To put it simply, the classic logic of a SIEM system works as follows: if event A occurs, followed by event B, this may be a sign of an attack, and an information security specialist should be notified. But in today’s environment, this simple scenario is increasingly failing. Just recently, our experts analyzed a high-profile incident: attackers compromised the update infrastructure of the popular Notepad++ software, and distributed malware via the update mechanism. It’s simply impossible to have rules in place in advance that are specifically designed to counter such scenarios.

The attacks themselves have become more sophisticated: attackers use legitimate tools, they attack through the supply chain by compromising software outside the corporate perimeter, stretch out their scenarios over time, and disguise their actions as normal activity. In other words, they do not “break into” the infrastructure; more often than not, they log in and use legitimate software. As a result, the classic fixed rules of the past either fail to trigger, or generate too many false alerts. This is what prompted the shift toward more flexible correlation scenarios.

Dynamically updated SIEM content

Correlation content today isn’t a static set of rules, but a process: it’s constantly evolving and adapting to current threats. In 2025 alone, we released 55 rule-package updates for different versions and languages of our Kaspersky SIEM system. In just one year, we added 10 new rule packs, as well as 250 detection rules and numerous improvements to existing content. This year, we’ve already added 43 new rules and refined another 63. In total, this amounts to over 850 rules covering a significant portion of the MITRE ATT&CK framework.

Kaspersky SIEM rules are written based on insights from our experts who analyze real-world, recent attacks: we primarily draw on the findings of our managed detection and response (MDR) service and our threat research. As a result, our rules cover scenarios — from reconnaissance to privilege escalation — that involve the latest approaches used by attackers. For example, we detect the use of new attack techniques such as ToolShell.

In addition to scheduled updates, the team regularly releases so-called emergency content — rule sets for rapid response to new and unexpected attack techniques. In February, for example, detection rules were released for authentication bypass in Fortinet products via the SSO mechanism: attackers used specially crafted SAML requests to gain access to systems without credentials.

From events to attack chains

Moreover, modern SIEM rules no longer describe individual events, but rather sequences of actions. Scenarios are built around the stages of an attack: from initial access, to privilege escalation and persistence. Kaspersky SIEM’s effectiveness is enhanced through integration with Kaspersky EDR and dedicated rule sets for Active Directory, which implement dozens of attack detection scenarios at various stages. This approach allows us to see not just individual signals, but the full picture.

Integration and internal visibility

Another way to improve the effectiveness of an SIEM system is to expand data sources. A classic SIEM aggregates events from different levels of the infrastructure: from logs to telemetry from endpoints and internal systems. In addition to this, our SIEM system includes specialized rule sets for our other solutions (Kaspersky Security Center, Kaspersky Security for Mail Groups, K Anti-Targeted Attack platform), which allow monitoring of administrator actions, authentication, and service status. As a result, the system becomes a tool not only for detecting attacks, but also for monitoring internal activity.

Overall, SIEM is no longer just a set of rules, but has evolved into a continuously updated detection system. Its effectiveness is determined not by the number of detections, but by their relevance, coherence, and how accurately they reflect the actual actions of attackers. Stay up to date regarding our Kaspersky Unified Monitoring and Analysis Platform (SIEM) on its official product page.

Our experts have discovered a large-scale supply chain attack via DAEMON Tools – software for emulating optical drives. The attackers managed to inject malicious code into the software installers, and all trojanized executable files are signed with a valid digital signature of AVB Disc Soft – the developer of DAEMON Tools. The malicious version of the program has been circulating since April 8, 2026. At the time of writing, the attack is still ongoing. Researchers at Kaspersky believe this is a targeted attack.

What are the risks of installing the malicious version of DAEMON Tools?

After the Trojanized software is installed on the victim’s computer, a malicious file is launched every time the system starts up – sending a request to a command-and-control server. In response, the server may send a command to download and execute additional malicious payloads.

First, the attackers deploy an information gatherer that collects the MAC address, hostname, DNS domain name, lists of running processes and installed software, and language settings. The malware then sends this information to the command-and-control server.

In some cases, in response to the collected information, the command server sends a minimalistic backdoor to the victim’s machine. It’s capable of downloading additional malicious payloads, executing shell commands, and running shellcode modules in memory.

