EFF legal intern Gabrielle Ladun was the principal author of this post. 

The Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General (DHS OIG) has published a summary of findings from its audit of the Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA) facial recognition technology. While the detailed findings are classified, the summary states that the OIG’s audit uncovered a “significant weakness” in the technology’s ability to protect the privacy of passenger data. This has massive privacy implications for the millions of passengers who travel and don’t opt out of the TSA’s biometric surveillance technology verification process. 

TSA uses facial comparison technology for identity verification of airline passengers. A camera takes a photo of passengers to verify that their provided identification matches their live photo. Although TSA states that it is “committed to protecting traveler privacy,” the audit highlights that this has not been the case.  

The OIG found that TSA’s Credential Authentication Technology 2’s (CAT-2) vendor “was able to access and extract sensitive passenger information, including driver’s license and passport images, during system troubleshooting and enhancements, without TSA’s knowledge.”  

The OIG further admonished the agency:  

TSA lacked clear policies, did not track when this data was extracted, could not verify that extracted information was properly deleted, and did not notify passengers when their biometric and biographic information may have been stored. As a result, although passenger information was generally protected during routine operations, weaknesses in vendor oversight created a risk that sensitive personal information could be retained or exposed. 

We hope the TSA will fix these issues. The OIG summary states: 

We issued one finding and three recommendations to strengthen controls, improve oversight, and ensure transparency and the proper handling of passenger data. TSA concurred with all three recommendations. Two recommendations are open and resolved, and one remains open and unresolved. 

Why EFF Opposes the Government’s Use of Facial Recognition Technology 

EFF has a long history of opposing governmental use of facial recognition technology. As the OIG’s audit underscores, this technology presents privacy risks associated with unsecured data, unauthorized access, and data breaches. The government’s use of this technology also creates a mass surveillance system and facilitates the creation of warrantless biometric records for unconsenting parties.  

The biometric data captured by this technology is not without errors. There have been multiple instances of law enforcement agencies using facial recognition technology to misidentify and arrest innocent individuals.  

Reminder: Opting Out of TSA Photos Is Possible 

Given that facial recognition technology is prone to mistakes, combined with the OIG’s audit revealing significant privacy weaknesses, it is imperative that travelers remember that opting out is possible. TSA’s own website emphasizes that travelers who wish to decline to have their photo taken for facial comparison can do so without any delay, disruption, or recourse.  

Considering the data protection weaknesses exposed by the OIG’s audit, EFF will continue to oppose this governmental system of mass surveillance and spread awareness to ensure that no one is forced to relinquish their biometric data without consent. 

EFF joined an amicus brief with ACLU, ACLU of D.C., National Press Photographers Association, and Professional Photographers of America to urge the D.C. Circuit to vacate an FAA drone flight restriction that violated the First Amendment right to record law enforcement. This is an important case—Levine v. FAA—challenging the ability of the government to punish drone pilots who record law enforcement officers engaged in official business. 

As we wrote about earlier this year, the FAA issued a flight restriction for drones that had effectively criminalized the recording of Department of Homeland Security officers, including immigration agents from ICE and CBP, and their vehicles (what the FAA called “mobile assets” including “ground vehicle convoys and their associated escorts”) even if the drone was over half a mile away. 

A drone operator, represented by the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, sued the FAA in March [PDF]. But in April, the FAA rescinded the flight restriction. 

The petitioner argued in his opening brief that the court should evaluate the legality of the flight restriction even though it was withdrawn. Drone pilots could still be punished for violations that occurred when the flight restriction was in effect. And the FAA could reinstate the flight restriction at any time, given that the rescission did not seem to reflect “a true change of heart” but rather an effort by the agency to avoid judicial review. 

The amicus brief, filed in support of the petitioner, noted that drones are unique because they provide “perspectives that cannot be captured by ground-based imagery,” and they “are far more maneuverable than ground-level cameras, and they are both much cheaper and much safer than using a chartered plane or helicopter to record newsworthy events from above.” The brief highlighted that drones have captured “bird’s-eye images of protest activity” and “police uses of force against protestors,” and have “allowed journalists to provide the public with up-to-the-minute information about natural disasters without putting themselves in harm’s way.” 

The brief argued that using drones to capture images and video is information-gathering activity protected by the First Amendment (similar to using cell phones to record law enforcement). The brief also argued that the FAA’s flight restriction appeared to be issued specifically to ban the recording of immigration agents and thus hinder accountability for their enforcement actions—it surely wasn’t a coincidence that the FAA imposed “no-drone zones around all roving DHS patrols just as those patrols were provoking intense national backlash.” If that’s true, it would make the FAA’s action a content-based restriction on speech that is subject to strict scrutiny—the highest First Amendment standard—and presumptively unconstitutional. And even under less rigorous standards of First Amendment scrutiny, the flight restriction is unconstitutional because the FAA can’t articulate any valid governmental interest justifying such a sweeping restriction on speech. 

