Why Effective CTEM Must be an Intelligence-Led Program
Continuous Threat Exposure Management (CTEM) is a continuous program and operational framework, not a single pre-boxed platform. Flashpoint believes that effective CTEM must be intelligence-led, using curated threat intelligence as the operational core to prioritize risk and turn exposure data into defensible decisions.
Continuous Threat Exposure Management (CTEM) is Not a Product
Since Gartner’s introduction of CTEM as a framework in 2022, cybersecurity vendors have engaged in a rapid “productization” race. This has led to inconsistent market definitions, with a variety of vendors from vulnerability scanners to Attack Surface Management (ASM) providers now claiming to be an “exposure management” solution.
The current approach to productizing CTEM is flawed. There is no such thing as a single “exposure management platform.” The enterprise reality is that most enterprises buy three or more products just to approximate what CTEM promises in theory. Even with these technologies, organizations still require heavy lifting with people, process, and custom integrations to actually make it work.
The Exposure Stack: When One Platform Becomes Three (or More)
A functional CTEM approach typically requires multiple platforms or tools, including:
Continuous Penetration/Exploitation Testing & Attack Path Analysis for continuous pentesting, attack path validation, and hands-on exposure validation.
Vulnerability and Exposure Management for vulnerability scanning, exposure scoring, and asset risk views.
Intelligence for deep, curated vulnerability, compromised credentials, card fraud, and other forms of intelligence that goes far beyond the scope of technology-based “management platforms”.
In some cases, organizations may also use an ASM vendor for shadow IT discovery, a CMDB for asset context, and ticketing integrations to drive remediation. This multi-platform model is the rule, not the exception. And that raises a hard truth: if you need three or more products, plus a dedicated team to implement CTEM, you need an intelligence-led CTEM program.
CTEM is an Operational Discipline, Not a Single Product
The narrative that CTEM can be packaged into a single product breaks down for three critical reasons:
1. CTEM is a Program, Not a Platform
You cannot buy a capability that requires full-stack asset visibility, contextualized threat actor data, real-world validation, and remediation orchestration from one tool. Each component spans a different domain of expertise and data. A vulnerability scanner, alone, cannot validate exploitability, a pentest service has a tough time scaling to daily monitoring, and generic threat intelligence feeds cannot provide critical business context.
However, CTEM requires orchestration of all these components in one operational loop. No single product delivers this comprehensively out of the box; this is why CTEM must be viewed as a continuous program, not a one-size-fits-all product.
2. Human Expertise is Irreplaceable
Vendors often advertise automation, however, key intelligence functions are still powered by and reliant on human analysis. Even with best-in-class AI tools in place, security teams are depending on human insights for:
Triaging noisy CVE lists
Cross-referencing exposure data with asset inventories
Manually validating if risks are real
Prioritizing based on threat intelligence and internal context
Writing custom logic and integrations to bridge platforms together
In other words, exposure management today still relies on human insights and expertise. So while vendors advertise “automation and intelligence,” what they’re really delivering is a starting point. Ultimately, AI is a force multiplier for threat analysts, not a replacement.
3. Risk Without Intelligence Is Just Data
Most platforms treat exposure like a math problem. But real risk isn’t just CVSS (Common Vulnerability Scoring System) scores or asset counts, it requires answering critical, intelligence-based questions:
How likely is this vulnerability to be exploited, and what’s the impact if it is?
How likely is this misconfiguration to be exploited, and what is its impact?
How likely is this compromised credential to be used by a threat actor, and what is the potential impact?
These answers require intelligence, not just data. Best-in-class intelligence provides security teams with confirmed exploit activity in the wild, context around attacker usage in APT (Advanced Persistent Threat) campaigns, and detailed metadata for prioritization where CVSS fails. That is why Flashpoint intelligence is leveraged by over 800 organizations as the operational core of exposure management, turning exposure data into defensible decisions.
CTEM Productization vs. CTEM Reality
If your risk strategy requires continuous penetration and exploit testing, vulnerability management, threat intelligence, and manual prioritization and validation, you’re not buying CTEM; you’re building it. At Flashpoint, we’re helping organizations build CTEM the right way: driven by intelligence, and powered by integrations and AI.
The Intelligence-Led Future of Exposure Management
Flashpoint treats CTEM for what it really is, as a program that must be constructed intelligently, iteratively, and contextually.
That means:
Using threat and vulnerability intelligence to drive what actually gets prioritized
Treating scanners, ASM platforms, and pentesting as inputs, not outcomes
Building processes where intelligence, context, and validation inform exposure decisions, not just ticket creation
Investing in platform interconnectivity, not just feature checklists
Using Flashpoint’s intelligence collections, organizations can achieve intelligence-led exposure management, with threat and vulnerability intelligence working together to provide context and actionable insights in a continuous, prioritized loop. This empowers security teams to build and scale their own CTEM programs, which is the only realistic approach in a cybersecurity landscape where no single platform can do it all.
Achieve Elite Operation Control Over Your CTEM Program Using Flashpoint
If you’re evaluating exposure management tools, ask yourself:
What happens when we find a critical vulnerability and how do we know it matters?
Can this platform correlate attacker behavior with our asset landscape?
Does it validate risk or just report it?
How many other tools will we need to buy just to complete the picture?
The answers may surprise you. At Flashpoint, we’re helping organizations build CTEM the right way, driven by intelligence, powered by integration, and grounded in reality. Request a demo today and see how best-in-class intelligence is the key to achieving an effective CTEM program.
“The Justice Department announced two indictments in the Central District of California charging Ukrainian national Victoria Eduardovna Dubranova, 33, also known as Vika, Tory, and SovaSonya, for her role in conducting cyberattacks and computer intrusions against critical infrastructure and other victims around the world, in support of Russia’s geopolitical interests. Dubranova was extradited to the United States earlier this year on an indictment charging her for her actions supporting CyberArmyofRussia_Reborn (CARR). Today, Dubranova was arraigned on a second indictment charging her for her actions supporting NoName057(16) (NoName). Dubranova pleaded not guilty in both cases, and is scheduled to begin trial in the NoName matter on Feb. 3, 2026 and in the CARR matter on April 7, 2026.”
“As described in the indictments, the Russian government backed CARR and NoName by providing, among other things, financial support. CARR used this financial support to access various cybercriminal services, including subscriptions to distributed denial of service-for-hire services. NoName was a state-sanctioned project administered in part by an information technology organization established by order of the President of Russia in October 2018 that developed, along with other co-conspirators, NoName’s proprietary distributed denial of service (DDoS) program.”
Cyber Army of Russia Reborn
“According to the indictment, CARR, also known as Z-Pentest, was founded, funded, and directed by the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (GRU). CARR claimed credit for hundreds of cyberattacks against victims worldwide, including attacks against critical infrastructure in the United States, in support of Russia’s geopolitical interests. CARR regularly posted on Telegram claiming credit for its attacks and published photos and videos depicting its attacks. CARR primarily hacked industrial control facilities and conducted DDoS attacks. CARR’s victims included public drinking water systems across several states in the U.S., resulting in damage to controls and the spilling of hundreds of thousands of gallons of drinking water. CARR also attacked a meat processing facility in Los Angeles in November 2024, spoiling thousands of pounds of meat and triggering an ammonia leak in the facility. CARR has attacked U.S. election infrastructure during U.S. elections, and websites for U.S. nuclear regulatory entities, among other sensitive targets.”
“An individual operating as ‘Cyber_1ce_Killer,’ a moniker associated with at least one GRU officer instructed CARR leadership on what kinds of victims CARR should target, and his organization financed CARR’s access to various cybercriminal services, including subscriptions to DDoS-for-hire services. At times, CARR had more than 100 members, including juveniles, and more than 75,000 followers on Telegram.”
NoName057(16)
“NoName was covert project whose membership included multiple employees of The Center for the Study and Network Monitoring of the Youth Environment (CISM), among other cyber actors. CISM was an information technology organization established by order of the President of Russia in October 2018 that purported to, among other things, monitor the safety of the internet for Russian youth.”
“According to the indictment, NoName claimed credit for hundreds of cyberattacks against victims worldwide in support of Russia’s geopolitical interests. NoName regularly posted on Telegram claiming credit for its attacks and published proof of victim websites being taken offline. The group primarily conducted DDoS cyberattacks using their own proprietary DDoS tool, DDoSia, which relied on network infrastructure around the world created by employees of CISM.”
“NoName’s victims included government agencies, financial institutions, and critical infrastructure, such as public railways and ports. NoName recruited volunteers from around the world to download DDoSia and used their computers to launch DDoS attacks on the victims that NoName leaders selected. NoName also published a daily leaderboard of volunteers who launched the most DDoS attacks on its Telegram channel and paid top-ranking volunteers in cryptocurrency for their attacks.” (Source: US Department of Justice)
Key Vulnerabilities: Week of December 20 – December 26, 2025
Foundational Prioritization
Of the vulnerabilities Flashpoint published this week, there are 34 that you can take immediate action on. They each have a solution, a public exploit exists, and are remotely exploitable. As such, these vulnerabilities are a great place to begin your prioritization efforts.
Diving Deeper – Urgent Vulnerabilities
Of the vulnerabilities Flashpoint published last week, four are highlighted in this week’s Vulnerability Insights and Prioritization Report because they contain one or more of the following criteria:
Are in widely used products and are potentially enterprise-affecting
Are exploited in the wild or have exploits available
Allow full system compromise
Can be exploited via the network alone or in combination with other vulnerabilities
Have a solution to take action on
In addition, all of these vulnerabilities are easily discoverable and therefore should be investigated and fixed immediately.
To proactively address these vulnerabilities and ensure comprehensive coverage beyond publicly available sources on an ongoing basis, organizations can leverage Flashpoint Vulnerability Intelligence. Flashpoint provides comprehensive coverage encompassing IT, OT, IoT, CoTs, and open-source libraries and dependencies. It catalogs over 100,000 vulnerabilities that are not included in the NVD or lack a CVE ID, ensuring thorough coverage beyond publicly available sources. The vulnerabilities that are not covered by the NVD do not yet have CVE ID assigned and will be noted with a VulnDB ID.
NOTES: The severity of a given vulnerability score can change whenever new information becomes available. Flashpoint maintains its vulnerability database with the most recent and relevant information available. Login to view more vulnerability metadata and for the most up-to-date information.
CVSS scores: Our analysts calculate, and if needed, adjust NVD’s original CVSS scores based on new information being available.
Social Risk Score: Flashpoint estimates how much attention a vulnerability receives on social media. Increased mentions and discussions elevate the Social Risk Score, indicating a higher likelihood of exploitation. The score considers factors like post volume and authors, and decreases as the vulnerability’s relevance diminishes.
Ransomware Likelihood: This score is a rating that estimates the similarity between a vulnerability and those known to be used in ransomware attacks. As we learn more information about a vulnerability (e.g. exploitation method, technology affected) and uncover additional vulnerabilities used in ransomware attacks, this rating can change.
Flashpoint Ignite lays all of these components out. Below is an example of what this vulnerability record for CVE-2025-33223 looks like.
This record provides additional metadata like affected product versions, MITRE ATT&CK mapping, analyst notes, solution description, classifications, vulnerability timeline and exposure metrics, exploit references and more.
Analyst Comments on the Notable Vulnerabilities
Below, Flashpoint analysts describe the five vulnerabilities highlighted above as vulnerabilities that should be of focus for remediation if your organization is exposed.
CVE-2025-33222
NVIDIA Isaac Launchable contains a flaw that is triggered by the use of unspecified hardcoded credentials. This may allow a remote attacker to trivially gain privileged access to the program.
CVE-2025-33223
NVIDIA Isaac Launchable contains an unspecified flaw that is triggered as certain activities are executed with unnecessary privileges. This may allow a remote attacker to potentially execute arbitrary code.
CVE-2025-68613
n8n Package for Node.js contains a flaw in packages/workflow/src/expression-evaluator-proxy.ts that is triggered as workflow expressions are evaluated in an improperly isolated execution context. This may allow an authenticated, remote attacker to execute arbitrary code with the privileges of the n8n process.
CVE-2025-14847
MongoDB contains a flaw in the ZlibMessageCompressor::decompressData() function in mongo/transport/message_compressor_zlib.cpp that is triggered when handling mismatched length fields in Zlib compressed protocol headers. This may allow a remote attacker to disclose uninitialized memory contents on the heap.
The Infostealer Gateway: Uncovering the Latest Methods in Defense Evasion
In this post, we analyze the evolving bypass tactics threat actors are using to neutralize traditional security perimeters and fuel the global surge in infostealer infections.
Infostealer-driven credential theft in 2025 has surged, with Flashpoint observing a staggering 800% increase since the start of the year. With over 1.8 billion corporate and personal accounts compromised, the threat landscape finds itself in a paradox: while technical defenses have never been more advanced, the human attack surface has never been more vulnerable.
Information-stealing malware has become the most scalable entry point for enterprise breaches, but to truly defend against them, organizations must look beyond the malware itself. As teams move into 2026 security planning, it is critical to understand the deceptive initial access vectors—the latest tactics Flashpoint is seeing in the wild—that threat actors are using to manipulate users and bypass modern security perimeters.
Here are the latest methods threat actors are leveraging to facilitate infections:
1. Neutralizing Mark of the Web (MotW) via Drag-and-Drop Lures
Mark of the Web (MotW) is a critical Windows defense feature that tags files downloaded from the internet as “untrusted” by adding a hidden NTFS Alternate Data Stream (ADS) to the file. This tag triggers “Protected View” in Microsoft Office programs and prompts Windows SmartScreen warnings when a user attempts to execute an unknown file.
