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Shai-Hulud copycat worm infects yet another npm package

A Shai-Hulud copycat has turned up in yet another npm package just five days after TeamPCP open sourced the worm and announced a supply-chain attack competition on BreachForums. The poisoned package, chalk-tempalte, masquerades as an extension for the popular JavaScript terminal string styling library Chalk. It now contains a clone of Shai-Hulud, which TeamPCP published last week on GitHub after poisoning more than 170 npm packages with the credential-stealing malware as part of the ongoing supply chain attacks targeting open source dev tools. Plus, the same scumbag that uploaded the worm to chalk-tempalte also published three other malicious npm packages - @deadcode09284814/axios-util, axois-utils, and color-style-utils - containing infostealer code, according to Ox security researchers, which detected and reported the malware over the weekend. “The four malwares are inherently different, as the collected data varies between them, including exfiltrated IP addresses, cloud configurations, crypto wallets, environment variables, and even one malware turning the victim’s machine into a DDoS botnet – all from the same npm user,” researcher Moshe Siman Tov Bustan wrote on Sunday. Anyone installing any version of the packages is affected, he added, noting the total number of weekly downloads is 2,678. On Monday, the researchers told The Register that the npm user behind all four new stealer infections ran the supply-chain campaign from a home computer or local server farm. "The use of lhr.life is a clear indicator of a reverse proxy used to expose an internal network to the internet," they wrote in an email, adding that the miscreant(s) seem to be financially motivated as the code targets victims' cryptocurrency wallets and accounts. Plus, the DDoS botnet component "could indicate affiliation with anarchy groups looking to take down infrastructure and services, or intent to sell it as DDoS-as-a-service," they added. If you are running any of the four, immediately uninstall the malicious package and delete any related malicious configuration from IDEs and Claude Code or other coding agents. You should also rotate your keys on any affected machines, and check for GitHub repositories containing the string “A Mini Sha1-Hulud has Appeared,” the application security shop cautions. The Shai-Hulud copycat, like the original worm, steals secrets, credentials, crypto wallets, accounts, and other sensitive data, and sends all of this to a remote command-and-control server: 87e0bbc636999b[.]lhr[.]life. It also uploaded the stolen credentials to a new GitHub repository. The @deadcode09284814/axios-util malware collects and exfiltrates SSH keys, environment variables, and cloud credentials to 80[.]200[.]28[.]28:2222, and the color-style-utils stealer hoovers up IP addresses, IP geo-locations, and crypto wallets and sends them to edcf8b03c84634[.]lhr[.]life. The fourth malicious npm package (axois-utils) calls its payload a “phantom bot.” The code is written in Go, and contains a DDoS botnet that floods websites with HTTP, TCP, UDP and Reset requests. Persistence mechanisms also ensure it remains on the infected machine even after the package has been deleted. All four of these are from the same npm user, and Bustan warns that this influx of infostealers spreading across npm is “just the first phase of an upcoming wave of supply chain attacks coming.”®

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Grafana Labs admits all its codebase are belong to someone who popped its GitHub account

Observability outfit Grafana Labs has revealed that an attacker accessed its GitHub repository and stole its codebase. In social media posts the company blamed the situation on an “unauthorized party” who was somehow able to obtain a token that offered access to its GitHub environment. The company thinks it has identified the source of the credential leak, and therefore “invalidated the compromised credentials and implemented additional security measures to further secure our environment against unauthorized access.” But that didn’t stop the attacker from threatening to release the company’s code unless Grafana paid a ransom. Grafana says it won’t pay. “Based on our operational experience and the published stance of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, which notes that ‘paying a ransom doesn't guarantee you or your organization will get any data back’ and only ‘offers an incentive for others to get involved in this type of illegal activity,’ we have determined the appropriate path forward is to not pay the ransom,” the company wrote. It’s not clear if that stance is entirely principled, because plenty of Grafana’s products are already open source. The company’s posts suggest that the attacker accessed code that is not freely available. The Register has sought clarification about just what the attacker accessed, because if they lifted code that’s mostly already open source there’s little reason for Grafana to pay a ransom! Grafana’s decision not to pay may also be easier than it is for other victims of cybercrime because the company says it “determined that no customer data or personal information was accessed during this incident, and we have found no evidence of impact to customer systems or operations.” The company therefore appears confident that whatever code the attackers downloaded won’t make a material different to its business, or harm customers. The same couldn’t be said for educationware giant Canvas, which last week paid extortionists after they claimed to have stolen data describing over 275 million students and faculty. The Register will update this story if we receive additional information from Grafana Labs. ®

