Researchers have prototyped an AI-powered internet worm.
The coolest thing about the prototype is that it carries its own LLM with it, and runs it on computers that have been broken into.
This is the closest to John Brunner’s original 1975 conception of a computer worm that I’ve seen.
In April 2026, we discovered a new malware campaign targeting players of “hentai” games. Once launched, the infected games install a previously unknown malicious implant on the user’s machine. After a few days, the implant downloads and executes a Trojan, resulting in full system compromise and broad remote control capabilities for the attackers. We dubbed this malware family “Argamal”.
The malware uses COM hijacking to persist on the victim’s machine, replacing the InprocServer32 entry for Windows Color System Calibration Loader DLL. This task is triggered when the user logs in, effectively allowing the malware to run at startup.
Kaspersky solutions detect this threat as Trojan.Win32.Termixia.*, Trojan.Win32.Agent.*, HEUR:Trojan.Win32.Argamal.gen and HEUR:Trojan-Downloader.Win32.Argamal.gen.
In April, as part of our ongoing monitoring of telemetry data, we found some suspicious DLLs. Further analysis revealed that various versions of these DLLs have existed since at least 2024.
The DLLs were spawned by different games written using various game engines and programming languages, including RenPy (Python) and RPG Maker MV (JavaScript), among others. However, they all had one thing in common: they were all hentai games. We searched for the distribution sources and found a number of websites hosting game screenshots and download links. These links redirected users to PixelDrain, a free file transfer service.
Adult games catalogue
In addition to these websites, the trojanized games have also been distributed via different torrent trackers, including AniRena.
Malicious game torrent in AniRena
Both the dedicated websites and torrents delivered an archive containing the infected game.
Contents of the game archive
This archive contained fully functional, legitimate game files, as well as a modified FFmpeg DLL (SHA1: 42add9475e67a1ccc6a6af94b5475d3defc01b85), that imported the DllGetClassObject function from a file called natives2_blob.bin. Since the game needs ffmpeg.dll to run properly, the library loads as soon as the user starts the game.
The natives2_blob.bin (SHA1: edce72f59e4c1d136cd1946af70d334c19df858d) file is a DLL that executes a Base64-encoded PowerShell script when loaded.
The natives2_blob.bin file code
This PowerShell script, which we’ll call Stage1, performs basic checks for controlled environments. For example, it checks for the Sandboxie folder in Program Files and Procmon64 in the process list. If all the checks indicate that the process is not running in a controlled environment, it proceeds to establish persistence.
Stage1 sets the MI_V environment variable (and also MI_V2 in the new versions of malware) for the current user to another Base64-encoded PowerShell script, which we’ll call Stage2. After that, it sets the InprocServer32 registry key at HKCU\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\{722D0F89-B69C-4700-AE8C-4A44350E4876} to a random DLL file name in a random subdirectory of %USER%\AppData\Local, as well as the ShellFolder subkey to another random DLL file name in the same location. Stage1 also creates a scheduled task that will execute three days later. This task executes Stage2 and runs once.
Stage2 is a payload downloader script. It takes previously generated DLL filenames from the registry and downloads an encrypted payload called zaesdl.dat from GitHub using bitsadmin.exe. The downloaded payload is saved in the settings.dat file in the randomly chosen subdirectory of %USER%\AppData\Local. Stage2 decrypts it using AES-CBC with the key zbcd1j9234r670eh and an IV equal to the key. The decrypted payload is then saved in the DLL file specified in the ShellFolder registry subkey.
The decrypted payload is set as InprocServer32 at HKCU\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\{B210D694-C8DF-490D-9576-9E20CDBC20BD}, which is a COM object used by the \Microsoft\Windows\WindowsColorSystem\Calibration Loader scheduled task. This task runs every time a user logs in, allowing the malware to run during every user session.
Before quitting, Stage2 also removes the changes made under the HKCU\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\{722D0F89-B69C-4700-AE8C-4A44350E4876} registry key, unsets the MI_V environment variable (and MI_V2 in newer versions), and removes the scheduled task that launched Stage2.
Early payload versions decrypted themselves using the 0xB0C1D4E9 rolling XOR key, where the decryption key for the i + 1 block is the encrypted content of the i block (each encrypted block being four bytes long). The most recent agent versions don’t do that.
The samples we found had string encryption; they use a simple substitution with a key that corresponds position-by-position to the following alphabet: ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789@#$./:<>*&~. The decryption process involves finding the position of each symbol of the encrypted strings in the key, and replacing it with the symbol that occupies the same position in the alphabet.
During our investigation, we found the following keys were used:
All symbols not used in the key remain unchanged.
String decryption
The payload checks for the presence of the following security solutions using the output of the tasklist command:
Security solution detection logic
The payload itself is a RAT with broad functionality. The default C2 server is asper1[.]freeddns[.]org for earlier versions and Winst0[.]kozow[.]com for the latest versions of the payload. Both domains point to 186[.]158.223.35. We also saw another IP address for the first C2 in pDNS records, though we haven’t actually seen it in use. The C2 address can change based on a C2 reply or when certain conditions are met. For example, if the user’s default locale is set to “zh-CN”, the RAT sets its C2 address to country1[.]ignorelist[.]com. During most of our investigation, this domain pointed to 127[.]0.0.1, but starting April 26, it has been pointing to 186[.]158.223.35 as well.
The payload sends UDP heartbeats to port 57441 of the C2 server. These heartbeats contain information about detected security solutions, system startup time, time since last input activity, architecture info, machine IP address and username.
The C2 may respond to the heartbeat. Based on this response, the payload can perform different actions. Below is the full list of available commands.
| Response first byte | Description |
| 0x31 | Run DLL on the system |
| 0x57 | Send UDP request to the specified address |
| 0x55 | Open file or link from the response |
| 0x50 | Collect information about the infected system (e.g. process list and architecture) |
| 0x53 | Execute command from the response using ShellExecuteW |
| 0x52 | Run the file specified in the response using WinExec |
| 0x42 | Delete the file specified in the response |
| 0x41 | Update C2 domain |
| 0x59 | Get new payload: connect to C2 port 63559/UDP, get new DLL and update COM path in the registry |
The C2 can also set a flag in the response that will turn on the extended RAT mode. In this mode, the payload communicates with the C2 server using the 3747/tcp port.
TCP communications are encrypted using a simple substitution cipher. Each character is replaced using a fixed mapping defined by the key:
koP]Y4Os-_t?cB',aK.Wm>QM2[U!^C`*@Ff:X\6Dp8H%ATydE<e(#G&LhwRZ5znjJqgNrl)I7V$3=910"+Svxi/;ub
This key corresponds position-by-position to the standard ASCII character sequence:
Login!"#$%&'()*+,-./0123456789:;<=>?@ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ[\\]^_`abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz{|}In other words, each character in the ASCII set is replaced by the corresponding character in the key string.
C2 requests and responses are divided into two parts by the first space character. The first part is a command and the second part is usually an argument.
After connecting and before receiving information from the C2, the malware sends metadata about the infected machine using the NOOP command. This metadata includes a run cycle counter, mounted drive metadata, time since the last input activity and data about the display settings.
Based on the C2 command, the malware can execute commands on the infected machine, perform reboot and shutdown actions, control the cursor, take screenshots, compress files into archives, and send files to other specified servers. In short, it can fully control the machine. The full list of commands is as follows:
System control
KILL REBOOT: Reboots the infected systemKILL POWER: Shuts down the infected systemKILL SELF: Same as the QUIT command (described below)KILL ME: Exits process running the malwareSurveillance
SCREEN / SCREEN9: makes a screenshot, saves it to the ~wra1269.tmp file and sends it to the C2File operations
DELETE <filename>: deletes specified fileDELDIR <dirname>: deletes specified directoryREN <file path 1>#<file path 2>: moves specified fileMAKDIR <path>: creates directoryZIPFILE <file or folder name> / ZIPFOLDER <file or folder name>: compresses specified file/folder into a .zip archiveTAR <file or folder name> / TAR2 <file or folder name>: compresses specified file/folder into a .tar archiveGETFILEDATE <filename>: sends file’s last modification dateSETFILEDATE <filename>: sets file’s last modification dateGETFILEACC <filename>: sends file’s last access dateDWLOAD <filename>: sends file to the C2UPLOAD <filename>#<C2 address>: uploads file to the specified C2 serverReconnaissance
USER: sends usernameKALIVE: sends run cycle counterIDLE: sends number of seconds passed since last input activityDRIVES: sends information about mounted drivesFOLDEX <folder type>: sends full path to a directory of the specified type:0x63: temporary directory0x64: \Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\ in AppData\Local folder0x65: \Downloads\ in user home directory0x66: \Microsoft\Excel\XLSTART\ in AppData folder0x67: AppData folderLFILES <folder path>: lists and sends paths to all files in the directoryOSVER: sends information about user, hostname, OS architecture and versionCOMPILERDATE: sends constant hardcoded in the RAT, e.g., 25.10.2025Generic control
DSOCKE: recreates TCP keep-alive socketQUIT: notifies the C2 about quitting, closes the socket and stops the processRUNHID <command> / RUN <command>: runs specified command inside ShellExecuteWRUNDOS <command>: runs specified command inside CreateProcessWRUNTASK <command>: creates, runs and deletes task that executes specified commandSKEY <key code>: presses specified keyMOUSE FREEZE: freezes mouse movementMOUSE <command>: clicks the specified mouse button or sets the cursor position to the specified coordinatesDuring our research, we also observed other delivery methods for the RAT. Instead of patching FFmpeg and downloading the payload from GitHub, the attackers included the main payload as libpython64.dat or another file with a similar name in the lib\py3-windows-x86_64 directory of the game. This .dat file was loaded by one of the libraries used in the game, which was patched for this purpose.
In another case, the threat actor posted their malicious DLL file (payload downloader) on a gaming forum, disguising it as a cheat.
Our research revealed the following infrastructure was used in this attack.
| Domain | IP | First seen | ASN |
| asper1[.]freeddns[.]org | 181[.]116.218.56 | September 16, 2024 | 11664 |
| 186[.]158.223.35 | July 01, 2025 | 11664 | |
| country1[.]ignorelist[.]com | 186[.]158.223.35 | September 10, 2025 | 11664 |
| 127[.]0.0.1 | November 11, 2025 | – | |
| Winst0.kozow[.]com | 186[.]158.223.35 | April 26, 2026 | 11664 |
According to our telemetry, hundreds of individuals were infected with this malware. The majority of the victims were located in Russia, Brazil, Germany and Vietnam.
