Police departments across the country are lining up to launch drone-as-first-responder (DFR) programs, and hundreds have cleared a necessary hurdle toward making deployment a reality, expanding aerial surveillance and data collection even in areas patrol officers typically can't reach.

As of February 2026, over 1,000 public safety agencies—including police, fire, and other emergency management agencies—had received Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) waivers needed to automate drone operations and launch a DFR program, according to a recent Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) release listing agencies that have obtained Part 91 waivers since the FAA streamlined and sped up the process in April 2025.

The changes led to a massive increase in the number of waivers issued. Only 976 DFR waivers had been granted since the first DFR program launched in 2018 through April 2025, according to an FAA representative. The agency issued more waivers between April 2025 and February 2026 than it had in the previous seven years combined.

A map illustrating the locations of police departments and other public safety agencies that have received Part 91 waivers, making it possible for them to launch drone-as-first-responder programs. (This map image links to Google Maps, which is governed by Google's privacy policy)

The new FAA process for waivers and the rush of police departments to obtain them signifies a shift in law enforcement's use of drones: from human-operated aerial surveillance to AI-based autonomous drone use. 

Typically, a drone operator is only permitted to fly in areas that can still be seen by the pilot, and that drone pilot needs to be certified under FAA Part 107. To fly drones “Beyond Visual Line of Sight” (BVLOS) requires additional approval from the FAA, as do flights above 200 feet, due to the risk of colliding with planes and other aircrafts. Without such approval, an officer could not pilot a drone from a desk inside a building and fly it to a call across the city because they could not possibly have line of sight on the drone. 

FAA rules for police drones also required a human operator to manually fly the device to a scene, but DFR technology has become a more common and more automated police technology. DFR programs increasingly rely on artificial intelligence to automate drone flights from launchpads placed around the city, often atop municipal buildings, and make it possible for one drone operator to “fly” multiple devices at once. Though not every police department that has received BVLOS has launched a DFR program yet, by going through this process, every department on this list has signified it has strong enough interest to clear the necessary regulatory hurdles.

Police departments and the companies that sell DFR equipment claim that these drones make it easier for officers to establish “situational awareness” of a scene before they arrive. Early drone adoption centered on similar claims, particularly related to high-risk situations like vehicular accidents or incidents involving an armed suspect. However, these kinds of situations may make up only a small portion of deployments, which often occur in response to low-risk calls for service related to unhoused people, mental health concerns, and loud music, as a Government Technology analysis of the system in Chula Vista, California, found. 

DFR programs have become important sources of revenue for companies like Flock Safety and Axon, the latter of which reported that its DFR platform has become one of the company’s fastest growing sectors. Axon is also known for products like the TASER and the Fusus camera system that lets police integrate viewing of public and private cameras. 

Footage from drone flights is streamed back to a police office, and it can be stored, shared, and analyzed like other video. Turning drone footage into fodder for automated license plate reader (ALPR) networks, for example, requires very little additional software, and Flock Safety was quietly able to turn its drones into “flying ALPRs” last year. 

The normalization of police DFR programs jeopardizes privacy in communities across the country. As flying cameras, drones can capture footage from areas typically inaccessible to a casual patrol officer—backyards, roofs, through windows—at distances that leave subjects of surveillance completely unaware of the spy in the sky. A recent leak of drone footage from the San Francisco Police Department illustrated the ease with which surreptitious drone flights could observe innocent individuals for minutes without them realizing it. EFF's Atlas of Surveillance contains a list of police departments with drones, including those with DFR programs.

While daytime DFR use grows, police departments are exploring other ways to expand overhead surveillance. In October 2024, the Campbell Police Department in California announced it had received the first FAA approval for BVLOS operations at night, claiming it was the “first to incorporate radar technology with electro-optical sensors to enhance airspace monitoring, enabling a single remote pilot to safely deploy drones both day and night.”  

As communities consider drone use, it’s crucial that they have a say in whether the program is acquired at all, not just how it's run once purchased. Throughout the process, police should be transparent with the community and comply with local regulations about its adoption.

Many cities provide portals that log the flight paths and reasons for each drone flight, often in real time, an important transparency practice. In California, under AB 481, police departments are required to provide advance notice of intent to acquire drones, establish policies before they’re procured, and provide annual updates on their uses—giving communities and city councils the opportunity, before any contract is signed, to weigh in or object to the acquisition itself. 

For police departments and communities considering drone use, clear policies on appropriate use, transparency around deployment, and regular re-evaluation—including the choice to discontinue a program that isn't working—are all vital for protecting people’s privacy and security. 

A new report from the Government Accounting Office reveals that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) plans to nearly triple the number of surveillance towers along U.S. borders, from the current 830 to 2,300 by 2034.

DHS expects to expend $1 billion in taxpayer dollars for this dangerous expansion of a surveillance network indiscriminately trained on towns, school playgrounds, backyards, and vehicles—threatening the privacy and civil liberties of everyone in the border regions.

The towers are planned as part of DHS component Customs and Border Protection’s (CBP) Integrated Surveillance Tower (IST) program, which captures images of people and vehicles. The IST program operates autonomous surveillance towers, consisting of autonomous surveillance towers, consisting of AI-based systems using radar, thermal infrared and optical systems to track targets over long distances; integrated fixed towers, optimized for surveilling foot traffic and vehicles; and remote video surveillance systems, which can often be found very close to the border fence in Arizona, including residential neighborhoods where cameras are capable of spying on homes on both sides of the border. (For a description and photos of these technologies, see EFF’s updated guide to surveillance at the U.S.-Mexico Border.)

DHS expects to purchase more long-range autonomous towers and to upgrade existing towers with autonomous capabilities. The $1 billion comes from the so-called One Big Beautiful Act—a massive tax and spending law that President Trump signed in 2025, the report says.

The explosive expansion of border surveillance is a digital dumpster fire for human rights and civil liberties. It’s not just surveillance towers; drones, aerostats, surveillance vehicles, ground sensors, game cameras, and license plate readers are also part of the vast taxpayer-funded infrastructure that threatens all those who live, work, or seek refuge in the borderlands. This technology isn’t exclusive to U.S. federal agencies: it’s also deployed by state and local law enforcement, and even by governments on the Mexican side.

Since 2022, EFF has studied and mapped surveillance technology along the U.S.-Mexico border using public records research, open-source intelligence, and fact-finding trips, and created a handy interactive map to provide researchers and journalists with the tools they need to analyze the impact of U.S. border security policy. We have also documented the different types of surveillance technology in a zine, "Surveillance Technology at the U.S.-Mexico Border." We updated the publication earlier this year to help people identify the machinery of homeland security by adding more models of surveillance towers, newly deployed military tech, and a gallery of disguised trail cams and automated license plate readers.

EFF’s work includes defending the rights of individuals whose devices have been searched or seized upon entering the country; pushing back on the collection of biometric and social media identifiers; and developing digital security guidance for people crossing borders.

With the web of surveillance tech at the borders about to explode, EFF will continue to investigate and expose it and find ways to fight back with the communities that live in the shadow of this technological threat to human rights.

Reversing course, Flock Safety—the surveillance technology vendor most known for its extensive network of automated license plate readers—has announced that it will end a pilot for its acoustic gunshot detection devices to identify signs of “human distress.”

...public pressure can sometimes work to influence both companies and lawmakers that control a city’s purse strings to discontinue or divest from harmful products...

In October 2025, EFF warned the public that Flock was rolling out a new feature called “Distress Detection” that would be deployed through their acoustic gunshot detection devices (formerly known as Flock Raven, now called Audio Detection). This feature purported to use high-powered microphones scattered throughout a city to search for sounds of human distress, with original advertisements from the product indicating it would search for “screaming.” (Since the publication of our original blog post, Flock quietly amended the ad on this webpage to say “distress” instead of “screaming.”)

Now, Flock has published a blog post stating that “[a]fter careful consideration and community consultation, we decided to remove the feature.” Good riddance. 

We said it when the product was announced and we’ll say it again: this was a misguided and dangerous feature because of the civil liberties concerns it poses, the possibility it could summon armed police to every loud interaction happening on the street, and because in several places this type of spying would be illegal under state eavesdropping laws. 

We were not quiet about this potential new feature. Flock even mentioned our concern about Distress Detection in an attempt to rebut our opposition to the mass surveillance their products enable.

The suspension of Distress Detection, however, does not mean that these high-powered microphones are now magically safe or beyond our concern. Acoustic gunshot detection is still a dangerous and often highly inaccurate technology that has resulted in real world harm, as in Chicago where it resulted in police shooting at children lighting fireworks. As Flock itself states, “No acoustic system is perfect, and we don't claim otherwise.” But police response to a situation where they believe guns are actively in use seems like a pretty high-stakes situation to be making, selling, and deploying technology known to be imperfect. Flock’s devices also listen for more than just gunshots. Their marketing materials admit to be listening for “community disruption,” which includes “non-violent” threats like car sideshows and fireworks. 

Flock’s failed attempt to roll out Distress Detection teaches us a few important lessons about the current state of police surveillance. First, we should not assume that just because these companies are large and well-funded, that does not ensure that they are complying with local privacy laws before floating new products to customers. Second, companies roll out and police adopt invasive technology under the justification that it will be used to address our society’s very worst crimes. However, both the companies and police will leverage deployed surveillance infrastructure to introduce new uses without necessarily seeking the consent or approval of the public. Gunshot detecting microphones eventually being used to listen for screaming is exactly the type of mission creep that we’ve seen happen with other pieces of surveillance technology, including Flock’s license plate readers. Finally, gun violence is too serious and complex of an issue to purport to solve with one flawed piece of technology. It has become too easy for police and cities to listen to the fancy marketing pitches of tech companies claiming they’re going to solve all crime instead of doing the hard work of addressing the root causes of societal issues. And, in the meantime, that technology creates more problems and hazards for the communities they blanket in police surveillance. 

As we’ve also seen with people across the country pushing back on Flock license plate reader contracts in their communities, public pressure can sometimes work to influence both companies and lawmakers that control a city’s purse strings to discontinue or divest from harmful products. Flock’s decision to end “Distress Detection” for human voices is a win.  

When Ubisoft's Watch Dogs 2 was released in 2016, it was a headtrip for those of us working on digital-rights issues in the Bay Area. During the day, I'd fight tech-authoritarianism from EFF's San Francisco offices and then, at night, I'd fight tech-authoritarianism in an uncanny simulation of San Francisco from my home gaming console.  

Watch Dogs 2 is an open-world video game that follows a hacktivist collective called Dedsec as they take on surveillance tech and discriminatory AI systems that are being controlled by tech bros, government contractors, and corrupt cops. The game's missions often felt like they were ripped from the pages of EFF's Deeplinks blog.  

EFF’s mission is defending civil liberties in the digital world, and we do that with activists, technologists, and lawyers. If you've ever dreamt of joining Dedsec, you should definitely join us as a member.  

 Join the movement to Take Back CTRL.  

In fact, we've even got the same merch aesthetic. I cosplayed as the lead character, Marcus, at Dragon Con, and no one even knew I was in costume. 

Dave (left) as Marcus takes a selfie with a Wrench cosplayer at Dragon Con 2018.

To commemorate Watch Dog 2's 10th anniversary, I'll be speaking on a panel at San Diego Comic-Con reflecting on how the game predicted tech issues we're facing today. Organized by Mia Ginae of The Mighty Hostess and Black in Gaming, we've got voice actors Ruffin Prentiss lll and Shawn Baichoo, cinematic producer Timmy Fisher, and music producer Hudson Mohawke, who did the soundtrack, with Mia Ginae moderating. That's at 3:15 PM on Friday, July 24 in room 6BCF. 

But not everyone can get to Comic-Con and I certainly have more to say that can fit in. So here are a few ways where Watch Dogs 2 mirrored our work back then and foresaw what we're facing today.

Check out our full San Diego Comic Schedule, including panels and a meet-up. 

Insecure Surveillance Cameras 

One of the signature gameplay elements of the Watch Dogs series is the ability for your character to hack into nearby security cameras from your phone and use that to gain a strategic advantage over hostile adversaries. 

About a year before, that's exactly the issue that we were working on. EFF Technologist Cooper Quintin and I used the service Shodan to identify a slew of automated license plate readers (ALPRs) that Louisiana police had left unprotected on the internet. We found that the controls were open to anyone to manipulate and, just like in the game, you could watch the live video feeds.

We didn't use the data to acquire a skill point or collectible outfit. Instead, we forced police agencies to lock down their equipment and then used what we learned to persuade then Gov. Bobby Jindal to veto a bill that would have created a new statewide surveillance dragnet.  

