Global Attack Volumes Remain Elevated Worldwide In February 2026, global cyber attack activity remained near record levels, confirming that elevated attack volumes are becoming the new normal for organizations worldwide. The average number of weekly cyber attacks per organization reached 2,086, representing a 9.6% increase year over year, while remaining essentially flat month over month (-0.2% compared to January 2026). This stabilization at a high baseline reflects a sustained pressure environment rather than a short‑term surge. Despite a slowdown in ransomware activity compared to the same period last year, overall attack volumes continue to rise, driven by automation, expanding digital footprints, and persistent exposure risks linked to enterprise GenAI usage. Check Point Research data shows that February’s […]
Key Findings Since the recent escalation in the Middle East, Check Point Research has observed increased activity by Chinese-nexus APT actors in the region, particularly targeting Qatar The Chinese-nexus threat actor Camaro Dragon attempted to deploy a variant of PlugX malware against Qatari targets within one day of the launch of Operation Epic Fury and the onset of the escalation in the Middle East The attackers leveraged the ongoing war in the Middle East to make their lures more credible and engaging, demonstrating the ability to rapidly adapt to major developments and breaking news The use of payloads such as […]
Your whitelist is not a wall. For nation-state attackers, it’s a map, showing exactly who to compromise to get to your assets. $1,788,000,000 STOLEN FROM INSTITUTIONS WITH WHITELISTS, MULTISIGS, AND HARDWARE WALLETS IN PLACE TL;DR When you hold significant assets on a public blockchain, nation-state groups will target you – not if, but when Your whitelist tells attackers exactly which vendors and counterparties to compromise to reach your funds Bybit ($1.5B), WazirX ($235M), and Radiant ($53M) all had whitelists. All were drained through whitelisted entities The correct assumption: every whitelisted address is potentially compromised. Trust must be verified in real […]
We identified a security weakness in n8n’s credential management layer that could have completely compromised the application’s security. This finding highlights the core risks of centralized authentication in workflow automation platforms.
As n8n serves as the central hub connecting critical systems and orchestrating business processes across teams, any gap in credential handling can potentially cascade across connected systems, disrupting operations, compromising data flows, and credentials.
While this issue was fixed in v2.6.4, it reminds us about the unique security challenges of AI automation platforms.
Introduction
We are in a moment where AI and automation platforms are rapidly becoming embedded in everyday operations, allowing teams to connect models, APIs, SaaS tools, and internal systems with minimal friction.
Platforms like n8n promise powerful automation through visual workflows and reusable credentials, lowering the barrier to orchestrating complex tasks across services. But this convenience comes with structural risk: these tools centralize highly sensitive tokens, OAuth flows, and API keys, effectively concentrating trust in a single automation layer.
When that layer fails to enforce basic security controls, the impact is not limited to one workflow, it can extend across every connected system. In this research, we examine how a Stored XSS vulnerability in n8n’s OAuth credential handling can lead to account takeover and broader instance compromise.
The Vulnerability
The vulnerability lies in how n8n handles the “Authorization URL” within the OAuth credential setup. OAuth (Open Authorization) is an authorization framework that allows an application to access a user’s data on another service without exposing the user’s password.
In a standard workflow, users configure OAuth credentials to authenticate n8n with an external provider. When a user clicks “Connect my account,” n8n opens a popup window pointing to the service’s authorization page.
However, we discovered that the frontend function responsible for opening this window did not validate the protocol of the provided URL (see below). This allowed an attacker to bypass the expected scheme and inject JavaScript code.
The Attack Flow
Because n8n allows credentials to be shared between users in the same instance (collaborative features), a threat actor can weaponize this weakness, see Fig 1.
Fig. 1: High level view of the attack flow
The steps are the following:
Preparation: The attacker creates a new credential using the “OAuth2 API” type.
Injection: In the “Authorization URL” field, instead of a valid URL, the attacker inserts a malicious JavaScript payload.
Trap: The attacker shares this credential with the victim (e.g., an administrator or a user with higher privileges).
Execution: The victim, seeing a shared credential, opens it and clicks “Connect my account.” The browser immediately executes the injected JavaScript in the context of the victim’s session instead of navigating to the remote authorization URL.
Demonstration Video
The following video demonstrates the exploitation chain: sharing the malicious credential with a victim account and triggering the XSS payload.
Root Cause
During the OAuth flow, the browser initiates a top-level navigation to the authorization URL in the oAuthCredentialAuthorize function of the credential service. However, this segment of the program missed sanitation of the Authorization URL.