The backdoor can be used to deploy a more sophisticated implant dubbed as QUIC RAT. It supports multiple communication protocols with the command-and-control server, and is capable of injecting malicious payloads into the notepad.exe and conhost.exe processes.

More detailed technical information, along with indicators of compromise, can be found in the experts’ article on the Securelist blog.

Who’s being targeted?

Since early April, several thousand attempts to install additional malicious payloads via infected DAEMON Tools software have been detected. Most of the infected devices belonged to home users, but approximately 10% of installation attempts were detected on systems running in organizations. Geographically, the victims were spread across around a hundred different countries and territories. Most victims were located in Russia, Brazil, Turkey, Spain, Germany, France, Italy, and China.

Most often, the attack was limited to installing an information collector. The backdoor infected only a dozen machines in government, scientific, and manufacturing organizations, as well as in retail businesses in Russia, Belarus, and Thailand.

What exactly was infected

The malicious code was detected in DAEMON Tools versions ranging from 12.5.0.2421 to 12.5.0.2434. The attackers compromised the files DTHelper.exe, DiscSoftBusServiceLite.exe, and DTShellHlp.exe, which are installed in the main DAEMON Tools directory.

Updated on March 6: Following disclosure, the vendor acknowledged the issue and published a new version of the software to address it. The updated DAEMON Tools version 12.6.0.2445 no longer shows the malicious behavior described in this article.

How to stay safe?

If DAEMON Tools software is used on your computer (or elsewhere in your organization), our experts recommend thoroughly checking the computers on which it is installed for any unusual activity starting from April 8.

In addition, we recommend using reliable security solutions on all home and corporate computers used to access the internet. Our solutions successfully protect users from all malware used in the supply chain attack via DAEMON Tools.

Droids appear in practically every movie or TV series set in the “Star Wars” universe. They usually behave strangely. On the one hand, they give the impression of being independent-thinking beings with their own personalities; on the other, they’re objects: they belong to someone, remain loyal to their owners, and carry out their orders. Most of the time we’re never given any explanation for the droids’ motivations. Why are some of them willing to break the law at their master’s command? What determines who exactly they consider their master? How do they decide whom to remain loyal to and whose orders to follow?

Someone might say, “What’s the difference?” And from the perspective of the average viewer, they’d be absolutely right. But from our perspective, the question of a droid’s loyalty is first and foremost a question of cybersecurity. A droid is a complex cyber-physical system; by influencing its motivation, an attacker can gain access to confidential data, or even cause harm to the actual owner. In 2025, two TV series were released whose creators dealt with the issue of droid ownership. We were presented with two concepts for managing droid motivation. We’ll attempt to examine both of these concepts and their shortcomings in this post. As usual, please be warned that the text may contain spoilers.

“Star Wars: Skeleton Crew”

In “Skeleton Crew”, we’re introduced for the first time to the concept changing droids’ behavior using voice commands. In several instances, a person who’s not the droid’s formal owner attempts to influence its actions by trying to mislead the droid. Overall, it appears this concept was influenced by modern chatbots based on large language models (LLMs) — it bears a striking resemblance to “jailbreak” attempts, i.e., attacks on the model aimed at bypassing security restrictions or built-in filters.

An unnamed droid working as a servant

Fern, a ten-year-old girl, wants her mother to think that she came home early and was studying in her room. But there’s a problem: the home droid knows that’s not true. So Fern uses the “Run memory override” command, and feeds the droid false information in the rather absurd phrasing, “I was home, you just didn’t see me”.

The fact that this method works points to two problems. First, the droid accepts the memory override command from Fern, which means it either lacks account control or has improperly configured permissions. The formal owner of the droid is the mother (otherwise, manipulating the memory would make no sense), but nevertheless, it accepts a potentially dangerous command from Fern. Second, a home droid tasked with watching over a child obviously lacks a built in parental control feature.

