According to this year’s Microsoft Digital Defense Report, government agencies and services were the sector most impacted by cyber threats in 2026, accounting for 27% of observed activity, up from 17% in 2025. Governments are also the most frequently targeted sectors for nation-state activity. They are attractive targets because they hold sensitive information, operate essential services, and sit at the center of networks of agencies, contractors, technology providers, and critical infrastructure operators.  

Dwell time, the period between when an attacker gains access and when defenders detect and stop them, also increased this year across multiple sectors. While organizations responded faster once an intrusion was identified, detecting threats early remains a challenge. Attackers increasingly gain access through techniques that mimic legitimate activity, making malicious behavior harder to spot. For example, phishing accounted for 23% of observed intrusions in 2026, up from 7% in 2025, highlighting the continued importance of compromised identities as an entry point for broader attacks. 

Taken together, the implication for governments is clear. Security in the AI era is no longer simply about preventing individual intrusions. It is about ensuring institutions can operate effectively in an environment where risks are interconnected, threats move faster, and attackers remain hidden longer. Public-private partnerships are also more important than ever for securing critical government infrastructure and developing the policies and regulations needed for emerging technologies.  

In this year’s report, which examines cyber threat trends observed between July 2025 and June 2026, Terrell Cox, Microsoft’s Corporate Vice President & Deputy Chief Information Security Officer, and I explore how these dynamics are reshaping cyber risk. In a companion blog, Terrell takes a closer look at what these findings mean for CISOs and security professionals.

To strengthen resilience, governments should focus on five priorities:

1. Prepare for a faster threat environment 

AI is compressing the window for action. Adversaries are moving faster. A vulnerability’s discovery in the wild to active weaponization can be well below 24 hours. While the number of publicly disclosed software vulnerabilities (commonly tracked as CVEs) is projected to reach a record 72,000 in 2026. 

Governments best prepared for the future will be those that can rapidly gather and assess information, make decisions, coordinate across institutions and industries, and communicate effectively during a crisis. This requires clearly defined responsibilities and trusted relationships established before an incident occurs, enabling swift and coordinated action when it matters most.  

2. Build security into the AI ecosystem  

AI is becoming part of the infrastructure that governments, businesses, and citizens rely on every day. As governments continue to adopt AI across public services and encourage its broader use, they should approach its security as a resilience challenge rather than a narrow technical issue. 

AI systems depend on interconnected infrastructure, data, models, applications, suppliers, and governance processes. Governments should promote security across this ecosystem through secure-by-design practices, testing and evaluation, stronger supply chain protections, transparency, accountability, and international cooperation on AI risk. 

The goal is not to create a separate AI security agenda. It is to integrate AI security into broader efforts to protect critical infrastructure and build national resilience. 

3. Plan for incidents to spread

Governments may not immediately know whether an intrusion is criminal, geopolitical, or something else. Cybercriminals and nation-state actors pursue different objectives, but increasingly rely on many of the same entry points, including compromised identities, exposed applications, social engineering, and legitimate administrative tools. 

Microsoft found that 52.2% of intrusions involving valid accounts resulted in additional credential theft, highlighting how quickly attackers can expand beyond an initial foothold. A seemingly isolated compromise can evolve into ransomware, espionage, data theft, or disruption of essential services. 

Governments should therefore assess incidents not only by how they begin, but by where they could lead. Response plans should account for the suppliers, partners, and service providers supporting critical functions. As attacks expand beyond their initial targets, they can also cross organizational, sectoral, and national boundaries, reinforcing the need for global collaboration. 

4. Enable timely, two-way public-private information sharing 

A compromised account at one organization may provide early warning of a broader campaign. Signals that appear inconclusive in isolation can reveal coordinated activity when combined across organizations and jurisdictions. Modern cybercrime operates through interconnected networks of actors, services, and infrastructure that no single institution can fully see or disrupt on its own. 

