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Check Point Supports Google Cloud Network Security Integration
Simplifying Cloud Network Security When securing cloud landscapes, itβs critically important to eliminate any downtime or performance degradation that firewall or gateway implementation may cause. To address these challenges, Check Point is proud to announce our support for Google Cloud Network Security Integration. This innovation creates a nondisruptive approach to cloud firewall deployment, increasing network security without negatively impacting performance. Scaling Hybrid Cloud Network Security Network security and performance are critical to any organization, but this is especially true for industries under heavy regulations like financial services, healthcare, and government. So over time these organizations gain comfort, expertise, and confidence [β¦]
The post Check Point Supports Google Cloud Network Security Integration appeared first on Check Point Blog.
Meet Rey, the Admin of βScattered Lapsus$ Huntersβ
A prolific cybercriminal group that calls itself βScattered LAPSUS$ Huntersβ has dominated headlines this year by regularly stealing data from and publicly mass extorting dozens of major corporations. But the tables seem to have turned somewhat for βRey,β the moniker chosen by the technical operator and public face of the hacker group: Earlier this week, Rey confirmed his real life identity and agreed to an interview after KrebsOnSecurity tracked him down and contacted his father.
Scattered LAPSUS$ Hunters (SLSH) is thought to be an amalgamation of three hacking groups β Scattered Spider, LAPSUS$ and ShinyHunters. Members of these gangs hail from many of the same chat channels on the Com, a mostly English-language cybercriminal community that operates across an ocean of Telegram and Discord servers.
In May 2025, SLSH members launched a social engineering campaign that used voice phishing to trick targets into connecting a malicious app to their organizationβs Salesforce portal. The group later launched a data leak portal that threatened to publish the internal data of three dozen companies that allegedly had Salesforce data stolen, including Toyota,Β FedEx,Β Disney/Hulu, andΒ UPS.
The new extortion website tied to ShinyHunters, which threatens to publish stolen data unless Salesforce or individual victim companies agree to pay a ransom.
Last week, the SLSH Telegram channel featured an offer to recruit and reward βinsiders,β employees at large companies who agree to share internal access to their employerβs network for a share of whatever ransom payment is ultimately paid by the victim company.
SLSH has solicited insider access previously, but their latest call for disgruntled employees started making the rounds on social media at the same time news broke that the cybersecurity firm Crowdstrike had fired an employee for allegedly sharing screenshots of internal systems with the hacker group (Crowdstrike said their systems were never compromised and that it has turned the matter over to law enforcement agencies).
The Telegram server for the Scattered LAPSUS$ Hunters has been attempting to recruit insiders at large companies.
Members of SLSH have traditionally used other ransomware gangsβ encryptors in attacks, including malware from ransomware affiliate programs like ALPHV/BlackCat, Qilin, RansomHub, and DragonForce. But last week, SLSH announced on its Telegram channel the release of their own ransomware-as-a-service operation called ShinySp1d3r.
The individual responsible for releasing the ShinySp1d3r ransomware offering is a core SLSH member who goes by the handle βReyβ and who is currently one of just three administrators of the SLSH Telegram channel. Previously, Rey was an administrator of the data leak website for Hellcat, a ransomware group that surfaced in late 2024 and was involved in attacks on companies including Schneider Electric, Telefonica, and Orange Romania.
A recent, slightly redacted screenshot of the Scattered LAPSUS$ Hunters Telegram channel description, showing Rey as one of three administrators.
Also in 2024, Rey would take over as administrator of the most recent incarnation of BreachForums, an English-language cybercrime forum whose domain names have been seized on multiple occasions by the FBI and/or by international authorities. In April 2025, Rey posted on Twitter/X about another FBI seizure of BreachForums.
On October 5, 2025, the FBI announced it had once again seized the domains associated with BreachForums, which it described as a major criminal marketplace used by ShinyHunters and others to traffic in stolen data and facilitate extortion.
βThis takedown removes access to a key hub used by these actors to monetize intrusions, recruit collaborators, and target victims across multiple sectors,β the FBI said.
Incredibly, Rey would make a series of critical operational security mistakes last year that provided multiple avenues to ascertain and confirm his real-life identity and location. Read on to learn how it all unraveled for Rey.
WHO IS REY?
According to the cyber intelligence firm Intel 471, Rey was an active user on various BreachForums reincarnations over the past two years, authoring more than 200 posts between February 2024 and July 2025. Intel 471 says Rey previously used the handle βHikki-Chanβ on BreachForums, where their first post shared data allegedly stolen from the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC).
In that February 2024 post about the CDC, Hikki-Chan says they could be reached at the Telegram username @wristmug. In May 2024, @wristmug posted in a Telegram group chat called βPantifanβ a copy of an extortion email they said they received that included their email address and password.
