It starts with the familiar: a short message, a trusted name, a routine tone. Delivery updates, work pings, brand alerts hum in the background, rarely attracting scrutiny. You check, you answer… — until minutes later you’ve slipped into a trap built to lower your guard and hijack your trust.

That’s why messaging scams cut deep: they exploit everyday habits where instinct, not caution, leads. Communication once moved slowly, leaving room for doubt. Now it’s instant — and that speed is a weapon in criminal hands.

On our blog, we’ve already examined numerous scam schemes in messaging apps — from pig butchering, where the victim is groomed for a very long time, or catfishing, where the scammer creates a fake identity, to phishing via chatbots or through gift-giving campaigns in messaging apps.

Now, for the first time, Kaspersky has set out to capture the full end-to-end reality of messaging-based scams to understand how quickly harm occurs, how they impact trust and what remains after the interaction ends. What emerges is a highly organized and industrialized scam ecosystem embedded within everyday messaging channels such as SMS, WhatsApp, and email.

Kaspersky experts have prepared a report on targeted scams in messaging apps, detailing not only the financial but also the emotional damage caused by such attacks, as well as providing tips on how to protect yourself and avoid them. In this post, we explore the most interesting facts, but you can find more details in the full report.

The damage is underestimated

How much do you think a single successful attack via a messaging app costs the average victim? Ten dollars? Or maybe 50? You’re underestimating the scammers. Although more than a third (36%) of victims incur losses of less than $135, on average a victim loses… $733!

Country	Average loss per victim
Senegal	$392.94
Serbia	$493.32
Morocco	$504.28
Greece	$609.32
United Kingdom	$617.38
Côte d’Ivoire	$654.11
Spain	$672.67
United States	$724.73
Portugal	$868.20
Italy	$896.02
France	$1,193.58
Germany	$1,369.35

On the one hand, the financial hit doesn’t look catastrophic in isolation. These are micro-losses by design. Small enough that some never report them to the police. Small enough that banks don’t always investigate. Small enough to be dismissed as bad luck rather than organized crime.

But $733 is not nothing. It’s enough to cover a month’s worth of groceries, school or daycare fees, or utility bills. Against the backdrop of the global cost-of-living crisis, a single such loss can seriously dent a family’s budget.

In 11% of cases, losses exceed $1,350, and more than a quarter of victims (28%) report having been scammed three or more times in the past six months. Once scammers discover that a phone number responds, that contact becomes an asset, circulating from one database to another.

Now imagine the scale of the problem: if just 10% of the three billion messaging‑app users worldwide fell victim with the average loss, the total damage would amount to… nearly $220 billion! This is comparable to the GDP of Greece, and exceeds that of Morocco, Serbia, or Côte d’Ivoire.

It becomes clear that behind the daily flood of fraudulent schemes lie large scam cartels operating on an industrial scale, using AI to personalize messages that mimic those of family members, friends, and familiar brands. This, in essence, forms the basis of a full-fledged economy built on digital identity theft.

Speed beats scrutiny

More than half of successful messaging scams (52%) unfold in under 30 minutes — from first contact to the moment money or personal data changes hands — or even faster, before the victim begins to doubt the legitimacy of the sender. In fact, one in seven scams takes less than five minutes — quicker than boiling an egg!

The speed isn’t accidental. It’s the method. Scammers structure their schemes to deny the victim a chance to come to their senses. Every element is engineered to compress the decision-making window: the urgency of the scenario, the familiarity of the format, the plausibility of the request.

They rush you — faster, faster, don’t tell anyone, you only have a few minutes, solve the problem, don’t ask questions. Click the link, fill in the details, approve the transaction, or else… Or else what? The scammers’ imagination knows no bounds here, but if you don’t do something right now, you’ll definitely regret it.

Alas, the realization of what has happened usually comes when the damage is already irreversible. More than half of victims (51%) lose money; another 43% hand over their personal data — most commonly phone numbers, names, and email addresses — to scammers, and often the victim loses both.

Where and how attacks occur

A delivery notification, a bank alert, a message from a merchant you ordered from last week — messaging apps permeate every aspect of everyday life, making such interactions completely normal. An attack shouldn’t feel like an attack. It should feel like the same message you’ve received hundreds of times.

It’s no surprise that scammers focus their attention on this method of communication first and foremost. The most popular platforms for scams are predictable: WhatsApp (43%), SMS/iMessage (40%), Facebook (27%), Telegram (22%), and Instagram (19%) — these are the ones that people trust most.

A wide variety of schemes is used. Brand impersonation is now one of the three most common types of messaging scam worldwide — accounting for 31% of cases. Fake delivery notifications top the list at 38%, followed by investment scams at 37%.

At the same time, nearly two-thirds (63%) of fraudulent schemes span multiple platforms, moving from SMS to WhatsApp, from WhatsApp to Telegram, etc. In this way, scammers achieve two goals: they mimic organic messaging and evade moderation algorithms.

AI has taken scams to a new level

Just a couple of years ago, fraudulent messages gave themselves away with bad grammar, awkward phrasing, illogical requests, and an obsessive sense of urgency. Today, a phishing message looks, sounds, and reads just like the real thing.

Scam cartels want to catch people in motion — between meetings, on a commute, or during everyday tasks — when your attention is already fragmented. They mimic your mother’s turn of phrase. They match your bank’s tone of voice. They copy your courier’s format exactly. They mirror the rhythm, structure, and style of authentic brand communications across messaging platforms. And AI is accelerating all of it.

What this creates is overlap. Legitimate and fraudulent messages appear in the same environment, using the same formats, language, and triggers. The difference between them is no longer obvious.

The data shows that two-thirds of victims (66%) believe AI was used in the scam against them, 42% cite messages written by AI, 31% report generated or cloned voices, and 25% encountered deepfake images or videos.