Flashpoint has observed a new social engineering method to bypass these protections through a simple drag-and-drop lure. Instead of asking a user to open a suspicious attachment directly, which would trigger an immediate MotW warning, threat actors are instead instructing the victim to drag the malicious image or file from a document onto their desktop to view it. This manual interaction is highly effective for two reasons:
Contextual Evasion: By dragging the file out of the document and onto the desktop, the file is executed outside the scope of the Protected View sandbox.
Metadata Stripping: In many instances, the act of dragging and dropping an embedded object from a parent document can cause the operating system to treat the newly created file as a local creation, rather than an internet download. This effectively strips the MotW tag and allows malicious code to run without any security alerts.
2. Executing Payloads via Vulnerabilities and Trusted Processes
Flashpoint analysts uncovered an illicit thread detailing a proof of concept for a client-side remote code execution (RCE) in the Google Web Designer for Windows, which was first discovered by security researcher Bálint Magyar.
Google Web Designer is an application used for creating dynamic ads for the Google Ads platform. Leveraging this vulnerability, attackers would be able to perform remote code execution through an internal API using CSS injection by targeting a configuration file related to ads documents.
Within this thread, threat actors were specifically interested in the execution of the payload using the chrome.exe process. This is because using chrome.exe to fetch and execute a file is likely to bypass several security restrictions as Chrome is already a trusted process. By utilizing specific command-line arguments, such as the –headless flag, threat actors showed how to force a browser to initiate a remote connection in the background without spawning a visible window. This can be used in conjunction with other malicious scripts to silently download additional payloads onto a victim’s systems.
3. Targeting Alternative Softwares as a Path of Least Resistance
As widely-used software becomes more hardened and secure, threat actors are instead pivoting to targeting lesser-known alternatives. These tools often lack robust macro-protections. By targeting vulnerabilities in secondary PDF viewers or Office alternatives, attackers are seeking to trick users into making remote server connections that would otherwise be flagged as suspicious.
Understanding the Identity Attack Surface
Social engineering is one of the driving factors behind the infostealer lifecycle. Once an initial access vector is successful, the malware immediately begins harvesting the logs that fuel today’s identity-based digital attacks.
As detailed in The Proactive Defender’s Guide to Infostealers, the end goal is not just a password. Instead, attackers are prioritizing session cookies, which allow them to perform session hijacking. By importing these stolen cookies into anti-detect browsers, they bypass Multi-Factor Authentication and step directly into corporate environments, appearing as a legitimate, authenticated user.
Understanding how threat actors weaponize stolen data is the first step toward a proactive defense. For a deep dive into the most prolific stealer strains and strategies for managing the identity attack surface, download The Proactive Defender’s Guide to Infostealers today.
Surfacing Threats Before They Scale: Why Primary Source Collection Changes Intelligence
This blog explores how Primary Source Collection (PSC) enables intelligence teams to surface emerging fraud and threat activity before it reaches scale.
Spend enough time investigating fraud and threat activity, and a familiar pattern emerges. Before a tactic shows up at scale—before credential stuffing floods login pages or counterfeit checks hit customers—there is almost always a quieter formation phase. Threat actors test ideas, trade techniques, and refine playbooks in small, often closed communities before launching coordinated campaigns.
The signals are there. The challenge is that most organizations never see them.
For years, intelligence programs have leaned heavily on static feeds: prepackaged streams of indicators, alerts, and reports delivered on a fixed cadence. These feeds validate what is already known, but they rarely surface what is still taking shape. They are designed to summarize activity after it has matured, not to discover it while it is still evolving.
Meanwhile, the real innovation in fraud and threat ecosystems happens elsewhere in invite-only Telegram channels, dark web marketplaces, and regional-language forums that update in real time. By the time a static feed flags a new technique, it is often already widespread.
This disconnect has consequences. When intelligence arrives too late, teams are left responding to impact rather than shaping outcomes.
How Threats Actually Evolve
Fraudsters and threat actors do not work in isolation, they collaborate. In closed forums and encrypted channels, one actor experiments with a new login bypass, another tests two-factor authentication evasion, and a third packages those ideas into a tool or service. What begins as a handful of screenshots or code snippets quickly becomes a repeatable process.
These shared processes often take the form of playbooks that act as step-by-step guides that document how to execute a fraud scheme or exploit a weakness. Once a playbook begins circulating, scale is inevitable. Techniques that started as limited tests turn into thousands of coordinated attempts almost overnight.
Every intelligence or fraud analyst has experienced the moment when an unfamiliar tactic suddenly overwhelms detection systems. The frustrating reality is that the warning signs were often visible weeks earlier, they simply never made it into the static feeds teams were relying on.
Why Static Collection Falls Short
Static collection creates a sense of coverage, but that coverage is often shallow. Sources are fixed. Cadence is slow. Context is stripped away.
A feed might tell you that a domain, handle, or email address is associated with a known tactic, but not how that tactic was developed, who is promoting it, or whether it has any relevance to your organization’s specific exposure. You are seeing the exhaust, not the engine.
This lag matters. The window between a tactic being tested in a small community and being deployed at scale is often the most valuable moment for intervention. Miss that window, and response becomes exponentially more expensive.
As threats accelerate and collaboration among adversaries increases, intelligence programs that depend solely on static inputs struggle to keep pace.
A Different Model: Primary Source Collection
Primary Source Collection (PSC) changes how intelligence is gathered by starting with the questions that matter most and collecting directly from the original environments where those answers exist.
Rather than relying on a predefined list of sources or vendor-determined priorities, PSC begins with a defined intelligence requirement. Collection is then shaped around that requirement, directing analysts to the forums, marketplaces, and channels where relevant activity is actively unfolding.
This means monitoring closed communities advertising check alteration services. It means observing invite-only groups trading identity fraud tutorials. It means collecting original posts, screenshots, files, and discussions while they are still part of an active conversation instead of weeks later in summarized form. When actors begin discussing a new bypass technique or sharing proof-of-concept screenshots, that is the moment to act, not weeks later when the same method is being resold across marketplaces.
Primary Source Collection provides that window. It surfaces the conversations, artifacts, and early indicators that reveal what is coming next and gives teams the time they need to intervene before campaigns scale.
This does not replace analytics, automation, or baseline monitoring. It strengthens them by feeding earlier, richer insight into downstream systems. It ensures that detection and response are informed by how threats are actually developing, not just how they appear after the fact.
In one case, a financial institution using this approach identified counterfeit checks featuring its brand being advertised in underground marketplaces weeks before customers began reporting losses. By collecting directly from those spaces, analysts flagged the images, traced sellers, and alerted internal teams early enough to prevent further exploitation.
That is what early warning looks like when collection is aligned with purpose.
Making Intelligence Taskable
One of the most important shifts enabled by Primary Source Collection is tasking.
Traditional intelligence programs operate like autopilot. They deliver a steady stream of data, but that stream reflects the provider’s priorities rather than the organization’s evolving needs. Analysts spend valuable time triaging irrelevant information while emerging risks go unnoticed.
In classified intelligence environments, this problem has long been addressed through tasking. Every collection effort begins with a clearly defined requirement and priorities drive collection, not the other way around.
PSC applies that same discipline to open-source and commercial intelligence. Teams define Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIRs), such as identifying actors testing bypass methods for specific login flows, and immediately direct collection toward those needs. As priorities change, tasking changes with them.
This transforms intelligence from a passive stream into an operational capability. Analysts are no longer waiting for someone else’s update cycle. They are shaping visibility in real time, testing hypotheses, validating concerns, and uncovering tactics before they mature.
For leadership, this provides something more valuable than indicators: confidence that critical developments are not happening just out of sight.
How Taskable Collection Works in Practice
A taskable Primary Source Collection framework is dynamic by design. As stakeholder priorities shift due to a new campaign, incident, or geopolitical development, collection pivots immediately.
In practice, this approach includes:
Source discovery: Identifying new, relevant sources as they emerge, using a combination of analyst expertise and automated tooling.
Secure access: Entering closed or restricted spaces safely and ethically through controlled environments and vetted identities.
Direct collection: Capturing original content directly from threat actor environments, including posts, images, and files.
Processing and enrichment: Applying techniques such as optical character recognition, entity extraction, and metadata tagging to transform raw material into usable intelligence.
Delivery and collaboration: Routing outputs into investigative workflows or directly to stakeholders to accelerate response.
Intelligence can then mirror the agility of modern threats instead of lagging behind them.
Why This Shift Matters Now
Threat and fraud operations are moving faster than ever. Barriers to entry are lower. Tooling is more accessible. Collaboration rivals legitimate software development cycles.
Defenders cannot afford to move slower than the adversaries they are trying to stop.
Primary Source Collection is how intelligence teams keep pace. It aligns collection with mission needs, enables real-time tasking, and delivers insight early enough to change outcomes instead of just documenting them.
The signals have always been there. What has changed is the ability to surface them while they still matter.
The CTI Analyst’s Isolated Arsenal: Desktop Tools for High-Risk Intelligence
This blog explores how CTI teams safely analyze high-risk environments, engage with threat actors, and process sensitive data using Flashpoint Managed Attribution.
Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI) analysts routinely operate in high-risk digital spaces where threat actors operate, such as Dark Web forums, encrypted chat rooms, and sites hosting massive breached datasets. Engaging with this data requires absolute confidence that your operational security (OPSEC) is up-to-date.
OPSEC failures can have significant consequences. A single attribution error or host-machine exposure can put both the analyst at risk, and compromise the organization’s security posture. To ensure your organization’s CTI activities remain anonymous, secure, and effective, this post focuses on two essentials:
The types of desktop applications and tools that must run in a secure, isolated environment
How Flashpoint Managed Attribution (MA) provides the operational foundation for safe CTI workflows.
OPSEC & Access
Successful execution of CTI operations hinges on establishing a complete shield between the analyst and the target environment. These tools form the base layer for secure and anonymous activity, ensuring that an analyst’s real identity and location are never exposed.
Tool Category
Tool/Type
Use Case
Network Anonymity
VPN Clients
IP Masking & Geo-Shifting: Adding a layer of IP obfuscation, especially when accessing geo-restricted content or high-risk sites (often used before Tor for added protection).
Secure Communication
Telegram, Session, Tox, Pidgin (with OTR/OMEMO)
Threat Actor Engagements: Contacting a threat actor (TA) about a posted dataset, discussing access, or validating a claimed compromise.
Network Utility
Torsocks / Proxychains
Script Anonymization: Forcing data collection scripts (Python, Go, etc.) to use an anonymized network when scraping or downloading data.
Operational Case Study: Secure Threat Actor Engagement with Telegram and Flashpoint Managed Attribution
When communicating anonymously with a threat actor, the Flashpoint Managed Attribution workflow provides the following key advantages for CTI teams:
Identity Protection: Creates a secure, isolated virtual machine with robust anonymization (VPN, Tor, rotating IPs) to protect the analyst’s identity. The analyst sets up messaging clients like Telegram within this secure environment, making it impossible for the threat actor to trace their real IP or location.
Continuous OPSEC: Continuously masks the operational footprint with constantly changing and untraceable IP addresses, ensuring all communication is routed through multiple layers of anonymity.
Host Machine Isolation & Secure Logging: All information exchanged is handled within this isolated environment to prevent malicious files from affecting the analyst’s host machine, while all communications are securely logged for later analysis.
Data Processing & Automation
CTI analysts routinely process massive log files and breach dumps that are unstable, unvalidated, or potentially malicious. By deploying essential data processing and automation tools within an isolated environment like Flashpoint Managed Attribution, you ensure this high-risk content never compromises the analyst’s host machine.
Tool Category
Tool/Type
Use Case
Scripting & Automation
Python, Golang, Bash/PowerShell
Breach Data Analysis: Creating custom scraping and parsing scripts to download and search breached datasets (often multi-terabyte files) from ransomware or other leak sites.
Command-Line Tools
grep, awk, sed, curl, wget
Assess Exposure: Quickly search for company-specific keywords, employee names, or technical indicators across massive, potentially compromised datasets.
Data Encoding/Decoding
CyberChef (Desktop/Local Instance)
Indicator of Compromise (IOC) Transformation: Decoding obfuscated strings, converting data formats, or analyzing potentially malicious content without sending it to an external server.
Operational Case Study: Automating Breach Data Analysis with Python and Flashpoint Managed Attribution
Within a Flashpoint Managed Attribution workspace, a CTI analyst deploys a Python script. The anonymized MA environment ensures:
This script crawls and downloads data through an untraceable, constantly changing IP network, performing on-the-fly parsing and storing extracted intelligence in an encrypted database.
Data ingestion and analysis is executed securely, leaving no trace of the analyst’s activity.
Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) & Analysis
The below applications help analysts connect the dots between various pieces of intelligence but often require handling data from unverified or hostile sources, necessitating strict isolation.
Tool Category
Tool/Type
Use Case
Research
Tor Browser
Dark Web Collection: Accessing closed forums, markets, and hosting sites for intelligence gathering and monitoring.
Link Analysis
Maltego
Mapping Threat Actors: Identifying the infrastructure, affiliates, and complex relationships of a cybercrime group under investigation.
Evidence Preservation
Hunch.ly
Chain of Custody: Securely capturing and preserving online evidence (e.g., from a hacktivist blog or a ransomware leak page) before it is taken down.
Metadata Analysis
ExifTool (Desktop Client)
Source Attribution: Analyzing a file downloaded from a threat actor site to extract potential clues like hidden usernames, internal network paths, or original creation dates.
Operational Case Study: Analyzing a Ransomware Leak Page with Hunch.ly
When a new ransomware group emerges, a CTI analyst uses tools like Hunch.ly to safely collect evidence from leak sites. Hunch.ly captures all data, timestamps it, and creates a cryptographic hash to ensure integrity. Using tools like Hunch.ly inside of a secure virtual machine like Flashpoint Managed Attribution ensures the analyst’s anonymity, enabling thorough analysis without risking the analyst’s system or identity.