Resolving this issue to protect First Amendment rights is especially urgent as government agencies continue to sink billions of dollars into technology designed to counter drones—technology that could easily be deployed against journalists and other people hoping to use drones to document government abuse.  

We urge the D.C. Circuit to review the petition and to vacate the FAA’s flight restriction, which would send a message that the government can’t avoid accountability by punishing those who exercise their First Amendment rights. 

A federal appeals court just made it harder for online services, big and small, to get lawsuits over user speech dismissed early. In California v. Meta, a Ninth Circuit three-judge panel held that the lower court’s denial of Section 230 immunity to Meta is not immediately appealable. The misguided ruling has the potential to have widespread impact and to threaten the free speech of all internet users.

The ruling is bigger than a loss for Meta, which has the resources to defend itself against these lawsuits. The court’s ruling signals that all online services (and internet users) that host others’ speech—including those without Meta’s deep pockets—must bear the burden and expense of fighting lawsuits that Section 230 ultimately precludes. This will have real consequences, incentivizing online services to take down users’ speech in response to spurious legal threats, filter speech preemptively, or simply stop offering a place for people to speak online. So even though some may think that Meta is not a sympathetic company, the ruling should raise concerns for anyone who cares about an open and free internet.

Immunities from Suit Advance Important Public Interests

A little procedural background is necessary to understand the implications of the Ninth Circuit’s ruling.

Meta had moved to dismiss a group of social media addiction cases brought by state attorneys general, school districts, and local governments. Meta argued that Section 230(c)(1) immunity applies because the plaintiffs’ claims, framed as seeking to hold Meta liable for allegedly harmful platform features, really seek to hold the company liable for publishing decisions related to third-party content. Section 230 is one of the most important laws supporting online free speech, because its protections for online services enable them to distribute users’ speech at an unprecedented scale.

The district court ruled that Section 230 does not apply to certain features (and does apply to others) and so denied the motion to dismiss on the claims related to those features. Meta immediately appealed invoking appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, but the question before the Ninth Circuit was whether the appeal was legally appropriate.

Under Section 1291, U.S. circuit courts generally only have jurisdiction to hear appeals of “final decisions” from the district courts. Final decisions are trial court orders ending a case, or come after a trial on the merits. Section 230 appellate cases often arise from a district court’s grant of a defendant platform’s motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s case based on Section 230. Typically, a district court’s denial of a defendant’s motion to dismiss is not a final order—it simply means that the case may continue to discovery and summary judgment or trial, after which time an appeal would be appropriate.

However, federal law allows for “interlocutory appeals,” which are appeals of orders that do not end a case but nonetheless are allowed because they involve important legal issues. For example, there is an exception to Section 1291 called the “collateral order doctrine”—at issue in this case—allowing for immediate appeal if, as the Ninth Circuit explained here, “holding a trial would imperil a substantial public interest.”

Inherent in the collateral order doctrine is the consideration of whether an immunity like Section 230 provides mere “immunity from liability” or a more robust “immunity from suit.”

An immunity from liability does not require an immediate appeal and so demands that Section 1291’s final order rule be followed. That’s because waiting until the end of a case before an appellate court can consider the trial court’s denial of immunity does not prejudice the defendant. The appellate court may overturn the trial court and grant the immunity, and thus the defendant’s right to be immune from liability would be vindicated on appeal.

Immunity from suit is different. It means that the public interest demands that a defendant be able to get out of a case as early as possible and avoid having to litigate the case to the end. The U.S. Supreme Court has held, for example, that qualified immunity is such an immunity, and that a district court’s denial of qualified immunity for a government official is immediately appealable under Section 1291, notwithstanding the lack of a final order. The idea is that the public interest is served when government officials are free to act without fear of consequences when established rights are not implicated, and so determining as soon as possible whether their acts are immune serves that public interest.

Here, the Ninth Circuit held that the district court’s denial of Section 230 immunity for Meta was not immediately appealable under Section 1291’s collateral order doctrine because the immunity is not from suit, but rather from ultimate liability. The panel’s absurd result contravenes the text of Section 230, the statute’s policy goals, and the court’s own prior rulings.

Treating Section 230 as an Immunity from Suit Protects Online Free Speech

Meta rightly argued that Section 230(e)(3) plainly states, “No cause of action may be brought and no liability may be imposed under any State or local law that is inconsistent with this section.” The panel dismissed this argument, stating that this language likely amounts to “redundancy” reflecting only immunity from liability. The court failed to side with the more reasonable position that statutory language should generally not be interpreted as superfluous.

Meta also reminded the panel that the Ninth Circuit has many times over the past two decades framed Section 230 as both an immunity from liability and an immunity from suit. The panel also dismissed this argument, stating, “It is true that we have used the phrase ‘immunity’ somewhat loosely in our section 230 jurisprudence.”

But “loosely” is a gross mischaracterization—the panel did not discuss a seminal prior ruling, Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com (2008), in which the entire Ninth Circuit, not just a three-judge panel, explicitly ruled that Section 230 is also an immunity from suit. That court rightly explained that Section 230 “must be interpreted to protect websites not merely from ultimate liability, but from having to fight costly and protracted legal battles.”