The message that @wristmug cut and pasted appears to have been part of an automated email scam that claims it was sent by a hacker who has compromised your computer and used your webcam to record a video of you while you were watching porn. These missives threaten to release the video to all your contacts unless you pay a Bitcoin ransom, and they typically reference a real password the recipient has used previously.
βNoooooo,β the @wristmug account wrote in mock horror after posting a screenshot of the scam message. βI must be done guys.β
A message posted to Telegram by Rey/@wristmug.
In posting their screenshot, @wristmug redacted the username portion of the email address referenced in the body of the scam message. However, they did not redact their previously-used password, and they left the domain portion of their email address (@proton.me) visible in the screenshot.
O5TDEV
Searching on @wristmugβs rather unique 15-character password in the breach tracking service Spycloud finds it is known to have been used by just one email address: cybero5tdev@proton.me. According to Spycloud, those credentials were exposed at least twice in early 2024 when this userβs device was infected with an infostealer trojan that siphoned all of its stored usernames, passwords and authentication cookies (a finding that was initially revealed in March 2025 by the cyber intelligence firm KELA).
Intel 471 shows the email address cybero5tdev@proton.me belonged to a BreachForums member who went by the username o5tdev. Searching on this nickname in Google brings up at least two website defacement archives showing that a user named o5tdev was previously involved in defacing sites with pro-Palestinian messages. The screenshot below, for example, shows that 05tdev was part of a group called Cyb3r Drag0nz Team.
Rey/o5tdevβs defacement pages. Image: archive.org.
A 2023 report from SentinelOne described Cyb3r Drag0nz Team as a hacktivist group with a history of launching DDoS attacks and cyber defacements as well as engaging in data leak activity.
βCyb3r Drag0nz Team claims to have leaked data on over a million of Israeli citizens spread across multiple leaks,β SentinelOne reported. βTo date, the group has released multiple .RAR archives of purported personal information on citizens across Israel.β
The cyber intelligence firm Flashpoint finds the Telegram user @05tdev was active in 2023 and early 2024, posting in Arabic on anti-Israel channels like βGhost of Palestineβ [full disclosure: Flashpoint is currently an advertiser on this blog].
βIβM A GINTYβ
Flashpoint shows that Reyβs Telegram account (ID7047194296) was particularly active in a cybercrime-focused channel called Jacuzzi, where this user shared several personal details, including that their father was an airline pilot. Rey claimed in 2024 to be 15 years old, and to have family connections to Ireland.
Specifically, Rey mentioned in several Telegram chats that he had Irish heritage, even posting a graphic that shows the prevalence of the surname βGinty.β
Rey, on Telegram claiming to have association to the surname βGinty.β Image: Flashpoint.
Spycloud indexed hundreds of credentials stolen from cybero5dev@proton.me, and those details indicate that Reyβs computer is a shared Microsoft Windows device located in Amman, Jordan. The credential data stolen from Rey in early 2024 show there are multiple users of the infected PC, but that all shared the same last name of Khader and an address in Amman, Jordan.
The βautofillβ data lifted from Reyβs family PC contains an entry for a 46-year-old Zaid Khader that says his motherβs maiden name was Ginty. The infostealer data also shows Zaid Khader frequently accessed internal websites for employees of Royal Jordanian Airlines.
MEET SAIF
The infostealer data makes clear that Reyβs full name is Saif Al-Din Khader. Having no luck contacting Saif directly, KrebsOnSecurity sent an email to his father Zaid. The message invited the father to respond via email, phone or Signal, explaining that his son appeared to be deeply enmeshed in a serious cybercrime conspiracy.
Less than two hours later, I received a Signal message from Saif, who said his dad suspected the email was a scam and had forwarded it to him.
βI saw your email, unfortunately I donβt think my dad would respond to this because they think its some βscam email,'β said Saif, who told me he turns 16 years old next month. βSo I decided to talk to you directly.β
Saif explained that heβd already heard from European law enforcement officials, and had been trying to extricate himself from SLSH. When asked why then he was involved in releasing SLSHβs new ShinySp1d3r ransomware-as-a-service offering, Saif said he couldnβt just suddenly quit the group.
βWell I cant just dip like that, Iβm trying to clean up everything Iβm associated with and move on,β he said.
The former Hellcat ransomware site. Image: Kelacyber.com
He also shared that ShinySp1d3r is just a rehash of Hellcat ransomware, except modified with AI tools. βI gave the source code of Hellcat ransomware out basically.β
Saif claims he reached out on his own recently to the Telegram account for Operation Endgame, the codename for an ongoing law enforcement operation targeting cybercrime services, vendors and their customers.