Fig. 2: Vulnerable source code
Impact: Application Compromise
This is a stored XSS, meaning the payload is saved permanently in the database and served to any user who interacts with the credential. The impact of executing arbitrary JavaScript in the context of an n8n session is significant:
Account Takeover: The attacker can impersonate the victim’s in his session and force actions on their behalf, effectively taking over the account.
Credential Exfiltration: The attacker can then use the XSS to query the internal n8n API and retrieve other credentials stored in the instance.
Instance Control: With admin access gained via the XSS, the attacker can access more credentials, escalate privileges, and gain full control of the n8n instance.
Conclusion
Workflow automation tools like n8n are becoming the backbone of modern IT infrastructure. While they offer immense power and speed, they also centralize trust. A vulnerability in this layer can often be more damaging than a vulnerability in a single isolated application.
We recommend organizations treat their automation platforms as Tier-0 assets, enforce strict access controls, and ensure they are patched promptly.
Silver Dragon is a China nexus cyber espionage group targeting government ministries and public sector organizations across Southeast Asia, with additional victims identified in Europe The group gains initial access through exploitation of public-facing servers and targeted phishing campaigns aimed at government entities It maintains long-term persistence by hijacking legitimate Windows services, thus allowing malware processes to blend into normal system activity A custom backdoor, GearDoor, enables covert command-and-control communications via Google Drive, blending malicious traffic with normal cloud usage The campaign remains relevant as attackers continue to abuse trusted enterprise services and legitimate system components to evade detection Based […]
The CVSS Blind Spot For years, CVSS scores have been the default metric for vulnerability severity. But severity does not equal risk. A CVSS 9.8 vulnerability that is never exploited is less dangerous than a CVSS 6.5 actively used in ransomware campaigns. Yet many organizations still chase the highest scores first, wasting time and leaving real threats exposed. KEV lists help, but they are reactive and often lag behind active exploitation. Attackers move faster than static scoring systems. If your prioritization strategy starts and ends with CVSS, you are playing catch-up. If vulnerability management feels overwhelming, the numbers explain why. […]
With the current Iran crisis at its peak, cyber activity is a relevant part of the threat picture alongside kinetic and political pressure. Iran’s ecosystem includes multiple clusters aligned with state entities, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS), as well as deniable operators and “hacktivist” groups. This ecosystem supports a broad set of objectives: espionage to gain intelligence and footholds; disruption and destructive activity, including DDoS attacks, pseudo-ransomware, and data wipers to impose costs; and information operations that pair destructive activity or data leaks with coordinated online amplification. This activity is expected to intensify and broaden across the Middle East, the United States, and […]
Recently, we uncovered BeatBanker, an Android‑based malware campaign targeting Brazil. It spreads primarily through phishing attacks via a website disguised as the Google Play Store. To achieve their goals, the malicious APKs carry multiple components, including a cryptocurrency miner and a banking Trojan capable of completely hijacking the device and spoofing screens, among other things. In a more recent campaign, the attackers switched from the banker to a known RAT.
This blog post outlines each phase of the malware’s activity on the victim’s handset, explains how it ensures long‑term persistence, and describes its communication with mining pools.
Key findings:
To maintain persistence, the Trojan employs a creative mechanism: it plays an almost inaudible audio file on a loop so it cannot be terminated. This inspired us to name it BeatBanker.
It monitors battery temperature and percentage, and checks whether the user is using the device.
At various stages of the attack, BeatBanker disguises itself as a legitimate application on the Google Play Store and as the Play Store itself.
It deploys a banker in addition to a cryptocurrency miner.
When the user tries to make a USDT transaction, BeatBanker creates overlay pages for Binance and Trust Wallet, covertly replacing the destination address with the threat actor’s transfer address.
New samples now drop BTMOB RAT instead of the banking module.
Initial infection vector
The campaign begins with a counterfeit website, cupomgratisfood[.]shop, that looks exactly like the Google Play Store. This fake app store contains the “INSS Reembolso” app, which is in fact a Trojan. There are also other apps that are most likely Trojans too, but we haven’t obtained them.
The INSS Reembolso app poses as the official mobile portal of Brazil’s Instituto Nacional do Seguro Social (INSS), a government service that citizens can use to perform more than 90 social security tasks, from retirement applications and medical exam scheduling to viewing CNIS (National Registry of Social Information), tax, and payment statements, as well as tracking request statuses. By masquerading as this trusted platform, the fake page tricks users into downloading the malicious APK.
Packing
The initial APK file is packed and makes use of a native shared library (ELF) named libludwwiuh.so that is included in the application. Its main task is to decrypt another ELF file that will ultimately load the original DEX file.