Why is it important that social media platforms and other internet intermediaries (and their users) have immunity from suit for engaging in publishing activities related to third-party content—and thus a right to immediately appeal when Section 230 immunity is denied?

The Ninth Circuit panel here, using their own words, failed to “evaluate the interests that would be lost through rigorous application of a final judgment requirement” and failed to consider the “substantial public interest” served by treating Section 230 as an immunity from suit.

Section 230 immunity, contrary to what some argue, is not a gift to Big Tech—it applies to all internet intermediaries, big and small, from the large social media companies to smaller entities like community message boards and local ISPs. It even protects internet users who forward others’ emails or host comments on their blogs. In turn, the law supports the free speech of all internet users.

While it is helpful when an internet intermediary can ultimately benefit from Section 230 immunity, if a trial court’s early denial is not immediately appealable, that means the intermediary must bear the extended logistical and financial burdens of defending itself. Under the Ninth Circuit’s logic, anyone hosting others’ speech online would have to endure the pain and expense of discovery, summary judgment, or trial, before they ultimately can be protected by Section 230.

Congress crafted Section 230 to give internet intermediaries legal breathing room, so that they will be incentivized to facilitate online communication and commerce, allowing the rest of us to go online with minimal barriers to entry, without needing to have loads of money or to know how to code. Congress acknowledged in Section 230 itself, “Increasingly Americans are relying on interactive media for a variety of political, educational, cultural, and entertainment services.”

Yet if platforms, especially smaller platforms, know that they will have to defend themselves for years in court before they can ultimately benefit from Section 230 immunity, this alone will create a perverse incentive, as we have explained, to censor user speech, in order to reduce the platforms’ legal exposure. And this incentive is only exacerbated at scale, where the sheer volume of user-generated content hosted by modern platforms makes legal risk astronomical.

Unfortunately, this opinion seems to be part of larger trend reflecting the Ninth Circuit’s increasing disdain for Section 230, and apparently for free speech rights more broadly. The court similarly held last year in Gopher Media v. Melone (2025)—overruling itself—that a trial court’s denial of a defendant’s anti-SLAPP motion also is not immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine. This is despite the fact that, similar to Section 230, California’s anti-SLAPP law is intended to allow defendants to get harassing lawsuits meant to silence them dismissed early, lest they be chilled from engaging in lawful speech on public issues due to the risk of being mired in litigation, even if they ultimately win a delayed appeal.

This post is available as a printable one page handout in English and Spanish.

Recordings of law enforcement, whether by bystanders or by those directly encountering officers, can be powerful tools of government accountability and can support movements for social change. But recording officers can come with risks. Below are important legal and practical considerations related to recording the police and other law enforcement officers.

Can I legally record the police or immigration officers?

Yes. All Americans have a First Amendment right to record law enforcement. This includes local police and federal officers such as those from Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and Customs and Border Protection (CBP). Although the Supreme Court has not squarely ruled on the issue, nine different federal appellate courts have recognized and affirmed this right, relying on decades of Supreme Court precedent.

Courts typically frame the right to record law enforcement as the right to record officers exercising their official duties in public. This right extends to bystanders as well as people recording their own interactions with law enforcement, such as livestreaming their own traffic stops. The right also applies to private places where the recorder has a legal right to be, such as in their own home.

You may take photos, or record video and audio. Courts have held that wiretap laws, which generally protect private conversations, do not prohibit civilians from audio recording law enforcement. That’s because officers exercising their official duties, particularly in public, do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy. Neither do civilians in public places who speak to law enforcement in a manner audible to passersby.

What are some limitations on the right to record law enforcement?

Courts have been clear that behavior that obstructs or interferes with effective law enforcement or the protection of public safety is not protected. Officers can't order you to move because you are recording, but they may order you to move for public safety reasons even if you are recording.

If the law enforcement officer is off-duty or is in a private space that you don’t also have a right to be in, your right to record the officer may be limited. For example, a Los Angeles jury in 2026 found two women guilty of felony stalking after they followed an ICE agent to his home and livestreamed the pursuit.

What are some other considerations when recording officers?

Even if you believe you are appropriately exercising your First Amendment right to record law enforcement, officers may nevertheless escalate the situation and/or retaliate against you. Below are some things to keep in mind.

• Stay calm and courteous.
• If you are a bystander, stand at a safe distance from the scene that you are recording. But note that officers may approach and confront you, closing that distance in an effort to accuse you of interfering with and possibly also assaulting a federal officer.
• Be alert and mindful of the possibility that officers may illegally retaliate against you in a number of ways, including arrest, destruction of your device, and bodily harm. They may also try to retaliate by harming the person being arrested. 
• Consider the sensitive nature of recording in the context of an arrest. For example, the person being arrested or their loved ones may be concerned about exposing their immigration status, so think about obtaining consent or blurring out faces in any version you publish to focus on ICE/CBP conduct (while still retaining the original video). 
• Law enforcement may not search your cell phone or other device without a warrant based on probable cause from a judge, even if you are under arrest. Thus, you may refuse a request from an officer to review or delete what you recorded. You also may refuse to unlock your phone or provide your passcode.