This issue still persists today. Most recently, security researchers Benn Jordan and Jon “GainSec” Gaines, and the award-winning journalists at 404 Media, uncovered how at least 60 pan-tilt-zoom cameras from the vendor Flock Safety were left exposed online.

Cell-Site Simulators 

In Watch Dogs 2 there's a mission called "Stolen Signals," in which Marcus and his best friend Wrench are trying to locate "stingrays," police devices that gather nearby cell-phone data by masquerading as legit cellular towers. We call these "cell-site simulators" (CSSs) and they're are an extremely alarming mass surveillance technology that allows police to track individual users through their phone identifiers. We've long advocated that this should require a search warrant.   

Like Dedsec, we also had initiated a project to do the exact same thing. And in true Dedsec fashion, we also gave it a pop-culture name: Crocodile Hunter, an homage to wildlife expert Steve Irwin, who had famously died after a stingray attack.  

But while Marcus was running around Telegraph Hill, staff technologist Cooper Quintin and I were running around downtown San Francisco, testing out our own device for detecting suspicious cell phone towers during Salesforce's annual Dreamforce conference. And while we didn't find a CSS that day, we did find a mobile surveillance tower that a start-up had set up for the event.

Cooper Quintin, EFF's own 'Wrench,' testing out Crocodile Hunter at Dreamforce

Today, that project has evolved into Rayhunter, which allows anyone to use a cheap mobile hotspot to detect the type of cellular anomalies associated with CSSs. We're proud to say that now there's a whole international Dedsec-style network of researchers using this technology to look for surveillance at protests, at the border, and in metropolitan areas.  

Security Robots 

Throughout the game, Marcus encounters a number of autonomous pickle-shaped security robots wandering the city. At one point, Wrench reprograms one to become "Wrench Jr," a bona fide member of the Dedsec team.  

In real life, these robots are made by a company called Knightscope, and EFF started shining light on them in 2020-2021, when they were first being deployed by companies and government agencies.

A Knightscope robot patrols a casino parking lot in Reno, Nevada.

Today, law enforcement is pursuing weaponized robots and drones, and EFF is at the forefront to stop this dystopian reality. In fact, in December 2022, we successfully fought for San Francisco to ban the police department from weaponizing drones. In 2024, New York Police Department also retired its subway robot.

A Citywide Surveillance "Operating System" 

In the Watch Dog series, one of the ominous developments is CTOS 2.0 (Central Operating System 2.0). Through this system, Blume, a government contractor, tries to collect a massive amount of data through citywide sensors and infrastructure, and to combine all that data into one unified—and totally insecure—analytics system.  

At the time we'd only just begun to see this idea floated, with a limited number of cities trying tools like Palantir's Gotham to manage data.  

Today, it is a frighteningly competitive market, particularly when it comes to law enforcement surveillance. For example, both Axon and Flock Safety are trying to offer products that integrate with every function of policing that sound like CTOs. In fact, Flock Safety product is literally titled, "Flock OS."

Fusus demonstrated at a police chief's conference.

Meanwhile, Axon's camera networking product, "Fusus," sounds like it came straight from the Watch Dogs' writers room. Fusus allows for central live-streaming of all types of surveillance cameras in a city, including body-worn cameras, which was another prediction from the Watch Dog series that came true.  

EFF has been part of many local battles to reject Flock and Axon surveillance systems, and we've also advocated against recent efforts at the federal level to consolidate government data.  

Join the Fight Against Authoritarian Tech 

Watch Dogs 2's protagonists aren't just the merry band of core hackers: It's a distributed movement spread across the region and social media. The sequel, Watch Dogs Legion, is even designed so that every single person in the city of London is a potential playable Dedsec member, ready to take on tech tyranny with whatever skills they have.  

That's also our philosophy: If you use tech, if you're affected by tech, this is your fight. And it's time to take back control. 

There are a lot of ways to do this. You can become a member by donating. You can contact public officials through our Action Center. You can join the thousands of volunteers who are helping gather data on surveillance through our Atlas of Surveillance project. You can also hunt cell-site simulators with us—and help improve our code—through the Rayhunter project.  

And just like Watch Dogs 2, this is a game we can win if we work together.

You have an expectation of privacy in location data that reveals your movements in the physical world, and even short-term surveillance of these movements is a search subject to the Fourth Amendment, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled today in Chatrie v. United States.  

The case involved geofence warrants, a form of dragnet surveillance police have used to vacuum up location data from electronic devices of people who happen to be in the vicinity of a crime. EFF had joined the American Civil Liberties Union, the ACLU of Virginia, and the Center on Privacy & Technology at Georgetown Law in filing an amicus brief in the case. 

JOIN EFF

The decision in Chatrie is important: It is the first digital surveillance decision by the Court since its landmark 2018 ruling Carpenter v. United States, which involved prolonged tracking of people’s movements using cell phone location data. The new case expands that ruling by confirming that even shorter-term surveillance of location data can constitute a search because it can still reveal “private matters,” including “a wealth of detail about a person’s familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations.”  

The case is also important because the Court also recognized the records generated by the apps on a user’s phone—records we necessarily share with third-party tech company—are a user’s “own” and require Fourth Amendment protection. This is true, regardless of whether those records are “emails, documents, photographs, [ ] calendars” or location data. This will likely have broad implications for data generated by other apps on our phones, even if we click “agree” to sharing that data with third-party tech companies.  

Geofence warrants don’t name a suspect or a specific individual or device the way typical warrants do. Instead, they compel companies—almost always Google—to provide information on every electronic device in a given area during a given time period. This creates a high risk of suspicion falling on innocent people and can reveal sensitive and private information about where individuals have traveled in the past. 

Geofence warrants are the digital equivalent of police going person to person, home to home, without suspicion that any device holder has a connection to a crime. This turns innocent bystanders into suspects, just for being in the wrong place at the wrong time.  

In Chatrie, a 2019 geofence warrant compelled Google to search the accounts of all its hundreds of millions of users to see if any one of them was within a radius police drew around a Northern Virginia crime scene. This area amounted to several football fields in size and encompassed numerous homes, businesses, and a church. 

A federal district court in Virginia in 2022 held that the geofence warrant plainly violated  the Fourth Amendment. If the police want to get information on every device in the area, they must also establish probable cause to search every person in the area, the court said. The judge noted the government lacked particularized probable cause as to every individual within the geofence, which swept up innocent people and covered over 70,000 square meters in a busy area. 

The decision set an important precedent in finding the warrant overbroad and unconstitutional and was later followed by a 2024 federal Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruling holding that geofence warrants are “categorically prohibited by the Fourth Amendment.” However, the Chatrie lower court allowed the government to use the evidence it obtained because it relied on the warrant in “good faith.” A much divided en banc panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in 2025 affirmed this “good faith” finding in the lower court’s opinion. 

Google in 2023 announced changes to how it stores location data, with the effect of eventually making it impossible for the company to respond to geofence warrants. Since July 2025, mass geofence searches of Google users’ location data have not been possible.  

However, Google is not the only company collecting location data, nor the only way for police to access mass amounts of data on people with no connection to a crime. As we’ve written about extensively, data brokers collect and aggregate location data from many different apps on our phones and provide that data to police. And police can use “cell tower dump” warrants to get access to data on everyone within range of specific cell towers. Suspicionless searches like these drag a net through vast swaths of information in hopes of identifying previously unknown suspects—ensnaring innocent bystanders along the way. 

Chatrie could have wide-ranging implications beyond location data as well. The Supreme Court affirmed that app data is subject to the Fourth Amendment, because users “reasonably view” it as their own and reasonably expect it “to be shielded from the ‘inquisitive eyes’ of the government.” Justice Gorsuch, in an opinion concurring in the judgment, called location data a user’s “personal property,” no different from myriad other “effects” explicitly protected by the text of the Fourth Amendment.  As the Court concluded, “the point of carrying smartphones is to use what is on them,” so the Fourth Amendment has to protect more than just location data generated by the act of carrying the phone itself. 

The Court ultimately did not decide whether the particular warrant at issue in Chatrie was “reasonable” or whether the “good faith” doctrine applied. The case now heads back to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals to address these questions.  

But regardless of how the Fourth Circuit rules on remand, this Chatrie opinion will shape how lower courts address police access to location and other data going forward. We look forward to citing Chatrie to press future courts to recognize broad Fourth Amendment protections for user data.

This is not science fiction. It’s not premature. If towns, cities, states, or the federal government want to act to rein in the emergence of armed police drones and robots, we have precious little time. In the absence of substantial regulation around when and how domestic law enforcement in the United States can deploy force using drones, the companies that markets technology to law enforcement have been moving. It’s past time concerned people take notice. Cities should not procure weaponized drones or robots, and multi-purpose drones and robots should be restricted from causing harm. 

Since 2021, EFF has been advocating against the use of armed robots or drones by law enforcement. This call has become more urgent as companies are moving in to take advantage of the lax regulatory landscape.

This month, two disturbing developments raised concerns that we might be on the verge of a larger trend of drone militarization. The first is that the CEO of Skydio, one of the most prolific vendors of police drones in the United States, signaled that the company has a more permissive attitude toward arming their drones in some contexts than many people expected. When asked on a podcast about the public perception that the company had restrictions around letting the military arm their drones, CEO Adam Bry said, “This is an area where I’ve gotten some things wrong. We said some things previously that led folks externally and internally to believe that, for example, we would prevent the military from putting weapons on our drones […] It’s very easy to sit back in a Silicon Valley office and think that we’re very smart, that we know the technology, and the idea of using it for X, Y, or Z thing seems evil or bad, so we’re going to write a policy or ban people from doing it. I think that’s ultimately misguided.”

Simply put: he is signaling that Skydio will not implement restrictions on their customers’ use of their devices. 

Bry was specifically asked about the military arming drones but the question reveals a disturbing truth: whether police arm drones domestically is currently based more on the internal ethical commitments of companies than it is any laws created by elected officials. Combining Skydio’s huge amount of police contracts, including supplying entire fleets for Drone as First Responders (DFR) programs, and the tendency of military technologies like surveillance aerostats to get redeployed on U.S. soil, creates a real recipe for the emergence of armed police drones. 

The other piece on the chess board to keep our eye on is the introduction of weaponized drones as a tool of school safety. A company called Campus Guardian Angel will run pilot programs in schools in Georgia and Florida in Fall 2026 to introduce drones that are designed to swarm, distract, crash into, and even shoot irritants at potential school shooters. This comes just years after a large national backlash that got the large police tech company Axon to pause its development of drones armed with tasers as a solution to school shootings. 

Although it may be obvious to some people, it’s worth saying again: antagonizing an active shooter with a small drone is a dangerous idea. In chaotic situations, deploying physical harm via drone is likely to get bystanders or good samaritans hurt by accident. It is also unproven that this technology will work to distract or deter an actual school shooter–especially when the demonstrations we see online revolve around crashing drones into stationary mannequins in pristine, controlled conditions. Another important question: What would happen if a potential shooter shoots at the small moving drone and endangers the people fleeing behind it? After all, in the demonstrations we’ve seen it is unclear if these drones have the ability to see what is behind them.  This is an unproven and potentially dangerous method of combating the very serious problem of gun violence in schools, and it’s one that helps to normalize armed drones as a solution to other policing problems as well. 

These developments also mean It’s not enough to follow San Francisco’s lead, which became the first city to change its policy regarding how robots could be used in order to ban police from using deadly force via robots in 2022. A robust and effective policy must include both drones and robots (not one or the other), and it has to explicitly prevent drones and robots from deploying any body harm — including deadly force and less-lethal measures like kinetic strikes, pepper spray, rubber bullets, or tasers. In addition, cities and states should not procure weaponized drones and robots. 

Since 2021, EFF has been advocating against the use of armed robots or drones by law enforcement. This call has become more urgent as companies are moving in to take advantage of the lax regulatory landscape. We cannot continue to rely solely on the good will of companies that make their money selling technology to police departments to protect us from dangerous police technology. Lawmakers need to act now. 

When a car passes an automated license plate reader (ALPR), its plate is captured and instantly compared against a list of vehicles that police are actively looking for or that police have identified for real-time surveillance. These are called “hotlists,” and EFF has learned that one used by agencies across the country targets immigrants on behalf of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). 

Agencies using Flock Safety ALPR systems commonly allow the plates their cameras collect to be compared against the FBI's National Crime Information Center (NCIC) hotlists. These hotlists are broken into "topics," such as "Gang or Suspected Terrorist," "Stolen Vehicle," and "Missing Person." 

