In the most recent update to Apple’s devices, iOS 27.2, the company has introduced a new setting to “Exclude Apps” from Siri AI, fulfilling one of our asks from our Encrypt It Already campaign earlier this year.

One of our main concerns with new AI features on devices is how those features interact with end-to-end encrypted content, particularly with secure messaging apps. Many AI features require cloud processing, and despite privacy protections engineered into these systems, the content of secure messaging apps may leave a user’s device without their knowledge. That changes the privacy concerns around using those tools. In a perfect world, users would be able to put a barrier up to ensure data from certain apps doesn’t leave the device. Here was our initial ask:

You should be able to tell the operating system’s AI to not access an app, even if that comes at the “cost” of missing out on some features. The setting should be straightforward and easy to understand in ways the Gemini and Apple Intelligence controls currently are not.

At launch, we found the settings to control Siri AI’s app access behavior pretty confusing. You had to toggle several options to block Siri AI off from accessing an app, or disable Siri AI entirely. Turning off Siri AI and reverting to Siri Classic is, for now, still a good option if you’d prefer to use the older version.

The most recent update is far more clear and does more to protect your data. And, just as expected, it comes at the cost of some features. That’s a good thing, actually. The features not working shows that the new setting is effective. 

Here’s how to add apps to the exclusion list, once you’ve updated to 27.2:

• Open Settings > Siri > Excluded Apps
• Tap “Add Apps” and select any apps you’d like to add to the exclusion list

Now Siri AI cannot access the contents of the app. Excluding an app also means you may lose some features. For example, if you exclude the Apple Messages app, you will no longer be able to have Siri AI read or respond to messages for you. Even the “onscreen awareness” feature, where you invoke Siri and ask it for information about what you’re currently looking at, will not work anymore. For example, if you exclude Signal, you cannot invoke Siri and ask it to discern any information in the Signal app. You’ll just get these messages:

What’s the State of This on Android?

This update from Apple is also a good excuse to check in on the process on Android. It has improved a little, but is not as straightforward as Apple’s new settings, and lacks the ability to set the screen context feature per-app. But you do have some control over what Gemini can access: 

• Open up the Gemini app
• Tap your user photo, then Settings > Personal Intelligence > Connected Apps
• Revoke access to any apps you do not want Gemini to have access to

This process seems to work well enough for some data and we like that it’s opt in, but it’s not exactly intuitive. For example, Signal doesn’t appear there because Signal doesn’t support Gemini’s app access feature at all. That means Gemini can’t access the content of Signal directly, which is good. 

But Gemini can read notifications if you’ve enabled the “Device Assistance” Connected App (which you likely have, since that also enables basic features, like setting a timer—check under Settings > Personal Intelligence > Connected Apps), and it can use screen context unless you’ve disabled the Device controls > Screen context > “Use screen and app data” option in the Gemini Settings. These two features may access the contents of the Signal app or notifications, if you choose to use them. We’d prefer a more hard-lined approach that reduces the chances of user error here: Google should give users the ability to turn these features off per app.

Apple clearly understands that some users want stronger controls over what Siri AI can and cannot access. But we think they should go further and offer the option to only use “on device” AI features, similar to what Samsung offered with its Galaxy AI. We’re happy to see this change and think all operating systems need to consider similar controls moving forward.

Last week, researchers at Citizen Lab revealed a horrifying new malware campaign, dubbed “AdFection.” It used an ad network to distribute spyware to journalist’s devices to infect them without the target ever needing to click anything. This sort of attack on journalists is dangerous and incredibly concerning, especially since it’s built on the backbone of a technology we already object to: behavioral advertising. Although this type of attack has only been described targeting journalists, you can take a few steps we outline in the next section to mitigate the risk no matter who you are.

A few factors combined to make this attack a noteworthy first-of-its-kind. First, it utilized the surveillance ad-tech ecosystem to specially target the malicious code. Second, the spyware it delivered was so-called “zero-click,” meaning it required no interaction from the user to be infected: all that is required is for the ad to be delivered and code bundled along with it to be run, which happens automatically. Neither malvertising nor zero-click attacks are new on their own. What’s novel about the AdFection attack is combining them, creating a highly targeted, extremely dangerous attack which is difficult to defend against and even harder to detect.

Let’s take a deeper look from the perspective of one of the Windows devices supplied to the researchers from Al Jazeera. Here’s how the report describes the infection happening: 

• Someone browsing the web or using an app on that machine is served an ad created by Discover-Tech, a company exposed in the report as “purporting to be a legitimate advertising company, [but] appears to be a front for large-scale ad espionage abuse.” 
• The ad contains a small snippet of JavaScript code which is automatically executed when rendered in the app or website. 
• This code reaches back out to a Discover-Tech server, referred to as their “NOAS server,” with detailed information about the machine rendering it: its cookie-set advertising ID, IP address, and more.

So far, nothing particularly unusual has happened. Ads that contain JavaScript code and reach back out to their servers with lots of information on your device—and by extension you—are commonplace. It’s all part of the data-driven advertising ecosystem. What happens next is more interesting:

• The NOAS server uses this detailed information to determine it is an Al Jazeera machine requesting the ad. 
• Instead of returning an empty response (as it does most of the time), it responds with a malicious, zero-click spyware payload. That payload was created by Discover-Tech’s partner Candiru/Integrity Labs, a company previously exposed for involvement in sophisticated malware attacks. 
• The payload is then executed and infects the targeted machine.

Companies targeting zero-click malware attacks against journalists might seem like the plot of a blockbuster spy thriller. But this attack was enabled by the everyday practices of ad-tech companies, which unfortunately have extreme latitude in the collection of users’ data. By leveraging the tracking identifiers and data collected on devices for the purpose of delivering targeted ads to specific individuals, mercenary spyware companies can repurpose this data in order to fine-tune who they infect—and hide that they’re doing it from everyone else. 

Most ads are not delivered directly by the ad creators, but rather by intermediaries that facilitate Real-Time Bidding auctions. Nonetheless, winning bidders are given the ability to execute JavaScript code in the browser of the person who receives the targeted ad. This allows for interactive ads to be displayed, but also (as we’ve seen) for the compromise of a device just by delivery of malicious code.

While the different components in this attack chain are not novel on their own, the exposure of this combined attack is significant because it reveals a technique to hyper-target individuals and organizations for infection. Luckily, there are steps you can take to protect yourself from the myriad of dangers presented by the ad-tracking industry. Here’s how.

What You Can Do About It

As we work towards fundamental fixes to the ad ecosystem and banning online behavioral ads altogether, the onus is on all of us to protect ourselves. This is especially important for higher risk individuals or journalists working in states with heavy surveillance. Citizen Lab outlines several steps, depending on your threat model, to take to help protect yourself:

• Take some simple steps to lock down your devices right now.
• Establish strong security fundamentals. Sites like our own Surveillance Self-Defense and Consumer Reports’ Security Planner can help get you started.
• Use a browser extension to reduce tracking. Our Privacy Badger extension is an excellent start. Network-wide ad blocking services are also worth considering if you’re comfortable handling the set up process.
• On mobile phones, disable or reset your AD ID. Here are directions to do so for Android and iPhone.
• Consider using more privacy protective browsers.

These steps can be very helpful in protecting yourself, but there is only so much you can do as an individual. Banning behavioral ads like this would be a good place to start. Behavioral ads aren’t just a privacy nightmare as designed. They are the perfect vehicle for malvertising and similar threats, just as we see here.

The internet is a vast and confusing place no matter your age. Trying to help youth engage with it safely and privately is a complicated topic that touches on many different skillsets and ideas. But just because it’s complicated doesn’t mean it’s impossible. We’ve launched our Online Privacy for Parents and Youth Surveillance Self-Defense guide in hopes to provide a framework for finding solutions that work for you. 

EFF rolls out this crucial resource as state and local governments consider ill-advised laws that cut young people off from essential information and experiences. This particularly harms vulnerable youth and marginalized groups who often find safety in supportive online communities they can't access offline. Such laws also entail age gating, which compromises the privacy of all internet users and stifles young users’ ability to learn, grow, and express themselves.

Young people have unique needs and those needs change over time. Trying to protect from everything all the time is an exhausting process, but the security community has long had a solution for this: security planning (also called threat modeling). The idea is to provide a series of questions designed to help you focus on what’s truly important. When it comes to online privacy, this is as applicable for youth and parents as it is for anyone else. 

We used a security plan as our foundation for this guide because deciding what is and isn’t important is the first step we should all take when assessing our privacy risks. But this isn’t a place for quick fixes, and every young person has their unique needs and considerations. There is no single tool or technology fix that can substitute for spending time learning, and then teaching a young person, how the internet works, how to use it, what sorts of harms exist, and how to navigate those harms.

Solutions are rarely about the tools or software you use. It’s about understanding the threats and concerns you have, and then determining what steps you can take to mitigate those risks. We hope our Online Privacy for Parents and Youth guide can help provide the outline to get the conversation started.

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Over the years, the major tech companies have found all sorts of ways to embed themselves into our lives. We often use their software, their AI tools, their social media, and their operating systems by default without even thinking about potential alternatives. It’s time to rethink that relationship. 

Last year, we created Opt Out October to help remind ourselves of the variety of ways we can take back control of our data through small steps inside apps, operating systems, and other various forms. This year, we highlight the idea that sometimes the best way to control your data is to leave a platform, app, or operating system altogether. 

To do so, we’ve created a hub of resources sharing ways to find new software that isn’t made by the tech giants, take advantage of the growing universe of new social media options, install a whole new operating system, and better control how various popular tools and software use your data for AI training. 

As an incentive, we’ve made merit badges like the one below to help you track your own wins and share them with others. Complete any of these tasks and let the world know by sharing that accomplishment on social media or changing your profile image! Better, more privacy-respecting, and less-enshittified tools are out there. We just have to find and use them.

Head over to our Opt Out October landing page and start taking the first steps to regaining control of the tools and software you use.

Apple’s new operating system is here, and along with it comes a new version of Siri, dubbed with two very familiar letters: AI. As the name suggests, this Siri power-up resembles an AI chatbot more than the often derided voice assistant you might be used to. It has even evolved from a blob you invoke with a verbal command or a button press to a whole app. This update comes with a slew of privacy complications, but you can take some control over what this new Siri can access and use. 

There’s no denying that the new version of Siri is far more powerful than it used to be, and arguably more useful at surfacing details on your phone. But that comes at the cost of deeper access. Once enabled, Siri and Spotlight are combined, unifying the interface. Where you may have once just pulled down on the screen to search for an app or contact, you’re now also invoking Siri. 

By default, ask Siri a question and it’ll search through your Apple apps, like Notes, Messages, emails, and more. As time goes on, if the developer chooses to let it, Siri will gain access to more and more third-party apps. If an app developer doesn’t add that support, then Siri AI won’t be able to access the contents of that app (unless it’s shared screenshot-style via a new feature called “on-screen awareness,” which we’ll talk about more in a moment). 

For example, if Signal doesn’t choose to implement Siri AI support and you only talk to Bill on Signal, you won’t get an answer when you ask Siri AI, “What was the last photo Bill sent me?” But if you talk to Bill on Apple Messages and ask that same question, Siri AI will summarize what it thinks the photo is.

Sometimes Siri processes this data on your device. Sometimes it uses Apple’s Private Cloud Compute (PCC), which means the data is sent off your device to a cloud server. While you can try digging through the Apple Intelligence Report to figure out what’s sent to PCC, there’s no immediate visual indication from the user’s point of view when data leaves the device or when AI can handle it on the phone, iPad, or Mac itself. In practice, ask Siri AI a question and you’ll never really know if it’s being computed on device or off.

Apple claims what’s sent to PCC is not stored by the company after it is processed, but there are certain types of data or certain apps you might have on your phone that are not worth the risk. That’s especially true if you’re using a feature like Advanced Data Protection, which turns on end-to-end encryption for much of what’s stored in iCloud. Sending data that’s stored with end-to-end encryption off your device and into the cloud—no matter the privacy promises—is a fundamental change to the risk assessment you should make. “Private” means the system is engineered so that Apple shouldn’t be able to see or store the data, but it doesn’t mean it’s encrypted or doesn’t leave the device.

This leaves the privacy of certain apps up to a strange combination of an app developer’s choices and your own. You can, of course, disable Siri entirely (Settings > Siri > "Turn Off Siri"), or choose not to invoke Siri to ask questions, but perhaps you don’t want to fully disable or disengage with the system. Thankfully, you can put some guardrails on Siri AI’s access. Once you’ve updated to iOS 27, here are the steps to take. 