That’s why mere awareness and “tech-savviness” may no longer be enough to protect oneself. From Gen Z to Gen X, messaging scams cut across every generation.

And what about the emotional toll?

But money is far from the only problem a victim is left with after an attack. After what they’ve been through, people develop distrust toward incoming messages, unfamiliar numbers, and any requests for action. As a result, 99% of fraud victims say they no longer trust incoming notifications in messaging apps.

This creates a crisis of trust in all digital channels in general. Every legitimate message can now be perceived as a scam. Brands, banks, and delivery services are forced to operate in an environment where the customer is, by default, in a state of distrust.

Dr. Elizabeth Carter, a forensic linguist and criminologist at Kingston University in London, notes that scammers use familiar contexts, common social settings and embedded linguistic norms to create the illusion for the victim that their decision-making is rational and reasonable in the moment. However, what is actually happening is that they construct false realities in which those decisions end up causing financial and psychological harm. She also notes that it is very hard to identify a false reality while you are in it.

After realizing they had been deceived, more than half of victims felt anger — the kind that comes from having trusted something and discovering it was used against you. 42% of victims report frustration, 38% — feeling upset. Moreover, several months later, these feelings haven’t gone away: nearly half of all victims (48%) are still angry, a third (33%) remain frustrated, and 30% are upset.

And nearly one in 10 victims don’t tell anyone what happened. They feel shame, a sense of having fallen for something so obvious. This leaves a significant portion of the actual damage unreported: only 24% of victims contact the police, and only 23% report it to their bank.

So what can be done?

The crisis of trust — and even a touch of paranoia — that has arisen due to widespread attacks on users can linger in victims’ minds for a long time, affecting their quality of life. To prevent this, follow these guidelines:

• Pause before you act. The sense of urgency you feel is almost always artificial. A legitimate bank, retailer, or delivery service won’t penalize you for taking 30 seconds to verify before clicking a link or confirming details. It’s precisely this instinct to resolve the situation quickly that scammers are counting on.
• Verify through another channel. If a message appears to be from a relative, colleague, or company you trust — contact them through another channel before taking any action. Use secure verification methods, and cross-check identities when something doesn’t feel right. For families, agreeing on a “safe word” in advance can defeat even the most convincing voice clones.
• Use a password manager. It will not only help you generate strong, unique passwords for all your accounts and store them securely, syncing them across all your devices, but also protect you from spoofed sites. Even if you click a phishing link and land on such a site, our password manager will notify you about the domain mismatch and refuse to autofill your username and password.
• Use protection that works in real time. Modern security solutions, such as Kaspersky Premium, provide real-time protection against malicious links and phishing attempts in the apps and websites you use every day. On Android devices, a dedicated layer of anti-phishing security scans and neutralizes suspicious links as they appear, even within notifications, before you even have a chance to click them.

We’ve covered other threats in messaging apps in similar articles:

• Pig butchering: large-scale cryptocurrency fraud
• How to safely meet people online
• How phishers and scammers use AI
• How to avoid falling for scammers in Telegram mini-apps

In 2025, we observed pervasive SSH tunnel activity, which has remained active into 2026, affecting many government organizations and commercial companies in Russia and Belarus. Behind some of this activity is Cloud Atlas, a group we have known since 2014. During our investigation, we identified new tools used by this group, as well as indicators of compromise.

The group is back to sending out archives containing malicious shortcuts that launch PowerShell scripts. This technique is employed in addition to the previously described use of malicious documents, which exploit an old vulnerability in the Microsoft Office Equation Editor process (CVE-2018-0802) to download and execute malicious code. We have observed the use of third-party public utilities (Tor/SSH/RevSocks) to gain a foothold in infected systems and create additional backup control channels.

Technical details

Initial infection

As for the primary compromise, Cloud Atlas remains consistent in using phishing. In the observed campaigns, the attackers emailed a ZIP archive containing an LNK file as an attachment.

Attackers use LNK shortcuts to covertly execute PowerShell scripts hosted on external resources. The command line of the shortcut:

Example of the PowerShell script downloaded and executed by the shortcut:

Actions performed by the downloaded PowerShell:

Step	Action	Description
1	Drops “$temp\fixed.ps1”	Pre-staging: places the main payload locally in advance to ensure an execution capability independent of subsequent network connectivity or C2 availability.
2	Creates “Run” registry key “YandexBrowser_setup” for “$temp\fixed.ps1” startup	Early persistence: guarantees execution upon the next logon or reboot. If the script is interrupted during later stages, the payload will still activate automatically.
3	Downloads and drops “$temp\rar.zip” Extracts “*.pdf” from the downloaded  “$temp\rar.zip”	Payload delivery: retrieves the decoy archive from the remote server to prepare user-facing content for the distraction phase.
4	Extracts “*.pdf” from the downloaded  “$temp\rar.zip”	Decoy preparation: unpacks the legitimate-looking document so it can be executed silently without requiring user interaction.
6	Opens extracted decoy document “*.pdf” with user’s default software	User distraction: opens a convincing document to maintain user engagement and creates a legitimate workflow appearance to buy additional 30–120 seconds for background operations.
6	Executes  “taskkill.exe /F /Im winrar.exe”	Process concealment: terminates the archive extractor to prevent the user from seeing the archive contents or noticing unexpected file extraction activity.
7	Searches and deletes “rar.zip”, “*.pdf.zip” and “*.pdf.lnk”	Anti-forensic cleanup: removes the initial infection artifacts before activating the main payload, reducing the number of disk traces available for incident response or EDR correlation.
8	Executes  “$temp\fixed.ps1”	Controlled execution: launches the main payload only after persistence is secured, the user is distracted, and access traces are cleaned up.

