker can perform necessary actions unhindered. The malware can also capture the audio stream from the microphone and the video stream from the camera in the background.
The finishing touch is a separate section of the panel named “Rofl” with commands whose functions consist of various pranks on the victim.
cmd.exe.Moreover, the attacker can send a message to the victim, after which a dialog window will open in the system, allowing a bidirectional chat.
The sheer variety of available RATs has perpetuated demand, as actors prioritize flexibility of existing malware and its infrastructure. Thus, CrystalX RAT represents a highly functional MaaS platform that is not limited to espionage capabilities – spyware, keylogging and remote control – but includes unique stealer and prankware features. At the moment, the vector of the initial infection is not precisely known, but it affects dozens of victims. Although to date, we have only seen infection attempts in Russia, the MaaS itself has no regional restrictions meaning it may attack anywhere around the globe. Moreover, our telemetry has recorded new implant versions, which indicates that this malware is still being actively developed and maintained. Combined with the growing PR campaign for CrystalX RAT, it can be concluded that the number of victims can increase significantly in the near future.
# C2 infrastructure
webcrystal[.]lol
webcrystal[.]sbs
crystalxrat[.]top
# CrystalX RAT implants
47ACCB0ECFE8CCD466752DDE1864F3B0
2DBE6DE177241C144D06355C381B868C
49C74B302BFA32E45B7C1C5780DD0976
88C60DF2A1414CBF24430A74AE9836E0
E540E9797E3B814BFE0A82155DFE135D
1A68AE614FB2D8875CB0573E6A721B46
Cybersecurity researchers have taken a close look at the inner workings of the Predator spyware, developed by the Cyprus-based company Intellexa. Rather than focusing on how the spyware initially infects a device, this latest research zooms in on how the malware behaves once a device has already been compromised.
The most fascinating discovery involves the mechanisms the Trojan uses to hide iOS camera and microphone indicators. By doing so, it can covertly spy on the infected user. In today’s post, we break down what Predator spyware actually is, how the iOS indicator system is designed to work, and how this malware manages to disable these indicators.
We previously took a deep dive into the most notorious commercial spyware out there in a dedicated feature — where we discussed the star of today’s post, Predator, among the others. You can check out that earlier post for a detailed review of this spyware, but for now, here’s a quick refresher on the essentials.
Predator was originally developed by a North Macedonian company named Cytrox. It was later acquired by the aforementioned Intellexa, a Cyprus-registered firm owned by a former Israeli intelligence officer — a truly international spy games collaboration.
Strictly speaking, Predator is the second half of a spyware duo designed to monitor iOS and Android users. The first component is named Alien; it’s responsible for compromising a device and installing Predator. As you might’ve guessed, these pieces of malware are named after the famous Alien vs. Predator franchise.
An attack using Intellexa’s software typically begins with a message containing a malicious link. When the victim clicks it, they’re directed to a site that leverages a chain of browser and OS vulnerabilities to infect the device. To keep things looking normal and avoid raising suspicion, the user is then redirected to a legitimate website.
Besides Alien, Intellexa offers several other delivery vehicles for landing Predator on a target’s device. These include the Mars and Jupiter systems, which are installed on the service provider’s side to infect devices through a man-in-the-middle attack.
Predator spyware for iOS comes packed with a wide array of surveillance tools. Most notably, it can record and transmit data from the device’s camera and microphone. Naturally, to keep the user from catching on to this suspicious activity, the system’s built-in recording indicators — the green and orange dots at the top of the screen — must be disabled. While it’s been known for some time that Predator could somehow hide these alerts, it’s only thanks to this research that we know how exactly it pulls it off.
To understand how Predator disables these indicators, we first need to look at how iOS handles them. Since the release of iOS 14 in 2020, Apple devices have alerted users whenever the microphone or camera is active by displaying an orange or green dot at the top of the screen. If both are running simultaneously, only the green dot is shown.
In iOS 14 and later, an orange dot appears at the top of the screen when the microphone is in use. Source
Just like other iOS user interface elements, recording indicators are managed by a process called SpringBoard, which is responsible for the device’s system-wide UI. When an app starts using the camera or microphone, the system registers the change in that specific module’s state. This activity data is then gathered by an internal system component, which passes the information to SpringBoard for processing. Once SpringBoard receives word that the camera or microphone is active, it toggles the green or orange dot on or off based on that data.