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Canvas hack: is it ever a good idea to pay a ransom, and what happens to the data?

Businesses are advised against paying – but many are prepared to deal to protect users’ privacy

After a week of outages, hundreds of millions of students’ data stolen, delayed assignment due dates and school login pages being defaced by hackers, the US tech firm Instructure – which operates the education platform Canvas, used by education providers worldwide – announced it had “reached an agreement with the unauthorised actor” behind the ransomware attack.

Experts read the careful language as a sign that a ransom has been paid. The company has not confirmed this.

Continue reading...

© Photograph: Boonchai Wedmakawand/Getty Images

© Photograph: Boonchai Wedmakawand/Getty Images

© Photograph: Boonchai Wedmakawand/Getty Images

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Nobody believes the 'criminals and scumbags' who hacked Canvas really deleted stolen student data

FEATURE When Instructure “reached an agreement” with data theft and extortion crew ShinyHunters this week, the education tech giant assured Canvas users after attackers claimed to have stolen data tied to 275 million students, teachers, and staff that their private chats and email addresses would not turn up on a dark-web marketplace, and that they would not be extorted over the incident. “We received digital confirmation of data destruction (shred logs),” Instructure assured the nearly 9,000 affected universities and K-12 schools. “We have been informed that no Instructure customers will be extorted as a result of this incident, publicly or otherwise.” Not a single responder that The Register spoke with believes this is true. “Do I believe they deleted the data? No. They're criminals and scumbags,” Recorded Future threat intelligence analyst Allan Liska, aka the Ransomware Sommelier, told us. “But, this is part of what Max Smeets calls ‘The Ransomware Trust Paradox,’” he added. “Ransomware groups have to, minimally, not post data they claimed to have deleted or no one will pay them in the future, but this is done knowing that the data is likely not deleted.” Halcyon Ransomware Research Center SVP Cynthia Kaiser, who previously spent two decades at the FBI, said she doesn’t think that anyone who studies ransomware groups’ operations believes the gang actually destroyed the stolen files. “‘We destroyed the data’ is a standard line from extortion groups once a payment is made or negotiations conclude, but time after time it has proven untrue,” Kaiser told The Register. “ShinyHunters in particular has a documented history of recycling, reselling, and re-leveraging stolen data across campaigns – data they claimed was contained from earlier intrusions has resurfaced on criminal forums months and years later.” Kaiser also doesn’t think this is the last threat that the schools will face from the Canvas breach. “Halcyon expects targeted phishing waves against staff, students, and parents over the next six to 12 months using leaked names, email addresses, and Canvas chat context to make the lures convincing,” she said. To be clear: Instructure execs never directly said the company paid the ransom, and we don’t know the exact amount of money the criminals demanded from the digital learning biz. We do know, however, that “reached an agreement” is corporate-speak for the victim paid up. Alliance Risk CEO David Vainer estimates the figure sits somewhere between $5 million and $30 million. Meanwhile, this latest extortion attack illustrates the impossible choice facing organizations entrusted with protecting people’s data when digital thieves breach their networks and steal sensitive information. “The FBI says don’t pay,” Doug Thompson, chief education architect at cybersecurity firm Tanium, told The Register. “But the operational reality at 3 a.m. during finals week or enrollment season can push institutions toward a very different calculation. Until that incentive structure changes, education is likely to remain unusually vulnerable to extortion pressure.” To pay, or not to pay? The US federal government, law enforcement agencies, and private-sector threat intelligence analysts all advise victims not to pay a ransom. “Paying ransoms rewards and incentivizes the criminals, funding their search for new victims, and I’ve long advocated before for a ban on ransomware payments,” Emsisoft threat analyst Luke Connolly told us. “But in the absence of regulation applying to all organizations, the stark reality is that Instructure faced a crisis, and they negotiated to try to minimize risk and harm.” No company wants to pay a ransom to its attackers, and most say they won’t – at least in principle – because they don’t want to fund criminal operations and incentivize the crooks. There’s also no guarantee that paying will guarantee the return of their data or prevent additional extortion attempts. CrowdStrike surveyed 1,100 global security leaders last summer, and of the 78 percent who said they experienced a ransomware attack in the past year, 83 percent of those that paid ransoms were attacked again. Plus 93 percent lost data regardless of payment. While data suggests that fewer organizations are paying criminals’ ransom demands - Chainalysis found the percentage of paying victims in 2025 dropped to an all-time low of 28 percent, despite attacks hitting record highs - when faced with extortion or a ransomware infection, the "to pay or not to pay" debate becomes much more complicated. “Most organizations still say publicly that they won't pay, and many genuinely don't, but when the alternative is mass downstream harm