First, libludwwiuh.so decrypts an embedded encrypted ELF file and drops it to a temporary location on the device under the name l.so. The same code that loaded the libludwwiuh.so library then loads this file, which uses the Java Native Interface (JNI) to continue execution.
l.so – the DEX loader
The library does not have calls to its functions; instead, it directly calls the Java methods whose names are encrypted in the stack using XOR (stack strings technique) and restored at runtime:
Initially, the loader makes a request to collect some network information using https://ipapi.is to determine whether the infected device is a mobile device, if a VPN is being used, and to obtain the IP address and other details.
This loader is engineered to bypass mobile antivirus products by utilizing dalvik.system.InMemoryDexClassLoader. It loads malicious DEX code directly into memory, avoiding the creation of any files on the device’s file system. The necessary DEX files can be extracted using dynamic analysis tools like Frida.
Furthermore, the sample incorporates anti-analysis techniques, including runtime checks for emulated or analysis environments. When such an environment is detected (or when specific checks fail, such as verification of the supported CPU_ABI), the malware can immediately terminate its own process by invoking android.os.Process.killProcess(android.os.Process.myPid()), effectively self-destructing to hinder dynamic analysis.
After execution, the malware displays a user interface that mimics the Google Play Store page, showing an update available for the INSS Reembolso app. This is intended to trick victims into granting installation permissions by tapping the “Update” button, which allows the download of additional hidden malicious payloads.
The payload delivery process mimics the application update. The malware uses the REQUEST_INSTALL_PACKAGES permission to install APK files directly into its memory, bypassing Google Play. To ensure persistence, the malware keeps a notification about a system update pinned to the foreground and activates a foreground service with silent media playback, a tactic designed to prevent the operating system from terminating the malicious process.
Crypto mining
When UPDATE is clicked on a fake Play Store screen, the malicious application downloads and executes an ELF file containing a cryptomining payload. It starts by issuing a GET request to the C2 server at either hxxps://accessor.fud2026.com/libmine-<arch>.so or hxxps://fud2026.com/libmine-<arch>.so. The downloaded file is then decrypted using CipherInputStream(), with the decryption key being derived from the SHA-1 hash of the downloaded file’s name, ensuring that each version of the file is encrypted with a unique key. The resulting file is renamed d-miner.
The decrypted payload is an ARM-compiled XMRig 6.17.0 binary. At runtime, it attempts to create a direct TCP connection to pool.fud2026[.]com:9000. If successful, it uses this endpoint; otherwise, it automatically switches to the proxy endpoint pool-proxy.fud2026[.]com:9000. The final command-line arguments passed to XMRig are as follows:
-o pool.fud2026[.]com:9000 or pool-proxy.fud2026[.]com:9000 (selected dynamically)
-k (keepalive)
--tls (encrypted connection)
--no-color (disable colored output)
--nicehash (NiceHash protocol support)
C2 telemetry
The malware uses Google’s legitimate Firebase Cloud Messaging (FCM) as its primary command‑and‑control (C2) channel. In the analyzed sample, each FCM message received triggers a check of the battery status, temperature, installation date, and user presence. A hidden cryptocurrency miner is then started or stopped as needed. These mechanisms ensure that infected devices remain permanently accessible and responsive to the attacker’s instructions, which are sent through the FCM infrastructure. The attacker monitors the following information:
isCharging: indicates whether the phone is charging;
batteryLevel: the exact battery percentage;
isRecentInstallation: indicates whether the application was recently installed (if so, the implant delays malicious actions);
isUserAway: indicates whether the user is away from the device (screen off and inactive);
overheat: indicates whether the device is overheating;
temp: the current battery temperature.
Persistence
The KeepAliveServiceMediaPlayback component ensures continuous operation by initiating uninterrupted playback via MediaPlayer. It keeps the service active in the foreground using a notification and loads a small, continuous audio file. This constant activity prevents the system from suspending or terminating the process due to inactivity.
The identified audio output8.mp3 is five seconds long and plays on a loop. It contains some Chinese words.
Banking module
BeatBanker compromises the machine with a cryptocurrency miner and introduces another malicious APK that acts as a banking Trojan. This Trojan uses previously obtained permission to install an additional APK called INSS Reebolso, which is associated with the package com.destination.cosmetics.
Similar to the initial malicious APK, it establishes persistence by creating and displaying a fixed notification in the foreground to hinder removal. Furthermore, BeatBanker attempts to trick the user into granting accessibility permissions to the package.
Leveraging the acquired accessibility permissions, the malware establishes comprehensive control over the device’s user interface.
The Trojan constantly monitors the foreground application. It targets the official Binance application (com.binance.dev) and the Trust Wallet application (com.wallet.crypto.trustapp), focusing on USDT transactions. When a user tries to withdraw USDT, the Trojan instantly overlays the target app’s transaction confirmation screen with a highly realistic page sourced from Base64-encoded HTML stored in the banking module.