Based on the language of the comments in the code, infrastructure data and other facts we assess with medium confidence that the developer of the downloader chain speaks Spanish.
The actor behind this attack uses Spanish in variable names and comments. For example, the Base64-decoded delivery script contains the following lines:
Part of the PowerShell script used in the payload delivery
In addition, the JavaScript code from the website distributing infected games contains variable names, function names and comments in Spanish:
JavaScript code from the malicious site
Notably, the malware payloads used in this attack had previously chosen 127.0.0.1 as their C2 server when the victim’s default locale is set to “zh-CN”, thus not targeting Chinese users. This may indicate that the attacker is associated with a Chinese-speaking threat actor or uses payloads developed by a Chinese-speaking threat actor. However, we still believe it’s unlikely that the developer of these delivery chains is Chinese-speaking.
The Argamal Trojan is a new RAT targeting individuals who seek adult games. During our analysis, we observed a steady stream of updates to the payload, including the addition of new features and fixes for various bugs, as well as changes to the infrastructure. This leads us to believe that the threat actor behind this malware will continue to develop and enhance it. The campaign’s goal is likely data and credential theft; however, the RAT enables the attacker to take full control of the device and execute any malicious activity they want.
Creating malware in today’s development landscape has become significantly easier thanks to the wide availability of detailed guides, tooling, and automation resources. As a result, it is crucial not only to detect known malware but also to identify new and evolving threats as they emerge. Kaspersky solutions prevented the malicious activity in the earliest stages of the attack. The solutions help ensure device security by identifying not only known threats but also the behavior of the software and its actions, providing comprehensive protection against malware.
File hashes
RAT payloads:
76253fb55aed707440e808ea78e7101318436b1c
1405a3c5e0aeb08012484134e16cdec4ab29b4a4
535f4337f261b6da20a3c614eb13270bed2d533a
d2cb0d7a9ad2b5d4ea7c2da8aec62beb37cf36d6
e05f1767c2a337910ed75e90288838d6d0541164
dad26f61da7b8bccc78364411812be74c025b475
29f1d346a6e71774c7dad25b90f446b2974393df
e815a9b418d09c2d4bcd074c2c0bc21406eeb22f
17f8f8f34dfa737f36182fed7ff9e9814a114058
954722b0c9c678b1313d1f8b204e102842dc5889
69331cfdac792dc79240e6a6bb6e803eabd70beb
901cfa97b1baaf908fd4a02bb52d970f576c4193
5f1f3689bcf23de1b280b5f35712946da0f7978f
c2d9d48b3b10bd58cdf5df9463e3ffcd60533ff3
2423a5bf0fa7cb9ec09211630a5488629499691b
ae4601a19d28332a3ec6ac31b385cdf53be53450
Trojan downloaders:
9803604ec45f31f9ef75bcca1e1310d8ac1fc3a6
edce72f59e4c1d136cd1946af70d334c19df858d
02819d200d1424882af81cb504b3e8614b32397a
Domains and IPs
asper1[.]freeddns[.]org
Winst0[.]kozow[.]com
Country1[.]ignorelist[.]com
186[.]158.223.35
GitHub repositories used in the campaign
hxxps://github[.]com/gmz159/u
hxxps://github[.]com/DnyP/files
hxxps://github[.]com/mgzv/p
In April 2026, we discovered a new malware campaign targeting players of “hentai” games. Once launched, the infected games install a previously unknown malicious implant on the user’s machine. After a few days, the implant downloads and executes a Trojan, resulting in full system compromise and broad remote control capabilities for the attackers. We dubbed this malware family “Argamal”.
The malware uses COM hijacking to persist on the victim’s machine, replacing the InprocServer32 entry for Windows Color System Calibration Loader DLL. This task is triggered when the user logs in, effectively allowing the malware to run at startup.
Kaspersky solutions detect this threat as Trojan.Win32.Termixia.*, Trojan.Win32.Agent.*, HEUR:Trojan.Win32.Argamal.gen and HEUR:Trojan-Downloader.Win32.Argamal.gen.
In April, as part of our ongoing monitoring of telemetry data, we found some suspicious DLLs. Further analysis revealed that various versions of these DLLs have existed since at least 2024.
The DLLs were spawned by different games written using various game engines and programming languages, including RenPy (Python) and RPG Maker MV (JavaScript), among others. However, they all had one thing in common: they were all hentai games. We searched for the distribution sources and found a number of websites hosting game screenshots and download links. These links redirected users to PixelDrain, a free file transfer service.
Adult games catalogue
In addition to these websites, the trojanized games have also been distributed via different torrent trackers, including AniRena.
Malicious game torrent in AniRena
Both the dedicated websites and torrents delivered an archive containing the infected game.
Contents of the game archive
This archive contained fully functional, legitimate game files, as well as a modified FFmpeg DLL (SHA1: 42add9475e67a1ccc6a6af94b5475d3defc01b85), that imported the DllGetClassObject function from a file called natives2_blob.bin. Since the game needs ffmpeg.dll to run properly, the library loads as soon as the user starts the game.
The natives2_blob.bin (SHA1: edce72f59e4c1d136cd1946af70d334c19df858d) file is a DLL that executes a Base64-encoded PowerShell script when loaded.
The natives2_blob.bin file code
This PowerShell script, which we’ll call Stage1, performs basic checks for controlled environments. For example, it checks for the Sandboxie folder in Program Files and Procmon64 in the process list. If all the checks indicate that the process is not running in a controlled environment, it proceeds to establish persistence.
Stage1 sets the MI_V environment variable (and also MI_V2 in the new versions of malware) for the current user to another Base64-encoded PowerShell script, which we’ll call Stage2. After that, it sets the InprocServer32 registry key at HKCU\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\{722D0F89-B69C-4700-AE8C-4A44350E4876} to a random DLL file name in a random subdirectory of %USER%\AppData\Local, as well as the ShellFolder subkey to another random DLL file name in the same location. Stage1 also creates a scheduled task that will execute three days later. This task executes Stage2 and runs once.
Stage2 is a payload downloader script. It takes previously generated DLL filenames from the registry and downloads an encrypted payload called zaesdl.dat from GitHub using bitsadmin.exe. The downloaded payload is saved in the settings.dat file in the randomly chosen subdirectory of %USER%\AppData\Local. Stage2 decrypts it using AES-CBC with the key zbcd1j9234r670eh and an IV equal to the key. The decrypted payload is then saved in the DLL file specified in the ShellFolder registry subkey.
The decrypted payload is set as InprocServer32 at HKCU\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\{B210D694-C8DF-490D-9576-9E20CDBC20BD}, which is a COM object used by the \Microsoft\Windows\WindowsColorSystem\Calibration Loader scheduled task. This task runs every time a user logs in, allowing the malware to run during every user session.
Before quitting, Stage2 also removes the changes made under the HKCU\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\{722D0F89-B69C-4700-AE8C-4A44350E4876} registry key, unsets the MI_V environment variable (and MI_V2 in newer versions), and removes the scheduled task that launched Stage2.
Early payload versions decrypted themselves using the 0xB0C1D4E9 rolling XOR key, where the decryption key for the i + 1 block is the encrypted content of the i block (each encrypted block being four bytes long). The most recent agent versions don’t do that.
The samples we found had string encryption; they use a simple substitution with a key that corresponds position-by-position to the following alphabet: ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789@#$./:<>*&~. The decryption process involves finding the position of each symbol of the encrypted strings in the key, and replacing it with the symbol that occupies the same position in the alphabet.
During our investigation, we found the following keys were used:
All symbols not used in the key remain unchanged.
String decryption
The payload checks for the presence of the following security solutions using the output of the tasklist command:
Security solution detection logic
The payload itself is a RAT with broad functionality. The default C2 server is asper1[.]freeddns[.]org for earlier versions and Winst0[.]kozow[.]com for the latest versions of the payload. Both domains point to 186[.]158.223.35. We also saw another IP address for the first C2 in pDNS records, though we haven’t actually seen it in use. The C2 address can change based on a C2 reply or when certain conditions are met. For example, if the user’s default locale is set to “zh-CN”, the RAT sets its C2 address to country1[.]ignorelist[.]com. During most of our investigation, this domain pointed to 127[.]0.0.1, but starting April 26, it has been pointing to 186[.]158.223.35 as well.
The payload sends UDP heartbeats to port 57441 of the C2 server. These heartbeats contain information about detected security solutions, system startup time, time since last input activity, architecture info, machine IP address and username.
The C2 may respond to the heartbeat. Based on this response, the payload can perform different actions. Below is the full list of available commands.
| Response first byte | Description |
| 0x31 | Run DLL on the system |
| 0x57 | Send UDP request to the specified address |
| 0x55 | Open file or link from the response |
| 0x50 | Collect information about the infected system (e.g. process list and architecture) |
| 0x53 | Execute command from the response using ShellExecuteW |
| 0x52 | Run the file specified in the response using WinExec |
| 0x42 | Delete the file specified in the response |
| 0x41 | Update C2 domain |
| 0x59 | Get new payload: connect to C2 port 63559/UDP, get new DLL and update COM path in the registry |
The C2 can also set a flag in the response that will turn on the extended RAT mode. In this mode, the payload communicates with the C2 server using the 3747/tcp port.
TCP communications are encrypted using a simple substitution cipher. Each character is replaced using a fixed mapping defined by the key:
koP]Y4Os-_t?cB',aK.Wm>QM2[U!^C`*@Ff:X\6Dp8H%ATydE<e(#G&LhwRZ5znjJqgNrl)I7V$3=910"+Svxi/;ub
This key corresponds position-by-position to the standard ASCII character sequence:
!"#$%&'()*+,-./0123456789:;<=>?@ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ[\\]^_`abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz{|}In other words, each character in the ASCII set is replaced by the corresponding character in the key string.
C2 requests and responses are divided into two parts by the first space character. The first part is a command and the second part is usually an argument.
After connecting and before receiving information from the C2, the malware sends metadata about the infected machine using the NOOP command. This metadata includes a run cycle counter, mounted drive metadata, time since the last input activity and data about the display settings.
