California lawmakers have amended A.B. 1709, but the core problem remains: the bill is still a ban on social media access for youth under 16, and it still threatens the privacy and First Amendment rights of all Californians.

Proponents of the bill may argue that the recent amendments represent a compromise, but a close look at the text shows no major changes. As the bill moves forward in the Senate, we must continue to urge lawmakers to vote NO.

Take Action: Tell Your Senator to OPPOSE A.B. 1709

A "Compromise" That Still Denies Access

Under the newly amended Section 22683, platforms are prohibited from offering "addictive features" to users under 16. A platform can allow a minor to keep an account only if it strips away these features, which include what the bill calls "addictive feeds," auto-play, and anything else the Attorney General designates in future rulemaking.

However, the bill defines "addictive feeds" so broadly that it covers virtually every functional recommendation algorithm. The bill applies this label to any presentation of user-generated content recommended "in whole or in part, on information provided by the user." That includes basic inputs like who a user follows, what posts they like, or their self-expressed interests. By calling these basic tools and features “addictive," the bill also makes broad conclusions about the unsettled science behind social media use, youth, and addiction.

Because almost every major social media service uses automated feeds to deliver content, the end result of AB 1709 remains the same: young people under 16 will be denied access to major social media services as they currently exist.

Even if a platform attempts to comply by stripping away recommendation systems for minors, this still violates the First Amendment. Recommendation systems are the primary tools that users rely on to find speech and disseminate their own. Forcing young people onto a stripped-down, dysfunctional version of social media burdens their constitutional right to access information and participate in public discourse.

AB 1709 Still Forces Invasive Age Verification

The amendments do not eliminate the privacy threats posed by age gating. Although the bill references the age-signaling framework in AB 1043, Section 22684 explicitly states that a covered platform "shall verify the age of a user” and makes platforms liable every time a person under 16 makes it through an age check. 

Because AB 1043 does not actually specify how verification should occur without requiring additional proof, AB 1709 will, in practice, force platforms to implement the strictest forms of age verification. To comply, platforms will likely require users to upload government-issued IDs or submit to biometric scanning. Forcing users to turn over their personal information will create massive honeypots of sensitive personal data, destroying online anonymity and exposing users of all ages to security breaches. And relying on biometric systems to verify users’ ages is problematic because the systems have historically had high error rates estimating ages across race and gender lines.

Take Action: Tell Your Senator to OPPOSE A.B. 1709

Lawmakers Must Reject AB 1709

The amendments to AB 1709 also introduce legal confusion, creating provisions that conflict with already enacted legislation like SB 976. Rather than providing clarity or protecting young people, AB 1709 creates a tangled regulatory scheme that sacrifices constitutional rights for political grandstanding.

Denying minors access to digital forums—or stripping those forums of the basic tools needed to navigate them—is censorship. California should not set a national precedent of cutting young people off from digital lifelines, communities, and speech.

We need to keep the pressure on as AB 1709 moves through the Senate. Contact your state senator today and tell them that minor tweaks to a bad bill do not make it good policy.

The Senate Commerce Committee is set to consider S. 737, the SCREEN Act, a sweeping age-verification bill that would require online services to verify users’ ages before they can access any sexually explicit content. If this bill passes, it will force millions of adult internet users to give up their anonymity, privacy, and security before they access lawful speech.  

Unlike many state-age verification laws—which have been harmful in their own right—the SCREEN Act has no requirement that a significant portion of the website consist of sexually explicit content that is harmful to minors. The bill requires nearly any service hosting even a single piece of sexually explicit content to verify the ages of its users. The result is that the bill would apply not only to adult content sites like PornHub or OnlyFans, but also streaming services like Netflix, and social media platforms like Reddit, Discord, or Bluesky, if they host any adult content.

The SCREEN Act does not merely require users to attest they are adults. It specifically states that “requiring a user to confirm that the user is not a minor shall not be sufficient.” In practice, that means platforms would have to verify users’ ages using methods tied to their real identities. Providing proof of age online is dramatically different, and far more invasive, than showing your ID at the door to a bartender or bouncer. In the physical world, the bouncer at the door looks at your ID card, confirms you’re old enough, and gives it back to you. Under the SCREEN Act, the “bouncer” will be a digital age-verification service that captures your personal information and saves it to a database for an unspecified amount of time. 