Note: only iPhone 15 Pro/Pro Max, as well as all models of the iPhone 16 and newer support Apple’s AI features. Siri AI is currently only available in English, and not available worldwide.

How to Restrict Siri’s Access to the Content Inside Apps

By default, how (and if) Siri AI can access data inside apps is up to the app developer. If an app developer chooses to index the contents of their app, then it may appear in search, and thus be made available to Siri AI. This means the content may pop up during general or direct searches, like “What are my plans for November" might cull information from your calendar, Messages, Notes, and, as they update, third-party apps.

If you do not want Siri to look through certain apps to consider the contents in results, you can tell it not to:

• Open Settings > Apps > [the app you don’t want Siri to look through] > Search
• Disable the option to “Show Content in Search.” 

With this setting disabled, when you ask Siri general questions, it will not surface details from the app you selected. For example, if you disable “Show Content in Search” for Messages, it will not be able to read your Messages conversations. 

There is also an “App Access” setting where you can configure some of the ways Siri interacts with apps. You’d think this is where we’d have gone to revoke access to the content of an app, but alas, this settings page is more about some basic functionality with device personalization, not Siri’s access to the contents of the app.

• Open Settings > Siri > App Access
• Tap an app where you’d like to change Siri’s settings.

On this screen, you’ll find a variety of options, depending on what an app supports. “Learn from this App” sounds nefarious, but is mostly about tracking usage, like how often you open an app, and if a developer supports it, what you interact with.

The rest of the options are mostly about the personalization tweaks that Siri makes, where it suggests apps it thinks you want at the moment in various places, like when searching or sharing. “Show on Home Screen,” “Suggest App,” and “Suggest Notifications” are just about whether you see apps in those places. 

For example, if you have a widget of Siri-suggested apps on the home screen, that’s the “Show on Home Screen” toggle. If you see an app recommended in another app, like adding a date to your calendar from an email, that’s “Suggest App.” Apple claims these features all use on-device processing and the data is not stored on servers.

For anything not covered here, refer to this documentation for steps to disable certain features.

The On-Screen Awareness Capability May Be Concerning for Some People

There is one Siri AI feature you (and app developers) can’t do as much about: on-screen awareness, a feature you can invoke at any point to prompt Siri and ask it to explain what you’re looking at and perform certain actions. For example, you can ask it to summarize a web page, cut a recipe you’re reading in half, add an event to your calendar, or try to figure out where a photo was taken. All potentially useful features.

But you can also ask it to summarize or explain a Signal group chat that you're looking at, or a meme in a WhatsApp chat, and the data from that on-screen interaction may be sent to PCC. There is currently no way for you or app developers to block this feature, so it’s up to you, and those you chat with, to simply not use it if you’re concerned about the content of conversations potentially leaving your device. It would be a large improvement to privacy, especially secure chat apps, if Apple provided developers a means to block access to Siri AI’s on-screen awareness tool. Even better if they gave you a single control to block all Siri AI features from an app entirely.

Revoke Access to Training Data

By default, Siri AI won’t collect and use data from your interactions with it for training AI features. But during the setup process, Apple provides a way to opt in, which you might have tapped without thinking about it. If you’d rather your data not get used for training, you can opt out:

• Open Settings > Privacy & Security > Analytics & Improvements
• Disable the option for “Improve Siri & Dictation.” 

According to Apple’s privacy documentation, disabling this option should revoke training access to the audio and text from the Siri app.

Go Back to the Old Version of Siri (and Disable Other AI Features)

Want nothing to do with any of this but still find Siri useful enough to keep around (or you just have to keep it turned on in order to use CarPlay)? For the time being, you can get the old Siri back, though the process is a bit odd.

• Open up Settings > Screen Time > Content & Privacy Restrictions
• If you have never done so, enable the toggle for “Content & Privacy Restrictions.”
• Tap the Siri option, then “Allowed Siri Version.” 
• Select “Siri Classic.”

You can no longer easily disable Apple Intelligence entirely with one tap in the Settings, but on this screen you can also configure other AI features, like disabling the writing and math assistance prompts, turning off image creation, and disallowing the use of extensions. Follow this guide on Apple's site for everything else.

For the most part, Apple’s handling of AI features is far less in-your-face than others, and because of that the privacy implications are easier to untangle. But even still, it’s difficult to know what’s processed on device and what’s sent off, and so the privacy trade-offs are never spelled out as clearly as they should be. 

Apple could improve on this by offering an on-device only option for Siri AI and providing a clear, single setting toggle to prevent all AI features in a specific app (it looks like Apple is planning a single privacy toggle in a future update. We'll update if and when it does). In general, Siri’s power-up has also made it blurry and difficult to really figure out what sorts of privacy options exist. “Siri” means many things, both on device and off, ranging from “searching the entire internet for an answer” to “setting a timer,” and users have no straightforward ways to wrangle that data to suit their needs. As it stands, it’s a confusing collection of different toggles that never feel exactly right and which many users might struggle to grasp.

Secure messaging platforms, like Signal, WhatsApp, and recently, encrypted RCS, operate on a straightforward assumption: the content at each end of a conversation is private to the participants in the conversation. End-to-end encryption helps provide the mathematical guarantees that the companies who operate these messaging platforms cannot access the contents of messages. But there’s no way to guarantee what happens once the message arrives on a phone. As more devices and services introduce more artificial intelligence (AI) features into messaging apps, that line begins to blur. 

When AI features are computed entirely on device, it’s less concerning. Yet sometimes the computing requirements are heavy enough that the computation has to be done on a company server. Tech companies tell us they have a solution for this: trusted execution environments (TEEs). But do server-side TEEs really solve the problem?

TEEs exist to serve many different functions, ranging from digital rights management (DRM) content protections to securely storing information in your phone's mobile wallet, but for our purposes, we’ll be focusing on how tech companies use them for their AI tools. 

The basic idea is straightforward: most consumer devices aren’t powerful enough to handle the sorts of AI features companies want to offer, so sometimes they send data off your device to more powerful cloud servers to do the computing, then display the results on your device. Since your data is leaving your device, there’s a privacy compromise. For example, if you ask for a messaging app to summarize a conversation, it may offload that computing power to a cloud server, sending the entire contents of your messages to the cloud, then back to your phone.

TEEs supposedly offer a way to keep those requests private. There are several implementations out there, like Apple’s Private Cloud Compute, Google’s Private AI Compute, and WhatsApp’s Private Processing. It’s not just the big tech players, we’ve seen chatbots built with TEEs as well.

TEEs can provide more security and privacy than simply running in the clear, but they are fundamentally different from actual encryption or running locally. Despite the promises of some tech companies, they will never be able to match that level of security and privacy. Because of that, a user’s device should never automatically send data to a TEE. Let’s dig through the reasons why.

What Exactly Is a TEE, Anyway?

A TEE is a hardened section of the computer that runs software in a way that’s supposed to be secret even from other processes running on the machine. TEEs also let users check that the code being run is the code that they think is running, and not backdoored code instead, using a process called “attestation.” You may have also heard this referred to as a “secure enclave,” or heard the brand names SGX or TrustZone.

The intention of a cloud-based TEE is simple: a company can run a server in their data center, but still process data that you provide on your behalf without being able to see that information themselves.

Is a TEE Secure?

In practice, we've seen multiple cracks and hacks every year that show that it is possible to get at that data. That’s because while encryption relies on math, TEEs rely on engineering to provide their security. Standard encryption algorithms are created by years-long processes collaboratively produced by mathematicians around the world and are based on problems that have been studied for decades. The math is reliable, and there is no shortcut to breaking it that would not also upend fundamental understandings of mathematics as a field. 

The collective understanding of every mathematician in the world is that standard encryption algorithms are not breakable to the best of the world’s collective knowledge. No responsible engineer builds a system based on a new encryption method until after it’s been offered up for prodding.

Engineering, on the other hand, doesn’t work like that. Every individual system is the product of a group of engineers who put it out into the world, and each product will have its own quirks and bugs that have to be individually discovered and patched. These bugs are found after the system is built, not before. No one has yet built a system that is unbreakable. On the contrary, there is new research all the time that finds new ways to break into TEE systems. They’re patched as they come up, but they’re unlikely to ever become perfect, and certainly not any time soon. 

TEEs in particular are a hard engineering problem because the encryption key is physically right there on the device. Building a TEE means keeping a key fully separate and inaccessible while it’s on the same physical device as parts of the system that shouldn’t have access to the key.

Many attacks on TEEs involve “side channels.” In a side channel attack, the attacker measures the electrical impulses or other effects to figure out the timing of operations inside the TEE, then uses that to figure out the key being used. Once they have the key, they can read all the data. Compare that to end-to-end encryption, where the key is never on that machine in the first place, so an attacker would have to also run a similar attack on the user’s device.

Companies who turn to TEEs to protect data want to both have the key on the server and have it protected while still performing complex operations like running an LLM, which makes it much more difficult to protect those keys.

That being said, a TEE versus plaintext on a server is the difference between being able to easily read the data and having to do a bunch of specialized work to get at the data. That work often involves accessing the physical machine. This is most relevant for protecting against mass surveillance, and for many people, that might just be enough security.

But that's the core of the problem. “Secure enough for most cases” and “encrypted as in math” are not the same thing, and it’s important not to conflate the two. And services that currently offer “encryption as in math” have a real downgrade in security when they switch to security based on TEEs. 

If you want to dive into the myriad security issues and limitations of TEEs we’ve seen so far, they’re well documented here, here, here, and here.

What Does This Have To Do With LLMs and AI?

Sometimes organizations want to offer an LLM that can respond to queries in a private manner. On-device LLMs exist, but they’re limited in size. So, when organizations want to offer the ability to answer queries without being able to see the conversation, they turn to TEEs. That’s a useful way to run a chatbot that’s reasonably private. This is what Apple, Google, WhatsApp, and others are doing.

Why not turn to encryption? After all, LLM inference is just a bunch of math like any other things a computer does. It takes input to a (really big) function and gives an output. We have the math to do that computation in a way that hides the inputs and outputs from the one running the computation, it's just super expensive. It’s called homomorphic encryption, and no one’s figured out how to do it fast enough that it makes sense for this sort of computation.

Instead, the allure of a TEE is that it will run that computation for you inside of a special opaque section of a server. TEE manufacturers try to make it as hard as possible for the person running the TEE to peek inside. But you still have to trust the operator to not put a stethoscope to the box to try to figure out what's happening inside. 

In this case, it’s reasonable to consider these systems “privacy-preserving,” but not “encrypted.” That distinction is important, especially when we talk about how the TEEs interact with secure messaging. When someone using an end-to-end encrypted chat app asks an LLM to summarize, review, or store those messages, the content of those messages is leaving the device and going to an unencrypted third-party server somewhere. That’s a major threat to the privacy of secure chat apps, and one that’s increasingly hard for users to take control of.

How Does This Translate to Practical Advice?

The answer to this is going to vary based on an individual’s threat model, but a good rule of thumb is that a user’s device should never automatically send data to a TEE. When the person holding a phone can choose what information is sent, even if it’s a chunk of data like “unread messages,” they have the opportunity to pause and consider if that data might be too sensitive to risk sending.

In contrast, when data is sent automatically, the automatic sending becomes a feature of the system as a whole. If the system was previously end-to-end encrypted, adding automatic exfiltration makes the whole system no longer end-to-end encrypted.

Developers: don’t build systems that automatically send data off a device to a TEE, especially when it’s coming from an app that is otherwise end-to-end encrypted.

Users: if developers ignore us and build that system, turn off any automatic data sending features. Take a second to think about how much you’re willing to risk sending data when you choose to send it off the device.

So, What Should I Be Concerned About?

TEEs are useful for security in a number of circumstances. Your phone likely has a TEE where it keeps the key that encrypts your biometric unlock data and the base of the keychain where passwords are stored. It also enables certain backup systems, like how you can restore a phone with your passcode or restore WhatsApp or Signal backups.

But when we’re talking about cloud processing, it’s important to be clear this isn’t the same as end-to-end encryption and doesn’t offer the same level of privacy. 

Most of our private lives are on our phones and in our messages. We’ve worked for years to secure those messages, with major wins like encrypted RCS, and the continued user experience improvements of Signal and WhatsApp. We’ve even seen real improvements to backup security with features like Advanced Data Protection that bring end-to-end encryption for a variety of data outside of messaging, like notes and photos. 

But as companies roll out AI features that interact with these encrypted services, pulling data off devices and into a cloud-based TEE, they’re eroding the privacy protections of end-to-end encryption and risk causing serious confusion around what data is protected and what isn’t.

