Written by: Austin Larsen, Tyler McLellan, Genevieve Stark, Dan Ebreo
Introduction
Google Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) has continued to track an expansive extortion campaign by UNC6671, a threat actor operating under the "BlackFile" brand, that targets organizations via sophisticated voice phishing (vishing) and single sign-on (SSO) compromise. By leveraging adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) techniques to bypass traditional perimeter defenses and multi-factor authentication (MFA), UNC6671 gains deep access to cloud environments. The group primarily targets Microsoft 365 and Okta infrastructure, leveraging Python and PowerShell scripts to programmatically exfiltrate sensitive corporate data for subsequent extortion attempts. This post details UNC6671’s attack lifecycle and provides defenders with actionable guidance to detect and mitigate these identity-centric threats.
Since emerging in early 2026, UNC6671 has maintained a high operational cadence. GTIG assesses that the group has targeted dozens of organizations across North America, Australia, and the UK.
GTIG previously highlighted UNC6671 as a distinct cluster in aprior report detailing similar SaaS data-theft techniques utilized by ShinyHunters (UNC6240). While UNC6671 has co-opted the ShinyHunters brand in at least one instance to inject artificial credibility into their threats, GTIG assesses that the operations are independent. This distinction is supported by UNC6671's use of separate TOX communication channels, unique domain registration patterns, and the launch of a dedicated "BlackFile" data leak site (DLS).
These compromises are not the result of a security vulnerability in vendor products or infrastructure. Instead, this campaign continues to highlight the effectiveness of social engineering and underscores the critical importance of organizationsmoving toward phishing-resistant MFA to protect their SaaS and identity platforms.
Initial Access
UNC6671 initial access operations rely on high-volume voice phishing (vishing), often characterized by meticulous social engineering tactics, synchronized with real-time credential harvesting. These vishing calls are typically made by "callers" hired by the threat actor.
IT Deployment Pretext
The callers often call targeted employees' personal cellular phones to bypass security tooling and move the victim away from standard support channels. They typically masquerade as internal IT or help desk personnel, citing a mandatory migration to passkeys or a required multi-factor authentication (MFA) update. This pretext justifies directing the victim to a credential harvesting site and provides a logical cover for any subsequent security alerts generated during the compromise. UNC6671 has shifted from unique, organization-tailored credential harvesting domains to a subdomain-based model. These domains are typically registered with Tucows. Recent campaigns have used subdomains explicitly referencing "passkey" or "enrollment" themes to enhance the legitimacy of the help desk pretext.
<organization>.enrollms[.]com
<organization>.passkeyms[.]com
<organization>.setupsso[.]com
Real-Time MFA Interception
The vishing call functions as a live adversary-in-the-middle (AitM) attack. The process follows a rapid, procedural lifecycle:
Redirection: The victim is directed to a lookalike subdomain mirroring the organization's single sign-on (SSO) portal.
Credential Capture: As the victim inputs their username and password, the threat actor captures these in real-time and immediately submits them to the legitimate SSO provider.
MFA Bypass: When the legitimate portal issues an MFA challenge (Push, SMS, or TOTP), the victim—believing they are completing a setup step—provides the code or approval to the threat actor.
Device Registration: Upon gaining access, the threat actor immediately navigates to the user's security settings to register a new, attacker-controlled MFA device to ensure persistence.
The speed of this execution ensures the threat actor can establish a permanent foothold before the victim or the organization's Security Operations Center (SOC) can identify the anomaly.
Data Theft
Following successful authentication, UNC6671 leverages SSO access to move laterally across the victim's SaaS applications to enable data theft operations. The threat actors appear to be focused on targeting Microsoft 365 and Okta environments, using compromised accounts to access SharePoint, OneDrive, and other connected SaaS applications such as Zendesk and Salesforce. In several instances, the actors specifically queried internal search functions for string literals such as "confidential" and "SSN" to prioritize theft of perceived high-value data.
Programmatic Data Exfiltration
Upon establishing persistence, UNC6671 transitions from interactive browser-based reconnaissance to automated exfiltration. In multiple engagements, we observed the use of scripts to harvest high-value data from SharePoint and OneDrive repositories.
In addition to relying on methods that triggered standard FileDownloaded events, the threat actor has also used less conspicuous approaches. These include the threat actor’s use of formal APIs, such as Microsoft Graph, as well as the python-requests library and PowerShell to issue direct HTTP GET requests against document resource URLs. Notably, by repurposing valid session cookies (e.g., FedAuth) captured during the initial vishing phase, the actor has been able to "stream" file content directly to attacker-controlled infrastructure.
In these cases, the request mimics a standard web client fetch rather than a formal "Download" command. As a result, the activity is frequently recorded as a FileAccessed event rather than FileDownloaded. This 'direct fetch' method naturally blends into routine traffic, which may bypass detection in many Security Operations Centers (SOCs) that prioritize FileDownloaded events and treat FileAccessed as benign.
Forensic Artifacts and Scripting
Analysis of Microsoft 365 Unified Audit Log (UAL) telemetry revealed several consistent forensic indicators of UNC6671 activity, including clear evidence of scripted exfiltration. Most notably, the threat actor frequently showed User-Agent mismatches; while they spoofed the ClientAppId for "Microsoft Office" to bypass basic conditional access filters, the recorded UserAgent strings identified scripting engines such as python-requests/2.28.1 or WindowsPowerShell/5.1. This discrepancy suggests that access was driven by automated scripts rather than human interaction with the SharePoint user interface. Additionally, these access attempts consistently originated from non-standard infrastructure, such as commercial VPN exit nodes and hosting providers.
Figure 2: FileAccessed event from later UNC6671 intrusions
The speed and scale of UNC6671’s data exfiltration also reflects the automated nature of these scripts, which allows the threat actors to exfiltrate massive volumes of data at high speeds. In one case, the threat actor used their Python script from a remote IP to access and download over a million individual files from a victim's SharePoint and OneDrive environments. In another case, the threat actor rapidly iterated through tens of thousands of SharePoint file interactions.
Extortion
UNC6671 conducts highly targeted extortion campaigns, beginning with unbranded ransom notes sent from programmatically generated consumer email accounts. Once a victim engages via the unique, encrypted communication channel (such as Tox or Session) provided by the threat actor in the initial ransom note, the operators identify themselves under the "BlackFile" brand. While the operators typically open negotiations with initial demands in the millions of dollars, they often pivot to low six-figure demands when met with active engagement. Notably, while the initial emails typically do not contain errors, at least some follow up emails have contained mistakes suggesting that those are human generated.
In cases where the operator is met with silence or resistance, the group aggressively escalates pressure. During a recent incident, after the victim was unresponsive, UNC6671 pivoted to an aggressive spam campaign. Using dozens of Gmail accounts with randomly generated usernames, the threat actor flooded employee mailboxes with messages before automated restrictions kicked in based on their sending behavior and their accounts were restricted. We have also observed these threat actors sending threatening voicemails to C-suite executives and, in severe cases, utilizing swatting tactics against company personnel.
Subject: [COMPANY NAME] DATA BREACH 72 HOURS TO CONTACT US From:[pseudorandom_alphanumeric_string]@gmail.com
Hello [Company Name] Executives and HR,
We have managed to export ~[X] TB of data from your network due to your terrible security practices and negligent data storing practices.
