While How to Fix the Internet is on hiatus, we wanted to share a great conversation with you from last week. EFF Executive Director Cindy Cohn spoke with bestselling novelist, journalist, and EFF Special Advisor Cory Doctorow about Cindy’s new book, “Privacy’s Defender: My Thirty-Year Fight Against Digital Surveillance” (MIT Press).

Privacy info. This embed will serve content from simplecast.com

You can also listen to this episode on the Internet Archive or watch the video on YouTube.

Part memoir, part battle cry, “Privacy’s Defender” is the story of Cindy’s fights alongside the visionaries who looked at the early internet and understood that the legal and political battles over this new technology - the Crypto Wars, the NSA’s dragnet, the FBI gag orders - were really over the future of free speech, privacy, and power for all. 

Cindy Cohn and Cory Doctorow at City Lights.jpg

And finally, stay tuned to this feed; we’re working on a special podcast series featuring key players and moments from the book! 

Resources: 

• The Crypto Wars: Bernstein v. US Department of Justice
• NSA Spying: Hepting v. AT&T
• NSA Spying: Jewel v. NSA
• EFF’s National Security Letter lawsuits 

Over the last decade or so, the tech industry has tried, and mostly failed, to make “smart glasses”—tech-infused glasses with cameras, AI, maps, displays, and more—a thing. But in the past year, products like Meta’s Ray-Ban Display Glasses and Oakley’s Meta Glasses have gone from a curious niche to the mainstream. 

Before you strap a dashcam to your face and sprint out into the world filming everything and everyone in your life, there are some civil liberties and privacy concerns to consider before buying or using a pair.

Meta is the biggest company that makes these sorts of glasses and their partnerships with Ray-Ban and Oakely are the most popular options, so we’ll be mostly focusing on them here. Others, like models from Snapchat are similar in form but far less ubiquitous. But Meta won’t hold this space for long. Google’s already announced a partnership with Warby Parker for their “AI-powered smart glasses,” and there are rumors around a competing product from Apple. 

With that, let’s dive into some of the considerations you should make before purchasing a pair.

If You’re Thinking About Buying Smart Glasses

You’re likely not the only one who can see (and hear) your footage

The photos and videos you record with most smartglasses will likely be stored online at some point in the process. On Meta’s offerings, unless you are livestreaming, media you capture when you press the camera button is kept on the glasses until you import them onto your phone, but media is imported automatically by default into the Meta AI mobile app, which is required to set up the glasses. 

You can't use any AI features locally on the glasses. So anytime you use AI features, like when you say, “Hey Meta, start recording,” the footage is fed to Meta. You can use the glasses without the Meta AI app entirely, but considering you can’t easily download footage from the glasses to your phone without it, most people will likely use the app.

Some videos are fed to Meta for AI training, and we know at least in some cases that those videos go through human review. An investigation by Swedish newspapers found that workers were reviewing and annotating camera footage, which includes all sorts of sensitive videos, including nudity, sex, and going to the bathroom. Meta claimed to the BBC that this is in accordance with its terms of use, all in the name of AI training, which states:

In some cases, Meta will review your interactions with AIs, including the content of your conversations with or messages to AIs, and this review may be automated or manual (human).

This all means that Meta and their third-party contractors will have access to at least some of what you record, and it’s very hard as a user to know where footage goes, who will have access to it, and what they will do with it. When you save footage to your phone’s camera roll, which is where the Meta AI app stores content, that might also be sent to Apple or Google’s servers, depending on your settings. Employees at these companies can then possibly access that media, and it could be shared with law enforcement.

The recorded audio from conversations with Meta AI are also saved by default, and if you don’t like that, tough luck, unless you go in and manually delete them every time you say something.

Filming all the time is even more privacy invasive than you think

A common argument in favor of using the cameras in smartglasses is that phones and cameras can do this too, and it’s never been a problem. 

But smartglasses are designed to resemble regular glasses, to the point where most reviews point out how friends didn’t notice that they had cameras embedded in them. They’re designed to be invisible to those being recorded—outside of a small indicator light when they’re recording video footage (that cheap hacks can disable)—whereas it is often obvious that a person is recording if they pull their phone out of their pocket and point it at someone else.

They’re designed to be invisible to those being recorded, outside of a small indicator light when they’re recording.

Moreover, constant recording of everything in public spaces can create all sorts of potential privacy problems, some more obvious than others. This is another way that cameras on glasses are different from cameras on phones: it is far easier to constantly record one’s whereabouts with the former than the latter. If you continuously record, maybe you just happen to catch someone entering their passcode or password onto their phone or computer at a coffee shop, or broadcast someone’s bank details when you’re standing in line at an ATM. That doesn’t even begin to get into when smartglasses are intentionally used for less socially responsible means. And some people may forget to turn off their smartglasses when they enter a private space like a bathroom.  