Amazon recently debuted a new feature for its Ring cameras that the company is calling Throw Away the Key Encryption (TAKE). The idea is to cut back on the amount of video content available to the company, and thus potentially available to law enforcement. But while it might technically add a speed bump to accessing full video content, it doesn’t deliver nearly the level of privacy we should be demanding from video doorbells and other security cameras.

TAKE introduces a new way for Ring to manage encryption keys, where the user’s device has its key, then the company holds encryption keys temporarily within its own cloud infrastructure. Ring’s servers receive the keys temporarily so it can offer a variety of the features it says it can’t offer when a user chooses to use end-to-end encryption, like video descriptions, smart alerts, video search, and more, then deletes the key after 24 hours. 

This differs from how it works now, where footage is encrypted in transit and at rest, then decrypted by Ring, which always has access to the footage, to process those features. 

Comparatively, this is an improvement to the default settings Ring has now, because it at least puts some restrictions on historical footage, but it has some serious holes worth exploring.

Ring Gets Access to Unencrypted Video for a Short Period

Ring has designed its service so many of its camera features, including smart alerts and video search, need cloud processing to work. That means to provide those features, Ring needs to decrypt the footage while it’s stored in Ring’s cloud servers. 

With TAKE, in order to decrypt footage to offer these features, Ring gets access to footage stored in the cloud for 24 hours. TAKE adds some small measures using secure enclaves to make base key material harder to directly export, but keys are still released to services that can be modified. With access to the keys, the cloud processing does its thing and delivers the requested feature to the user. The key is then deleted 24 hours later—until the user wants to watch an old video or use other so-called “smart” features, at which point the keys are sent back to the server. 

In practice, that makes the system as a whole barely different from encryption at rest where the server holds the keys. The client device essentially takes the place of a hardware security module (HSM), including making those keys available to the server whenever they’re needed. The end result is an improvement from the status quo, but still not even close to the privacy protections of end-to-end encryption. 

The company says it does not keep backups of the keys and there’s no way for a Ring employee to access footage. It also claims that any decrypted content is deleted from its servers. 

But that doesn’t mean much when user actions send the keys back to the server. And making features like “Video Search” and “Smart Video Descriptions” available to the device owner means that while the footage can’t be seen by Ring, descriptions are readily available to the company. In response to a question about capability, Ring responded to us that, “As Ring continues to expand and further strengthen TAKE's protections, video descriptions will be included.”

Plus, account recovery keys are stored in the camera itself by default. When that’s paired with the fact that currently, indices of video contents are available to the company, it means that TAKE isn’t even a protection against mass surveillance. Law enforcement could request a mass search across cameras for certain terms, then delve into further details by seizing cameras of interest from the device-owner, decrypting account backups, and using that information to decrypt encrypted videos. 

Law Enforcement May Still Seek to Compel Access to Footage

Because of the ways the access and key rotations work, it’s technically still possible for Ring to alter its current practice if compelled to do so by law enforcement, in much the same way as other existing encryption-at-rest systems where the company holds the keys. For example, Ring could receive an order that demands they save content encryption keys or unencrypted videos from memory to disk, which would mean they’d retain some level of access. 

In an email to EFF, Ring stated, “By design, under TAKE, Ring will not be able to provide encryption keys or decrypted content. With TAKE, Ring will only preserve and provide encrypted video files in response to valid legal process. It has been and continues to be Ring's policy to object to overbroad legal requests.” EFF specifically asked about the possibility of complying with law enforcement orders to modify existing practice to turn over or preserve unencrypted video, which appears to be technically possible, but the company did not address it.

End-to-end encryption works to maintain trust by its user base because the company that employs it never has access to the keys at any point, making it impossible for itself to access the encrypted contents. This also means law enforcement can’t demand the service retain keys or choose not to rotate them. As described, this level of protection isn’t offered with TAKE.

Ultimately, Ring is the one managing this software and its implementation, and beyond a white paper, “trust us” is the only level of verification they’re offering outside observers. While it doesn’t fix the issues, at the bare minimum, the company needs to open the entire infrastructure up to third-party auditors to verify its claims. Ring seems to agree, as they told us that, “Ring conducts rigorous security reviews of all products before launch and critical components of TAKE’s infrastructure underwent independent security testing prior to launch. We are exploring options for further independent review.”

TAKE is not end-to-end encryption, where Ring would never have access to the keys, and the company thankfully doesn’t claim it as such. Ring already offers the option for end-to-end encryption, and turning that on by default would offer the real sorts of privacy improvements we all want from video doorbells. 

Oura Rings, Garmin GPS fitness watches, Apple Watches, Whoop bands—every year, more and more tech devices are promising to monitor our health and fitness, guide us toward healthier living, and provide useful health metrics to take to our doctors. But few of these tools provide the sorts of privacy and security promises we demand from all technology, let alone tech that captures personal health data. It’s time they step up and start providing transparency reports and stronger encryption options.

Surveys suggest that around 40 percent of people in the United States own some sort of commercially available wearable health device. Despite being marketed as health devices, they have no special health-related privacy protections that one might hope for. The companies who make these devices can and do collect an abundance of data, and many of them share that data with third-parties for marketing or to influence insurance rates, or use it for their own purposes, like training artificial intelligence models.

Health data is increasingly an important part of law enforcement or government investigations. Wearable data has been critical in a number of cases, where information about heart rate and steps was used to determine the whereabouts of individuals. And the surveillance company Penlink calls fitness trackers and wearables an “overlooked source” for law enforcement since they tend to show movement patterns and changes in heart rates. Law enforcement can try to get access to this data through subpoenas or warrants. 

There are many potential privacy issues with these sorts of devices, including whether the companies who make them share or sell information to third-parties. But here we are choosing to focus on two facets we’re concerned with around health data itself: 1) whether the company shares information with law enforcement and governments and 2) if they offer end-to-end encryption, which means the company itself can’t access that health data to begin with.

Reading through dozens of product review sites we narrowed our research in on ten companies that seem to make the majority of recommended consumer health products on the market:

• Amazfit
• Apple
• Coros
• Garmin
• Google (including Fitbit)
• Hume
• Oura
• Polar
• Suunto
• Whoop 

We reviewed each company’s public facing policies, then emailed them to confirm those findings. Here’s what we found.

Transparency Reports Are Few and Far Between

Companies should provide transparency reports of how often they provide data to the government, including information about whether it’s an official demand or an unofficial request. We have been calling on tech companies to publish transparency reports for a long time, but the practice is still rare across the industry. That’s especially true with fitness gadgets. 

Only two of the companies we surveyed, Apple and Google (which also owns Fitbit), currently publish transparency reports. Apple, Google, and Whoop promise to notify users of law enforcement requests in publicly available documentation. 

Oura now does too, after an update to their privacy policy in June 2026 that was perhaps prompted by a series of requests from journalist Zack Whittaker. In that same update and in an email to us, Oura promises that it is “actively evaluating ways to provide greater visibility into how we handle these requests, like through a transparency report.” This is promising, and we hope the company agrees that transparency reports are the best option moving forward. 

Any company that handles data that’s of interest to law enforcement and governments owes it to their users to publish transparency reports and, when legally possible, notify users when that data is requested.

Similarly, Suunto does not currently publish transparency reports, but in an email reply to our questions the company did express an openness to potentially doing so, stating, “We continuously evaluate our transparency practices and may publish additional information, such as a transparency report, in the future if we believe it would provide meaningful value for users and support our data protection efforts.” We hope they do, as these sorts of reports are a useful metric for all of us to better understand if and when our data can potentially be accessed by law enforcement.

We could not find instances where the other companies publicly state a policy around notification or transparency reports, and no others replied to our email questions.

Any company that handles data that’s of interest to law enforcement and governments owes it to their users to publish transparency reports and, when legally possible, notify users when that data is requested. This is especially true of personal health data, which can reveal our movements, and be used to infer details about what we’re doing at any given moment.

End-to-End Encrypted Data Is Far Too Rare of a Feature

End-to-end encryption is a method to ensure that your personal data is only accessible by you, and not the company who makes the device and manages the cloud storage. End-to-end encryption is usually used to refer to message encryption in communication apps, like Signal or WhatsApp, but can also refer to data storage. For example, many password managers use end-to-end encryption, and Ring implemented it for its cameras after we pushed for it. There’s no reason it can’t be offered for wearables too.

In the case of health data from wearable devices, it’s a way to store data in the cloud so that information can be synced and backed up between your device and an app on your phone in a way where only your devices can access it. 

Support for end-to-end encryption is more rare than transparency reports. 

The Apple Watch, at least with data that’s stored in the Health app, is the only popular fitness wearable that supports end-to-end encryption, and it’s enabled by default for all users (you are required to have two-factor authentication enabled as well, but that is also on by default for most accounts).

However, Apple Watch owners should remember that this protection is only for data stored in the Apple Health app. If you use other apps on your watch, or choose to share data with third-parties, like Strava, or if you’re sharing data with other wearables, like an Oura ring, that data is likely not end-to-end encrypted by the third-party company. 

Support for end-to-end encryption is more rare than transparency reports. 

And that’s it. Apple is the only one. No other popular consumer health wearable offers end-to-end encryption for the data it collects and stores online. Not Google. Not Garmin. Not Oura. Most of these companies instead offer encryption in transit and at rest, but this means those companies can still see and use your data. This is the industry standard, but it doesn’t have to be.

Another option would be more robust local-storage options. Some devices we looked at, like a handful of Garmin and Polar watches, can operate on the watch itself without syncing data to the cloud, but some models are limited in capability and cannot sync to an app without storing data online. More robust options for limiting the data to just the wearable and the phone app it's synced to would be a privacy improvement. For example, the Apple Watch has the option to disable iCloud sharing in Apple Health, which will keep the data only on your phone. It’s the only wearable we found that offers this feature without using a third-party app like Gadgetbridge or by physically connecting the wearable to a computer with a USB cable and transferring activity files over manually.

The general lack of local-only options or end-to-end encryption is a major privacy oversight, especially when you consider these devices collect heart rate, track sleep, and can log your location while also calculating a variety of health metrics supposedly intuiting everything from anxiety to your fitness “age.”

We understand that it’s technically more difficult to implement end-to-end encryption than other sorts of cloud storage, and comes with some limitations that may affect a user’s experience with a product. It also makes certain types of AI-related features harder to implement, since they’d typically need to work on-device (either in the app or the wearable device itself). Because of that, we believe an option for end-to-end encryption or local-only storage of the data collected by a wearable is the least companies can do. This way, those who want to use these devices can do so with the choice to either accept some privacy risks, or choose a more locked down option.

What’s Next

If you’re a user of a fitness wearable from any of the companies we’ve reached out to, or any other one, don’t be shy in asking for these sorts of features. In the rare cases a company offers a feature request page, use it—like for Garmin, Polar, Suunto, and Whoop. And when those types of outlets aren’t offered, don’t shy away from general contact pages, like those offered by Amazfit and Oura, or on community subreddits.

The companies that make these wearables, whether they’re designed for fitness or health, need to improve. At the bare minimum, companies need to publish transparency reports detailing how often they receive requests from law enforcement and commit to notifying users whenever that happens. 

It’s also well past the time for more companies to offer end-to-end encryption for the health data they’re storing. We acknowledge that this may be a trade-off for some features, like social networking features, but it should be up to users to decide if they’re willing to make those trade-offs. This level of privacy is an appealing feature that benefits users in myriad ways and more companies can set themselves apart by committing to this level of privacy.

Health data is some of the most personal data we produce, and most wearables companies are behind the times when it comes to basic privacy practices and transparency. Now’s the time to improve those practices.

Poke your head into just about any online social network—or any general conversations about internet culture—and you’ll likely find a boogieman: the algorithm. Since at least the moment Facebook introduced (and apologized for) its News Feed, “the algorithm” has been shorthand for the ways the tech giants control what we see and when we see it. In the age of enshittification, there is a push to reclaim our feeds and networks. Good news: there’s a tool that’s been around for decades that can help wrangle many of your feeds into something manageable: Really Simple Syndication, more commonly known as RSS.

What’s RSS and How Do I Use It?

RSS has been around since 1999, but its real publicity glow-up came from Google Reader, a newsreader service that Google offered between 2005 and 2013. Despite the alarm bells people rang at the time, the death of Google Reader wasn’t the death of RSS, and many replacements have come and gone over the years.