Based on the C2 command, the malware can execute commands on the infected machine, perform reboot and shutdown actions, control the cursor, take screenshots, compress files into archives, and send files to other specified servers. In short, it can fully control the machine. The full list of commands is as follows:
System control
KILL REBOOT: Reboots the infected systemKILL POWER: Shuts down the infected systemKILL SELF: Same as the QUIT command (described below)KILL ME: Exits process running the malwareSurveillance
SCREEN / SCREEN9: makes a screenshot, saves it to the ~wra1269.tmp file and sends it to the C2File operations
DELETE <filename>: deletes specified fileDELDIR <dirname>: deletes specified directoryREN <file path 1>#<file path 2>: moves specified fileMAKDIR <path>: creates directoryZIPFILE <file or folder name> / ZIPFOLDER <file or folder name>: compresses specified file/folder into a .zip archiveTAR <file or folder name> / TAR2 <file or folder name>: compresses specified file/folder into a .tar archiveGETFILEDATE <filename>: sends file’s last modification dateSETFILEDATE <filename>: sets file’s last modification dateGETFILEACC <filename>: sends file’s last access dateDWLOAD <filename>: sends file to the C2UPLOAD <filename>#<C2 address>: uploads file to the specified C2 serverReconnaissance
USER: sends usernameKALIVE: sends run cycle counterIDLE: sends number of seconds passed since last input activityDRIVES: sends information about mounted drivesFOLDEX <folder type>: sends full path to a directory of the specified type:0x63: temporary directory0x64: \Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\ in AppData\Local folder0x65: \Downloads\ in user home directory0x66: \Microsoft\Excel\XLSTART\ in AppData folder0x67: AppData folderLFILES <folder path>: lists and sends paths to all files in the directoryOSVER: sends information about user, hostname, OS architecture and versionCOMPILERDATE: sends constant hardcoded in the RAT, e.g., 25.10.2025Generic control
DSOCKE: recreates TCP keep-alive socketQUIT: notifies the C2 about quitting, closes the socket and stops the processRUNHID <command> / RUN <command>: runs specified command inside ShellExecuteWRUNDOS <command>: runs specified command inside CreateProcessWRUNTASK <command>: creates, runs and deletes task that executes specified commandSKEY <key code>: presses specified keyMOUSE FREEZE: freezes mouse movementMOUSE <command>: clicks the specified mouse button or sets the cursor position to the specified coordinatesDuring our research, we also observed other delivery methods for the RAT. Instead of patching FFmpeg and downloading the payload from GitHub, the attackers included the main payload as libpython64.dat or another file with a similar name in the lib\py3-windows-x86_64 directory of the game. This .dat file was loaded by one of the libraries used in the game, which was patched for this purpose.
In another case, the threat actor posted their malicious DLL file (payload downloader) on a gaming forum, disguising it as a cheat.
Our research revealed the following infrastructure was used in this attack.
| Domain | IP | First seen | ASN |
| asper1[.]freeddns[.]org | 181[.]116.218.56 | September 16, 2024 | 11664 |
| 186[.]158.223.35 | July 01, 2025 | 11664 | |
| country1[.]ignorelist[.]com | 186[.]158.223.35 | September 10, 2025 | 11664 |
| 127[.]0.0.1 | November 11, 2025 | – | |
| Winst0.kozow[.]com | 186[.]158.223.35 | April 26, 2026 | 11664 |
According to our telemetry, hundreds of individuals were infected with this malware. The majority of the victims were located in Russia, Brazil, Germany and Vietnam.
Based on the language of the comments in the code, infrastructure data and other facts we assess with medium confidence that the developer of the downloader chain speaks Spanish.
The actor behind this attack uses Spanish in variable names and comments. For example, the Base64-decoded delivery script contains the following lines:
Part of the PowerShell script used in the payload delivery
In addition, the JavaScript code from the website distributing infected games contains variable names, function names and comments in Spanish:
JavaScript code from the malicious site
Notably, the malware payloads used in this attack had previously chosen 127.0.0.1 as their C2 server when the victim’s default locale is set to “zh-CN”, thus not targeting Chinese users. This may indicate that the attacker is associated with a Chinese-speaking threat actor or uses payloads developed by a Chinese-speaking threat actor. However, we still believe it’s unlikely that the developer of these delivery chains is Chinese-speaking.
The Argamal Trojan is a new RAT targeting individuals who seek adult games. During our analysis, we observed a steady stream of updates to the payload, including the addition of new features and fixes for various bugs, as well as changes to the infrastructure. This leads us to believe that the threat actor behind this malware will continue to develop and enhance it. The campaign’s goal is likely data and credential theft; however, the RAT enables the attacker to take full control of the device and execute any malicious activity they want.
Creating malware in today’s development landscape has become significantly easier thanks to the wide availability of detailed guides, tooling, and automation resources. As a result, it is crucial not only to detect known malware but also to identify new and evolving threats as they emerge. Kaspersky solutions prevented the malicious activity in the earliest stages of the attack. The solutions help ensure device security by identifying not only known threats but also the behavior of the software and its actions, providing comprehensive protection against malware.
File hashes
RAT payloads:
76253fb55aed707440e808ea78e7101318436b1c
1405a3c5e0aeb08012484134e16cdec4ab29b4a4
535f4337f261b6da20a3c614eb13270bed2d533a
d2cb0d7a9ad2b5d4ea7c2da8aec62beb37cf36d6
e05f1767c2a337910ed75e90288838d6d0541164
dad26f61da7b8bccc78364411812be74c025b475
29f1d346a6e71774c7dad25b90f446b2974393df
e815a9b418d09c2d4bcd074c2c0bc21406eeb22f
17f8f8f34dfa737f36182fed7ff9e9814a114058
954722b0c9c678b1313d1f8b204e102842dc5889
69331cfdac792dc79240e6a6bb6e803eabd70beb
901cfa97b1baaf908fd4a02bb52d970f576c4193
5f1f3689bcf23de1b280b5f35712946da0f7978f
c2d9d48b3b10bd58cdf5df9463e3ffcd60533ff3
2423a5bf0fa7cb9ec09211630a5488629499691b
ae4601a19d28332a3ec6ac31b385cdf53be53450
Trojan downloaders:
9803604ec45f31f9ef75bcca1e1310d8ac1fc3a6
edce72f59e4c1d136cd1946af70d334c19df858d
02819d200d1424882af81cb504b3e8614b32397a
Domains and IPs
asper1[.]freeddns[.]org
Winst0[.]kozow[.]com
Country1[.]ignorelist[.]com
186[.]158.223.35
GitHub repositories used in the campaign
hxxps://github[.]com/gmz159/u
hxxps://github[.]com/DnyP/files
hxxps://github[.]com/mgzv/p
Operation FlutterBridge is a malvertising campaign targeting macOS users. It distributed the new backdoor FlutterShell, built using the Flutter framework.
The post Operation FlutterBridge: macOS Malvertising Campaign Spreads New FlutterShell Backdoor appeared first on Unit 42.
In late April 2026, a client reached out to us for incident response support after discovering a miner running on users’ computers. We later discovered that the malware was being distributed via illegal movie and TV show streaming sites. The infection chain leveraged a fake update for a video player plugin. When the user attempted to watch a video, the player displayed a message saying the plugin version was outdated and asking to install an update to continue.
Clicking the link downloaded a ZIP archive with the following contents:
The archive contained a legitimate executable, HLS Installer.874.exe, alongside a malicious DLL. Launching the EXE triggered a DLL side-loading mechanism, injecting the malicious module into a legitimate program process and executing code within its context. The library contained the logic for deploying the miner and establishing persistence on the device.
At the time of the investigation, the infection risk was associated with two pirated video sites in the .ru and .top TLDs.
The current incident does not appear to be an isolated case. After analyzing the infection vector and the logic of the DLL, we concluded that this activity is a continuation of a campaign involving pirated digital libraries, which was previously described by another cybersecurity company.
The delivery mechanism for the malicious archive has remained virtually unchanged. Previously, the archive was downloaded in parts from the domain file[.]ipfs[.]us[.]69[.]mu, but this domain was unavailable at the time of our investigation. Instead, the threat actor employed a new website, urush1bar4[.]online.
The structure of the archive has also been preserved: inside is a legitimate executable and a large malicious DLL (see the screenshot below).
In the course of our research, we also discovered a blog post by NTT Security describing a similar delivery method for a malicious archive. In that instance, the threat actors displayed a fake browser crash page (shown below) while simultaneously downloading an archive to the device with a name starting with chromium-patch-nightly.
This scenario resembles the current scheme involving the fake video player plugin update. Given the previously described activity, it’s safe to assume that this campaign has been active since at least 2022. Throughout this entire period, the threat actor has been updating both the downloadable malware and individual parts of the infection mechanism.
As in previous episodes of the campaign, infections occur via highly popular websites. As of late April 2026, sites linked to the campaign typically displayed extremely high monthly traffic. For instance, the audience for the smallest of the free digital libraries stood at 11,000 users, while the largest reached 4.7 million. For pirated movie and TV show streaming sites, this figure ranged from 2.1 million to 27.4 million. In April, the total number of visits to websites where the malware described in this study was detected reached 40 million.
The popularity of these sites increases the potential scale of the miner’s distribution. Furthermore, the campaign is not limited to a single type of platform: the malicious archive is being distributed through both online digital libraries and movie and TV show streaming sites. This broadens the potential range of victims and makes it more difficult to attribute the threat to a single infection vector.
The current version of the downloadable malware is a ZIP archive containing a legitimate EXE file and a malicious DLL. When the executable runs, the library side-loads into its process, triggering the malicious logic.
The technical analysis that follows covers the current version of this malware. This version was first observed in April 2025 and has been distributed unmodified for over a year.
Most of the data inside the DLL carries no meaningful weight and was randomly generated just to inflate the file size and impede analysis.
Amidst the large volume of junk code inside the DLL, there is a single function that triggers a stack overflow during execution:
Based on the code, the size of the stackBuf buffer on the stack is only 64 bytes, and the SmashStack function overwrites this buffer without validating the length of the input data.
This overflow constructs a ROP chain that decrypts the next stage. After decryption, it transfers execution to code located within the modified DOS header of the PE file:
The header was intentionally modified to make it into valid shellcode:
pop r10 push r10 call $+5 pop rcx sub rcx, 9 mov rax, rcx add rax, 5C1000h call rax retn
This shellcode passes control to a function located at offset 0x5C1000 from the base of the PE file. This function then reflectively loads the same PE file into memory.
Going forward, we will refer to this decrypted PE file as the main module.