to students, parents, and thousands of customer institutions, the calculus shifts,” Kaiser said. “Pay-or-leak groups like ShinyHunters specifically engineer that calculus by creating intense financial and reputational pressure, and when demands go unmet, they escalate to direct harassment of victim companies, employees, and clients.” ShinyHunters did just that. The crew initially compromised Instructure in late April, and after the initial pay-or-leak deadline passed on May 6, ShinyHunters switched tactics to school-by-school extortion. They injected a ransom message into about 330 Canvas school login portals, causing Instructure to take the platform offline for a day - during final exams and Advanced Placement testing for many. Other ransomware scum have gone to horrifying extremes, posting pictures and addresses of preschool children in an effort to get a payday, leaking cancer patients’ nude photos and threatening them with swatting attacks. Mandiant Consulting CTO Charles Carmakal previously told The Register that ransomware infections have morphed into "psychological attacks” with crooks SIM swapping executives’ kids to pressure their parents into paying. Calculating risk In addition to responding to criminals directly harassing their students, patients, customers and employees, victim organizations also have to take into account potential lawsuits if the crooks dump individuals’ personal or health data, and the reputational hit from seeing all of this protected information published online. The decision about what to do in a ransomware attack revolves around risk reduction, Liska said. “Not paying a ransom means an increased risk of data exposure, which in this case could cause serious harm,” he told us. “While there is no good decision in most ransomware negotiations, the idea is to protect as many people as possible and that may mean that paying is the least bad option.” While he didn’t respond to or investigate the Instructure case, “protecting children's data is absolutely a critical factor in these types of decisions, especially when the attacks originate from one of the groups associated with The Com,” Liska added. The Com, a loosely knit group of primarily English speakers who are also involved in several interconnected networks of hackers, SIM swappers, and extortionists such as ShinyHunters and Scattered Lapsus$ Hunters, has been known to blackmail kids and teens into carrying out shootings, stabbings, and other real-life criminal acts. “These groups are known to coerce victims using threats of physical harm, including bricking and swatting," he said. "Not paying may have increased the risk of serious harm to the children whose data was exposed.” A representative of ShinyHunters contacted The Register to "deny any and all association, affiliation, and/or linkage with 'The Com' including 'Scattered Lapsus Hunters'" The rep said "There is no actual concrete evidence to support that we are associated, affiliated, or linked to the aforementioned. These are baseless allegations and industry propaganda surrounding 'The Com.'" The Shiny one admitted that some of their crew's tactics are similar to those the other gangs use but suggested it's lazy to assume a link. "If China or North Korea used vishing to infiltrate organizations networks would they also immediately become associated with “The Com?'" the representative asked. Ed sector 'more likely to pay' Instructure’s intrusion follows several other high-profile attacks against education-sector software providers. In December 2024, PowerSchool suffered a breach, affecting tens of millions of students. The company reportedly paid about $2.85 million in bitcoin in exchange for a video supposedly showing the attackers destroying the data. But about five months later, in May 2025, the ed-tech provider’s school district customers received individual extortion threats from either the same ransomware crew that hit PowerSchool or someone connected to the crooks. Earlier this year, ShinyHunters claimed it stole data from K-12 software provider Infinite Campus as part of a broader wave of Salesforce-related intrusions. “Education keeps emerging as one of the sectors where organizations are still more likely to pay under pressure,” Thompson said. In addition to students’ – especially minors’ – data containing highly sensitive personal details, and therefore presenting an attractive target for attackers, this is also driven in part by market pressure and economics. It’s costly and inconvenient for schools to switch learning management systems, and they are typically locked into multi-year contracts with these software vendors, according to Thompson. “The other issue is concentration,” he said. “A relatively small number of vendors hold data for enormous portions of the education system. PowerSchool, Infinite Campus, Canvas, Blackboard; those four hold records on something close to every American student, and hackers know it. Three of the four have been breached at a multi-million-record scale in the last 18 months.” Thompson said he expects to see additional attacks against major education platforms to follow. “The economics are good. Instructure paid. PowerSchool paid last year. Every other ed-tech vendor's board just had a conversation about what their number would be,” he told us. “The pattern is established.” According to Connolly, the universities and K-12 schools affected by the Canvas hack shouldn’t consider their data safe, regardless of Instructure’s assurances or the crooks' promises to delete it. “There will be future attacks, without a doubt.” ® Correction: The estimate of $5 million to $30 million comes from Alliance Risk CEO David Vainer.