Information sharing must be timely, trusted, and two-way—also known as bidirectional. The goal is not simply for companies to report threats to government. Public agencies should also return actionable intelligence, guidance, and warnings that help organizations protect their networks, customers, and operations. Trusted channels can enable this exchange among government agencies, law enforcement, critical infrastructure operators, technology providers, and international partners while respecting legal and privacy requirements. 

Policymakers can support this cooperation through protections for good-faith information sharing, common anonymization standards, and investment in shared threat intelligence and detection capabilities. Information sharing should also lead to action, including investigations, disruption efforts, and accountability for those responsible for serious cyber intrusions. 

5. Prepare essential services to operate through disruption

The organizations governments depend on to deliver public services, including transportation systems, communications infrastructure, schools, universities, and critical infrastructure operators, are increasingly targeted by cyber threats. Resilience therefore requires understanding not only government systems, but the broader ecosystem that supports them.

Planning documents alone are not enough. Governments should regularly conduct tabletop exercises bringing together policymakers, operational leaders, law enforcement, critical infrastructure operators, and private-sector partners to test how they would respond to incidents disrupting essential services. These exercises can expose gaps in decision-making, information sharing, public communications, and cross-sector coordination before a real-world crisis. Microsoft’s work through initiatives such as the Advancing Regional Cybersecurity (ARC) program, most recently in Kenya, illustrates how scenario-based exercises and cross-sector collaboration can help strengthen preparedness and response capabilities across the broader ecosystem. 

Government leaders should also know which services are most critical, which identities, systems, suppliers, and infrastructure support them, and how incidents will be escalated. Shared-service approaches can help extend security and response capabilities to local governments and public institutions that cannot build them independently. 

As cyber incidents cross organizational and national boundaries, resilience depends not only on technical preparedness, but on whether institutions can coordinate effectively under pressure. 

In an era of AI-enabled and increasingly interconnected cyber threats, resilience is no longer simply about recovering from an attack. It is about preparing for a world in which cyber incidents move faster, spread further, and affect more organizations than ever before. Governments best prepared for the future will be those that can contain harm, adapt quickly, and continue delivering critical services when citizens need them the most.  

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In armed conflict, a simple symbol can save lives. The Red Cross, Red Crescent, and Red Crystal emblems signal that those providing medical care and humanitarian assistance must be protected. 

In cyberspace, there is not yet a widely adopted equivalent, even as hospitals, humanitarian organizations, and relief operations increasingly rely on digital systems to deliver care, coordinate assistance, protect sensitive data, and reach people in crisis. 

Today, the digital systems that support hospitals and humanitarian operations—including communications tools, logistics platforms, patient care systems, cloud services, and the data center infrastructure which underpins them—can be difficult to distinguish from surrounding digital infrastructure. In conflict, that raises the risk of misidentification, spillover, and cascading disruption from cyber operations. As cybersecurity operations become more automated and machine-driven, clear, trustworthy, machine-readable signals become even more important.

That is why Microsoft supports the International Committee of the Red Cross as it launches the next phase of the Digital Emblem initiative today in Geneva. The Digital Emblem is intended to provide a machine-readable way to help identify digital assets that support protected medical and humanitarian functions, so they can be recognized, verified, and avoided in conflict settings.

From principles to operational practice

The Digital Emblem does not create new legal protections, and it does not replace cybersecurity. Instead, it helps to make existing protections under international humanitarian law more actionable in cyberspace. 

For many years, governments, humanitarian actors, civil society, technical experts, and industry have worked to clarify how international law applies in cyberspace. These efforts have reinforced a core principle that civilians, medical services, and humanitarian operations must be respected and protected in armed conflict. But translating that principle into operational reality remains difficult when protected digital assets are not easily identifiable. 

The Digital Emblem can help bridge that gap. If implemented responsibly, a clearer, more consistent, and technically usable signal can support recognition, verification, and respect for protected medical and humanitarian functions in cyberspace. 