Unlock Maximum Tool Utility with Flashpoint Managed Attribution
Ultimately, while these desktop tools are indispensable for CTI analysts operating in high-risk environments, their effective and secure deployment hinges on a robust underlying platform. This is where Flashpoint Managed Attribution becomes an invaluable asset. By providing a secure, anonymous workspace, Flashpoint Managed Attribution allows analysts to leverage these powerful tools, from network anonymizers and secure communication channels to advanced OSINT and data processing applications within an environment specifically built for operational security.
Request a demo today to ensure that gathered critical intelligence remains untraceable to your organization or analysts.
Beyond the Malware: Inside the Digital Empire of a North Korean Threat Actor
In this post Flashpoint reveals how an infostealer infection on a North Korean threat actor’s machine exposed their digital operational security failures and reliance on AI. Leveraging Flashpoint intelligence, we pivot from a single persona to a network of fake identities and companies targeting the Web3 and crypto industry.
Last week, Hudson Rock published a blog on “Trevor Greer,” a persona tied to a North Korean IT Worker. Flashpoint shared additional insights with our clients back in July, and we’re now making those findings public.
Trevor Greer, a North Korean operative, was identified via an infostealer infection on their own machine. Information-stealing malware, also known as Infostealers or stealers, are malware designed to scrape passwords and cookies from unsuspecting victims. Stealers (like LummaC2 or RedLine) are typically used by cybercriminals to steal login credentials from everyday users to sell on the Dark Web. It is rare to see them infect the machines of a state-sponsored advanced persistent threat group (APT).
However, when adversaries unknowingly infect themselves, they can expose valuable insights into the inner workings of their campaigns. Leveraging Flashpoint intelligence sourced from the leaked logs of “Trevor Greer,” our analysts uncovered a myriad of fake identities and companies used by DPRK APTs.
Finding Trevor Greer
Flashpoint analysts have been tracking the Trevor Greer email address since December 2024 in relation to the “Contagious Interview” campaign, in which threat actors operated as LinkedIn recruiters to target Web3 developers, resulting in the deployment of multiple stealers compromising developer Web3 wallets. Flashpoint also identified the specific persona’s involvement in a campaign in which North Korean threat actors posed as IT freelance workers and applied for jobs at legitimate companies before compromising the organizations internally.
ByBit Compromise
The ByBit compromise in late February 2025 further fueled Flashpoint’s investigations into the Trevor Greer email address. Bybit, a cryptocurrency exchange, suffered a critical incident resulting in North Korean actors extorting US $1.5 billion worth of cryptocurrency. In the aftermath, Silent Push researchers identified the persona “Trevor Greer” associated with the email address trevorgreer9312@gmail[.]com, which registered the domain “Bybit-assessment[.]com” prior to the Bybit compromise.
A later report claimed that the domain “getstockprice[.]com” was involved in the compromise. Despite these domain discrepancies, both investigations attributed the attack to North Korean advanced persistent threat (APT) nexus groups.
Tracing the Infection
Using Flashpoint’s vast intelligence collections, we performed a full investigation of compromised virtual private servers (VPS), revealing the actor’s potential involvement in several other operations, including remote IT work, several self-made blockchain and cryptocurrency exchange companies, and a potential crypto scam dating back to 2022.
Flashpoint analysts also discovered that the Trevor Greer email address was linked to domains infected with information-stealing malware.
What the Logs Revealed
Analysts extracted information about the associated infected host from Trevor Greer, revealing possible tradecraft and tools used. Analysts further identified specific indicators of compromise (IOCs) used in the campaigns mentioned above, as well as email addresses used by the actor for remote work.
The data painted a vivid picture of how these threat actors operate:
Preparation for “Contagious Interviews”
The browser history revealed the actor logging into Willo, a legitimate video interview platform. This suggests the actor was conducting reconnaissance to clone the site for the “Contagious Interview” campaign, where they lured Web3 developers into fake job interviews to deploy malware.
Reliance on AI Tools
The logs exposed the actor’s reliance on AI to bridge the language gap. The operator frequently accessed ChatGPT and Quillbot, likely using them to write convincing emails, build resumes, and generate code for their malware.
Pivoting: One Node to a Network
By analyzing the “Trevor Greer” logs, we were able to pivot to other personas and campaigns involved in the operation.
Fake Employment: The logs contained credentials for freelance platforms, such as Upwork and Freelancer, associated with other aliases, including “Kenneth Debolt” and “Fabian Klein.” This confirmed the actor was part of a broader scheme to infiltrate Western companies as remote IT workers.
Fake Companies: The data linked the actor to fake corporate entities, such as Block Bounce (blockbounce[.]xyz), a sham crypto trading firm set up to appear legitimate to potential victims.
Developer Personas: The infection data linked the actor to the GitHub account svillalobosdev, which had been active in open source projects to build credibility before the attack.
Legitimate Platforms & Tools: Analysts observed the actor using job boards such as Dice and HRapply[.]com, freelance platforms such as Upwork and Freelancer, and direct applications through company Workday sites. To improve their resume, the actor used resumeworded[.]com or cakeresume[.]com. For conversing, the threat actor likely relies on a mix of both GPT and Quilbot, as found in infected host logins, to ensure they sound human. During interviews, analysts determined that they potentially used Speechify.
Deep & Dark Web Resources: The actor also likely purchased Social Security numbers (SSNs) from SSNDOB24[.]com, a site for acquiring Social Security data.
Disrupt Threat Actors Using Flashpoint
The “Trevor Greer” case study illustrates a critical shift in modern threat intelligence. We are no longer limited to analyzing the malware adversaries deploy; sometimes, we can analyze the adversaries themselves.
Using their own tools against them, Flashpoint transformed a faceless state-sponsored entity into a tangible user with bad habits, sloppy OPSEC, and a trail of digital breadcrumbs. Behind every sophisticated APT campaign is a human operator, and sometimes, they click the wrong link too.
Request a demo today to delve deeper into the tactics, techniques, and procedures of advanced persistent threats and learn how Flashpoint’s intelligence strengthens your defenses.
From Endpoint Compromise to Enterprise Breach: Mapping the Infostealer Attack Chain
In Flashpoint’s latest webinar, we map the global infostealer attack chain step-by-step, from initial infection to enterprise-level account takeover. We analyze how the commodification of stolen identities works and demonstrate how Flashpoint intelligence provides the critical visibility necessary to disrupt this cycle.
Compromised digital identities have become one of the most valuable currencies in the cybercriminal ecosystem. The rise of information-stealing malware has created an industrial-scale supply chain for stolen credentials, session cookies, and browser fingerprints, directly fueling account takeover (ATO) campaigns that penetrate even the most mature security environments.
Flashpoint recently hosted an on-demand webinar, “From Compromise to Breach: How Infostealers Power Identity Attacks,” where our experts dissected this developing threat landscape. We exposed the exact sequence of events, providing defenders with the actionable intelligence required to disrupt the chain at multiple points. For the full technical breakdown, check out the full on-demand webinar.
Here are the main key takeaways you need to know:
Stage 1: Initial Infection and Data Harvest (The Compromise)
A full scale compromise often begins with a single event, typically a phishing lure, a malicious download, or a compromised cracked software installer. Once executed, the infostealer goes to work, quickly and stealthily, to build a “log” that grants post-MFA (multi-factor authentication) access.
Scouring now-compromised endpoints, the stealer searches for and compiles data such as:
Credentials: Saved logins, credit card details, and passwords for applications and websites.
Session Cookies/Tokens: These are the keys that allow an attacker to bypass login prompts entirely, appearing as an already-authenticated user.
Browser Fingerprints and System Metadata: Geolocation, IP address, and system language used to evade security tools by accurately mimicking the victim’s legitimate environment.
Stage 2: Commodification and the ATO Supply Chain (The Market)
Once a log is harvested, it enters the Infostealer-as-a-Service ecosystem, a critical industrialized stage of the attack chain. Here, threat actors can rent or purchase access to millions of fresh logs, effectively outsourcing the initial compromise phase and enabling mass identity exploitation for a minimal investment.
Check out the on-demand webinar for a full technical breakdown of this dark web economy and how the commodification of stealer logs drastically reduces the barrier to entry for follow-on attacks.
Stage 3: Post-MFA Account Takeover (The Breach)
This is the ultimate pivot point, where a simple endpoint infection escalates into an enterprise breach. Unlike the brute-forcing and phishing attacks of the past, attackers leverage the stolen session tokens and browser fingerprints.
Stolen log buyers leverage obfuscation tools such as anti-detect browsers. These tools ensure the attacker can seamlessly utilize the stolen cookies and digital fingerprints to appear identical to the original victim.
They inject valid, unexpired session tokens into their browser, which allows attackers to hijack the victim’s active session. This allows them to avoid fraud and anomaly detection systems, providing them access into corporate VPNs, cloud environments, and internal applications without ever needing to see a login prompt. From here, attackers can move laterally, exfiltrate sensitive data, or deploy ransomware.
Disrupting the Attack Chain Using Flashpoint’s Actionable Intelligence
Defense against this threat requires not only an understanding of the attack chain, but also comprehensive Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI) to identify and mitigate risks at every stage:
Disruption Point in the Attack Chain
How Flashpoint Empowers Proactive Defense
Stage 1: Initial Infection/Log Creation
Gain immediate alerting on the sale of your organization’s compromised assets on the Dark Web before attackers can leverage stolen data.
Stage 2: Commodification/ATO Setup
Expose the illicit platforms and forums where threat actors discuss, buy, and sell stolen logs, allowing you to track the tooling and TTPs.
Stage 3: Post-MFA ATO/Breach
Identify and remediate the vulnerabilities within browsers or enterprise software that are most actively being targeted by infostealers.
The speed of infostealer-powered attacks demands an intelligence-driven response. Our recent webinar demonstrated how Flashpoint intelligence can empower your security teams to quickly identify and validate stolen logs, protecting your organization from compromise to breach. Watch the on-demand webinar to learn more, or request a demo today.
Digital Supply Chain Risk: Critical Vulnerability Affecting React Allows for Unauthorized Remote Code Execution
CVE-2025-55182 (VulnDB ID: 428930), is a severe, unauthenticated RCE impacting a major component of React and its ecosystem, putting global applications at immediate, high-fidelity risk.
Flashpoint’s vulnerability research team assesses significant enterprise and supply chain risk given React’s ubiquity: the impacted JavaScript library underpins modern UIs, with 168,640 dependents and more than 51 million weekly downloads.
How CVE-2025-55182 Works
CVE-2025-55182 (VulnDB ID: 428930) impacts all React versions since 19.0.0, meaning that this issue has been potentially exploitable since November 14, 2024. This vulnerability stems from how React handles payloads sent to React Server Function endpoints and deserializes them.
Flashpoint’s VulnDB entry for CVE-2025-55182
Depending on the implementation of this library, a remote, unauthenticated threat actor could send a crafted payload that would be deserialized in a way that causes remote code execution. This would lead to a total compromise of the system hosting the application, allowing for malware such as infostealers, ransomware, or cryptojackers (cryptocurrency mining) to be downloaded.
A working exploit for CVE-2025-55182 has already been published that is effective against some installations. In addition, Amazon has reported that two threat actors, attributed to Chinese Advanced Persistent Threat Groups (APTs), have begun to exploit this vulnerability. Those groups are:
Understanding the Impact and Scope of CVE-2025-55182
It is critical that security teams fully understand the potential downstream scope and impact so that they can fully focus on mitigation, rather than time-consuming research. While the vendor has provided a full disclosure, there are several important caveats to understand about CVE-2025-55182:
Applications not implementing any React Server Function endpoints may still be vulnerable as long as it supports React Server Components.
If an application’s React code does not use a server, it is not affected by this vulnerability.
Applications that do not use a framework, bundler, or bundler plugins that support React Server Components are unaffected by this vulnerability.
Additionally, several React frameworks and bundlers have been discovered to leverage vulnerable React packages in various ways. The following frameworks and bundlers are known to be affected:
next
react-router
waku
@parcel/rsc
@vitejs/plugin-rsc
rwsdk
NPMJS.com currently shows that the react-dom package, which is effectively part of React, has 168,640 dependents. This means that an incredible number of enterprise applications are likely to be affected. Nearly every commercial application is built on hundreds, sometimes thousands of components and dependencies. Furthermore, applications coded via Vibe and similar technology are also likely to leverage React: potentially amplifying the downstream risk this vulnerability poses.
How to Mitigate CVE-2025-55182
For mitigation, the React library has released versions 19.0.1, 19.1.2, and 19.2.1 that resolve the issue. Flashpoint advises organizations to upgrade their respective libraries urgently. Security teams leveraging dynamic SBOMs (Software Bill of Materials) can drastically increase risk mapping and triage for deployed React versions.
To avoid confusion, security teams should ignore CVE-2025-66478. It has been rejected for being a duplicate of the preferred CVE-2025-55182.
Mitigate Critical Vulnerabilities Using Flashpoint
Flashpoint strongly recommends security teams treat this vulnerability with utmost urgency. Our vulnerability research team will continue to monitor this vulnerability and its downstream impacts. All updates will be provided via Flashpoint’s VulnDB.
Request a demo today and gain access to quality vulnerability intelligence that helps address critical threats in a timely manner.
Flashpoint’s Top 5 Predictions for the 2026 Threat Landscape
Flashpoint’s forward-looking threat insights for security and executive teams, provides the strategic foresight needed to prepare for the convergence of AI, identity, and physical security threats in 2026.