What can I do to protect my footage?

How well protected your photos or video footage are depends on both the device and the way you’re recording. If you’re uploading video to a livestreaming service, it can save that video to the cloud if you enable that setting. But what if you want to protect your recordings  stored locally?

Modern smartphones generally protect data, including videos, using encryption. This means if your phone is locked and protected by a strong passphrase, it is more difficult for an officer to delete what you’ve stored on the device. Removing biometrics such as face and fingerprint unlock can protect your device contents further. You can check your settings by following the steps in our Surveillance Self-Defense guides (see below) to ensure device encryption is turned on.

Want more information?

• Read more about your right to record law enforcement: https://www.eff.org/issues/right-record
• Read EFF’s Surveillance Self-Defense technical guide: https://ssd.eff.org

Legal intern Suzanne Castillo was the principal author of this post.

The Fourth Circuit issued a disappointing opinion in U.S. v. Belmonte Cardozo, a case in which EFF filed an amicus brief, alongside the national ACLU, its Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Virginia affiliates, and the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (NACDL).

We argued that electronic device searches at the border should require a warrant based on probable cause, but at minimum, regardless of whether an officer searches by hand or with forensic software that plugs into a device and downloads its entire contents for search, the same Fourth Amendment standard should apply to all device searches at the border.

Unfortunately, the court rejected that argument and ruled that a lower standard applies to manual searches, allowing the government to conduct extraordinarily invasive electronic device searches without any suspicion of wrongdoing, simply because the border officer chooses to search by hand rather than with a forensic tool.

The Border Search Exception Meets Your Phone

The Fourth Amendment requires that government searches of persons or property be reasonable, which usually means obtaining a warrant based on probable cause from a judge.

But a warrantless search can still be reasonable if it falls within an exception to the warrant requirement, including the exception that allows officers to search your belongings at the border. The border search exception allows warrantless searches of persons or property crossing the U.S. border, including the functional equivalent of the border such as international airports, given the government’s interests in controlling who and what may enter the country.

Historically, courts have categorized border searches of luggage, vehicles, and personal effects as “routine” and thus reasonable even if conducted without any suspicion that the traveler has engaged in wrongdoing; courts have also held that more invasive “nonroutine” searches, such as certain body searches and searches that damage property, require reasonable suspicion.

But a person’s privacy interests in the personal data on a phone or laptop are extraordinarily different than their limited privacy interests in the contents of their suitcase.

The Supreme Court addressed cell phone privacy in Riley v. California (2014), holding that the search-incident-to-arrest exception to the warrant requirement did not apply to cell phones, thereby generally requiring a warrant for phone searches, at least at the interior of the country. The court recognized the unprecedented privacy interests people have in their cell phones and how even brief manual searches can reveal the “sum of an individual’s private life,” including our political affiliations, religious beliefs, sexuality, and more. Accordingly, the Supreme Court held that because electronic device searches bear “little resemblance” to searches of bags or physical containers, they should be evaluated differently.

Following Riley, the Fourth Circuit considered two border device search cases involving forensic searches, in which border officers used external software to extract and analyze a device’s data.

In U.S. v. Kolsuz (2018), the Fourth Circuit held that a forensic search of a cell phone at the border “must be considered a nonroutine border search, requiring some measure of individualized suspicion” of a transnational offense, but the court declined to decide whether the standard is only reasonable suspicion or instead a probable cause warrant.

Then in U.S. v. Aigbekaen (2019), the Fourth Circuit held that a forensic device search at the border in support of a purely domestic law enforcement investigation requires a warrant. The court also reiterated the general Kolsuz rule for a forensic border-related device search: the “Government must have individualized suspicion of an offense that bears some nexus to the border search exception's purposes of protecting national security, collecting duties, blocking the entry of unwanted persons, or disrupting efforts to export or import contraband.”

In Belmonte Cardozo, manual searches were finally before the court.

A Disappointing Decision

Jose Belmonte Cardozo was already on the U.S. government’s radar when he traveled from Bolivia to the U.S. and was met by a U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officer at Washington Dulles International Airport. The officer manually searched his cell phone and found child sexual abuse material (CSAM), considered “digital contraband,” leading to Belmonte Cardozo’s arrest and criminal prosecution.

At issue on appeal was what standard should apply to manual device searches at the border. The Fourth Circuit held that, unlike forensic searches, manual searches are “routine” and thus reasonable under the Fourth Amendment without a warrant or individualized suspicion.

The court’s holding hinged on four differences between manual and forensic searches: (1) in a manual search, a person does the searching, not a machine; (2) a manual search’s breadth depends on the officer’s time and energy, while forensic searches are comprehensive; (3) manual searches reveal only what a user can typically access, while forensic searches can uncover deleted files, cached fragments, metadata, and more; and (4) manual searches are subject to an officer’s fading memory or imperfect notes, while forensic searches create a permanent copy.