The module’s behavior across its different operational stages is detailed below:
The main module is a modified fork of the SilentCryptoMiner project. We have previously analyzed miners leveraging this project in other posts: Scam Information and Event Management and Undercover miner: how YouTubers get pressed into distributing SilentCryptoMiner as a restriction bypass tool. However, this specific fork has not been documented anywhere before, which is why we decided to break down its unique features in detail in this article.
Upon an initial run, the main module checks whether it has permission to proceed with execution. To do this, it collects the following data from the victim’s device:
The information is transmitted as a single large DNS query using the DNS tunneling technique. An example of the DNS query is shown below:
The attackers disguise the DNS query as legitimate traffic through low-level packet crafting and by using a domain name ending in microsoft.com. However, the IP address to which the query is actually sent has no relation to Microsoft.
DNS query crafting code
The execution of the main module proceeds only if the following byte sequence is detected in the response: 01 02 03 04. Following a successful check, the main module launches, and the subsequent logic is adjusted depending on whether the process has elevated privileges on the compromised host.
Let’s look at both scenarios:
1. The process is launched with elevated privileges.
In this case, preparatory steps precede the miner launch:
%USERPROFILE%, %PROGRAMDATA%, and %WINDIR% folders.ZwSetInformationFile with the FileDispositionInformation type, which causes the mrt.exe file to be deleted upon closing. To prevent MSRT from being automatically installed during the next update, the DontOfferThroughWUAU parameter is created with a value of 1 under the HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\MRT registry key.powercfg /x -hibernate-timeout-ac 0 powercfg /x -hibernate-timeout-dc 0 powercfg /x -standby-timeout-ac 0 powercfg /x -standby-timeout-dc 0
This is done to maximize the miner’s potential runtime on the device.
Next, to achieve persistence, a copy is created in the C:\ProgramData\Google\Chrome directory, after which the GoogleUpdateTaskMachineQC service is registered and configured to launch automatically at system startup.
Finally, four reflexive loads are executed: the components are injected directly into the memory of the target processes without writing to disk, having bypassed standard Windows loading mechanisms. Each implant is injected into its own host process:
2. The process is launched with standard privileges.
In this scenario, the miner begins repeatedly triggering User Account Control (UAC) prompts until it is successfully executed with elevated privileges. The workflow is as follows:
%USERPROFILE%\AppData\Roaming\Sandboxie directory and relaunched from there. Simultaneously, an attempt is made to launch it with elevated privileges via UAC.HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run.GoogleUpdateTaskMachineQC service is successfully installed.A successful installation requires all of the following conditions to be met:
GoogleUpdateTaskMachineQC service exists in the system.C:\ProgramData\Google\Chrome folder.The purpose of this component is to ensure the uninterrupted operation of the miner. At the very beginning of its execution, it copies all files from the C:\ProgramData\Google\Chrome folder and encrypts the contents of each file using a cyclic XOR algorithm with the key AFeIboiOmImJS2ypJU0pTpAO61SELkUc. After that, the encrypted contents are written into the process memory, and the following structure is created in memory for each file:
class FileContainer{
wchar_t* fullPath; // full path to file
size_t* ptrSize; // pointer to file size
uint8_t* xorEncryptedFile; //pointer to buffer containing encrypted file contents
};As soon as the contents of all files are saved in memory, Watchdog enters an infinite loop, where every five seconds, it checks the integrity of the installed GoogleUpdateTaskMachineQC service, just as the main module does. If the service is found to be incorrectly installed, the miner overwrites its files in the C:\ProgramData\Google\Chrome path with the contents acquired at startup.
To successfully remediate the miner, this module, which runs inside the explorer.exe process, must be terminated first.
This module provides remote control capabilities via four commands, which are described at the end of this section. The command-and-control addresses used to receive these commands follow this format:
http://{domain}.space/index.php?authorization=1http://{domain}.site/index.php? backup versionThe {domain} is calculated based on the current date. The process starts with the current year, then adds the zone identifier for the current month. All 12 months are divided into four zones. Finally, the word microsoft is appended to the resulting string. This final string is used as the input for subsequent double hashing using the MurmurHash64 algorithm. The hash output is the domain for the implant to communicate with.
At the time of writing this, the following domains were registered:
An example of a request to the C2 server is provided below:
As can be seen, the request contains an encrypted body consisting of data encrypted via AES-CBC with the key 0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef and the initialization vector 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f. The data contains a list of installed programs on the system, along with processor information and the serial number of the C: drive.
This information is likely used by the backend to check for virtual or debugging environments.
The first 16 bytes of the server response body represent the initialization vector for the AES-CBC algorithm with the key 0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef, while the remaining bytes are the data encrypted with this algorithm. The decrypted data contains a malicious payload, as well as its RSA-SHA256 signature (sign):
struct PLAINTEXT{
uint32_t len_payload;
uint8_t payload[len_payload];
uint32_t len_sign;
uint8_t sign[len_signature];
}The authenticity of the message is verified via the sign signature using the server’s public key, which is embedded in the executable.
Inside the malicious payload is a 4-byte code that determines the subsequent behavior of the program, along with additional data whose meaning depends on the code.
The table below lists the four remote control commands for the RAT agent module.
| Code | Purpose |
| 1 | Execution of an arbitrary command |
| 2 | Reflexive execution of the provided PE file within the explorer.exe process |
| 3 | Execution of the provided shellcode |
| 4 | Exit |
Depending on whether a discrete GPU is present in the system, either the CPU miner alone or a combination of the CPU and GPU miners is launched. The CPU miner is based on XMRig, while the GPU miner supports multiple algorithms.
Upon initial execution, both miners attempt to retrieve their startup configuration from a remote server. The potential addresses are listed below:
As with the RAT agent component, the server address is generated from the current date — in this case, the server address changes every week. This results in quite a large number of domains for the 2020–2030 period; however, all of them point to the same IP address: 107[.]172[.]212[.]235. The first available domain out of the four potential domains listed above will be used.
The algorithm for retrieving the configuration from the server is completely identical to that used by the RAT agent, with the sole exception that th1s1sth3key0f4n1ntere5t1ngw0rld is used as the AES-CBC key in this scenario, and the configuration resides within the payload. The retrieved configuration is encrypted via AES-CBC using the key UXUUXUUXUUCommandULineUUXUUXUUXU and the initialization vector UUCommandULineUU. The encrypted data is then converted into a base64 string, which is passed as a command-line parameter to launch the miner inside the explorer.exe process through process hollowing.
Our investigation focused on an ongoing campaign distributing miners via popular illegal content sites. The threat actors leverage a variety of sites, ranging from online libraries to movie and TV show streaming platforms. There is no telling what channels they will use to distribute the malicious archive in the future. However, the current case shows that users visiting pirated websites continue to take a serious risk.
Our products detect this malware with the following Generic verdicts:
Malicious archive download URL
urush1bar4[.]online
Malicious DLL libraries:
6A0FE6065D76715FEEBC1526D456DB73
7F624407AE489324E96A708A09C17E6F
02A43B3423367B9DDDC24CC7DFC070DF
RAT C&C:
5d14vnfb[.]space
r7mvjl67[.]space
zgj1tam9[.]space
jeaw520i[.]space
qdmagva5[.]space
Configuration retrieval address
107[.]172[.]212[.]235
UnamWebPanel control panel addresses
m4yuri[.]online
kristina[.]quest
In late April 2026, a client reached out to us for incident response support after discovering a miner running on users’ computers. We later discovered that the malware was being distributed via illegal movie and TV show streaming sites. The infection chain leveraged a fake update for a video player plugin. When the user attempted to watch a video, the player displayed a message saying the plugin version was outdated and asking to install an update to continue.
Clicking the link downloaded a ZIP archive with the following contents:
The archive contained a legitimate executable, HLS Installer.874.exe, alongside a malicious DLL. Launching the EXE triggered a DLL side-loading mechanism, injecting the malicious module into a legitimate program process and executing code within its context. The library contained the logic for deploying the miner and establishing persistence on the device.
At the time of the investigation, the infection risk was associated with two pirated video sites in the .ru and .top TLDs.
The current incident does not appear to be an isolated case. After analyzing the infection vector and the logic of the DLL, we concluded that this activity is a continuation of a campaign involving pirated digital libraries, which was previously described by another cybersecurity company.
The delivery mechanism for the malicious archive has remained virtually unchanged. Previously, the archive was downloaded in parts from the domain file[.]ipfs[.]us[.]69[.]mu, but this domain was unavailable at the time of our investigation. Instead, the threat actor employed a new website, urush1bar4[.]online.
The structure of the archive has also been preserved: inside is a legitimate executable and a large malicious DLL (see the screenshot below).
In the course of our research, we also discovered a blog post by NTT Security describing a similar delivery method for a malicious archive. In that instance, the threat actors displayed a fake browser crash page (shown below) while simultaneously downloading an archive to the device with a name starting with chromium-patch-nightly.
This scenario resembles the current scheme involving the fake video player plugin update. Given the previously described activity, it’s safe to assume that this campaign has been active since at least 2022. Throughout this entire period, the threat actor has been updating both the downloadable malware and individual parts of the infection mechanism.
As in previous episodes of the campaign, infections occur via highly popular websites. As of late April 2026, sites linked to the campaign typically displayed extremely high monthly traffic. For instance, the audience for the smallest of the free digital libraries stood at 11,000 users, while the largest reached 4.7 million. For pirated movie and TV show streaming sites, this figure ranged from 2.1 million to 27.4 million. In April, the total number of visits to websites where the malware described in this study was detected reached 40 million.
The popularity of these sites increases the potential scale of the miner’s distribution. Furthermore, the campaign is not limited to a single type of platform: the malicious archive is being distributed through both online digital libraries and movie and TV show streaming sites. This broadens the potential range of victims and makes it more difficult to attribute the threat to a single infection vector.
The current version of the downloadable malware is a ZIP archive containing a legitimate EXE file and a malicious DLL. When the executable runs, the library side-loads into its process, triggering the malicious logic.
The technical analysis that follows covers the current version of this malware. This version was first observed in April 2025 and has been distributed unmodified for over a year.
Most of the data inside the DLL carries no meaningful weight and was randomly generated just to inflate the file size and impede analysis.
Amidst the large volume of junk code inside the DLL, there is a single function that triggers a stack overflow during execution:
Based on the code, the size of the stackBuf buffer on the stack is only 64 bytes, and the SmashStack function overwrites this buffer without validating the length of the input data.