As the global threat landscape accelerates its transformation, 2026 marks an inflection point requiring defensive strategies to fundamentally shift. The volatility observed in 2025 has paved the way for an era soon to be defined by AI-weaponized autonomy, information-stealing malware, systemic instability of public vulnerability systems, and the complete convergence of digital and physical risk.
Flashpoint offers a unique window into these complexities, providing organizations with the foresight needed to navigate what lies ahead. Drawing from Flashpoint’s leading intelligence and primary source collections, we highlight five key trends shaping the 2026 threat landscape. These insights aim to help organizations not only understand what’s next but also build the resilience needed to withstand and adapt to emerging challenges.
Prediction 1: Agentic AI Threats Will Weaponize Autonomy, Forcing a New Defensive Standard
2026 will see continued evolution of AI threats, with future attacks centering on autonomy and integration. Across the deep and dark web, Flashpoint is observing threat actors move past experimentation and into operational use of illegal AI.
As attackers train custom fraud-tuned LLMs (Large Language Models) and multilingual phishing tools directly on illicit data, these AI models will become more capable. The criminal intent shaping their misuse will also become more sophisticated. Additionally, 2026 will see a greater marketplace for paid jailbreaking communities and synthetic media kits for KYC (Know Your Customer) bypass.
These advancements are enabling criminals to move beyond simple tools and engage in scaled, autonomous fraud operations, leading to two major shifts:
Agentic AI is becoming the true flashpoint: Threat actors will be using agentic systems to automate reconnaissance, generate synthetic identities, and iterate on fraud playbooks in near real-time. In this SaaS ecosystem, AI will help attackers leverage subscription tiers and customer feedback loops at scale.
The attack surface will shift to focus on AI Integrations: Organizations are increasingly plugging LLMs into live data streams, internal tools, identity systems, and autonomous agents. This practice often lacks the same security vetting, access controls, and monitoring applied to other enterprise systems. As such, attackers will heavily target these integrations, such as APIs, plugins, and system connections, rather than the models themselves.
“The ubiquity of automation has dramatically increased attack tempo, leaving many security teams behind the curve. While automation can replace repetitive tasks across the enterprise, organizations must not make the critical mistake of substituting human judgement for AI at the intelligence level.
This is paramount because a critical threat in 2026 is Agentic AI autonomy weaponized against soft targets—API integrations and identity systems. The only winning defense will be human-led and AI-scaled, prioritizing purposeful use to keep organizations ahead of this exponential risk.”
Josh Lefkowitz, CEO at Flashpoint
These evolving AI threats will force a fundamental shift in defensive strategies. Defenders will have to shift to deploying systems around AI rather than trust them on their own.
Prediction 2: Identity Compromise via Infostealers Will Become the Foundation of Every Attack
Infostealers will become the entry point, the data broker, the reconnaissance layer, and the fuel for everything that comes after a cyberattack. This shift is already in motion and is accelerating rapidly: in just the first half of 2025, infostealers were responsible for 1.8 billion stolen credentials, an 800% spike from the start of the year. However, 2026 will redefine the malware’s role, making its most valuable output being access, rather than disruption.
Infostealers will become the upstream event that powers the rest of the attack chain. Identity and session data will be increasingly targeted, since it gives attackers immediate access into victim environments. Ransomware, fraud, data theft, and extortion will simply be downstream ways to monetize.
This upstream approach defines the new reality of the attack chain, which is already operational. Nearly every major stealer strain Flashpoint observes now exfiltrates the following:
An organization’s attack surface is no longer just composed of their own networks. It is the entire digital identity of their employees and partners. This new reality requires security teams to take a new approach. Instead of attempting to block attacks, they must proactively detect compromised credentials before they are weaponized. This will be the difference between reacting to a data breach and preventing one.
“The infostealer economy has fully industrialized the attack chain, making initial compromise a low-cost commodity. Multiple security incidents in 2025 tie back to credentials found in infostealer logs. This reality has underscored the critical importance of digital trust—specifically, verifying who can access what resources. For 2026, identity is the perimeter to watch, and security teams must proactively hunt for compromised credentials before they’re weaponized.”
Ian Gray, Vice President of Intelligence at Flashpoint
Prediction 3: CVE Volatility Will Force Redundancy in Vulnerability Intelligence
The temporary funding crisis at CVE in April 2025 and the subsequent CISA stopgap extension through March 2026 exposed the systemic fragility of a centralized vulnerability intelligence model. With the future of the CVE/NVD system hanging in the balance, 2026 will be defined by the urgent need for redundancy and diversification in vulnerability intelligence.
In today’s vulnerability intelligence ecosystem, nearly every organization’s vulnerability management framework relies on CVE and NVD—including its “alternatives” such as the EUVD (European Union Vulnerability Database). The CVE system has grown into a critical global cybersecurity utility, relied upon by nearly all vulnerability scanners, SIEM platforms, patch management tools, threat intelligence feeds, and compliance reports. A complete shutdown of CVE would result in a widespread loss of institutional infrastructure.
The next generation of security needs to be built on practices that are resilient, diversified, and intelligence-driven. It should be focused on providing insights that can be used to take action such as threat actor behavior, likelihood of exploitation in the wild, relevance to ransomware campaigns, and business context. Security teams will need to leverage a comprehensive source of vulnerability intelligence such as Flashpoint’s VulnDB that provides full coverage for CVE, while also cataloging more than 100,000 vulnerabilities missed by CVE and NVD.
Prediction 4: Executive Protection Will Remain a Critical Challenge as Cyber-Physical Threats Converge
The continued blurring of lines between cyber, physical, and geopolitical threats will elevate the risk to organizational leadership, turning executive protection into a holistic intelligence function in 2026. The rise of information warfare combined with physical world convergence means the threat to key personnel is no longer purely digital.
In the aftermath of the tragic December 2024 assassination of United Healthcare’s CEO, Flashpoint has seen the continued circulation and glorification of “wanted-style posters” of executives in extremist communities. Additionally, Flashpoint has seen nation-state actors participate, using espionage and influence to target high-value individuals. Organizations must adopt an integrated approach that connects insights from threat actor chatter and a wealth of other OSINT sources. This fusion of intelligence is essential for applying frameworks to ensure the safety of leadership and key personnel.
Prediction 5: Extortion Shifts to Identity-Based Supply Chain Risk
2025 was marked by several large-scale extortion campaigns, demonstrating how the threat landscape is rapidly evolving. Ransomware operations have shifted into a straight extortion play. Flashpoint has observed a surge in new entrants to the ransomware market, accompanied by a decline in the quality and decorum of ransomware groups.
Furthermore, vishing campaigns attributed to “Scattered Spider” have highlighted weaknesses in identity, trust, and verification. Campaigns from “Scattered LAPSUS$ Hunters” have also exposed vulnerabilities in third-party integrations. These attacks culminated in extortion, showcasing that modern attacks will target trusted users and trusted applications for initial access, and will forgo ransomware in place of data access.
As this shift continues into 2026, threat actors will increasingly focus their efforts on exploiting human behavior and identity systems. Instead of attempting to spend resources on breaking network perimeters, attackers will instead socially engineer employees to gain access to corporate systems at scale. This change in TTPs will undoubtedly greatly increase supply chain risk, especially for third parties.
Charting a Path Through an Evolving Threat Landscape with Flashpoint Intelligence
These five predictions highlight the transformative trends shaping the future of cybersecurity and threat intelligence. Staying ahead of these challenges demands more than just reactive measures—it requires actionable intelligence, strategic foresight, and cross-sector collaboration. By embracing these principles and investing in proactive security strategies, organizations can not only mitigate risks but also seize opportunities to enhance their resilience.
As the threat landscape continues to rapidly evolve, staying informed and prepared are critical components of risk mitigation. With the right tools, insights, and partnerships, security teams can navigate the complexities ahead and safeguard what matters most.
In the midst of the Israel-Hamas War, which erupted with a surprising and devastating attack on October 7, 2023 that resulted in the deaths of more than 1,300 Israelis, it is becoming increasingly apparent that the dynamics of this complex conflict extend beyond the actions of Hamas alone. While Hamas took the lead in launching the initial assault, there is evidence, outlined in this article, that numerous other militant and terrorist groups worked in concert with Hamas, which continues to shape the trajectory of the ongoing conflict.
Based on frontline reportage, open-source intelligence, including social media and message platforms, and Flashpoint collections surrounding the events on October 7, we explore the roles and actions of additional militant and terrorist factions, shedding light on their collective impact in the evolving Israel-Hamas War.
We will update this article as the situation in Israel, Gaza, and the Middle East develops.
Militant and Terrorist Groups Involved in October 7 Attack on Israel
Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades (كتائب الشهيد عز الدين القسام)
Operation Al-Aqsa Tufan (Flood) involved coordinated attacks from the Gaza Strip into bordering areas in Israel on October 7, coinciding with a major Jewish holiday and marking the beginning of the 2023 Israel–Hamas war. The attack included a rocket barrage of thousands of missiles, vehicle-transported incursions into Israeli territory, kidnappings, including at a music festival, and significant civilian casualties. It has been described as one of the bloodiest days in Israel’s history and the deadliest for Jews since the Holocaust. Founded in the late 1980s, Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades is the militant wing of the terrorist organization Hamas. It has been designated as a terrorist organization by several countries, including the United States, Israel, and the European Union.
Palestinian Islamic Jihad (الجهاد الإسلامي الفلسطيني)
As we previously reported, Hamas and PIJ communicate often with followers via Telegram. On the day after the October 7 attacks, PIJ, in one of its main channels, posted that “the elite of Al-Quds Brigades is entering the border to support al-Qassam Brigades fighters (Hamas) and supply them with weapons.” It has also been reported that PIJ took part in the October 7 attacks alongside Hamas.
On October 17, a rocket hit the Al Ahli Arab Hospital in Gaza, killing hundreds of Palestinian civilians. In a statement, Israeli Defense Forces said that “[Palestinian] Islamic Jihad is responsible for the failed rocket launch which hit the hospital in Gaza.” PIJ has denied the allegation in a statement, reportedly calling it “false and baseless.”
Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) is a Palestinian terrorist organization that is designated by several countries, including the United States, Israel, and the European Union. It was founded in the late 1970s with the goal of establishing an Islamic Palestinian state and has carried out attacks against Israel.
Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade (كتائب شهداء الأقصى)
The Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade is a Palestinian militant organization affiliated with Fatah, a major Palestinian political party, that has carried out attacks and other activities against Israel. One of the key players in Palestinian politics today, Al-Aqsa Martyrs brigade was founded in the late 1950s and has historically been associated with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). The group was designated a Foreign Terrorist Organization by the US Department of State in 2002.
Above: Screengrab from October 7 showing a video of a man wearing a headband with the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade emblem. The video, posted in an official Al-Aqsa Martys Brigade Telegram channel, shows the man speaking alongside a gravely injured Israeli soldier. The message hashtag translates to “#Scenes_of_enemy_soldiers_capture” (Image: Flashpoint)
Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (الجبهة الديمقراطية لتحرير فلسطين)
The Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) is a Palestinian political and militant organization founded in 1969, known for its left-wing and Marxist ideologies. It has historically aimed for the liberation of Palestine and the establishment of an independent Palestinian state through both militaristic and political means. While a member of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), it has not been as prominent as other Palestinian factions like Fatah or Hamas in recent years.
Above: Pictures posted by an official Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine showing armed militants reportedly inside Israeli territory on October 7. (Image: Flashpoint)
Palestinian Mujahideen Movement (حركة المجاهدين الفلسطينيين)
The Palestinian Mujahideen Movement is a Palestinian militant organization that emerged in the early 1970s with the goal of resisting Israeli occupation and achieving Palestinian self-determination through various armed activities and operations against Israeli forces. However, it is not as widely recognized or prominent as Palestinian terrorist groups like Hamas or the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ).
Above: Screengrab of an official Palestinian Mujahideen Movement channel showing an image of Dr. Asaad Abu Sharia, the General of the Palestinian Mujahideen Movement, congratulating the “heroes…who stormed the positions and settlements of [Israel].”
We have shared this Telegram message in lieu of the many messages shared in the same channel the day prior, October 7, that showed graphically violent images of what appears to be soldiers in IDF uniforms. (Image: Flashpoint)
Popular Resistance Committees (لجان المقاومة الشعبية)
The Popular Resistance Committees (PRC), whose military wing is referred to as Al-Nasser Salah al-Deen Brigades (ألوية الناصر صلاح الدين), are a coalition of various Palestinian factions and armed groups in the Gaza Strip. They were formed in the early 2000s during the Second Intifada, a period of intense Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The PRC includes members from different political and militant backgrounds and has carried out attacks against Israel. While not as prominent as terrorist organizations like Hamas or the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), the PRC has played a role in the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict, as evidenced by the events of October 7, 2023.
Above: Screengrab of communications within the official Al-Nasser Salah al-Din Brigades Telegram channel from October 7, alongside photos of allegedly confiscated military equipment and IDs belonging to captured Israeli soldiers. (Image: Flashpoint)
Those who could join the fight
Lebanese Hezbollah (حزب الله اللبناني)
Though not directly involved in the October 7 attacks, Lebanese Hezbollah and Israel have exchanged assaults in connection with the ongoing Israel-Hamas War since October 8.
Also known as Hezbollah, Lebanese Hezbollah is a Shiite Islamist political and militant organization based in Lebanon. It was founded in the early 1980s with support from Iran, following the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. Hezbollah’s primary goal is to resist Israel and promote Shiite interests in Lebanon and the wider region. The group was designated a Foreign Terrorist Organization by the US Department of State in 1997, the same year as Hamas and PIJ.