But in identifying these technical differences, the court never explains why they justify a lower standard for manual searches.

The Fourth Circuit’s holding is problematic because, as we argued in our amicus brief, manual searches reach the same categories of data as forensic searches—data that can reveal highly personal aspects of our identities and our lives. It does not matter if a search is conducted by an agent’s thumbs or by software: the end result is equally as invasive, therefore all device searches should fall under the warrant requirement, or at least the same Fourth Amendment standard.

The court repeatedly emphasized that the search here lasted only two minutes, suggesting that the time-limited search was not privacy-invasive. But an individual’s privacy interests in their personal data don’t change based on how their phone is searched or how long. Scrolling for two minutes through someone’s personal text messages or photos is an invasion of privacy that may reveal intimate details about the person even in that short period of time.

Moreover, as devices’ native search functions improve, manual searches can surface personal information in seconds through keyword searches, even for photos, where it might have taken an hour of scrolling to find the same information, further showing that a time-limited search is not necessarily less privacy-invasive. What matters is not the breadth of the search itself, but the unprecedented (and growing) breadth of data on our phones.

A Silver Lining

There’s one silver lining: by relying on the fact that the search lasted two minutes, the Fourth Circuit left open the possibility that lengthier manual searches could trigger heightened suspicion requirements. But until a clear line is drawn, border officers within the Fourth Circuit’s jurisdiction can use manual searches to sidestep heightened Fourth Amendment standards that would otherwise apply. In the meantime, EFF will keep fighting against extraordinarily invasive warrantless, suspicionless device searches at the border, and for robust privacy standards to protect our most personal data.

EFF, along with the national ACLU, the ACLU affiliates in Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Virginia, and the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (NACDL) filed an amicus brief in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit urging the court to require a warrant for border searches of electronic devices under the Fourth Amendment, an argument EFF has been making in the courts and Congress for nearly a decade. The Fourth Circuit heard oral arguments on May 8. The Knight Institute at Columbia University and Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press also filed a helpful brief focusing on the First Amendment implications of border searches of electronic devices.

The case, U.S. v. Belmonte Cardozo, involves a U.S. citizen whose cell phone was manually searched after he arrived at Dulles airport near Washington, D.C., following a trip to Bolivia. He had been on the government’s radar prior to his international trip and had been flagged for secondary inspection. Border officers found child sexual abuse material (CSAM) on his phone, and he was later arrested and criminally charged.

The district court denied the defendant’s motion to suppress the images and other data obtained from the warrantless search of his cell phone. He was ultimately convicted of child pornography and sexual exploitation of minors because he had used social media to entice minors to send him sexually explicit photos of themselves.

The number of warrantless device searches at the border and the significant invasion of privacy they represent is only increasing. In Fiscal Year 2025, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) conducted 55,318 device searches, both manual (“basic”) and forensic (“advanced”).

A manual search involves a border officer tapping or mousing around a device. A forensic search involves connecting another device to the traveler’s device and using software to extract and analyze the data to create a detailed report the device owner’s activities and communications. However, both search methods are highly privacy-invasive, as border officers can access the same data that can reveal the most personal aspects of our lives, including political affiliations, religious beliefs and practices, sexual and romantic affinities, financial status, health conditions, and family and professional associations.

In our amicus brief, we argued that the Fourth Circuit should adopt the same legal standard for both manual and forensic searches, and that standard should be a warrant supported by probable cause and issued by a neutral judge. The highly personal nature of the information found on electronic devices is why there should not be different legal standards for different methods of search, and why a judge should determine whether the government has provided credible preliminary evidence that there’s a likelihood that further evidence will be found on the device indicating wrongdoing by the specific traveler.

Moreover, we argued that “the process of getting a warrant is not unduly burdensome,” and that “getting a warrant would not impede the efficient processing of travelers. If border officers have probable cause to search a device, they may retain it and let the traveler continue on their way, then get a search warrant. Or, where there is truly no time to go to a judge, the exigent circumstances exception may apply on a case-by-case basis.”

The Fourth Circuit in prior cases only considered forensic device searches at the border. In U.S. v. Kolsuz (2018), the court held that the forensic search of the defendant’s cell phone at the border “must be considered a nonroutine border search, requiring some measure of individualized suspicion” of a transnational offense, but the court declined to decide whether the standard is only reasonable suspicion or instead a probable cause warrant. Then in U.S. v. Aigbekaen (2019), the court held that a forensic device search at the border in support of a purely domestic law enforcement investigation requires a warrant. The court also reiterated the general Kolsuz rule for a forensic border-related device search: the “Government must have individualized suspicion of an offense that bears some nexus to the border search exception's purposes of protecting national security, collecting duties, blocking the entry of unwanted persons, or disrupting efforts to export or import contraband.” Now, manual searches are before the court.