The module captures the original withdrawal address and amount, then surreptitiously substitutes the destination address with an attacker-controlled one using AccessibilityNodeInfo.ACTION_SET_TEXT. The overlay page shows the victim the address they copied (for Binance) or just shows a loading icon (for Trust Wallet), leading them to believe they are remitting funds to the intended wallet when, in fact, the cryptocurrency is transferred to the attacker’s designated address.
Fake overlay pages: Binance (left) and Trust Wallet (right)
Target browsers
BeatBanker’s banking module monitors the following browsers installed on the victim’s device:
Chrome
Firefox
sBrowser
Brave
Opera
DuckDuckGo
Dolphin Browser
Edge
Its aim is to collect the URLs accessed by the victim using the regular expression ^(?:https?://)?(?:[^:/\\\\]+\\\\.)?([^:/\\\\]+\\\\.[^:/\\\\]+). It also offers management functionalities (add, edit, delete, list) for links saved in the device’s default browser, as well as the ability to open links provided by the attacker.
C2 communication
BeatBanker is also designed to receive commands from the C2. These commands aim to collect the victim’s personal information and gain complete control of the device.
Command
Description
0
Starts dynamic loading of the DEX class
Update
Simulates software update and locks the screen
msg:
Displays a Toast message with the provided text
goauth<*>
Opens Google Authenticator (if installed) and enables the AccessService.SendGoogleAuth flag used to monitor and retrieve authentication codes
kill<*>
Sets the protection bypass flag AccessService.bypass to “True”
and sets the initializeService.uninstall flag to “Off”
srec<*>
Starts or stops audio recording (microphone), storing the recorded data in a file with an automatically generated filename. The following path format is used to store the recording: /Config/sys/apps/rc/<timestamp>_0REC<last5digits>.wav
pst<*>
Pastes text from the clipboard (via Accessibility Services)
GRC<*>
Lists all existing audio recording files
gtrc<*>
Sends a specific audio recording file to the C2
lcm<*>
Lists supported front camera resolutions
usdtress<*>
Sets a USDT cryptocurrency address when a transaction is detected
lnk<*>
Opens a link in the browser
EHP<*>
Updates login credentials (host, port, name) and restarts the application
ssms<*>
Sends an SMS message (individually or to all contacts)
CRD<*>
Adds (E>) or removes (D>) packages from the list of blocked/disabled applications
SFD<*>
Deletes files (logs, recordings, tones) or uninstalls itself
adm<>lck<>
Immediately locks the screen using Device Administrator permissions
adm<>wip<>
Performs a complete device data wipe (factory reset)
Aclk<*>
Executes a sequence of automatic taps (auto-clicker) or lists existing macros
KBO<*>lod
Checks the status of the keylogger and virtual keyboard
KBO<*>AKP/AKA
Requests permission to activate a custom virtual keyboard or activates one
Requests Draw Over Other Apps permission (overlay)
RPM<*>INST
Requests permission to install apps from unknown sources (Android 8+)
ussd<*>
Executes a USSD code (e.g., *#06# for IMEI)
Blkt<*>
Sets the text for the lock overlay
BLKV<*>
Enables or disables full-screen lock using WindowManager.LayoutParams.TYPE_APPLICATION_OVERLAY to display a black FrameLayout element over the entire screen
SCRD<> / SCRD2<>
Enables/disables real-time screen text submission to the C2 (screen reading)
Controls VPN and firewall (status, block/allow apps, enable/disable)
noti<*>
Creates persistent and custom notifications
sp<*>
Executes a sequence of swipes/taps (gesture macro)
lodp<*>
Manages saved links in the internal browser (add, edit, delete, list)
scc:
Starts screen capture/streaming
New BeatBanker samples dropping BTMOB
Our recent detection efforts uncovered a campaign leveraging a fraudulent StarLink application that we assess as being a new BeatBanker variant. The infection chain mirrored previous instances, employing identical persistence methods – specifically, looped audio and fixed notifications. Furthermore, this variant included a crypto miner similar to those seen previously. However, rather than deploying the banking module, it was observed distributing the BTMOB remote administration tool.
The BTMOB APK is highly obfuscated and contains a class responsible for configuration. Despite this, it’s possible to identify a parser used to define the application’s behavior on the device, as well as persistence features, such as protection against restart, deletion, lock reset, and the ability to perform real-time screen recording.