Flock Safety told EFF via email: "Local agencies add/remove license plates from the NCIC list. The FBI curates the NCIC list, and pushes it out to local agencies. Once the list leaves the FBI, they do not see any agency alerts. They only see when a local agency adds or removes plates from the list."

But one list is different: The "Immigration Violator" hotlist is populated exclusively by ICE, and it is the only agency authorized to enter or maintain records in this system, according to the NCIC operator manual. It includes license plates associated with administrative warrants, which are issued by ICE agents without judicial review. The manual further describes the data:

The Immigration Violator File contains records on criminal aliens who have been deported for drug trafficking, firearms trafficking, or serious violent crimes and on foreign-born individuals who have violated some section of the Immigration and Nationality Act.

And: 

If the ICE has reasonable grounds to believe that the subject may be operating a particular vehicle or a vehicle bearing a particular license plate, the vehicle and/or license data may be included in the record.

Buried in the Flock Safety administrative interface, there is a drop-down menu where agencies select which NCIC topics to subscribe to. If Immigration Violator is selected, the local agency will receive an alert that a vehicle ICE is looking for has been sighted. According to Flock Safety, ICE itself does not get an alert, although the local agency may contact ICE to let them know. Many agencies also participate or collaborate with immigration enforcement (through, for example, 287(g) agreements) and may take steps to stop a vehicle based on one of these alerts. 

In many places, using ALPRs for immigration enforcement is against city or state law–or at minimum, against agency policy. But using this hotlist is immigration enforcement. 

For example, Sparks Police Department's ALPR transparency portal lists immigration enforcement among the "prohibited uses." Yet, records show Sparks utilizes ICE's Immigration Violator hotlist.

Many agencies publicly acknowledge using NCIC hotlists, but don't publish which ones. So, EFF filed public records requests with agencies around the country to figure how to identify at least which agencies may be using the Immigration Violator hotlist. Here are links to the documents from the 13 agencies that have responded so far. 

Knowing whether your agency has this box checked isn't just useful information—it's the kind of evidence that can change how officials vote when a contract comes up for renewal. So, how can you find out if your local agency is using the Immigration Violator list? It takes some digging, and you may not be successful. But here's what has worked for us in some instances. 

STEP 1: Conduct background research. 

The first questions you want to try to answer are: 

• Does your local agency use Flock Safety ALPRs, and if so, 
• Are they using NCIC hotlists? 

To answer the first question, here are two sites to try: 

• AtlasofSurveillance.org - This is an EFF project to catalog the technologies law enforcement agencies use. You can search for your agency to see if they use ALPR.

• EyesonFlock.com  - This site includes an index of every agency that maintains a Flock Safety "Transparency Portal." These portals often disclose what hotlists an agency uses. You'll want to look for your agency, then click the outbound link to their transparency portal, if they have one. 

Once you're on the transparency portal, you'll want to look for two things. 

• Is "immigration enforcement" a prohibited use? If it is, you might find that the agency is violating its own policies. 

• Does the agency list "NCIC" as one of its hot lists? 

Not all agencies disclose this information, so even if you don't find anything, you can move on to these next steps. 

STEP 2: File a public records request. 

Every state has a law that allows the public to request information from the government. This can often be done by emailing the police department or sheriff’s office, using the agency's online public records portal. You can usually find these emails or portals quickly online by searching for the agency's website and contact information. You can also subscribe to a service like MuckRock, which is how we filed these requests. 

We have developed language to request the hotlist topics. It doesn't always work, due to differences in how agencies interpret public records laws, but it is still worth a shot. 

STEP 3: Wait for a response.

Depending on the agency and the state law, it may take anywhere from days to weeks to receive a response. 

If the agency provides the records, they might look something like this: 

If "Immigration Violator" is checked, then yes–police are scanning vehicles for immigration enforcement. 

You can then put this information to work, sharing it with local reporters or bringing it directly to city officials who have the authority to modify, restrict, or cancel your agency's Flock contract. This is especially important if the agency has the box checked but also claims ALPR data is not used for immigration enforcement. Government officials like easy fixes, and "uncheck the box" is about as easy as it gets. But remember: If that's where it stops, the infrastructure for immigration surveillance stays fully intact, and the system is one policy, personnel change, or error away from being switched back on.

In many cases, you will not receive records. The agency may claim it's protected under legal exemptions or that it is not actually a public record under state law. For example, we received rejections from the Abington Police Department in Massachusetts and the Akron Police Department in Ohio.

If that happens, push back politely. You can explain that many other agencies across the country have produced this information and that it would greatly help inform the public. You can try contacting the police department's public information officer. Another option is alerting local press that the agency is refusing to disclose basic information about a public surveillance system, shutting residents out of decisions about how that system is being used. If you have the resources and time, you may also consider litigating a denial or lack of response.

You can also email your city council or board of supervisors member. Explain why this matters: The law enforcement agency may be facilitating immigration enforcement in secret, potentially in violation of its own policies. Ask them to use their oversight authority to demand answers from the agency, including pressing the vendor directly. Elected officials hold real leverage here: In most cities, either the council or the city manager controls the contract, and both are accountable to the public. If your agency's contract is up for renewal—or if a new pilot program is on the horizon—this is exactly the kind of information that should be part of that public debate before officials sign anything.

While we have filed dozens of these requests, we need locals to help gather even more. Drop us a line with the records you receive (or don't) at aos@eff.org. 

An EFF analysis of millions of searches of Flock Safety automated license plate reader (ALPR) data by police has uncovered a troubling pattern: in the absence of a warrant requirement to search ALPR databases, law enforcement agencies have moved beyond specific investigations to use these surveillance networks for virtually any whim.

Our findings suggest that the absence of a warrant requirement has fostered a culture of unrestricted access to sensitive location data, allowing agencies to leverage that data beyond the scope of specific criminal investigations.

As a refresher: Law enforcement agencies lease or purchase camera systems from Flock Safety and then mount them by the side of the road and at intersections to document every vehicle that passes, including the plate, make, model, color and distinguishing characteristics, along with the date, time and location of where it was seen. 

Law enforcement's talking points—often scripted by the company itself—trumpet their role in solving high-stakes crimes. But the data reveals a different story. What they're not saying is that ALPRs are also frequently used for extremely low-level investigations, such as verifying whether a student lives within a particular school zone. In some cases, police have even used this tech to conduct employment background checks and investigations into loud music complaints. Recently, a motorcyclist was even targeted for simply holding a cell phone while riding.

The reach of this ALPR surveillance is amplified by the nature of the indiscriminate sharing these technologies encourage. Most agencies choose to share broadly, often as part of a nationwide pool, making it common for a single city's system to be searched hundreds of thousands of times each month. By analyzing these "network audit logs," privacy advocates and journalists have uncovered evidence of the technology being used to surveil protesters, abortion-seekers, immigrants, and even ethnic Roma populations. 

While these high-profile abuses are shocking, the more mundane uses are also problematic, signaling a massive, unchecked mission creep that has turned an alleged “crime-fighting” tool into a universal tracker of everyone’s movements. 

Residency Checks

School systems in the U.S. conduct "residency verification" investigations of their parents or guardians to ensure enrolled children live in the district. To carry out these checks, some school districts have enlisted law enforcement officers for help, leveraging ALPR databases to track the comings and goings of families across the region. 

Buford City Schools in Georgia, which serves only about 6,000 students, illustrates the scale of this prying. Between January 2025 and March 2026, school police ran more than 375 searches where officers listed school residency verification, or simply "RV," as the reason for the search. That accounts for more than half of all ALPR searches in that period, and in those three months of 2026, three-quarters of all searches were related to residency verification. 

School officials stand by the searches. "[B]ecause Buford City Schools is a highly sought-after district, we experience ongoing challenges with residency fraud," a spokesperson told Appen Media, which shared the email with EFF. "Flock Safety is one of the tools we use to verify residency and protect the integrity of the Buford City School System for families who live within the district."

A search of ALPR data will show a lot more than whether a family lives within the right zone. In these Buford cases, officers ran some searches across more than 5,800 different networks nationwide. Every time a plate is searched, it can reveal personal information about a family: when they go to the doctor, when they go to worship, when they go out at night, and where they travel on vacation. None of that is the school district's business, and these searches are a huge invasion of privacy. 

While Buford was by the far the most prolific, it wasn't the only agency to run school residency checks. For example, Delhi Township Police Department (DTPD) in Ohio ran 35 searches related to students in five schools in a three-month period during spring 2025, and similarly stood by the practice, citing a warning given to parents that submitting a false statement of residency may be a felony. 

After EFF sent an inquiry to DTPD, the agency conducted a brief investigation and found that "these searches were not done to verify residency upon submission, but to investigate cases where it was believed the form was filled out with false information." DTPD did not say what kind of evidence was required to establish suspicion before an ALPR query, nor did it offer information on how many of these investigations turned out to be justified. 

However, the official told EFF: "in response to your inquiry, the department will be implementing a change to how these queries are documented in the Flock system and internally, to increase accountability and help avoid any confusion moving forward."

Other agencies that ran school residency searches include Cortland Police Department in Ohio and Lincoln Police Department in Alabama. Several agencies also ran searches with "residency," "residency investigation" or "residency verification" as the reason, but that could refer to a number of public services. These agencies include Ridgeland Police Department in Mississippi, Fairfield County Sheriff's Office in South Carolina, Manteno Police Department in Illinois, Illinois Department of Natural Resources, and Mora County Sheriff's Office in New Mexico. 

Background Checks

Few people would imagine that applying for a government job would open you up to an ALPR search. Yet, several law enforcement agencies ran searches through the Flock network related to employment. 

For example:

• Jefferson County Sheriff's Office in Missouri ran six searches across 2,853 networks, documenting "employment" in the reason field.
• Little Elm Police Department in Texas ran 10 searches across 6,306 networks, documenting "EMPLOYMENT" in the reason field.
• Ridgeland Police Department in Mississippi ran two searches across more than 6,000 networks documenting "employment background inv" in the reason field.
• Texas City Police Department, Texas ran three searches across 728 networks, documenting "pre employment background" in the reason field. 
• Zion Police Department in Illinois ran a research across 585 networks documenting "Employee Background" in the reason field. 

Davidson Police Department in North Carolina logged a search listed as "Employment Background," but in response to an inquiry from EFF, the chief described this as "poor choice of words by our investigator." He further stated that the agency does not use ALPRs as part of employment background checks, but in this case, the agency shared that a potential violation of a protective order came to light during a background check, hence the reference to it in the search log.

In addition to the agencies mentioned, several agencies ran searches that simply referred to "background check" or "background checks," which could be related to employment or perhaps some other issue, such as a concealed weapons permit, for example. These include Avon Police Department in Indiana, Rockford Police Department in Illinois, San Bernardino County Sheriff's Office in California, and Seaford Police Department in Delaware.

Noise Complaints

Many people have probably been irritated at some point or another by a car blasting a deep bassline or even the infamous "whistle tip." Some may have even called the cops to complain about a neighbor’s house party. But that's a far cry from the types of serious crimes that Flock and its customers have claimed that the ALPR systems would be used to solve. 

Yet, EFF identified 26 agencies where officers felt it was appropriate to pry into a driver's life because of a noise complaint, ranging from house parties to loud exhausts to just "music": 

Some of these agencies searched upwards of 6,500 networks’ cameras—the equivalent of launching a nationwide goose chase over a booming subwoofer or a busted muffler. 

When Mission Creep Is Just Plain Creepy

An observant reader of this report may have noticed that Ridgeland Police Department in Mississippi ran searches in all three of the categories we reported above.

However, after the city first installed the Flock Safety cameras, the then-police chief told the press that the technology helps solve cases that range from "theft to crimes of violence"—without disclosing that the range would extend much further.

When police and salespeople trot out cherry-picked cases to argue that a mass surveillance technology is an "important" tool,  they obfuscate that it's a convenient shortcut around due process. For serious crimes, police can already go through the standard legal process: making the case to a judge on why they should get a search warrant for location data, whether it's from cell phones or service providers. But police treat ALPR databases as if no such threshold exists, giving them free rein to track a person’s movements without a sliver of judicial oversight.

When police and salespeople trot out cherry-picked cases to argue that a mass surveillance technology is an "important" tool,  they obfuscate that it's a convenient shortcut around due process.

"This is the same as if I put a police officer on the side of the road with a pen and a notepad and he writes down every license plate number that drives by,” the former chief said, repeating a commonly circulated talking point. 