In urging the Fourth Circuit to adopt a warrant standard for both manual and forensic device searches at the border, we argued that the U.S. Supreme Court’s balancing test in Riley v. California (2014) should govern the analysis here. In that case, the Court weighed the government’s interests in warrantless and suspicionless access to cell phone data following an arrest, against an arrestee’s privacy interests in the depth and breadth of personal information stored on a cell phone. The Court concluded that the search-incident-to-arrest warrant exception does not apply, and that police need to get a warrant to search an arrestee’s phone.

The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized for a century a border search exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement, allowing not only warrantless but also often suspicionless “routine” searches of luggage, vehicles, and other items crossing the border. The primary justification for the border search exception has been to find—in the items being searched—goods smuggled to avoid paying duties (i.e., taxes) and contraband such as drugs, weapons, and other prohibited items, thereby blocking their entry into the country.

But a traveler’s privacy interests in their suitcase and its contents are minimal compared to those in all the personal data on the person’s cell phone or laptop. And a travelers’ privacy interests in their electronic devices are at least the same as those considered in Riley. Modern devices, over a decade later, contain even more data that can reveal even more intimate details about our lives.

We hope that the Fourth Circuit will rise to the occasion and be the first circuit to fully protect travelers’ Fourth Amendment rights at the border.

EFF filed an amicus brief for the second time in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, arguing that allowing cases against the Apple, Google, and Facebook app stores to proceed could lead to greater censorship of users’ online speech.

Our brief argues that the app stores should not lose Section 230 immunity for hosting “social casino” apps just because they process payments for virtual chips within those apps. Otherwise, all platforms that facilitate financial transactions for online content—beyond app stores and the apps and games they distribute—would be forced to censor user content to mitigate their legal exposure.

Social casino apps are online games where users can buy virtual chips with real money but can’t ever cash out their winnings. The three cases against Apple, Google, and Facebook were brought by plaintiffs who spent large sums of money on virtual chips and even became addicted to these games. The plaintiffs argue that social casino apps violate various state gambling laws.

At issue on appeal is the part of Section 230 that provides immunity to online platforms when they are sued for harmful content created by others—in this case, the social casino apps that plaintiffs downloaded from the various app stores and the virtual chips they bought within the apps.

Section 230 is the foundational law that has, since 1996, created legal breathing room for internet intermediaries (and their users) to publish third-party content. Online speech is largely mediated by these private companies, allowing all of us to speak, access information, and engage in commerce online, without requiring that we have loads of money or technical skills.

The lower court hearing the case ruled that the companies do not have Section 230 immunity because they allow the social casino apps to use the platforms’ payment processing services for the in-app purchasing of virtual chips.

However, in our brief we urged the Ninth Circuit to reverse the district court and hold that Section 230 does apply to the app stores, even when they process payments for virtual chips within the social casino apps. The app stores would undeniably have Section 230 immunity if sued for simply hosting the allegedly illegal social casino apps in their respective stores. Congress made no distinction—and the court shouldn’t recognize one—between hosting third-party content and processing payments for the same third-party content. Both are editorial choices of the platforms that are protected by Section 230.

We also argued that a rule that exposes internet intermediaries to potential liability for facilitating a financial transaction related to unlawful user content would have huge implications beyond the app stores. All platforms that facilitate financial transactions for third-party content would be forced to censor any user speech that may in any way risk legal exposure for the platform. This would harm the open internet—the unique ability of anyone with an internet connection to communicate with others around the world cheaply, easily, and quickly.

The plaintiffs argue that the app stores could preserve their Section 230 immunity by simply refusing to process in-app purchases of virtual chips. But the plaintiffs’ position fails to recognize that other platforms don’t have such a choice. Etsy, for example, facilitates purchases of virtual art, while Patreon enables artists to be supported by memberships. Platforms like these would lose Section 230 immunity and be exposed to potential liability simply because they processed payments for user content that a plaintiff argues is illegal. That outcome would threaten the entire business models of these services, ultimately harming users’ ability to share and access online speech.

The app stores should be protected by Section 230—a law that protects Americans’ freedom of expression online by protecting the intermediaries we all rely on—irrespective of their role as payment processors.

Legal intern Raj Gambhir was the principal author of this post.

Update: On April 15, 2026 the FAA rescinded the TFR (FDC 6/4375) and instead issued an advisory (FDC 6/2824), which states: 

[Drone] operators are advised to avoid flying in proximity to: Department of War (DOW), Department of Energy (Doe), Department of Justice (DOJ), and Department of Homeland security (DHS) covered mobile assets as defined in 10 U.S.C. 130i [DOW/DOD], 10 U.S.C. 6227 [DOE], and 6 U.S.C. 124n [DHS], including ground vehicle convoys and their associated escorts. [Drone] operators who fly within this airspace are warned that [the agencies] may take action that results in the interference, disruption, seizure, damaging, or destruction of unmanned [aircraft] deemed to pose a credible safety or security threat to covered mobile assets. [Drone] operators should therefore exercise caution when flying in proximity of all DOW, DOE, DOJ and DHS mobile assets."

The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press (RCFP) plans to continue with its lawsuit (Levine v. FAA).