If the camera is in use (or both the camera and microphone are), a green dot appears. Source
From an app’s perspective, the process works like this: first, the app requests permission to access the camera or microphone through the standard iOS permission mechanism. When the app actually needs to use one or both of these modules, it calls the iOS system API. If the user has granted permission, iOS activates the requested module and automatically updates the status indicator. These indicators are strictly controlled by the operating system; third-party apps have no direct access to them.
Cybersecurity researchers analyzed a captured version of Predator and uncovered traces of multiple techniques used by the spyware’s creators to bypass built-in iOS mechanisms and disable recording indicators.
In the first approach — which appears to have been used during early development — the malware attempted to interfere with the indicators at the display stage right after SpringBoard received word that the camera or microphone was active. However, this method was likely deemed too complex and unreliable by the developers. As a result, this specific function remains in the Trojan as dead code — it’s never actually executed.
Ultimately, Predator settled on a simpler, more effective method that operates at the very level where the system receives data about the camera or microphone being turned on. To do this, Predator intercepts the communication between SpringBoard and the specific component responsible for collecting activity data from these modules.
By exploiting the specific characteristics of Objective-C — the programming language used to write the SpringBoard application — the malware completely blocks the signals indicating that the camera or microphone has been activated. As a result, SpringBoard never receives the signal that the module’s status has changed, so it never triggers the recording indicators.
Predator-grade spyware is quite expensive, and typically reserved for high-stakes industrial or state-sponsored espionage. On one hand, this means defending against such a high-tier threat is difficult — and achieving 100% protection is likely impossible. On the other hand, for these same reasons, the average user is statistically unlikely to be targeted.
However, if you’ve reason to believe you’re at risk from Predator or Pegasus-class spyware, here are a few steps you can take to make an attacker’s job much harder:
For a deeper dive into staying safe, check out security expert Costin Raiu’s post: Staying safe from Pegasus, Chrysaor and other APT mobile malware.
Curious about other ways your smartphone might be used to spy on you? Check out our related posts:
This is coming:
The Irish government is planning to bolster its police’s ability to intercept communications, including encrypted messages, and provide a legal basis for spyware use.
The Predator spyware is more sophisticated and dangerous than previously realized.
The post Predator Spyware Turns Failed Attacks Into Intelligence for Future Exploits appeared first on SecurityWeek.
In Q3 2025, the percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked decreased from the previous quarter by 0.4 pp to 20.1%. This is the lowest level for the observed period.
Percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked, Q3 2022–Q3 2025
Regionally, the percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked ranged from 9.2% in Northern Europe to 27.4% in Africa.
Regions ranked by percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked
In Q3 2025, the percentage increased in five regions. The most notable increase occurred in East Asia, triggered by the local spread of malicious scripts in the OT infrastructure of engineering organizations and ICS integrators.
Changes in the percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked, Q3 2025
The biometrics sector traditionally led the rankings of the industries and OT infrastructures surveyed in this report in terms of the percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked.
Rankings of industries and OT infrastructures by percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked
In Q3 2025, the percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked increased in four of the seven surveyed industries. The most notable increases were in engineering and ICS integrators, and manufacturing.
Percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked in selected industries
In Q3 2025, Kaspersky protection solutions blocked malware from 11,356 different malware families of various categories on industrial automation systems.
Percentage of ICS computers on which the activity of malicious objects of various categories was blocked
In Q3 2025, there was a decrease in the percentage of ICS computers on which denylisted internet resources and miners of both categories were blocked. These were the only categories that exhibited a decrease.
Depending on the threat detection and blocking scenario, it is not always possible to reliably identify the source. The circumstantial evidence for a specific source can be the blocked threat’s type (category).
The internet (visiting malicious or compromised internet resources; malicious content distributed via messengers; cloud data storage and processing services and CDNs), email clients (phishing emails), and removable storage devices remain the primary sources of threats to computers in an organization’s technology infrastructure.
In Q3 2025, the percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects from various sources were blocked decreased.
Percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects from various sources were blocked
The same computer can be attacked by several categories of malware from the same source during a quarter. That computer is counted when calculating the percentage of attacked computers for each threat category, but is only counted once for the threat source (we count unique attacked computers). In addition, it is not always possible to accurately determine the initial infection attempt. Therefore, the total percentage of ICS computers on which various categories of threats from a certain source were blocked can exceed the percentage of threats from the source itself.
Typical attacks blocked within an OT network are multi-step sequences of malicious activities, where each subsequent step of the attackers is aimed at increasing privileges and/or gaining access to other systems by exploiting the security problems of industrial enterprises, including technological infrastructures.