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Foxconn confirms cyberattack after ransomware crew claims it stole confidential Apple, Nvidia files

Foxconn, a critical supplier for major hardware companies like Apple and Nvidia, on Tuesday confirmed a cyberattack affecting its North American operations after the Nitrogen ransomware gang listed the electronics manufacturer on its data leak site. “Some of Foxconn's factories in North America suffered a cyberattack,” a Foxconn spokesperson told The Register. “The cybersecurity team immediately activated the response mechanism and implemented multiple operational measures to ensure the continuity of production and delivery. The affected factories are currently resuming normal production.” Nitrogen ransomware criminals on Monday claimed to have breached the Taiwan-based company and stolen 8 TB of data comprising more than 11 million files. The miscreants say the leaks include confidential instructions, internal project documentation, and technical drawings related to projects at Intel, Apple, Google, Dell, and Nvidia, among others. Foxconn declined to confirm that these - or any - customers’ information was hoovered up in the digital intrusion. Nitrogen, which has been around since 2023, is believed to be one of the various ransomware offshoots that borrowed code from the leaked Conti 2 builder. And, in what may be very bad news for its latest victim, even paying the ransom demand may not guarantee recovery of encrypted files. In February, Coveware researchers warned that a programming error prevents the gang's decryptor from recovering victims' files, so paying up is futile. The finding specifically concerns the group's malware that targets VMware ESXi. This isn’t the first time Foxconn has been targeted by ransomware gangs. In 2024, LockBit claimed to have infected Foxsemicon Integrated Technology, a semiconductor equipment manufacturer within the Foxconn Technology Group. The same criminal crew also hit a Foxconn subsidiary in Mexico in 2022. ®

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Cache-poisoning caper turns TanStack npm packages toxic