The consequences of the bill won’t be limited to minors. If websites and apps are expected to reliably identify teenagers, adults will be asked to prove they are adults. 

Even worse, the SCREEN Act is a privacy and data security nightmare. One provision of the bill requires services to take reasonable steps to protect the data collected and to not maintain for longer than is necessary. But these are terribly weak protections that impose no meaningful collection, use, or retention limits on services collecting people’s private information. 

In other words, the third parties tasked with verifying a user’s age on a platform could sweep up a lot of personal info they don’t actually need and then could use that information for any number of purposes, so long as they deem their actions reasonable. Companies would then be allowed to keep the information users have been compelled to turn over for as long as possible, raising security and privacy issues along the way.

The SCREEN Act Attacks Your Right To Use VPNs

The SCREEN Act also targets virtual private network (VPN) users and providers. The bill requires covered websites to verify users' ages based on their IP addresses unless the service can determine that the user is outside the United States, and specifically requires age verification on traffic coming from known VPN addresses. In practice, this discourages the use of VPNs and proxy servers, which millions of people rely on for legitimate purposes such as protecting personal privacy, securing public Wi-Fi connections, safeguarding journalists and activists, and preventing data tracking. 

VPNs mask your real location by routing your internet traffic through a server somewhere else. When you visit a website through a VPN, that website only sees the VPN server's IP address, not your actual location. It's like sending a letter through a P.O. box so the recipient doesn't know where you really live. VPNs are a privacy and security tool used by millions of internet users every day, and their use should not be treated as suspect. It is particularly galling that the SCREEN Act forces users who intentionally take steps to protect their privacy to identify themselves.

The SCREEN Act creates onerous age-verification rules that will block adults from accessing lawful speech, curtail their ability to be anonymous, and jeopardize the data security and privacy of all internet users. 

The California legislature has stepped back from a plan that would have expanded its age-gating law, removing language that could have compounded serious threats to users’ speech, privacy and security just to browse the internet. A.B. 1856, authored by Assemblymember Buffy Wicks, will now move forward through the legislature without its most problematic pieces.

EFF still believes the underlying law that A.B. 1856 amends, A.B. 1043, is unconstitutional. Signed into law in 2025 (and effective January of 2027), A.B. 1043 requires all operating systems and app stores to collect users’ ages, place them in various age brackets and then block young people from lawful speech and services depending on their age. We also believe that even though A.B. 1043 does not require age verification, the liability it creates for operating systems and app stores—including fining operating systems up to $7,500 per affected child for violating the law—will push those services to verify users’ ages. In practice, that could lead to more ID checks, more biometric scanning, more invasive data collection and risk of breach, and more barriers to adults’ and young people’s lawful speech.

However, we appreciate that the Legislature has abandoned its plan to expand this problematic age-gating  framework to browsers and websites. This would have significantly expanded this dangerous law before it even took effect. We thank the author and committee staff for recognizing these harms and not moving forward with this language. 

On top of that, EFF is pleased that an earlier amendment to A.B 1856 reduced the threat to the open-source community by exempting open-source operating systems. Given these changes, EFF has removed its opposition to A.B. 1856. We appreciate the author for listening to concerns from advocates, developers and others about the effect it would have on open-source development and also around expanding this problematic framework.

To be clear, we still believe the law passed last year threatens online anonymity, privacy, and security. A.B. 1043 is one of a troubling wave of proposals that encourage—or, in some cases, outright require—age verification. Our position on this is clear: no one should have to provide or verify their age to access the internet. Once users’ personal data is collected, it can easily be leaked, hacked, or misused. No matter the method, every age verification system demands that people hand over their sensitive and immutable personal information to link their offline identity to their online activity. That’s a bad deal for us all.

Age-gating mandates are reshaping the internet in ways that are invasive, dangerous, and deeply unnecessary. But users are not powerless! We can challenge these laws, protect our digital rights, and build a safer digital world for all internet users, no matter their ages. This resource hub can help—so explore, share, and join us in the fight for a better internet.

The Illinois legislature recently passed House Bill 5511, which imposes a sweeping, device-level age-gating framework across nearly all internet-enabled hardware, operating systems, and online services. This well-intentioned but deeply flawed piece of legislation will harm young people who rely on the internet to access essential information and find community. That’s why we’re urging the Illinois governor to veto the measure. 