This next phase marks an important transition for the Digital Emblem: from concept development toward operationalization, testing, standards, and implementation. 

Over the past several years, the ICRC has worked with states, the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, technical experts, standards bodies, academia, and industry to explore whether the protective function of the physical emblems can be translated meaningfully into cyberspace. That work has helped move the Digital Emblem from an important idea to a project with growing legal, technical, and operational foundations. 

The work now is to test how the Digital Emblem can be deployed, discovered, authenticated, and verified in real-world conditions. It also means advancing standards work through bodies such as the Internet Engineering Task Force and the International Telecommunication Union, developing guidance for those who operate protected digital infrastructure, and engaging the actors who will need to recognize and respect the Digital Emblem in practice.

Building on Microsoft’s work to protect civilians in cyberspace

Across our cybersecurity work, we have consistently argued that protecting civilians and critical services in cyberspace requires more than statements of principle. It requires practical standards, technical implementation, trusted partnerships, and cooperation among governments, humanitarian actors, civil society, standards bodies, and industry. 

From our early calls for stronger norms of responsible state behavior in cyberspace, to the launch of the Cybersecurity Tech Accord, Microsoft has advocated for the application of international law and the protection of civilians online. 

Every day, Microsoft works alongside governments and partners to detect, disrupt, and defend against cyberattacks that target critical infrastructure, healthcare, and humanitarian operations. Together, we have seen the importance of real-time visibility, trusted signals, and coordinated defense across public and private actors. This work has underscored a central reality: as civilian and humanitarian services become more digitally dependent, cybersecurity is increasingly connected to humanitarian resilience. 

Microsoft will continue supporting the ICRC with a focus on how our technologies enable this model at scale. That includes exploring how technology can support both sides: enabling humanitarian and medical organizations to signal protected systems and helping defenders recognize and verify those signals in real-world operations.

The role of industry

The ICRC’s leadership is essential to the credibility and neutrality of this effort. But for the Digital Emblem to succeed, it must also work across the broader technology ecosystem, which includes the cloud services and data centers, telecommunications networks, cybersecurity tools, identity systems, and other digital infrastructure on which humanitarian and medical organizations increasingly rely.

Industry, therefore, has an important role to play in helping ensure the Digital Emblem is technically sound, interoperable, and aligned with how defenders operate in practice. That includes supporting standards development, helping test implementation models, and ensuring that any approach reflects both sides of the model: enabling eligible humanitarian and medical organizations to express the signal for relevant assets and helping defenders recognize and verify that signal in operational workflows. 

In today’s fragmented and low-trust geopolitical environment, shared technical standards can reduce ambiguity even where political agreement is difficult. That is why standards-based implementation can help make the Digital Emblem consistent, verifiable, and usable across networks, platforms, and borders.

From launch to implementation 

The launch in Geneva marks an important milestone, but the Digital Emblem’s promise will depend on what happens next. 

The work ahead should focus on clear and concrete outcomes: continued technical testing, progress in standards development bodies, practical implementation guidance, and broader engagement from states, humanitarian actors, technology companies, telecommunications providers, cybersecurity professionals, and operational defenders. 

The call to action is straightforward. Governments should support the Digital Emblem as a mechanism for making protected humanitarian and medical functions more identifiable in cyberspace and promote respect for it in policy and practice. Humanitarian and medical organizations should help test and shape implementation so it reflects operational reality. Standards bodies should continue building the technical foundations for trusted adoption. And technology companies should help translate the Digital Emblem into the tools, systems, and workflows defenders already use. 

Physical emblems made humanitarian protection visible on the battlefield. The Digital Emblem can help make protected humanitarian and medical functions visible, verifiable, and actionable in cyberspace. Turning that promise into practice will require sustained cooperation so that those who care for the wounded, the sick, and civilians can be more easily recognized, respected, and protected in the digital age. 

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