An attacker has published 84 malicious versions of official TanStack npm packages, with the impact including credential theft, self-propagation, and complete disk wipe of an infected host. The attack is part of a wave of attacks across npm and PyPI, continuing the Mini Shai-Hulud campaign. Supply chain security company Socket reports that other compromised packages include the OpenSearch client, Mistral AI, UiPath, and Guardrails AI. Malicious npm packages for TanStack, an open source application stack, were published between 19:20 and 19:26 UTC on May 11. The attack was detected and reported within 30 minutes by StepSecurity, triggering incident response and npm deprecation. GitHub published a security advisory at 21:30 UTC, including a list of affected packages. TanStack founder Tanner Linsley published a postmortem describing how the attacker used a malicious commit on a fork to create a pull request on the TanStack repository, causing scripts to auto-run and build the malware. This poisoned the GitHub Actions cache in what Linsley said is a variant of a known GitHub Action vulnerability discovered in 2024. The malware then extracted the npm OpenID Connect (OIDC) token, used for trusted npm publishing, from runner memory using the same code used to compromise tj-actions in an attack last year. No TanStack maintainers were compromised. StepSecurity has a detailed analysis of the attack, noting that the payload "reads files from over 100 hardcoded paths" including those that may contain cloud credentials, SSH (secure shell) keys, developer tool configuration files, crypto wallets, VPN configurations, messaging credentials, and shell history. Shell history may contain tokens and passwords pasted into the terminal. Security researcher Nicholas Carlini warned the payload "installs a dead-man's switch… as a system user service." The service checks whether a stolen GitHub token has been revoked and, if it has, runs a command to wipe the local disk completely. Socket's write-up includes recommended actions such as rotating all secrets on any affected system. GitHub's advisory suggests "any developer or CI environment that ran npm install, pnpm install, or yarn install against an affected version on 2026-05-11 should be considered compromised." The Mistral AI has also been reported on GitHub, and at the time of writing, the Mistral AI project is quarantined on PyPI. This attack is still evolving and will likely have a far-reaching impact. It confirms again that running everyday commands like npm install is unsafe, that for all their efforts major package repositories including npm and PyPI are still not secured, and that software development is now best done in isolated, ephemeral environments. ®

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DarkSword Malware

DarkSword is a sophisticated piece of malware—probably government designed—that targets iOS.

Google Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) has identified a new iOS full-chain exploit that leveraged multiple zero-day vulnerabilities to fully compromise devices. Based on toolmarks in recovered payloads, we believe the exploit chain to be called DarkSword. Since at least November 2025, GTIG has observed multiple commercial surveillance vendors and suspected state-sponsored actors utilizing DarkSword in distinct campaigns. These threat actors have deployed the exploit chain against targets in Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Malaysia, and Ukraine.

DarkSword supports iOS versions 18.4 through 18.7 and utilizes six different vulnerabilities to deploy final-stage payloads. GTIG has identified three distinct malware families deployed following a successful DarkSword compromise: GHOSTBLADE, GHOSTKNIFE, and GHOSTSABER. The proliferation of this single exploit chain across disparate threat actors mirrors the previously discovered Coruna iOS exploit kit. Notably, UNC6353, a suspected Russian espionage group previously observed using Coruna, has recently incorporated DarkSword into their watering hole campaigns.

A week after it was identified, a version of it leaked onto the internet, where it is being used more broadly.

This news is a month old. Your devices are safe, assuming you patch regularly.

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Strengthening cyber capacity in Kenya: A new toolkit with lessons for the region

When a major cyber incident hits, the first decisions aren’t technical—they’re human. Who takes the lead? How quickly can information be shared? When should governments step in, and how do you protect public trust while keeping essential services running? 

These questions are at the heart of Microsoft’s Advancing Regional Cybersecurity (ARC) initiative, launched in 2025 to help governments strengthen cyber preparedness through practical, public-private collaboration. Today, we’re sharing the first tangible output of that work: the ARC Kenya Exercise Report & Toolkit, developed through a tabletop exercise held in Nairobi in December 2025.  