Under this new regime, digital platforms are forced to collect and share users' ages to platforms and websites. It also strips away basic, everyday features like personalized content feeds and overnight notifications for young people unless they can secure "verifiable parental consent."

H.B. 5511 is a massive privacy and free speech nightmare. That’s why we sent a letter to formally urge Governor J.B. Pritzker to veto the bill.

Much of H.B. 5511 is modeled after controversial legislation passed in California (A.B. 1043) and New York’s Stop Addictive Feeds Exploitation (SAFE) for Kids Act, both of which have already drawn immense blowback from open-source communities, privacy advocates, and tech stakeholders. For Illinois to copy this suspect age-bracketing regime before either law has even gone into effect, been tested in court, or proven functional is premature, economically risky, and legally wasteful.

H.B. 5511 is a massive privacy and free speech nightmare. That’s why we sent a letter to formally urge Governor J.B. Pritzker to veto the bill. Far from protecting children, the bill will effectively dismantle online anonymity, jeopardize data security, and severely restrict access to constitutionally protected speech for young people and adults alike. Finally, these schemes cut off vital lifelines for vulnerable youth in non-traditional families and pose an existential threat to the open-source ecosystem that underpins the modern internet.

For a deeper look at the constitutional, policy, and technological concerns with H.B. 5511, you can read our full letter here. 

This week, politicians in the UK pushed forward with plans to eviscerate privacy and free speech on the internet by announcing a ban on social media for users under 16 that is set to take effect in Spring 2027. 

The UK government continues to falsely characterize this policy as a necessary response to growing concerns about online harms for young people. In reality, much like the Online Safety Act, it will cause more harm than it will prevent. 

Users of all ages are burdened with proving their age before accessing content, with social media platforms such as Snapchat, TikTok, YouTube, Instagram, Facebook, and X included in the ban. There remains no reliable, privacy-preserving method of verifying the age of every internet user and methods vary from one platform to the next.

Young people will not simply be protected from being contacted by adults or endlessly scrolling—they’ll also lose access to educational videos on YouTube, local events on Facebook, and potentially cut off from distant friends and family. 

Public policy must be effective, proportionate and respectful of fundamental rights. Young people deserve better than a policy built on panic, and all internet users deserve a safe and free internet. A social media ban generates headlines, but it will not solve the problem. 

A Brief History of Age-Gating in the UK

Age restriction proposals in the UK date back to a decade ago, when the proposed Digital Economy Bill was put forth to (among other things) restrict young people from accessing pornographic websites. While the Digital Economy Act of 2017 passed without age-based restrictions, it laid the groundwork for later age verification measures.

Over the next few years, age checks for porn websites were announced then delayed several times. But it wasn’t until a consultation under the 2016-2019 May government and the 2020 publication of the Online Harms Whitepaper that age verification became a broader idea.

In 2023, the UK passed the controversial Online Safety Act, establishing powers that could weaken privacy protections and freedom of expression for internet users worldwide. In July 2025, the government implemented age assurance measures on sites hosting “harmful” content. 

And despite politicians affirming repeatedly that the Online Safety Act would solve all of the problems with online safety, this year they decided it in fact did not go far enough. American social psychologist and The Anxious Generation author Jonathan Haidt—who has called for age-related social media bans around the world, despite significant scientific doubt about his research—met with the UK Health Secretary in February to push for the ban.

In March, politicians introduced plans for a social media ban into the Children’s Wellbeing and Schools Bill to “prevent children under the age of 16 from becoming or being users” of “all regulated user-to-user services,” to be implemented by “highly-effective age assurance measures”—effectively banning under-16s from social media. 

When this proposal came before the House of Commons, MPs defeated and proposed their own amendment: enabling the Secretary of State to introduce provisions “requiring providers of specified internet services” to prevent access by children, under age 18 rather than 16, to specified internet services or to specified features; and to restrict access by children to specified internet services which ministers provide. 

But the social media ban does not stop there. The provision also requires internet service providers to limit the time kids spend online, and has rules about who can contact them online. These extreme rules will take decisions about using technology away from families and put them in the hands of government regulators. 

The history of this proposal shows that the UK government has repeatedly returned to the same flawed idea: restricting access to online services by requiring age checks for everyone. But the fundamental problems have not changed. There is still no widely available way to verify age online without compromising privacy—but even if there were, broad restrictions on social media will inevitably limit access to lawful speech, and valuable online communities, and arts and culture.