Original post:

The Trump administration has restricted the First Amendment right to record law enforcement by issuing an unprecedented nationwide flight restriction preventing private drone operators, including professional and citizen journalists, from flying drones within half a mile of any ICE or CBP vehicle.

In January, EFF and media organizations including The New York Times and The Washington Post responded to this blatant infringement of the First Amendment by demanding that the FAA lift this flight restriction. Over two months later, we’re still waiting for the FAA to respond to our letter.

The First Amendment guarantees the right to record law enforcement. As we have seen with the extrajudicial killings of George Floyd, Renée Good, and Alex Pretti, capturing law enforcement on camera can drive accountability and raise awareness of police misconduct.

A 21-Month Long “Temporary” Flight Restriction?

The FAA regularly issues temporary flight restrictions (TFRs) to prevent people from flying into designated airspace. TFRs are usually issued during natural disasters, or to protect major sporting events and government officials like the president, and in most cases last mere hours.

Not so with the restriction numbered FDC 6/4375, which started on January 16, 2026. This TFR lasts for 21 months—until October 29, 2027—and covers the entire nation. It prevents any person from flying any unmanned aircraft (i.e., a drone) within 3000 feet, measured horizontally, of any of the “facilities and mobile assets,” including “ground vehicle convoys and their associated escorts,” of the Departments of Defense, Energy, Justice, and Homeland Security. Violators can be subject to criminal and civil penalties, and risk having their drones seized or destroyed.

In practical terms, this TFR means that anyone flying their drone within a half mile of an ICE or CBP agent’s car (a DHS “mobile asset”) is liable to face criminal charges and have their drone shot down. The practical unfairness of this TFR is underscored by the fact that immigration agents often use unmarked rental cars, use cars without license plates, or switch the license plates of their cars to carry out their operations. Nor do they provide prior warning of those operations.

The TFR is an Unconstitutional Infringement of Free Speech

While the FAA asserts that the TFR is grounded in its lawful authority, the flight restriction not only violates multiple constitutional rights, but also the agency’s own regulations.

First Amendment violation. As we highlighted in the letter, nearly every federal appeals court has recognized the First Amendment right of Americans to record law enforcement officers performing their official duties. By subjecting drone operators to criminal and civil penalties, along with the potential destruction or seizure of their drone, the TFR punishes—without the required justifications—lawful recording of law enforcement officers, including immigration agents.  

Fifth Amendment violation. The Fifth Amendment guarantees the right to due process, which includes being given fair notice before being deprived of liberty or property by the government. Under the flight restriction, advanced notice isn’t even possible. As discussed above, drone operators can’t know whether they are within 3000 horizontal feet of unmarked DHS vehicles. Yet the TFR allows the government to capture or even shoot down a drone if it flies within the TFR radius, and to impose criminal and civil penalties on the operator.

Violations of FAA regulations. In issuing a TFR, the FAA’s own regulations require the agency to “specify[] the hazard or condition requiring” the restriction. Furthermore, the FAA must provide accredited news representatives with a point of contact to obtain permission to fly drones within the restricted area. The FAA has satisfied neither of these requirements in issuing its nationwide ban on drones getting near government vehicles.

EFF Demands Rescission of the TFR

We don’t believe it’s a coincidence that the TFR was put in place in January 2026, at the height of the Minneapolis anti-ICE protests, shortly after the killing of Renée Good and shortly before the shooting of Alex Pretti. After both of those tragedies, civilian recordings played a vital role in contradicting the government’s false account of the events.

By punishing civilians for recording federal law enforcement officers, the TFR helps to shield ICE and other immigration agents from scrutiny and accountability. It also discourages the exercise of a key First Amendment right. EFF has long advocated for the right to record the police, and exercising that right today is more important than ever.

Finally, while recording law enforcement is protected by the First Amendment, be aware that officers may retaliate against you for exercising this right. Please refer to our guidance on safely recording law enforcement activities.

Recently, a California Superior Court jury found that Meta and YouTube harmed a user through some of the features they offered. And a New Mexico jury concluded that Meta deceived young users into thinking its platforms were safe from predation. 

It’s clear that many people are frustrated by big tech companies and perhaps Meta in particular. We, too, have been highly critical of them and have pushed for years to end their harmful corporate surveillance. So it’s not surprising that a jury felt like Mark Zuckerberg and his company, along with YouTube, needed to be held accountable. 

While it would be easy to claim that these cases set a legal precedent that should make social media companies fearful, that’s not exactly true. And that’s actually a good thing for the internet and its users. 

These jury trials were just an early step in a long road through the court system. These cases will now go up on appeal, where the courts’ rulings about the First Amendment and immunity under Section 230 will likely get reconsidered. 

As we have argued many times before, the First Amendment protects both user speech and the choices platforms make on how to deliver that speech (in the same way it protects newspapers' right to curate their editorial pages as they see fit). Features on social media sites that are designed to connect users cannot be separated from the users’ speech, which is why courts have repeatedly held that these features are indeed protected. 