Here is a brief overview of data exported from your network:
[X]+ GB of internal company files (SharePoint & OneDrive) containing confidential business processes, NDAs, project cost estimates, subcontractor contracts, and HR records.
Tens of thousands of emails from executive mailboxes, including confidential documents.
Complete CRM and support ticket exports (Salesforce & Zendesk) containing hundreds of thousands of customer records, PII, billing details, and communication logs.
Complete corporate directory (Entra) dumps including employee names, mobile numbers, job titles, and hierarchy.
~[X] ServiceNow IT infrastructure records (computers, servers, cloud resources).
You have exactly 72 hours to contact the [Tox / Session] ID provided below. If you fail to contact the ID provided by us within the timeframe stated, we will be forced to publish your data to the public. We will also be forced to contact each company you work with via the employee team contact phone numbers and email addresses provided and explain how [Company Name] has terrible security protocols and does not care about its customers.
We are willing to engage in good faith negotiation terms. Upon contacting us, a full list of all data exported from your network will be sent to you for review. You will be able to pick up to 3 files to confirm and verify we have what we are claiming.
[Tox / Session] ID: [Unique Alphanumeric String]
Silence may not always be wise in situations like this. We will not be ignored. Make the right choice and cooperate with us so this can be a learning experience for you.
Figure 3: Generalized example initial unbranded extortion note from UNC6671
Subject: [COMPANY NAME] DATA BREACH 72 HOURS TO CONTACT US From:[pseudorandom_alphanumeric_string]@gmail.com
Dearest executive,
You have picked to ignore the first deadline to contact us. That is not smart do not ignore us it will only make things worse. We are BlackFile. Do not play games with us. We are giving a final deadline of 72 hours to contact us so we can reach an agreement.
We copied over [X] TB+ of data from your SharePoint & M365 instance (legal documents, operational documents, client documents, sales documents, development documents, etc) over [X]gb of Salesforce data, full ZenDesk support ticket export for [X]+ customers, ALL ticket history including old and new tickets and their contents. Total taken from your network is over [X]TB+
Do not be alarmed as you can secure the proteciton of your data by choosing to work with us. Nothing taken from your network has been disclosed to the public or shared with third parties as of now.
Reach out to us on session to receive all details and evidense that we accessed your network. We will use Session to communicate with you. You can get Session by visiting getsession(.)org
Reach out to the following ID using Session: [Unique Session ID]
Do not reply to this email. Instead alert the rest of your HR and SOC/IT Security Team. We give you a final deadline of 72 hours to confirm reciept that you received this email by contacting us on Session.
If you fail to contact us a second time then a majority of the emails taken from your network will receive a notification from us explaining you failed to come to an agreement with us to protect your customers PII and other sensitive information. Additionally we will message journalists about this breach and your failure to come to a resolution with us before finally uploading all data taken from you to our blog for the public.
Do not let a data recovery company tell you not to negotate us we are BlackFile and we do not play games. The data we took from you can seriously damage your reputation if released is it really worth having that happen over ignoring us?
Blackfile
Figure 4: Generalized example follow up extortion email which included branding not present in initial messages
Evolution of Ransom Notes
Throughout their operations in early 2026, UNC6671's ransom notes exhibited an evolution in formatting, branding, and communication methods. Initially, the threat actors used highly aggressive, short-term deadlines, often giving early victims generic 24 or 48 hour windows to respond. This appeared to become more standardized in late January when they gave subsequent targets a strict 72-hour deadline. Their email subject lines also evolved into a formalized, all-caps structure: [COMPANY NAME] DATA BREACH 72 HOURS TO CONTACT US.
During this same period, the group’s identity and preferred communication channels shifted. Early extortion emails were unbranded, with the actors demanding contact via Tox (a peer-to-peer instant messaging protocol). By February 2026, the group formally adopted the "BlackFile" moniker and transitioned their communication demands exclusively to Session (a decentralized, privacy-focused messenger), providing victims with Session IDs and client download instructions. Additionally, while early extortion notes were sent from external emails that could easily be flagged by spam filters or ignored, since at least March 2026, UNC6671 has leveraged hijacked internal corporate email and Microsoft Teams accounts.
The BlackFile Data Leak Site (DLS)
The threat actors launched the BlackFile Data Leak Site (DLS) on February 6, 2026, claiming to operate as "security researchers." Despite maintaining a dedicated DLS, the group's approach to data exposure deviates significantly from the maximum-publicity, high-noise model employed by other actors. UNC6671 does not publicly advertise their leak site or attempt to index it for search engines. Furthermore, the group has typically only leaked limited file samples and directory listings rather than full datasets; to date, GTIG has not observed the actor leak victim data in full.
Figure 5: BlackFile DLS
Figure 6: BlackFile DLS Deletion Process
Notably, the BlackFile DLS site went offline in late April 2026, but briefly came back online on May 11, 2026 to share the below message before shutting down again. In this message, the threat actor stated "BlackFile is shutting down… under this name." As of the time of publication, the DLS site is inaccessible.
Figure 7: BlackFile DLS Shutdown Announcement
Remediation and Hardening
GTIG recommends the following mitigations and hunting strategies:
Deploy Credential Guarding: Configure environment-specific protections to catch credential submission at the point of impact. In Google Workspace, enable Password Alert to monitor for corporate password hashes being entered into unauthorized domains. For Microsoft environments, leverage Microsoft Defender's Credential Protection and SmartScreen to intercept submissions on known phishing or low-reputation sites. These automated technical controls act as a final fail-safe, triggering immediate password resets or security alerts when a user inadvertently interacts with a malicious page.
Implement Phishing-Resistant MFA: Transition away from SMS-based or push-notification MFA. Implement FIDO2-compliant security keys or passkeys, which are resistant to the adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) and vishing tactics employed by UNC6671.
Monitor IdP Logs: Review identity provider logs for system.multifactor.factor.setup events that are immediately preceded by user.authentication.auth_via_mfa failures or "Abandoned" challenges.
Correlate Infrastructure: Alert on authentication attempts originating from known commercial VPNs or hosting providers that are abnormal for the user's typical geographic location.
Audit SaaS API Activity: Monitor Microsoft 365, SharePoint, and Salesforce audit logs for anomalous, high-volume file downloads (FileDownloaded or FileAccessed events) originating from generic scripting user agents (e.g., PowerShell, Python).
Monitor User-Agents: Monitor for specific IdP SDK User-Agents on devices not previously associated with a user's profile.
Re-Evaluate "Access" Severity: Security Operations Centers (SOCs) should treat FileAccessed events with the same criticality as FileDownloaded when the User-Agent identifies it as a programming library (Python, Go, etc.) or a command-line tool.
Audit for Direct File Streaming: Monitor for FileAccessed logs where the AppAccessContext indicates a headless client or where the volume of "Accessed" files in a short window exceeds human browsing capability.
Outlook and Implications
The recent shutdown of the BlackFile data leak site (DLS) accompanied by the actors' own declaration that they are shutting down "under this name" signals a possible transition phase rather than a permanent cessation of their threat activity. Historical precedents across the extortion ecosystem demonstrate that major threat clusters commonly rebrand or disperse their operations following disruption or voluntary shutdowns. These events can serve several strategic functions: evading law enforcement or competitor scrutiny, quietly resolving pending extortion cases, or preparing to pivot to a more viable brand while simultaneously also allowing time for the threat actors to retool and/or set up new infrastructure. Even if the BlackFile brand is permanently retired, the techniques leveraged by UNC6671, specifically their focus on data theft from cloud and SaaS environments, represent a highly successful trend in the cyber crime threat landscape that we also highlighted in the Google Cloud H1 2026 Cloud Threat Horizons Report. Organizations can review our prior blog post with actionable hardening, logging, and detection recommendations to help protect against these threats.
Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)
To assist the wider community in hunting and identifying activity outlined in this blog post, we have provided indicators of compromise (IOCs) in a free GTI Collection for registered users. At the time of publication, identified phishing domains have been added to Google Safe Browsing.
While this collection provides a comprehensive list of IOCs, defenders should note that the majority of identified IP addresses are commercial VPN nodes, and actual source IPs tend to vary as the actor continuously cycles through new infrastructure. Furthermore, the domains are often stood up and used within minutes of registration; as such, they are provided primarily as examples of past naming conventions and usage patterns rather than as a primary mechanism for real-time blocking.
Google Security Operations (SecOps)
Google SecOps customers have access to broad category rules under the Okta and O365 rule packs that detect the behaviors outlined in this report. The activity discussed in the blog post is detected in Google SecOps under the following rule names:
Okta Admin Console Access Failure
Okta Suspicious Actions from Anonymized IP
O365 SharePoint Bulk File Access or Download via PowerShell
O365 SharePoint High Volume File Access Events
O365 Sharepoint Query for Proprietary or Privileged Information
Over the past few weeks, we have reached a critical turning point in cybersecurity. Following the launch of our Frontier AI Defense initiative, we’ve continued testing the latest frontier models (including Anthropic’s Mythos and Claude Opus 4.7, as well as OpenAI’s GPT-5.5-Cyber) as part of the Trusted Access for Cyber program.
The urgency to innovate continues to ramp up. As Lee Klarich recently detailed in his Defender's Guide to the Frontier AI Impact on Cybersecurity, our current landscape is defined by a brief three-to-five-month window to gain a strategic advantage over attackers. To outsmart AI-based exploits, enterprises must decisively address vulnerabilities across their code and stand up the right security stack to enable real-time, automated defenses.
With such a ticking clock in front of us, acting rapidly and at-scale to support our customers is paramount. Today, we exponentially grow our scale of delivery by expanding our Frontier AI Alliance.
Since introducing this initiative, our collaboration with initial partners – Accenture, Deloitte, IBM, NTT DATA, and PwC – has already begun changing the defensive math for our customers. This is a moment that calls for radical collaboration across the entire security ecosystem, so today we are proud to welcome a new cohort of strategic partners – Cognizant, HCLTech, Kyndryl, TCS, Infosys, McKinsey & Company, Orange Cyberdefense, and Wipro – who will join us in delivering AI readiness at scale.
While this expansion significantly increases our reach, this is only the beginning. We are committed to a continuous evolution of this alliance and will be adding more critical partners in the future across the globe to ensure our customers have the most robust defense network possible.
By combining our technology with these partners’ deep consulting expertise, we are delivering:
Machine-Speed Security: Natively integrating Frontier AI to provide real-time, automated defense against autonomous threats.
Intelligence-Led Resilience: Leveraging Unit 42® experts to fast-track the discovery and remediation of exposures at machine speed.
Hardened Defenses: Utilizing early access to frontier models from partners like OpenAI and Anthropic to simulate and block attack chains before they hit the mainstream.
The stakes are high. The attack cycle has compressed with the time from initial access to data exfiltration collapsing to just 39 seconds. Machine-speed MTTR (mean time to respond) is no longer an ambitious goal, it is a requirement.
This initiative underscores our commitment to providing every client with integrated, real-time protection.
This blog contains forward-looking statements that involve risks, uncertainties and assumptions, including, without limitation, statements regarding the benefits, impact, or performance or potential benefits, impact or performance of our products and technologies or future products and technologies. These forward-looking statements are not guarantees of future performance, and there are a significant number of factors that could cause actual results to differ materially from statements made in this blog. We identify certain important risks and uncertainties that could affect our results and performance in our most recent Annual Report on Form 10-K, our most recent Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q, and our other filings with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission from time-to-time, each of which are available on our website at investors.paloaltonetworks.com and on the SEC's website at www.sec.gov. All forward-looking statements in this blog are based on information available to us as of the date hereof, and we do not assume any obligation to update the forward-looking statements provided to reflect events that occur or circumstances that exist after the date on which they were made.
On May 4th, 2026, The GentlemenRaaS administrator acknowledged on underground forums that an internal backend database (Rocket) had been leaked. This leak exposed 9 accounts, including zeta88 (aka hastalamuerte), who runs the infrastructure, builds the locker and RaaS panel, manages payouts, and effectively acts as the administrator of the program.
The internal discussions provide a rare end‑to‑end view of the operation: they detail initial access paths (Fortinet and Cisco edge appliances, NTLM relay, OWA/M365 credential logs), the division of roles, the shared toolsets, and the group’s active tracking and evaluation of modern CVEs such as CVE-2024-55591, CVE-2025-32433, and CVE-2025-33073.
Screenshots from ransom negotiations were also leaked, showing a successful case where the group received 190,000 USD, after starting with an initial demand (anchor) of 250,000 USD.
Further chats indicate that stolen data from a UK software consultancy was later reused to attack a company in Turkey. The Gentlemen used this during negotiations as a dual‑pressure tactic: they portrayed the UK firm as the “access broker,” while mentioning to provide “proof” to the Turkish company that the intrusion originated from the UK side and encouraging it to consider legal action against the consultancy.
By collecting all available ransomware samples, Check Point Research identified 8 distinct affiliate TOX IDs, including the administrator’s TOX ID. This suggests that the admin not only manages the RaaS program but also actively participates in, or directly carries out, some of the infections.
Introduction
The Gentlemen ransomware‑as‑a‑service (RaaS) operation is a relatively new group that emerged around mid‑2025. Its operators advertise the service across multiple underground forums, promoting their ransomware platform and inviting penetration testers and other technically skilled actors to join as affiliates.
In 2026, based on victims listed on the data leak site (DLS), The Gentlemen appears to be one of the most active RaaS programs, with approximately 332 published victims in just the first five months of 2026. This volume places the group as the second most productive RaaS operation in that period, at least among those that publicly list their victims.
During our previous publication, Check Point Research analyzed a specific infection carried out by an affiliate of this RaaS. In that case, the affiliate used SystemBC, and the associated command‑and‑control (C&C) server revealed more than 1,570 victims.
In this publication, we focus on the affiliate program itself and the actors who participate in it. On May 4th, 2026, The Gentlemen administrator acknowledged the leak of an internal database used by the group, which contained operational information about their infrastructure, affiliates, and victims. Check Point Research obtained what appears to be a partial leak of the group’s internal chats and related data, which was briefly posted on an underground forum before being removed. Later on, the leak also appeared on another underground forum.
The leaked material includes detailed conversations between the RaaS operators and their affiliates across several internal channels (such as INFO, general, TOOLS, and PODBOR). In these chats, they coordinate ongoing intrusions, exchange toolsets and EDR‑kill packages, discuss infrastructure and backend components (including the Rocket database and NAS storage), review CVEs and exploit paths (for example Fortinet, Cisco, and NTLM relay issues), and talk about specific victims, campaigns, and payouts. Together, these messages provide a rare inside view of how The Gentlemen plans, executes, and scales its ransomware operations.