Fixed.ps1 (loader)

The primary purpose of the Fixed.ps1 script is to deliver and install subsequent malware onto the compromised system, specifically VBCloud and PowerShower. Fixed.ps1 establishes persistence (by adding itself to registry Run keys), creates a decoy for the user (by opening a PDF document), and executes the next stages of the attack.

Fixed.ps1::Payload (VBCloud dropper)

This module functions as a dropper for the VBCloud backdoor. It drops two files onto the infected machine:

• video.vbs: the loader of the backdoor,VBCloud::Launcher. This is a VBScript that decrypts the contents of video.mds (typically using RC4 with a hardcoded key) and executes it in memory.
• video.mds: the encrypted body of the backdoor, VBCloud::Backdoor. This is the main module that connects to a C2 server to receive additional scripts or execute built-in commands. This backdoor is designed to function as a stealer, specifically targeting files with extensions of interest (such as DOC, PDF, XLS) and exfiltrating them.

Fixed.ps1::Payload (PowerShower)

This module installs a second backdoor called PowerShower on the system. We don’t have the specific script that performs this installation, but we assume it’s performed by a script similar to fixed.ps1::Payload (VBCloud dropper).

Unlike VBCloud, which focuses on file theft, PowerShower is primarily used for network reconnaissance and lateral movement within the victim’s infrastructure. PowerShower can perform the following tasks:

• Collect information about running processes, administrator groups, and domain controllers.
• Download and execute PowerShell scripts from the C2 server.
• Conduct “Kerberoasting” attacks (stealing password hashes of Active Directory accounts).

PowerShower is dropped onto the system via the path ‘C:\Users\[username]\Pictures\googleearth.ps1’.

PowerShower::Payload (credential grabber)

PowerShower downloads an additional script for stealing credentials. It performs the following actions:

• Creates a Volume Shadow Copy of the C:\ drive.
• Copies the SAM (stores local user password hashes) and SECURITY system files from this shadow copy to C:\Users\Public\Documents\, disguising them as PDF files.
• The script is launched in several stages. To execute with high privileges, the script uses a UAC bypass technique via fodhelper.exe (a built-in Windows utility). This allows PowerShell to run as an administrator without directly prompting the user, which could otherwise raise suspicion.

The full launch chain looks like this:

The full Base64-decoded script is given below.

Multi-user RDP by patching termsrv.dll

Moving laterally across the victim’s network, the attackers executed a suspicious PowerShell script named rdp_new.ps1 (MD5 1A11B26DD0261EF27A112CE8B361C247):

The script is designed to allow multiple RDP sessions in Windows 10 by patching the termsrv.dll file. Termsrv.dll is the core Windows library that enforces Remote Desktop Services rules.

By default, Windows limits the number of simultaneous RDP sessions. Removing this restriction allows attackers to operate on the machine in the background without disconnecting the legitimate user, thereby reducing the likelihood of detection.

At first, the script enables RDP on the firewall and downgrades the RDP security settings:

Before modifying termsrv.dll, the script takes ownership and assigns itself full permissions. Then the script finds the sequence of bytes 39 81 3C 06 00 00 ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? and replaces it with B8 00 01 00 00 89 81 38 06 00 00 90. After these manipulations, the script restarts the RDP service.

The patched version allows multiple concurrent logins so attackers can stay connected without disrupting the legitimate user, thereby reducing suspicion.

Reverse SSH tunneling

As mentioned above, during this wave of attacks, the adversaries widely deployed reverse SSH tunnels to many hosts of interest. The compromised machine initiates an SSH connection to an attacker-controlled server, which allows attackers to bypass standard firewall rules via establishing outbound connections.

That way, even if the primary backdoor is discovered, the attackers can maintain control through the SSH tunnel.

To install a reverse SSH tunnel on a victim’s host, the attackers run VBS scripts via PAExec or PsExec.

We’ve seen three types of scripts:

• Gen.vbs (WriteToSchedulerGenerateKey.vbs) generates key for SSH tunnel.
• Run.vbs (WriteToSchedulerRunSSH.vbs) runs reverse SSH tunnel.
• Kill.vbs (WriteToSchedulerKillSSH.vbs) stops reverse SSH tunnel via taskkill.exe.

To achieve persistence, the attackers added a new scheduled task in Windows:

In some cases, before establishing a reverse SSH tunnel, attackers set new access permissions to the folder containing the private key to prevent the legitimate user or system administrators from easily accessing or modifying it:

Patched OpenSSH

Some OpenSSH binaries used by the attackers had their imports modified. Instead of libcrypto.dll, the SSH executable imports syruntime.dll, which was placed in the same folder as the binary. This was likely done to evade detection and ensure stealth.

In addition, we found a portable version of OpenSSH, presumably compiled by the adversaries:

RevSocks

In addition to Reverse SSH tunnels, the attackers installed RevSocks using the same infrastructure. RevSocks is an alternative tool to SSH for establishing tunnels and proxy connections, written in Golang. This tool allows direct connection to workstations on the local network. It also allows attackers to gain access to other segments of the victim’s network by using the machine as a gateway. In some cases, C2 addresses were hardcoded into the binary; in other cases, the C2 was passed in command line arguments.

There were also reverse SOCKS samples with hardcoded C2 addresses:

Tor tunneling

To maintain control over the compromised host, the Tor network was used in some cases. A minimal set of a Tor executable and configuration files, necessary for launching HiddenService, was copied to the system directories of infected devices. The name of the Tor Browser executable file was modified. As a result, the infected machine was accessible via RDP from the Tor network when accessing the generated .onion domain.
Below is an example of a configuration file for routing connections from Tor to RDP ports on the local network, as well as example command lines for logging into Tor.

PowerCloud

We analyzed a new Cloud Atlas tool, PowerCloud. It collects user data with administrator privileges and writes this information to Google Sheets in Base64 format.