And if you find yourself caught on someone’s camera, there’s not much you can do in recourse. If you do notice a stranger recording you, it’s up to you to intervene and ask not to be included in that footage, which can easily turn awkward or confrontational.

Our expectations of privacy shift when we’re in public, but bystanders in many cases will still have privacy interests. Public spaces are a place where you will be seen, but that shouldn’t mean it’s suddenly okay to catalog and identify everyone.

Consider the company’s track record and public statements

Meta, Google, Apple—perhaps one benefit of all the major tech companies entering this market is that we already have a good idea of how much they tend to respect the privacy of their users or the openness of their platforms. Spoiler, it’s often not much.

Meta has a long history of privacy invasive technologies and practices. We’ve heard rumblings that Meta hopes to add face recognition to its smartglasses, preferably, “during a dynamic political environment where many civil society groups that we would expect to attack us would have their resources focused on other concerns.” Yikes. This is a monumentally bad idea that should be abandoned by Meta and any of its competitors considering a similar feature. But regardless of whether they launch this feature, it’s a pretty clear indication of where Meta wants these sorts of devices to go. 

If You Have Smartglasses Already

Opt out of sharing with Meta where you can

You can disable a couple of the features where unnecessary data is sent to Meta. In the Meta AI app, under the device settings, there’s a privacy page where you can disable sharing additional data, and more importantly, turn off “Cloud media,” where your photos and videos are sent to Meta’s cloud for processing and temporary storage. 

Decide your use-case and stick to it

These glasses can be useful for filming a variety of activities. We’ve seen fascinating scenes of tattoo artists doing their work (with client’s permission), and it doesn’t take a stretch of the imagination to see how people might use it to film extreme sports. Even on an everyday level, you might find them useful for capturing holidays, birthdays, and all sorts of other private occasions. 

But if you buy these glasses for a specific, mostly private purpose, it is probably best to stick to that, instead of wearing them everywhere and recording everything you do.

Follow the rules of businesses and social expectations

You often have a right to record in public spaces, but that doesn’t mean other people will like it. Businesses, including restaurants and stores, may want nothing to do with continuous filming and may either post a sign asking you not to use smartglasses, or ask you to stop. This may reflect the preferences not just of the business owner, but the people around you. And don’t use glasses to record when you enter other people’s private spaces like bathrooms or changing rooms.

It’s also a good idea to check in with friends and family before tapping that record button at a social gathering. Some people may not be as comfortable with these glasses as they are with other recording equipment.

Consider blurring strangers if you’re going to upload video

Blurring video footage isn’t an easy task, but if you’re considering uploading footage from something like a protest, it may be worth the effort to do so (apps like Meta’s Edits simplify this process, as do some other video sites, like YouTube). Some people don’t want the government to see their faces at protests, and might be afraid to attend if other people are uploading their faces.

Some people don’t want the government to see their faces at protests, and might be afraid to attend if other people are uploading their faces.

It would be better if Meta leveraged its AI features to offer this sort of feature automatically, especially with livestreaming. It’s not that outlandish of a request, as it seems like the company tries to blur faces automatically in footage it captures for annotation, though it’s not always reliable. After all, Google began redacting faces in Street View years ago, following privacy concerns from groups like EFF.

Resist face recognition

Adding facial recognition technology to smartglasses would obliterate the privacy of everyone. We cannot let companies push face recognition into these glasses, and as a user, you should make your voice clear that this is not something you want.

Smartglasses don’t have to be used to decimate the privacy of anyone you encounter during the day. There are legitimate uses out there, but it’s up to those who use them to respect the social norms of the spaces they enter and the people they encounter.

We're celebrating the launch of Privacy's Defender, a new book by EFF Executive Director Cindy Cohn on Thursday, March 12—and we want you to join us! Cindy has tangled with the feds, fought for your data security, and argued before judges to protect our access to science and knowledge on the internet. In Privacy's Defender she asks: can we still have private conversations if we live our lives online?

Join the festivities for a live conversation between Cindy Cohn and Annalee Newitz followed by a book signing with Cindy.

About the book

Throughout her career, Cindy Cohn has been driven by a fundamental question: Can we still have private conversations if we live our lives online? Privacy’s Defender chronicles her thirty-year battle to protect our right to digital privacy and shows just how central this right is to all our other rights, including our ability to organize and make change in the world.