The Gentlemen RaaS Admin
The Gentlemen RaaS administrator has been very active and vocal on various underground forums, trying to attract affiliates with an aggressive profit-sharing model: 90% for affiliates and 10% for the operator.
In September 2025, in one of the first posts promoting the RaaS program, the account Zeta88 published a message advertising the service and inviting individual penetration testers to join as affiliates.
Figure 1 — Zeta88 advertising The Gentlemen’s RaaS.
Later on, the official posts for this ransomware program started to be published by another account, The Gentlemen. The administrator also shared their TOX ID across several forums.
Figure 2 — RaaS admin in underground forum.
The same TOX ID can be seen on the onion data leak site (DLS), where it is used by affiliates or compromised victims to contact the administrator.
Figure 3 — Onion page TOX ID.
In a post on an underground forum, where the administrator demonstrated how affiliates can build the ransomware, we can see the administrator’s profile page, where their TOX ID is again visible in the corresponding field.
Figure 4 — Image uploaded by RaaS admin.
In the second shared image, we again observe the same TOX ID and see how the target or victim entry is supposed to look from an affiliate’s perspective.
Figure 5 — Image uploaded by RaaS admin.
Considering that the initial post was made by Zeta88, it is likely that this account belongs to the administrator and that their TOX ID is F8E24C7F5B12CD69C44C73F438F65E9BF560ADF35EBBDF92CF9A9B84079F8F04060FF98D098E. This assessment is based on the fact that the same TOX ID appears consistently across different contexts: in the early recruitment posts, in the onion data leak site (DLS), and in the screenshots showing the administrator’s profile and communication fields. Taken together, these overlaps strongly suggest that Zeta88, the later The Gentlemen account, and this TOX ID are all controlled by the same RaaS administrator.
RaaS Affiliates
Check Point Research collected most of the available artifacts related to The Gentlemen RaaS from online sources. Based on the current 412 public victims listed on the data leak site (DLS), and considering that there are likely additional victims who paid and therefore were not published, we identified 29 unique campaigns in public sources such as VirusTotal.
For each of these 29 campaigns, we extracted the TOX ID associated with the corresponding affiliate. Our analysis shows that these campaigns were conducted by 8 unique TOX IDs.
There are almost certainly more affiliates involved in this group, however, based on our current locker visibility, we can confidently confirm 29 discovered campaigns and ransomware samples.
Based on this small collection of samples, most of the campaigns appear to have been conducted by the affiliate using the TOX ID 98C132E2B20B531BE6604397D97040C1E9EB42FCE12EDF119BCE8B4031CA5C70DAF5E65FA3C3. It is also noteworthy that the RaaS administrator’s TOX ID has been observed in four unique infections. This suggests that the administrator not only manages the RaaS program but also actively participates in, or directly carries out, some of the infections.
RaaS Leak
On May 4th, 2026, on an underground forum, the RaaS administrator published a post acknowledging the claims of an internal leak involving their so‑called Rocket database, an internal backend system used to store operational data, and addressed his affiliates directly about the incident.
Figure 6 — The Gentlemen RaaS post.
The message continues in a dismissive tone toward the leak seller and then shifts focus back to “more interesting” topics. These include a full overhaul of the communication structure, the deployment of a new NAS with unlimited storage, and several technical upgrades to the locker, such as removing hardware breakpoints, performing NTDLL unhooking, and patching ETW to suppress Event Tracing for Windows.
Demanding ransom from a RaaS
On May 5th, 2026, the account n7778 with TOX ID 7862AE03A73AAC2994A61DF1F635347F2D1731A77CACC155594C6B681D201F7AD6817AD3AB0A advertised the sale of The Gentlemen’s hacked data on underground forums for 10,000 USD, payable in Bitcoin.
Figure 7 — Account selling The Gentlemen RaaS Data.
In the following days, the same account posted two MediaFire links containing proof files supporting the claimed leak.
Figure 8 — Partial leaks.
The first leaked data is a text file that contains the contents of the shadow file from The Gentlemen’s server, including user account entries and their password hashes. The file lists many usernames, among them zeta88, 3NT3R, B1d3n, C0CA, d0wnloAd1, equal1z3r, F3N1X, Gblog88, JLL, LDW, n0n3, PRTGRS, W1Z. Notably, we again see the zeta88 account, the same handle that was used in the initial underground post advertising the RaaS program, further linking this server to the RaaS administrator.
Figure 9 — shadow file content.
The second leaked data set contains partial conversations between the RaaS operators and their affiliates across several internal channels (such as INFO, general, TOOLS, and PODBOR). In these chats, they coordinate ongoing intrusions, exchange toolsets and EDR‑kill packages, discuss infrastructure and backend components, review CVEs and exploit paths, and talk about specific victims, campaigns, and payouts.
While the partial leaked data that we obtained is around 44.4 MB, a screenshot shared by the same account on another underground forum shows a total size of approximately 16.22 GB, which likely corresponds to the full leaked data set.
Figure 10 — Full leaked data screenshot.
Roles & Structure
The group appears to have a clear division of roles and responsibilities. At the core, the main operator and developer, zeta88 (most likely hastalamuerte), runs the infrastructure and builds and maintains the custom ransomware locker, the RaaS panel and builder (Linux with containers and a TOR front), as well as the GPO‑based spread mechanism and the locker’s “spread” module. This operator also curates toolsets in the TOOLS channel, including EDR kill kits and kiljalki collections, selects targets, and assigns them to specific teams, often talking about “targets”, “подбор” (selection) channels, and distributing corporate victims to groups of 2–3 people. In addition, they manage payouts and negotiations, including multi‑million ransom discussions (“переговоры на 10кк”).
Figure 11 — Image shared in the chats, zeta88 – Admin.
Considering our previous assessment that the RaaS administrator also runs campaigns himself (based on TOX IDs), the leaked chats reinforce this view: they show him personally deploying the locker and encrypting at least one victim’s environment.
Figure 12 — zeta88 locking message.
Often, messages sent by zeta88 appear to be copied or adapted from earlier messages made by hastalamuerte, and affiliates frequently mention hastalamuerte by name. Taken together with previous findings and earlier RaaS posts linked to zeta88, these patterns strongly suggest that hastalamuerte and zeta88 are very likely the same person.
Figure 13 — zeta88 – hastalamuerte message.
Below this core role, key operators or affiliates such as qbit and quant handle more hands‑on operational work. qbit is a practical operator on many cases, responsible for scanning and filtering Fortinet VPNs and other edge devices, performing reconnaissance and persistence (including “крепиться клаудом” (English: “to establish persistence via the cloud”) through Cloudflare tunnels or Zero Trust solutions), and using tools such as NetExec (NXC), RelayKing, PrivHound, and NTLM relay scanning. qbit frequently requests clear EDR killer sets, manuals, and guidance for locking ESXi environments, and also brings in new bot or access suppliers (“поставщик ботов”) (English: “supplier of bots”). quant focuses on log‑based access (“логи ЛБ”, i.e. spilled credentials for OWA/O365 and similar services) and maintains a custom log parser and proprietary credential/data collector, referred to as buildx641, which is run from a domain‑joined machine, uses vssadmin, shadow copies, ntds.dit, and SYSTEM copies, and collects and compresses data from multiple hosts. quant is oriented toward OW/OVA spam and higher‑value (“тир1”) (English: “tier‑1”) victims and has set up a powerful “brute server” (Threadripper PRO, 128 GB RAM, RTX 5090) for large‑scale brute forcing.