The tool represents an obfuscated PowerShell script. In most cases, it is packaged into an executable file using the PS2EXE utility, but we have also encountered variants in the form of a separate PowerShell script.

To find administrators on the victim host, the tool executes the following command:

This information is appended with the computer name and current date, the data is encoded in base64, and then the collected data is added to an existing Google Sheet.

Browser checker

Additionally, the attackers used another PowerShell script (MD5 5329F7BFF9D0D5DB28821B86C26D628F), compiled into an executable file via PS2EXE, which checks whether browser processes (Chrome, Edge, Firefox, and other) are running. This helps detect when the user is working on the computer. This can be used to choose the optimal time for conducting attacks (for example, when the user is away but their browser is still open) or simply to gather information about the victim’s habits.

The information about running browsers is written to a log file on the local host.

Victims

According to our telemetry, in late 2025 and early 2026, the identified targets of the described malicious activities are located in Russia and Belarus. The targeted industries mostly include government agencies and diplomatic entities.

We attribute the activity described in this report to the Cloud Atlas APT group with a high degree of confidence. The group used techniques and tools described previously, such as the initial access vector, the Python script for information gathering, and the Tor application for forwarding ports to the Tor network. The victim profile and geography also matches the Cloud Atlas targets.

We couldn’t help but notice some parallels with recent Head Mare activity. The PhantomHeart backdoor (available in Russian only), attributed to Head Mare and used to create an SSH tunnel, was placed in directories actively used by Cloud Atlas:

• C:\Windows\ime
• C:\Windows\System32\ime
• C:\Windows\pla
• C:\Windows\inf
• C:\Windows\migration
• C:\Windows\System32\timecontrolsvc
• C:\Windows\SKB

However, TTPs are still differentiated.

Conclusion

For more than ten years, the Cloud Atlas group has continued its activities and expanded its arsenal. Over the course of last year, many targeted campaigns in general were found to employ ReverseSocks, SSH and Tor, and the use of these utilities was no exception for Cloud Atlas. Creating such backup control channels using publicly available utilities significantly complicates the complete disruption of attackers’ actions on compromised systems. We will continue to closely monitor the group’s activity and describe their new tools and techniques.

Indicators of compromise

PowerCloud

7A95360B7E0EB5B107A3D231ABBC541A  C:\Windows\wininet.exe
C0D1EAA15A2CEFBAB9735787575C8D8E C:\Windows\LiveKernelReports\update.exe
D5B38B252CF212A4A32763DE36732D40   C:\Windows\ime\imejp\dicts\i39884.exe
3C75CEDB1196DF5EAB91F31411ED4B33  C:\pla\reports.exe
42AC350BFBC5B4EB0FEDBA16C81919C7   C:\ProgramData\update_[redacted].exe
493B901D1B33EB577DB64AADD948F9CE  C:\Windows\migration\wtr\MicrosoftBrowser.exe
2CABB721681455DAE1B6A26709DEF453  C:\Windows\pla\reports\winlog.exe
1B39E86EB772A0E40060B672B7F574F1 C:\Windows\System32\timecontrolsvc\vmnetdrv64.exe
1D401D6E6FC0B00AAA2C65A0AC0CFD6B C:\Windows\setup\scripts\install\software\activation\aact\dfsvc.exe
40A562B8600F843B717BC5951B2E3C29  C:\Windows\branding\scat.exe
F721A76DEB28FD0B80D27FCE6B8F5016  C:\Windows\ime\imekr\dicts\dfsvc.exe
D3C8AFD22BAA306FF659DB1FAC28574A  C:\ProgramData\update_[redacted].exe
6D7B2D1172BBDB7340972D844F6F0717 C:\Users\[redacted]\AppData\Local\1c\1cv8\1cv8ud.exe
C:\Users\[redacted]\AppData\Local\1c\1cv8\svc.exe
9769F43B9DE8D19E803263267FA6D62E C:\Users\[redacted]\AppData\Local\1c\1cv8\1cv8ud.exe
63B6BE9AE8D8024A40B200CCCB438F1D  C:\Windows\notepad.exe
6AA586BCC45CA2E92A4F0EF47E086FA1  C:\Windows\splwow32.exe
EBA3BCDB19A7E256BF8E2CC5B9C1CCA9   C:\Users\[redacted]\Desktop\soc\stant.exe
B4E183627B7399006C1BC47B3711E419  C:\WINDOWS\ime\service.exe
F56B31A4B47AD3365B18A7E922FBA1A8  dfsvc.exe
F6F62456FB0FCC396FB654CBED339BC3   –
25C8ED0511375DCA57EF136AC3FA0CCA   C:\branding\dwmw.exe

Browser checker

5329F7BFF9D0D5DB28821B86C26D628F  C:\ProgramData\checker_[redacted].exe

ReverseSocks

2B4BA4FACF8C299749771A3A4369782E  C:\Windows\PLA\System\bounce.exe
C:\Windows\pla\print_status.exe
BA9CE06641067742F2AFC9691FAFF1DC   C:\ProgramData\hp\client.exe
FB0F8027ACF1B1E47E07A63D8812ED50   C:\Windows\System32\timecontrolsvc\vmnetdrv64.exe
BBF1FA694122E07635DEEAC11AD712F8   C:\Windows\System32\HostManagement.exe
F301AA3D62B5095EEC4D8E34201A4769   C:\Windows\ime\imejp\msfu.exe
F9C3BBE108566D1A6B070F9C5FB03160   C:\Windows\ime\imetc\help\IMTCEN14.exe