RSS may seem complicated, but it boils down to one general concept: when websites publish new content, like news articles, blog entries, webcomics, videos, or podcasts, that content gets added to an RSS feed, where your RSS reader (aka newsreader, feed reader, or aggregator) will show you that content in chronological order. If you’ve ever used a podcast player like Apple Podcasts or Spotify to follow different podcasts, you’ve used RSS. You can think of it like an internet-wide “follow” button, where you can track the contents of websites, users, and more.

People talk about RSS like it’s a power user’s secret trick to making the internet more usable, but the real secret is that it’s not that hard to set up and use. Here’s what you need to do:

• Find an RSS reader: RSS readers come in many forms. Feedly, NewsBlur, or The Old Reader, are web-based, but have their own apps (though they also support third-party apps). Others, like NetNewsWire, are app-based, and support either using a web-based RSS reader like Feedly, or a local file. Some live in browsers or web extensions. There’s an abundance of choice in RSS readers, and part of the fun is finding one that best accomplishes what you want to do. But don’t worry about finding the right RSS reader right away. One of the many magic tricks of RSS is that it is platform agnostic, and nearly every RSS reader—whether it's a website or an app, supports importing and exporting a list of the sites you subscribe to. This means you can change RSS readers in a couple minutes. If you need some help finding an RSS reader, Wired, The Verge, and Privacy Guides all have useful roundups. 
• Collect your feeds: As for adding websites to your feeds, the process is straightforward. Most RSS readers are designed to help find the feed for a site for you, so you don’t need to go hunting down a special link. Just drop the URL of what you want to follow in your reader, and if an RSS feed exists, it should be able to find it. If not, some sites, including ours (and our current podcast, EFFector as well as our last series, How to Fix the Internet), provide direct links to our RSS feeds.
• Sort, filter, and build your feed: Adding a bunch of new feeds can be overwhelming, particularly for news sites. RSS readers typically include folders, which let you group similar feeds together and can be great for lifting up low-traffic updates you don’t want to miss. Your reader may also have different filters, like the option to block any article that contains “sponsored post.” 

RSS Is the Best Way to Follow the News

It can be very difficult to follow the news, whether that means politics, tech policy, or your hobbies. Solutions like Google News or Apple News have tried to make this simpler, but many find that their algorithmic feeds are as often a source of frustration and annoyance as they are genuinely useful. And no matter how often you tap on news stories that matter to you from publications you respect, there may always be stories that refuse to bubble up.

RSS can make reading the news much easier, reliable, and more private. The vast majority of news sites have RSS feeds you can subscribe to, and many, including CNN, The New York Times, BBC, Wired, Politico, and many others, offer RSS for specific sections or special feeds that include the full text of articles for subscribers, so you aren’t just pummeled with a firehose of news all day long (we’ll get to a tip below in the next section that tackles this problem if they don’t have separate feeds, though). In many cases, you can read articles right in your RSS reader, never being forced to engage with wonky comments sections or poor design choices on websites.

Of course, the news isn’t just general news sites, it also includes hobbyist or more niche sites, local news offerings, and blogs. Most of these sorts of websites also offer RSS feeds, as do newsletter platforms like Substack or Ghost. 

RSS Offers One Way to Fix Some Social Feeds

Decentralized social media like Mastodon, Bluesky, and Threads, use RSS for user feeds, so you can follow your friend’s posts on Bluesky or Mastodon without actually having an account on either. This can be especially helpful for news sources, too—where you likely wouldn’t want to subscribe to a feed of everything a national news organization publishes because that would include dozens if not hundreds of stories a day, you can instead subscribe to their social media posts, which often get you the most breaking or important news.

The internet is more than just Facebook.

Some legacy social media works with RSS, too, including YouTube, Reddit (though that is currently at risk), and Tumblr. But others, like Facebook, LinkedIn, and Instagram, wall off posts behind account requirements that seem to pop up if you simply look at an account page for too long, let alone come in from an RSS feed. These walled gardens prevent information from getting out there, which ranges from annoying, like when your favorite local brewery only posts their food truck schedule on Instagram, to dangerous, like when local public services only post to a Facebook page.

The internet is more than just Facebook. It’s more than Mastodon or Bluesky, too. It’s a decentralized smorgasbord of websites, tools, feeds, newsletters, social profiles, and more, and treating it as such will help us wrangle the information we want and trust. 

Other Surprising Places You’ll Find RSS Feeds

When in doubt, try copying and pasting the URL for a site into your RSS reader of choice, you might be surprised to find a feed that proves useful to you. Many places on the internet may offer RSS feeds without you even realizing it. For example, if you want to keep an eye on an artist’s prints that you like, but you don’t have Instagram where they usually post, you might be able to subscribe to their webstore, as some shopping platforms, like Big Cartel, create XML feeds that some RSS readers can read. And for something even more tweakable, even Google Alerts can be turned into RSS feeds.

RSS is one of the best examples we have of the open web, where we can design and customize how we experience the internet, not the other way around.

If you prefer to track policy over products, then you’ll be happy to know that government sites often support RSS, including most U.S. government sites, many of which break them into different sections like the U.S. Department of State’s various feeds. Many local governments or other public services, like fire departments may offer the same. Some universities (and university newspapers) also sometimes offer some RSS feeds. 

And even if a website doesn’t have an RSS feed, there are workarounds from tools like RSSHub, RSS-Bridge, and RSS.app that require varying levels of technical expertise or a willingness to pay subscription fees.

RSS is one of the best examples we have of the open web, where we can design and customize how we experience the internet, not the other way around. RSS has come in and out of fashion, been declared dead, and has come back, every time. Open systems are the best way forward to a free, equitable internet, and the resilience and continued reinvention of RSS has shown just how creative the web community can be with open protocols.

Correction: clarified that Big Cartel creates an XML file, not an RSS feed.

Last week, Instagram ended its opt-in, and therefore rarely used, end-to-end encryption feature. Years after publicly promising to provide the privacy protections of end-to-end encryption across its platforms by default, it instead gave up on that technical challenge. Now, we've all lost an option for safer conversations on one of the biggest social media platforms in the world.

In an announcement in 2023, Meta bragged about how it had successfully encrypted Messenger, and teased that Instagram was in progress. Even before then, they’d talked about how important encryption was in Messenger and Instagram in a white paper published in 2022, stating: 

We want people to have a trusted private space that’s safe and secure, which is why we’re taking our time to thoughtfully build and implement e2ee by default across Messenger and Instagram DMs.

So where did the reversal come from? In a statement, Meta claimed that, “Very few people were opting in to end-to-end encrypted messaging in DMs.” This isn’t all that surprising, as turning it on was an optional four-step process that few people knew about. Defaults matter, and Meta’s choice to blame people for failing to opt into this feature is proof of how much. In that same statement, the company pointed people to WhatsApp for access to encrypted messaging. Yet if Meta truly wanted people to have a trusted private space to communicate, it would meet them everywhere they are: on WhatsApp, on Messenger, and on Instagram.

But at least Meta was straightforward about the fact that it will not continue to support or work on this feature. That's rare. Most tech company promises aren’t broken explicitly, they just remain undelivered long enough to be forgotten. 

This is particularly disappointing as other companies take even bigger swings, like Google and Apple working together to implement end-to-end encryption over Rich Communication Services (RCS), and Signal’s continued work to make its app simpler and easier to use for everyone.

Meta abandoning this principle is disheartening, especially as we are still waiting for other promised features from the company, like end-to-end encryption in Facebook Messenger group messages. Instead of blaming users for not using these sorts of features and then abandoning the promise of delivery, Meta—and other tech companies—should start by enabling strong privacy protective features by default.

This week, Apple released iOS 26.5, an update that supports end-to-end encryption for Rich Communication Services (RCS), meaning conversations between Android and iPhone will soon be encrypted in the default chat apps. This has been a long time coming, and is a welcome delivery on a promise both Google and Apple made.

With this update, conversations that take place between Apple’s Messages app and Google Messages on Android will be end-to-end encrypted by default, as long as the carrier supports both RCS and encrypted messages (you can find a list of carriers here). RCS messages are a replacement for SMS, and in 2024 Apple started supporting it, making for a marked improvement in the quality of images and other media shared between Android and iPhones. 

Now, those conversations can also benefit from the increased privacy and security that end-to-end encryption offers, making it so neither Google, Apple, nor the cellular carriers have access to the contents of messages. This feature comes courtesy of both Apple and Google supporting the GSMA RCS Universal Profile 3.0, which implements the Messaging Layer Security protocol for encryption. Metadata will likely still be collected and stored for these conversations, making alternatives like Signal still a better option for many conversations. Likewise, if you back up those conversations to the cloud, they may be stored unencrypted unless you enable Advanced Data Protection on iOS (Google Messages end-to-end encrypts the text of messages in backups, but not the media, so we’d like to see a similar offering as ADP on Android). Still, this is a significant step forward for the privacy of millions of conversations worldwide.

End-to-end encrypted RCS messaging is still marked as beta on Apple devices, likely because the rollout is dependent on carriers as well as the Android phone running the most recent version of Google Messages. 

It might take some time before you get this feature in your chats and until you do, remember that the conversations are not protected with end-to-end encryption. But once everyone in the conversation is on the right software version and the carrier support is implemented, you will see a lock icon and the text, “Encrypted” at the top of the conversation for any chats you have over RCS, as seen here:

We applaud Apple and Google for getting this across the finish line and Encrypting It Already! More companies should take these sorts of difficult but necessary steps to protect the privacy of our conversations and our data.

Last year, the Canadian government pushed Bill C-2, which would erode Canadian digital rights in the name of “border security.” The bill was so bad it didn’t even make it to committee because of the backlash from the privacy community. Now, the spring’s worst sequel, Bill C-22, aka The Lawful Access Act, is trying it again.

As with most sequels, Bill C-22 makes some tweaks to problematic elements, but largely retains the same problems. The bill forces digital services, which could include telecoms, messaging apps, and more, to record and retain metadata for a full year, and expands information sharing with foreign governments, including the United States. Metadata can reveal a lot about who you communicate with, where you go, and when you do so. Expanding the collection of metadata would require companies to store even more information about their users than they already do, providing an incentive for bad actors to access that information. 

Worst of all, Bill C-22 erodes the privacy of millions by providing a mechanism for the Minister of Public Safety to demand companies create a backdoor to their services to provide law enforcement access to data, as long as these mandates don’t introduce a “systemic vulnerability.” These widespread surveillance backdoors would likely facilitate even more data breaches than we see already. The bill also bans companies from even revealing the existence of these orders publicly.

The definitions of both “systemic vulnerabilities” and “encryption” are not clear enough in C-22, leaving wiggle room for the government to demand that companies circumvent encryption. And the overbroad definitions in the bill can include apps as well as operating systems. Canadian officials have made it clear they believe it’s possible to add surveillance without introducing systemic vulnerabilities, which is just not true. Surveillance of encrypted communications is fundamentally a systemic vulnerability.

This resembles what happened in the UK last year, when the government demanded that Apple implement this type of backdoor into its optional Advanced Data Protection feature, which then forced Apple to revoke the feature for its UK users instead of complying with the request. To this day, UK users still do not have access to this powerful, privacy-protective feature that provides stronger protections for data stored in iCloud. Both Meta and Apple are concerned that C-22 would give the Canadian governments similar powers, and both companies have come out against the bill. The U.S. House Judiciary and Foreign Affairs committees also sent a joint letter to Canada’s Minister of Public Safety highlighting the concern around backdoors into encrypted systems.

The dangers of these sorts of backdoors are not theoretical. In 2024, the Salt Typhoon hack took advantage of a system built by Internet Service Providers to give law enforcement access to user data. When you build these systems, hackers will come.

Canadians deserve strong privacy protections, transparency into how companies handle user data, and clear safeguards around encrypted data. Bill C-22 provides none of that, instead reaching further into the digital pockets of tech companies to build broad lawful access mechanisms.

Further reading

• Full text of C-22
• Canadian Civil Liberties Association statement and letter
• Open Media blog on C-22
• EFF’s blog on bill C-2

One of the central promises of open social media services is interoperability—the idea that wherever you personally decide to post doesn’t require others to be there just to follow what you have to say. Think of it like a radio broadcast: you want to reach people and don't care where they are or what device they're using. For example, in theory, a Bluesky user can follow someone on Mastodon or Threads without having to create a Mastodon or Threads account. But these systems are still a work in progress, and you might need to tweak a few things to get it working correctly.

Right now, broadcasting your message across social platforms can be a funky experience at best, deliberately broken up by oligopolists. The idea of the open web was baked into the internet via protocols like HTML and RSS that made it easy for anyone to visit a website or follow most blogs. The fact social media isn’t similarly open reflects an intentional choice to privatize the internet. 

