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EFF's Investigations Expose Flock Safety's Surveillance Abuses: 2025 in Review

Throughout 2025, EFF conducted groundbreaking investigations into Flock Safety's automated license plate reader (ALPR) network, revealing a system designed to enable mass surveillance and susceptible to grave abuses. Our research sparked state and federal investigations, drove landmark litigation, and exposed dangerous expansion into always-listening voice detection technology. We documented how Flock's surveillance infrastructure allowed law enforcement to track protesters exercising their First Amendment rights, target Romani people with discriminatory searches, and surveil women seeking reproductive healthcare.

Flock Enables Surveillance of Protesters

When we obtained datasets representing more than 12 million searches logged by more than 3,900 agencies between December 2024 and October 2025, the patterns were unmistakable. Agencies logged hundreds of searches related to political demonstrations—the 50501 protests in February, Hands Off protests in April, and No Kings protests in June and October. Nineteen agencies conducted dozens of searches specifically tied to No Kings protests alone. Sometimes searches explicitly referenced protest activity; other times, agencies used vague terminology to obscure surveillance of constitutionally protected speech.

The surveillance extended beyond mass demonstrations. Three agencies used Flock's system to target activists from Direct Action Everywhere, an animal-rights organization using civil disobedience to expose factory farm conditions. Delaware State Police queried the Flock network nine times in March 2025 related to Direct Action Everywhere actions—showing how ALPR surveillance targets groups engaged in activism challenging powerful industries.

Biased Policing and Discriminatory Searches

Our November analysis revealed deeply troubling patterns: more than 80 law enforcement agencies used language perpetuating harmful stereotypes against Romani people when searching the nationwide Flock Safety ALPR network. Between June 2024 and October 2025, police performed hundreds of searches using terms such as "roma" and racial slurs—often without mentioning any suspected crime.

Audit logs revealed searches including "roma traveler," "possible g*psy," and "g*psy ruse." Grand Prairie Police Department in Texas searched for the slur six times while using Flock's "Convoy" feature, which identifies vehicles traveling together—essentially targeting an entire traveling community without specifying any crime. According to a 2020 Harvard University survey, four out of 10 Romani Americans reported being subjected to racial profiling by police. Flock's system makes such discrimination faster and easier to execute at scale.

Weaponizing Surveillance Against Reproductive Rights

In October, we obtained documents showing that Texas deputies queried Flock Safety's surveillance data in what police characterized as a missing person investigation, but was actually an abortion case. Deputies initiated a "death investigation" of a "non-viable fetus," logged evidence of a woman's self-managed abortion, and consulted prosecutors about possible charges.

A Johnson County official ran two searches with the note "had an abortion, search for female." The second search probed 6,809 networks, accessing 83,345 cameras across nearly the entire country. This case revealed Flock's fundamental danger: a single query accesses more than 83,000 cameras spanning almost the entire nation, with minimal oversight and maximum potential for abuse—particularly when weaponized against people seeking reproductive healthcare.

Feature Updates Miss the Point

In June, EFF explained why Flock Safety's announced feature updates cannot make ALPRs safe. The company promised privacy-enhancing features like geofencing and retention limits in response to public pressure. But these tweaks don't address the core problem: Flock's business model depends on building a nationwide, interconnected surveillance network that creates risks no software update can eliminate. Our 2025 investigations proved that abuses stem from the architecture itself, not just how individual agencies use the technology.

Accountability and Community Action

EFF's work sparked significant accountability measures. U.S. Rep. Raja Krishnamoorthi and Rep. Robert Garcia launched a formal investigation into Flock's role in "enabling invasive surveillance practices that threaten the privacy, safety, and civil liberties of women, immigrants, and other vulnerable Americans."

Illinois Secretary of State Alexi Giannoulias launched an audit after EFF research showed Flock allowed U.S. Customs and Border Protection to access Illinois data in violation of state privacy laws. In November, EFF partnered with the ACLU of Northern California to file a lawsuit against San Jose and its police department, challenging warrantless searches of millions of ALPR records. Between June 5, 2024 and June 17, 2025, SJPD and other California law enforcement agencies searched San Jose's database 3,965,519 times—a staggering figure illustrating the vast scope of warrantless surveillance enabled by Flock's infrastructure.

Our investigations also fueled municipal resistance to Flock Safety. Communities from Austin to Evanston to Eugene successfully canceled or refused to renew their Flock contracts after organizing campaigns centered on our research documenting discriminatory policing, immigration enforcement, threats to reproductive rights, and chilling effects on protest. These victories demonstrate that communities—armed with evidence of Flock's harms—can challenge and reject surveillance infrastructure that threatens civil liberties.