βIβm already cooperating with law enforcement,β Saif said. βIn fact, I have been talking to them since at least June. I have told them nearly everything. I havenβt really done anything like breaching into a corp or extortion related since September.β
Saif suggested that a story about him right now could endanger any further cooperation he may be able to provide. He also said he wasnβt sure if the U.S. or European authorities had been in contact with the Jordanian government about his involvement with the hacking group.
βA story would bring so much unwanted heat and would make things very difficult if Iβm going to cooperate,β Saif said. βIβm unsure whats going to happen they said theyβre in contact with multiple countries regarding my request but its been like an entire week and I got no updates from them.β
Saif shared a screenshot that indicated heβd contacted Europol authorities late last month. But he couldnβt name any law enforcement officials he said were responding to his inquiries, and KrebsOnSecurity was unable to verify his claims.
βI donβt really care I just want to move on from all this stuff even if its going to be prison time or whatever they gonna say,β Saif said.
Google Cloud Security Threat Horizons Report #12 Is Out!
This is my completely informal, uncertified, unreviewed and otherwise completely unofficial blog inspired by my reading of our next Cloud Threat Horizons Report, #12 (full version) that we just released (the official blog for #1 report, my unofficial blogs for #2, #3, #4, #5, #6, #7, #8, #9, #10 andΒ #11).
My favorite quotes from the report followΒ below:
- βGoogle Cloudβs latest research highlights that common hygiene gaps like credential issues and misconfigurations are persistently exploited by threat actors to gain entry into cloud environments. During the first half of 2025, weak or absent credentials were the predominant threat, accounting for 47.1% of incidents. Misconfigurations (29.4%) and API/UI compromises (11.8%) followed as the next most frequently observed initial access vectors.β

- βNotably, compared to H2 2024, we observed a 4.9% decrease in misconfiguration-based access and a 5.3% decrease in API/UI compromises (i.e., when an unauthorized entity gains access to, or manipulates a system or data through an applicationβs user-facing screen or its programmatic connections). This shift appears to be partly absorbed by the rise of leaked credentials representing 2.9% of initial access in H1 2025. β [A.C.βββIt gently suggests that while weβre making some progress on configurations, the attackers are moving to where the fruit is even more low-hanging: already leaked credentials.]
- βFoundational security remains the strongest defense: Google Cloud research indicates that credential compromise and misconfiguration remain the primary entry points for threat actors into cloud environments, emphasizing the critical need for robust identity and access management and proactive vulnerability management.β [A.C.βββit wonβt be the magical AI that saves you, it would be not given admin to employees]
- βFinancially motivated threat groups are increasingly targeting backup systems as part of their primary objective, challenging traditional disaster recovery, and underscoring the need for resilient solutions like Cloud Isolated Recovery Environments (CIRE) to ensure business continuity.β [A.C.βββif your key defense against ransomware is still backups, well, we got some βnewsβ gotΒ youβ¦]
- βAdvanced threat actors are leveraging social engineering to steal credentials and session cookies, bypassing MFA to compromise cloud environments for financial theft, often targeting high-value assets.β [A.C.βββthis is NOT an anti-MFA stance, this is a reminder that MFA helps a whole lot, yet if yours can be bypassed, then its value diminishes]
- βThreat actors are increasingly co-opting trusted cloud storage services as a key component in their initial attack chains, deceptively using these platforms to host seemingly benign decoy files, often PDFs.β and βthreat actors usedΒ .desktop files to infect systems by downloading decoy PDFs from legitimate cloud storage services from multiple providers, a tactic that deceives victims while additional malicious payloads are downloaded in the backgroundβ [A.C.βββa nice example of thinking about how the defender will respond by the attackerΒ here]
- βmore traditional disaster recovery approaches, focused primarily on technical restoration, often fall short in addressing the complexities of recovering from a cyber event, particularly the need to re-establish trust with third parties.β [A.C.βββThe technical recovery is only half the battle. This speaks to the human element of incident response, and the broader impact of aΒ breach.]
Now, go and read the THR 12Β report!
Related posts:
- EP112 Threat HorizonsβββHow Google Does Threat Intelligence podcast
- Google Cloud Security Threat Horizons Report #11 IsΒ Out!
- Google Cloud Security Threat Horizons Report #10 IsΒ Out!
- Google Cybersecurity Action Team Threat Horizons Report #9 IsΒ Out!
- Google Cybersecurity Action Team Threat Horizons Report #8 IsΒ Out!
- Google Cybersecurity Action Team Threat Horizons Report #7 IsΒ Out!
- Google Cybersecurity Action Team Threat Horizons Report #6 IsΒ Out!
- Google Cybersecurity Action Team Threat Horizons Report #5 IsΒ Out!
- Google Cybersecurity Action Team Threat Horizons Report #4 IsΒ Out!
- Google Cybersecurity Action Team Threat Horizons Report #3 IsΒ Out!