Lions’ Den (عرين الأسود)
Saraya al-Quds Military spokesman Abu Hamza has calledfor Lions’ Den and Jenin Brigade, another Palestinian militant group, to join the fight.
The Lions’ Den is a Palestinian militant group in the Israeli-occupied West Bank, formed in August 2022. Comprising members from various Palestinian militant and terrorist organizations, including Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, along with disaffected Fatah members, it resonates with some young Palestinians frustrated by the Israeli occupation, settlements, settler violence, and the perceived ineffectiveness of the Palestinian Authority. They have engaged in various West Bank attacks, funded in part by Hamas.
These profiles represent the most meaningful actors on the digital and physical frontlines of the Israel-Hamas War at the moment. Flashpoint has seen an expansion of participants as the conflict unfolds and expands into new physical and digital theaters. We will therefore update this article as the situation continues to develop.
Telegram, with its 700 million-plus-strong user base, has evolved into a pivotal communication hub for Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ). Its robust privacy and encryption protocols safeguard communications while also providing a covert operational space for militant groups and cybercriminals. The platform’s role in open-source intelligence (OSINT) is vital, offering real-time insights into unfolding global events, such as the ongoing military conflict between Hamas and Israel, and becoming an essential tool for intelligence professionals navigating the multifaceted landscape of contemporary warfare. Organizations with regional interests should perceive Telegram as a crucial asset in understanding their risk apertures and navigating through conflict complexities.
In the context of recent global conflicts, including the Russia-Ukraine war and the Hamas-Israel conflict, platforms like Telegram have demonstrated their significance by providing real-time updates, documenting potential war crimes, and offering a platform for anti-war narratives amidst governmental censorship. Both scenarios underscore Telegram’s evolving role in modern warfare, influencing narratives and strategies, and providing a digital battlefield for organizations and intelligence professionals to navigate and anticipate conflict dynamics.
This digital battlefield, while shaping the narratives and strategies in contemporary conflicts, abruptly collided with reality on October 7, when the virtual orchestrations of Hamas transformed into a tangible, devastating surprise attack on Israel.
Hamas militants launched an unexpected, devastating attack on Israel on October 7, resulting in hundreds of casualties and numerous hostages. Over 2,000 rockets were fired into Israel, causing significant casualties and prompting Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to declare war on Hamas, mobilizing the military and reserves. The assault, occurring on the fiftieth anniversary of the 1973 Egypt and Syria attack and during the Jewish holiday, Shemini Atzeret, took Israel by surprise.
Reports state that the attack resulted in hundreds dead and more than 500 injuries, the kidnappings of Israeli soldiers, and vehicle takeovers, while Hezbollah celebrated the assault. The US Embassy in Jerusalem issued an alert and initiated shelter-in-place protocols for its personnel. Militants breached the Gaza-Israel barrier using various methods, and Hamas commander Mohammed Deif urged Palestinians and Arabs to join the operation, raising fears of a wider conflict.
At around 5:30 a.m. UTC, Hamas posted in one of its main Telegram channels, that the Commander-in-Chief of Al-Qassam Brigades announced the beginning of Hamas’s Al-Aqsa Tufan (Flood) and the firing of over 5,000 rockets aimed at Israel. Shortly thereafter, reports show that air raid sirens sounded in Jerusalem around 6:30 a.m. local time, signaling an attack and instructing citizens to take cover.
Hamas Telegram post announcing the start of Al-Aqsa Tufan (Image: Flashpoint)
This message represents one of 1,145 messages sent over Hamas’s main Telegram channel on October 7. For context, the day prior, 373 messages were sent over the same channels, showing more than a 3X spike in chatter from October 6.
October 8: Violence escalates
The conflict intensifies with continued assaults and counter-assaults from both Israel and Hamas. The death toll rises sharply on both sides, and the situation garners international attention and condemnation. Hamas issues a threat to execute Israeli hostages, prompting further international outrage. The U.S. confirms that several American citizens have been killed in the attacks and expresses its unwavering support for Israel. Various nations and international leaders continue to condemn the violence and express solidarity with Israel.
On October 8, Palestinian Islamic Jihad posted that “the elite of Al-Quds Brigades is entering the border to support Al-Qassam Brigades fighters and supply them with weapons.” (Image: Flashpoint)
On Sunday, 1,129 posts were sent between PIJ and its followers on Telegram, with messages such as above sharing updates of the assault.
October 9: Broadening battlefields
The conflict takes a new turn as rockets are fired from Lebanon toward Israel, prompting Israeli forces to retaliate against Lebanese territories. The U.S. updates the number of American citizens killed in the attacks and acknowledges that Americans are among those taken hostage by Hamas. Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant orders a “complete siege” on Gaza and promises a robust and unrestrained response to the ongoing attacks, vowing to eliminate any threats against Israel.
Telegram post from a major Hamas channel linking to a video of Abu Obaida, the spokesperson for the al-Qassam Brigades, in which he signals further violence to Israelis, particularly hostages (Image: Flashpoint).
Throughout Monday, Telegram activity from Hamas and PIJ fell by almost half compared to the day prior. Within the first 72 hours of the Israeli-Hamas War, Flashpoint observed a total of 5,472 Telegram posts shared by both Hamas and PIJ across their main channels.
Flashpoint has earned multiple trust badges from G2’s Fall 2023 Reports, affirming our unwavering commitment to delivering timely, contextual intelligence to our clients so they can take rapid, decisive action to stop threats and reduce risk. Here are some highlights from G2’s reports.
‘Leader’ and ‘High Performer’
G2 awarded Flashpoint a “Leader Badge”—ranking us #1 in the Enterprise Americas Regional Grid for Threat Intelligence. Specifically, customers highlighted the value of Flashpoint’s finished intelligence reports, with 98 percent of customers emphasizing its utility.
In G2’s Enterprise Relationship Index for Threat Intelligence, Flashpoint has the highest score for “Most Likely to Recommend,” with 94 percent of surveyed customers endorsing Flashpoint as an intelligence partner.
Flashpoint also exceeded the index’s performance averages in all categories, including “Ease of Doing Business With” and “Quality of Support.”
‘Flashpoint has been a great partner of ours for many years, and the trust we’ve built with their team of managers and analysts is excellent.‘
—Fraud Intelligence Lead, Fortune 500 Technology Company
In G2’s Americas Regional Grid® Report, 99 percent of surveyed customers highlighted Flashpoint’s dark web monitoring capabilities.
Additionally, 90 percent of customers emphasized Flashpoint’s ticketing and RFI services, showcasing our commitment to the intersections between data, intelligence, and professional services support.
‘Flashpoint offers the greatest amount of data regarding the criminal underground in relation to their peers. The data is well sorted, well presented, and easy to search.‘
— SVP, DFIR Investigations, Public Sector
‘An Excellent Intelligence Tool’
Hear from our customers by reading Flashpoint review on G2, or sign up for a free trial today to see how “great” threat intelligence can help your organization reduce risk and mitigate threats.
1. Tell me about the Flashpoint Firehose. What needs and challenges was it built to address?
Michael Raypold: The Flashpoint Firehose is a data-as-a-service solution that delivers a constant stream of data from various sources, ranging from social media platforms to messaging apps and illicit communities. It also includes numerous sources from APAC, Europe, the Middle East, and Africa—all vital data sources that are often underrepresented among other providers.
The Firehose delivers access to all ingested data from Flashpoint’s unique collections that data companies, federal systems integrators (FSIs), and large-scale national security teams need in order to build high-quality data and AI tools to enhance global situational awareness, generate timely intelligence, and advance national security initiatives.
With Firehose access, customers can pull key segments of Flashpoint data into their own infrastructure without needing to query our APIs. This unlocks the ability to train large language models or build machine learning models, enabling product development. This is especially important for many of our OEM partners.
2. Why is Flashpoint especially positioned to offer this type of solution?
Threat actors aren’t constrained by borders, and a diverse data set is imperative for organizations working in the cyber and physical security domains. Because of this, Flashpoint has dedicated the last 13 years to building out its collections capabilities and in-house analyst team to deliver actionable intelligence from a wide range of publicly and commercially available information data sources. As a result, Flashpoint has become the industry leader in delivering solutions for cyber threat intelligence, vulnerability management, physical security intelligence, and national security teams.
3. What are some of the unique capabilities of the Firehose?
The Firehose excels in the following primary categories:
Speed: Once the data is ingested by the Flashpoint Firehose, it is delivered to the customer in real-time or near-real-time. This is especially important for customers building products where speed is paramount, such as an alerting dashboard.
Data: Flashpoint focuses heavily on the variety, breadth, and depth of its data, which is incredibly important for our customers who require comprehensive coverage of the information landscape.
Flexibility: The Firehose is designed to enable users to manipulate the data according to their specific needs.
To ease adoption, Flashpoint has also enriched all of the Firehose content with geospatial inference and language detection, making it easier for users to draw actionable insights and pivot off of Flashpoint’s unique selectors.
4. Tell me more about the ML enrichments.
Once collected and structured, the data undergoes enrichment through named entity recognition and machine learning, providing geospatial insight and language detection, offering customers additional ways to filter and query the data while delivering immediate value. This data can then integrate seamlessly into custom products and be indexed according to the customer’s requirements.
5. As an engineer yourself, what excites you the most about the Firehose?
When building high-quality intelligence products, engineers are often limited by the breadth, depth, and availability of the data they can query or make actionable for their customers. This problem is exacerbated when they have to make API queries to third-party providers.
The ability to ingest Flashpoint data in real time and have end-to-end control over the storage, enrichment, and querying of that data enables really exciting product opportunities. The Firehose allows engineers to ingest data into their own infrastructure and enable a crisper product experience.
The ability to build a notification or alerting pipeline off of a data stream is one possibility that’s unlocked with a Firehose versus a REST API. Others will find that the Firehose is uniquely positioned for anomaly detection, dashboarding, data visualization, training large language models, or extending internal and proprietary data sets to craft a truly differentiated experience.
We’re innovating entirely with our partners in mind, to fulfill their data requirements. The Flashpoint Firehose was built to serve as a force multiplier for their data-driven products, enabling them to realize their visions and value faster.
The Seven Phases of a Ransomware Attack: A Step-by-Step Breakdown of the Attack Lifecycle
Understanding the anatomy of a ransomware attack empowers security teams to strengthen defenses, reduce the risk of successful attacks, and protect organizations from the serious consequences of a ransomware incident
Ransomware attacks are pervasive and devastating, targeting organizations and causing havoc on operations, finances, and reputation. To defend against these threats, security teams must understand the ransomware attack lifecycle.
As reliance on digital systems and networks increases, the risk of ransomware attacks grows exponentially. These attacks can cripple businesses, disrupt services, compromise data, and lead to significant financial losses. Cybercriminals continually evolve their tactics, demanding constant adaptation from security teams.
In this blog, we will explore the intricacies of ransomware, breaking down the attack lifecycle. Understanding this anatomy empowers security teams to strengthen defenses, reduce the risk of successful attacks, and protect organizations from the serious consequences of a ransomware incident.
Phase 1: Reconnaissance and target selection
Phase 1 of a ransomware attack involves the threat actor researching and selecting organizations to attack. During this phase, threat actors identify potential targets and gather critical information about them.
Identifying potential targets
Threat actors engage in reconnaissance to identify organizations that are more likely to yield a high return on their malicious activities. They carefully assess factors such as the industry, size, financial stability, and the value of the data held by the potential targets. Organizations that heavily rely on their digital infrastructure and are more likely to pay a ransom to regain access to critical systems and data are prime targets.
Techniques used for reconnaissance
Threat actors employ various techniques to gather information during the reconnaissance phase. These techniques may include passive reconnaissance, where they collect publicly available data from websites, social media platforms, and professional networking sites. They may also utilize active reconnaissance, such as scanning for open ports and vulnerabilities, conducting phishing campaigns to gather employee information, or leveraging third-party sources like leaked databases and dark web forums.
Vulnerability factors
Several factors can make organizations more vulnerable to targeting during the reconnaissance phase:
Lack of Security Awareness: Organizations that do not prioritize cybersecurity awareness and training for their employees may inadvertently provide attackers with valuable information through social engineering tactics.
Inadequate Patch Management: Failure to promptly apply software patches and updates leaves systems vulnerable to known vulnerabilities that threat actors can exploit.
Weak Access Controls: Poorly managed user accounts, weak passwords, and insufficient access controls increase the likelihood of unauthorized access to sensitive systems and data.
Absence of Network Segmentation: If an organization’s network lacks proper segmentation, a successful initial access point can provide attackers with the opportunity to move laterally within the network and escalate privileges.
Lack of Monitoring and Detection: Organizations that lack robust monitoring and detection capabilities may not notice the initial signs of a reconnaissance attempt, allowing threat actors to proceed undetected.
Phase 2: Initial access
Phase 2 of a ransomware attack is the critical stage where threat actors strive to gain initial access to an organization’s network and systems.
During this stage, threat actors employ a range of techniques to achieve initial access, including:
Phishing Emails: One of the most common and successful methods, threat actors craft convincing emails designed to deceive recipients into clicking on malicious links or opening infected attachments.
Exploit Kits: These toolkits contain prepackaged exploits that target vulnerabilities in software, commonly used web browsers, or plugins. By visiting compromised websites, unsuspecting users can unwittingly trigger the exploit kit and grant the attacker initial access.
Vulnerable Software: Exploiting weaknesses in software, particularly outdated or unpatched applications, is another avenue threat actors may exploit to gain a foothold within an organization’s network. This was recently observed through CLOP’s use of the MOVEit and GoAnywhere MFT vulnerabilities to attack over 100 organizations globally.