Malicious MS Office documents

369B75BDCDED16469EDE7AB8BEDCFAE1
9EAAE9491F6A50D6DF0BE393734A44CB
3E6E9DF00A764B348EC611EE8504ACA0
9BD788F285E32A05E6591D1EB36EBFFC
F42085522EC2EBB16EDCF814E7C330AD
2042EB5D52F0B535A1CE6B6F954C8C2B
2AA1E9765EF6B00B94A9B6BE0041436A
36120F5E9411BCBAC7104EF3FA964ED2
5000A353399500BC78381DC95B6ED2DC
579A9952D31CAD801A3988DBE7914CE7
867B634588C0FD6B26684D502C15AB03
38FA4306FA4406BA31CF171AF4D36E34
83EDDE9F7EEEFAC0363413972F35572B
CC751619BFEC0DC4607C17112B9E3B2C
A632858F14B36F03D0F213F5F5D6BFF2
097CA205AD9E3B72018750280904718C
69121C36EB8BF77962DCA825FCFFD873
C5702EB250F855C8C872FFFB9BB656ED
ED34F5A136FBA4FDEA976570FAA33ED7
0577DB70844E88B32B954906E2F20798
28ECF8FB6719E14231B94B4D37629B0E
0857C84B62289A1A9F29E19244E9A499
0C514E137860F489E3801213460EF938
50568B1F9335A7E3BA4E5DF035A8FB86
7F776AD200287D6DE14A29158C457179
51F7F794ED43FB90D0F8EBBB5EFFE628
B8C753DD254509FBA5077FFD5067EAB0
BC3739DEC8CD8F54F3F60A85F3ED600E
EC076CD21C483A40156F4E40D08DADED
216CB7F31D383C0DD892B284DF05A495
116F59E70A9DF97F4ADAEA71EECB1E9A
7242AC065B50BCDE9308756B49DBADCB
8158552950D2E13B075001CE0C52AA97
A75DBED984963B9AB21309C5B2F8FD9B
0320DD389FDBAB25D46792BD2817675E
5339D1A666F3E40FE756505CF1D87D4B
67D7E3AEEB673BF60C59361C12A4ED81
89572F0ED20791A5AC9FC4267D67CCB0
B6AAE073E7BFEBF4D643C2BBEB5C02E1
344CA9EA07CD4AC90EF27F8890D4EC05

Domains and IPs

Reverse SSH/Socks domains

tenkoff[.]org
cloudguide[.]in
goverru[.]com
kufar[.]org
ultimatecore[.]net
spbnews[.]net
onedrivesupport[.]net

Malicious and compromised domains used in MS Office documents

amerikastaj[.]com
bigbang[.]me
paleturquoise-dragonfly-364512.hostingersite[.]com
wizzifi[.]com
totallegacy[.]org
mamurjor[.]com
landscapeuganda[.]com
lafortunaitalian.co[.]uk
kommando[.]live
internationalcommoditiesllc[.]com
humanitas[.]si
fishingflytackle[.]com
firsai.tipshub[.]net
alnakhlah.com[.]sa
allgoodsdirect.com[.]au
agenciakharis.com[.]br

Powershell payload staging

istochnik[.]org
znews[.]neti
investika-club[.]com
194.102.104[.]207
46.17.45[.]56
46.17.45[.]49
46.17.44[.]125
46.17.44[.]212
185.22.154[.]73
194.87.196[.]163
195.58.49[.]9
93.125.114[.]193
93.125.114[.]57
45.87.219[.]116
37.228.129[.]224
185.53.179[.]136
185.126.239[.]77
5.181.21[.]75
146.70.53[.]171
45.15.65[.]134
185.250.181[.]207
81.30.105[.]71

File paths

VBS scripts

WriteToSchedulerKillSSH.vbs
Create_task_day.vbs
WriteToSchedulerGenerateKey.vbs
C:\Windows\INF\Run.vbs
c:\Windows\INF\install.vbs
Update.vbs
c:\Windows\PLA\System\Gen.vbs
C:\Windows\INF\GenK.vbs
c:\Windows\PLA\System\Kill.vbs
c:\Windows\PLA\System\Run.vbs

ssh.exe

c:\Windows\ime\imejp\Asset.exe
c:\Windows\PLA\System\conhosts.exe
c:\Windows\INF\BITS\esentprf.exe
c:\Windows\INF\MSDTC\RuntimeBrokers.exe
c:\Windows\inf\diagnostic.exe

ReverseSocks

C:\Windows\PLA\System\bounce.exe
C:\ProgramData\hp\client.exe
C:\Windows\System32\timecontrolsvc\vmnetdrv64.exe

Tor client

C:\Windows\Resources\Update\Intel.exe
C:\Windows\INF\package.exe

In 2025, we observed pervasive SSH tunnel activity, which has remained active into 2026, affecting many government organizations and commercial companies in Russia and Belarus. Behind some of this activity is Cloud Atlas, a group we have known since 2014. During our investigation, we identified new tools used by this group, as well as indicators of compromise.

The group is back to sending out archives containing malicious shortcuts that launch PowerShell scripts. This technique is employed in addition to the previously described use of malicious documents, which exploit an old vulnerability in the Microsoft Office Equation Editor process (CVE-2018-0802) to download and execute malicious code. We have observed the use of third-party public utilities (Tor/SSH/RevSocks) to gain a foothold in infected systems and create additional backup control channels.

Technical details

Initial infection

As for the primary compromise, Cloud Atlas remains consistent in using phishing. In the observed campaigns, the attackers emailed a ZIP archive containing an LNK file as an attachment.