Developed with Kenya’s National Computer and Cybercrime Coordination Committee (NC4) and RiskSight, the toolkit is a practical planning resource designed to help government and cross-sector leaders prepare for cyber crises before they occur. It is grounded in real conversations among leaders from government, regulators, critical infrastructure operators, law enforcement, academia, and the private sector working through what a serious cyber incident would demand of them, together. 

Stress‑testing decisions before a crisis hits

The ambition of the “Silicon Savannah” makes Kenya a compelling setting for this work. Its digital economy is expanding rapidly—from mobilefirst financial services to cloudenabled public infrastructure—positioning the country as a regional technology leader. But rapid digital growth also brings increased exposure to more sophisticated cyber threats. As systems become more interconnected, a serious cyber incident can quickly disrupt essential services, undermine public trust, and threaten economic stability. 

Kenya’s approach recognizes this reality and reflects a critical principle: cybersecurity is not separate from innovation; it is one of the conditions that allows digital transformation to scale safely. The ARC initiative embodies this philosophy and helps decision makers confront the practical realities of coordination, escalation, and response in this complex environment. 

This is exactly what the ARC Kenya tabletop exercise was designed to do. The objective was not to test tools but to stresstest decision making under pressure. Participants were challenged with complex scenarios—including AIenabled breaches, ransomware attacks, and infrastructurelevel disruptions. The focus was not on technical fixes but on leadership clarity, crossagency coordination, and realtime decision making in highpressure environments. 

The outcome was both a roadmap for the unknown and a clear recognition of the need for shared expectations before a crisis begins—particularly around leadership and authority, trusted information sharing channels, and agreed response frameworks. These gaps, identified by participants themselves, now form the backbone of the ARC Kenya Toolkit. 

What the ARC Kenya toolkit delivers

The toolkit translates the lessons of the exercise into concrete actions that leaders can take now—before the next incident occurs. It also serves as a practical and specific 12month roadmap for strengthening Kenya’s cyber preparedness, moving from lessons identified to durable, institutional capability. Specifically, the toolkit provides recommendations to: 

  • Clarify national leadership during major cyber incidents, enabling government, regulators, law enforcement, and critical infrastructure operators to coordinate more quickly, with fewer gaps and overlaps. 
  • Establish practical, standardsaligned incident response models for the entire country, including priority playbooks that teams can train on and execute consistently. 
  • Strengthen operational readiness across sectors, with better coordination between security operations centers (SOCs), clearer escalation thresholds, and more reliable incident reporting pathways. 
  • Deepen trusted information sharing and publicprivate collaboration through common handling rules, safer “goodfaith” reporting mechanisms, and regular joint exercises to build muscle memory before a crisis.

Taken together, these elements enable leaders not only to respond more effectively to cyber incidents, but to institutionalize preparedness, coordination, and resilience across the national cyber ecosystem. For African countries more broadly, the model also offers a practical pathway to strengthen regional cyber cooperation—by aligning expectations around escalation, information sharing, and public‑private coordination before a crossborder incident occurs. By translating highlevel principles into practical, repeatable approaches to crisis readiness, the toolkit underscores the value of trusted international partnerships and alignment with global norms for responsible state behavior in cyberspace. 

Why Kenya’s approach matters beyond its borders

Many countries across the Global South are grappling with similar challenges: fragmented ownership of critical infrastructure, uneven cyber capacity across sectors, and the need to coordinate rapidly under pressure. While firmly grounded in Kenya’s national context, the lessons from ARC Kenya are therefore intentionally designed to resonate far beyond its borders and to be highly transferable. 

Importantly, this work does not end in Kenya. We are already building on these lessons through ARC engagements in other regions, including a new workstream in Mexico, applying the same approach to strengthen preparedness, coordination, and resilience across different national contexts. 