In Q3 2025, the percentage of ICS computers on which denylisted internet resources were blocked decreased to 4.01%. This is the lowest quarterly figure since the beginning of 2022.
Percentage of ICS computers on which denylisted internet resources were blocked, Q3 2022–Q3 2025
Regionally, the percentage of ICS computers on which denylisted internet resources were blocked ranged from 2.35% in Australia and New Zealand to 4.96% in Africa. Southeast Asia and South Asia were also among the top three regions for this indicator.
The percentage of ICS computers on which malicious documents were blocked has grown for three consecutive quarters, following a decline at the end of 2024. In Q3 2025, it reached 1,98%.
Percentage of ICS computers on which malicious documents were blocked, Q3 2022–Q3 2025
The indicator increased in four regions: South America, East Asia, Southeast Asia, and Australia and New Zealand. South America saw the largest increase as a result of a large-scale phishing campaign in which attackers used new exploits for an old vulnerability (CVE-2017-11882) in Microsoft Office Equation Editor to deliver various spyware to victims’ computers. It is noteworthy that the attackers in this phishing campaign used localized Spanish-language emails disguised as business correspondence.
In Q3 2025, the percentage of ICS computers on which malicious scripts and phishing pages were blocked increased to 6.79%. This category led the rankings of threat categories in terms of the percentage of ICS computers on which they were blocked.
Percentage of ICS computers on which malicious scripts and phishing pages were blocked, Q3 2022–Q3 2025
Regionally, the percentage of ICS computers on which malicious scripts and phishing pages were blocked ranged from 2.57% in Northern Europe to 9.41% in Africa. The top three regions for this indicator were Africa, East Asia, and South America. The indicator increased the most in East Asia (by a dramatic 5.23 pp) as a result of the local spread of malicious spyware scripts loaded into the memory of popular torrent clients including MediaGet.
Malicious objects used to initially infect computers deliver next-stage malware — spyware, ransomware, and miners — to victims’ computers. As a rule, the higher the percentage of ICS computers on which the initial infection malware is blocked, the higher the percentage for next-stage malware.
In Q3 2025, the percentage of ICS computers on which spyware and ransomware were blocked increased. The rates were:
The percentage of ICS computers on which miners of both categories were blocked decreased. The rates were:
Self-propagating malware (worms and viruses) is a category unto itself. Worms and virus-infected files were originally used for initial infection, but as botnet functionality evolved, they took on next-stage characteristics.
To spread across ICS networks, viruses and worms rely on removable media and network folders in the form of infected files, such as archives with backups, office documents, pirated games and hacked applications. In rarer and more dangerous cases, web pages with network equipment settings, as well as files stored in internal document management systems, product lifecycle management (PLM) systems, resource management (ERP) systems and other web services are infected.
In Q3 2025, the percentage of ICS computers on which worms and viruses were blocked increased to 1.26% (by 0.04 pp) and 1.40% (by 0.11 pp), respectively.
This category of malware can spread in a variety of ways, so it does not belong to a specific group.
In Q3 2025, the percentage of ICS computers on which AutoCAD malware was blocked slightly increased to 0.30% (by 0.01 pp).
For more information on industrial threats see the full version of the report.
In Q3 2025, the percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked decreased from the previous quarter by 0.4 pp to 20.1%. This is the lowest level for the observed period.
Percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked, Q3 2022–Q3 2025
Regionally, the percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked ranged from 9.2% in Northern Europe to 27.4% in Africa.
Regions ranked by percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked
In Q3 2025, the percentage increased in five regions. The most notable increase occurred in East Asia, triggered by the local spread of malicious scripts in the OT infrastructure of engineering organizations and ICS integrators.
Changes in the percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked, Q3 2025
The biometrics sector traditionally led the rankings of the industries and OT infrastructures surveyed in this report in terms of the percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked.
Rankings of industries and OT infrastructures by percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked
In Q3 2025, the percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked increased in four of the seven surveyed industries. The most notable increases were in engineering and ICS integrators, and manufacturing.
Percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects were blocked in selected industries
In Q3 2025, Kaspersky protection solutions blocked malware from 11,356 different malware families of various categories on industrial automation systems.
Percentage of ICS computers on which the activity of malicious objects of various categories was blocked
In Q3 2025, there was a decrease in the percentage of ICS computers on which denylisted internet resources and miners of both categories were blocked. These were the only categories that exhibited a decrease.