That rhetoric may sound reasonable if we were just talking about a single camera on a street corner, but Ridgeland now operates more than 50 cameras—the equivalent of one for every 500 residents—and maintains access to tens of thousands more. 

If the chief had stood in front of the city’s aldermen and asked for permission to search more than 20,000 cameras so his officers could investigate the high crime of "music," it’s quite unlikely that they would have been nodding their heads along. 

Ridgeland Police Department did not respond to EFF’s requests for comment.

This is the third installment of a blog series reflecting on the global digital legacy of the 2011 Arab uprisings. You can read the first post here, and the second here.

When people recall the 2011 uprisings across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), they often picture crowded squares, raised phones, and the feeling that the internet had finally shifted the balance of power toward ordinary people. But the past decade and a half is also a story about how governments, companies, and platforms turned those same tools into the backbone of a powerful state surveillance apparatus.

For activists, journalists, everyday users, that means now living with a constant threat. The phone in your pocket, the platforms you organize on, and the systems you rely on for safety and connection can be weaponized at the flip of a switch. A global surveillance industry has treated repression by many MENA governments as a growth opportunity, and the tactics refined there now shape digital authoritarianism worldwide. This essay traces how that shift unfolded: security agencies upgraded older systems of repression with new surveillance tools and permanent monitoring infrastructure; cybercrime laws and mercenary spyware markets turned digital control into standard operating procedure; and biometrics, facial recognition, and ‘smart city’ projects laid the groundwork for AI‑driven surveillance that now shapes protests, borders, and everyday life far beyond the region. 

Remembering the Arab Spring means seeing the events of 2011 as both a remarkable moment of movement history when people leveraged networked tools in their fight for freedom and the beginning of a long, grinding effort to turn those same tools into mechanisms of state control.

Old‑School Repression, New‑School Tools

Long before Facebook and Twitter, regimes in countries like Egypt and Syria already knew how to crush dissent. They leaned on informant networks, physical surveillance, and wiretaps, backed by emergency laws that let security agencies monitor and detain critics with almost no restraint. Research on the use of surveillance technology in MENA shows that, even before the Arab Spring, states were layering early digital tools like internet monitoring, deep packet inspection, and interception centers on top of that older machinery of control.

At the same time, connectivity was racing ahead. Cheap smartphones and social media suddenly let people share information at scale, coordinate protests, and broadcast abuses in real time. In 2011, EFF described both the excitement around “Facebook revolutions” and the early signs that governments were scrambling to upgrade their capacity to watch and disorganize popular dissent.

After the uprisings, Western critics endlessly debated how much credit to give social media itself. While in the background, security agencies across several MENA states reached a much simpler conclusion: if networked communication can help topple a dictator, then they needed to embed themselves deep inside those networks. Analyses of the rise of digital authoritarianism in MENA show how quickly officials pivoted from being surprised by online organizing to building systems to monitor and pre‑empt it.

In the years after 2011, governments across the region poured money into tools that let them systematically watch what people said and did on major platforms. Foreign vendors set up monitoring centers and interception systems that let security agencies block tens of thousands of sites, scrape and analyze social media at scale, monitor activist pages and online communities, and track activists in real time. They built a new, pre‑emptive model of digital control, one that assumes the state should see as much as possible, as early as possible.

As we noted in 2011, exporting permanent surveillance infrastructure to already‑abusive governments doesn’t “modernize” public safety; it locks in an architecture of control that is primed to abuse dissidents, journalists, and marginalized communities.

Domestic Lawfare and Cyber-Mercenaries

After the uprisings, a number of governments also rewrote the rules that govern online life. Cybercrime laws, “fake news” provisions, and overbroad public‑order and ‘morality’ offences gave prosecutors and security agencies legal cover to act with impunity. Governments in Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Jordan, and Egypt combined counterterrorism, cybercrime, defamation, and protest laws into a legal thicket designed to make online dissent feel dangerous and costly. Morality laws and cybercrime provisions are used to target queer and trans people based on identity and expression.​

At the United Nations, a new global cybercrime convention now risks baking this logic into international law. The convention was adopted by the UN General Assembly in late 2024, despite serious human rights concerns raised by civil society. Echoing our partners, EFF warned at the time that the UN cybercrime draft convention remained too flawed to adopt and urged states to reject the draft language because it legitimized expansive surveillance powers and criminalized legitimate expression, security research, and everyday digital practices around the world. While on paper, these instruments gesture to “public safety” objectives, in practice they function as pathways for state security agencies to monitor, prosecute, and silence the communities most at risk. For state-targeted communities, that makes being visible online a calculated risk, not a neutral choice.​​

Criminal codes are only half the story; mercenary tech is the other. As governments worldwide looked for ways to outpace their critics, a parallel market emerged to help them infiltrate and take over devices. Companies like NSO Group marketed Pegasus and similar tools as off‑the‑shelf capabilities for governments that wanted to hack a target’s cellphones or other devices to read messages, turn on microphones, and monitor entire social networks while bypassing the courts. 

In 2019, UN Special Rapporteur David Kaye called for a global moratorium on the sale and transfer of private surveillance tools until real, enforceable safeguards exist. Two years later, forensic work by Amnesty and media partners showed how the same spyware used to hack phones of Palestinian human‑rights defenders was used to surveil journalists, activists, lawyers, and political opponents across dozens of countries. 

Regional groups responded by demanding an end to the sale of surveillance technology to autocratic governments and security agencies, arguing that you cannot keep selling “lawful intercept” tools into systems where law itself is an instrument of repression. Commercial spyware is at the center of digital repression, not at its margins. Surveillance vendors are not neutral suppliers. Safeguards remain weak, fragmented, or nonexistent in most of the countries buying these tools, yet vendors continue seeking new contracts and new militarized “use cases.” Put bluntly, the companies that design, market, and maintain these systems precisely because they enable this kind of control profit from (and help entrench) authoritarian power.

Biometrics, Facial Recognition, and AI‑Powered Surveillance Cities

On top of this rapidly intensifying interception and spyware stack, governments and companies began layering biometrics and face recognition into everyday systems, creating pathways for bulk data collection, automated analysis, and risk profiling. In parts of MENA, national ID schemes, border and migration controls, and centralized biometric databases have been rolled out in environments with weak or captured data‑protection laws, making it easy to link people’s movements, services, and political activity to a single, persistent identifier.​

Humanitarian programs are not exempt from this protocol. In Jordan, Syrian refugees have been required to submit iris scans and biometric data to access cash assistance and food, turning “consent” into a precondition for survival. When access to aid depends on enrollment in centralized biometric systems, any breach, misuse, or repurposing of that data can have severe, life‑altering consequences for people who have no realistic way to opt out. Investigations into surveillance‑tech firms complicit in abuses in MENA show that vendors profit from supplying biometric and surveillance tools for migration management and internal security, even when those tools are used in discriminatory or abusive ways.​

Like elsewhere, mass surveillance technologies in MENA were first piloted on people who were already criminalized or made vulnerable by poverty. But their use quickly expanded from narrow, security‑framed deployments to routine use in city streets. As hardware sensors, cameras, and data storage got cheaper, “smart city” surveillance systems promised seamless security and services, and it became easier and less politically contentious to keep these systems running everywhere, all the time.​

Unlike targeted hacking tools, these broad, city‑wide surveillance infrastructures erase any practical line between people under investigation and the broad public, normalizing bulk, indiscriminate monitoring of public space and everyday movement. In the Gulf, facial recognition and dense sensor networks are increasingly built into high‑profile “smart city” and mega‑project plans that lean heavily on biometric and AI‑driven monitoring. These are security‑first development projects where biometric and sensor infrastructures are designed from the outset to embed policing, migration control, and commercial tracking into the urban fabric. In this vision of the Gulf’s “smart city” future—often sold as seamless services and digital opportunity—“smart” is the branding, and pervasive monitoring is the operating principle.​​

EFF has consistently opposed government use of face recognition and biometric surveillance, in some instances calling for outright bans. In contexts that treat peaceful dissent as a security threat, embedding biometric surveillance into everyday infrastructure locks in a balance of power that favors militarized policing and state control. That infrastructure is now the starting point for a new set of risks. Surveillance systems built over the last decade are being repackaged as the foundation for a new generation of “AI‑enabled” defense and security products. 

Companies that once focused on video management or perimeter security now advertise “defense applications” for AI‑driven situational awareness and threat detection, using computer‑vision models to scan camera feeds, compare against existing watchlists, and flag “suspicious” people or behaviors in real time. Drone and sensor platforms are being upgraded with embedded AI that tracks and classifies targets autonomously and with “drone‑based AI threat detection and intelligent situational awareness,” turning aerial surveillance into a continuous data feed for security agencies and militaries. In smart‑city and defense expos from the Gulf to Europe and North America, similar systems are marketed as neutral efficiency upgrades or tools to “protect critical infrastructure,” even where they are explicitly designed to scale up border enforcement, protest surveillance, and internal security operations.

As these systems are folded into AI‑driven defense products, the line between “civilian” infrastructure and militarized surveillance disappears, turning streets, borders, and aid sites into continuous input for security operations. That is the landscape that human rights and accountability efforts now have to confront.

Templates of Control, Networks of Resistance

The patterns established in heavily securitized MENA states after the Arab Spring now shape how states monitor and crush more recent uprisings, from Iran’s use of location data and facial recognition to track down protesters to long‑running crackdowns elsewhere in the region. This model of “digital authoritarianism” built on spyware, data‑hungry ID systems, platform control, and emergency‑style security laws has emerged everywhere from Latin America to Eastern Europe to here in the United States. As the new UN Cybercrime Convention moves toward implementation, its broad offences and surveillance powers risk turning this ad hoc toolkit into a formal template for cross‑border data‑sharing, repression, and an all‑purpose global surveillance instrument.

For people on the ground, none of this is theoretical. Human‑rights defenders, journalists, and ordinary users across the region face arrest, long prison sentences, and exile based on their digital traces. In that context, commercial spyware is not a marginal issue but part of the core machinery of repression. Pegasus has been used to hack journalists’ phones through zero‑click exploits and compromise human‑rights defenders and watchdog organizations themselves, including staff at Amnesty’s Pegasus Project partners and Human Rights Watch. These deployments give practical effect to the “cybercrime” and “terrorism” frameworks described earlier: person‑by‑person campaigns against particular communities, contacts, and networks, rather than “neutral,” generalized security measures.

Under these conditions, everyday security becomes a second job. People describe carrying multiple phones, keeping one for relatively “clean” uses and others for riskier conversations, splitting identities across platforms, using coded language, and moving their organizing off mainstream services when possible. Pushing this burden onto users is a political choice: states, platforms, and vendors could build systems that are safe by design; instead, they externalize risk to the people they watch and punish.

Even against that backdrop, civil society organizations have refused to capitulate to security agencies and vendors. Regional coalitions have demanded strict export controls and outright bans on selling intrusive surveillance tech to autocratic governments. Advocates have also pushed companies to do more than box‑ticking “due diligence.” Work with surveillance‑tech firms in the context of migration and border control has repeatedly shown that most are still far from serious human‑rights assessments, let alone willing to turn down these lucrative contracts.

Many of the same governments that have been critical of others on the issue of human rights have hosted or licensed companies that build these tools, in some cases buying similar capabilities for their own security agencies. European authorities, for instance, have investigated FinFisher’s export of spyware “made in Germany” to Turkey and other non‑EU governments. Meanwhile, the NSO Group has at least 22 Pegasus contracts with security and law‑enforcement agencies in 12 EU countries. This is a transnational industry, not a localized problem.

Against near impossible odds, people continue finding pathways to freedom. The global surveillance sector reinforces the same hierarchies and violence that people have found ways to survive for generations. Queer activists and others at the sharpest edges of this system have had to develop their own forms of resistance, including against biometric and data‑driven targeting. Encryption, circumvention tools, and security training are not silver bullets, but they remain essential for anyone trying to organize, document abuses, or simply exist online with a bit less risk. Resources like EFF’s Surveillance Self‑Defense are one piece of that ecosystem, alongside trainers and groups who have been doing this work on the ground for years.​

Defending the Future of Digital Dissent

The Arab Spring is often remembered through images of packed squares and hopeful tweets. But contending with its aftermath means confronting the surveillance architecture built in its shadow: laws that turn online speech into a crime, spyware and biometric systems that turn phones and faces into tracking beacons, and platform practices that routinely sacrifice the people most at risk. None of that is inevitable, and none of it is confined to one part of the world.