String decryption
The simple decryption routine uses repetitive XOR between the encrypted data and a short key. It iterates through the encrypted text byte by byte, repeating the key from the beginning whenever it reaches the end. At each position, the sample XORs the encrypted byte with the corresponding byte of the key, overwriting the original. Ultimately, the modified byte array contains the original text, which is then converted to UTF-8 and returned as a string.
Malware-as-a-Service
BTMOB is an Android remote administration tool that evolved from the CraxsRAT, CypherRAT, and SpySolr families. It provides full remote control of the victim’s device and is sold in a Malware-as-a-Service (MaaS) model. On July 26, 2025, a threat actor posted a screenshot of the BTMOB RAT in action on GitHub under the username “brmobrats”, along with a link to the website btmob[.]xyz. The website contains information about the BTMOB RAT, including its version history, features, and other relevant details. It also redirects to a Telegram contact. Cyfirma has already linked this account to CraxsRAT and CypherRAT.
Recently, a YouTube channel was created by a different threat actor that features videos demonstrating how to use the malware and facilitate its sale via Telegram.
We also saw the distribution and sale of leaked BTMOB source code on some dark web forums. This may suggest that the creator of BeatBanker acquired BTMOB from its original author or the source of the leak and is utilizing it as the final payload, replacing the banking module observed in the INSS Reebolso incident.
In terms of functionality, BTMOB maintains a set of intrusive capabilities, including: automatic granting of permissions, especially on Android 13–15 devices; use of a black FrameLayout overlay to hide system notifications similar to the one observed in the banking module; silent installation; persistent background execution; and mechanisms designed to capture screen lock credentials, including PINs, patterns, and passwords. The malware also provides access to front and rear cameras, captures keystrokes in real time, monitors GPS location, and constantly collects sensitive data. Together, these functionalities provide the operator with comprehensive remote control, persistent access, and extensive surveillance capabilities over compromised devices.
Victims
All variants of BeatBanker – those with the banking module and those with the BTMOB RAT – were detected on victims in Brazil. Some of the samples that deliver BTMOB appear to use WhatsApp to spread, as well as phishing pages.
Conclusion
BeatBanker is an excellent example of how mobile threats are becoming more sophisticated and multi-layered. Initially focused in Brazil, this Trojan operates a dual campaign, acting as a Monero cryptocurrency miner, discreetly draining your device’s battery life while also stealing banking credentials and tampering with cryptocurrency transactions. Moreover, the most recent version goes even further, substituting the banking module with a full-fledged BTMOB RAT.
The attackers have devised inventive tricks to maintain persistence. They keep the process alive by looping an almost inaudible audio track, which prevents the operating system from terminating it and allows BeatBanker to remain active for extended periods.
Furthermore, the threat demonstrates an obsession with staying hidden. It monitors device usage, battery level and temperature. It even uses Google’s legitimate system (FCM) to receive commands. The threat’s banking module is capable of overlaying Binance and Trust Wallet screens and diverting USDT funds to the criminals’ wallets before the victim even notices.
The lesson here is clear: distrust is your best defense. BeatBanker spreads through fake websites that mimic Google Play, disguising itself as trustworthy government applications. To protect yourself against threats like this, it is essential to:
Download apps only from official sources. Always use the Google Play Store or the device vendor’s official app store. Make sure you use the correct app store app, and verify the developer.
Check permissions. Pay attention to the permissions that applications request, especially those related to accessibility and installation of third-party packages.
Keep the system updated. Security updates for Android and your mobile antivirus are essential.
Our solutions detect this threat as HEUR:Trojan-Dropper.AndroidOS.BeatBanker and HEUR:Trojan-Dropper.AndroidOS.Banker.*
Recently, we uncovered BeatBanker, an Android‑based malware campaign targeting Brazil. It spreads primarily through phishing attacks via a website disguised as the Google Play Store. To achieve their goals, the malicious APKs carry multiple components, including a cryptocurrency miner and a banking Trojan capable of completely hijacking the device and spoofing screens, among other things. In a more recent campaign, the attackers switched from the banker to a known RAT.
This blog post outlines each phase of the malware’s activity on the victim’s handset, explains how it ensures long‑term persistence, and describes its communication with mining pools.
Key findings:
To maintain persistence, the Trojan employs a creative mechanism: it plays an almost inaudible audio file on a loop so it cannot be terminated. This inspired us to name it BeatBanker.
It monitors battery temperature and percentage, and checks whether the user is using the device.
At various stages of the attack, BeatBanker disguises itself as a legitimate application on the Google Play Store and as the Play Store itself.
It deploys a banker in addition to a cryptocurrency miner.
When the user tries to make a USDT transaction, BeatBanker creates overlay pages for Binance and Trust Wallet, covertly replacing the destination address with the threat actor’s transfer address.