This overflow constructs a ROP chain that decrypts the next stage. After decryption, it transfers execution to code located within the modified DOS header of the PE file:
The header was intentionally modified to make it into valid shellcode:
pop r10 push r10 call $+5 pop rcx sub rcx, 9 mov rax, rcx add rax, 5C1000h call rax retn
This shellcode passes control to a function located at offset 0x5C1000 from the base of the PE file. This function then reflectively loads the same PE file into memory.
Going forward, we will refer to this decrypted PE file as the main module.
The module’s behavior across its different operational stages is detailed below:
The main module is a modified fork of the SilentCryptoMiner project. We have previously analyzed miners leveraging this project in other posts: Scam Information and Event Management and Undercover miner: how YouTubers get pressed into distributing SilentCryptoMiner as a restriction bypass tool. However, this specific fork has not been documented anywhere before, which is why we decided to break down its unique features in detail in this article.
Upon an initial run, the main module checks whether it has permission to proceed with execution. To do this, it collects the following data from the victim’s device:
The information is transmitted as a single large DNS query using the DNS tunneling technique. An example of the DNS query is shown below:
The attackers disguise the DNS query as legitimate traffic through low-level packet crafting and by using a domain name ending in microsoft.com. However, the IP address to which the query is actually sent has no relation to Microsoft.
DNS query crafting code
The execution of the main module proceeds only if the following byte sequence is detected in the response: 01 02 03 04. Following a successful check, the main module launches, and the subsequent logic is adjusted depending on whether the process has elevated privileges on the compromised host.
Let’s look at both scenarios:
1. The process is launched with elevated privileges.
In this case, preparatory steps precede the miner launch:
%USERPROFILE%, %PROGRAMDATA%, and %WINDIR% folders.ZwSetInformationFile with the FileDispositionInformation type, which causes the mrt.exe file to be deleted upon closing. To prevent MSRT from being automatically installed during the next update, the DontOfferThroughWUAU parameter is created with a value of 1 under the HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\MRT registry key.powercfg /x -hibernate-timeout-ac 0 powercfg /x -hibernate-timeout-dc 0 powercfg /x -standby-timeout-ac 0 powercfg /x -standby-timeout-dc 0
This is done to maximize the miner’s potential runtime on the device.
Next, to achieve persistence, a copy is created in the C:\ProgramData\Google\Chrome directory, after which the GoogleUpdateTaskMachineQC service is registered and configured to launch automatically at system startup.
Finally, four reflexive loads are executed: the components are injected directly into the memory of the target processes without writing to disk, having bypassed standard Windows loading mechanisms. Each implant is injected into its own host process:
2. The process is launched with standard privileges.
In this scenario, the miner begins repeatedly triggering User Account Control (UAC) prompts until it is successfully executed with elevated privileges. The workflow is as follows:
%USERPROFILE%\AppData\Roaming\Sandboxie directory and relaunched from there. Simultaneously, an attempt is made to launch it with elevated privileges via UAC.HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run.GoogleUpdateTaskMachineQC service is successfully installed.A successful installation requires all of the following conditions to be met:
GoogleUpdateTaskMachineQC service exists in the system.C:\ProgramData\Google\Chrome folder.The purpose of this component is to ensure the uninterrupted operation of the miner. At the very beginning of its execution, it copies all files from the C:\ProgramData\Google\Chrome folder and encrypts the contents of each file using a cyclic XOR algorithm with the key AFeIboiOmImJS2ypJU0pTpAO61SELkUc. After that, the encrypted contents are written into the process memory, and the following structure is created in memory for each file:
class FileContainer{
wchar_t* fullPath; // full path to file
size_t* ptrSize; // pointer to file size
uint8_t* xorEncryptedFile; //pointer to buffer containing encrypted file contents
};As soon as the contents of all files are saved in memory, Watchdog enters an infinite loop, where every five seconds, it checks the integrity of the installed GoogleUpdateTaskMachineQC service, just as the main module does. If the service is found to be incorrectly installed, the miner overwrites its files in the C:\ProgramData\Google\Chrome path with the contents acquired at startup.
To successfully remediate the miner, this module, which runs inside the explorer.exe process, must be terminated first.
This module provides remote control capabilities via four commands, which are described at the end of this section. The command-and-control addresses used to receive these commands follow this format:
http://{domain}.space/index.php?authorization=1http://{domain}.site/index.php? backup versionThe {domain} is calculated based on the current date. The process starts with the current year, then adds the zone identifier for the current month. All 12 months are divided into four zones. Finally, the word microsoft is appended to the resulting string. This final string is used as the input for subsequent double hashing using the MurmurHash64 algorithm. The hash output is the domain for the implant to communicate with.
At the time of writing this, the following domains were registered:
An example of a request to the C2 server is provided below:
As can be seen, the request contains an encrypted body consisting of data encrypted via AES-CBC with the key 0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef and the initialization vector 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f. The data contains a list of installed programs on the system, along with processor information and the serial number of the C: drive.
This information is likely used by the backend to check for virtual or debugging environments.
The first 16 bytes of the server response body represent the initialization vector for the AES-CBC algorithm with the key 0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef, while the remaining bytes are the data encrypted with this algorithm. The decrypted data contains a malicious payload, as well as its RSA-SHA256 signature (sign):
struct PLAINTEXT{
uint32_t len_payload;
uint8_t payload[len_payload];
uint32_t len_sign;
uint8_t sign[len_signature];
}The authenticity of the message is verified via the sign signature using the server’s public key, which is embedded in the executable.
Inside the malicious payload is a 4-byte code that determines the subsequent behavior of the program, along with additional data whose meaning depends on the code.
The table below lists the four remote control commands for the RAT agent module.
| Code | Purpose |
| 1 | Execution of an arbitrary command |
| 2 | Reflexive execution of the provided PE file within the explorer.exe process |
| 3 | Execution of the provided shellcode |
| 4 | Exit |
Depending on whether a discrete GPU is present in the system, either the CPU miner alone or a combination of the CPU and GPU miners is launched. The CPU miner is based on XMRig, while the GPU miner supports multiple algorithms.
Upon initial execution, both miners attempt to retrieve their startup configuration from a remote server. The potential addresses are listed below:
As with the RAT agent component, the server address is generated from the current date — in this case, the server address changes every week. This results in quite a large number of domains for the 2020–2030 period; however, all of them point to the same IP address: 107[.]172[.]212[.]235. The first available domain out of the four potential domains listed above will be used.
The algorithm for retrieving the configuration from the server is completely identical to that used by the RAT agent, with the sole exception that th1s1sth3key0f4n1ntere5t1ngw0rld is used as the AES-CBC key in this scenario, and the configuration resides within the payload. The retrieved configuration is encrypted via AES-CBC using the key UXUUXUUXUUCommandULineUUXUUXUUXU and the initialization vector UUCommandULineUU. The encrypted data is then converted into a base64 string, which is passed as a command-line parameter to launch the miner inside the explorer.exe process through process hollowing.
Our investigation focused on an ongoing campaign distributing miners via popular illegal content sites. The threat actors leverage a variety of sites, ranging from online libraries to movie and TV show streaming platforms. There is no telling what channels they will use to distribute the malicious archive in the future. However, the current case shows that users visiting pirated websites continue to take a serious risk.
Our products detect this malware with the following Generic verdicts:
Malicious archive download URL
urush1bar4[.]online
Malicious DLL libraries:
6A0FE6065D76715FEEBC1526D456DB73
7F624407AE489324E96A708A09C17E6F
02A43B3423367B9DDDC24CC7DFC070DF
RAT C&C:
5d14vnfb[.]space
r7mvjl67[.]space
zgj1tam9[.]space
jeaw520i[.]space
qdmagva5[.]space
Configuration retrieval address
107[.]172[.]212[.]235
UnamWebPanel control panel addresses
m4yuri[.]online
kristina[.]quest
Unit 42 details Screening Serpens' use of AppDomainManager hijacking and new RAT variants to target tech and defense sectors in recent campaigns.
The post Tracking Iranian APT Screening Serpens’ 2026 Espionage Campaigns appeared first on Unit 42.
In 2025, we observed pervasive SSH tunnel activity, which has remained active into 2026, affecting many government organizations and commercial companies in Russia and Belarus. Behind some of this activity is Cloud Atlas, a group we have known since 2014. During our investigation, we identified new tools used by this group, as well as indicators of compromise.
The group is back to sending out archives containing malicious shortcuts that launch PowerShell scripts. This technique is employed in addition to the previously described use of malicious documents, which exploit an old vulnerability in the Microsoft Office Equation Editor process (CVE-2018-0802) to download and execute malicious code. We have observed the use of third-party public utilities (Tor/SSH/RevSocks) to gain a foothold in infected systems and create additional backup control channels.
As for the primary compromise, Cloud Atlas remains consistent in using phishing. In the observed campaigns, the attackers emailed a ZIP archive containing an LNK file as an attachment.
Malware execution flow
Attackers use LNK shortcuts to covertly execute PowerShell scripts hosted on external resources. The command line of the shortcut:
Example of the PowerShell script downloaded and executed by the shortcut:
Example of the PowerShell script downloaded by the shortcut
Actions performed by the downloaded PowerShell:
| Step | Action | Description |
| 1 | Drops “$temp\fixed.ps1” | Pre-staging: places the main payload locally in advance to ensure an execution capability independent of subsequent network connectivity or C2 availability. |
| 2 | Creates “Run” registry key “YandexBrowser_setup” for “$temp\fixed.ps1” startup
|
Early persistence: guarantees execution upon the next logon or reboot. If the script is interrupted during later stages, the payload will still activate automatically. |
| 3 | Downloads and drops “$temp\rar.zip” Extracts “*.pdf” from the downloaded “$temp\rar.zip” |
Payload delivery: retrieves the decoy archive from the remote server to prepare user-facing content for the distraction phase. |
| 4 | Extracts “*.pdf” from the downloaded “$temp\rar.zip” | Decoy preparation: unpacks the legitimate-looking document so it can be executed silently without requiring user interaction. |
| 6 | Opens extracted decoy document “*.pdf” with user’s default software | User distraction: opens a convincing document to maintain user engagement and creates a legitimate workflow appearance to buy additional 30–120 seconds for background operations. |
| 6 | Executes “taskkill.exe /F /Im winrar.exe” | Process concealment: terminates the archive extractor to prevent the user from seeing the archive contents or noticing unexpected file extraction activity. |
| 7 | Searches and deletes “rar.zip”, “*.pdf.zip” and “*.pdf.lnk” | Anti-forensic cleanup: removes the initial infection artifacts before activating the main payload, reducing the number of disk traces available for incident response or EDR correlation. |
| 8 | Executes “$temp\fixed.ps1” | Controlled execution: launches the main payload only after persistence is secured, the user is distracted, and access traces are cleaned up. |
The primary purpose of the Fixed.ps1 script is to deliver and install subsequent malware onto the compromised system, specifically VBCloud and PowerShower. Fixed.ps1 establishes persistence (by adding itself to registry Run keys), creates a decoy for the user (by opening a PDF document), and executes the next stages of the attack.