Dangerous New Capabilities: Always-Listening Microphones

In October 2025, Flock announced plans to expand its gunshot detection microphones to listen for "human distress" including screaming. This dangerous expansion transforms audio sensors into powerful surveillance tools monitoring human voices on city streets. High-powered microphones above densely populated areas raise serious questions about wiretapping laws, false alerts, and potential for dangerous police responses to non-emergencies. After EFF exposed this feature, Flock quietly amended its marketing materials to remove explicit references to "screaming"—replacing them with vaguer language about "distress" detection—while continuing to develop and deploy the technology.

Looking Forward

Flock Safety's surveillance infrastructure is not a neutral public safety tool. It's a system that enables and amplifies racist policing, threatens reproductive rights, and chills constitutionally protected speech. Our 2025 investigations proved it beyond doubt. As we head into 2026, EFF will continue exposing these abuses, supporting communities fighting back, and litigating for the constitutional protections that surveillance technology has stripped away.

This article is part of our Year in Review series. Read other articles about the fight for digital rights in 2025.

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Procurement Power—When Cities Realized They Can Just Say No: 2025 in Review

In 2025, elected officials across the country began treating surveillance technology purchases differently: not as inevitable administrative procurements handled by police departments, but as political decisions subject to council oversight and constituent pressure. This shift proved to be the most effective anti-surveillance strategy of the year.

Since February, at least 23 jurisdictions fully ended, cancelled, or rejected Flock Safety ALPR programs (including Austin, Oak Park, Evanston, Hays County, San Marcos, Eugene, Springfield, and Denver) by recognizing surveillance procurement as political power, not administrative routine.

Legacy Practices & Obfuscation

For decades, cities have been caught in what researchers call "legacy procurement practices": administrative norms that prioritize "efficiency" and "cost thresholds" over democratic review. 

Vendors exploit this inertia through the "pilot loophole." As Taraaz and the Collaborative Research Center for Resilience (CRCR) note in a recent report, "no-cost offers" and free trials allow police departments to bypass formal procurement channels entirely. By the time the bill comes due, the surveillance is already normalised in the community, turning a purchase decision into a "continuation of service" that is politically difficult to stop.

This bureaucracy obscures the power that surveillance vendors have over municipal procurement decisions. As Arti Walker-Peddakotla details, this is a deliberate strategy. Walker-Peddakotla details how vendors secure "acquiescence" by hiding the political nature of surveillance behind administrative veils: framing tools as "force multipliers" and burying contracts in consent agendas. For local electeds, the pressure to "outsource" government decision-making makes vendor marketing compelling. Vendors use "cooperative purchasing" agreements to bypass competitive bidding, effectively privatizing the policy-making process. 

The result is a dangerous "information asymmetry" where cities become dependent on vendors for critical data governance decisions. The 2025 cancellations finally broke that dynamic.

The Procurement Moment

This year, cities stopped accepting this "administrative" frame. The shift came from three converging forces: audit findings that exposed Flock's lack of safeguards, growing community organizing pressure, and elected officials finally recognizing that saying "no" to a renewal was not just an option—it was the responsible choice.

When Austin let its Flock pilot expire on July 1, the decision reflected a political judgment: constituents rejected a nationwide network used for immigration enforcement. It wasn't a debate about retention rates; it was a refusal to renew.

These cancellations were also acts of fiscal stewardship. By demanding evidence of efficacy (and receiving none) officials in Hays County, Texas and San Marcos, Texas rejected the "force multiplier" myth. They treated the refusal of unproven technology not just as activism, but as a basic fiduciary duty. In Oak Park, Illinois, trustees cancelled eight cameras after an audit found Flock lacked safeguards, while Evanston terminated its 19-camera network shortly after. Eugene and Springfield, Oregon terminated 82 combined cameras in December. City electeds have also realized that every renewal is a vote for "vendor lock-in." As EPIC warns, once proprietary systems are entrenched, cities lose ownership of their own public safety data, making it nearly impossible to switch providers or enforce transparency later.

The shift was not universal. Denver illustrated the tension when Mayor Mike Johnston overrode a unanimous council rejection to extend Flock's contract. Council Member Sarah Parady rightly identified this as "mass surveillance" imposed "with no public process." This is exactly why procurement must be reclaimed: when treated as technical, surveillance vendors control the conversation; when recognized as political, constituents gain leverage.

Cities Hold the Line Against Mass Surveillance

EFF has spent years documenting how procurement functions as a lever for surveillance expansion, from our work documenting Flock Safety's troubling data-sharing practices with ICE and federal law enforcement to our broader advocacy on surveillance technology procurement reform. The 2025 victories show that when cities understand procurement as political rather than technical, they can say no. Procurement power can be the most direct route to stopping mass surveillance. 