Attackers use LNK shortcuts to covertly execute PowerShell scripts hosted on external resources. The command line of the shortcut:

Example of the PowerShell script downloaded and executed by the shortcut:

Actions performed by the downloaded PowerShell:

Step	Action	Description
1	Drops “$temp\fixed.ps1”	Pre-staging: places the main payload locally in advance to ensure an execution capability independent of subsequent network connectivity or C2 availability.
2	Creates “Run” registry key “YandexBrowser_setup” for “$temp\fixed.ps1” startup	Early persistence: guarantees execution upon the next logon or reboot. If the script is interrupted during later stages, the payload will still activate automatically.
3	Downloads and drops “$temp\rar.zip” Extracts “*.pdf” from the downloaded  “$temp\rar.zip”	Payload delivery: retrieves the decoy archive from the remote server to prepare user-facing content for the distraction phase.
4	Extracts “*.pdf” from the downloaded  “$temp\rar.zip”	Decoy preparation: unpacks the legitimate-looking document so it can be executed silently without requiring user interaction.
6	Opens extracted decoy document “*.pdf” with user’s default software	User distraction: opens a convincing document to maintain user engagement and creates a legitimate workflow appearance to buy additional 30–120 seconds for background operations.
6	Executes  “taskkill.exe /F /Im winrar.exe”	Process concealment: terminates the archive extractor to prevent the user from seeing the archive contents or noticing unexpected file extraction activity.
7	Searches and deletes “rar.zip”, “*.pdf.zip” and “*.pdf.lnk”	Anti-forensic cleanup: removes the initial infection artifacts before activating the main payload, reducing the number of disk traces available for incident response or EDR correlation.
8	Executes  “$temp\fixed.ps1”	Controlled execution: launches the main payload only after persistence is secured, the user is distracted, and access traces are cleaned up.

Fixed.ps1 (loader)

The primary purpose of the Fixed.ps1 script is to deliver and install subsequent malware onto the compromised system, specifically VBCloud and PowerShower. Fixed.ps1 establishes persistence (by adding itself to registry Run keys), creates a decoy for the user (by opening a PDF document), and executes the next stages of the attack.

Fixed.ps1::Payload (VBCloud dropper)

This module functions as a dropper for the VBCloud backdoor. It drops two files onto the infected machine:

• video.vbs: the loader of the backdoor,VBCloud::Launcher. This is a VBScript that decrypts the contents of video.mds (typically using RC4 with a hardcoded key) and executes it in memory.
• video.mds: the encrypted body of the backdoor, VBCloud::Backdoor. This is the main module that connects to a C2 server to receive additional scripts or execute built-in commands. This backdoor is designed to function as a stealer, specifically targeting files with extensions of interest (such as DOC, PDF, XLS) and exfiltrating them.

Fixed.ps1::Payload (PowerShower)

This module installs a second backdoor called PowerShower on the system. We don’t have the specific script that performs this installation, but we assume it’s performed by a script similar to fixed.ps1::Payload (VBCloud dropper).

Unlike VBCloud, which focuses on file theft, PowerShower is primarily used for network reconnaissance and lateral movement within the victim’s infrastructure. PowerShower can perform the following tasks:

• Collect information about running processes, administrator groups, and domain controllers.
• Download and execute PowerShell scripts from the C2 server.
• Conduct “Kerberoasting” attacks (stealing password hashes of Active Directory accounts).

PowerShower is dropped onto the system via the path ‘C:\Users\[username]\Pictures\googleearth.ps1’.

PowerShower::Payload (credential grabber)

PowerShower downloads an additional script for stealing credentials. It performs the following actions:

• Creates a Volume Shadow Copy of the C:\ drive.
• Copies the SAM (stores local user password hashes) and SECURITY system files from this shadow copy to C:\Users\Public\Documents\, disguising them as PDF files.
• The script is launched in several stages. To execute with high privileges, the script uses a UAC bypass technique via fodhelper.exe (a built-in Windows utility). This allows PowerShell to run as an administrator without directly prompting the user, which could otherwise raise suspicion.

The full launch chain looks like this:

The full Base64-decoded script is given below.

Multi-user RDP by patching termsrv.dll

Moving laterally across the victim’s network, the attackers executed a suspicious PowerShell script named rdp_new.ps1 (MD5 1A11B26DD0261EF27A112CE8B361C247):

The script is designed to allow multiple RDP sessions in Windows 10 by patching the termsrv.dll file. Termsrv.dll is the core Windows library that enforces Remote Desktop Services rules.

By default, Windows limits the number of simultaneous RDP sessions. Removing this restriction allows attackers to operate on the machine in the background without disconnecting the legitimate user, thereby reducing the likelihood of detection.

At first, the script enables RDP on the firewall and downgrades the RDP security settings:

Before modifying termsrv.dll, the script takes ownership and assigns itself full permissions. Then the script finds the sequence of bytes 39 81 3C 06 00 00 ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? and replaces it with B8 00 01 00 00 89 81 38 06 00 00 90. After these manipulations, the script restarts the RDP service.

The patched version allows multiple concurrent logins so attackers can stay connected without disrupting the legitimate user, thereby reducing suspicion.

Reverse SSH tunneling

As mentioned above, during this wave of attacks, the adversaries widely deployed reverse SSH tunnels to many hosts of interest. The compromised machine initiates an SSH connection to an attacker-controlled server, which allows attackers to bypass standard firewall rules via establishing outbound connections.

That way, even if the primary backdoor is discovered, the attackers can maintain control through the SSH tunnel.

To install a reverse SSH tunnel on a victim’s host, the attackers run VBS scripts via PAExec or PsExec.

We’ve seen three types of scripts:

• Gen.vbs (WriteToSchedulerGenerateKey.vbs) generates key for SSH tunnel.
• Run.vbs (WriteToSchedulerRunSSH.vbs) runs reverse SSH tunnel.
• Kill.vbs (WriteToSchedulerKillSSH.vbs) stops reverse SSH tunnel via taskkill.exe.

To achieve persistence, the attackers added a new scheduled task in Windows:

In some cases, before establishing a reverse SSH tunnel, attackers set new access permissions to the folder containing the private key to prevent the legitimate user or system administrators from easily accessing or modifying it:

Patched OpenSSH

Some OpenSSH binaries used by the attackers had their imports modified. Instead of libcrypto.dll, the SSH executable imports syruntime.dll, which was placed in the same folder as the binary. This was likely done to evade detection and ensure stealth.

