The Senate Commerce Committee is set to consider S. 737, the SCREEN Act, a sweeping age-verification bill that would require online services to verify users’ ages before they can access any sexually explicit content. If this bill passes, it will force millions of adult internet users to give up their anonymity, privacy, and security before they access lawful speech.  

Unlike many state-age verification laws—which have been harmful in their own right—the SCREEN Act has no requirement that a significant portion of the website consist of sexually explicit content that is harmful to minors. The bill requires nearly any service hosting even a single piece of sexually explicit content to verify the ages of its users. The result is that the bill would apply not only to adult content sites like PornHub or OnlyFans, but also streaming services like Netflix, and social media platforms like Reddit, Discord, or Bluesky, if they host any adult content.

The SCREEN Act does not merely require users to attest they are adults. It specifically states that “requiring a user to confirm that the user is not a minor shall not be sufficient.” In practice, that means platforms would have to verify users’ ages using methods tied to their real identities. Providing proof of age online is dramatically different, and far more invasive, than showing your ID at the door to a bartender or bouncer. In the physical world, the bouncer at the door looks at your ID card, confirms you’re old enough, and gives it back to you. Under the SCREEN Act, the “bouncer” will be a digital age-verification service that captures your personal information and saves it to a database for an unspecified amount of time. 

The consequences of the bill won’t be limited to minors. If websites and apps are expected to reliably identify teenagers, adults will be asked to prove they are adults. 

Even worse, the SCREEN Act is a privacy and data security nightmare. One provision of the bill requires services to take reasonable steps to protect the data collected and to not maintain for longer than is necessary. But these are terribly weak protections that impose no meaningful collection, use, or retention limits on services collecting people’s private information. 

In other words, the third parties tasked with verifying a user’s age on a platform could sweep up a lot of personal info they don’t actually need and then could use that information for any number of purposes, so long as they deem their actions reasonable. Companies would then be allowed to keep the information users have been compelled to turn over for as long as possible, raising security and privacy issues along the way.

The SCREEN Act Attacks Your Right To Use VPNs

The SCREEN Act also targets virtual private network (VPN) users and providers. The bill requires covered websites to verify users' ages based on their IP addresses unless the service can determine that the user is outside the United States, and specifically requires age verification on traffic coming from known VPN addresses. In practice, this discourages the use of VPNs and proxy servers, which millions of people rely on for legitimate purposes such as protecting personal privacy, securing public Wi-Fi connections, safeguarding journalists and activists, and preventing data tracking. 

VPNs mask your real location by routing your internet traffic through a server somewhere else. When you visit a website through a VPN, that website only sees the VPN server's IP address, not your actual location. It's like sending a letter through a P.O. box so the recipient doesn't know where you really live. VPNs are a privacy and security tool used by millions of internet users every day, and their use should not be treated as suspect. It is particularly galling that the SCREEN Act forces users who intentionally take steps to protect their privacy to identify themselves.

The SCREEN Act creates onerous age-verification rules that will block adults from accessing lawful speech, curtail their ability to be anonymous, and jeopardize the data security and privacy of all internet users. 

Last week, the House voted on the KIDS Act, a disjointed package of legislation that seeks to control Americans’ web browsing and private messaging. The package combines a revised version of the Kids Online Safety Act (KOSA), with several other internet bills, study bills, reporting requirements, and new regulations. Different parts of the bill pressure online services to impose different age-gating schemes, using different standards. EFF opposed this bill, along with many of our members and supporters.

Take action

Tell Congress: no internet age-gates

The bill passed the House, 267-117. It now heads to the Senate, where its fate remains uncertain. But this fight is not over. Even if you took our earlier action to contact the House, we need you to reach out to your Senators today. 

The KIDS Act Will Lead to Mandatory Age Checks 

Many of the bills in the KIDS Act share the same premise: that children and teenagers should have different experiences online than adults. In practice, that requires websites and apps to determine who is under 18—and who isn’t. That’s where the problems with the KIDS Act start. 

EFF certainly supports giving all users better privacy and safety tools online. But those protections should not, and do not need to, come at the expense of privacy or free expression. Unfortunately, that’s exactly the tradeoff the KIDS Act makes.

There is no way to determine a user’s age online that is both privacy protective and accurate. Some age verification processes may rely on collecting government-issued ID, while others may use biometric scans. Others will use algorithms to guess a user’s age based on facial images or online behavior. But no matter the method, every system demands users hand over sensitive personal information that links their offline identity to their online activity. And then, once that valuable data is collected, it can be leaked, hacked, or misused. In fact, we’ve already seen several breaches of age verification providers.

The Bill Still Regulates Online Speech

The revised KOSA language within the KIDS Act still pressures companies to police lawful speech online. Platforms must “establish, implement, maintain, and enforce” policies that address content like gambling or the use of alcohol or cannabis. This encourages platforms to broadly restrict speech on these topics, which could include a teen seeking advice on a parent’s gambling problem or searching for substance abuse recovery resources. When platforms are required to create and enforce content moderation policies that regulators can sue them over, they will often err on the side of deleting speech. 