New samples now drop BTMOB RAT instead of the banking module.
Initial infection vector
The campaign begins with a counterfeit website, cupomgratisfood[.]shop, that looks exactly like the Google Play Store. This fake app store contains the “INSS Reembolso” app, which is in fact a Trojan. There are also other apps that are most likely Trojans too, but we haven’t obtained them.
The INSS Reembolso app poses as the official mobile portal of Brazil’s Instituto Nacional do Seguro Social (INSS), a government service that citizens can use to perform more than 90 social security tasks, from retirement applications and medical exam scheduling to viewing CNIS (National Registry of Social Information), tax, and payment statements, as well as tracking request statuses. By masquerading as this trusted platform, the fake page tricks users into downloading the malicious APK.
Packing
The initial APK file is packed and makes use of a native shared library (ELF) named libludwwiuh.so that is included in the application. Its main task is to decrypt another ELF file that will ultimately load the original DEX file.
First, libludwwiuh.so decrypts an embedded encrypted ELF file and drops it to a temporary location on the device under the name l.so. The same code that loaded the libludwwiuh.so library then loads this file, which uses the Java Native Interface (JNI) to continue execution.
l.so – the DEX loader
The library does not have calls to its functions; instead, it directly calls the Java methods whose names are encrypted in the stack using XOR (stack strings technique) and restored at runtime:
Initially, the loader makes a request to collect some network information using https://ipapi.is to determine whether the infected device is a mobile device, if a VPN is being used, and to obtain the IP address and other details.
This loader is engineered to bypass mobile antivirus products by utilizing dalvik.system.InMemoryDexClassLoader. It loads malicious DEX code directly into memory, avoiding the creation of any files on the device’s file system. The necessary DEX files can be extracted using dynamic analysis tools like Frida.
Furthermore, the sample incorporates anti-analysis techniques, including runtime checks for emulated or analysis environments. When such an environment is detected (or when specific checks fail, such as verification of the supported CPU_ABI), the malware can immediately terminate its own process by invoking android.os.Process.killProcess(android.os.Process.myPid()), effectively self-destructing to hinder dynamic analysis.
After execution, the malware displays a user interface that mimics the Google Play Store page, showing an update available for the INSS Reembolso app. This is intended to trick victims into granting installation permissions by tapping the “Update” button, which allows the download of additional hidden malicious payloads.
The payload delivery process mimics the application update. The malware uses the REQUEST_INSTALL_PACKAGES permission to install APK files directly into its memory, bypassing Google Play. To ensure persistence, the malware keeps a notification about a system update pinned to the foreground and activates a foreground service with silent media playback, a tactic designed to prevent the operating system from terminating the malicious process.
Crypto mining
When UPDATE is clicked on a fake Play Store screen, the malicious application downloads and executes an ELF file containing a cryptomining payload. It starts by issuing a GET request to the C2 server at either hxxps://accessor.fud2026.com/libmine-<arch>.so or hxxps://fud2026.com/libmine-<arch>.so. The downloaded file is then decrypted using CipherInputStream(), with the decryption key being derived from the SHA-1 hash of the downloaded file’s name, ensuring that each version of the file is encrypted with a unique key. The resulting file is renamed d-miner.
The decrypted payload is an ARM-compiled XMRig 6.17.0 binary. At runtime, it attempts to create a direct TCP connection to pool.fud2026[.]com:9000. If successful, it uses this endpoint; otherwise, it automatically switches to the proxy endpoint pool-proxy.fud2026[.]com:9000. The final command-line arguments passed to XMRig are as follows:
-o pool.fud2026[.]com:9000 or pool-proxy.fud2026[.]com:9000 (selected dynamically)
-k (keepalive)
--tls (encrypted connection)
--no-color (disable colored output)
--nicehash (NiceHash protocol support)
C2 telemetry
The malware uses Google’s legitimate Firebase Cloud Messaging (FCM) as its primary command‑and‑control (C2) channel. In the analyzed sample, each FCM message received triggers a check of the battery status, temperature, installation date, and user presence. A hidden cryptocurrency miner is then started or stopped as needed. These mechanisms ensure that infected devices remain permanently accessible and responsive to the attacker’s instructions, which are sent through the FCM infrastructure. The attacker monitors the following information:
isCharging: indicates whether the phone is charging;
batteryLevel: the exact battery percentage;
isRecentInstallation: indicates whether the application was recently installed (if so, the implant delays malicious actions);
isUserAway: indicates whether the user is away from the device (screen off and inactive);
overheat: indicates whether the device is overheating;
temp: the current battery temperature.