Around these core and key operators, there are several other accounts, including Wick, mAst3r, Protagor, Bl0ck, JeLLy, Kunder, and Mamba who take on various roles such as red‑teamers, advertising partners, access brokers, or case‑specific collaborators; for example, Protagor is mentioned in connection with OV (online vault/OWA‑type) spam, while Mamba acts as an access broker for Fortinet VPNs sourced from ramp.
Through this specific leak, we identified 9 unique accounts actively communicating with each other: Kunder, qbit, JeLLy, Protagor, zeta88, Bl0ck, Wick, quant, and mAst3r. This internal interaction pattern supports the view that these accounts form a coordinated operational network within The Gentlemen RaaS ecosystem. This number aligns with our earlier assessment based on the unique TOX IDs extracted from the ransomware lockers.
Group members collaborate on various infections and share the profits as well. As a result, the 90% share allocated to the affiliate is often split among multiple affiliates who worked together to achieve a successful intrusion.
Figure 14 — Collaboration and profit sharing.
Based on the analyzed chat messages, the organization’s structure appears to match the model shown in the following image. It is likely that additional members exist who do not appear in this specific leak, but the roles and relationships we observe here are consistent across the available data. There are also indications of an internal separation between trusted members and newcomers—for example, one message notes that “that Rocket is still alive – there are rookies there”—suggesting a tiered or layered structure within the group.
Figure 15 — Organization diagram.
Operational workflow
The conversations from the leak show a fairly standard but well‑organized operational workflow. The group claims to usually gain initial access through exposed edge devices such as VPN appliances, firewalls, and other internet-facing systems, with a particular focus on platforms like Fortinet FortiGate and Cisco. They combine different methods to achieve this, including credential brute‑forcing against web or VPN panels, exploiting known vulnerabilities, and buying access from third‑party “bot” or access brokers. Screenshots shared in the chats also show them searching for accounts and credentials in data‑breach search engines. Once they obtain a foothold, they treat these systems as pivots to move deeper into the internal network.
Figure 16 — Searching credentials & accounts.
After gaining access, the operators perform internal reconnaissance and privilege escalation to understand the environment and obtain higher-level permissions, often aiming for domain administrator access. They rely on a mixture of Active Directory discovery, certificate abuse, and various local privilege escalation techniques. At the same time, they invest significant effort into disabling or bypassing security tools such as EDR and antivirus solutions, using a combination of misconfigurations, registry abuse, logging mechanisms, and bring-your-own-vulnerable-driver–style (BYOD) techniques to tamper with or overwrite security binaries.
With elevated access and reduced defensive visibility, the group focuses on expanding across the network and preparing for the final stages of the attack. This includes lateral movement, establishing additional tunnels or proxies for reliable connectivity, and relaxing security settings to make further operations easier. They also harvest credentials and browser-based sessions to reuse existing access to corporate services. Data exfiltration is then carried out using automated tools and tuned configurations to move large volumes of data efficiently, often targeting NAS devices, backup systems, and virtualization infrastructure. Finally, once the environment is prepared and critical data is in their control, they deploy their custom ransomware “locker,” which is designed to spread quickly across the network, leverage existing administrator sessions, and encrypt systems in a coordinated manner.
Tools & Infra
The leaked conversations show that The Gentlemen RaaS operators use a repeatable and fairly mature toolset to support their operations. For remote access and C2, they rely on frameworks like ZeroPulse and Velociraptor, combined with Cloudflare-based tunnels and custom VPN setups to keep stable access into compromised networks. For offensive operations, they use a range of red‑team utilities such as NetExec, RelayKing, TaskHound, PrivHound, CertiHound, and others to perform Active Directory discovery, certificate abuse, privilege escalation, and file share discovery. A separate group of tools is dedicated to EDR and AV evasion, including EDRStartupHinder, gfreeze, glinker, and DumpBrowserSecrets, as well as techniques inspired by public research on abusing Windows logging and Event Tracing for Windows (ETW). Finally, they support these activities with infrastructure and helper tools like port scanners (gogo.exe), usage guides, OSINT extensions, and password‑cracking services, which together give them a reusable framework for running repeated intrusions and ransomware deployments.
Category
Tool / Resource
Purpose / Usage
Reference / Notes
C2 / Remote Access
ZeroPulse
Remote access / C2 framework for controlling compromised hosts.
https://github.com/jxroot/ZeroPulse
C2 / Remote Access
Velociraptor
Used as a covert C2 platform, including memory and LSASS dumping.
Often used with signed builds to reduce detection.
C2 / Remote Access
Cloudflare Zero Trust / Tunnels
Provides stealthy tunnels into victim networks over HTTPS.
The leaked chats show that the group pays close attention to other ransomware operations, including the leaked Black Basta negotiations. In particular, they discuss Black Basta’s approach to code signing and note how that group allegedly used VirusTotal to search for legitimate code‑signing certificates, which were then targeted for brute‑force attacks on their private keys. The Gentlemen actors refer to this technique as a model they can reuse or adapt, highlighting their interest in abusing trusted certificates to make their binaries look legitimate and harder to detect.
Figure 17 — Code signing conversations.
AI mentions
The Gentlemen mention AI usage in multiple channels and for various purposes. While it is clear that they have already used AI for code‑assisted development, including experiments with Chinese models, more advanced use cases—such as locally deploying models to analyze large volumes of exfiltrated victim data—are only discussed at a conceptual level. These ideas are suggested in the chats but do not appear to be fully implemented.
zeta88 states that he built the GLOCKER admin panel in three days using AI‑assisted coding. He is candid about the limitations of this approach, noting that while AI can speed up development, you still need to understand what you are doing and be able to guide and correct the code it produces.
Figure 18 — zeta88 “vibe-coded” the Panel.
Members share their AI preferences across different chats. zeta88 states that he finds DeepSeek, Qwen, Kimi, and Emi the most effective models for his purposes, particularly for coding assistance and technical queries.
Figure 19 — AI preferences.
He also suggests adding more Chinese LLMs to their toolkit, in addition to those they are already considering or using, such as DeepSeek and Qwen.
Figure 20 — Chinese LLMs suggestions.
A couple of months later, qbit shares in the INFO channel their recommendation for “the most radical neural network, which creates any content without censorship. Runs on Qwen 3.5 with all barriers removed… Zero refusals. Absolutely no restrictions.”
Figure 21 — Qwen 3.5 post.
zeta88 directs affiliates to use AI as a quick reference—for example, to look up FortiGate internals—rather than asking in the channel.
Figure 22 — Usage of AI as quick reference.
For more challenging tasks such as operational data analysis, identifying high‑value access points, and offloading much of the manual data‑triage work to an AI model, the operators explicitly discuss using an uncensored, self‑hosted LLM. However these suggestions appear to remain theoretical, as Protagor admits, “I have no idea how to do that, but I think it’s possible.”
Figure 23 — Local, self-hosted LLM.
Screenshot shared in the chats shows an LLM response on how to send an email to all users via the Jira admin interface, in Russian. It describes two methods, mainly using Jira Automation and user groups.
Figure 24 — Screenshot shared in the chats.
The group appears to be experimenting with well‑known Chinese LLMs and has considered using locally hosted models to assist with data triage on stolen information.
CVEs and Exploits
While the group discusses these vulnerabilities, shares related links, and occasionally attempts to exploit specific systems using particular CVEs, we cannot confirm whether the targeted machines were actually vulnerable to the exact vulnerabilities they referenced.