- Google Cybersecurity Action Team Threat Horizons Report #2 IsΒ Out!
- Illicit coin mining, ransomware, APTs target cloud users in firstΒ Google
- Cybersecurity Action Team Threat HorizonsΒ report
Google Cloud Security Threat Horizons Report #12 Is Out! was originally published in Anton on Security on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.
5 Things We Are Going to Continue to Ignore in 2025
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In this video, John Strand discusses the complexities and challenges of penetration testing, emphasizing that it goes beyond just finding and exploiting vulnerabilities.
The post 5 Things We Are Going to Continue to Ignore in 2025 appeared first on Black Hills Information Security, Inc..
Reconnaissance: Azure Cloud w/ Kevin Klingbile
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This webcast was originally published on September 26, 2024. In this video, Kevin Klingbile from Black Hills Information Security discusses the intricacies of Azure Cloud services and M365, focusing on [β¦]
The post Reconnaissance: Azure Cloud w/ Kevin Klingbile appeared first on Black Hills Information Security, Inc..
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Black Hills Information Security, Inc.

- Better Together: Real Time Threat Detection for Kubernetes with Atomic Red Tests & Falco
Better Together: Real Time Threat Detection for Kubernetes with Atomic Red Tests & Falco
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| Nigel Douglas As a Developer Advocate working on Project Falco, Nigel Douglas plays a key role in driving education for the Open-Source Detection and Response (D&R) segment of cloud-native [β¦]
The post Better Together: Real Time Threat Detection for Kubernetes with Atomic Red Tests & Falco appeared first on Black Hills Information Security, Inc..
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Black Hills Information Security, Inc.

- Introducing GraphRunner: A Post-Exploitation Toolset for Microsoft 365
Introducing GraphRunner: A Post-Exploitation Toolset for Microsoft 365
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By Beau Bullock & Steve Borosh TL;DR We built a post-compromise toolset called GraphRunner for interacting with the Microsoft Graph API. It provides various tools for performing reconnaissance, persistence, and [β¦]
The post Introducing GraphRunner: A Post-Exploitation Toolset for Microsoft 365 appeared first on Black Hills Information Security, Inc..
How to Purge Google and Start Over β Part 2
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Mike Felch// How to Purge Google and Start Over β Part 1 Brief Recap In part 1, we discussed a red team engagement that went south when the Google SOC [β¦]
The post How to Purge Google and Start Over β Part 2 appeared first on Black Hills Information Security, Inc..
How to Purge Google and Start Over β Part 1
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Mike Felch// A Tale of Blue Destroying Red Let me start by sharing a story about a fairly recent red team engagement against a highly-secured technical customer that didnβt end [β¦]
The post How to Purge Google and Start Over β Part 1 appeared first on Black Hills Information Security, Inc..
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Black Hills Information Security, Inc.

- PODCAST: Attack Tactics Part 3: No Active Directory? No Problem!
PODCAST: Attack Tactics Part 3: No Active Directory? No Problem!
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John StrandΒ talks about how BHIS pen tests companies who use the cloud. Want to know how you can defend against attacks in your cloud infrastructure? Keep your eyes peeled for [β¦]
The post PODCAST: Attack Tactics Part 3: No Active Directory? No Problem! appeared first on Black Hills Information Security, Inc..
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Black Hills Information Security, Inc.
- Deploy REMnux to the Cloud, Reverse Engineering Malware in the Cloud
Deploy REMnux to the Cloud, Reverse Engineering Malware in the Cloud
Carrie Roberts //* REMnuxΒ is a free virtual machine image with Reverse Engineering Malware tools preinstalled.Β REMnux is maintained byΒ Lenny ZeltserΒ with extensive help fromΒ David Westcott and is available from https://remnux.org. I have [β¦]
The post Deploy REMnux to the Cloud, Reverse Engineering Malware in the Cloud appeared first on Black Hills Information Security, Inc..
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Black Hills Information Security, Inc.

- How to Crack Passwords in the Cloud with GPU Acceleration (Kali 2017)
How to Crack Passwords in the Cloud with GPU Acceleration (Kali 2017)
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Carrie Roberts* // How does password cracking in the cloud compare to down here on earth? Maybe not as heavenly as imagined. I saw this on the web and got [β¦]
The post How to Crack Passwords in the Cloud with GPU Acceleration (Kali 2017) appeared first on Black Hills Information Security, Inc..
Storm Chasing: How We Hacked Your Cloud
Beau Bullock // Overview The traditional methodology of a remote attacker who has no preconceptions of a target network used to be fairly static. With organizations moving to βthe cloudβ, [β¦]
The post Storm Chasing: How We Hacked Your Cloud appeared first on Black Hills Information Security, Inc..