Accountability has to reach both governments and the companies that profit from arming them with these tools. That means pushing for far stronger limits on how surveillance tech is built, sold, and deployed; demanding meaningful transparency when these systems are used; and defending the tools people rely on to communicate and organize safely, including robust encryption and secure channels. It also means taking direction from the people and communities who have been navigating and resisting this landscape for years.

Surveillance itself is transnational: tools, playbooks, and data moves across borders as easily as money. And so we, too, continue our work, documenting abuses, sharing security knowledge, and collectively organizing against these violent systems.

​This is the third installment of a blog series reflecting on the global digital legacy of the 2011 Arab uprisings. Read the rest of the series here.

A new report from 404 Media sheds light on how automated license plate readers (ALPRs) could be used beyond the press releases and glossy marketing materials put out by law enforcement agencies and ALPR vendors. In December 2025, Georgia State Patrol ticketed a motorcyclist for holding a cell phone in his hand. According to the report, the ticket read, “CAPTURED ON FLOCK CAMERA 31 MM 1 HOLDING PHONE IN LEFT HAND.” 

If you’re thinking that this sounds outside of the scope of what ALPRs are supposed to do, you’re right. In November 2025, Flock Safety, the maker of the ALPR in question, wrote a post about how they definitely are in compliance with the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. In this post, which highlighted what ALPRs are and what they are not, the company writes: “What it is not: Flock ALPR does not perform facial recognition, does not store biometrics, cannot be queried to find people, and is not used to enforce traffic violations.” (emphasis added)

Well, apparently their customers never got the memo and apparently the technology’s design does not explicitly prevent behavior the company officially and publicly disavows. 

Or at least this used to be the case: Flock now lists six different companies providing traffic enforcement technology on its “Partner program”  site. Public records also show that speed enforcement cameras have been connected to Flock's ALPR network. 

EFF and other privacy advocates have long warned about mission creep when it comes to surveillance infrastructure. Police often swear that a piece of technology will only be used in a particular set of circumstances or to fight only the most serious crimes only to utilize it to fight petty crimes or watch protests.  

We continue to urge cities, states, and even companies to end their relationship with Flock Safety because of the incompatibility between the mass surveillance it enables and its inability to protect civil liberties—including preventing mission creep.

In a big win for protesters’ rights, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit overturned a lower court’s dismissal of a challenge to sweeping warrants to search a protester’s devices and digital data and a nonprofit’s social media data.

The case, Armendariz v. City of Colorado Springs, arose after a housing protest in 2021, during which Colorado Springs police arrested protesters for obstructing a roadway. After the demonstration, police also obtained warrants to seize and search through the devices and data of Jacqueline Armendariz Unzueta, who they claimed threw a bike at them during the protest. The warrants included a search through all of her photos, videos, emails, text messages, and location data over a two-month period, as well as a time-unlimited search for 26 keywords, including words as broad as “bike,” “assault,” “celebration,” and “right,” that allowed police to comb through years of Armendariz’s private and sensitive data—all supposedly to look for evidence related to the alleged simple assault. Police further obtained a warrant to search the Facebook page of the Chinook Center, the organization that spearheaded the protest, despite the Chinook Center never having been accused of a crime.

The district court dismissed the civil rights lawsuit brought by Armendariz and the Chinook Center, holding that the searches were justified and that, in any case, the officers were entitled to qualified immunity. The plaintiffs, represented by the ACLU of Colorado, appealed. EFF—joined by the Center for Democracy and Technology, the Electronic Privacy Information Center, and the Knight First Amendment Institute at Columbia University—wrote an amicus brief in support of that appeal.

In a 2-1 opinion, the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of the lawsuit’s Fourth Amendment search and seizure claims. The court painstakingly picked apart each of the three warrants and found them to be overbroad and lacking in particularity as to the scope and duration of the searches. The court further held that in furnishing such facially deficient warrants, the officers violated “clearly established” law and thus were not entitled to qualified immunity. Although the court did not explicitly address the First Amendment concerns raised by the lawsuit, it did note the backdrop against how these searches were carried out, including animus by Colorado Springs police leading up to the housing protest.

It is rare for appellate courts to call into question any search warrants. It’s even rarer for them to deny qualified immunity defenses. The Tenth Circuit’s decision should be celebrated as a big win for protesters and anyone concerned about police immunity for violating people’s constitutional rights. The case is now remanded back to the district court to proceed—and hopefully further vindicate the privacy rights we all have in our devices and digital data.

(This appeared as an op-ed published February 12, 2026 in the San Jose Spotlight, written by Huy Tran (SIREN), Jeffrey Wang (CAIR-SFBA), and Jennifer Pinsof.)

As ICE and other federal agencies continue their assault on civil liberties, local leaders are stepping up to protect their communities. This includes pushing back against automated license plate readers, or ALPRs, which are tools of mass surveillance that can be weaponized against immigrants, political dissidents and other targets.

In recent weeks, Mountain View, Los Altos Hills, Santa Cruz, East Palo Alto and Santa Clara County have begun reconsidering their ALPR programs. San Jose should join them. This dangerous technology poses an unacceptable risk to the safety of immigrants and other vulnerable populations.

ALPRs are marketed to promote public safety. But their utility is debatable and they come with significant drawbacks. They don’t just track “criminals.” They track everyone, all the time. Your vehicle’s movements can reveal where you work, worship and obtain medical care. ALPR vendors like Flock Safety put the location information of millions of drivers into databases, allowing anyone with access to instantly reconstruct the public’s movements.

But “anyone with access” is far broader than just local police. Some California law enforcement agencies have used ALPR networks to run searches related to immigration enforcement. In other situations, purported issues with the system’s software have enabled federal agencies to directly access California ALPR data. This is despite the promises of ALPR vendors and clear legal prohibitions.

Communities are saying enough is enough. Just last week, police in Mountain View decided to turn off all of the city’s Flock cameras, following revelations that federal and other unauthorized agencies had accessed their network. The cameras will remain inactive until the City Council provides further direction.

Other localities have shut off the cameras for good. In January, Los Altos Hills terminated its contract with Flock following concerns about ICE. Santa Cruz severed relations with Flock, citing rising tensions with ICE. Most recently, East Palo Alto and Santa Clara County are reconsidering whether to continue their relationships with Flock, given heightened concern for the safety of immigrant communities.

California law prohibits local police from disclosing ALPR data to out-of-state or federal agencies. But at least 75 California police agencies were sharing these records out-of-state as recently as 2023. Just last year, San Francisco police allowed access to out-of-state agencies and 19 searches were related to ICE.

Even without direct access, ICE can exploit local ALPR systems. One investigation found more than 4,000 cases where police had made searches on behalf of federal law enforcement, including for immigration investigations.

Increasing the risk is that law enforcement routinely searches these networks without first obtaining a warrant. In San Jose, police aren’t required to have any suspicion of wrongdoing before searching ALPR databases, which contain a year’s worth of data representing hundreds of millions of records. In a little over a year, San Jose police logged more than 261,000 ALPR searches, or nearly 700 searches a day, all without a warrant.

Two nonprofit organizations, SIREN and CAIR California, represented by Electronic Frontier Foundation and the ACLU of Northern California, are currently suing to stop San Jose’s warrantless searches of ALPR data. But this is only the first step. A better solution is to simply turn these cameras off.

San Jose cannot afford delay. Each day these cameras remain active, they collect sensitive location data that can be misused to target immigrant families and violate fundamental freedoms. It is a risk materializing across California. City leaders must act now to shut down ALPR systems and make clear that public safety will not come at the expense of privacy, human dignity or community trust.

Surveillance technology vendors, federal agencies, and wealthy private donors have long helped provide local law enforcement “free” access to surveillance equipment that bypasses local oversight. The result is predictable: serious accountability gaps and data pipelines to other entities, including Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), that expose millions of people to harm.

The cost of “free” surveillance tools — like automated license plate readers (ALPRs), networked cameras, face recognition, drones, and data aggregation and analysis platforms — is measured not in tax dollars, but in the erosion of civil liberties. 

The cost of “free” surveillance tools is measured not in tax dollars, but in the erosion of civil liberties.

The collection and sharing of our data quietly generates detailed records of people’s movements and associations that can be exposed, hacked, or repurposed without their knowledge or consent. Those records weaken sanctuary and First Amendment protections while facilitating the targeting of vulnerable people.   

Cities can and should use their power to reject federal grants, vendor trials, donations from wealthy individuals, or participation in partnerships that facilitate surveillance and experimentation with spy tech. 

If these projects are greenlit, oversight is imperative. Mechanisms like public hearings, competitive bidding, public records transparency, and city council supervision aid to ensure these acquisitions include basic safeguards — like use policies, audits, and consequences for misuse — to protect the public from abuse and from creeping contracts that grow into whole suites of products. 

Clear policies and oversight mechanisms must be in place before using any surveillance tools, free or not, and communities and their elected officials must be at the center of every decision about whether to bring these tools in at all.

Here are some of the most common methods “free” surveillance tech makes its way into communities.

Trials and Pilots

Police departments are regularly offered free access to surveillance tools and software through trials and pilot programs that often aren’t accompanied by appropriate use policies. In many jurisdictions, trials do not trigger the same requirements to go before decision-makers outside the police department. This means the public may have no idea that a pilot program for surveillance technology is happening in their city. 

The public may have no idea that a pilot program for surveillance technology is happening in their city.  

In Denver, Colorado, the police department is running trials of possible unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) for a drone-as-first-responder (DFR) program from two competing drone vendors: Flock Safety Aerodome drones (through August 2026) and drones from the company Skydio, partnering with Axon, the multi-billion dollar police technology company behind tools like Tasers and AI-generated police reports. Drones create unique issues given their vantage for capturing private property and unsuspecting civilians, as well as their capacity to make other technologies, like ALPRs, airborne. 

Functional, Even Without Funding 

We’ve seen cities decide not to fund a tool, or run out of funding for it, only to have a company continue providing it in the hope that money will turn up. This happened in Fall River, Massachusetts, where the police department decided not to fund ShotSpotter’s $90,000 annual cost and its frequent false alarms, but continued using the system when the company provided free access. 

 Police technology companies are developing more features and subscription-based models, so what’s “free” today frequently results in taxpayers footing the bill later.

In May 2025, Denver's city council unanimously rejected a $666,000 contract extension for Flock Safety ALPR cameras after weeks of public outcry over mass surveillance data sharing with federal immigration enforcement. But Mayor Mike Johnston’s office allowed the cameras to keep running through a “task force” review, effectively extending the program even after the contract was voted down. In response, the Denver Taskforce to Reimagine Policing and Public Safety and Transforming Our Communities Alliance launched a grassroots campaign demanding the city “turn Flock cameras off now,” a reminder that when surveillance starts as a pilot or time‑limited contract, communities often have to fight not just to block renewals but to shut the systems off.

 Importantly, police technology companies are developing more features and subscription-based models, so what’s “free” today frequently results in taxpayers footing the bill later. 

Gifts from Police Foundations and Wealthy Donors

Police foundations and the wealthy have pushed surveillance-driven agendas in their local communities by donating equipment and making large monetary gifts, another means of acquiring these tools without public oversight or buy-in.

In Atlanta, the Atlanta Police Foundation (APF) attempted to use its position as a private entity to circumvent transparency. Following a court challenge from the Atlanta Community Press Collective and Lucy Parsons Labs, a Georgia court determined that the APF must comply with public records laws related to some of its actions and purchases on behalf of law enforcement.
In San Francisco, billionaire Chris Larsen has financially supported a supercharging of the city’s surveillance infrastructure, donating $9.4 million to fund the San Francisco Police Department’s (SFPD) Real-Time Investigation Center, where a menu of surveillance technologies and data come together to surveil the city’s residents. This move comes after the billionaire backed a ballot measure, which passed in March 2025, eroding the city’s surveillance technology law and allowing the SFPD free rein to use new surveillance technologies for a full year without oversight.

Free Tech for Federal Data Pipelines

Federal grants and Department of Homeland Security funding are another way surveillance technology appears free to, only to lock municipalities into long‑term data‑sharing and recurring costs. 

Through the Homeland Security Grant Program, which includes the State Homeland Security Program (SHSP) and the Urban Areas Security (UASI) Initiative, and Department of Justice programs like Byrne JAG, the federal government reimburses states and cities for "homeland security" equipment and software, including including law‑enforcement surveillance tools, analytics platforms, and real‑time crime centers. Grant guidance and vendor marketing materials make clear that these funds can be used for automated license plate readers, integrated video surveillance and analytics systems, and centralized command‑center software—in other words, purchases framed as counterterrorism investments but deployed in everyday policing.