CVE-2024-55591 – FortiOS management interface
This vulnerability affects the FortiOS management interface and fits directly into their broader focus on Fortinet appliances as high‑value initial access points. While the chats do not show detailed exploitation steps, the presence of this CVE alongside their FortiGate targeting suggests it is part of the set of vulnerabilities they track for potential use against exposed management interfaces.
In the logs, qbit shares a proof-of-concept (PoC) for CVE-2025-32433, and zeta88 comments on its quality and applicability. This shows that the group is not simply aware of the CVE but is actively evaluating whether it can be used in real operations, specifically in environments where Cisco or Erlang-based SSH services are exposed. Even if they are cautious about PoC reliability, the discussion confirms that this vulnerability is part of their potential exploit toolkit.
Figure 26 — qbit & zeta88 related posts.
CVE-2025-33073 – NTLM reflection / NTLM relay
qbit references RelayKing and shares output showing domains being scanned for NTLM relay issues, including checks that explicitly cover CVE-2025-33073. This is strong evidence that they are not just reading about the vulnerability but have integrated RelayKing into their standard reconnaissance process to generate target lists for tools like ntlmrelayx. In other words, CVE-2025-33073 is a vulnerability they actively scan for and intend to exploit as part of broader NTLM relay workflows.
Figure 27 — Mention of CVE-2025-33073.
Other Exploit Paths (Without Explicit CVE IDs)
The operators also make heavy use of technique-based exploits where no specific CVE number is mentioned in the chats. These include:
MSI service abuse via RegPwn, used for privilege escalation.
Veeam to domain admin paths, based on public write‑ups about misconfigured backup infrastructure.
iDRAC to domain admin paths, leveraging Dell iDRAC weaknesses.
WPR, AutoLogger, and ETW manipulation techniques documented by zerosalarium and others to overwrite or disable security binaries.
Payments & Negotiations
Zeta88 acts as the organizer/administrator, distributing cryptocurrency payouts to team members (including those who are “AFK”) and advising on how to cash out proceeds via Bitcoin wallets (Guarda, Trust Wallet, Exodus). The group discusses AML (Anti-Money Laundering) evasion strategies. Zeta88 sends a BTC transaction to Kunder as a payout, which Kunder confirms receiving.
Figure 28 — Transaction link shared.
The specific mentions of how they handle Bitcoin laundering/cash out:
Exchange Chains (“связки обмена”) Zeta88 mentions running ~800 transactions through “buy desks” (скупов) via exchange chains, or sometimes sending directly, suggesting chain-hopping to obscure transaction origins.
AML Checking They discuss whether their BTC is “clean” and reference a buyer who actively checks AML scores before transacting. They’re uncertain how the scoring works but are aware their coins could be traced.
Tinkoff QR Code Cash-Out A specific method mentioned: a buyer converts BTC to cash via Tinkoff bank QR codes, with minimums of 400k rubles (previously 250k). This converts crypto directly to Russian banking infrastructure.
Physical Cash Delivery Kunder mentions “locking in the rate” and a guy physically bringing cash at the end of the month, a classic peer-to-peer OTC (over-the-counter) arrangement that bypasses exchanges entirely.
Wallet Infrastructure They recommend non-custodial wallets (Guarda, Trust Wallet, Exodus) specifically to avoid KYC/AML controls that centralized exchanges enforce.
Blurry screenshots from the leak also shed light on the financial side of the operation. Although not fully legible, they appear to show a negotiation where the group secured approximately 190,000 USD after a discount of about 60,000 USD from the initial ransom demand.
Figure 29 — Agreement to pay 190,000 USD.
zeta88 is very aware of the importance of maximizing pressure on extorted victims to increase the chances of payment. In his private channel, he drafts a generic follow‑up letter that can be adapted to any company, emphasizing the costs of not paying the ransom, including regulatory exposure, reputational damage, and operational impact, and citing assessments from previous attacks. This is not the standard ransom note deployed alongside the encryption, but an additional, more tailored communication intended to reinforce the pressure on the victim.
Figure 30 — Negotiation playbook.
Interesting Negotiation Case
In a high‑profile attack in April 2026, a software consultancy company from United Kingdom publicly reported a breach. The company’s leadership stated in an open letter that only “typical business data, including business contact information, contracts, and NDAs related to client work” had been accessed.
From what appears to be a personal channel used by zeta88, he drafts a ransom demand letter addressed to the UK company, detailing what The Gentlemen claim to have exfiltrated, including customer infrastructure data, secrets, OAuth credentials, and more. The letter explicitly emphasizes potential GDPR violations as leverage to pressure the victim into paying.
Figure 31 — Ransom note.
Two weeks later, the group published the consultancy’s identity and breach details on their data leak site (DLS). According to the internal chats, data exfiltrated from the consultancy was then reused both before and during attacks against a company in Turkey, where The Gentlemen gained initial access via a vulnerable VPN appliance.
Figure 32 — Forti access to company in Turkey.
zeta88 ran this operation alongside Protagor, creating a backdoor Okta service account himself—typical of his intensive, hands‑on involvement in many of the intrusions documented in the leaked discussions. During the same campaign, zeta88 explicitly references data from the UK consultancy breach to cross‑reference and enrich information about the Turkish company, illustrating how prior compromises are used to enrich and support new attacks.
Figure 33 — UK company containing information for Turkish company.
One example mentioned was an internal “Transfer/Migration Document” (in the local language), an internal project document the consultancy maintained in its own collaboration platform describing work they did for the company in Turkey. This document, stolen in the first breach, was then used in the second.
The group discussed how best to use this access for extortion. In their internal chats, they talked about publishing the company from Turkey on their DLS together with a statement that, The access to the company in Turkey was obtained through the compromised consultancy from United Kingdom.
Figure 34 — DLS statement discussions.
This served a dual purpose:
Punishing the consultancy (UK), which the actors described as “a very bad company.”
Increasing pressure on the company in Turkey, by promising to show exactly how they gained access so that, the Turkish would be encouraged to legally pursue the consultancy in UK.
Figure 35 — Initial access proof.
Eventually, the Turkish company was published on the group’s DLS, and the attackers “credited” the consultancy in UK as their “access broker”.
Their View of Other RaaS Programs and Actors
The actors consistently frame the RaaS ecosystem through the lenses of brand strength, payout reliability, and affiliate leverage (percentage splits and control over negotiations). Among the programs mentioned, they clearly distinguish a small “top tier” from a broader landscape of lesser or untrusted players.
Program / Group
Things Discussed
Subjective Sentiment (Their View)
HelloKitty
Name/brand as something they’d like to use; jokes about linking to the real Hello Kitty site and putting (R) everywhere; described explicitly as a “мощный бренд”.
Very positive on brand strength and recognition; sees it as a powerful marketing asset.
Kraken
Mention that “товарищи кракен” wrote to qbit; qbit later says their team might “move” over to zeta88’s side.
Neutral‑pragmatic; current or past orbit, but clearly willing to switch away for better options.
Dragon Force
One of only two programs zeta88 would choose from “all presented”; explicitly says they pay both operators and adverts; only negative comments heard were about their software/panel.
Strongly positive overall; trusted, in the top tier of programs they respect.
Gunra
Listed among candidate PPs for a supplier; zeta88 says “че эт ваще такое…”, and lumps it with Hyflock; calls the operator “этот мудень”.