VulnDB’s vulnerability intelligence record highlighting the severity and importance of the MOVEit vulnerability.
Social engineering tactics play a significant role in the success of initial access attempts. Threat actors exploit human psychology to deceive individuals and gain access to sensitive information or systems.
Pretexting, where a false scenario or pretext is created to gain the target’s trust, and baiting, which offers enticing rewards or incentives, are common social engineering tactics used to manipulate individuals. Moreover, tailgating—or taking advantage of individuals holding doors open for others—can be used to gain unauthorized physical access to secure areas within an organization.
Phase 3: Lateral movement and privilege escalation
Once threat actors have gained initial access to an organization’s network and systems, they proceed to Phase 3 of a ransomware attack: lateral movement and privilege escalation.
This stage involves the navigation and expansion of their reach within the compromised network. Threat actors explore the compromised network to locate valuable data, critical systems, and potential targets for encryption.
They employ lateral movement, traversing through the network to gain control over multiple machines, servers, or devices, which increases the likelihood of finding and encrypting valuable information while making it challenging for defenders to contain the attack.
Threat actors may use several techniques to achieve lateral movement.
Exploiting Misconfigurations: They take advantage of misconfigured network shares, weak or shared passwords, and unsecured remote desktop protocols (RDP) to gain unauthorized access to other systems within the network.
Credential Theft and Reuse: They employ various tactics to steal or acquire legitimate user credentials, such as using keyloggers, credential harvesting, or compromising administrative accounts. These stolen credentials are then reused to move laterally within the network.
Pass-the-Hash: This technique involves stealing hashed credentials from compromised systems and using them to authenticate and gain access to other systems without needing to know the plaintext passwords.
Once within the network, threat actors seek to escalate their privileges. By elevating their access rights, they gain increased control over critical systems and can maneuver more freely within the network. Privilege escalation techniques may include:
Exploiting Vulnerabilities: They identify vulnerabilities in software, operating systems, or network configurations that can be leveraged to elevate their privileges. This may involve exploiting unpatched systems or misconfigured permissions.
Leveraging Stolen Credentials: If threat actors have successfully stolen credentials during the initial access phase, they can use these credentials to escalate their privileges within the network, gaining administrative or higher-level access.
Abusing Trusted Applications or Services: They manipulate trusted applications or services that have higher privileges or access rights to gain elevated permissions within the network.
It is important to note that lateral movement and privilege escalation are not necessarily linear processes. Threat actors adapt their tactics based on the network’s topology, security measures, and available targets, maneuvering opportunistically within the network.
Phase 4: Deployment of ransomware payload
In Phase 4 of a ransomware attack, threat actors execute their ultimate objective: deploying the ransomware payload. This phase involves the encryption of the victim’s files and the subsequent demand for a ransom payment.
Ransomware comes in various forms, each with its own characteristics and objectives. Some common types include:
Encryption Ransomware: This type of ransomware encrypts the victim’s files, rendering them inaccessible until a decryption key is obtained by paying the ransom. Examples include notorious strains like WannaCry and Ryuk.
Locker Ransomware: Locker ransomware locks the victim out of their system or specific applications, denying access to the device or critical functionalities. It often displays a ransom message directly on the victim’s screen, demanding payment to regain access.
Hybrid Ransomware: Hybrid ransomware combines elements of both encrypting and locker ransomware. It encrypts files while simultaneously locking the victim out of the system, amplifying the impact and urgency of the attack.
To deploy the ransomware payload effectively, threat actors may leverage various techniques including:
Email Attachments and Links: Malicious attachments or links embedded within phishing emails are a common delivery method for ransomware. Opening the attachment or clicking on the link initiates the download and execution of the ransomware payload.
Drive-by Downloads: By visiting compromised or malicious websites, victims unknowingly trigger the download and execution of ransomware through vulnerabilities in their web browsers or plugins.
Exploit Kits: Exploit kits can exploit vulnerabilities in software or operating systems to deliver ransomware onto the victim’s system. The kits automatically detect and target vulnerabilities, enabling threat actors to distribute the ransomware payload more efficiently.
Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) and its role in the attack lifecycle
Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) has emerged as a significant contributor to the proliferation of ransomware attacks. RaaS allows less technically skilled threat actors to access ransomware tools and infrastructure developed by more sophisticated actors. It operates on a profit-sharing model, where the developers take a percentage of the ransom payments. RaaS lowers the barrier to entry for cybercriminals, enabling the widespread distribution and execution of ransomware attacks.
RaaS platforms provide aspiring threat actors with user-friendly interfaces, technical support, and even customer service. They often offer customization options, allowing attackers to tailor the ransomware to their specific targets. The availability of RaaS has led to a surge in ransomware attacks globally, as it empowers a wider range of cybercriminals to participate in these lucrative campaigns.
Flashpoint’s monthly ransomware infographic highlighting the most prevalent groups, industries, and nations involved in ransomware events.
Phase 5: Encryption and impact
The true consequences of the attack begin to unfold during the encryption and impact phase. During this phase, threat actors encrypt the victim’s files and inflict significant damage on their systems.
Ransomware employs sophisticated encryption algorithms to lock the victim’s files, rendering them inaccessible without the decryption key. The encryption process typically targets a wide range of file types, including documents, images, videos, databases, and more. Threat actors often use strong encryption algorithms like RSA or AES to ensure the victim cannot decrypt the files without the decryption key.
As the encryption process unfolds, the victim’s files become unusable, with each file typically receiving a unique encryption key. The ransomware may also overwrite or modify the original file, making recovery without the decryption key even more challenging. The impact on the victim’s systems can be severe, leading to operational disruption, data loss, financial consequences, and reputational damage.
The consequences of a successful ransomware attack can be devastating for both organizations and individuals, and often entails many of the following:
Operational Disruption: Ransomware attacks can cripple an organization’s operations, causing significant disruptions and downtime. Critical systems may become inaccessible, leading to productivity losses, delayed services, and financial repercussions.
Data Loss and Corruption: If proper backups are not in place, victims may lose access to their valuable data permanently. Ransomware may also corrupt files during the encryption process, making recovery even more challenging.
Financial Losses: Organizations may face substantial financial losses due to ransom payments, costs associated with recovery and remediation efforts, and potential regulatory penalties. Moreover, there may be indirect financial impacts stemming from reputational damage and customer loss.
Reputational Damage: Publicly disclosed ransomware attacks can tarnish an organization’s reputation. Clients, partners, and stakeholders may lose trust in the organization’s ability to protect sensitive information, leading to a loss of business opportunities and customer confidence.
Legal and Regulatory Ramifications: Depending on the nature of the compromised data, organizations may face legal and regulatory consequences, especially if personal or sensitive information is involved. Violations of data protection regulations can result in significant fines and legal liabilities.
Phase 6: Extortion and communication
In Phase 6 of a ransomware attack, threat actors establish communication with their victims and begin the process of extortion. At this time, they’ll demand ransom payments in exchange for providing the decryption keys or access to the victim’s systems.
During this phase, threat actors initiate contact with the victim to convey their demands and establish a line of communication. They often use anonymizing technologies, such as the Tor network, to mask their identities and make it difficult to trace their activities. Communication can occur through various channels, including email, instant messaging platforms, or even dedicated ransom negotiation portals set up by the attackers.
Threat actors employ different methods to demand ransom payments from their victims. These may include:
Bitcoin or Cryptocurrency Payments: Threat actors typically demand ransom payments in cryptocurrencies, such as Bitcoin, due to the pseudonymous and decentralized nature of these currencies, which makes them difficult to trace.
Payment Deadlines and Threats: Threat actors often impose strict deadlines for payment, accompanied by threats of permanently deleting the decryption keys or increasing the ransom amount if the deadline is not met. These tactics aim to pressure victims into complying with their demands.
Proof of Data Exfiltration: In some cases, threat actors may claim to have exfiltrated sensitive data from the victim’s systems and threaten to publicly release it unless the ransom is paid. This adds an additional layer of pressure and urgency for victims to comply.
Engaging or not engaging with threat actors during the extortion phase raises legal and ethical considerations. Organizations must carefully evaluate their options:
Legal Considerations: Paying the ransom may be illegal in some jurisdictions or against organizational policies. Additionally, organizations may have legal obligations to report the incident, particularly if personal or sensitive data has been compromised.
Funding Criminal Activities: Paying the ransom may contribute to funding further criminal activities, as the money can be used to finance future attacks. Supporting cybercriminals through ransom payments perpetuates the ransomware ecosystem.
No Guarantee of Decryption: There is no guarantee that threat actors will provide the decryption keys or restore access to the victim’s systems even after the ransom is paid. Organizations must consider the risk of paying the ransom and not receiving the promised outcome.
Cyber Insurance Coverage: Organizations with cyber insurance policies should consult with their insurance providers regarding their coverage and the implications of paying the ransom.
It is crucial for organizations to consult legal counsel, law enforcement agencies, and experienced incident response professionals before making any decisions regarding ransom payment. Each situation is unique, and a thorough evaluation of the risks, legal obligations, and ethical considerations is necessary.
Phase 7: Recovery and mitigation
The recovery and mitigation phase of an attack is where organizations focus on restoring systems, recovering encrypted data, and implementing measures to prevent future attacks.
Recovering from a ransomware attack requires a systematic approach. Key strategies for recovering encrypted data and restoring systems include:
Isolate and Contain: Immediately isolate the affected systems to prevent further spread of the ransomware. Disconnect compromised devices from the network and shut them down to mitigate the risk of re-infection.
Incident Analysis: Conduct a thorough analysis of the incident to identify the ransomware variant, its impact, and the compromised systems. This analysis can help determine the appropriate recovery strategy.
Data Restoration: If backups are available, restore data from clean and secure backups. It is crucial to ensure backups are offline or properly protected to prevent them from being compromised by the ransomware.
Decrypting Data: In some cases, decryption tools may be available from trusted sources, such as law enforcement agencies or security companies. These tools can help decrypt files without paying the ransom. However, this is not always possible, depending on the specific ransomware variant.
System Rebuilding: In situations where data restoration is not feasible or backups are unavailable, organizations may need to rebuild affected systems from scratch using known good configurations and software.
Effectively responding to ransomware incidents requires a well-defined incident response plan, and may include some of these best practices:
Incident Response Plan: Develop a comprehensive incident response plan that outlines the steps to be taken in the event of a ransomware attack. This plan should include roles and responsibilities, communication protocols, and predefined actions for different scenarios.
Rapid Response: Ensure you have the alerting capabilities to act swiftly and decisively to contain the attack, isolate affected systems, and initiate the recovery process. Promptly engage internal IT teams, incident response experts, and relevant stakeholders.
Communication and Notification: Establish clear lines of communication both internally and externally. Notify appropriate personnel, such as legal, PR, and executive teams, and consider legal and regulatory obligations for disclosing incidents involving compromised data.
Forensic Investigation: Conduct a thorough forensic investigation to understand the root cause, identify the attack vector, and collect evidence for potential legal actions or future prevention measures.
Employee Awareness and Training: Continuously educate employees about the risks of ransomware, phishing, and social engineering. Regularly train staff on cybersecurity best practices, including strong password management, recognizing suspicious emails, and reporting incidents promptly.
Prevention is key in mitigating future ransomware attacks. Implementing proactive security measures can significantly reduce the risk and impact of such incidents. Consider these important measures:
Patch Management: Regularly apply security patches and updates to operating systems, software, and firmware to address known vulnerabilities that threat actors often exploit.
Endpoint Protection: Deploy robust antivirus and anti-malware solutions, along with advanced endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools to detect and block malicious activities.
Network Segmentation: Implement network segmentation to restrict lateral movement and contain the impact of an attack. Separating critical systems from the rest of the network helps prevent the rapid spread of ransomware.
Least Privilege Access: Enforce the principle of least privilege, granting users only the necessary access rights required to perform their duties. This minimizes the potential damage that can be caused by compromised accounts.
Regular Data Backups: Maintain regular, encrypted, and secure offline backups of critical data. Regularly test the restoration process to ensure backups are viable for recovery in the event of a ransomware incident.
Know your enemy
Ransomware attacks continue to evolve, becoming more sophisticated and widespread. Threat actors adapt their tactics, techniques, and tools to exploit vulnerabilities and maximize their financial gain. As such, ongoing vigilance and adaptation are essential.
But at each stage of a ransomware attack, robust threat intelligence can stop an emerging risk in its tracks and minimize—or even prevent—damage to your organization.
An effective threat intelligence program enables you to understand threat actors and their TTPs each step of the way. Critical capabilities for your threat intelligence program include:
Vulnerability intelligence that gives practitioners access to real-time, comprehensive information so that they can understand the scope of the incident and develop effective response strategies to make faster, informed decisions and mitigate the attack.
A robust alerting system that allows security practitioners o set up customizable, automated ransomware alerts of leaked assets as a result of an extortion incident, and gain insight into the extent of exposure and damage.
Real-time and continuous data collection that includes background and assessments of the vulnerability, status updates with timelines, known victims, change logs, and intelligence that contributes to a more holistic understanding of a risk and informs decision-making.
A managed attribution solution that allows intelligence teams to shift from defense to offense by enabling security teams to safely and anonymously conduct investigations.
Robust risk management practices and incident response plans in place in order to respond effectively and recover from security breaches.
Flashpoint’s ransomware dashboard provides an up-to-date, easy-to-consume view of global ransomware trends, victims, as well as the ransomware groups themselves.
To learn more about how Flashpoint empowers security teams to prevent and respond to ransomware attacks, begin a free trial, or watch this video to discover the top ways to prevent an attack at your organization.