So while it may be tempting to celebrate these juries’ decisions as a "win" against big tech, in fact the ramifications of lowering First Amendment and immunity standards on other speakers—ones that members of the public actually like, and do not want to punish—are bad. We can’t create less protective speech rules for Meta and Google alone just because we want them held accountable for something else.

As we have often said, much of the anger against these companies arises from people rightfully feeling that these companies harvest and exploit their data, and monetize their lives for crass economic reasons. We therefore continue to urge Congress to pass a comprehensive national privacy law with a private right of action to address these core concerns.

EFF, along with the national ACLU and the ACLU affiliates in Pennsylvania, Delaware, and New Jersey, filed an amicus brief in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit urging the court to require a warrant for border searches of electronic devices, an argument EFF has been making in the courts and Congress for nearly a decade.

The case, U.S. v. Roggio, involves a man who had been under ongoing criminal investigation for illegal exports when he returned to the United States from an international trip via JFK airport. Border officers used the opportunity to bypass the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement when they seized several of his electronic devices (laptop, tablet, cell phone, and flash drive) and conducted forensic searches of them. As the district court explained, “investigative agents had a case coordination meeting and border search authority was discussed in early January 2017,” before Mr. Roggio traveled internationally in February 2017.

The district court denied Mr. Roggio’s motion to suppress the emails and other data obtained from the warrantless searches of his devices. He was subsequently convicted of illegally exporting gun manufacturing parts to Iraq (he was also charged in a superseding indictment with torture and also convicted of that).

The number of warrantless device searches at the border and the significant invasion of privacy they represent is only increasing. In Fiscal Year 2025, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) conducted 55,318 device searches, both manual (“basic”) and forensic (“advanced”).

While a manual search involves a border officer tapping or mousing around a device, a forensic search involves connecting another device to the traveler’s device and using software to extract and analyze the data to create a detailed report the device owner’s activities and communications. Border officers have access to forensic tools that help gain access to data on a locked or encrypted device they have physical access to. From public reporting, we know that more recent devices (and ones that have had the latest security updates applied) are more resistant to these type of tools, especially if they are turned off or turned on but not yet unlocked.

The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized for a century a border search exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement, allowing not only warrantless but also often suspicionless “routine” searches of luggage, vehicles, and other items crossing the border.

The primary justification for the border search exception has been to find—in the items being searched—goods smuggled to avoid paying duties (i.e., taxes) and contraband such as drugs, weapons, and other prohibited items, thereby blocking their entry into the country. But a traveler’s privacy interests in their suitcase and its contents are minimal compared to those in all the personal data on the person’s phone or laptop.

In our amicus brief, we argue that the U.S. Supreme Court’s balancing test in Riley v. California (2014) should govern the analysis here. In that case, the Court weighed the government’s interests in warrantless and suspicionless access to cell phone data following an arrest against an arrestee’s privacy interests in the depth and breadth of personal information stored on a cell phone. The Court concluded that the search-incident-to-arrest warrant exception does not apply, and that police need to get a warrant to search an arrestee’s phone.

Travelers’ privacy interests in their cell phones, laptops and other electronic devices are, of course, the same as those considered in Riley. Modern devices, over a decade later, contain even more data that together reveal the most personal aspects of our lives, including political affiliations, religious beliefs and practices, sexual and romantic affinities, financial status, health conditions, and family and professional associations.

In considering the government’s interests in warrantless access to digital data at the border, Riley requires analyzing how closely such searches hew to the original purpose of the warrant exception—preventing the entry of prohibited goods themselves via the items being searched. We argue that the government’s interests are weak in seeking unfettered access to travelers’ electronic devices.

First, physical contraband (like drugs) can’t be found in digital data.

Second, digital contraband (such as child sexual abuse material) can’t be prevented from entering the country through a warrantless search of a device at the border because it’s likely, given the nature of cloud technology and how internet-connected devices work, that identical copies of the files are already in the country on servers accessible via the internet.

Finally, searching devices for evidence of contraband smuggling (for example, the emails here revealing details of the illegal import scheme) and other evidence for general law enforcement (i.e., investigating non-border-related domestic crimes) are too “untethered” from the original purpose of the border search exception, which is to find prohibited items themselves and not evidence to support a criminal prosecution. Therefore, emails or other data found on a digital device searched without a warrant at the border cannot and should not be used as evidence in court.

If the Third Circuit is not inclined to require a warrant for electronic device searches at the border, we also argue that such a search—whether manual or forensic—should be justified only by reasonable suspicion that the device contains digital contraband and be limited in scope to looking for digital contraband.

This extends the Ninth Circuit’s rule from U.S. v. Cano (2019) in which the court held that only forensic device searches at the border require reasonable suspicion that the device contains digital contraband—that is, some set of already known facts pointing to this possibility—while manual searches may be conducted without suspicion. But the Cano court also held that all searches must be limited in scope to looking for digital contraband (for example, call logs are off limits because they can’t contain digital contraband in the form of photos or files).

We hope that the Third Circuit will rise to the occasion and be the first circuit to fully protect travelers’ Fourth Amendment rights at the border.