Negative; unserious / low‑relevance; clear disdain for the operator.
Hyflock
Same context as Gunra; zeta88 dismisses it in the same breath as Gunra, with the same derogatory comment about the person behind it.
Negative; grouped with Gunra as not to be taken seriously.
ShadowByt3$ RAAS
Appears in the candidate list; zeta88 simply comments “хз” (doesn’t know).
Neutral; no formed opinion, neither trust nor distrust expressed.
Anubis
Appears in the candidate list; zeta88 asks “% видел он?”, focusing on what percentage they take.
Cautious / skeptical; interest hinges on profit split; no clear positive trust.
CHAOS
Appears in the candidate list; zeta88 asks whether they will still take that supplier (“возьмут ли они его еще”).
Uncertain; doubts about acceptance / relationship continuity; not a clearly preferred option.
LockBit (tooling)
quant asks what a локбит тулза actually is (builder or decryptor), notes he has not opened it; no explicit evaluation of the group itself.
Curious but cautious; tooling is not trusted or fully understood yet; no explicit sentiment on LockBit group.
Black Basta / Devman
quant asks if “блек баста это девман”; zeta88 speaks harshly about “David” and his link to Devman, calls him “мудак” and “чепуха”, wishes them невыплат (non‑payment).
Strongly negative but personalized; animosity toward David/Devman rather than a structured view of the RaaS.
“Red team” / Mr Beng cluster
Mentions Редтим=красный лотос=арсен=баламут=студент and “мистер БЕНГ”; mocks offer of 15k for “source code” of a C2 built on top of white tools (Velociraptor, etc.); ridicules this as overpriced and based on legitimate software.
Negative; sees them as overpriced grifters repackaging white tools with heavy marketing.
Conclusion
The Gentlemen RaaS program has quickly evolved into a highly active and structured ransomware ecosystem. With over 320 public victims in 2026 and hundreds more systems visible through related infrastructure, it stands among the most productive RaaS operations that maintain a public data‑leak presence. The leaked Rocket backend and internal chats show that this scale is driven not by a loose crowd, but by a small, tightly coordinated core of about 9 named operators and at least 8 distinct affiliate TOX IDs, all organized around the administrator zeta88 / hastalamuerte, who both runs the platform and participates directly in operations.
The leak reveals a repeatable, human‑operated ransomware playbook: initial access through exposed edge infrastructure (such as VPNs and management interfaces), rapid expansion and privilege escalation, heavy investment in EDR/AV evasion and ETW/logging tampering, and systematic use of shared tools for discovery, lateral movement, credential theft, and data exfiltration. The group actively tracks and evaluates modern vulnerabilities, including CVE-2024-55591, CVE-2025-32433, and CVE-2025-33073and combines them with technique‑driven paths like backup and management‑controller abuse and NTLM relay workflows, giving them a flexible exploitation pipeline.
Overall, The Gentlemen exemplifies how contemporary RaaS programs blend productized ransomware with professional intrusion teams. A small, well‑organized set of operators, supported by curated tooling, structured communication channels, and up‑to‑date exploit knowledge, can generate substantial impact in a short time. For defenders, this underscores the need to harden internet‑facing services, close known misconfigurations and relay paths, and monitor for the specific tools, workflows, and TOX‑based communication patterns tied to this group.
Navigating the Threat Landscape of the 2026 FIFA World Cup
In this blog, we break down emerging threat activity, protest movements, cyber risks, and operational challenges shaping the security environment for the 2026 FIFA World Cup.
As the 2026 FIFA World Cup progresses, Flashpoint analysts continue to monitor a dynamic threat environment spanning physical security, civil unrest, cyber threats, and geopolitical developments. While analysts have not identified any credible indications of an imminent attack targeting tournament venues or participants, several notable developments have emerged since our previous assessment.
2026 FIFA World Cup Security Challenges:
Protest activity has expanded across host nations. In Mexico City, anti-World Cup demonstrators reportedly blocked access roads near Estadio Azteca and clashed with security forces during opening-event activities. Additional campaigns remain active across Canada, Mexico, and the United States, including anti-FIFA coalitions, labor actions, housing advocacy movements, and the growing “No ICE in the Cup” campaign.
Iran-related tensions continue to shape the tournament environment. Recent matches involving Iran have generated demonstrations, pitch-invasion incidents, political messaging from supporters, and ongoing disputes surrounding travel restrictions, visa issues, and operational limitations affecting the Iranian team.
Security concerns remain elevated around high-profile matches and surrounding fan activity. Analysts continue to monitor the potential for crowd-management incidents, stadium-perimeter disruptions, and clashes between rival supporter groups, particularly in and around fan zones, transit hubs, and other soft-target locations.
Local operational disruptions are increasingly intersecting with tournament activity. Recent examples include hotel labor strikes in Philadelphia and other city-specific demonstrations that may affect transportation, hospitality operations, and visitor movement around host venues.
Cybercriminal activity targeting fans remains persistent. Security researchers and law enforcement agencies continue to warn of thousands of fraudulent domains impersonating FIFA-related services, including fake ticketing portals, merchandise sites, streaming services, and employment opportunities designed to steal credentials and personal information.
Analysts are also monitoring claims from politically motivated and state-aligned cyber actors seeking to associate themselves with World Cup-related threats. While some publicly promoted claims remain unverified, the tournament continues to present an attractive target for threat actors seeking visibility, disruption, or financial gain.
Online sentiment remains largely positive and focused on the tournament atmosphere, but controversy continues around ticket prices, commercialization, geopolitical tensions, and fan-related incidents that have generated significant discussion across social media platforms.
Current Threat Assessment
The 2026 FIFA World Cup will be unlike any tournament before it.
Set to run starting next month from June 11th to July 19th across the United States, Canada, and Mexico, this will be the first World Cup co-hosted by three nations and expanded to 48 teams across 16 host cities. More than five million fans are expected to attend matches in person, with billions more engaging globally.
That scale introduces a different class of risk. The World Cup is a distributed, high-visibility global operation spanning stadiums, transit systems, hotels, fan festivals, and digital infrastructure.
At the time of writing, Flashpoint analysts have not identified any specific, credible threats targeting the tournament. However, recent extremist propaganda and geopolitical tensions continue to reinforce the need for heightened vigilance across host nations.
A Converging Threat Environment
The risks surrounding the 2026 World Cup intersect across multiple domains.
Physical security, cyber activity, geopolitical tensions, and social movements all operate against the same infrastructure and audiences. Activity in one area can quickly affect another.
Flashpoint assesses that the most persistent risks across all host nations include:
Crimes of opportunity targeting visitors unfamiliar with local environments
Lone-actor attacks, including those driven by extremist ideologies
Overcrowding, fan conflicts, and unmanaged gatherings
These risks are amplified by the tournament’s scale and geographic distribution.
Civil Unrest and Protest Activity
World Cup tournaments routinely become platforms for protest.
For 2026, multiple movements are already organizing around the event:
“Boycott USA 2026” campaigns and groups like CODEPINK are calling for relocation of matches
The “50501 Movement” has signaled intent to leverage the tournament’s visibility for national demonstrations
Coalitions of civil society organizations have raised concerns around immigration enforcement, surveillance, and civil rights
Recent organizing activity has expanded beyond traditional anti-FIFA campaigns. Civil rights organizations, labor groups, anti-ICE coalitions, and community organizations in multiple host cities have announced or promoted demonstrations tied to immigration enforcement, displacement concerns, labor issues, and the broader social impacts of the tournament.