Bridging and managing your posts so they’re viewable outside a singular source is part of the broader philosophy of POSSE, short for Post Own Site Syndicate Elsewhere (sometimes its Post Own Site, Share Everywhere). Instead of managing several accounts across different services, you post once to one primary site (which might be your personal website, or just one social media account), then set it up so it automatically publishes everywhere else. This way, it doesn’t matter where you or your audience is, and they're not walled off by account registration requirements. 

We’ll come back around to POSSE at the end of this post, but for now, let’s assume you just want your current main open social media account to actually have a chance to reach the most people it can. 

Why Post to the Open Social Web

Because the Fediverse and ATmosphere use different protocols, we need to use a third-party tool so accounts can communicate with each other. For that, we’ll need a bridge. As the name suggests, a bridge can connect one social media account to another, so you can post once and spread your message across several places. This isn’t just some niche concept: major blogging platforms like Wordpress and Ghost integrate posting to the Fediverse.

Bridging is an important facet of POSSE, but also something more people should consider, even if they don’t run their own websites. For example, if you don’t want to create a Threads account just to interact with your one friend who uses that platform, you shouldn’t have to. The good news is, you don’t. There are several bridging services, like Fedisky, RSS Parrot, and pinhole, but Bridgy Fed is currently the simplest to use, so we’ll focus on that. 

How to Post to Bluesky from Mastodon

From your Mastodon account (or other Fediverse account, for simplicity’s sake we’ll stick to Mastodon throughout), search for the username @bsky.brid.gy@bsky.brid.gy and follow that account. Once you do, the account will follow you back and you’ll be bridged and people can find you from their Bluesky account. You should also get a DM with your bridged username. If you don’t see the @bsky.brid.gy@bsky.brid.gy user when you search, your Mastodon instance may be blocking the bridging tool. 

Threads users who have enabled Fediverse sharing will be able to find you with your standard Mastodon username (ie, @your_user_name@mastodon.social), but if they haven’t enabled sharing, they will not be able to see your account. While this search is still a beta feature, you might find it easier to share the full URL, which would look like this: https://www.threads.net/fediverse_profile/@your_user_name@mastodon.social

People on Bluesky can find you by: Either searching for your Mastodon username, or if that doesn’t work, @your_user_name.instance.ap.brid.gy. For example, if your username is @eff@mastodon.social, it would appear as @eff.mastodon.social.ap.brid.gy.

How to Post to Mastodon and Bluesky from Threads

Yes, Threads is technically on the Fediverse, and you can bridge your Threads account to Mastodon or Bluesky (unless you’re in Europe, where the feature is disabled), but it’s a different process than on Bluesky and Mastodon.

• Open Settings > Account > Fediverse Sharing and set the option to “On.” This will make your posts visible to Mastodon (or other Fediverse) users, and vice versa. 
• Once the Fediverse sharing is enabled, you’ll likely need to wait a week, then you can bridge to Bluesky. Search for and follow the @bsky.brid.gy@bsky.brid.gy account (it may take some digging to find it, but if that doesn’t work you can try visiting the profile page directly. 

People on Mastodon (or other Fediverse accounts) and Bluesky can find you by: Mastodon users can find you at, @your_threads_username@threads.net while Bluesky users will find you at, @your_threads_username.threads.net.ap.brid.gy (seriously, that will be the username). Note that some Mastodon instances may block Threads users entirely.

How to Post to Mastodon and Threads from Bluesky

From your Bluesky (or other ATProto) account, search for the username, “@ap.brid.gy” and follow that account. Once you do, the account will follow you back and you’ll be bridged, so people can follow you from Mastodon or other Fediverse accounts. You should also get a DM with your bridged username.

People on Mastodon (or other Fediverse account) and Threads can find you by: Your username will appear as @your_bluesky_username@bsky.brid.gy. For example, if your Bluesky username is @eff@bsky.social, it would appear as @eff.bksy.social@bsky.brid.gy.

How to Post Everywhere from Your Own Website

You can bridge more than social media accounts. If you have your own website, you can bridge that too (as long as it supports microformats and webmention, or an Atom or RSS feed. If you have a blog, there’s a good chance you’re already good to go). When you do so, the bridged account will either post the full text (or image) of whatever you post to your personal site, or a link to that content,  depending on how your website is set up. You’ll also probably want to log into your Bridgy user page so you can manage the account. 

Where people can find your bridged account: Usually, a user can just search for your website’s URL on their decentralized social network of choice, or enter it on the Bridgy Fed page. But if that doesn’t work, they can try @yourdomain.com@web.brid.gy from Mastodon or @yourdomain.com.web.brid.gy from Bluesky.

How Your Account Username Looks on Each Platform

   

You’re Bound to Run Into Some Quirks

• Sometimes messages take a little while to crossover between networks, and sometimes they don't crossover at all.
• You can’t log into a bridged account like a regular account, but Bridgy Fed does provide some tools to see incoming notifications and recent activity in case they’re not coming through properly.
• ActivityPub and ATProto don’t have the same feature set, so you will have certain capabilities for one account you might not have in another. For example, you can edit posts on Mastodon, but not on Bluesky. If you edit a post that’s bridged from Mastodon to Bluesky, the Bluesky post will not be updated. 
• Replies can sometimes get lost, especially if the person (or people) replying to you doesn’t have sharing turned on.
• Ownership of accounts can get weird. For example, if you post to your own website and use a tool like Wordpress or Ghost for federation (more info below), you don’t necessarily get access to a “normal” social media account, with a standard login and password.
• And more! This is still a work in progress that has some technical quirks, but it’s improving all the time, and it’s best to keep telling yourself that troubleshooting is part of the fun.

Other Cool Stuff You Can Do

As mentioned up top, there’s a lot more you can do, and an increasing number of tools are making this process simpler. Bridgy Fed is one way to post to more places from a single account, but it’s far from the only way to do so. Here are just a few examples.

• Micro.blog is a paid service where you can blog from your own domain name, then post automatically to Mastodon, Bluesky, Threads, Tumblr, Nostr, LinkedIn, Medium, Pixelfed, and Flickr.
• Ghost is a blogging and newsletter platform that offers direct integration with the Fediverse, as well as support for Bluesky. Wordpress offers the option to join the Fediverse through a community plugin. Other newsletter platforms, like Buttondown, also have plans for federation. 
• Surf.social is a landing page and social media utility where you can show off all your various accounts (Federated or not). From the reader point of view, you can follow one publications numerous types of posts in one place. For example, 404 Media’s Surf.social feed includes its YouTube feed, podcast feed, and its journalist’s social media posts.
• If you think these new handles are a bit ugly, you can use a custom domain for Bluesky or fediverse account from your website. 

Of course, there are plenty of other tools, blogging platforms, and other utilities out there to help facilitate posting and bridging accounts, with new ones coming along every day. 

With proper support, time, and effort, eventually we will all be able to seamlessly interact across platforms, take our follows and followers to other services when a platform no longer suits our needs, and interact with a variety of web content regardless of what platform hosts it. Until then, we still need to do some DIY work, support the services we want to succeed, and push for more platforms and services to support federated protocols.

Correction: an earlier version of this blog was missing the full Bluesky username in the account username chart.

Update April 22, 2026. Apple has reportedly addressed part of the issue with the notification database in iOS 26.4.2 and 18.7.8, released today. With this update, notifications marked for deletion should no longer be stored in the notification database.

A phone’s push notifications can contain a significant amount of information about you, your communications, and what you do throughout the day. They’re important enough to government investigations that Apple and Google now both require a judge’s order to hand details about push notifications over to law enforcement, and even with that requirement Apple shares data on hundreds of users. More recently, we also learned from a 404 Media report that law enforcement forensic extraction tools can unearth the text from deleted notifications, including those from secure messaging tools, like Signal. The good news is that you can mitigate some of this risk. 

There are two points where notifications may betray your privacy: when they’re transmitted over cloud servers and once they land on the device. Let’s start with the cloud. It might seem like push notifications come directly from an app, but they are typically routed through either Apple or Google’s servers first (depending on if you use iOS or Android). According to a letter sent to the Department of Justice by Senator Wyden, the content of those notifications may be visible to Apple and Google, and at the very least the companies collect some metadata about what apps send a notification and when. App providers have to make the decision to hide the content from Apple and Google and implement that functionality; Signal is one app that does this. 

Then, once the notifications land on your phone, depending on your settings, the notification content may be visible on your lock screen without needing to unlock the device. This can be dangerous if you lose your device, someone steals it, or it’s confiscated by law enforcement. 

You may clear notifications after looking at them. But it turns out the content notifications get recorded in your device’s internal storage, which then makes them susceptible to recovery with certain types of forensic tools. Notification content may even persist after the app is deleted, if the OS doesn’t fully purge the app’s notification data. 

We still have a lot of unanswered questions about how the notification databases work on devices. We do not know how long notifications are stored, or whether they’re backed up to the cloud, in which case the cloud provider could get backdoor access to the content of messages if the backups are enabled and not end-to-end encrypted. This may also make backups vulnerable to law enforcement demands for data. 

Which is all to say that there are myriad ways that law enforcement can access the content or metadata of push notifications. Let’s fix that.

Consider the Strongest Notification Protections for Your Secure Messaging Apps

Secure chat tools are designed to keep the content of the messages safe inside the app. So, for secure chat apps like WhatsApp and Signal, that means the company that makes those apps cannot see the content of your messages, and they’re only accessible on your and your recipients’ devices. Once messages land on a device, it’s still important to consider some privacy precautions, particularly with notifications. 

Signal
Signal offers three levels of information to include in notifications, all which are pretty self explanatory:

• Name, Content, and Actions (Name and message on Android) shows the entirety of a message as well as who sent it (on iPhone you can also slide to reply, mark as read, or call back). 
• Name only only shows the name of the sender. 
• No Name or Content (No name or message on Android) will only show that you have a message from Signal, not who sent it or what it’s about. 

To change your settings:

• On iPhone: Tap your profile picture, then Settings > Notifications > Show.
• On Android: Tap your profile picture, then Notifications > Show. 

WhatsApp
WhatsApp only has one option for this, and it’s currently limited to iPhone, but you can at least tell the app not to include the content of a message in the notification:

• Open WhatsApp for iPhone, tap the “You” bar, then Notifications, and disable the Show preview option.

Check your other apps to see if they offer similar settings.

Limit Your Notifications Device-Wide

Since Apple and Google manage push notifications for their respective devices, they also have some visibility into certain data. Push notification data can include certain types of metadata, like which app sent a notification and when, as well as the account ID associated with the phone. In some cases, Apple and Google may have access to unencrypted content, including the content of the text in a notification or other information from the app itself. 

For most app notifications, there’s no simple way to easily figure out what metadata might be gleaned from a notification, or if the notification is unencrypted or not. But some app developers have described details along these lines. For example, Signal president Meredith Whittaker explained on social media how the Signal app handles notifications entirely on-device. Searching online for an app name along with “notification privacy,” “notification encryption” or “notification metadata” may help answer your questions, or you may need to dig around in support forums for the app.

It’s also good to reconsider whether any app should be sending you notifications to begin with. Aside from a potential decrease in the number of distractions you endure throughout the day, or the level of chaos on display on your lockscreen, limiting the apps that can send notifications and what content is visible in them can improve your privacy with respect to the sorts of metadata that may be gathered by the companies, as well as any content that may be viewable if someone has physically accessed your device.

To check and change your settings on iPhone

• Open Settings > Notifications.
• On the Show Previews option, you can choose whether to show the content of notifications on the lock screen, “Always,” which doesn’t require unlocking the device, “When Unlocked,” which does, and “Never,” which means notifications won’t have any details, just that you have a notification in an app. 
• Alternatively, you can scroll down and change these settings per app. Just tap the app name, then the Show Previews menu, and choose how you’d like them to appear. Or, if you’ve decided you don’t want notifications from that app at all, uncheck the Allow Notifications option.

To check and change your settings on Android
The core version of Android relies on app developers to develop specific settings more than controlling them on a platform-wide level.

• Open Settings > Notifications > App notifications to disable notifications from any app completely. Some apps may also offer internal notification options for specific types of notices, like new messages, that you can control in the app itself. Tap an app name, then tap the Addition settings in the app option to potentially customize it more.
• You can also experiment with the sensitive content setting. This is up to the developer to set properly, but when done so, most notifications will require at least unlocking the device to see them. Open Settings > Notifications > Notifications on lock screen and disable “Show sensitive content.”