Example of the fixed.ps1::Payload (VBCloud dropper)
This module functions as a dropper for the VBCloud backdoor. It drops two files onto the infected machine:
This module installs a second backdoor called PowerShower on the system. We don’t have the specific script that performs this installation, but we assume it’s performed by a script similar to fixed.ps1::Payload (VBCloud dropper).
Unlike VBCloud, which focuses on file theft, PowerShower is primarily used for network reconnaissance and lateral movement within the victim’s infrastructure. PowerShower can perform the following tasks:
PowerShower is dropped onto the system via the path ‘C:\Users\[username]\Pictures\googleearth.ps1’.
Contents of the googleearth.ps1(PowerShower)
PowerShower downloads an additional script for stealing credentials. It performs the following actions:
The full launch chain looks like this:
The full Base64-decoded script is given below.
Moving laterally across the victim’s network, the attackers executed a suspicious PowerShell script named rdp_new.ps1 (MD5 1A11B26DD0261EF27A112CE8B361C247):
The script is designed to allow multiple RDP sessions in Windows 10 by patching the termsrv.dll file. Termsrv.dll is the core Windows library that enforces Remote Desktop Services rules.
By default, Windows limits the number of simultaneous RDP sessions. Removing this restriction allows attackers to operate on the machine in the background without disconnecting the legitimate user, thereby reducing the likelihood of detection.
At first, the script enables RDP on the firewall and downgrades the RDP security settings:
Before modifying termsrv.dll, the script takes ownership and assigns itself full permissions. Then the script finds the sequence of bytes 39 81 3C 06 00 00 ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? and replaces it with B8 00 01 00 00 89 81 38 06 00 00 90. After these manipulations, the script restarts the RDP service.
Example of script
The patched version allows multiple concurrent logins so attackers can stay connected without disrupting the legitimate user, thereby reducing suspicion.
As mentioned above, during this wave of attacks, the adversaries widely deployed reverse SSH tunnels to many hosts of interest. The compromised machine initiates an SSH connection to an attacker-controlled server, which allows attackers to bypass standard firewall rules via establishing outbound connections.
That way, even if the primary backdoor is discovered, the attackers can maintain control through the SSH tunnel.
To install a reverse SSH tunnel on a victim’s host, the attackers run VBS scripts via PAExec or PsExec.
We’ve seen three types of scripts:
To achieve persistence, the attackers added a new scheduled task in Windows:
In some cases, before establishing a reverse SSH tunnel, attackers set new access permissions to the folder containing the private key to prevent the legitimate user or system administrators from easily accessing or modifying it:
Some OpenSSH binaries used by the attackers had their imports modified. Instead of libcrypto.dll, the SSH executable imports syruntime.dll, which was placed in the same folder as the binary. This was likely done to evade detection and ensure stealth.
In addition, we found a portable version of OpenSSH, presumably compiled by the adversaries:
In addition to Reverse SSH tunnels, the attackers installed RevSocks using the same infrastructure. RevSocks is an alternative tool to SSH for establishing tunnels and proxy connections, written in Golang. This tool allows direct connection to workstations on the local network. It also allows attackers to gain access to other segments of the victim’s network by using the machine as a gateway. In some cases, C2 addresses were hardcoded into the binary; in other cases, the C2 was passed in command line arguments.
There were also reverse SOCKS samples with hardcoded C2 addresses:
To maintain control over the compromised host, the Tor network was used in some cases. A minimal set of a Tor executable and configuration files, necessary for launching HiddenService, was copied to the system directories of infected devices. The name of the Tor Browser executable file was modified. As a result, the infected machine was accessible via RDP from the Tor network when accessing the generated .onion domain.
Below is an example of a configuration file for routing connections from Tor to RDP ports on the local network, as well as example command lines for logging into Tor.
Example of TOR configuration file
We analyzed a new Cloud Atlas tool, PowerCloud. It collects user data with administrator privileges and writes this information to Google Sheets in Base64 format.
The tool represents an obfuscated PowerShell script. In most cases, it is packaged into an executable file using the PS2EXE utility, but we have also encountered variants in the form of a separate PowerShell script.
To find administrators on the victim host, the tool executes the following command:
This information is appended with the computer name and current date, the data is encoded in base64, and then the collected data is added to an existing Google Sheet.
PowerCloud script
Additionally, the attackers used another PowerShell script (MD5 5329F7BFF9D0D5DB28821B86C26D628F), compiled into an executable file via PS2EXE, which checks whether browser processes (Chrome, Edge, Firefox, and other) are running. This helps detect when the user is working on the computer. This can be used to choose the optimal time for conducting attacks (for example, when the user is away but their browser is still open) or simply to gather information about the victim’s habits.
The information about running browsers is written to a log file on the local host.
Fragment of the deobfuscated script
According to our telemetry, in late 2025 and early 2026, the identified targets of the described malicious activities are located in Russia and Belarus. The targeted industries mostly include government agencies and diplomatic entities.
We attribute the activity described in this report to the Cloud Atlas APT group with a high degree of confidence. The group used techniques and tools described previously, such as the initial access vector, the Python script for information gathering, and the Tor application for forwarding ports to the Tor network. The victim profile and geography also matches the Cloud Atlas targets.
We couldn’t help but notice some parallels with recent Head Mare activity. The PhantomHeart backdoor (available in Russian only), attributed to Head Mare and used to create an SSH tunnel, was placed in directories actively used by Cloud Atlas:
However, TTPs are still differentiated.
For more than ten years, the Cloud Atlas group has continued its activities and expanded its arsenal. Over the course of last year, many targeted campaigns in general were found to employ ReverseSocks, SSH and Tor, and the use of these utilities was no exception for Cloud Atlas. Creating such backup control channels using publicly available utilities significantly complicates the complete disruption of attackers’ actions on compromised systems. We will continue to closely monitor the group’s activity and describe their new tools and techniques.
PowerCloud
7A95360B7E0EB5B107A3D231ABBC541A C:\Windows\wininet.exe
C0D1EAA15A2CEFBAB9735787575C8D8E C:\Windows\LiveKernelReports\update.exe
D5B38B252CF212A4A32763DE36732D40 C:\Windows\ime\imejp\dicts\i39884.exe
3C75CEDB1196DF5EAB91F31411ED4B33 C:\pla\reports.exe
42AC350BFBC5B4EB0FEDBA16C81919C7 C:\ProgramData\update_[redacted].exe
493B901D1B33EB577DB64AADD948F9CE C:\Windows\migration\wtr\MicrosoftBrowser.exe
2CABB721681455DAE1B6A26709DEF453 C:\Windows\pla\reports\winlog.exe
1B39E86EB772A0E40060B672B7F574F1 C:\Windows\System32\timecontrolsvc\vmnetdrv64.exe
1D401D6E6FC0B00AAA2C65A0AC0CFD6B C:\Windows\setup\scripts\install\software\activation\aact\dfsvc.exe
40A562B8600F843B717BC5951B2E3C29 C:\Windows\branding\scat.exe
F721A76DEB28FD0B80D27FCE6B8F5016 C:\Windows\ime\imekr\dicts\dfsvc.exe
D3C8AFD22BAA306FF659DB1FAC28574A C:\ProgramData\update_[redacted].exe
6D7B2D1172BBDB7340972D844F6F0717 C:\Users\[redacted]\AppData\Local\1c\1cv8\1cv8ud.exe
C:\Users\[redacted]\AppData\Local\1c\1cv8\svc.exe
9769F43B9DE8D19E803263267FA6D62E C:\Users\[redacted]\AppData\Local\1c\1cv8\1cv8ud.exe
63B6BE9AE8D8024A40B200CCCB438F1D C:\Windows\notepad.exe
6AA586BCC45CA2E92A4F0EF47E086FA1 C:\Windows\splwow32.exe
EBA3BCDB19A7E256BF8E2CC5B9C1CCA9 C:\Users\[redacted]\Desktop\soc\stant.exe
B4E183627B7399006C1BC47B3711E419 C:\WINDOWS\ime\service.exe
F56B31A4B47AD3365B18A7E922FBA1A8 dfsvc.exe
F6F62456FB0FCC396FB654CBED339BC3 –
25C8ED0511375DCA57EF136AC3FA0CCA C:\branding\dwmw.exe
Browser checker
5329F7BFF9D0D5DB28821B86C26D628F C:\ProgramData\checker_[redacted].exe
ReverseSocks
2B4BA4FACF8C299749771A3A4369782E C:\Windows\PLA\System\bounce.exe
C:\Windows\pla\print_status.exe
BA9CE06641067742F2AFC9691FAFF1DC C:\ProgramData\hp\client.exe
FB0F8027ACF1B1E47E07A63D8812ED50 C:\Windows\System32\timecontrolsvc\vmnetdrv64.exe
BBF1FA694122E07635DEEAC11AD712F8 C:\Windows\System32\HostManagement.exe
F301AA3D62B5095EEC4D8E34201A4769 C:\Windows\ime\imejp\msfu.exe
F9C3BBE108566D1A6B070F9C5FB03160 C:\Windows\ime\imetc\help\IMTCEN14.exe
Malicious MS Office documents
369B75BDCDED16469EDE7AB8BEDCFAE1
9EAAE9491F6A50D6DF0BE393734A44CB
3E6E9DF00A764B348EC611EE8504ACA0
9BD788F285E32A05E6591D1EB36EBFFC
F42085522EC2EBB16EDCF814E7C330AD
2042EB5D52F0B535A1CE6B6F954C8C2B
2AA1E9765EF6B00B94A9B6BE0041436A
36120F5E9411BCBAC7104EF3FA964ED2
5000A353399500BC78381DC95B6ED2DC
579A9952D31CAD801A3988DBE7914CE7
867B634588C0FD6B26684D502C15AB03
38FA4306FA4406BA31CF171AF4D36E34
83EDDE9F7EEEFAC0363413972F35572B
CC751619BFEC0DC4607C17112B9E3B2C