Protect Privacy For Everyone

There is a better way to protect young people online. Instead of encouraging a complicated system of age checks, more monitoring, and more restrictions on access to information, Congress could finally pass a strong, comprehensive privacy law that benefits all users. A great place to start would be to ban behavioral advertising that tracks us across the web—again, for users of all ages. 

We urge the Senate to oppose the KIDS Act and instead focus on a strong, bipartisan privacy package for all users. 

Take action

Tell the senate to reject the kids act

Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act lets US intelligence agencies collect communications from foreigners abroad without a warrant, and routinely sweeps in Americans’ emails, messages, and calls in the process.

The authority for this program is set to expire Friday, June 12th, 2026, at midnight. As we wrote earlier this week, Congress has been kicking the ball down the road for months now—temporarily postponing the expiration of the mass surveillance authority Section 702 of FISA in hopes that some consensus on a longer reauthorization could be reached. 

EFF has said for decades, every time this program is up for renewal: Section 702 should require a warrant before the Federal Bureau of Investigation can look at digital communications collected from Americans. If not, we should let the whole thing expire. And this time, it has, at least for a little while. 

Ironically, we have Bill Pulte to thank for this (probably temporary) reprieve. Earlier this month, Trump on Tuesday named Pulte – currently director of the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) and chairman of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac – to replace current DNI Tulsi Gabbard, who announced her resignation last month. As has been widely reported, Pulte lacks any intelligence, military, or congressional experience. Senate Democrats responded by refusing to move forward with their version of a bill to reauthorize Section 702. Similarly, the House refused to approve even a short-term renewal of the program. 

However, the potential for abuse of this program is not limited to one individual or one administration. And if Congress is this concerned about one particular individual having access to Americans’ most sensitive information, the responsible thing to do is to put more transparency, accountability, and oversight into the structure of this program. 

Members on both sides of the aisle understand this. As we have seen several times this year already, the appetite for reform is stronger than ever. We hope to continue to see strong bipartisan opposition in Congress to renewing Section 702 without a warrant requirement for backdoor searches. Until then, the authority for this program should remain expired. 

Two years ago, Congress passed the “Reforming Intelligence and Securing America” Act (RISAA) that included nominal reforms to Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). The bill unfortunately included some problematic expansions of the law—but it also included a relatively big victory for civil liberties advocates: Section 702 authorities were only extended for two years, allowing Congress to continue the important work of negotiating a warrant requirement for Americans as well as some other critical reforms. 

However, Congress clearly did not continue this work. In fact, it now appears that Congress is poised to consider another extension of this program without even attempting to include necessary and common sense reforms. Most notably, Congress is not considering a requirement to obtain a warrant before looking at data on U.S. persons that was indiscriminately and warrantlessly collected. House Speaker Mike Johnson confirmed that “the plan is to move a clean extension of FISA … for at least 18 months.” 

Even more disappointing, House Judiciary Chair Jim Jordan, who has previously been a champion of both the warrant requirement and closing the data broker loophole, told the press he would vote for a clean extension of FISA, claiming that RISAA included enough reforms for the moment.

It’s important to note RISAA was just a reauthorization of this mass surveillance program with a long history of abuse. Prior to the 2024 reauthorization, Section 702 was already misused to run improper queries on peaceful protesters, federal and state lawmakers, Congressional staff, thousands of campaign donors, journalists, and a judge reporting civil rights violations by local police. RISAA further expanded the government’s authority by allowing it to compel a much larger group of people and providers into assisting with this surveillance. As we said when it passed, overall, RISAA is a travesty for Americans who deserve basic constitutional rights and privacy whether they are communicating with people and services inside or outside of the US.

Section 702 should not be reauthorized without any additional safeguards or oversight. Fortunately, there are currently three reform bills for Congress to consider: SAFE, PLEWSA, and GSRA. While none of these bills are perfect, they are all significantly better than the status quo, and should be considered instead of a bill that attempts no reform at all. 

Mass spying—accessing a massive amount of communications by and with Americans first and sorting out targets second and secretly—has always been a problem for our rights.  It was a problem at first when President George W. Bush authorized it in secret without Congressional or court oversight. And it remained a problem even after the passage of Section 702 in 2008 created the possibility of  some oversight. Congress was right that this surveillance is dangerous, and that's why it set Section 702 up for regular reconsideration. That reconsideration has not occurred, even as the circumstances of the NSA, Justice Department, and FBI leadership, have radically changed. Reform is long overdue, and now it's urgent.  

State and federal lawmakers have introduced multiple proposals in 2025 to curtail or outright block children and teenagers from accessing legal content on the internet. These lawmakers argue that internet and social media platforms have an obligation to censor or suppress speech that they consider “harmful” to young people. Unfortunately, in many of these legislative debates, lawmakers are not listening to kids, whose experiences online are overwhelmingly more positive than what lawmakers claim. 