By design, the ARC initiative is not simply a record of a single exercise. It is a foundation others can build on—at a national or regional level—offering leaders a practical starting point to turn shared responsibility into sustained capability. 

Explore the ARC Kenya Toolkit & Tabletop Exercise

 

For more than a decade, the Microsoft Digital Crimes Unit (DCU) has persistently disrupted cybercrime and nation-state threats targeting people, organizations, and critical infrastructure. Explore major disruptions—and the ongoing cases and operations behind them here: Disrupting cyberthreats since 2008 | Microsoft

The post Strengthening cyber capacity in Kenya: A new toolkit with lessons for the region appeared first on Microsoft On the Issues.

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How cyberattacks on companies affect everyone

If you use the internet, you’ve likely been affected by cybercrime in some way. Even when an attack is aimed at a company, the fallout usually lands on ordinary people.

The most obvious harm is stolen data. When attackers break into a business, it is usually customer information that ends up in criminal hands, and that can lead to identity theft, tax fraud, credit card fraud, and a long tail of scam attempts that can continue for months or years. For consumers, the breach itself is often just the start of the cleanup.

That work is annoying, time-consuming, and sometimes expensive. People may have to freeze credit, replace cards, change passwords, be on the lookout for suspicious transactions, and dispute charges. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) specifically advises consumers to use IdentityTheft.gov after a breach and recommends steps like credit freezes and fraud alerts to reduce the chance of further abuse.

When sensitive data is exposed, the harm is not only financial. Medical, insurance, and other deeply personal records can be used to create more convincing phishing or extortion attempts, and the stress of knowing that private information is circulating among criminals can linger long after the technical incident is over. In other words, breach victims are not just cleaning up a data problem, they are dealing with a loss of trust.


Breaches happen every day. Don’t be the last to know.


Cybercrime also hits consumers through service disruption. Ransomware and intrusion campaigns can interrupt payment systems, telecom services, shipping, energy distribution, booking platforms, and other infrastructure people rely on every day. In those cases, the consumer impact is immediate: you may not be able to pay, travel, call, buy, or even work normally. The CSIS timeline and Canada’s cyberthreat assessment both show that these disruptions are increasingly tied to high-value targets and can be part of broader state or criminal campaigns.

Not all these incidents are driven by cybercriminals. Recently, Britain’s cybersecurity chief warned that the UK is handling 4 nationally significant cyberincidents every week, with the majority now traced back to foreign governments rather than cybercriminal groups.

Another cost is easy to overlook: disinformation and confusion. When attackers steal data, disrupt services, or impersonate trusted brands, they can also flood the public with fake support messages, scam calls, refund schemes, and phishing emails pretending to be the breached company. The breach becomes a launchpad for more fraud, and consumers are left trying to separate legitimate notifications from those sent by attackers.

Then there is the security backlash. After a breach, companies usually tighten access rules, add more multi-factor authentication prompts, force reauthentication, shorten sessions, and increase fraud checks. Those measures are often necessary, but they also make ordinary digital life more cumbersome. The consumer ends up paying with time and frustration for security problems they did not create.

That is why company-targeted cybercrime is not really only a business problem. It is a consumer issue, a public-trust issue, and sometimes even a national security issue. A single breach can leak data, trigger fraud, interrupt essential services, amplify scams, and make using the internet more frustrating for everyone else. The real cost is rarely confined to the company that got hit.

Knowing this, it’s worth thinking carefully about which companies to trust with your data and how much you’re willing to share . You cannot stop every attack against every company you deal with, but you can limit the fallout by being more selective. Some considerations:

  • Do they need all the information they are asking for?
  • Would it hurt anything if you leave some fields blank or give less specific answers?
  • Has this company been breached in the past, and how did they handle it?
  • How long will they store the data you provide?
  • Can you easily have your data removed at your request?

Your name, address, and phone number are probably already for sale.  