Lost in Transition: A Timeline of Failed Successors to Breach and Raid Forums
The legacy of Raid, Breach, and their ‘successors’ provides an important lens into how data breach communities function and the real-life implications of the information they traffic
Starting June 24, 2023, visitors to the former domain of Raid Forums were greeted by the avatar of arrested administrator “pompompurin” in tiny handcuffs—an unprecedented trolling of sorts by authorities.
Pompompurin, whose real name is Conor Brian Fitzpatrick, became a highly reputable threat actor on the now-defunct top-tier hacking forum Raid Forums and upon its shutdown, founded Breach Forums. Breach Forums continued the legacy of Raid Forums, both as a fixture among the data breach communities and as a law enforcement target.
The founder and administrator of Raid Forums, Diogo Santos Coelho (aka “omnipotent), was arrested on January 31, 2022. Fitzpatrick, who has been operating on English- and Russian-language forums under the pompompurin moniker since at least October 2020, was arrested by federal agents on March 15, 2023.
Now, both Raid Forums and Breach Forums are no more. And ever since their seizures, other threat actors, some of whom were involved in the Breach and Raid, have attempted to continue their legacies in the purpose and services they provide. But it has thus far been a race to the bottom.
Insight into the illicit spaces where cyber threat actors operate is vital to any threat intelligence operation. The legacy of Raid, Breach, and their “successors” provides an important lens into how data breach communities function and the real-life implications of the information they traffic.
Relatedreading
Another One Bites the Dust: The (Apparent) End of Breach Forums
Here is a summary of the recent events that we have observed within cybercriminal communities related, in some way, to Breach Forums and its legacy as a popular home for threat actors.
March 17, 2023: Breach Forums administrator “baphomet” decides to shut down the forum following the March 15 arrest of administrator pompompurin. The Washington Post included Flashpoint analysis in its March 22 coverage on the end of Breach Forums.
March 29, 2023: PwnedForum, an identically formatted clone of Breach Forums, launches and quickly gains users and shares compromised data. The forum’s creator, “Sinistery,” solicited forum administrators and developers to volunteer to operate the site.
However, the forum was quickly shut down on April 4, 2023, following a disagreement between Sinistery and forum administrators. A message attempting to sell PwnedForum was briefly advertised on the website before closing. One of the forum’s former main administrators, “Frost,” stated that they were working on a new forum separate from PwnedForum, though they did not provide a timeline.
May 29, 2023: “Impotent,” the forum administrator Exposed, leaks the database of 478,870 Raid Forums users.
June 4, 2023: PwnedForums posted on Telegram that the notorious leak collective, ShinyHunters, is launching a forum with former Breach Forums admins.
Also on June 4, a user posted an advertisement for the Exposed forum, calling it the “new” Breach Forums and inviting the Russian hacktivist collective Killnet to join the forum.
June 12, 2023: ShinyHunters launches a new forum called Breach Forums—eponymous by name only.
That very same day, Exposed Forums shut down. Its founders, “Impotent” and “Purism,” share that they will no longer support the development of Exposed Forums while cautioning against using the new Breach Forums due to operational security concerns.
June 18, 2023: Breach Forums is hacked, and the data breach exposes the personal information of over 4,000 registered members.
OnniForums, which appears to have launched in April 2023, took responsibility for the attack. It also claimed to have breached the forum Exposed, using a zero-day vulnerability in the open source forum software MyBB. The data leak included login keys, usernames, email addresses, IP addresses, password hashes, registration dates, members’ last visits and posts, number of posts, last activity, and social media handles with profile links.
June 24, 2023: The user database of DarkForums, a relatively new and unknown forum, is breached and leaked, joining the ranks of Raid Forums and the new Breach Forums.
Though it is difficult to assess if any of these forums will sufficiently fill the void of the data breach communities that Raid Forums provided, threat actors continue to start new darknet venues—a perpetual cycle that shows the resiliency of illicit communities and forums, despite law enforcement, in-fighting, and the adversarial nature of these communities that lends itself to, well, data breaches. Though there may not be a centralized venue for data breaches, it will not be for a lack of trying … even if it means leaking the databases of their competitors.
Get Flashpoint on your side
Flashpoint’s suite of actionable intelligence solutions enables organizations to proactively identify and mitigate cyber and physical risk that could imperil people, places, and assets. To unlock the power of great threat intelligence, get started with a free Flashpoint trial.
Days of Chaos: How OSINT Helps Us Understand the Putin-Prigozhin Schism
Social media and messaging platforms like Telegram continue to play a key role in understanding events, rumors, and ideas as they unfold in the Russia-Ukraine war
The once-cordial relationship between Vladimir Putin and Yevgeny Prigozhin, commonly known as “Putin’s chef,” has soured completely, marking one of the most compelling storylines in Russia’s now 16-month-long invasion of Ukraine. This particular conflict, however, played out in Russia on June 23 and lasted a scintillating ~36 hours, ending in a schism whose implications continue to reverberate across the world, especially in Russia.
Mentions count in Flashpoint collections for variations on searches for Prigozhin and the Wagner Group. (Image: Flashpoint)
Social media and messaging platforms like Telegram continues to play a key role in helping individuals and organizations alike understand events, rumors, and ideas as they unfolded, often in real time. As we describe in this article, and as we highlighted in our popular report on the role of open-source intelligence (OSINT) in the Russia-Ukraine War, organizations are rightfully viewing OSINT as a key element of their intelligence and security operations and leveraging it to understand organizational risk as it relates to the cyber, physical, and informational battlefields of this war.
Let’s zoom in on two crucial days—June 23 and June 24—of the conflict between Putin and Prigozhin and examine the importance of OSINT in understanding the events, then and now.
Flashpoint’s physical security intelligence platform showing results for a global search seeking mentions of Prigozhin across OSINT-related collections.
June 23: Wagner Accuses MOD of Missile Strike, Potential Military Coup Brews
On June 23, Yevgeny Prigozhin, the founder of the paramilitary company Wagner Group, accused Russia’s Ministry of Defence (MOD) and its leader, Sergei Shoigu, of conducting a missile strike on his mercenaries. Prigozhin claimed that the strike resulted in numerous fatalities. He characterized the MOD as “evil” and called for those responsible to be held accountable. It was unclear whether this move should be classified as a coup, insurrection, mutiny, or hardline bargaining tactic at the time.
In retaliation, Prigozhin has appeared to openly advocate for armed resistance against the MOD, adding fuel to an already tense stand-off. Prigozhin warned that “the next move will be ours,” and that those who are responsible for the deaths of the Wagner troops killed today, as well as the deaths of many tens of thousands of Russian soldiers, will be “punished” and “justice” will be “returned,” both to Russia’s armed forces and all of Russia. The MOD has rejected these accusations, claiming that they “do not correspond to reality” and labeling them as an “informational provocation.”
"All the video frames distributed on social networks on behalf of Yevgeny #Prigozhin about the alleged 'strike by the Russian Defense Ministry on the rear camps of the PMC Wagner” do not correspond to reality and are an informational provocation. pic.twitter.com/pBIPdFEdLc
The current events, particularly the Wagner Group turning on Putin, can be traced back to the devastating fighting at Bakhmut, where the Wagner Group suffered heavy losses. This battle resulted in significant costs and losses for Russia.
June 24: Prigozhin’s March To Moscow
On June 24, Prigozhin announced that Wagner Group, the private military company (PMC) he leads, would cease its march on Moscow, ending what has been widely regarded as an armed insurrection and potential coup attempt targeting Russia’s military and government leadership.
In an interesting twist, Belarusian President Lukashenko stepped in, providing a means for Wagner to continue operating in a “legal” manner. This intervention prompted the move of Wagner Group and Prigozhin to Belarus. This is particularly noteworthy as PMCs are technically illegal under Article 359 of the 1996 Russian Criminal Code. As a result of the negotiations, the sides agreed that a “bloodbath” on Russian territory should be averted and de-escalatory steps should be taken. Prigozhin agreed that Wagner would halt its advance on Moscow, which Prigozhin claims Wagner got within 200 kilometers of, and turn back to “go in the opposite direction to [their] field camps.” In return, Wagner personnel would be granted “security guarantees.”
Related Blog
Timeline of Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: Cyber and Physical Warfare
Prigozhin claims that Wagner had not spilled “a single drop of blood of our fighters” since the start of their march on Russia the day prior. However, Prigozhin claims that Russia’s military had attempted to fire at the PMC during their march, reportedly downing at least one and potentially multiple Russian military helicopters. There are also reports of a fire at a fuel depot in Voronezh, which may have been hit by a Russian helicopter.
Screengrab of a video posted on a pro-Wagner Telegram channel showing Wagner supporters in Rostov as they demonstrate support to departing Wagner troops. (Image: Telegram)
Wagner troops seized control of multiple military and administrative buildings in the Russian city of Rostov-on-Don early on Saturday morning and had since reportedly reached Voronezh, which lies 500 kilometers north of the city and on the way to Moscow. On June 24, Russian media reported that Wagner was preparing to leave Rostov-on-Don.
Since then, the Kremlin has said that Prigozhin would not have to face charges in Russia, but he has been dubbed a “traitor” by Putin. As of this publishing, Prigozhin is allegedly in Belarus, according to the country’s President, Lukashenko, who brokered the deal on Prigozhin behalf.
Concluding thoughts
In today’s dynamic geopolitical climate, staying ahead of the curve necessitates more than just monitoring mainstream media. Open-source intelligence collections have emerged as a game-changing tool for keeping abreast of the latest events in Ukraine and Russia, which can help various organizations and sectors sift through vast amounts of information, quickly filter out the noise, and deliver the most salient insights in real-time. The recent events in Russia showcase the value of this intelligence resource in offering a multifaceted perspective on ground realities.
Get Flashpoint on your side
Flashpoint’s suite of actionable intelligence solutions enables organizations to proactively identify and mitigate cyber and physical risk that could imperil people, places, and assets. To unlock the power of great threat intelligence, get started with a free Flashpoint trial.
Lessons From Clop: Combating Ransomware and Cyber Extortion Events
Recent attacks from Clop emphasize the importance of implementing an organization-wide ransomware and cyber extortion strategy, from preparedness to detection and isolation
When a ransomware or cyber extortion event occurs, security teams are racing against the clock:
What do we know about the cybercriminal group that’s claiming responsibility for an attack or double extortion?
Is our organization affected? If so, what is the extent of the breach and its impact on our systems, networks, people, and data?
How do we respond to and mitigate the situation?
Flashpoint Ignite’s finished intelligence is readily available to all teams to help mitigate risk across the entire organization.
These questions are of vital importance to organizations across the public and private sectors. And the recent Clop attacks—which affected organizations across the globe in nearly every vertical—are yet another example of why it’s vital to have proactive defense measures in place.
Targeting upstream data providers
First, it’s vital to have a deep understanding of the adversary, such as a RaaS (ransomware-as-a-service) group like Clop. Here are five ways that ransomware groups like Clop attack targets, as well as the threat vectors they seen to exploit:
Supply chain attacks. As illustrated through MOVEit, Clop often targets upstream software vendors or service providers so that it can cast a wide net. A number of the known Clop victims are companies who were attacked via a third-party vendor. Attackers like Clop may exploit vulnerabilities in the communication or data exchange between these companies, or compromise the software or hardware components supplied by third-party providers to inject malicious code or backdoors.
Cloud Service Providers (CSP). If a cloud service provider experiences a security breach, it can potentially impact third parties that utilize their cloud services in several ways. Clop successfully breached a cloud service provider, giving them potential access to highly sensitive information.
Managed Service Providers (MSPs), who inherently have access to clients’ IT infrastructure, are also a lucrative target for ransomware groups like Clop as they service a multitude of businesses.
Software vulnerabilities are common,asransomware groups often exploit known vulnerabilities in widely used software. Here, Clop exploited MOVEit, a file transfer software used by organizations globally, to install a malicious web shell called LEMURLOOT.
Zero-days. Ransomware groups may also exploit zero-day vulnerabilities, or previously unknown security flaws, in software leveraged by a wide range of organizations.
Putting vulnerabilities into context
VulnDB’s vulnerability intelligence record highlighting the severity and importance of the MOVEit vulnerability.
CLOP’s use of the MOVEit and GoAnywhere MFT vulnerabilities provide us with two recent high-profile examples of the power and impact of the group’s attacks—as well as the damage they can have on victims.
It also shines a bright light onto the level of information and context that CTI analysts and vulnerability management teams require in order to better prioritize and take action on the vulnerabilities likely to be used in ransomware and other attacks.
Tools such as Flashpoint’s VulnDB can unpack vulnerabilities like MOVEit in order to provide practitioners with access to real-time, comprehensive information so that they can understand the scope of the incident and develop effective response strategies to make faster, informed decisions and mitigate the attack.
This includes information about 300,000 vulnerabilities, including thousands not listed in the public source, as well as robust metadata and numerous prioritization and prediction metrics, including:
supplemental information on which versions of software may be affected
Furthermore, when equipped with this context, vulnerability practitioners should be able to gain an active understanding of how the software, services, and other third-party assets they use are affected.
The combination of threat intelligence and vulnerability intelligence is a powerful weapon against adversaries. For instance, when a ransomware event occurs, vulnerability practitioners should be able to easily raise their awareness levels by using a robust alerting system. From there, they can quickly drill down into supplemental information to identify if exploits are being shared, see which threat actors are discussing the vulnerability across all illicit and open-source communities (forums, chats, ransomware sites, paste sites, blogs, social media, e.g.), and better assess the risk.
Flashpoint’s ransomware dashboard provides an up-to-date, easy-to-consume view of global ransomware trends, victims, as well as the ransomware groups themselves.