Persistence
The KeepAliveServiceMediaPlayback component ensures continuous operation by initiating uninterrupted playback via MediaPlayer. It keeps the service active in the foreground using a notification and loads a small, continuous audio file. This constant activity prevents the system from suspending or terminating the process due to inactivity.
The identified audio output8.mp3 is five seconds long and plays on a loop. It contains some Chinese words.
Banking module
BeatBanker compromises the machine with a cryptocurrency miner and introduces another malicious APK that acts as a banking Trojan. This Trojan uses previously obtained permission to install an additional APK called INSS Reebolso, which is associated with the package com.destination.cosmetics.
Similar to the initial malicious APK, it establishes persistence by creating and displaying a fixed notification in the foreground to hinder removal. Furthermore, BeatBanker attempts to trick the user into granting accessibility permissions to the package.
Leveraging the acquired accessibility permissions, the malware establishes comprehensive control over the device’s user interface.
The Trojan constantly monitors the foreground application. It targets the official Binance application (com.binance.dev) and the Trust Wallet application (com.wallet.crypto.trustapp), focusing on USDT transactions. When a user tries to withdraw USDT, the Trojan instantly overlays the target app’s transaction confirmation screen with a highly realistic page sourced from Base64-encoded HTML stored in the banking module.
The module captures the original withdrawal address and amount, then surreptitiously substitutes the destination address with an attacker-controlled one using AccessibilityNodeInfo.ACTION_SET_TEXT. The overlay page shows the victim the address they copied (for Binance) or just shows a loading icon (for Trust Wallet), leading them to believe they are remitting funds to the intended wallet when, in fact, the cryptocurrency is transferred to the attacker’s designated address.
Fake overlay pages: Binance (left) and Trust Wallet (right)
Target browsers
BeatBanker’s banking module monitors the following browsers installed on the victim’s device:
Chrome
Firefox
sBrowser
Brave
Opera
DuckDuckGo
Dolphin Browser
Edge
Its aim is to collect the URLs accessed by the victim using the regular expression ^(?:https?://)?(?:[^:/\\\\]+\\\\.)?([^:/\\\\]+\\\\.[^:/\\\\]+). It also offers management functionalities (add, edit, delete, list) for links saved in the device’s default browser, as well as the ability to open links provided by the attacker.
C2 communication
BeatBanker is also designed to receive commands from the C2. These commands aim to collect the victim’s personal information and gain complete control of the device.
Command
Description
0
Starts dynamic loading of the DEX class
Update
Simulates software update and locks the screen
msg:
Displays a Toast message with the provided text
goauth<*>
Opens Google Authenticator (if installed) and enables the AccessService.SendGoogleAuth flag used to monitor and retrieve authentication codes
kill<*>
Sets the protection bypass flag AccessService.bypass to “True”
and sets the initializeService.uninstall flag to “Off”
srec<*>
Starts or stops audio recording (microphone), storing the recorded data in a file with an automatically generated filename. The following path format is used to store the recording: /Config/sys/apps/rc/<timestamp>_0REC<last5digits>.wav
pst<*>
Pastes text from the clipboard (via Accessibility Services)
GRC<*>
Lists all existing audio recording files
gtrc<*>
Sends a specific audio recording file to the C2
lcm<*>
Lists supported front camera resolutions
usdtress<*>
Sets a USDT cryptocurrency address when a transaction is detected
lnk<*>
Opens a link in the browser
EHP<*>
Updates login credentials (host, port, name) and restarts the application
ssms<*>
Sends an SMS message (individually or to all contacts)
CRD<*>
Adds (E>) or removes (D>) packages from the list of blocked/disabled applications
SFD<*>
Deletes files (logs, recordings, tones) or uninstalls itself
adm<>lck<>
Immediately locks the screen using Device Administrator permissions
adm<>wip<>
Performs a complete device data wipe (factory reset)
Aclk<*>
Executes a sequence of automatic taps (auto-clicker) or lists existing macros
KBO<*>lod
Checks the status of the keylogger and virtual keyboard
KBO<*>AKP/AKA
Requests permission to activate a custom virtual keyboard or activates one
Requests Draw Over Other Apps permission (overlay)
RPM<*>INST
Requests permission to install apps from unknown sources (Android 8+)
ussd<*>
Executes a USSD code (e.g., *#06# for IMEI)
Blkt<*>
Sets the text for the lock overlay
BLKV<*>
Enables or disables full-screen lock using WindowManager.LayoutParams.TYPE_APPLICATION_OVERLAY to display a black FrameLayout element over the entire screen
SCRD<> / SCRD2<>
Enables/disables real-time screen text submission to the C2 (screen reading)
Controls VPN and firewall (status, block/allow apps, enable/disable)
noti<*>
Creates persistent and custom notifications
sp<*>
Executes a sequence of swipes/taps (gesture macro)
lodp<*>
Manages saved links in the internal browser (add, edit, delete, list)
scc:
Starts screen capture/streaming
New BeatBanker samples dropping BTMOB
Our recent detection efforts uncovered a campaign leveraging a fraudulent StarLink application that we assess as being a new BeatBanker variant. The infection chain mirrored previous instances, employing identical persistence methods – specifically, looped audio and fixed notifications. Furthermore, this variant included a crypto miner similar to those seen previously. However, rather than deploying the banking module, it was observed distributing the BTMOB remote administration tool.