Data brokers collect and sell your personal details to anyone willing to pay. Malwarebytes Personal Data Remover finds them and gets your information removed, then keeps watch so it stays that way. 

  •  

How cyberattacks on companies affect everyone

If you use the internet, you’ve likely been affected by cybercrime in some way. Even when an attack is aimed at a company, the fallout usually lands on ordinary people.

The most obvious harm is stolen data. When attackers break into a business, it is usually customer information that ends up in criminal hands, and that can lead to identity theft, tax fraud, credit card fraud, and a long tail of scam attempts that can continue for months or years. For consumers, the breach itself is often just the start of the cleanup.

That work is annoying, time-consuming, and sometimes expensive. People may have to freeze credit, replace cards, change passwords, be on the lookout for suspicious transactions, and dispute charges. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) specifically advises consumers to use IdentityTheft.gov after a breach and recommends steps like credit freezes and fraud alerts to reduce the chance of further abuse.

When sensitive data is exposed, the harm is not only financial. Medical, insurance, and other deeply personal records can be used to create more convincing phishing or extortion attempts, and the stress of knowing that private information is circulating among criminals can linger long after the technical incident is over. In other words, breach victims are not just cleaning up a data problem, they are dealing with a loss of trust.


Breaches happen every day. Don’t be the last to know.


Cybercrime also hits consumers through service disruption. Ransomware and intrusion campaigns can interrupt payment systems, telecom services, shipping, energy distribution, booking platforms, and other infrastructure people rely on every day. In those cases, the consumer impact is immediate: you may not be able to pay, travel, call, buy, or even work normally. The CSIS timeline and Canada’s cyberthreat assessment both show that these disruptions are increasingly tied to high-value targets and can be part of broader state or criminal campaigns.

Not all these incidents are driven by cybercriminals. Recently, Britain’s cybersecurity chief warned that the UK is handling 4 nationally significant cyberincidents every week, with the majority now traced back to foreign governments rather than cybercriminal groups.

Another cost is easy to overlook: disinformation and confusion. When attackers steal data, disrupt services, or impersonate trusted brands, they can also flood the public with fake support messages, scam calls, refund schemes, and phishing emails pretending to be the breached company. The breach becomes a launchpad for more fraud, and consumers are left trying to separate legitimate notifications from those sent by attackers.

Then there is the security backlash. After a breach, companies usually tighten access rules, add more multi-factor authentication prompts, force reauthentication, shorten sessions, and increase fraud checks. Those measures are often necessary, but they also make ordinary digital life more cumbersome. The consumer ends up paying with time and frustration for security problems they did not create.

That is why company-targeted cybercrime is not really only a business problem. It is a consumer issue, a public-trust issue, and sometimes even a national security issue. A single breach can leak data, trigger fraud, interrupt essential services, amplify scams, and make using the internet more frustrating for everyone else. The real cost is rarely confined to the company that got hit.

Knowing this, it’s worth thinking carefully about which companies to trust with your data and how much you’re willing to share . You cannot stop every attack against every company you deal with, but you can limit the fallout by being more selective. Some considerations:

  • Do they need all the information they are asking for?
  • Would it hurt anything if you leave some fields blank or give less specific answers?
  • Has this company been breached in the past, and how did they handle it?
  • How long will they store the data you provide?
  • Can you easily have your data removed at your request?

Your name, address, and phone number are probably already for sale.  

Data brokers collect and sell your personal details to anyone willing to pay. Malwarebytes Personal Data Remover finds them and gets your information removed, then keeps watch so it stays that way. 

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Hulp na online pesten wordt deel van de inboedelverzekering

Online pesten kan zo hoog oplopen, dat mensen er hulp bij nodig hebben om de schadelijke berichten offline te halen. Je zou denken dat als dat al deel uitmaakte van een verzekering, dat tot de zorgverzekering behoorde, maar nu gaat Univé het als eerste als speciale dekking op de inboedelverzekering zetten. 

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