Control What Notifications AI Tools Can Access

In an attempt to make notifications easier to skim, both Android and iOS offer optional ways to get notification summaries using their AI tools that summarize the content of notifications. On an individual app level, WhatsApp offers this as well. Some of these summarization tools, like Apple’s, run on the device, while others, like WhatsApp’s, do not. This can all be a lot to keep track of, and sending data off device may create some level of risk for some messages.

Since this is a bit more complicated, we have another blog post that walks through the steps to take to protect messaging from accidentally ending up in AI tools built into Apple and Google's devices. For WhatsApp specifically, we have a blog detailing when you might want to turn on the app’s “Advanced Chat Privacy” feature, which can disable summaries for both yourself and others in the chat.

Balancing security, privacy, and usability with something like push notifications is a complicated task. At the very least, Apple and Google should better ensure that the content of these notifications isn’t transmitted over their servers in plain text. The companies need to also make sure that device operating systems don’t back up the notification database to the cloud, and when an app is deleted, that all notification data is purged.

We appreciate that apps like Signal allow you to control what’s visible with notifications on a per-app basis, and we’d like to see this level of granularity of choices in other secure messaging tools, like WhatsApp. Likewise, more apps should handle push notifications similarly to the way Signal does, where a ping is sent to wake up the app to check for messages, and the content of that message is never sent across servers.

Over the last decade or so, the tech industry has tried, and mostly failed, to make “smart glasses”—tech-infused glasses with cameras, AI, maps, displays, and more—a thing. But in the past year, products like Meta’s Ray-Ban Display Glasses and Oakley’s Meta Glasses have gone from a curious niche to the mainstream. 

Before you strap a dashcam to your face and sprint out into the world filming everything and everyone in your life, there are some civil liberties and privacy concerns to consider before buying or using a pair.

Meta is the biggest company that makes these sorts of glasses and their partnerships with Ray-Ban and Oakely are the most popular options, so we’ll be mostly focusing on them here. Others, like models from Snapchat are similar in form but far less ubiquitous. But Meta won’t hold this space for long. Google’s already announced a partnership with Warby Parker for their “AI-powered smart glasses,” and there are rumors around a competing product from Apple. 

With that, let’s dive into some of the considerations you should make before purchasing a pair.

If You’re Thinking About Buying Smart Glasses

You’re likely not the only one who can see (and hear) your footage

The photos and videos you record with most smartglasses will likely be stored online at some point in the process. On Meta’s offerings, unless you are livestreaming, media you capture when you press the camera button is kept on the glasses until you import them onto your phone, but media is imported automatically by default into the Meta AI mobile app, which is required to set up the glasses. 

You can't use any AI features locally on the glasses. So anytime you use AI features, like when you say, “Hey Meta, start recording,” the footage is fed to Meta. You can use the glasses without the Meta AI app entirely, but considering you can’t easily download footage from the glasses to your phone without it, most people will likely use the app.

Some videos are fed to Meta for AI training, and we know at least in some cases that those videos go through human review. An investigation by Swedish newspapers found that workers were reviewing and annotating camera footage, which includes all sorts of sensitive videos, including nudity, sex, and going to the bathroom. Meta claimed to the BBC that this is in accordance with its terms of use, all in the name of AI training, which states:

In some cases, Meta will review your interactions with AIs, including the content of your conversations with or messages to AIs, and this review may be automated or manual (human).

This all means that Meta and their third-party contractors will have access to at least some of what you record, and it’s very hard as a user to know where footage goes, who will have access to it, and what they will do with it. When you save footage to your phone’s camera roll, which is where the Meta AI app stores content, that might also be sent to Apple or Google’s servers, depending on your settings. Employees at these companies can then possibly access that media, and it could be shared with law enforcement.

The recorded audio from conversations with Meta AI are also saved by default, and if you don’t like that, tough luck, unless you go in and manually delete them every time you say something.

Filming all the time is even more privacy invasive than you think

A common argument in favor of using the cameras in smartglasses is that phones and cameras can do this too, and it’s never been a problem. 

But smartglasses are designed to resemble regular glasses, to the point where most reviews point out how friends didn’t notice that they had cameras embedded in them. They’re designed to be invisible to those being recorded—outside of a small indicator light when they’re recording video footage (that cheap hacks can disable)—whereas it is often obvious that a person is recording if they pull their phone out of their pocket and point it at someone else.

They’re designed to be invisible to those being recorded, outside of a small indicator light when they’re recording.

Moreover, constant recording of everything in public spaces can create all sorts of potential privacy problems, some more obvious than others. This is another way that cameras on glasses are different from cameras on phones: it is far easier to constantly record one’s whereabouts with the former than the latter. If you continuously record, maybe you just happen to catch someone entering their passcode or password onto their phone or computer at a coffee shop, or broadcast someone’s bank details when you’re standing in line at an ATM. That doesn’t even begin to get into when smartglasses are intentionally used for less socially responsible means. And some people may forget to turn off their smartglasses when they enter a private space like a bathroom.  

And if you find yourself caught on someone’s camera, there’s not much you can do in recourse. If you do notice a stranger recording you, it’s up to you to intervene and ask not to be included in that footage, which can easily turn awkward or confrontational.

Our expectations of privacy shift when we’re in public, but bystanders in many cases will still have privacy interests. Public spaces are a place where you will be seen, but that shouldn’t mean it’s suddenly okay to catalog and identify everyone.

Consider the company’s track record and public statements

Meta, Google, Apple—perhaps one benefit of all the major tech companies entering this market is that we already have a good idea of how much they tend to respect the privacy of their users or the openness of their platforms. Spoiler, it’s often not much.

Meta has a long history of privacy invasive technologies and practices. We’ve heard rumblings that Meta hopes to add face recognition to its smartglasses, preferably, “during a dynamic political environment where many civil society groups that we would expect to attack us would have their resources focused on other concerns.” Yikes. This is a monumentally bad idea that should be abandoned by Meta and any of its competitors considering a similar feature. But regardless of whether they launch this feature, it’s a pretty clear indication of where Meta wants these sorts of devices to go. 

If You Have Smartglasses Already

Opt out of sharing with Meta where you can

You can disable a couple of the features where unnecessary data is sent to Meta. In the Meta AI app, under the device settings, there’s a privacy page where you can disable sharing additional data, and more importantly, turn off “Cloud media,” where your photos and videos are sent to Meta’s cloud for processing and temporary storage. 

Decide your use-case and stick to it

These glasses can be useful for filming a variety of activities. We’ve seen fascinating scenes of tattoo artists doing their work (with client’s permission), and it doesn’t take a stretch of the imagination to see how people might use it to film extreme sports. Even on an everyday level, you might find them useful for capturing holidays, birthdays, and all sorts of other private occasions. 

But if you buy these glasses for a specific, mostly private purpose, it is probably best to stick to that, instead of wearing them everywhere and recording everything you do.

Follow the rules of businesses and social expectations

You often have a right to record in public spaces, but that doesn’t mean other people will like it. Businesses, including restaurants and stores, may want nothing to do with continuous filming and may either post a sign asking you not to use smartglasses, or ask you to stop. This may reflect the preferences not just of the business owner, but the people around you. And don’t use glasses to record when you enter other people’s private spaces like bathrooms or changing rooms.

It’s also a good idea to check in with friends and family before tapping that record button at a social gathering. Some people may not be as comfortable with these glasses as they are with other recording equipment.

Consider blurring strangers if you’re going to upload video

Blurring video footage isn’t an easy task, but if you’re considering uploading footage from something like a protest, it may be worth the effort to do so (apps like Meta’s Edits simplify this process, as do some other video sites, like YouTube). Some people don’t want the government to see their faces at protests, and might be afraid to attend if other people are uploading their faces.

Some people don’t want the government to see their faces at protests, and might be afraid to attend if other people are uploading their faces.

It would be better if Meta leveraged its AI features to offer this sort of feature automatically, especially with livestreaming. It’s not that outlandish of a request, as it seems like the company tries to blur faces automatically in footage it captures for annotation, though it’s not always reliable. After all, Google began redacting faces in Street View years ago, following privacy concerns from groups like EFF.

Resist face recognition

Adding facial recognition technology to smartglasses would obliterate the privacy of everyone. We cannot let companies push face recognition into these glasses, and as a user, you should make your voice clear that this is not something you want.

Smartglasses don’t have to be used to decimate the privacy of anyone you encounter during the day. There are legitimate uses out there, but it’s up to those who use them to respect the social norms of the spaces they enter and the people they encounter.

Today, we’re launching Encrypt It Already, our push to get companies to offer stronger privacy protections to our data and communications by implementing end-to-end encryption. If that name sounds a little familiar, it’s because this is a spiritual successor to our 2019 campaign, Fix It Already, a campaign where we pushed companies to fix longstanding issues.

End-to-end encryption is the best way we have to protect our conversations and data. It ensures the company that provides a service cannot access the data or messages you store on it. So, for secure chat apps like WhatsApp and Signal, that means the company that makes those apps cannot see the contents of your messages, and they’re only accessible on your and your recipients. When it comes to data, like what’s stored using Apple’s Advanced Data Protection, it means you control the encryption keys and the service provider will not be able to access the data.  

We’ve divided this up into three categories, each with three different demands:

• Keep your Promises: Features that the company has publicly stated they’re working on, but which haven’t launched yet.
• Facebook should use end-to-end encryption for group messages
• Apple and Google should deliver on their promise of interoperable end-to-end encryption of RCS
• Bluesky should launch its promised end-to-end encryption for DMs
• Defaults Matter: Features that are available on a service or in app already, but aren’t enabled by default.
• Telegram should default to end-to-end encryption for DMs
• WhatsApp should use end-to-end encryption for backups by default
• Ring should enable end-to-end encryption for its cameras by default
• Protect Our Data: New features that companies should launch, often because their competition is doing it already.
• Google should launch end-to-end encryption for Google Authenticator backups
• Google should offer end-to-end encryption for Android backup data
• Apple and Google should offer an AI permissions per app option to block AI access to secure chat apps

What is only half the problem. How is just as important.

What Companies Should Do When They Launch End-to-End Encryption Features

There’s no one-size fits all way to implement end-to-end encryption in products and services, but best practices can support the security of the platform with the transparency that makes it possible for its users to trust it protects data like the company claims it does. When these encryption features launch, companies should consider doing so with:

• A blog post written for a general audience that summarizes the technical details of the implementation, and when it makes sense, a technical white paper that goes into further detail for the technical crowd.
• Clear user-facing documentation around what data is and isn’t end-to-end encrypted, and robust and clear user controls when it makes sense to have them.
• Data minimization principles whenever feasible, storing as little metadata as possible.

Technical documentation is important for end-to-encryption features, but so is clear documentation that makes it easy for users to understand what is and isn’t protected, what features may change, and what steps they need to take to set it up so they’re comfortable with how data is protected.

What You Can Do

When it’s an option, enable any end-to-end encryption features you can, like on Telegram, WhatsApp, and Ring.

For everything else, let companies know that these are features you want! You can find messages to share on social media on the Encrypt It Already website, and take the time to customize those however you’d like. 

In some cases, you can also reach out to a company directly with feature requests, which all the above companies, except for Google and WhatsApp, offer in some form. We recommend filing these through any service you use for any of the above features you’d like to see:

• Apple’s feedback page
• Bluesky’s support
• Facebook’s feedback form

As for Ring and Telegram, we’ve already made the asks and just need your help to boost them. Head over to the Telegram bug and suggestions and upvote this post, and Ring’s feature request board and boost this post.

End-to-end encryption protects what we say and what we store in a way that gives users—not companies or governments—control over data. These sorts of privacy-protective features should be the status quo across a range of products, from fitness wearables to notes apps, but instead it’s a rare feature limited to a small set of services, like messaging and (occasionally) file storage. These demands are just the start. We deserve this sort of protection for a far wider array of products and services. It’s time to encrypt it already!

Join EFF

Help protect digital privacy & free speech for everyone

Our Surveillance Self-Defense (SSD) guides, which provide practical advice and explainers for how to deal with government and corporate surveillance, had a big year. We published several large updates to existing guides and released three all new guides. And with frequent massive protests across the U.S., our guide to attending a protest remained one of the most popular guides of the year, so we made sure our translations were up to date.

(Re)learn All You Need to Know About Encryption

We started this year by taking a deep look at our various encryption guides, which start with the basics before moving up to deeper concepts. We slimmed each guide down and tried to focus on making them as clear and concise as deep explainers on complicated topics can be. We reviewed and edited four guides in total:

• What Should I Know About Encryption? 
• Key Concepts in Encryption
• Key Verification
• A Deep Dive on End-to-End Encryption: How Do Public Key Encryption Systems Work?