A632858F14B36F03D0F213F5F5D6BFF2
097CA205AD9E3B72018750280904718C
69121C36EB8BF77962DCA825FCFFD873
C5702EB250F855C8C872FFFB9BB656ED
ED34F5A136FBA4FDEA976570FAA33ED7
0577DB70844E88B32B954906E2F20798
28ECF8FB6719E14231B94B4D37629B0E
0857C84B62289A1A9F29E19244E9A499
0C514E137860F489E3801213460EF938
50568B1F9335A7E3BA4E5DF035A8FB86
7F776AD200287D6DE14A29158C457179
51F7F794ED43FB90D0F8EBBB5EFFE628
B8C753DD254509FBA5077FFD5067EAB0
BC3739DEC8CD8F54F3F60A85F3ED600E
EC076CD21C483A40156F4E40D08DADED
216CB7F31D383C0DD892B284DF05A495
116F59E70A9DF97F4ADAEA71EECB1E9A
7242AC065B50BCDE9308756B49DBADCB
8158552950D2E13B075001CE0C52AA97
A75DBED984963B9AB21309C5B2F8FD9B
0320DD389FDBAB25D46792BD2817675E
5339D1A666F3E40FE756505CF1D87D4B
67D7E3AEEB673BF60C59361C12A4ED81
89572F0ED20791A5AC9FC4267D67CCB0
B6AAE073E7BFEBF4D643C2BBEB5C02E1
344CA9EA07CD4AC90EF27F8890D4EC05
Reverse SSH/Socks domains
tenkoff[.]org
cloudguide[.]in
goverru[.]com
kufar[.]org
ultimatecore[.]net
spbnews[.]net
onedrivesupport[.]net
Malicious and compromised domains used in MS Office documents
amerikastaj[.]com
bigbang[.]me
paleturquoise-dragonfly-364512.hostingersite[.]com
wizzifi[.]com
totallegacy[.]org
mamurjor[.]com
landscapeuganda[.]com
lafortunaitalian.co[.]uk
kommando[.]live
internationalcommoditiesllc[.]com
humanitas[.]si
fishingflytackle[.]com
firsai.tipshub[.]net
alnakhlah.com[.]sa
allgoodsdirect.com[.]au
agenciakharis.com[.]br
Powershell payload staging
istochnik[.]org
znews[.]neti
investika-club[.]com
194.102.104[.]207
46.17.45[.]56
46.17.45[.]49
46.17.44[.]125
46.17.44[.]212
185.22.154[.]73
194.87.196[.]163
195.58.49[.]9
93.125.114[.]193
93.125.114[.]57
45.87.219[.]116
37.228.129[.]224
185.53.179[.]136
185.126.239[.]77
5.181.21[.]75
146.70.53[.]171
45.15.65[.]134
185.250.181[.]207
81.30.105[.]71
VBS scripts
WriteToSchedulerKillSSH.vbs
Create_task_day.vbs
WriteToSchedulerGenerateKey.vbs
C:\Windows\INF\Run.vbs
c:\Windows\INF\install.vbs
Update.vbs
c:\Windows\PLA\System\Gen.vbs
C:\Windows\INF\GenK.vbs
c:\Windows\PLA\System\Kill.vbs
c:\Windows\PLA\System\Run.vbs
ssh.exe
c:\Windows\ime\imejp\Asset.exe
c:\Windows\PLA\System\conhosts.exe
c:\Windows\INF\BITS\esentprf.exe
c:\Windows\INF\MSDTC\RuntimeBrokers.exe
c:\Windows\inf\diagnostic.exe
ReverseSocks
C:\Windows\PLA\System\bounce.exe
C:\ProgramData\hp\client.exe
C:\Windows\System32\timecontrolsvc\vmnetdrv64.exe
Tor client
C:\Windows\Resources\Update\Intel.exe
C:\Windows\INF\package.exe
In 2025, we observed pervasive SSH tunnel activity, which has remained active into 2026, affecting many government organizations and commercial companies in Russia and Belarus. Behind some of this activity is Cloud Atlas, a group we have known since 2014. During our investigation, we identified new tools used by this group, as well as indicators of compromise.
The group is back to sending out archives containing malicious shortcuts that launch PowerShell scripts. This technique is employed in addition to the previously described use of malicious documents, which exploit an old vulnerability in the Microsoft Office Equation Editor process (CVE-2018-0802) to download and execute malicious code. We have observed the use of third-party public utilities (Tor/SSH/RevSocks) to gain a foothold in infected systems and create additional backup control channels.
As for the primary compromise, Cloud Atlas remains consistent in using phishing. In the observed campaigns, the attackers emailed a ZIP archive containing an LNK file as an attachment.
Malware execution flow
Attackers use LNK shortcuts to covertly execute PowerShell scripts hosted on external resources. The command line of the shortcut:
Example of the PowerShell script downloaded and executed by the shortcut:
Example of the PowerShell script downloaded by the shortcut
Actions performed by the downloaded PowerShell:
| Step | Action | Description |
| 1 | Drops “$temp\fixed.ps1” | Pre-staging: places the main payload locally in advance to ensure an execution capability independent of subsequent network connectivity or C2 availability. |
| 2 | Creates “Run” registry key “YandexBrowser_setup” for “$temp\fixed.ps1” startup
|
Early persistence: guarantees execution upon the next logon or reboot. If the script is interrupted during later stages, the payload will still activate automatically. |
| 3 | Downloads and drops “$temp\rar.zip” Extracts “*.pdf” from the downloaded “$temp\rar.zip” |
Payload delivery: retrieves the decoy archive from the remote server to prepare user-facing content for the distraction phase. |
| 4 | Extracts “*.pdf” from the downloaded “$temp\rar.zip” | Decoy preparation: unpacks the legitimate-looking document so it can be executed silently without requiring user interaction. |
| 6 | Opens extracted decoy document “*.pdf” with user’s default software | User distraction: opens a convincing document to maintain user engagement and creates a legitimate workflow appearance to buy additional 30–120 seconds for background operations. |
| 6 | Executes “taskkill.exe /F /Im winrar.exe” | Process concealment: terminates the archive extractor to prevent the user from seeing the archive contents or noticing unexpected file extraction activity. |
| 7 | Searches and deletes “rar.zip”, “*.pdf.zip” and “*.pdf.lnk” | Anti-forensic cleanup: removes the initial infection artifacts before activating the main payload, reducing the number of disk traces available for incident response or EDR correlation. |
| 8 | Executes “$temp\fixed.ps1” | Controlled execution: launches the main payload only after persistence is secured, the user is distracted, and access traces are cleaned up. |
The primary purpose of the Fixed.ps1 script is to deliver and install subsequent malware onto the compromised system, specifically VBCloud and PowerShower. Fixed.ps1 establishes persistence (by adding itself to registry Run keys), creates a decoy for the user (by opening a PDF document), and executes the next stages of the attack.
Example of the fixed.ps1::Payload (VBCloud dropper)
This module functions as a dropper for the VBCloud backdoor. It drops two files onto the infected machine:
This module installs a second backdoor called PowerShower on the system. We don’t have the specific script that performs this installation, but we assume it’s performed by a script similar to fixed.ps1::Payload (VBCloud dropper).
Unlike VBCloud, which focuses on file theft, PowerShower is primarily used for network reconnaissance and lateral movement within the victim’s infrastructure. PowerShower can perform the following tasks:
PowerShower is dropped onto the system via the path ‘C:\Users\[username]\Pictures\googleearth.ps1’.
Contents of the googleearth.ps1(PowerShower)
PowerShower downloads an additional script for stealing credentials. It performs the following actions:
The full launch chain looks like this:
The full Base64-decoded script is given below.
Moving laterally across the victim’s network, the attackers executed a suspicious PowerShell script named rdp_new.ps1 (MD5 1A11B26DD0261EF27A112CE8B361C247):
The script is designed to allow multiple RDP sessions in Windows 10 by patching the termsrv.dll file. Termsrv.dll is the core Windows library that enforces Remote Desktop Services rules.
By default, Windows limits the number of simultaneous RDP sessions. Removing this restriction allows attackers to operate on the machine in the background without disconnecting the legitimate user, thereby reducing the likelihood of detection.
At first, the script enables RDP on the firewall and downgrades the RDP security settings:
Before modifying termsrv.dll, the script takes ownership and assigns itself full permissions. Then the script finds the sequence of bytes 39 81 3C 06 00 00 ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? and replaces it with B8 00 01 00 00 89 81 38 06 00 00 90. After these manipulations, the script restarts the RDP service.
Example of script
The patched version allows multiple concurrent logins so attackers can stay connected without disrupting the legitimate user, thereby reducing suspicion.
As mentioned above, during this wave of attacks, the adversaries widely deployed reverse SSH tunnels to many hosts of interest. The compromised machine initiates an SSH connection to an attacker-controlled server, which allows attackers to bypass standard firewall rules via establishing outbound connections.
That way, even if the primary backdoor is discovered, the attackers can maintain control through the SSH tunnel.
To install a reverse SSH tunnel on a victim’s host, the attackers run VBS scripts via PAExec or PsExec.
We’ve seen three types of scripts:
To achieve persistence, the attackers added a new scheduled task in Windows:
In some cases, before establishing a reverse SSH tunnel, attackers set new access permissions to the folder containing the private key to prevent the legitimate user or system administrators from easily accessing or modifying it:
Some OpenSSH binaries used by the attackers had their imports modified. Instead of libcrypto.dll, the SSH executable imports syruntime.dll, which was placed in the same folder as the binary. This was likely done to evade detection and ensure stealth.
In addition, we found a portable version of OpenSSH, presumably compiled by the adversaries:
In addition to Reverse SSH tunnels, the attackers installed RevSocks using the same infrastructure. RevSocks is an alternative tool to SSH for establishing tunnels and proxy connections, written in Golang. This tool allows direct connection to workstations on the local network. It also allows attackers to gain access to other segments of the victim’s network by using the machine as a gateway. In some cases, C2 addresses were hardcoded into the binary; in other cases, the C2 was passed in command line arguments.