Vendors have learned to design products around this federal money, pitching ALPR networks, camera systems, and analytic platforms as "grant-ready" solutions that can be acquired with little or no upfront local cost. Motorola Solutions, for example, advertises how SHSP and UASI dollars can be used for "law enforcement surveillance equipment" and "video surveillance, warning, and access control" systems. Flock Safety, partnering with Lexipol, a company that writes use policies for law enforcement, offers a "License Plate Readers Grant Assistance Program" that helps police departments identify federal and state grants and tailor their applications to fund ALPR projects. 

Grant assistance programs let police chiefs fast‑track new surveillance: the paperwork is outsourced, the grant eats the upfront cost, and even when there is a formal paper trail, the practical checks from residents, councils, and procurement rules often get watered down or bypassed.

On paper, these systems arrive “for free” through a federal grant; in practice, they lock cities into recurring software, subscription, and data‑hosting fees that quietly turn into permanent budget lines—and a lasting surveillance infrastructure—as soon as police and prosecutors start to rely on them. In Santa Cruz, California, the police department explicitly sought to use a DHS-funded SHSP grant to pay for a new citywide network of Flock ALPR cameras at the city's entrances and exits, with local funds covering additional cameras. In Sumner, Washington, a $50,000 grant was used to cover the entire first year of a Flock system — including installation and maintenance — after which the city is on the hook for roughly $39,000 every year in ongoing fees. The free grant money opens the door, but local governments are left with years of financial, political, and permanent surveillance entanglements they never fully vetted.

The most dangerous cost of this "free" funding is not just budgetary; it is the way it ties local systems into federal data pipelines. Since 9/11, DHS has used these grant streams to build a nationwide network of at least 79–80 state and regional fusion centers that integrate and share data from federal, state, local, tribal, and private partners. Research shows that state fusion centers rely heavily on the DHS Homeland Security Grant Program (especially SHSP and UASI) to "mature their capabilities," with some centers reporting that 100 percent of their annual expenditures are covered by these grants. 

Civil rights investigations have documented how this funding architecture creates a backdoor channel for ICE and other federal agencies to access local surveillance data for their own purposes. A recent report by the Surveillance Technology Oversight Project (S.T.O.P.) describes ICE agents using a Philadelphia‑area fusion center to query the city’s ALPR network to track undocumented drivers in a self‑described sanctuary city.

Ultimately, federal grants follow the same script as trials and foundation gifts: what looks “free” ends up costing communities their data, their sanctuary protections, and their power over how local surveillance is used.

Protecting Yourself Against “Free” Technology

The most important protection against "free" surveillance technology is to reject it outright. Cities do not have to accept federal grants, vendor trials, or philanthropic donations. Saying no to "free" tech is not just a policy choice; it is a political power that local governments possess and can exercise. Communities and their elected officials can and should refuse surveillance systems that arrive through federal grants, vendor pilots, or private donations, regardless of how attractive the initial price tag appears. 

For those cities that have already accepted surveillance technology, the imperative is equally clear: shut it down. When a community has rejected use of a spying tool, the capabilities, equipment, and data collected from that tool should be shut off immediately. Full stop.

And for any surveillance technology that remains in operation, even temporarily, there must be clear rules: when and how equipment is used, how that data is retained and shared, who owns data and how companies can access and use it, transparency requirements, and consequences for any misuse and abuse. 

“Free” surveillance technology is never free. Someone profits or gains power from it. Police technology vendors, federal agencies, and wealthy donors do not offer these systems out of generosity; they offer them because surveillance serves their interests, not ours. That is the real cost of “free” surveillance.

Amazon Ring’s Super Bowl ad offered a vision of our streets that should leave every person unsettled about the company’s goals for disintegrating our privacy in public.

In the ad, disguised as a heartfelt effort to reunite the lost dogs of the country with their innocent owners, the company previewed future surveillance of our streets: a world where biometric identification could be unleashed from consumer devices to identify, track, and locate anything — human, pet, and otherwise.

The ad for Ring’s “Search Party” feature highlighted the doorbell camera’s ability to scan footage across Ring devices in a neighborhood, using AI analysis to identify potential canine matches among the many personal devices within the network. 

Amazon Ring already integrates biometric identification, like face recognition, into its products via features like "Familiar Faces,” which depends on scanning the faces of those in sight of the camera and matching it against a list of pre-saved, pre-approved faces. It doesn’t take much to imagine Ring eventually combining these two features: face recognition and neighborhood searches. 

Ring’s “Familiar Faces” feature could already run afoul of biometric privacy laws in some states, which require explicit, informed consent from individuals before a company can just run face recognition on someone. Unfortunately, not all states have similar privacy protections for their residents. 

Ring has a history of privacy violations, enabling surveillance of innocents and protestors, and close collaboration with law enforcement, and EFF has spent years reporting on its many privacy problems.

The cameras, which many people buy and install to identify potential porch pirates or get a look at anyone that might be on their doorstep, feature microphones that have been found to capture audio from the street. In 2023, Ring settled with the Federal Trade Commission over the extensive access it gave employees to personal customer footage. At that time, just three years ago, the FTC wrote: “As a result of this dangerously overbroad access and lax attitude toward privacy and security, employees and third-party contractors were able to view, download, and transfer customers’ sensitive video data for their own purposes.”

The company has made law enforcement access a regular part of its business. As early as 2016, the company was courting police departments through free giveaways. The company provided law enforcement warrantless access to people’s footage, a practice they claimed to cut off in 2024. Not long after, though, the company established partnerships with major police companies Axon and Flock Safety to facilitate the integration of Ring cameras into police intelligence networks. The partnership allows law enforcement to again request Ring footage directly from users. This supplements the already wide-ranging apparatus of data and surveillance feeds now available to law enforcement. 

This feature is turned on by default, meaning that Ring owners need to go into the controls to change it. According to Amazon Ring’s instructions, this is how to disable the “search party” feature: 

1. Open the Ring app to the main dashboard.
2. Tap the menu (☰).
3. Tap Control Center.
4. Select Search Party.
5. Tap Disable Search for Lost Pets. Tap the blue Pet icon next to "Search for Lost Pets" to turn the feature off for each camera. (You also have the option to "Disable Natural Hazards (Fire Watch)" and the option to tap the blue Flame icon next to Natural Hazards (Fire Watch) to turn the feature on or off for each camera.)

The addition of AI-driven biometric identification is the latest entry in the company’s history of profiting off of public safety worries and disregard for individual privacy, one that turbocharges the extreme dangers of allowing this to carry on. People need to reject this kind of disingenuous framing and recognize the potential end result: a scary overreach of the surveillance state designed to catch us all in its net.

Flock contracts have quietly spread to cities across the country. But Flock ALPR (Automated License Plate Readers) erode civil liberties from the moment they're installed. While officials claim these cameras keep neighborhoods safe, the evidence tells a different story. The data reveals how Flock has enabled surveillance of people seeking abortions, protesters exercising First Amendment rights, and communities targeted by discriminatory policing.

This is exactly why cities are saying no. From Austin to Cambridge to small towns across Texas, jurisdictions are rejecting Flock contracts altogether, proving that surveillance isn't inevitable—it's a choice.

Join EFF's Sarah Hamid and Andrew Crocker along with Reem Suleiman from Fight for the Future and Kate Bertash from Rural Privacy Coalition to explore what's happening as Flock contracts face growing resistance across the U.S. We'll break down the legal implications of the data these systems collect, examine campaigns that have successfully stopped Flock deployments, and discuss the real-world consequences for people's privacy and freedom. The conversation will be followed by a live Q&A. 

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The Baton Rouge Police Department announced this week that it will begin using a drone designed by military equipment manufacturer Lockheed Martin and Edge Autonomy, making it one of the first local police departments to use an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) with a history of primary use in foreign war zones. Baton Rouge is now one of the first local police departments in the United States to deploy an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) with such extensive surveillance capabilities — a dangerous escalation in the militarization of local law enforcement.

This is a troubling development in an already long history of local law enforcement acquiring and utilizing military-grade surveillance equipment. It should be a cautionary tale that prods  communities across the country to be proactive in ensuring that drones can only be acquired and used in ways that are well-documented, transparent, and subject to public feedback. 

Baton Rouge bought the Stalker VXE30 from Edge Autonomy, which partners with Lockheed Martin and began operating under the brand Redwire this week. According to reporting from WBRZ ABC2 in Louisiana, the drone, training, and batteries, cost about $1 million. 

Baton Rouge Police Department with Stalker VXE30 drone

All of the regular concerns surrounding drones apply to this new one in use by Baton Rouge:

• Drones can access and view spaces that are otherwise off-limits to law enforcement, including backyards, decks, and other areas of personal property.
• Footage captured by camera-enabled drones may be stored and shared in ways that go far beyond the initial flight.
• Additional camera-based surveillance can be installed on the drone, including automated license plate readers and the retroactive application of biometric analysis, such as face recognition.

However, the use of a military-grade drone hypercharges these concerns. Stalker VXE30's surveillance capabilities extend for dozens of miles, and it can fly faster and longer than standard police drones already in use. 

“It can be miles away, but we can still have a camera looking at your face, so we can use it for surveillance operations," BRPD Police Chief TJ Morse told reporters.

Drone models similar to the Stalker VXE30 have been used in military operations around the world and are currently being used by the U.S. Army and other branches for long-range reconnaissance. Typically, police departments deploy drone models similar to those commercially available from companies like DJI, which until recently was the subject of a proposed Federal Communications Commission (FCC) ban, or devices provided by police technology companies like Skydio, in partnership with Axon and Flock Safety. 

Additionally troubling is the capacity to add additional equipment to these drones: so-called “payloads” that could include other types of surveillance equipment and even weapons. 

The Baton Rouge community must put policies in place that restrict and provide oversight of any possible uses of this drone, as well as any potential additions law enforcement might make. 

EFF has filed a public records request to learn more about the conditions of this acquisition and gaps in oversight policies. We've been tracking the expansion of police drone surveillance for years, and this acquisition represents a dangerous new frontier. We'll continue investigating and supporting communities fighting back against the militarization of local police and mass surveillance. To learn more about the surveillance technologies being used in your city, please check out the Atlas of Surveillance.

Read more about how ICE has spent hundreds of millions of dollars on surveillance technology to spy on anyone—and potentially everyone—in the United States, and how to follow the Homeland Security Spending Trail..

ICE has been invading U.S. cities, targeting, surveilling, harassing, assaulting, detaining, and torturing people who are undocumented immigrants. They also have targeted people with work permits, asylum seekers, permanent residents (people holding “green cards”), naturalized citizens, and even citizens by birth. ICE has spent hundreds of millions of dollars on surveillance technology to spy on anyone—and potentially everyone—in the United States. It can be hard to imagine how to defend oneself against such an overwhelming force. But a few enterprising hackers have started projects to do counter surveillance against ICE, and hopefully protect their communities through clever use of technology. 

Let’s start with Flock, the company behind a number of automated license plate reader (ALPR) and other camera technologies. You might be surprised at how many Flock cameras there are in your community. Many large and small municipalities around the country have signed deals with Flock for license plate readers to track the movement of all cars in their city. Even though these deals are signed by local police departments, oftentimes ICE also gains access. 

Because of their ubiquity, people are interested in finding out where and how many Flock cameras are in their community. One project that can help with this is the OUI-SPY, a small piece of open source hardware. The OUI-SPY runs on a cheap Arduino compatible chip called an ESP-32. There are multiple programs available for loading on the chip, such as “Flock You,” which allows people to detect Flock cameras and “Sky-Spy” to detect overhead drones. There’s also “BLE Detect,” which detects various Bluetooth signals including ones from Axon, Meta’s Ray-Bans that secretly record you, and more. It also has a mode commonly known as “fox hunting” to track down a specific device. Activists and researchers can use this tool to map out different technologies and quantify the spread of surveillance. 

There’s also the open source Wigle app which is primarily designed for mapping out Wi-Fi, but also has the ability to make an audio alert when a specific Wi-Fi or Bluetooth identifier is detected. This means you can set it up to get a notification when it detects products from Flock, Axon, or other nasties in their vicinity. 

One enterprising YouTuber, Benn Jordan, figured out a way to fool Flock cameras into not recording his license plate simply by painting some minor visual noise on his license plate. This is innocuous enough that any human will still be able to read his license plate, but it completely prevented Flock devices from recognizing his license plate as a license plate at the time. Some states have outlawed drivers obscuring their license plates, so taking such action is not recommended. 