Depending on the threat detection and blocking scenario, it is not always possible to reliably identify the source. The circumstantial evidence for a specific source can be the blocked threat’s type (category).
The internet (visiting malicious or compromised internet resources; malicious content distributed via messengers; cloud data storage and processing services and CDNs), email clients (phishing emails), and removable storage devices remain the primary sources of threats to computers in an organization’s technology infrastructure.
In Q3 2025, the percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects from various sources were blocked decreased.
Percentage of ICS computers on which malicious objects from various sources were blocked
The same computer can be attacked by several categories of malware from the same source during a quarter. That computer is counted when calculating the percentage of attacked computers for each threat category, but is only counted once for the threat source (we count unique attacked computers). In addition, it is not always possible to accurately determine the initial infection attempt. Therefore, the total percentage of ICS computers on which various categories of threats from a certain source were blocked can exceed the percentage of threats from the source itself.
Typical attacks blocked within an OT network are multi-step sequences of malicious activities, where each subsequent step of the attackers is aimed at increasing privileges and/or gaining access to other systems by exploiting the security problems of industrial enterprises, including technological infrastructures.
In Q3 2025, the percentage of ICS computers on which denylisted internet resources were blocked decreased to 4.01%. This is the lowest quarterly figure since the beginning of 2022.
Percentage of ICS computers on which denylisted internet resources were blocked, Q3 2022–Q3 2025
Regionally, the percentage of ICS computers on which denylisted internet resources were blocked ranged from 2.35% in Australia and New Zealand to 4.96% in Africa. Southeast Asia and South Asia were also among the top three regions for this indicator.
The percentage of ICS computers on which malicious documents were blocked has grown for three consecutive quarters, following a decline at the end of 2024. In Q3 2025, it reached 1,98%.
Percentage of ICS computers on which malicious documents were blocked, Q3 2022–Q3 2025
The indicator increased in four regions: South America, East Asia, Southeast Asia, and Australia and New Zealand. South America saw the largest increase as a result of a large-scale phishing campaign in which attackers used new exploits for an old vulnerability (CVE-2017-11882) in Microsoft Office Equation Editor to deliver various spyware to victims’ computers. It is noteworthy that the attackers in this phishing campaign used localized Spanish-language emails disguised as business correspondence.
In Q3 2025, the percentage of ICS computers on which malicious scripts and phishing pages were blocked increased to 6.79%. This category led the rankings of threat categories in terms of the percentage of ICS computers on which they were blocked.
Percentage of ICS computers on which malicious scripts and phishing pages were blocked, Q3 2022–Q3 2025
Regionally, the percentage of ICS computers on which malicious scripts and phishing pages were blocked ranged from 2.57% in Northern Europe to 9.41% in Africa. The top three regions for this indicator were Africa, East Asia, and South America. The indicator increased the most in East Asia (by a dramatic 5.23 pp) as a result of the local spread of malicious spyware scripts loaded into the memory of popular torrent clients including MediaGet.
Malicious objects used to initially infect computers deliver next-stage malware — spyware, ransomware, and miners — to victims’ computers. As a rule, the higher the percentage of ICS computers on which the initial infection malware is blocked, the higher the percentage for next-stage malware.
In Q3 2025, the percentage of ICS computers on which spyware and ransomware were blocked increased. The rates were:
The percentage of ICS computers on which miners of both categories were blocked decreased. The rates were:
Self-propagating malware (worms and viruses) is a category unto itself. Worms and virus-infected files were originally used for initial infection, but as botnet functionality evolved, they took on next-stage characteristics.
To spread across ICS networks, viruses and worms rely on removable media and network folders in the form of infected files, such as archives with backups, office documents, pirated games and hacked applications. In rarer and more dangerous cases, web pages with network equipment settings, as well as files stored in internal document management systems, product lifecycle management (PLM) systems, resource management (ERP) systems and other web services are infected.
In Q3 2025, the percentage of ICS computers on which worms and viruses were blocked increased to 1.26% (by 0.04 pp) and 1.40% (by 0.11 pp), respectively.
This category of malware can spread in a variety of ways, so it does not belong to a specific group.
In Q3 2025, the percentage of ICS computers on which AutoCAD malware was blocked slightly increased to 0.30% (by 0.01 pp).
For more information on industrial threats see the full version of the report.
Heather Doerges // My mom called the other day. It started out, “Honestly, your father.” Which, isn’t a strange way for her to start a conversation about my dad. “What […]
The post That One Time My Parents Were Hacked appeared first on Black Hills Information Security, Inc..