Shattering the hypermasculine myth that our digital reality was solely the work of a handful of charismatic tech founders, the author weaves her own personal story with the history of Crypto Wars, FBI gag orders, and the post-9/11 surveillance state. She describes how she became a seasoned leader in the early digital rights movement, as well as how this work serendipitously helped her discover her birth parents and find her life partner. Along the way, she also details the development of the Electronic Frontier Foundation, which she grew from a ragtag group of lawyers and hackers into one of the most powerful digital rights organizations in the world.

Part memoir and part legal history for the general reader, the book is a compelling testament to just how hard-won the privacy rights we now enjoy as tech users are, but also how crucial these rights are in our efforts to combat authoritarianism, grow democracy, and strengthen other human rights. Learn about the Privacy's Defender book tour.

Parking

Street parking is available around the building.

Accessibility

The main event space is wheelchair accessible, on concrete. Lively music will be playing, and the speakers will be using a microphone, so louder volumes are expected. EFF is committed to improving accessibility for our events. If you will be attending in-person and need accommodation, or have accessibility questions prior to the event, please contact events@eff.org.

Food and Drink

Wine & Beer will be available for purchase. Cellarmaker Brewing Co., located next door to Ciel Space, will be serving food until 8:00 pm. 

Questions?

Email us at events@eff.org.

About the Speakers

Cindy Cohn
Cindy Cohn is the Executive Director of the Electronic Frontier Foundation. From 2000-2015 she served as EFF’s Legal Director as well as its General Counsel.  Ms. Cohn first became involved with EFF in 1993, when EFF asked her to serve as the outside lead attorney in Bernstein v. Dept. of Justice, the successful First Amendment challenge to the U.S. export restrictions on cryptography. 

Ms. Cohn has been named to TheNonProfitTimes 2020 Power & Influence TOP 50 list, honoring 2020's movers and shakers.  In 2018, Forbes included Ms. Cohn as one of America's Top 50 Women in Tech. The National Law Journal named Ms. Cohn one of 100 most influential lawyers in America in 2013, noting: "[I]f Big Brother is watching, he better look out for Cindy Cohn." She was also named in 2006 for "rushing to the barricades wherever freedom and civil liberties are at stake online."  In 2007 the National Law Journal named her one of the 50 most influential women lawyers in America. In 2010 the Intellectual Property Section of the State Bar of California awarded her its Intellectual Property Vanguard Award and in 2012 the Northern California Chapter of the Society of Professional Journalists awarded her the James Madison Freedom of Information Award.  

Ms. Cohn is the author of the professional memoir, called Privacy's Defender to be published by MIT Press in March, 2026. She is also the co-host of EFF's award-winning podcast, How to Fix the Internet.  

Annalee Newitz
Annalee Newitz writes science fiction and nonfiction. They are the author of four novels: Automatic Noodle, The Terraformers, The Future of Another Timeline, and Autonomous, which won the Lambda Literary Award. As a science journalist, they are the author of Stories Are Weapons: Psychological Warfare and the American Mind, Four Lost Cities: A Secret History of the Urban Age and Scatter, Adapt and Remember: How Humans Will Survive a Mass Extinction, which was a finalist for the LA Times Book Prize in science. They are a writer for the New York Times and elsewhere, and have a monthly column in New Scientist. They have published in The Washington Post, Slate, Scientific American, Ars Technica, The New Yorker, and Technology Review, among others. They were the co-host of the Hugo Award-winning podcast Our Opinions Are Correct, and have contributed to the public radio shows Science Friday, On the Media, KQED Forum, and Here and Now. Previously, they were the founder of io9, and served as the editor-in-chief of Gizmodo.

Join EFF Executive Director Cindy Cohn in conversation with 404 Media Cofounder Jason Koebler to discuss Privacy's Defender: My Thirty-Year Fight Against Digital Surveillance, Cindy’s personal story of standing up to the Justice Department, taking on the NSA, and tangling with the FBI to protect our right to digital privacy. The highly anticipated book asks the fundamental question: Can we still have private conversations if we live our lives online? Join the livestream for a live discussion followed by by Q&A.

Accessibility

This event will be live-captioned and recorded. EFF is committed to improving accessibility for our events. If you have any accessibility questions regarding the event, please contact events@eff.org.

Event Expectations

EFF is dedicated to a harassment-free experience for everyone, and all participants are encouraged to view our full Event Expectations.

Upcoming Events

Want to make sure you don’t miss our next livestream? Here’s a link to sign up for updates about this series: eff.org/ECUpdates. If you have a friend or colleague that might be interested, please join the fight for your digital rights by this link: eff.org/EFFectingChange. Thank you for helping EFF spread the word about privacy and free expression online.

Recording

We hope you and your friends can join us live! If you can't make it, we’ll post the recording afterward on YouTube and the Internet Archive!