There were also reverse SOCKS samples with hardcoded C2 addresses:
To maintain control over the compromised host, the Tor network was used in some cases. A minimal set of a Tor executable and configuration files, necessary for launching HiddenService, was copied to the system directories of infected devices. The name of the Tor Browser executable file was modified. As a result, the infected machine was accessible via RDP from the Tor network when accessing the generated .onion domain.
Below is an example of a configuration file for routing connections from Tor to RDP ports on the local network, as well as example command lines for logging into Tor.
Example of TOR configuration file
We analyzed a new Cloud Atlas tool, PowerCloud. It collects user data with administrator privileges and writes this information to Google Sheets in Base64 format.
The tool represents an obfuscated PowerShell script. In most cases, it is packaged into an executable file using the PS2EXE utility, but we have also encountered variants in the form of a separate PowerShell script.
To find administrators on the victim host, the tool executes the following command:
This information is appended with the computer name and current date, the data is encoded in base64, and then the collected data is added to an existing Google Sheet.
PowerCloud script
Additionally, the attackers used another PowerShell script (MD5 5329F7BFF9D0D5DB28821B86C26D628F), compiled into an executable file via PS2EXE, which checks whether browser processes (Chrome, Edge, Firefox, and other) are running. This helps detect when the user is working on the computer. This can be used to choose the optimal time for conducting attacks (for example, when the user is away but their browser is still open) or simply to gather information about the victim’s habits.
The information about running browsers is written to a log file on the local host.
Fragment of the deobfuscated script
According to our telemetry, in late 2025 and early 2026, the identified targets of the described malicious activities are located in Russia and Belarus. The targeted industries mostly include government agencies and diplomatic entities.
We attribute the activity described in this report to the Cloud Atlas APT group with a high degree of confidence. The group used techniques and tools described previously, such as the initial access vector, the Python script for information gathering, and the Tor application for forwarding ports to the Tor network. The victim profile and geography also matches the Cloud Atlas targets.
We couldn’t help but notice some parallels with recent Head Mare activity. The PhantomHeart backdoor (available in Russian only), attributed to Head Mare and used to create an SSH tunnel, was placed in directories actively used by Cloud Atlas:
However, TTPs are still differentiated.
For more than ten years, the Cloud Atlas group has continued its activities and expanded its arsenal. Over the course of last year, many targeted campaigns in general were found to employ ReverseSocks, SSH and Tor, and the use of these utilities was no exception for Cloud Atlas. Creating such backup control channels using publicly available utilities significantly complicates the complete disruption of attackers’ actions on compromised systems. We will continue to closely monitor the group’s activity and describe their new tools and techniques.
PowerCloud
7A95360B7E0EB5B107A3D231ABBC541A C:\Windows\wininet.exe
C0D1EAA15A2CEFBAB9735787575C8D8E C:\Windows\LiveKernelReports\update.exe
D5B38B252CF212A4A32763DE36732D40 C:\Windows\ime\imejp\dicts\i39884.exe
3C75CEDB1196DF5EAB91F31411ED4B33 C:\pla\reports.exe
42AC350BFBC5B4EB0FEDBA16C81919C7 C:\ProgramData\update_[redacted].exe
493B901D1B33EB577DB64AADD948F9CE C:\Windows\migration\wtr\MicrosoftBrowser.exe
2CABB721681455DAE1B6A26709DEF453 C:\Windows\pla\reports\winlog.exe
1B39E86EB772A0E40060B672B7F574F1 C:\Windows\System32\timecontrolsvc\vmnetdrv64.exe
1D401D6E6FC0B00AAA2C65A0AC0CFD6B C:\Windows\setup\scripts\install\software\activation\aact\dfsvc.exe
40A562B8600F843B717BC5951B2E3C29 C:\Windows\branding\scat.exe
F721A76DEB28FD0B80D27FCE6B8F5016 C:\Windows\ime\imekr\dicts\dfsvc.exe
D3C8AFD22BAA306FF659DB1FAC28574A C:\ProgramData\update_[redacted].exe
6D7B2D1172BBDB7340972D844F6F0717 C:\Users\[redacted]\AppData\Local\1c\1cv8\1cv8ud.exe
C:\Users\[redacted]\AppData\Local\1c\1cv8\svc.exe
9769F43B9DE8D19E803263267FA6D62E C:\Users\[redacted]\AppData\Local\1c\1cv8\1cv8ud.exe
63B6BE9AE8D8024A40B200CCCB438F1D C:\Windows\notepad.exe
6AA586BCC45CA2E92A4F0EF47E086FA1 C:\Windows\splwow32.exe
EBA3BCDB19A7E256BF8E2CC5B9C1CCA9 C:\Users\[redacted]\Desktop\soc\stant.exe
B4E183627B7399006C1BC47B3711E419 C:\WINDOWS\ime\service.exe
F56B31A4B47AD3365B18A7E922FBA1A8 dfsvc.exe
F6F62456FB0FCC396FB654CBED339BC3 –
25C8ED0511375DCA57EF136AC3FA0CCA C:\branding\dwmw.exe
Browser checker
5329F7BFF9D0D5DB28821B86C26D628F C:\ProgramData\checker_[redacted].exe
ReverseSocks
2B4BA4FACF8C299749771A3A4369782E C:\Windows\PLA\System\bounce.exe
C:\Windows\pla\print_status.exe
BA9CE06641067742F2AFC9691FAFF1DC C:\ProgramData\hp\client.exe
FB0F8027ACF1B1E47E07A63D8812ED50 C:\Windows\System32\timecontrolsvc\vmnetdrv64.exe
BBF1FA694122E07635DEEAC11AD712F8 C:\Windows\System32\HostManagement.exe
F301AA3D62B5095EEC4D8E34201A4769 C:\Windows\ime\imejp\msfu.exe
F9C3BBE108566D1A6B070F9C5FB03160 C:\Windows\ime\imetc\help\IMTCEN14.exe
Malicious MS Office documents
369B75BDCDED16469EDE7AB8BEDCFAE1
9EAAE9491F6A50D6DF0BE393734A44CB
3E6E9DF00A764B348EC611EE8504ACA0
9BD788F285E32A05E6591D1EB36EBFFC
F42085522EC2EBB16EDCF814E7C330AD
2042EB5D52F0B535A1CE6B6F954C8C2B
2AA1E9765EF6B00B94A9B6BE0041436A
36120F5E9411BCBAC7104EF3FA964ED2
5000A353399500BC78381DC95B6ED2DC
579A9952D31CAD801A3988DBE7914CE7
867B634588C0FD6B26684D502C15AB03
38FA4306FA4406BA31CF171AF4D36E34
83EDDE9F7EEEFAC0363413972F35572B
CC751619BFEC0DC4607C17112B9E3B2C
A632858F14B36F03D0F213F5F5D6BFF2
097CA205AD9E3B72018750280904718C
69121C36EB8BF77962DCA825FCFFD873
C5702EB250F855C8C872FFFB9BB656ED
ED34F5A136FBA4FDEA976570FAA33ED7
0577DB70844E88B32B954906E2F20798
28ECF8FB6719E14231B94B4D37629B0E
0857C84B62289A1A9F29E19244E9A499
0C514E137860F489E3801213460EF938
50568B1F9335A7E3BA4E5DF035A8FB86
7F776AD200287D6DE14A29158C457179
51F7F794ED43FB90D0F8EBBB5EFFE628
B8C753DD254509FBA5077FFD5067EAB0
BC3739DEC8CD8F54F3F60A85F3ED600E
EC076CD21C483A40156F4E40D08DADED
216CB7F31D383C0DD892B284DF05A495
116F59E70A9DF97F4ADAEA71EECB1E9A
7242AC065B50BCDE9308756B49DBADCB
8158552950D2E13B075001CE0C52AA97
A75DBED984963B9AB21309C5B2F8FD9B
0320DD389FDBAB25D46792BD2817675E
5339D1A666F3E40FE756505CF1D87D4B
67D7E3AEEB673BF60C59361C12A4ED81
89572F0ED20791A5AC9FC4267D67CCB0
B6AAE073E7BFEBF4D643C2BBEB5C02E1
344CA9EA07CD4AC90EF27F8890D4EC05
Reverse SSH/Socks domains
tenkoff[.]org
cloudguide[.]in
goverru[.]com
kufar[.]org
ultimatecore[.]net
spbnews[.]net
onedrivesupport[.]net
Malicious and compromised domains used in MS Office documents
amerikastaj[.]com
bigbang[.]me
paleturquoise-dragonfly-364512.hostingersite[.]com
wizzifi[.]com
totallegacy[.]org
mamurjor[.]com
landscapeuganda[.]com
lafortunaitalian.co[.]uk
kommando[.]live
internationalcommoditiesllc[.]com
humanitas[.]si
fishingflytackle[.]com
firsai.tipshub[.]net
alnakhlah.com[.]sa
allgoodsdirect.com[.]au
agenciakharis.com[.]br
Powershell payload staging
istochnik[.]org
znews[.]neti
investika-club[.]com
194.102.104[.]207
46.17.45[.]56
46.17.45[.]49
46.17.44[.]125
46.17.44[.]212
185.22.154[.]73
194.87.196[.]163
195.58.49[.]9
93.125.114[.]193
93.125.114[.]57
45.87.219[.]116
37.228.129[.]224
185.53.179[.]136
185.126.239[.]77
5.181.21[.]75
146.70.53[.]171
45.15.65[.]134
185.250.181[.]207
81.30.105[.]71
VBS scripts
WriteToSchedulerKillSSH.vbs
Create_task_day.vbs
WriteToSchedulerGenerateKey.vbs
C:\Windows\INF\Run.vbs
c:\Windows\INF\install.vbs
Update.vbs
c:\Windows\PLA\System\Gen.vbs
C:\Windows\INF\GenK.vbs
c:\Windows\PLA\System\Kill.vbs
c:\Windows\PLA\System\Run.vbs
ssh.exe
c:\Windows\ime\imejp\Asset.exe
c:\Windows\PLA\System\conhosts.exe
c:\Windows\INF\BITS\esentprf.exe
c:\Windows\INF\MSDTC\RuntimeBrokers.exe
c:\Windows\inf\diagnostic.exe
ReverseSocks
C:\Windows\PLA\System\bounce.exe
C:\ProgramData\hp\client.exe
C:\Windows\System32\timecontrolsvc\vmnetdrv64.exe
Tor client
C:\Windows\Resources\Update\Intel.exe
C:\Windows\INF\package.exe