Jordan later went on to discover hundreds of misconfigured Flock cameras that were exposing their administrator interface without a password on the public internet. This would allow anyone with an internet connection to view a live surveillance feed, download 30 days of video, view logs, and more. The cameras pointed at parks, public trails, busy intersections, and even a playground. This was a massive breach of public trust and a huge mistake for a company that claims to be working for public safety.

Other hackers have taken on the task of open-source intelligence and community reporting. One interesting example is deflock.me and alpr.watch, which are crowdsourced maps of ALPR cameras. Much like the OUI-SPY project, this allows activists to map out and expose Flock surveillance cameras in their community. 

There have also been several ICE reporting apps released, including apps to report ICE sightings in your area such Stop ICE Alerts, ICEOUT.org, and ICE Block. ICEBlock was delisted by Apple at the request of Attorney General Pam Bondi, a fact we are suing over. There is also Eyes Up, an app to securely record and archive ICE raids, which was taken down by Apple earlier this year. 

Another interesting project documenting ICE and creating a trove of open-source intelligence is ICE List Wiki which contains info on companies that have contracts with ICE, incidents and encounters with ICE, and vehicles ICE uses. 

People without programming knowledge can also get involved. In Chicago, people used whistles to warn their neighbors that ICE was present or in the area. Many people 3D-printed whistles along with instructional booklets to hand out to their communities, allowing a wider distribution of whistles and consequently earlier warnings for their neighbors. 

Many hackers have started hosting digital security trainings for their communities or building web sites with security advice, including how to remove your data from the watchful eyes of the surveillance industry. To reach a broader community, trainers have even started hosting trainings on how to defend their communities and what to do in an ICE raid in video games, such as Fortnight. 

There is also EFF’s own Rayhunter project for detecting cell-site simulators, about which we have written extensively. Rayhunter runs on a cheap mobile hotspot and doesn’t require deep technical knowledge to use.

It’s important to remember that we are not powerless. Even in the face of a domestic law enforcement presence with massive surveillance capabilities and military-esque technologies, there are still ways to engage in surveillance self-defense. We cannot give into nihilism and fear. We must continue to find small ways to protect ourselves and our communities, and when we can, fight back. 

EFF is not affiliated with any of these projects (other than Rayhunter) and does not endorse them. We don’t make any statements about the legality of using any of these projects. Please consult with an attorney to determine what risks there may be. 

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Read more about how enterprising hackers have started projects to do counter surveillance against ICE, and learn how to follow the Homeland Security spending trail.

U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has a new budget under the current administration, and they are going on a surveillance tech shopping spree. Standing at $28.7 billion dollars for the year 2025 (nearly triple their 2024 budget) and at least another $56.25 billion over the next three years, ICE's budget would be the envy of many national militaries around the world. Indeed, this budget would put ICE as the 14th most well-funded military in the world, right between Ukraine and Israel.  

There are many different agencies under U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) that deal with immigration, as well as non-immigration related agencies such as Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). ICE is specifically the enforcement arm of the U.S. immigration apparatus. Their stated mission is to “[p]rotect America through criminal investigations and enforcing immigration laws to preserve national security and public safety.” 

Of course, ICE doesn’t just end up targeting, surveilling, harassing, assaulting, detaining, and torturing people who are undocumented immigrants. They have targeted people on work permits, asylum seekers, permanent residents (people holding “green cards”), naturalized citizens, and even citizens by birth. 

While the NSA and FBI might be the first agencies that come to mind when thinking about surveillance in the U.S., ICE should not be discounted. ICE has always engaged in surveillance and intelligence-gathering as part of their mission. A 2022 report by Georgetown Law’s Center for Privacy and Technology found the following:

• ICE had scanned the driver’s license photos of 1 in 3 adults.
• ICE had access to the driver’s license data of 3 in 4 adults.
• ICE was tracking the movements of drivers in cities home to 3 in 4 adults.
• ICE could locate 3 in 4 adults through their utility records.
• ​​ICE built its surveillance dragnet by tapping data from private companies and state and local bureaucracies.
• ICE spent approximately $2.8 billion between 2008 and 2021 on new surveillance, data collection and data-sharing programs. 

With a budget for 2025 that is 10 times the size of the agency’s total surveillance spending over the last 13 years, ICE is going on a shopping spree, creating one of the largest, most comprehensive domestic surveillance machines in history. 

How We Got Here

The entire surveillance industry has been allowed to grow and flourish under both Democratic and Republican regimes. For example, President Obama dramatically expanded ICE from its more limited origins, while at the same time narrowing its focus to undocumented people accused of crimes. Under the first and second Trump administrations, ICE ramped up its operations significantly, increasing raids in major cities far from the southern border and casting a much wider net on potential targets. ICE has most recently expanded its partnerships with sheriffs across the U.S., and deported more than 1.5 million people cumulatively under the Trump administrations (600,000 of those were just during the first year of Trump’s second term according to DHS statistics), not including the 1.6 million people DHS claims have “self-deported.” More horrifying is that in just the last year of the current administration, 4,250 people detained by ICE have gone missing, and 31 have died in custody or while being detained. In contrast, 24 people died in ICE custody during the entirety of the Biden administration.

ICE also has openly stated that they plan to spy on the American public, looking for any signs of left-wing dissent against their domestic military-like presence. Acting ICE Director Todd Lyons said in a recent interview that his agency “was dedicated to the mission of going after” Antifa and left-wing gun clubs. 

On a long enough timeline, any surveillance tool you build will eventually be used by people you don’t like for reasons that you disagree with.

On a long enough timeline, any surveillance tool you build will eventually be used by people you don’t like for reasons that you disagree with. A surveillance-industrial complex and a democratic society are fundamentally incompatible, regardless of your political party. 

EFF recently published a guide to using government databases to dig up homeland security spending and compiled our own dataset of companies selling tech to DHS components. In 2025, ICE entered new contracts with several private companies for location surveillance, social media surveillance, face surveillance, spyware, and phone surveillance. Let’s dig into each.

Phone Surveillance Tools 

One common surveillance tactic of immigration officials is to get physical access to a person’s phone, either while the person is detained at a border crossing, or while they are under arrest. ICE renewed an $11 million contract with a company called Cellebrite, which helps ICE unlock phones and then can take a complete image of all the data on the phone, including apps, location history, photos, notes, call records, text messages, and even Signal and WhatsApp messages. ICE also signed a $3 million contract with Cellebrite’s main competitor Magnet Forensics, makers of the Graykey device for unlocking phones. DHS has had contracts with Cellebrite since 2008, but the number of phones they search has risen dramatically each year, reaching a new high of 14,899 devices searched by ICE’s sister agency U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) between April and June of 2025. 

If ICE can’t get physical access to your phone, that won’t stop them from trying to gain access to your data. They have also resumed a $2 million contract with the spyware manufacturer, Paragon. Paragon makes the Graphite spyware, which made headlines in 2025 for being found on the phones of several dozen members of Italian civil society. Graphite is able to harvest messages from multiple different encrypted chat apps such as Signal and WhatsApp without the user ever knowing. 

Our concern with ICE buying this software is the likelihood that it will be used against undocumented people and immigrants who are here legally, as well as U.S. citizens who have spoken up against ICE or who work with immigrant communities. Malware such as Graphite can be used to read encrypted messages as they are sent, other forms of spyware can also download files, photos, location history, record phone calls, and even discretely turn on your microphone to record you. 

How to Protect Yourself 

The most effective way to protect yourself from smartphone surveillance would be to not have a phone. But that’s not realistic advice in modern society. Fortunately, for most people there are other ways you can make it harder for ICE to spy on your digital life. 

The first and easiest step is to keep your phone up to date. Installing security updates makes it harder to use malware against you and makes it less likely for Cellebrite to break into your phone. Likewise, both iPhone (Lockdown Mode) and Android (Advanced Protection) offer special modes that lock your phone down and can help protect against some malware.

The first and easiest step is to keep your phone up to date.

Having your phone’s software up to date and locked with a strong alphanumeric password will offer some protection against Cellebrite, depending on your model of phone. However, the strongest protection is simply to keep your phone turned off, which puts it in “before first unlock” mode and has been typically harder for law enforcement to bypass. This is good to do if you are at a protest and expect to be arrested, if you are crossing a border, or if you are expecting to encounter ICE. Keeping your phone on airplane mode should be enough to protect against cell-site simulators, but turning your phone off will offer extra protection against cell-site simulators and Cellebrite devices. If you aren’t able to turn your phone off, it’s a good idea to at least turn off face/fingerprint unlock to make it harder for police to force you to unlock your phone. While EFF continues to fight to strengthen our legal protections against compelling people to decrypt their devices, there is currently less protection against compelled face and fingerprint unlocking than there is against compelled password disclosure.

Internet Surveillance 

ICE has also spent $5 million to acquire at least two location and social media surveillance tools: Webloc and Tangles, from a company called Pen Link, an established player in the open source intelligence space. Webloc gathers the locations of millions of phones by gathering data from mobile data brokers and linking it together with other information about users. Tangles is a social media surveillance tool which combines web scraping with access to social media application programming interfaces. These tools are able to build a dossier on anyone who has a public social media account. Tangles is able to link together a person’s posting history, posts, and comments containing keywords, location history, tags, social graph, and photos with those of their friends and family. Penlink then sells this information to law enforcement, allowing law enforcement to avoid the need for a warrant. This means ICE can look up historic and current locations of many people all across the U.S. without ever having to get a warrant.

These tools are able to build a dossier on anyone who has a public social media account.

ICE also has established contracts with other social media scanning and AI analysis companies, such as a $4.2 million contract with a company called Fivecast for the social media surveillance and AI analysis tool ONYX. According to Fivecast, ONYX can conduct “automated, continuous and targeted collection of multimedia data” from all major “news streams, search engines, social media, marketplaces, the dark web, etc.” ONYX can build what it calls “digital footprints” from biographical data and curated datasets spanning numerous platforms, and “track shifts in sentiment and emotion” and identify the level of risk associated with an individual. 

Another contract is with ShadowDragon for their product Social Net, which is able to monitor publicly available data from over 200 websites. In an acquisition document from 2022, ICE confirmed that ShadowDragon allowed the agency to search “100+ social networking sites,” noting that “[p]ersistent access to Facebook and Twitter provided by ShadowDragon SocialNet is of the utmost importance as they are the most prominent social media platforms.”

ICE has also indicated that they intend to spend between 20 and 50 million dollars on building and staffing a 24/7 social media monitoring office with at least 30 full time agents to comb every major social media website for leads that could generate enforcement raids. 

How to protect yourself 

For U.S. citizens, making your account private on social media is a good place to start. You might also consider having accounts under a pseudonym, or deleting your social media accounts altogether. For more information, check out our guide to protecting yourself on social media. Unfortunately, people immigrating to the U.S. might be subject to greater scrutiny, including mandatory social media checks, and should consult with an immigration attorney before taking any action. For people traveling to the U.S., new rules will soon likely require them to reveal five years of social media history and 10 years of past email addresses to immigration officials. 

Street-Level Surveillance 

But it’s not just your digital habits ICE wants to surveil; they also want to spy on you in the physical world. ICE has contracts with multiple automated license plate reader (ALPR) companies and is able to follow the driving habits of a large percentage of Americans. ICE uses this data to track down specific people anywhere in the country. ICE has a $6 million contract through a Thomson Reuters subsidiary to access ALPR data from Motorola Solutions. ICE has also persuaded local law enforcement officers to run searches on their behalf through Flock Safety's massive network of ALPR data. CBP, including Border Patrol, also operates a network of covert ALPR systems in many areas. 

ICE has also invested in biometric surveillance tools, such as face recognition software called Mobile Fortify to scan the faces of people they stop to determine if they are here legally. Mobile Fortify checks the pictures it takes against a database of 200 million photos for a match (the source of the photos is unknown). Additionally, ICE has a $10 million contract with Clearview AI for face recognition. ICE has also contracted with iris scanning company BI2 technologies for even more invasive biometric surveillance. ICE agents have also been spotted wearing Meta’s Ray-Ban video recording sunglasses. 

ICE has acquired trucks equipped with cell-site simulators (AKA Stingrays) from a company called TechOps Specialty Vehicles (likely the cell-site simulators were manufactured by another company). This is not the first time ICE has bought this technology. According to documents obtained by the American Civil Liberties Union, ICE deployed cell-site simulators at least 466 times between 2017 and 2019, and ICE more than 1,885 times between 2013 and 2017, according to documents obtained by BuzzFeed News. Cell-site simulators can be used to track down a specific person in real time, with more granularity than a phone company or tools like Webloc can provide, though Webloc has the distinct advantage of being used without a warrant and not requiring agents to be in the vicinity of the person being tracked. 