Understanding incidents as they unfold
Gaining continuous intelligence and context on ransomware attacks is vital throughout an attack, which often extends for weeks in the public sphere (and undoubtedly longer behind closed doors). It is therefore important to ensure that your organization is being provided with an active understanding of the situation as it unfolds in real-time—beyond vulnerability intelligence.
Flashpoint’s Intelligence Team, for example, delivers to customers incident pages and regular updates that communicate the most important details of an extortion event in progress. This includes background and assessments of the vulnerability, status updates with timelines, known victims, change logs, and intelligence that contributes to a more holistic understanding of a risk and informs decision-making.
Managed attribution for investigations
A managed attribution solution allows intelligence teams to shift from defense to offense by enabling security teams to safely and anonymously conduct investigations. Analysts will often access or download files from a ransomware blog to verify if their organization was impacted in the incident. While doing so, it’s vital to protect and keep your organization safe via a secure research environment that is isolated from analyst browsers, computers and network infrastructure. Flashpoint’s Managed Attribution solution allows security teams to interact with files, conduct online investigations, and browse safely without risk to their organization.
Ransomware response and readiness
To quickly assess, contain, and mitigate the impact of such incidents, it is crucial for organizations to have robust risk management practices in place. This includes conducting thorough due diligence when selecting third-party vendors, assessing their security practices, actively monitoring their security posture, and implementing contractual obligations and security controls to protect the company’s interests.
Additionally, it’s crucial to have incident response plans in place in order to respond effectively and recover from security breaches.In the event that an organization is impacted by ransomware, having a well-practiced incident response plan can greatly minimize damages. This includes:
Creating an Incident Response playbook
Holding mandatory training sessions for employees
Enabling staff members to proactively thwart attacks
Ransomware and cyber extortion events are undoubtedly stressful and challenging, but there are practical and proven ways to lessen that burden to reduce risk across your organization. To learn more about how Flashpoint empowers security teams to prevent and respond to ransomware attacks, contact us, sign up for a free trial, or watch this video to understand the top ways to prevent a ransomware attack at your organization.
How to Combat Check Fraud: Leveraging Intelligence to Prevent Financial Loss
Criminals increasingly steal checks and sell them on illicit online marketplaces, where check fraud-related services are common. Intelligence is helping the financial sector fight back
Checks are one of the most vulnerable legacy payment methods. Check fraud can actively affect the bottom lines (and reputations) of banks, financial services organizations, government entities, and many other organizations that utilize checks. According to the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), fraud—including check fraud—is “the largest source of illicit proceeds in the US” as well as “one of the most significant money laundering threats to the United States.”
Targeting the mail
Criminals target the US mail system to steal a variety of checks. In fact, there is a nationwide surge in check fraud schemes targeting the US mail and shipping system, as threat actors continue to steal, alter, and sell checks through illicit means and channels.
This includes personal checks and tax refund checks to government or government assistance-related checks (Social Security payments, e.g.). Business checks are also a primary target because they are often written for larger amounts and may take longer for the victim to identify fraudulent activity.
In 2022 alone, US banks filed 680,000 check fraud-related suspicious activity reports (SARs). This represents a nearly two-fold increase from 2021 (which itself represents a 23 percent YoY increase from 2020). This surge in check fraud has been exacerbated by Covid-19 Economic Impact Payments (EIPs) under the CARES Act, which presented threat actors with a new avenue to attempt to commit fraud.
Related Reading
This Is What Covid Fraud Looks Like: Targeting Government Relief Funding
In order to mitigate and ultimately prevent check-fraud-related risks, it’s crucial for financial intelligence and fraud teams to understand what threat actors seek, how they work, and where they operate.
This begins, as we detail below, with intelligence into the communities, forums, and marketplaces where check fraud occurs as well as the tools that enable deep understandings, timely insights, and measurable action.
Below is an intelligence narrative, in three acts, that tells the story of how transactions involving some of the above examples could play out.
Act I: Obtain
Threat actors are known to remove mail from individuals’ mailboxes and parcel lockers using blue box “arrow” master keys. These arrow keys are often stolen from USPS employees, which has led to numerous incidents of harassment, threats, and even violence. Generally, arrow keys are sold within illicit community chats and/or the deep and dark web, often fetching upwards of $3,000 per key.
In general, when it comes to check fraud, threat actors may sell or seek:
Mailbox keys
Stolen checks
Check alteration services (physical and digital)
Synthetic identity provisioning
Drop account sharing
Counterfeit check creation
Writing a check with insufficient funds behind it
Insider access
A screenshot of Flashpoint’s Ignite platform, showing the results of an OCR-driven search for stolen checks.
Act II: Alter
Check alteration comes in two forms: “washing” and “cooking.”
Washing refers to the process of altering a check by chemically removing ink and replacing the newly empty spaces with a different value, recipient name, or another fraud-enabling alteration.
Cooking involves digitally scanning the check and altering text or values through digital means.
Act III: Monetize
Threat actors will deposit the fraudulent check and rapidly withdraw the funds from an ATM, or sell a stolen or altered check on an illicit marketplace or chat group, and then receive payment, often via cryptocurrency.
Four key elements of actionable check fraud intelligence
Financial institutions should rely on four essential intelligence-led technologies, tools, or capabilities to effectively combat check fraud.
1) Visibility and access to illicit communities and channels
To prevent check fraud, organizations should focus on a few key places. Financially motivated threat actors operate and share information on messaging apps like Telegram and other open-source channels, as well as illicit marketplaces on the deep and dark web. Therefore, it is imperative for financial intelligence and fraud teams to have access to the most relevant check fraud-related threats across the internet.
Keep in mind, however, that accessing these communities is not always straightforward and, if done frivolously, can compromise an investigation.
2) Timeliness and curated alerting
Intelligence is often only as good as it is relevant. Flashpoint enables security and intelligence practitioners to bubble the most important, mission-critical intelligence through our real-time alerting capability, which allows users to receive notifications for keywords and phrases that relate to their mission, such as check fraud-related lingo and activity.
Essential Reading
The Flashpoint Guide to Card Fraud for the Financial Services Sector
In addition to real-time alerts, analysts can rely on curated alerting and saved searches to track topics of long-term interest. Flashpoint Ignite enables analysts to research particular accounts and their recent activity and matches transactions to their respective ATM slips and institution address. This helps to ensure the accuracy of the information found within these communities and marketplaces before raising any alarms, as many scammers post false content.
This approach is particularly valuable as check fraudsters often share crucial information such as preferred methodologies, social media handles, and geolocations that can aid in identifying malicious activities. In addition, by closely observing newly emerging trends, such as the evolution of pandemic relief fraud to refund fraud to check fraud, analysts can proactively develop robust preventative measures to mitigate risks before these tactics become widespread.
3) Actionable OCR and Video Search
In order to provide “material proof,” cyber threat actors will often tout and post an image of a check in a chat application or marketplace in hopes of increasing the likelihood of a successful transaction. Optical Character Recognition (OCR) technology can capture important information about check fraud attempts, since actors often share images of the fraudulent check or subsequent monetization transactions. OCR alerts are customizable with the financial institution’s name and common phrases used on checks to enhance accuracy.
Images of fraudulent checks provide valuable insights into the fraud attempt, including the check’s unique identifier, the account holder’s name, the bank’s name and address, and the endorsement signature. By analyzing these details, financial institutions and law enforcement agencies can identify patterns and leads that can help them track down the perpetrators and prevent future fraudulent activity.
Related Resource
The Risk-Reducing Power of Flashpoint Video Search
Moreover, ATM withdrawal slips can offer critical information about the transaction, such as the location of the ATM, the time of the deposit, and the type of account used. This data is useful when taking appropriate measures to prevent similar attempts and protect customers’ assets. With the help of advanced technologies like Flashpoint’s OCR, institutions can quickly extract and analyze this information to generate real-time alerts and take prompt action to prevent monetary losses.
An essential investigative component, Flashpoint’s industry-first video search technology, like its OCR capability, enables fraud and cyber threat intelligence (CTI) teams to surface logos, text, explicit content, and other critical intelligence to enhance investigations.
Combat check fraud with Flashpoint
Flashpoint delivers the intelligence that enables financial institutions to combat check fraud at scale. With timely, actionable, and accurate intelligence, financial institutions can mitigate and prevent financial loss, protect customer assets, and track down perpetrators. Get a free trial today to learn how:
A financial services customer detected more than $4M in illicitly marketed assets, including checks and compromised accounts, using Flashpoint’s OCR capabilities.
A customer received 125 actionable alerts in a single month equated to over $15M in potentially averted losses.
An automated alert enabled a customer to identify a threat actor’s specific operations, saving them over $5M.
When most people think of physical security, they often think about access control measures or physical security systems. These include gates, alarms, surveillance cameras, and security guards. These measures are fundamental to protecting facilities, as well as the people, assets, and infrastructure inside of them. However, these measures fail to address several external factors. These factors include the impact of natural disasters, terrorist attacks, and insider threats on physical security.
Why is Physical Security Intelligence Important?
That is where physical security intelligence comes into play. Physical security intelligence delivers mission-critical insights into real-time situations occurring globally. It empowers governments and commercial enterprises to safeguard, defend, and enhance the security of individuals, locations, and physical assets.
Physical security intelligence is built on external information. This includes social media and other online channels. It provides situational awareness and insights into potential physical security threats in their earliest stages.
Where Physical and Cyber Threat Intelligence Collide
Cyber and physical threats are increasingly related. In fact, most attacks on people, places, and infrastructure involve some degree of online communication. Real-world events are often enabled or bolstered by cyber-related activities. An example is when a threat actor uses an online discussion forum or social media network to plan a physical attack.
Decentralized open-source channels like Telegram have become an increasingly popular medium for both cyber and physical threat actors. These channels have eroded long-standing barriers to entry to the deep and dark web. When that communication takes place in publicly available channels, security teams can use that information to investigate the incident. Ideally, they can be alerted to early warning indicators and prevent it altogether.
Case Study: Physical Security Intelligence
How Flashpoint Helped the Community Security Initiative (NY) Stop a Potential Synagogue Shooting
Physical security intelligence reduces information gaps and leads to more proactive physical security. Open-source intelligence is a critical resource for these applications.
OSINT involves gathering and analyzing publicly available information to derive meaningful insights. In recent years, OSINT has become one of the most relied-upon forms of intelligence for the US government. Its abundance and low barrier to entry make OSINT increasingly useful for commercial enterprises as well.
Thanks to the smartphone, open sources like social media often provide the most up-to-the-minute information about breaking events. Tapping into this data gives security and intelligence teams the real-time information necessary for addressing immediate crises and generating timely intelligence. OSINT provides incredible value for both public and private sector teams. This is true as long as they have the tools and capabilities to gather and analyze the abundance of information effectively.
Examples of Physical Security Intelligence Use Cases
How understanding physical risk can enable corporate physical security teams and public sector organizations to address a wide range of challenges.
Global Situational Awareness
Open-source data can improve situational awareness. It does this by providing insight related to geopolitics, public sentiment, technology developments, and on-the-ground activities in areas of interest. This is especially true when that data is enriched with geospatial information. This information includes where the posts originated, or what locations were mentioned within the post contents and metadata.
Crisis Response
Open-source data provides real-time information for events like natural disasters, public health crises, and terrorist attacks. This information helps security teams stay alert to breaking events, assess impacts, and respond appropriately.
Executive Protection and Force Protection
Across the public and private sectors, threats to personnel come from all directions. This ranges from unforeseen travel risks to doxing and reputational risks, such as bad press. Leveraging OSINT is crucial for surfacing this information and reducing blind spots. It is a strategic complement to traditional executive protection methods like bodyguards and security cameras.
Flashpoint Ignite equips physical security teams with real-time access to the most extensive breadth of open-source information available.
Flashpoint Ignite equips physical security teams with real-time access to the most extensive breadth of open-source information available.
Persistent Threat Analysis
Persistent security concerns like terrorism rely on social media and other online channels to spread. OSINT helps physical security and intelligence teams monitor evolving web-based chatter to improve visibility and defend against those threats.
Insider Threats
Social dissent, burnout, and various other factors have dramatically shifted the insider threat landscape. Disgruntled employees may take action against organizations. This could include disclosing confidential data or disrupting business operations. They often discuss these topics online before taking action. Government, healthcare, big tech, and media are especially vulnerable.
Physical Attacks
Social media and discussion websites are often used to share violent intent and plan events. For example, the Capitol Hill insurrection was planned online for weeks prior to the attack. Bad actors tend to be more candid in online settings. This is because their identity is anonymous, and they are engaging with like-minded communities.
Supply Chain Disruptions
Disruptions like natural disasters or geopolitical conflicts can halt or delay the flow of goods along the supply chain. Monitoring open sources for these disruptions can provide early warning indicators. It can also help you assess if your organization will be impacted down the line.
Event Monitoring
It is vital to have the right physical security intelligence protocols in place. This ensures the security of an event and its attendees. Physical security intelligence can augment an organization’s overall security and intelligence operations during an event. This could be a high-profile conference with global attendees or a smaller affair. Physical security intelligence can include pre-event assessments, daily stand-ups, and monitoring and alerting of imminent and potential threats. Protecting a location—and the people around it—is also essential to strengthening brand reputation
Flashpoint Ignite for Physical Security Teams
Flashpoint’s Physical Security Intelligence (PSI) solution is part of the Ignite platform. It gathers open-source data from a variety of online spaces. These range from mainstream social media, discussion forums, fringe networks, messaging apps, and regional sources from around the world. The solution is fast and intuitive. It allows users to search, filter, monitor, and analyze the data in a customizable dashboard. User-generated alerts ensure that the right team gets notified if new, relevant content is detected. Enrichments like geolocation, language detection, and threat detection provide valuable context to the information discovered.
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