About the Speakers

 Cindy Cohn 
Cindy Cohn is the Executive Director of the Electronic Frontier Foundation. From 2000-2015 she served as EFF’s Legal Director as well as its General Counsel.  Ms. Cohn first became involved with EFF in 1993, when EFF asked her to serve as the outside lead attorney in Bernstein v. Dept. of Justice, the successful First Amendment challenge to the U.S. export restrictions on cryptography. Ms. Cohn has been named to TheNonProfitTimes 2020 Power & Influence TOP 50 list, honoring 2020's movers and shakers.  In 2018, Forbes included Ms. Cohn as one of America's Top 50 Women in Tech. The National Law Journal named Ms. Cohn one of 100 most influential lawyers in America in 2013, noting: "[I]f Big Brother is watching, he better look out for Cindy Cohn." She was also named in 2006 for "rushing to the barricades wherever freedom and civil liberties are at stake online."  In 2007 the National Law Journal named her one of the 50 most influential women lawyers in America. In 2010 the Intellectual Property Section of the State Bar of California awarded her its Intellectual Property Vanguard Award and in 2012 the Northern California Chapter of the Society of Professional Journalists awarded her the James Madison Freedom of Information Award.  

 Jason Koebler 
Jason Koebler is a cofounder of 404 Media, a journalist-owned investigative tech publication. He reports on surveillance and privacy, the ways that artificial intelligence is changing the internet, labor, and society, and consumer rights. Before 404 Media, he was the editor-in-chief of Motherboard, VICE's technology publication and an executive producer on Encounters, a Netflix documentary about the search for alien life.

For the last hundred years, women have had pivotal and far too often unsung roles in building and shaping the technology that we now use every day. Many have heard of Ada Lovelace’s contributions to computer programming, but far fewer know Mary Allen Wilkes, a prominent modern programmer who wrote much of the software for the LINC, one of the world’s first interactive personal computers (it could fit in a single office and cost $40,000, but it was the 60’s). Decades earlier, when the first all-electronic, digital Eniac computer was built in the 40’s, the “software” for it was written by women: Kathleen McNulty, Jean Jennings, Betty Snyder, Marlyn Wescoff, Frances Bilas and Ruth Lichterman. 

It’s thankfully become more common knowledge that actor and inventor Hedy Lamarr co-created the concept of "frequency-hopping" that became a basis for radio systems from cell phones to wireless networking systems. But too few know Laila Ohlgren, who in the 1970’s solved a major problem with the development of mobile networks and phones by recognizing that dialed numbers could be stored and sent all at once with a “call button,” rather than sent one number at a time, which created connection issues before a call was even made. 

Women in tech deserve more and brighter spotlights. At EFF, we’ve had the honor of celebrating some of our heroes at our annual EFF Awards, including many women who are leading the digital rights community. For International Women’s Day, we’re highlighting the contributions of just a few of these recipients from the last decade, whose work to protect privacy, speech, and creativity online has had a global impact.

Carolina Botero (EFF Award Winner, 2024) 

Carolina Botero is a leader in the fight for digital rights in Latin America. For over a decade, she led the Colombia-based Karisma Foundation and cultivated its regional and international impact. Botero and Karisma helped connect indigenous peoples to the internet and made it possible to contribute content to Wikipedia in their native language, expanding access to both history and modern information. They built alliances to combat disinformation, pushed for legal tools to protect cultural and heritage institutions from digital blackholes, and were, and remain, a necessary voice speaking for human rights in the online world. EFF worked closely with Karisma and Botero to help free Colombian graduate student Diego Gomez, who shared another student’s Master’s thesis with colleagues over the internet. Diego’s story demonstrates what can go wrong when nations enact severe penalties for copyright infringement, and thanks to work from Karisma, many partners, and many EFF supporters, he was cleared of the criminal charges that he faced for this harmless act of sharing scholarly research.

Carolina Botero receiving her EFF Award

Botero stepped down from the role in 2024, opening the door for a new generation. While her work continues—she’s currently on the advisory board of CELE, the Centro de Estudios en Libertad de Expresión—her EFF Award was well-deserved based on her strong and inspiring legacy for those in Latin America and beyond who advocate for a digital world that enhances rights and empowers the powerless. Learn more about Botero on her EFF Awards page and the recap of the 2024 event. 

Chelsea Manning (EFF Award Winner, 2017)

Chelsea Manning became famous as a whistleblower: In 2010, she disclosed classified Iraq War documents, including a video of the killings of Iraqi civilians and two Reuters reporters by U.S. troops. These documents exposed aspects of U.S. operations in Iraq and Afghanistan that infuriated the public and embarrassed the government. But she is also a transparency and transgender rights advocate, network security expert, author, and former U.S. Army intelligence analyst. 