As cities move into 2026, the lesson is clear: surveillance is a choice, not a mandate, and your community has the power to refuse it. The question isn't whether technology can police more effectively; it's whether your community wants to be policed this way. That decision belongs to constituents, not vendors.

This article is part of our Year in Review series. Read other articles about the fight for digital rights in 2025.

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Local Communities Are Winning Against ALPR Surveillance—Here’s How: 2025 in Review

Across ideologically diverse communities, 2025 campaigns against automated license plate reader (ALPR) surveillance kept winning. From Austin, Texas to Cambridge, Massachusetts to Eugene, Oregon, successful campaigns combined three practical elements: a motivated political champion on city council, organized grassroots pressure from affected communities, and technical assistance at critical decision moments.

The 2025 Formula for Refusal

  • Institutional Authority: Council members leveraging "procurement power"—local democracy's most underutilized tool—to say no. 
  • Community Mobilization: A base that refuses to debate "better policy" and demands "no cameras." 
  • Shared Intelligence: Local coalitions utilizing shared research on contract timelines and vendor breaches.

Practical Wins Over Perfect Policies

In 2025, organizers embraced the "ugly" win: prioritizing immediate contract cancellations over the "political purity" of perfect privacy laws. Procurement fights are often messy, bureaucratic battles rather than high-minded legislative debates, but they stop surveillance where it starts—at the checkbook. In Austin, more than 30 community groups built a coalition that forced a contract cancellation, achieving via purchasing power what policy reform often delays. 

In Hays County, Texas, the victory wasn't about a new law, but a contract termination. Commissioner Michelle Cohen grounded her vote in vendor accountability, explaining: "It's more about the company's practices versus the technology." These victories might lack the permanence of a statute, but every camera turned off built a culture of refusal that made the next rejection easier. This was the organizing principle: take the practical win and build on it.

Start with the Harm

Winning campaigns didn't debate technical specifications or abstract privacy principles. They started with documented harms that surveillance enabled. EFF's research showing police used Flock's network to track Romani people with discriminatory search terms, surveil women seeking abortion care, and monitor protesters exercising First Amendment rights became the evidence organizers used to build power.

In Olympia, Washington, nearly 200 community members attended a counter-information rally outside city hall on Dec. 2. The DeFlock Olympia movement countered police department claims point-by-point with detailed citations about data breaches and discriminatory policing. By Dec. 3, cameras had been covered pending removal.

In Cambridge, the city council voted unanimously in October to pause Flock cameras after residents, the ACLU of Massachusetts, and Digital Fourth raised concerns. When Flock later installed two cameras "without the city's awareness," a city spokesperson  called it a "material breach of our trust" and terminated the contract entirely. The unexpected camera installation itself became an organizing moment.

The Inside-Outside Game

The winning formula worked because it aligned different actors around refusing vehicular mass surveillance systems without requiring everyone to become experts. Community members organized neighbors and testified at hearings, creating political conditions where elected officials could refuse surveillance and survive politically. Council champions used their institutional authority to exercise "procurement power": the ability to categorically refuse surveillance technology.

To fuel these fights, organizers leveraged technical assets like investigation guides and contract timeline analysis. This technical capacity allowed community members to lead effectively without needing to become policy experts. In Eugene and Springfield, Oregon, Eyes Off Eugene organized sustained opposition over months while providing city council members political cover to refuse. "This is [a] very wonderful and exciting victory," organizer Kamryn Stringfield said. "This only happened due to the organized campaign led by Eyes Off Eugene and other local groups."

Refusal Crosses Political Divides

A common misconception collapsed in 2025: that surveillance technology can only be resisted in progressive jurisdictions. San Marcos, Texas let its contract lapse after a 3-3 deadlock, with Council Member Amanda Rodriguez questioning whether the system showed "return on investment." Hays County commissioners in Texas voted to terminate. Small towns like Gig Harbor, Washington rejected proposals before deployment. 

As community partners like the Rural Privacy Coalition emphasize, "privacy is a rural value." These victories came from communities with different political cultures but shared recognition that mass surveillance systems weren't worth the cost or risk regardless of zip code.

Communities Learning From Each Other

In 2025, communities no longer needed to build expertise from scratch—they could access shared investigation guides, learn from victories in neighboring jurisdictions, and connect with organizers who had won similar fights. When Austin canceled its contract, it inspired organizing across Texas. When Illinois Secretary of State's audit revealed illegal data sharing with federal immigration enforcement, Evanston used those findings to terminate 19 cameras.

The combination of different forms of power—institutional authority, community mobilization, and shared intelligence—was a defining feature of this year's most effective campaigns. By bringing these elements together, community coalitions have secured cancellations or rejections in nearly two dozen jurisdictions since February, building the infrastructure to make the next refusal easier and the movement unstoppable.

This article is part of our Year in Review series. Read other articles about the fight for digital rights in 2025.

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