In addition, we found a portable version of OpenSSH, presumably compiled by the adversaries:

RevSocks

In addition to Reverse SSH tunnels, the attackers installed RevSocks using the same infrastructure. RevSocks is an alternative tool to SSH for establishing tunnels and proxy connections, written in Golang. This tool allows direct connection to workstations on the local network. It also allows attackers to gain access to other segments of the victim’s network by using the machine as a gateway. In some cases, C2 addresses were hardcoded into the binary; in other cases, the C2 was passed in command line arguments.

There were also reverse SOCKS samples with hardcoded C2 addresses:

Tor tunneling

To maintain control over the compromised host, the Tor network was used in some cases. A minimal set of a Tor executable and configuration files, necessary for launching HiddenService, was copied to the system directories of infected devices. The name of the Tor Browser executable file was modified. As a result, the infected machine was accessible via RDP from the Tor network when accessing the generated .onion domain.
Below is an example of a configuration file for routing connections from Tor to RDP ports on the local network, as well as example command lines for logging into Tor.

PowerCloud

We analyzed a new Cloud Atlas tool, PowerCloud. It collects user data with administrator privileges and writes this information to Google Sheets in Base64 format.

The tool represents an obfuscated PowerShell script. In most cases, it is packaged into an executable file using the PS2EXE utility, but we have also encountered variants in the form of a separate PowerShell script.

To find administrators on the victim host, the tool executes the following command:

This information is appended with the computer name and current date, the data is encoded in base64, and then the collected data is added to an existing Google Sheet.

Browser checker

Additionally, the attackers used another PowerShell script (MD5 5329F7BFF9D0D5DB28821B86C26D628F), compiled into an executable file via PS2EXE, which checks whether browser processes (Chrome, Edge, Firefox, and other) are running. This helps detect when the user is working on the computer. This can be used to choose the optimal time for conducting attacks (for example, when the user is away but their browser is still open) or simply to gather information about the victim’s habits.

The information about running browsers is written to a log file on the local host.

Victims

According to our telemetry, in late 2025 and early 2026, the identified targets of the described malicious activities are located in Russia and Belarus. The targeted industries mostly include government agencies and diplomatic entities.

We attribute the activity described in this report to the Cloud Atlas APT group with a high degree of confidence. The group used techniques and tools described previously, such as the initial access vector, the Python script for information gathering, and the Tor application for forwarding ports to the Tor network. The victim profile and geography also matches the Cloud Atlas targets.

We couldn’t help but notice some parallels with recent Head Mare activity. The PhantomHeart backdoor (available in Russian only), attributed to Head Mare and used to create an SSH tunnel, was placed in directories actively used by Cloud Atlas:

• C:\Windows\ime
• C:\Windows\System32\ime
• C:\Windows\pla
• C:\Windows\inf
• C:\Windows\migration
• C:\Windows\System32\timecontrolsvc
• C:\Windows\SKB

However, TTPs are still differentiated.

Conclusion

For more than ten years, the Cloud Atlas group has continued its activities and expanded its arsenal. Over the course of last year, many targeted campaigns in general were found to employ ReverseSocks, SSH and Tor, and the use of these utilities was no exception for Cloud Atlas. Creating such backup control channels using publicly available utilities significantly complicates the complete disruption of attackers’ actions on compromised systems. We will continue to closely monitor the group’s activity and describe their new tools and techniques.

Indicators of compromise

PowerCloud

7A95360B7E0EB5B107A3D231ABBC541A  C:\Windows\wininet.exe
C0D1EAA15A2CEFBAB9735787575C8D8E C:\Windows\LiveKernelReports\update.exe
D5B38B252CF212A4A32763DE36732D40   C:\Windows\ime\imejp\dicts\i39884.exe
3C75CEDB1196DF5EAB91F31411ED4B33  C:\pla\reports.exe
42AC350BFBC5B4EB0FEDBA16C81919C7   C:\ProgramData\update_[redacted].exe
493B901D1B33EB577DB64AADD948F9CE  C:\Windows\migration\wtr\MicrosoftBrowser.exe
2CABB721681455DAE1B6A26709DEF453  C:\Windows\pla\reports\winlog.exe
1B39E86EB772A0E40060B672B7F574F1 C:\Windows\System32\timecontrolsvc\vmnetdrv64.exe
1D401D6E6FC0B00AAA2C65A0AC0CFD6B C:\Windows\setup\scripts\install\software\activation\aact\dfsvc.exe
40A562B8600F843B717BC5951B2E3C29  C:\Windows\branding\scat.exe
F721A76DEB28FD0B80D27FCE6B8F5016  C:\Windows\ime\imekr\dicts\dfsvc.exe
D3C8AFD22BAA306FF659DB1FAC28574A  C:\ProgramData\update_[redacted].exe
6D7B2D1172BBDB7340972D844F6F0717 C:\Users\[redacted]\AppData\Local\1c\1cv8\1cv8ud.exe
C:\Users\[redacted]\AppData\Local\1c\1cv8\svc.exe
9769F43B9DE8D19E803263267FA6D62E C:\Users\[redacted]\AppData\Local\1c\1cv8\1cv8ud.exe
63B6BE9AE8D8024A40B200CCCB438F1D  C:\Windows\notepad.exe
6AA586BCC45CA2E92A4F0EF47E086FA1  C:\Windows\splwow32.exe
EBA3BCDB19A7E256BF8E2CC5B9C1CCA9   C:\Users\[redacted]\Desktop\soc\stant.exe
B4E183627B7399006C1BC47B3711E419  C:\WINDOWS\ime\service.exe
F56B31A4B47AD3365B18A7E922FBA1A8  dfsvc.exe
F6F62456FB0FCC396FB654CBED339BC3   –
25C8ED0511375DCA57EF136AC3FA0CCA   C:\branding\dwmw.exe