And if you’re not sure where to start, we got you covered with the new Interested in Encryption? playlist.

New Guides

We launched three new guides this year, including iPhone and Android privacy guides, which walk you through all the various privacy options of your phone. Both of these guides received a handful of updates throughout their first year as new features were released or, in the case of the iPhone, a new design language was introduced. These also got a fun little boost from a segment on "Last Week Tonight with John Oliver" telling people how to disable their phone’s advertising identifier.

We also launched our How to: Manage Your Digital Footprint guide. This guide is designed to help you claw back some of the data you may find about yourself online, walking through different privacy options across different platforms, digging up old accounts, removing yourself from people search sites, and much more.

Always Be Updating

As is the case with most software, there is always incremental work to do. This year, that meant small updates to our WhatsApp and Signal guides to acknowledge new features (both are already on deck for similar updates early next year as well). 

We overhauled our device encryption guides for Windows, Mac, and Linux, rolling what was once three guides into one, and including more detailed guidance on how to handle recovery keys. Some slight changes to how this works on both Windows and Mac means this one will get another look early next year as well.

Speaking of rolling multiple guides into one, we did the same with our guidance for the Tor browser, where it once lived across three guides, it now lives as one that covers all the major desktop platforms (the mobile guide remains separate).

The password manager guide saw some small changes to note some new features with Apple and Chrome’s managers, as well as some new independent security audits. Likewise, the VPN guide got a light touch to address the TunnelVision security issue.

Finally, the secure deletion guide got a much needed update after years of dormancy. With the proliferation of solid state drives (SSDs, not to be confused with SSD), not much has changed in the secure deletion space, but we did move our guidance for those SSDs to the top of the guide to make it easier to find, while still acknowledging many people around the world still only have access to a computer with spinning disk drives. 

Translations

As always, we worked on translations for these updates. We’re very close to a point where every current SSD guide is updated and translated into Arabic, French, Mandarin, Portuguese, Russian, Spanish, and Turkish.

And with the help of Localization Lab, we also now have translations for a handful of the most important guides in Changana, Mozambican Portuguese, Ndau, Luganda, and Bengali.

Blogs Blogs Blogs

Sometimes we take our SSD-like advice and blog it so we can respond to news events or talk about more niche topics. This year, we blogged about new features, like WhatsApp’s “Advanced Chat Privacy” and Google’s "Advanced Protection.” We also broke down the differences between how different secure chat clients handle backups and pushed for expanding encryption on Android and iPhone.

We fight for more privacy and security every day of every year, but until we get that, stronger controls of our data and a better understanding of how technology works is our best defense.

This article is part of our Year in Review series. Read other articles about the fight for digital rights in 2025.

Defending encryption has long been a bedrock of our work. Without encryption, it's impossible to have private conversations or private data storage. This year, we’ve seen attacks on these rights from all around the world. 

Europe Goes All in On Breaking Encryption, Mostly Fails (For Now)

The European Union Council has repeatedly tried to pass a controversial message scanning proposal, known as “Chat Control,” that would require secure messaging providers to scan the contents of messages. Every time this has come up since it was first introduced in 2022, it got batted down—because no matter how you slice it, client-side scanning breaks end-to-end encryption. The Danish presidency seemed poised to succeed in passing Chat Control this year, but strong pushback from across the EU caused them to reconsider and rework their stance. In its current state, Chat Control isn’t perfect, but it at least includes strong language to protect encryption, which is good news for users. 

Meanwhile, France tried to pass its own encryption-breaking legislation. Unlike Chat Control, which pushed for client-side scanning, France took a different approach: allowing so-called “ghost participants,” where law enforcement could silently join encrypted chats. Thankfully, the French National Assembly did the right thing and rejected this dangerous proposal. 

It wasn’t all wins, though.

Perhaps the most concerning encryption issue is still ongoing in the United Kingdom, where the British government reportedly ordered Apple to backdoor its optional end-to-end encryption in iCloud. In response, Apple disabled one of its strongest security features, Advanced Data Protection, for U.K. users. After some back and forth with the U.S., the U.K. allegedly rewrote the demand, to clarify it was limited to only apply to British users. That doesn’t make it any better. Tribunal hearings are planned for 2026, and we’ll continue to monitor developments.

Speaking of developments to keep an eye on, the European Commission released its “Technology Roadmap on Encryption” which discusses new ways for law enforcement to access encrypted data. There’s a lot that could happen with this roadmap, but let’s be clear, here: EU officials should scrap any roadmap focused on encryption circumvention and instead invest in stronger, more widespread use of end-to-end encryption. 

U.S. Attempts Fall Flat

The U.S. had its share of battles, too. The Senate re-introduced the STOP CSAM Act, which threatened to compromise encryption by requiring encrypted communication providers to have knowledge about what sorts of content their services are being used to send. The bill allows encrypted services to raise a legal defense—but only after they’ve been sued. That's not good enough. STOP CSAM would force encryption providers to defend against costly lawsuits over content they can't see or control. And a jury could still consider the use of encryption to be evidence of wrongdoing. 

In Florida, a bill ostensibly about minors' social media use also just so happened to demand a backdoor into encryption services—already an incredible overreach. It went further, attempting to ban disappearing messages and grant parents unrestricted access to their kids’ messages as well. Thankfully, the Florida Legislature ended without passing it.

It is unlikely these sorts of attempts to undermine encryption will suddenly stop. But whatever comes next, EFF will continue to stand up for everyone's right to use encryption to have secure and private online communications. 

This article is part of our Year in Review series. Read other articles about the fight for digital rights in 2025.

Another year has come and gone, and with it, thousands of data breaches that affect millions of people. The question these days is less, Is my information in a data breach this year? and more How many data breaches had my information in them this year? 

Some data breaches are more noteworthy than others. Where one might affect a small number of people and include little useful information, like a name or email address, others might include data ranging from a potential medical diagnosis to specific location information. To catalog and talk about these breaches we created the Breachies, a series of tongue-in-cheek awards, to highlight the most egregious data breaches. 

In most cases, if these companies practiced a privacy first approach and focused on data minimization, only collecting and storing what they absolutely need to provide the services they promise, many data breaches would be far less harmful to the victims. But instead, companies gobble up as much as they can, store it for as long as possible, and inevitably at some point someone decides to poke in and steal that data. Once all that personal data is stolen, it can be used against the breach victims for identity theft, ransomware attacks, and to send unwanted spam. It has become such a common occurrence that it’s easy to lose track of which breaches affect you, and just assume your information is out there somewhere. Still, a few steps can help protect your information.

With that, let’s get to the awards.

The Winners

• The Say Something Without Saying Anything Award: Mixpanel
• The We Still Told You So Award: Discord
• The Tea for Two Award: Tea Dating Advice and TeaOnHer
• The Just Stop Using Tracking Tech Award: Blue Shield of California
• The Hacker's Hall Pass Award: PowerSchool
• The Worst. Customer. Service. Ever. Award: TransUnion
• The Annual Microsoft Screwed Up Again Award: Microsoft
• The I Didn’t Even Know You Had My Information Award: Gravy Analytics
• The Keeping Up With My Cybertruck Award: Teslamate
• The Disorder in the Courts Award: PACER
• The Only Stalkers Allowed Award: Catwatchful
• The Why We’re Still Stuck on Unique Passwords Award: Plex
• The Uh, Yes, Actually, I Have Been Pwned Award: Troy Hunt’s Mailing List
• (Dis)honorable Mentions

The Say Something Without Saying Anything Award: Mixpanel

We’ve long warned that apps delivering your personal information to third-parties, even if they aren’t the ad networks directly driving surveillance capitalism, presents risks and a salient target for hackers. The more widespread your data, the more places attackers can go to find it. Mixpanel, a data analytics company which collects information on users of any app which incorporates its SDK, suffered a major breach in November this year. The service has been used by a wide array of companies, including the Ring Doorbell App, which we reported on back in 2020 delivering a trove of information to Mixpanel, and PornHub, which despite not having worked with the company since 2021, had its historical record of paying subscribers breached.    

There’s a lot we still don’t know about this data breach, in large part because the announcement about it is so opaque, leaving reporters with unanswered questions about how many were affected, if the hackers demanded a ransom, and if Mixpanel employee accounts utilized standard security best practices. One thing is clear, though: the breach was enough for OpenAI to drop them as a provider, disclosing critical details on the breach in a blog post that Mixpanel’s own announcement conveniently failed to mention.

The worst part is that, as a data analytics company providing libraries which are included in a broad range of apps, we can surmise that the vast majority of people affected by this breach have no direct relationship with Mixpanel, and likely didn’t even know that their devices were delivering data to the company. These people deserve better than vague statements by companies which profit off of (and apparently insufficiently secure) their data.

The We Still Told You So Award: Discord

Last year, AU10TIX won our first The We Told You So Award because as we predicted in 2023, age verification mandates would inevitably lead to more data breaches, potentially exposing government IDs as well as information about the sites that a user visits. Like clockwork, they did. It was our first We Told You So Breachies award, but we knew it wouldn’t be the last. 

Unfortunately, there is growing political interest in mandating identity or age verification before allowing people to access social media or adult material. EFF and others oppose these plans because they threaten both speech and privacy. 

Nonetheless, this year’s winner of The We Still Told You So Breachies Award is the messaging app, Discord — once known mainly for gaming communities, it now hosts more than 200 million monthly active users and is widely used to host fandom and community channels. 

In September of this year, much of Discord’s age verification data was breached — including users’ real names, selfies, ID documents, email and physical addresses, phone numbers, IP addresses, and other contact details or messages provided to customer support. In some cases, “limited billing information” was also accessed—including payment type, the last four digits of credit card numbers, and purchase histories. 

Technically though, it wasn’t Discord itself that was hacked but their third-party customer support provider — a company called Zendesk—that was compromised, allowing attackers to access Discord’s user data. Either way, it’s Discord users who felt the impact. 

The Tea for Two Award: Tea Dating Advice and TeaOnHer

Speaking of age verification, Tea, the dating safety app for women, had a pretty horrible year for data breaches. The app allows users to anonymously share reviews and safety information about their dates with men—helping keep others safe by noting red flags they saw during their date.

Since Tea is aimed at women’s safety and dating advice, the app asks new users to upload a selfie or photo ID to verify their identity and gender to create an account. That’s some pretty sensitive information that the app is asking you to trust it with! Back in July, it was reported that 72,000 images had been leaked from the app, including 13,000 images of photo IDs and 59,000 selfies. These photos were found via an exposed database hosted on Google’s mobile app development platform, Firebase. And if that isn’t bad enough, just a week later a second breach exposed private messages between users, including messages with phone numbers, abortion planning, and discussions about cheating partners. This breach included more than 1.1 million messages from early 2023 all the way to mid-2025, just before the breach was reported. Tea released a statement shortly after, temporarily disabling the chat feature.

But wait, there’s more. A completely different app based on the same idea, but for men, also suffered a data breach. TeaOnHer failed to protect similar sensitive data. In August, TechCrunch discovered that user information — including emails, usernames, and yes, those photo IDs and selfies — was accessible through a publicly available web address. Even worse? TechCrunch also found the email address and password the app’s creator uses to access the admin page.

Breaches like this are one of the reasons that EFF shouts from the rooftops against laws that mandate user verification with an ID or selfie. Every company that collects this information becomes a target for data breaches — and if a breach happens, you can’t just change your face. 

The Just Stop Using Tracking Tech Award: Blue Shield of California

Another year, another data breach caused by online tracking tools. 

In April, Blue Shield of California revealed that it had shared 4.7 million people’s health data with Google by misconfiguring Google Analytics on its website. The data, which may have been used for targeted advertising, included: people’s names, insurance plan details, medical service providers, and patient financial responsibility. The health insurance company shared this information with Google for nearly three years before realizing its mistake.

If this data breach sounds familiar, it’s because it is: last year’s Just Stop Using Tracking Tech award also went to a healthcare company that leaked patient data through tracking code on its website. Tracking tools remain alarmingly common on healthcare websites, even after years of incidents like this one. These tools are marketed as harmless analytics or marketing solutions, but can expose people’s sensitive data to advertisers and data brokers. 

EFF’s free Privacy Badger extension can block online trackers, but you shouldn’t need an extension to stop companies from harvesting and monetizing your medical data. We need a strong, federal privacy law and ban on online behavioral advertising to eliminate the incentives driving companies to keep surveilling us online. 