Manning joined the military in 2007. Her role as an intelligence analyst to an Army unit in Iraq in 2009 gave her access to classified databases, but more importantly, it gave her a uniquely comprehensive view of the war in Iraq, and she became increasingly disillusioned and frustrated by what she saw, versus what was being shared. In 2010, she approached major news outlets hoping to give information to them that would reveal a new side of the war to the public. Ultimately, she shared the documents with Wikileaks. 

Manning’s bravery did not end there. When she was arrested a few months later, she endured "cruel, inhuman and degrading" treatment, according to the UN Special Rapporteur on torture. She was locked up alone for 23 hours a day over an 11-month period, before her trial. The mistreatment resulted in public outcry and advocacy by organizations like Amnesty International. Even a State Department spokesperson, Philip Crowley, criticized the treatment as "ridiculous, counterproductive, and stupid," and resigned. She was moved to a medium-security facility in April 2011. 

The government’s charges against Manning were outrageous, but in 2013 she was convicted of 19 of 22 counts as a result of her whistleblowing activities. She became one of fewerthan a dozen people prosecuted for espionage in the entire history of the United States, and she was sentenced to the longest punishment ever imposed on a whistleblower. Then, the day after her conviction, isolated from her community and in all likelihood expecting to remain in prison for years if not decades, she courageously issued a statement identifying herself as a trans woman, which she’d wanted to reveal for years. 

Over the next several years, while imprisoned, she became an advocate both for government transparency and for transgender rights. Her conviction and sentence pointed to the need for legal reform of both the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) and the Espionage Act.  EFF filed an amicus brief to the U.S. Army Court of Criminal Appeals arguing that the CFAA was never meant to criminalize violations of private policies like those of government systems, and EFF also pushed, and continues to fight for, narrower interpretations of the Espionage Act and stronger protections for whistleblowers, particularly to take into account both the motivation of individuals who pass on documents and the disclosure’s ramifications. 

Even after President Obama commuted her sentence in 2017, and EFF celebrated her work and her release with an EFF award in September, 2017, her fight wasn’t over. She was imprisoned again twice in 2019 and ultimately fined $256,000 for refusing to testify before grand juries investigating WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange. The U.N. Special Rapporteur on torture again criticized Manning’s treatment, writing that "the practice of coercive detention appears to be incompatible with the international human rights obligations of the United States." 

Manning was released in 2020 after having spent almost a decade in total imprisoned for her courage. She wrote a memoir, README.txt, in 2022, to take back control over her story.

EFF Award Winners Mike Masnick, Annie Game, and Chelsea Manning

Annie Game (EFF Award Winner, 2017)

Annie Game spent over 16 years as the Executive Director of IFEX, a global network of journalism and civil liberties organizations working together to defend freedom of expression.  IFEX (formerly International Freedom of Expression Exchange) began in the 1990s, when a group of organizations and the Canadian Committee to Protect Journalists came together to consider how to respond as a single voice to free-expression violations around the world. IFEX now is a global hub for the protection of free speech and journalism. 

Game recognized early on that digital rights and freedom of expression groups needed one another. Under her leadership, IFEX paired more traditional free-expression organizations with their more digital counterparts, with a focus on building organizational security capacities. IFEX Initiatives under Game’s leadership have been expansive. For example, the International Day to End Impunity for Crimes against Journalists, November 2, has been an annual wake-up call and reminder for UN member states to live up to their commitments to protecting journalists. UNESCO observed more than 1,700 journalists were killed globally between 2006 and 2024, and nearly 90% of these cases went unsolved in the courts. 

Game and IFEX have also focused on high-profile cases of journalists threatened by governments for their work, such as Bahey eldin Hassan in Egypt. Bahey is the director of the Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies (CIHRS) and has advocated for freedom of expression and the basic human rights of Egyptians, but has lived in exile since 2014. The charges against him, of “disseminating false information” and “insulting the judiciary,” are common tactics of intimidation and harassment. Bahey’s supposed crimes were sharing social media posts criticising the Egyptian judiciary’s lack of independence, and speaking about the killing in Egypt of Italian researcher Giulio Regeni. Bahey—an IFEX member—is just one of many reporters and human rights workers in danger when they speak. But when journalists and those defending their rights online speak out as one voice, as IFEX helps them do, it makes a difference. 

Another initiative has been the Faces of Free Expression project, a partnership between IFEX and the International Free Expression Project. If you’re looking for more heroes, this project details the stories of “risk-takers and change-makers – individuals who put their careers, their freedom, their safety, and sometimes even their lives on the line,” while reporting, or defending free expression and the right to information. 