In the United States, Flashpoint analysts assess with high confidence that protests will occur across all host cities, with messaging tied to immigration policy, labor issues, and geopolitical tensions.
In Canada and Mexico, protests tied to environmental concerns, infrastructure impact, and global conflicts are also expected.
While many campaigns began as awareness and advocacy efforts, several have evolved into organized demonstrations, community events, and direct actions tied to tournament activities. Analysts continue to monitor anti-FIFA coalitions in Canada, anti-World Cup organizing efforts in Mexico, and the growing “No ICE in the Cup” campaign across US host cities. The scale of the event means even localized demonstrations can escalate quickly, especially around stadiums, transit hubs, fan zones, and other high-traffic gathering areas.
Physical Security and Crowd Risk
No specific terrorist plots have been identified. But that does not reduce the risk.
Large gatherings remain attractive targets for:
Lone actors seeking high visibility
Opportunistic criminals
Disruptive fan groups
Online chatter continues to reference potential attacks, including decentralized calls for violence from extremist-linked media outlets. At the same time, analysts are monitoring a broader threat environment shaped by geopolitical tensions, extremist propaganda, and lone-actor attack risks that frequently accompany large and globally visible events.
Beyond intentional threats, crowd dynamics pose a persistent risk. Past sporting events have shown how quickly panic, overcrowding, or pyrotechnics can trigger dangerous conditions, including crowd crush incidents.
Fan culture adds another layer. Organized groups such as Ultras and hooligan firms increasingly operate with coordination, using encrypted messaging, reconnaissance (“spotting”), and off-site meetups to avoid security controls.
Security concerns extend beyond traditional supporter culture. Some organized fan groups have evolved increasingly sophisticated tactics, including coordinated reconnaissance, plain-clothes scouting, encrypted communications, and deliberate efforts to move confrontations away from stadium security zones and into “soft zones” like bars, transit hubs, and other gathering locations.
Recent demonstrations in Mexico City highlighted the potential for stadium-perimeter disruptions and confrontations with security personnel during major tournament events. While these incidents were protest-related rather than terrorism-related, they underscore how quickly localized tensions can create operational and crowd-management challenges.
Geopolitical Tensions and High-Risk Matches
Geopolitics will shape the security environment throughout the tournament.
The ongoing tensions involving the United States, Israel, and Iran are expected to influence both protest activity and threat perceptions. Iran’s participation—particularly matches held in U.S. cities—has already sparked debate, travel concerns, and increased security planning.
Discussions surrounding Iranian participation continue to generate significant attention online and offline. Analysts are monitoring protest activity related to symbol restrictions, travel policies, and broader geopolitical tensions involving Iran, Israel, and the United States. These issues are expected to influence both public demonstrations and security planning throughout the tournament.
The issue extends beyond match security. Visa policies, travel restrictions, diaspora activism, and ongoing debate surrounding Iranian participation have already generated significant discussion among supporters, advocacy groups, and government stakeholders.
Certain matches carry elevated risk due to:
Historical rivalries
National identity tensions
Known fan group activity
These matches require heightened monitoring not just inside stadiums, but across surrounding areas where supporters gather.
The Expanding Cyber Threat Surface
The World Cup is also a large-scale digital event.
Even without identified active campaigns, Flashpoint analysts expect the tournament to function as a stress test for global infrastructure.
Key cyber risks include:
Ticketing fraud: Fake domains impersonating official FIFA platforms
Phishing and social engineering: Targeting fans, vendors, and staff
Ransomware and DDoS attacks: Disrupting transit systems, stadium operations, and hospitality networks
Infrastructure targeting: Exploiting vulnerabilities in public-facing systems
Researchers have already identified thousands of fraudulent domains impersonating FIFA-related services, alongside phishing campaigns designed to harvest credentials, hijack accounts, and resell legitimate tickets purchased by victims.
Threat actors are also expected to monetize the event through:
AI-enhanced fraud campaigns leveraging convincing fake websites, social media content, and communications
Fraudulent housing and rental listings
Rideshare and transportation scams
Sports betting manipulation and extortion
Analysts are also monitoring claims by state-aligned hacktivist groups seeking to associate themselves with World Cup-related threats. While some publicly promoted claims remain uncorroborated, the broader trend highlights ongoing interest from politically motivated cyber actors in leveraging the tournament’s visibility to amplify messaging, generate attention, or target supporting infrastructure.
Even minor disruptions to digital infrastructure can have cascading effects on physical operations that cause delayed transportation, overwhelming venues, or other safety concerns.
The reality of large-scale global events in 2026, writes Flashpoint’s intelligence operations expert Ian Gray, is that “the attack surface is no longer just the venue, it’s the infrastructure surrounding the whole event.” Read his full in-depth analysis on TechRadar here.
Operational Security Gaps
Some of the most overlooked risks are also the simplest.
Attendees, staff, and media frequently post images of credentials like press passes, security badges, and access tokens on public social media. These images can be used to replicate credentials and bypass controls.
Similarly, fans often attempt to:
Access team hotels
Enter restricted areas
Interact directly with players
These behaviors create additional pressure on venue and hospitality security teams, particularly in high-profile locations.
Beyond the Stadium: Distributed Risk
The World Cup extends far beyond match venues. Security teams must account for:
Team base camps and training facilities
Fan festivals and unofficial gatherings
Hotels, tourist destinations, and transit systems
Cross-border travel between host nations
Increased human trafficking and exploitation risks associated with large-scale international travel and temporary workforces
Housing, labor, and community tensions in host cities experiencing increased visitor traffic
Unauthorized fan festivals and spontaneous gatherings remain a persistent concern, often drawing large crowds without coordinated security planning.
At the same time, environmental factors like extreme heat, severe storms, wildfire risk, and transportation disruptions may affect operations and place additional strain on local infrastructure.
Getting Ready for the Tournament
The absence of identified threats should not be misinterpreted as low risk.
Events of this scale require continuous monitoring across physical, cyber, and social domains. Threat indicators often emerge early in:
Online forums and messaging platforms
Local protest planning
Fraudulent domain registrations
Changes in adversary behavior
Emerging protest campaigns and social mobilization efforts
Effective preparation depends on:
Broad, multilingual monitoring across open and closed sources
Correlation between physical and cyber indicators
Visibility into both high-profile targets and “soft zones”
Close coordination between public and private sector partners
Flashpoint recommends monitoring key terms such as “World Cup,” “FIFA,” “Fan Festival,” and related hashtags across intelligence platforms to maintain situational awareness.
Maintaining visibility into both online sentiment and real-world activity remains critical, particularly as narratives surrounding immigration enforcement, geopolitical tensions, event costs, and tournament operations continue to evolve.
Preparing for the Whistle
Building a robust threat monitoring architecture is a continuous process. Host cities and law enforcement often use smaller-scale international competitions as test runs to prepare for the scale and complexity of events like the FIFA World Cup.
By leveraging Flashpoint’s advanced search capabilities—including broad keyword coverage, wildcard operators, and visibility into deep and dark web communities—organizations can maintain awareness of emerging risks tied to large-scale events. From stadium infrastructure to digital ticketing platforms, actionable intelligence supports more informed, timely decisions.
To see how Flashpoint enables this level of visibility and monitoring in practice, request a demo.
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