Pirate droid SM-33: motivation

The SM-33 droid considers the captain of the ship “Onyx Cinder” to be its owner. That is, it remains loyal not to a specific person, but to a role. A pirate code is used to determine the legitimacy of the right to hold this role. Unfortunately, the entire code isn’t explained to us, but several of its tenets are cited. First, according to the SM-33’s programming, there can be no ship without a captain (if there is no captain, someone must take their place). Second, the person who defeats the captain legally becomes the new captain. Third, if a challenge is invoked, the droid cannot assist the active captain, but must wait for the outcome of a duel. And fourth, a person can be the captain of only one ship — if a person takes command of another vessel, they automatically lose their status as captain of the first.

The SM-33 changes hands three times, strictly following this code. First, Fern lies to him, claiming she killed the previous captain and took his place. Then Jod Na Nawood throws down a challenge and becomes captain when Fern surrenders. Then Jod takes command of a pirate frigate and loses the captain’s seat of the Onyx Ash, but manages to reclaim his rights.

And here’s where an interesting twist occurs. Fern introduces a concept from children’s games —unclaimsies (essentially a reset of claims) — and asserts her own claim to the captain’s seat. She then immediately orders SM-33 to throw the pirates overboard. To many viewers, this moment seemed extremely unrealistic — why would a droid, whose motivation is defined by the pirate code, consider such a transfer of rights to be legitimate? However, if we assume that the droids are controlled by LLMs, then this plot twist is quite explainable.

The Pirate Code is the original system of ethical values embedded in the droid. The chatbot typically assesses the interlocutor’s intent at the very beginning of the dialogue, using a complex (resource-intensive) model for this purpose. Subsequently, to conserve resources and ensure safety during the conversation, simpler models are employed. However, the more context (dialogue history) there is, the more complex and resource-intensive it becomes to assess intent. This is precisely the basis of the popular jailbreak technique, which works on at least some modern LLMs. That is, as a result of prolonged communication with Fern, SM-33 lost the ability to correctly assess new requests for compliance with its original ethical guidelines, and therefore it deemed the statement about nullifying rights to be justified.

SM-33: Access to Memory

In fact, there is another issue with SM-33’s security that’s not directly dependent on whom it considers its owner, but is nonetheless related. The old captain gave the order to forget everything related to the planet At Attin, and to dismantle anyone who begins to take an interest in this matter. Fern, with the admin captain’s privileges, runs her favorite memory override, and forces the droid to retrieve its memories of At Attin, after which SM-33 recalls both the planet and the order to attack the questioner.

And as a result, we realize that, in fact, it did not carry out the old captain’s order; the information about At Attin remained in the droid’s memory; it simply couldn’t find it — that is, if it did delete it, it was only from the index of accessible memories. Perhaps this is some physical property of the droid’s memory, or maybe this can be explained by the fact that SM-33 was programmed not by a professional, but by a pirate. After all, its design includes other suboptimal solutions, such as a power switch accessible to anyone standing nearby, exactly like C-3PO’s. But what makes sense for a protocol droid isn’t exactly suitable for a combat droid designed, among other things, for hand-to-hand combat…

Season 2 of the series “Andor”

In the series “Andor”, the prequel to the film “Rogue One,” we finally see how the main character, Cassian Andor, acquired the reprogrammed Imperial security droid K-2SO to become his partner. And most importantly, the process of how the rebels changed his motivation is shown.

As it turns out, in order for a combat droid loyal to the Empire to stop obeying its original programming, its “cortex” must be replaced — though the replacement cortex can trigger rejection. The specialist says, verbatim: “You’ll hear a lot of nonsense about reprogramming, which makes it sound as though it’s a problem that can be solved from a console, but frankly, that’s nonsense. It’s really all about impulse suppression, which is entirely an engineering and wiring issue.”

In other words, the rebels replace a certain component, after which the droid becomes a being with new moral principles. At the same time, it retains its memory (K-2SO later recalls how it once participated in a parade on Coruscant).

So, what conclusions can we draw from all this? Well, first, it becomes clear that a droid controlled by an LLM is a clear security threat. It can easily be misled and made to act against its rightful owner. And second, the hardware and software platform used to create droids in “Star Wars” is far from ideal. If our colleagues had been responsible for creating the droids, they’d have strived to develop a cyber-immune solution in which functionality would be impossible after a key component was replaced, as would malicious memory manipulation. In other words, it’s a real shame that a long time ago, in a galaxy far, far away, there was no KasperskyOS.