Wherever authoritarianism and repression of speech have been on the rise, Game has unapologetically called out injustices and made it safer for journalists to do their work, while ensuring accountability when crimes are committed. The work is more critical now than ever, and since leaving IFEX in 2022, she’s remained an activist while focusing increasingly on environmental protection. 

Twelve More Heroes 

EFF has honored many more women with awards over the years—from Anita Borg and Hedy Lamarr to Amy Goodman and Beth Givens. This blog from 2012 looks back and acknowledges the important contributions from twelve more EFF Award winners. 

We’ve also asked five women at EFF about women in digital rights, freedom of expression, technology, and tech activism who have inspired us. You can read that here.

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We've all had the unsettling experience of seeing an ad online that reveals just how much advertisers know about our lives. You're right to be disturbed. Those very same online ad systems have been used by the government to warrantlessly track peoples' locations, new reporting has confirmed.

For years, the internet advertising industry has been sucking up our data, including our location data, to serve us "more relevant ads." At the same time, we know that federal law enforcement agencies have been buying up our location data from shady data brokers that most people have never heard of.

Now, a new report gives us direct evidence that Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has used location data taken from the internet advertising ecosystem to track phones. In a document uncovered by 404 Media, CBP admits what we’ve been saying for years: The technical systems powering creepy targeted ads also allow federal agencies to track your location.

The document acknowledges that a program by the agency to use "commercially available marketing location data" for surveillance drew from the process used to select the targeted ads shown to you on nearly every website and app you visit. In this blog post, we'll tell you what this process is, how it can and is being used for state surveillance, and what can be done about it—by individuals, by lawmakers, and by the tech companies that enable these abuses.

Advertising Surveillance Enables Government Surveillance

The online advertising industry has built a massive surveillance machine, and the government can co-opt it to spy on us. 

In the absence of strong privacy laws, surveillance-based advertising has become the norm online. Companies track our online and offline activity, then share it with ad tech companies and data brokers to help target ads. Law enforcement agencies take advantage of this advertising system to buy information about us that they would normally need a warrant for, like location data. They rely on the multi-billion-dollar data broker industry to buy location data harvested from people’s smartphones.

We’ve known for years that location data brokers are one part of federal law enforcement's massive surveillance arsenal, including immigration enforcement agencies like CBP and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). ICE, CBP and the FBI have purchased location data from the data broker Venntell and used it to identify immigrants who were later arrested. Last year, ICE purchased a spy tool called Webloc that gathers the locations of millions of phones and makes it easy to search for phones within specific geographic areas over a period of time. Webloc also allows them to filter location data by the unique advertising IDs that Apple and Google assign to our phones.

But a document recently obtained by 404 Media is the first time CBP has acknowledged the location data it buys is partially sourced from the system powering nearly every ad you see online: real-time bidding (RTB). As CBP puts it, “RTB-sourced location data is recorded when an advertisement is served.” 

Even though this document is about a 2019-2021 pilot use of this data, CBP and other federal agencies have continued to purchase and use commercially obtained location data. ICE has purchased location tracking tools since then and recently requested information on “Ad Tech” tools it could use for investigations. 

The CBP document acknowledges two sources of location data that it relies on: software development kits (SDKs) and RTB, both methods of location-tracking that EFF has written about before. Apps for weather, navigation, dating, fitness, and “family safety” often request location permissions to enable key features. But once an app has access to your location, it could share it with data brokers directly through SDKs or indirectly (and often without the app developers' knowledge) through RTB. Data brokers can collect location data from SDKs that they pay developers to put in their apps. When relying on RTB, data brokers don’t need any direct relationship with the apps and websites they’re collecting location data from. RTB is facilitated by ad companies that are already plugged into most websites and apps. 

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How Real-Time Bidding Works

RTB is the process by which most websites and apps auction off their ad space. Unfortunately, the milliseconds-long auctions that determine which ads you see also expose your information, including location data, to thousands of companies a day. At a high-level, here’s how RTB works:

1. The moment you visit a website or app with ad space, it asks an ad tech company to determine which ads to display for you. 
2. This ad tech company packages all the information they can gather about you into a “bid request” and broadcasts it to thousands of potential advertisers. 
3. The bid request may contain information like your unique advertising ID, your GPS coordinates, IP address, device details, inferred interests, demographic information, and the app or website you’re visiting. The information in bid requests is called “bidstream data” and typically includes identifiers that can be linked to real people. 
4. Advertisers use the personal information in each bid request, along with data profiles they’ve built about you over time, to decide whether to bid on the ad space. 
5. The highest bidder gets to display an ad for you, but advertisers (or the adtech companies that represent them) can collect your bidstream data regardless of whether or not they bid on the ad space.   