The Hacker's Hall Pass Award: PowerSchool

 In December 2024, PowerSchool, the largest provider of student information systems in the U.S., gave hackers access to sensitive student data. The breach compromised personal information of over 60 million students and teachers, including Social Security numbers, medical records, grades, and special education data. Hackers exploited PowerSchool’s weak security—namely, stolen credentials to their internal customer support portal—and gained unfettered access to sensitive data stored by school districts across the country.

PowerSchool failed to implement basic security measures like multi-factor authentication, and the breach affected districts nationwide. In Texas alone, over 880,000 individuals’ data was exposed, prompting the state's attorney general to file a lawsuit, accusing PowerSchool of misleading its customers about security practices. Memphis-Shelby County Schools also filed suit, seeking damages for the breach and the cost of recovery.

While PowerSchool paid hackers an undisclosed sum to prevent data from being published, the company’s failure to protect its users’ data raises serious concerns about the security of K-12 educational systems. Adding to the saga, a Massachusetts student, Matthew Lane, pleaded guilty in October to hacking and extorting PowerSchool for $2.85 million in Bitcoin. Lane faces up to 17 years in prison for cyber extortion and aggravated identity theft, a reminder that not all hackers are faceless shadowy figures — sometimes they’re just a college kid.

The Worst. Customer. Service. Ever. Award: TransUnion

Credit reporting giant TransUnion had to notify its customers this year that a hack nabbed the personal information of 4.4 million people. How'd the attackers get in? According to a letter filed with the Maine Attorney General's office obtained by TechCrunch, the problem was a “third-party application serving our U.S. consumer support operations.” That's probably not the kind of support they were looking for. 

TransUnion said in a Texas filing that attackers swept up “customers’ names, dates of birth, and Social Security numbers” in the breach, though it was quick to point out in public statements that the hackers did not access credit reports or “core credit data.” While it certainly could have been worse, this breach highlights the many ways that hackers can get their hands on information. Coming in through third-parties, companies that provide software or other services to businesses, is like using an unguarded side door, rather than checking in at the front desk. Companies, particularly those who keep sensitive personal information, should be sure to lock down customer information at all the entry points. After all, their decisions about who they do business with ultimately carry consequences for all of their customers — who have no say in the matter.

The Annual Microsoft Screwed Up Again Award: Microsoft

Microsoft is a company nobody feels neutral about. Especially in the infosec world. The myriad software vulnerabilities in Windows, Office, and other Microsoft products over the decades has been a source of frustration and also great financial rewards for both attackers and defenders. Yet still, as the saying goes: “nobody ever got fired for buying from Microsoft.” But perhaps, the times, they are a-changing. 

In July 2025, it was revealed that a zero-day security vulnerability in Microsoft’s flagship file sharing and collaboration software, SharePoint, had led to the compromise of over 400 organizations, including major corporations and sensitive government agencies such as the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), the federal agency responsible for maintaining and developing the U.S. stockpile of nuclear weapons. The attack was attributed to three different Chinese government linked hacking groups. Amazingly, days after the vulnerability was first reported, there were still thousands of vulnerable self-hosted Sharepoint servers online. 

Zero-days happen to tech companies, large and small. It’s nearly impossible to write even moderately complex software that is bug and exploit free, and Microsoft can’t exactly be blamed for having a zero-day in their code. But when one company is the source of so many zero-days consistently for so many years, one must start wondering whether they should put all their eggs (or data) into a basket that company made. Perhaps if Microsoft’s monopolistic practices had been reined in back in the 1990s we wouldn’t be in a position today where Sharepoint is the defacto file sharing software for so many major organizations. And maybe, just maybe, this is further evidence that tech monopolies and centralization of data aren’t just bad for consumer rights, civil liberties, and the economy—but also for cybersecurity. 

The Silver Globe Award: Flat Earth Sun, Moon & Zodiac

Look, we’ll keep this one short: in October of last year, researchers found security issues in the flat earther app, Flat Earth, Sun, Moon, & Clock. In March of 2025, that breach was confirmed. What’s most notable about this, aside from including a surprising amount of information about gender, name, email addresses and date of birth, is that it also included users’ location info, including latitude and longitude. Huh, interesting.

The I Didn’t Even Know You Had My Information Award: Gravy Analytics

In January, hackers claimed they stole millions of people’s location history from a company that never should’ve had it in the first place: location data broker Gravy Analytics. The data included timestamped location coordinates tied to advertising IDs, which can reveal exceptionally sensitive information. In fact, researchers who reviewed the leaked data found it could be used to identify military personnel and gay people in countries where homosexuality is illegal. 

The breach of this sensitive data is bad, but Gravy Analytics’s business model of regularly harvesting and selling it is even worse. Despite the fact that most people have never heard of them, Gravy Analytics has managed to collect location information from a billion phones a day. The company has sold this data to other data brokers, makers of police surveillance tools, and the U.S. government. 

How did Gravy Analytics get this location information from people’s phones? The data broker industry is notoriously opaque, but this breach may have revealed some of Gravy Analytics’ sources. The leaked data referenced thousands of apps, including Microsoft apps, Candy Crush, Tinder, Grindr, MyFitnessPal, pregnancy trackers and religious-focused apps. Many of these app developers said they had no relationship with Gravy Analytics. Instead, expert analysis of the data suggests it was harvested through the advertising ecosystem already connected to most apps. This breach provides further evidence that online behavioral advertising fuels the surveillance industry. 

Whether or not they get hacked, location data brokers like Gravy Analytics threaten our privacy and security. Follow EFF’s guide to protecting your location data and help us fight for legislation to dismantle the data broker industry. 

The Keeping Up With My Cybertruck Award: Teslamate

TeslaMate, a tool meant to track Tesla vehicle data (but which is not owned or operated by Tesla itself), has become a cautionary tale about data security. In August, a security researcher found more than 1,300 self-hosted TeslaMate dashboards were exposed online, leaking sensitive information such as vehicle location, speed, charging habits, and even trip details. In essence, your Cybertruck became the star of its own Keeping Up With My Cybertruck reality show, except the audience wasn’t made up of fans interested in your lifestyle, just random people with access to the internet.

TeslaMate describes itself as “that loyal friend who never forgets anything!” — but its lack of proper security measures makes you wish it would. This breach highlights how easily location data can become a tool for harassment or worse, and the growing need for legislation that specifically protects consumer location data. Without stronger regulations around data privacy, sensitive location details like where you live, work, and travel can easily be accessed by malicious actors, leaving consumers with no recourse.

The Disorder in the Courts Award: PACER

Confidentiality is a core principle in the practice of law. But this year a breach of confidentiality came from an unexpected source: a breach of the federal court filing system. In August, Politico reported that hackers infiltrated the Case Management/Electronic Case Files (CM/ECF) system, which uses the same database as PACER, a searchable public database for court records. Of particular concern? The possibility that the attack exposed the names of confidential informants involved in federal cases from multiple court districts. Courts across the country acted quickly to set up new processes to avoid the possibility of further compromises.

The leak followed a similar incident in 2021 and came on the heels of a warning to Congress that the file system is more than a little creaky. In fact, an IT official from the federal court system told the House Judiciary Committee that both systems are “unsustainable due to cyber risks, and require replacement.”

The Only Stalkers Allowed Award: Catwatchful

Just like last year, a stalkerware company was subject to a data breach that really should prove once and for all that these companies must be stopped. In this case, Catwatchful is an Android spyware company that sells itself as a “child monitoring app.” Like other products in this category, it’s designed to operate covertly while uploading the contents of a victim’s phone, including photos, messages, and location information.

This data breach was particularly harmful, as it included not just the email addresses and passwords on the customers who purchased the app to install on a victim’s phone, but also the data from the phones of 26,000 victims’ devices, which could include the victims’ photos, messages, and real-time location data.

This was a tough award to decide on because Catwatchful wasn’t the only stalkerware company that was hit this year. Similar breaches to SpyX, Cocospy, and Spyic were all strong contenders. EFF has worked tirelessly to raise the alarm on this sort of software, and this year worked with AV Comparatives to test the stalkerware detection rate on Android of various major antivirus apps.

The Why We’re Still Stuck on Unique Passwords Award: Plex

Every year, we all get a reminder about why using unique passwords for all our accounts is crucial for protecting our online identities. This time around, the award goes to Plex, who experienced a data breach that included customer emails, usernames, and hashed passwords (which is a fancy way of saying passwords are scrambled through an algorithm, but it is possible they could still be deciphered).

If this all sounds vaguely familiar to you for some reason, that’s because a similar issue also happened to Plex in 2022, affecting 15 million users. Whoops.

This is why it is important to use unique passwords everywhere. A password manager, including one that might be free on your phone or browser, makes this much easier to do. Likewise, credential stuffing illustrates why it’s important to use two-factor authentication. Here’s how to turn that on for your Plex account.

The Uh, Yes, Actually, I Have Been Pwned Award: Troy Hunt’s Mailing List

Troy Hunt, the person behind Have I Been Pwned? and who has more experience with data breaches than just about anyone, also proved that anyone can be pwned. In a blog post, he details what happened to his mailing list:

You know when you're really jet lagged and really tired and the cogs in your head are just moving that little bit too slow? That's me right now, and the penny has just dropped that a Mailchimp phish has grabbed my credentials, logged into my account and exported the mailing list for this blog.

And he continues later:

I'm enormously frustrated with myself for having fallen for this, and I apologise to anyone on that list. Obviously, watch out for spam or further phishes and check back here or via the social channels in the nav bar above for more.

The whole blog is worth a read as a reminder that phishing can get anyone, and we thank Troy Hunt for his feedback on this and other breaches to include this year.

Tips to Protect Yourself

Data breaches are such a common occurrence that it’s easy to feel like there’s nothing you can do, nor any point in trying. But privacy isn’t dead. While some information about you is almost certainly out there, that’s no reason for despair. In fact, it’s a good reason to take action.

There are steps you can take right now with all your online accounts to best protect yourself from the the next data breach (and the next, and the next):

• Use unique passwords on all your online accounts. This is made much easier by using a password manager, which can generate and store those passwords for you. When you have a unique password for every website, a data breach of one site won’t cascade to others.
• Use two-factor authentication when a service offers it. Two-factor authentication makes your online accounts more secure by requiring additional proof (“factors”) alongside your password when you log in. While two-factor authentication adds another step to the login process, it’s a great way to help keep out anyone not authorized, even if your password is breached.
• Delete old accounts: Sometimes, you’ll get a data breach notification for an account you haven’t used in years. This can be a nice reminder to delete that account, but it’s better to do so before a data breach happens, when possible. Try to make it a habit to go through and delete old accounts once a year or so. 
• Freeze your credit. Many experts recommend freezing your credit with the major credit bureaus as a way to protect against the sort of identity theft that’s made possible by some data breaches. Freezing your credit prevents someone from opening up a new line of credit in your name without additional information, like a PIN or password, to “unfreeze” the account. This might sound absurd considering they can’t even open bank accounts, but if you have kids, you can freeze their credit too.
• Keep a close eye out for strange medical bills. With the number of health companies breached this year, it’s also a good idea to watch for healthcare fraud. The Federal Trade Commission recommends watching for strange bills, letters from your health insurance company for services you didn’t receive, and letters from debt collectors claiming you owe money. 

(Dis)Honorable Mentions

According to one report, 2025 had already seen 2,563 data breaches by October, which puts the year on track to be one of the worst by the sheer number of breaches.

We did not investigate every one of these 2,500-plus data breaches, but we looked at a lot of them, including the news coverage and the data breach notification letters that many state Attorney General offices host on their websites. We can’t award the coveted Breachies Award to every company that was breached this year. Still, here are some (dis)honorable mentions we wanted to highlight:

Salesforce, F5, Oracle, WorkComposer, Raw, Stiizy, Ohio Medical Alliance LLC, Hello Cake, Lovense, Kettering Health, LexisNexis, WhatsApp, Nexar, McDonalds, Congressional Budget Office, Doordash, Louis Vuitton, Adidas, Columbia University, Hertz, HCRG Care Group, Lexipol, Color Dating, Workday, Aflac, and Coinbase. And a special nod to last minute entrants Home Depot, 700Credit, and Petco.

What now? Companies need to do a better job of only collecting the information they need to operate, and properly securing what they store. Also, the U.S. needs to pass comprehensive privacy protections. At the very least, we need to be able to sue companies when these sorts of breaches happen (and while we’re at it, it’d be nice if we got more than $5.21 checks in the mail). EFF has long advocated for a strong federal privacy law that includes a private right of action.