Browser checker

5329F7BFF9D0D5DB28821B86C26D628F  C:\ProgramData\checker_[redacted].exe

ReverseSocks

2B4BA4FACF8C299749771A3A4369782E  C:\Windows\PLA\System\bounce.exe
C:\Windows\pla\print_status.exe
BA9CE06641067742F2AFC9691FAFF1DC   C:\ProgramData\hp\client.exe
FB0F8027ACF1B1E47E07A63D8812ED50   C:\Windows\System32\timecontrolsvc\vmnetdrv64.exe
BBF1FA694122E07635DEEAC11AD712F8   C:\Windows\System32\HostManagement.exe
F301AA3D62B5095EEC4D8E34201A4769   C:\Windows\ime\imejp\msfu.exe
F9C3BBE108566D1A6B070F9C5FB03160   C:\Windows\ime\imetc\help\IMTCEN14.exe

Malicious MS Office documents

369B75BDCDED16469EDE7AB8BEDCFAE1
9EAAE9491F6A50D6DF0BE393734A44CB
3E6E9DF00A764B348EC611EE8504ACA0
9BD788F285E32A05E6591D1EB36EBFFC
F42085522EC2EBB16EDCF814E7C330AD
2042EB5D52F0B535A1CE6B6F954C8C2B
2AA1E9765EF6B00B94A9B6BE0041436A
36120F5E9411BCBAC7104EF3FA964ED2
5000A353399500BC78381DC95B6ED2DC
579A9952D31CAD801A3988DBE7914CE7
867B634588C0FD6B26684D502C15AB03
38FA4306FA4406BA31CF171AF4D36E34
83EDDE9F7EEEFAC0363413972F35572B
CC751619BFEC0DC4607C17112B9E3B2C
A632858F14B36F03D0F213F5F5D6BFF2
097CA205AD9E3B72018750280904718C
69121C36EB8BF77962DCA825FCFFD873
C5702EB250F855C8C872FFFB9BB656ED
ED34F5A136FBA4FDEA976570FAA33ED7
0577DB70844E88B32B954906E2F20798
28ECF8FB6719E14231B94B4D37629B0E
0857C84B62289A1A9F29E19244E9A499
0C514E137860F489E3801213460EF938
50568B1F9335A7E3BA4E5DF035A8FB86
7F776AD200287D6DE14A29158C457179
51F7F794ED43FB90D0F8EBBB5EFFE628
B8C753DD254509FBA5077FFD5067EAB0
BC3739DEC8CD8F54F3F60A85F3ED600E
EC076CD21C483A40156F4E40D08DADED
216CB7F31D383C0DD892B284DF05A495
116F59E70A9DF97F4ADAEA71EECB1E9A
7242AC065B50BCDE9308756B49DBADCB
8158552950D2E13B075001CE0C52AA97
A75DBED984963B9AB21309C5B2F8FD9B
0320DD389FDBAB25D46792BD2817675E
5339D1A666F3E40FE756505CF1D87D4B
67D7E3AEEB673BF60C59361C12A4ED81
89572F0ED20791A5AC9FC4267D67CCB0
B6AAE073E7BFEBF4D643C2BBEB5C02E1
344CA9EA07CD4AC90EF27F8890D4EC05

Domains and IPs

Reverse SSH/Socks domains

tenkoff[.]org
cloudguide[.]in
goverru[.]com
kufar[.]org
ultimatecore[.]net
spbnews[.]net
onedrivesupport[.]net

Malicious and compromised domains used in MS Office documents

amerikastaj[.]com
bigbang[.]me
paleturquoise-dragonfly-364512.hostingersite[.]com
wizzifi[.]com
totallegacy[.]org
mamurjor[.]com
landscapeuganda[.]com
lafortunaitalian.co[.]uk
kommando[.]live
internationalcommoditiesllc[.]com
humanitas[.]si
fishingflytackle[.]com
firsai.tipshub[.]net
alnakhlah.com[.]sa
allgoodsdirect.com[.]au
agenciakharis.com[.]br

Powershell payload staging

istochnik[.]org
znews[.]neti
investika-club[.]com
194.102.104[.]207
46.17.45[.]56
46.17.45[.]49
46.17.44[.]125
46.17.44[.]212
185.22.154[.]73
194.87.196[.]163
195.58.49[.]9
93.125.114[.]193
93.125.114[.]57
45.87.219[.]116
37.228.129[.]224
185.53.179[.]136
185.126.239[.]77
5.181.21[.]75
146.70.53[.]171
45.15.65[.]134
185.250.181[.]207
81.30.105[.]71

File paths

VBS scripts

WriteToSchedulerKillSSH.vbs
Create_task_day.vbs
WriteToSchedulerGenerateKey.vbs
C:\Windows\INF\Run.vbs
c:\Windows\INF\install.vbs
Update.vbs
c:\Windows\PLA\System\Gen.vbs
C:\Windows\INF\GenK.vbs
c:\Windows\PLA\System\Kill.vbs
c:\Windows\PLA\System\Run.vbs

ssh.exe

c:\Windows\ime\imejp\Asset.exe
c:\Windows\PLA\System\conhosts.exe
c:\Windows\INF\BITS\esentprf.exe
c:\Windows\INF\MSDTC\RuntimeBrokers.exe
c:\Windows\inf\diagnostic.exe

ReverseSocks

C:\Windows\PLA\System\bounce.exe
C:\ProgramData\hp\client.exe
C:\Windows\System32\timecontrolsvc\vmnetdrv64.exe

Tor client

C:\Windows\Resources\Update\Intel.exe
C:\Windows\INF\package.exe