A key vulnerability of real-time bidding is that while only one advertiser wins the auction, all participants receive data about the person who would see their ad. As a result, anyone posing as an ad buyer can access a stream of sensitive data about billions of individuals a day. Data brokers have taken advantage of this vulnerability to harvest data at a staggering scale. For example, the FTC found that location data broker Mobilewalla collected data on over a billion people, with an estimated 60% sourced from RTB auctions. Leaked data from another location data broker, Gravy Analytics, referenced thousands of apps, including Microsoft apps, Candy Crush, Tinder, Grindr, MyFitnessPal, pregnancy trackers and religious-focused apps. When confronted, several of these apps’ developers said they had never heard of Gravy Analytics. 

As Venntel, one of the location data brokers that has sold to ICE, puts it, “Commercially available bidstream data from the advertising ecosystem has long been one of the most comprehensive sources of real-time location and device data available.” But the privacy harms of RTB are not just a matter of misuse by individual data brokers. RTB auctions broadcast the average person’s data to thousands of companies, hundreds of times per day, with no oversight of how this information is ultimately exploited. Once your information is broadcast through RTB, it’s almost impossible to know who receives it or control how it’s used. 

What You Can Do To Protect Yourself

Revelations about the government's exploitation of this location data shows how dangerous online tracking has become, but we’re not powerless. Here are two basic steps you can take to better protect your location data:

1. Disable your mobile advertising ID (see instructions for iPhone/Android). Apple and Google assign unique advertising IDs to each of their phones. Location data brokers use these advertising IDs to stitch together the information they collect about you from different apps. 
2. Review apps you’ve granted location permissions to. Apps that have access to your location could share it with other companies, so make sure you’re only granting location permission to apps that really need it in order to function. If you can’t disable location access completely for an app, limit it to only when you have the app open or only approximate location instead of precise location. 

For more tips, check out EFF’s guide to protecting yourself from mobile-device based location tracking. Keep in mind that the security plan that’s best for you will vary in different situations. For example, you may want to take stronger steps to protect your location data when traveling to a sensitive location, like a protest. 

What Tech Companies and Lawmakers Must Do

Legislators and tech companies must act so that individuals don’t bear the burden of defending their data every time they use the internet.

Ad tech companies must reckon with their role in warrantless government surveillance, among other privacy harms. The systems they built for targeted advertising are actively used to track people’s location. The best way to prevent online ads from fueling surveillance is to stop targeting ads based on detailed behavioral profiles. Ads can still be targeted contextually—based on the content people are viewing—without collecting or exposing their sensitive personal information. Short of moving to contextual advertising, tech companies can limit the use of their systems for government location tracking by:

• Stopping the use of precise location data for targeted advertising. Ad tech companies facilitating ad auctions can and should remove precise location data from bid requests. Ads can be targeted based on people’s coarse location, like the city they’re in, without giving data brokers people’s exact GPS coordinates. Precise location data can reveal where we work, where we live, who we meet, where we protest, where we worship, and more. Broadcasting it to thousands of companies a day through RTB is dangerous.
• Removing advertising IDs from devices, or at minimum, disabling them by default. Advertising IDs have become a linchpin of the data broker economy and are actively used by law enforcement to track people’s location. Advertising IDs were added to phones in 2012 to let companies track you, and removing them is not a far-fetched idea. When Apple forced apps to request access to people’s advertising IDs starting in 2021 (if you have an iPhone you’ve probably seen the "Ask App Not to Track" pop-ups), 96% of U.S. users opted out, essentially disabling advertising IDs on most iOS devices. One study found that iPhone users were less likely to be victims of financial fraud after Apple implemented this change. Google should follow Apple’s lead and disable advertising IDs by default.

Lawmakers also need to step up to protect their constituents' privacy. We need strong, federal privacy laws to stop companies from spying on us and selling our personal information. EFF advocates for data privacy legislation with teeth and a ban on ad targeting based on online behavioral profiles, as it creates a financial incentive for companies to track our every move.

Legislators can and must also close the "data broker loophole" on the Fourth Amendment. Instead of obtaining a warrant signed by a judge, law enforcement agencies can just buy location data from private brokers to find out where you've been. Last year, Montana became the first state in the U.S. to pass a law blocking the government from buying sensitive data it would otherwise need a warrant to obtain. And in 2024, Senator Ron Wyden's EFF-endorsed Fourth Amendment is Not for Sale Act passed the House before dying in the Senate. Others should follow suit to stop this end-run around constitutional protections.