The BTMOB APK is highly obfuscated and contains a class responsible for configuration. Despite this, it’s possible to identify a parser used to define the application’s behavior on the device, as well as persistence features, such as protection against restart, deletion, lock reset, and the ability to perform real-time screen recording.
String decryption
The simple decryption routine uses repetitive XOR between the encrypted data and a short key. It iterates through the encrypted text byte by byte, repeating the key from the beginning whenever it reaches the end. At each position, the sample XORs the encrypted byte with the corresponding byte of the key, overwriting the original. Ultimately, the modified byte array contains the original text, which is then converted to UTF-8 and returned as a string.
Malware-as-a-Service
BTMOB is an Android remote administration tool that evolved from the CraxsRAT, CypherRAT, and SpySolr families. It provides full remote control of the victim’s device and is sold in a Malware-as-a-Service (MaaS) model. On July 26, 2025, a threat actor posted a screenshot of the BTMOB RAT in action on GitHub under the username “brmobrats”, along with a link to the website btmob[.]xyz. The website contains information about the BTMOB RAT, including its version history, features, and other relevant details. It also redirects to a Telegram contact. Cyfirma has already linked this account to CraxsRAT and CypherRAT.
Recently, a YouTube channel was created by a different threat actor that features videos demonstrating how to use the malware and facilitate its sale via Telegram.
We also saw the distribution and sale of leaked BTMOB source code on some dark web forums. This may suggest that the creator of BeatBanker acquired BTMOB from its original author or the source of the leak and is utilizing it as the final payload, replacing the banking module observed in the INSS Reebolso incident.
In terms of functionality, BTMOB maintains a set of intrusive capabilities, including: automatic granting of permissions, especially on Android 13–15 devices; use of a black FrameLayout overlay to hide system notifications similar to the one observed in the banking module; silent installation; persistent background execution; and mechanisms designed to capture screen lock credentials, including PINs, patterns, and passwords. The malware also provides access to front and rear cameras, captures keystrokes in real time, monitors GPS location, and constantly collects sensitive data. Together, these functionalities provide the operator with comprehensive remote control, persistent access, and extensive surveillance capabilities over compromised devices.
Victims
All variants of BeatBanker – those with the banking module and those with the BTMOB RAT – were detected on victims in Brazil. Some of the samples that deliver BTMOB appear to use WhatsApp to spread, as well as phishing pages.
Conclusion
BeatBanker is an excellent example of how mobile threats are becoming more sophisticated and multi-layered. Initially focused in Brazil, this Trojan operates a dual campaign, acting as a Monero cryptocurrency miner, discreetly draining your device’s battery life while also stealing banking credentials and tampering with cryptocurrency transactions. Moreover, the most recent version goes even further, substituting the banking module with a full-fledged BTMOB RAT.
The attackers have devised inventive tricks to maintain persistence. They keep the process alive by looping an almost inaudible audio track, which prevents the operating system from terminating it and allows BeatBanker to remain active for extended periods.
Furthermore, the threat demonstrates an obsession with staying hidden. It monitors device usage, battery level and temperature. It even uses Google’s legitimate system (FCM) to receive commands. The threat’s banking module is capable of overlaying Binance and Trust Wallet screens and diverting USDT funds to the criminals’ wallets before the victim even notices.
The lesson here is clear: distrust is your best defense. BeatBanker spreads through fake websites that mimic Google Play, disguising itself as trustworthy government applications. To protect yourself against threats like this, it is essential to:
Download apps only from official sources. Always use the Google Play Store or the device vendor’s official app store. Make sure you use the correct app store app, and verify the developer.
Check permissions. Pay attention to the permissions that applications request, especially those related to accessibility and installation of third-party packages.
Keep the system updated. Security updates for Android and your mobile antivirus are essential.
Our solutions detect this threat as HEUR:Trojan-Dropper.AndroidOS.BeatBanker and HEUR:Trojan-Dropper.AndroidOS.Banker.*
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