How to protect yourself 

Taking public transit or bicycling is a great way to keep yourself off ALPR databases, but an even better way is to go to your local city council meetings and demand the city cancels contracts with ALPR companies, like people have done in Flagstaff, Arizona; Eugene, Oregon; and Denver, Colorado, among others. 

If you are at a protest, putting your phone on airplane mode could help protect you from cell-site simulators and from apps on your phone disclosing your location, but might leave you vulnerable to advanced targeted attacks. For more advanced protection, turning your phone completely off protects against all radio based attacks, and also makes it harder for tools like Cellebrite to break into your phone as discussed above. But each individual will need to weigh their need for security from advanced radio based attacks against their need to document potential abuses through photo or video. For more information about protecting yourself at a protest, head over to SSD.

There is nothing you can do to change your face, which is why we need more stringent privacy laws such as Illinois’ Biometric Information Privacy Act.

Tying All the Data Together 

Last but not least, ICE uses tools to combine and search all this data along with the data on Americans they have acquired from private companies, the IRS, TSA, and other government databases. 

To search all this data, ICE uses ImmigrationOS, a system that came from a $30-million contract with Palantir. What Palantir does is hard to explain, even for people who work there, but essentially they are plumbers. Palantir makes it so that ICE has all the data they have acquired in one place so it’s easy to search through. Palantir links data from different databases, like IRS data, immigration records, and private databases, and enables ICE to view all of this data about a specific person in one place. 

Palantir makes it so that ICE has all the data they have acquired in one place so it’s easy to search through.

The true civil liberties nightmare of Palantir is that they enable governments to link data that should have never been linked. There are good civil liberties reasons why IRS data was never linked with immigration data and was never linked with social media data, but Palantir breaks those firewalls. Palantir has labeled themselves as a progressive, human rights centric company historically, but their recent actions have given them away as just another tech company enabling surveillance nightmares.

Threat Modeling When ICE Is Your Adversary 

 Understanding the capabilities and limits of ICE and how to threat model helps you and your community fight back, remain powerful, and protect yourself.

One of the most important things you can do is to not spread rumors and misinformation. Rumors like “ICE has malware so now everyone's phones are compromised” or “Palantir knows what you are doing all the time” or “Signal is broken” don’t help your community. It’s more useful to spread facts, ways to protect yourself, and ways to fight back. For information about how to create a security plan for yourself or your community, and other tips to protect yourself, read our Surveillance Self-Defense guides.

How EFF Is Fighting Back

One way to fight back against ICE is in the courts. EFF currently has a lawsuit against ICE over their pressure on Apple and Google to take down ICE spotting apps, like ICEBlock. We also represent multiple labor unions suing ICE over their social media surveillance practices. 

We have also demanded the San Francisco Police Department stop sharing data illegally with ICE, and issued a statement condemning the collaboration between ICE and the malware provider Paragon. We also continue to maintain our Rayhunter project for detecting cell-site simulators. 

Other civil liberties organizations are also suing ICE. ACLU has sued ICE over a subpoena to Meta attempting to identify the owner of an account providing advice to protestors, and another coalition of groups has thus far successfully sued the IRS to stop sharing taxpayer data with ICE. 

We need to have a hard look at the surveillance industry. It is a key enabler of vast and untold violations of human rights and civil liberties, and it continues to be used by aspiring autocrats to threaten our very democracy. As long as it exists, the surveillance industry, and the data it generates, will be an irresistible tool for anti-democratic forces.

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Throughout 2025, EFF conducted groundbreaking investigations into Flock Safety's automated license plate reader (ALPR) network, revealing a system designed to enable mass surveillance and susceptible to grave abuses. Our research sparked state and federal investigations, drove landmark litigation, and exposed dangerous expansion into always-listening voice detection technology. We documented how Flock's surveillance infrastructure allowed law enforcement to track protesters exercising their First Amendment rights, target Romani people with discriminatory searches, and surveil women seeking reproductive healthcare.

Flock Enables Surveillance of Protesters

When we obtained datasets representing more than 12 million searches logged by more than 3,900 agencies between December 2024 and October 2025, the patterns were unmistakable. Agencies logged hundreds of searches related to political demonstrations—the 50501 protests in February, Hands Off protests in April, and No Kings protests in June and October. Nineteen agencies conducted dozens of searches specifically tied to No Kings protests alone. Sometimes searches explicitly referenced protest activity; other times, agencies used vague terminology to obscure surveillance of constitutionally protected speech.

The surveillance extended beyond mass demonstrations. Three agencies used Flock's system to target activists from Direct Action Everywhere, an animal-rights organization using civil disobedience to expose factory farm conditions. Delaware State Police queried the Flock network nine times in March 2025 related to Direct Action Everywhere actions—showing how ALPR surveillance targets groups engaged in activism challenging powerful industries.

Biased Policing and Discriminatory Searches

Our November analysis revealed deeply troubling patterns: more than 80 law enforcement agencies used language perpetuating harmful stereotypes against Romani people when searching the nationwide Flock Safety ALPR network. Between June 2024 and October 2025, police performed hundreds of searches using terms such as "roma" and racial slurs—often without mentioning any suspected crime.

Audit logs revealed searches including "roma traveler," "possible g*psy," and "g*psy ruse." Grand Prairie Police Department in Texas searched for the slur six times while using Flock's "Convoy" feature, which identifies vehicles traveling together—essentially targeting an entire traveling community without specifying any crime. According to a 2020 Harvard University survey, four out of 10 Romani Americans reported being subjected to racial profiling by police. Flock's system makes such discrimination faster and easier to execute at scale.

Weaponizing Surveillance Against Reproductive Rights

In October, we obtained documents showing that Texas deputies queried Flock Safety's surveillance data in what police characterized as a missing person investigation, but was actually an abortion case. Deputies initiated a "death investigation" of a "non-viable fetus," logged evidence of a woman's self-managed abortion, and consulted prosecutors about possible charges.

A Johnson County official ran two searches with the note "had an abortion, search for female." The second search probed 6,809 networks, accessing 83,345 cameras across nearly the entire country. This case revealed Flock's fundamental danger: a single query accesses more than 83,000 cameras spanning almost the entire nation, with minimal oversight and maximum potential for abuse—particularly when weaponized against people seeking reproductive healthcare.

Feature Updates Miss the Point

In June, EFF explained why Flock Safety's announced feature updates cannot make ALPRs safe. The company promised privacy-enhancing features like geofencing and retention limits in response to public pressure. But these tweaks don't address the core problem: Flock's business model depends on building a nationwide, interconnected surveillance network that creates risks no software update can eliminate. Our 2025 investigations proved that abuses stem from the architecture itself, not just how individual agencies use the technology.

Accountability and Community Action

EFF's work sparked significant accountability measures. U.S. Rep. Raja Krishnamoorthi and Rep. Robert Garcia launched a formal investigation into Flock's role in "enabling invasive surveillance practices that threaten the privacy, safety, and civil liberties of women, immigrants, and other vulnerable Americans."

Illinois Secretary of State Alexi Giannoulias launched an audit after EFF research showed Flock allowed U.S. Customs and Border Protection to access Illinois data in violation of state privacy laws. In November, EFF partnered with the ACLU of Northern California to file a lawsuit against San Jose and its police department, challenging warrantless searches of millions of ALPR records. Between June 5, 2024 and June 17, 2025, SJPD and other California law enforcement agencies searched San Jose's database 3,965,519 times—a staggering figure illustrating the vast scope of warrantless surveillance enabled by Flock's infrastructure.

Our investigations also fueled municipal resistance to Flock Safety. Communities from Austin to Evanston to Eugene successfully canceled or refused to renew their Flock contracts after organizing campaigns centered on our research documenting discriminatory policing, immigration enforcement, threats to reproductive rights, and chilling effects on protest. These victories demonstrate that communities—armed with evidence of Flock's harms—can challenge and reject surveillance infrastructure that threatens civil liberties.

Dangerous New Capabilities: Always-Listening Microphones

In October 2025, Flock announced plans to expand its gunshot detection microphones to listen for "human distress" including screaming. This dangerous expansion transforms audio sensors into powerful surveillance tools monitoring human voices on city streets. High-powered microphones above densely populated areas raise serious questions about wiretapping laws, false alerts, and potential for dangerous police responses to non-emergencies. After EFF exposed this feature, Flock quietly amended its marketing materials to remove explicit references to "screaming"—replacing them with vaguer language about "distress" detection—while continuing to develop and deploy the technology.

Looking Forward

Flock Safety's surveillance infrastructure is not a neutral public safety tool. It's a system that enables and amplifies racist policing, threatens reproductive rights, and chills constitutionally protected speech. Our 2025 investigations proved it beyond doubt. As we head into 2026, EFF will continue exposing these abuses, supporting communities fighting back, and litigating for the constitutional protections that surveillance technology has stripped away.

This article is part of our Year in Review series. Read other articles about the fight for digital rights in 2025.

Drone as first responder (DFR) adoption really took off in 2025. Though the concept has been around since 2018, this year saw more normalization of the technology, its integration into more real-time crime center structures, and the implementation of automated deployment of drones.

A DFR program features a fleet of camera-equipped drones, which can range from just a couple to dozens or more. These are deployed from a launch pad in response to 911 calls and other calls for service, sometimes operated by a drone pilot or, increasingly, autonomously directed to the call location. The appeal is the promise of increased “situational awareness” for officers headed to a call. This video offers a short explanation of DFR, and for a list of all of the cities we know use drones, including DFR programs, check out EFF’s Atlas of Surveillance. 

Major Moves from the FAA and Forthcoming Federal Issues

In order to deploy a drone beyond where it can be seen, operators need to receive a waiver from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and all DFR programs require this. Police departments and technology vendors have complained that the process takes too long, and in May, FAA finalized reworked requirements, leading to a flood of waiver requests. An FAA spokesperson reported that in the first two months of the new waiver process, it had approved 410 such waivers, already accounting for almost a third of the approximately 1,400 DFR waivers that had ever been granted.

The federal government made other major moves on the drone front this year. A month after the new waivers went to effect, President Trump issued an Executive Order with aspirations for advancing the country’s drone industry. And at the end of the year, one of the largest drone manufacturers in the world and one of the biggest purveyors of law enforcement drones, DJI, will be banned from launching new products in the U.S. unless the federal government conducts a security audit that was mandated by the National Defense Authorization Act. However, at the moment, it doesn’t seem like that audit will happen, and if it doesn’t, it won’t be surprising to see other drone manufacturers leveraging the ban to boost their own products. 

Automated Drone Deployment and Tech Integrations

Early iterations of drone use required a human operator, but this year, police drone companies began releasing automated flying machines that don’t require much human intervention at all. New models can rely on AI and automated directions to launch and direct a drone. 

This article is part of our Year in Review series. Read other articles about the fight for digital rights in 2025.

This was the year we saw DFR integrated with other tools and tech companies teamed up to bring even more powerful surveillance. Flock Safety added automated license plate readers (ALPR) to their drones. Axon and Skydio built on the partnership they launched in 2024. Drone manufacturer Brinc teamed up with Motorola Solutions on a DFR program. Drone company Paladin teamed up with a company called SkyeBrowse to add 3-D mapping of the environment to their list of features. 

DFR also is increasingly part of the police plans for real-time crime centers, meaning that the footage being captured by these flying cameras is being integrated into other streams and analyzed in ways that we’re still learning about. 

Transparency Around DFR Deployments

Transparency around adoption, use, and oversight is always crucial, particularly when it comes to police surveillance, and EFF has been tracking the growth of DFR programs across the country. We encourage you to use your local public records laws to investigate them further. Examples of the kinds of requests and the responsive documents people have already received — including flight logs, policies, and other information — can be found on MuckRock. 

The Problem with Drones

Flying cameras are bad enough. They can see and record footage from a special vantage point, capturing video of your home, your backyard, and your movements that should require clear policies around retention, audits, and use, including when the cameras shouldn’t be recording. We’re also seeing that additional camera analysis and other physical features that can be added (so-called “payloads”) — like thermal cameras and even tear gas — can make drones even more powerful and that police technology companies are encouraging DFR as part of surveillance packages.

It's important that next year we all advocate for, and enforce, standards in adopting and using these DFRs. Check the Atlas to see if they are used where you live and learn more about drones and other surveillance tools on EFF’s Street-Level Surveillance Hub.

This article is part of our Year in Review series. Read other articles about the fight for digital rights in 2025.