Fortunately, EFF has spent the past year trying to make sure that lawmakers hear young people’s voices. We have also been reminding lawmakers that minors, like everyone else, have First Amendment rights to express themselves online. 

These rights extend to a young person’s ability to use social media both to speak for themselves and access the speech of others online. Young people also have the right to control how they access this speech, including a personalized feed and other digestible and organized ways. Preventing teenagers from accessing the same internet and social media channels that adults use is a clear violation of their right to free expression. 

On top of violating minors’ First Amendment rights, these laws also actively harm minors who rely on the internet to find community, find resources to end abuse, or access information about their health. Cutting off internet access acutely harms LGBTQ+ youth and others who lack familial or community support where they live. These laws also empower the state to decide what information is acceptable for all young people, overriding parents’ choices. 

Additionally, all of the laws that would attempt to create a “kid friendly” internet and an “adults-only” internet are a threat to everyone, adults included. These mandates encourage an adoption of invasive and dangerous age-verification technology. Beyond creepy, these systems incentivize more data collection, and increase the risk of data breaches and other harms. Requiring everyone online to provide their ID or other proof of their age could block legal adults from accessing lawful speech if they don’t have the right form of ID. Furthermore, this trend infringes on people’s right to be anonymous online, and creates a chilling effect which may deter people from joining certain services or speaking on certain topics

EFF has lobbied against these bills at both the state and federal level, and we have also filed briefs in support of several lawsuits to protect the First Amendment Rights of minors. We will continue to advocate for the rights of everyone online – including minors – in the future.

This article is part of our Year in Review series. Read other articles about the fight for digital rights in 2025.

Earlier this year, both chambers of Congress passed the TAKE IT DOWN Act. This bill, while well-intentioned, gives powerful people a new legal tool to force online platforms to remove lawful speech that they simply don't like. 

The bill, sponsored by Senate Commerce Chair Ted Cruz (R-TX) and Rep. Maria Salazar (R-FL), sought to speed up the removal of troubling online content: non-consensual intimate imagery (NCII). The spread of NCII is a serious problem, as is digitally altered NCII, sometimes called “deepfakes.” That’s why 48 states have specific laws criminalizing the distribution of NCII, in addition to the long-existing defamation, harassment, and extortion statutes—all of which can be brought to bear against those who abuse NCII. Congress can and should protect victims of NCII by enforcing and improving these laws. 

Unfortunately, TAKE IT DOWN takes another approach: it creates an unneeded notice-and-takedown system that threatens free expression, user privacy, and due process, without meaningfully addressing the problem it seeks to solve. 

While Congress was still debating the bill, EFF, along with the Center for Democracy & Technology (CDT), Authors Guild, Demand Progress Action, Fight for the Future, Freedom of the Press Foundation, New America’s Open Technology Institute, Public Knowledge, Restore The Fourth, SIECUS: Sex Ed for Social Change, TechFreedom, and Woodhull Freedom Foundation, sent a letter to the Senate outlining our concerns with the proposal. 

First, TAKE IT DOWN’s removal provision applies to a much broader category of content—potentially any images involving intimate or sexual content—than the narrower NCII definitions found elsewhere in the law. We worry that bad-faith actors will use the law’s expansive definition to remove lawful speech that is not NCII and may not even contain sexual content. 

Worse, the law contains no protections against frivolous or bad-faith takedown requests. Lawful content—including satire, journalism, and political speech—could be wrongly censored. The law requires that apps and websites remove content within 48 hours or face significant legal risks. That ultra-tight deadline means that small apps or websites will have to comply so quickly to avoid legal risk, that they won’t be able to investigate or verify claims. 

Finally, there are no legal protections for providers when they believe a takedown request was sent in bad faith to target lawful speech. TAKE IT DOWN is a one-way censorship ratchet, and its fast timeline discourages providers from standing up for their users’ free speech rights. 

This new law could lead to the use of automated filters that tend to flag legal content, from commentary to news reporting. Communications providers that offer users end-to-end encrypted messaging, meanwhile, may be served with notices they simply cannot comply with, given the fact that these providers can’t view the contents of messages on their platforms. Platforms could respond by abandoning encryption entirely in order to be able to monitor content, turning private conversations into surveilled spaces.

We asked for several changes to protect legitimate speech that is not NCII, and to include common-sense safeguards for encryption. Thousands of EFF members joined us by writing similar messages to their Senators and Representatives. That resulted in several attempts to offer common-sense amendments during the Committee process. 

However, Congress passed the bill without those needed changes, and it was signed into law in May 2025. The main takedown provisions of the bill will take effect in 2026. We’ll be pushing online platforms to be transparent about the content they take down because of this law, and will be on the watch for takedowns that overreach and censor lawful speech. 

This article is part of our Year in Review series. Read other articles about the fight for digital rights in 2025.