Online behavioral advertising isn’t just creepy–it’s dangerous. It's wrong that our personal information is being silently harvested, bought by shadow-y data brokers, and sold to anyone who wants to invade our privacy. This latest revelation of warrantless government surveillance should serve as a frightening wakeup call of how dangerous online behavioral advertising  has become.

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In a big win for protesters’ rights, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit overturned a lower court’s dismissal of a challenge to sweeping warrants to search a protester’s devices and digital data and a nonprofit’s social media data.

The case, Armendariz v. City of Colorado Springs, arose after a housing protest in 2021, during which Colorado Springs police arrested protesters for obstructing a roadway. After the demonstration, police also obtained warrants to seize and search through the devices and data of Jacqueline Armendariz Unzueta, who they claimed threw a bike at them during the protest. The warrants included a search through all of her photos, videos, emails, text messages, and location data over a two-month period, as well as a time-unlimited search for 26 keywords, including words as broad as “bike,” “assault,” “celebration,” and “right,” that allowed police to comb through years of Armendariz’s private and sensitive data—all supposedly to look for evidence related to the alleged simple assault. Police further obtained a warrant to search the Facebook page of the Chinook Center, the organization that spearheaded the protest, despite the Chinook Center never having been accused of a crime.

The district court dismissed the civil rights lawsuit brought by Armendariz and the Chinook Center, holding that the searches were justified and that, in any case, the officers were entitled to qualified immunity. The plaintiffs, represented by the ACLU of Colorado, appealed. EFF—joined by the Center for Democracy and Technology, the Electronic Privacy Information Center, and the Knight First Amendment Institute at Columbia University—wrote an amicus brief in support of that appeal.

In a 2-1 opinion, the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of the lawsuit’s Fourth Amendment search and seizure claims. The court painstakingly picked apart each of the three warrants and found them to be overbroad and lacking in particularity as to the scope and duration of the searches. The court further held that in furnishing such facially deficient warrants, the officers violated “clearly established” law and thus were not entitled to qualified immunity. Although the court did not explicitly address the First Amendment concerns raised by the lawsuit, it did note the backdrop against how these searches were carried out, including animus by Colorado Springs police leading up to the housing protest.

It is rare for appellate courts to call into question any search warrants. It’s even rarer for them to deny qualified immunity defenses. The Tenth Circuit’s decision should be celebrated as a big win for protesters and anyone concerned about police immunity for violating people’s constitutional rights. The case is now remanded back to the district court to proceed—and hopefully further vindicate the privacy rights we all have in our devices and digital data.

The New York Times reported that Meta is considering adding face recognition technology to its smart glasses. According to an internal Meta document, the company may launch the product “during a dynamic political environment where many civil society groups that we would expect to attack us would have their resources focused on other concerns.” 

This is a bad idea that Meta should abandon. If adopted and released to the public, it would violate the privacy rights of millions of people and cost the company billions of dollars in legal battles.   

Your biometric data, such as your faceprint, are some of the most sensitive pieces of data that a company can collect. Associated risks include mass surveillance, data breach, and discrimination. Adding this technology to glasses on the street also raises safety concerns.  

 This kind of face recognition feature would require the company to collect a faceprint from every person who steps into view of the camera-equipped glasses to find a match. Meta cannot possibly obtain consent from everyone—especially bystanders who are not Meta users.  

Dozens of state laws consider biometric information to be sensitive and require companies to implement strict protections to collect and process it, including affirmative consent.  

Meta Should Know the Privacy and Legal Risks  

Meta should already know the privacy risks of face recognition technology, after abandoning related technology and paying nearly $7 billion in settlements a few years ago.  

In November 2021, Meta announced that it would shut down its tool that scanned the face of every person in photos posted on the platform. At the time, Meta also announced that it would delete more than a billion face templates. 

Two years before that in July 2019, Facebook settled a sweeping privacy investigation with the Federal Trade Commission for $5 billion. This included allegations that Facebook’s face recognition settings were confusing and deceptive. At the time, the company agreed to obtain consent before running face recognition on users in the future.   

In March 2021, the company agreed to a $650 million class action settlement brought by Illinois consumers under the state's strong biometric privacy law. 

And most recently, in July 2024, Meta agreed to pay $1.4 billion to settle claims that its defunct face recognition system violated Texas law.  

 Privacy Advocates Will Continue to Focus our Resources on Meta  

 Meta’s conclusion that it can avoid scrutiny by releasing a privacy invasive product during a time of political crisis is craven and morally bankrupt. It is also dead wrong.  

Now more than ever, people have seen the real-world risk of invasive technology. The public has recoiled at masked immigration agents roving cities with phones equipped with a face recognition app called Mobile Fortify. And Amazon Ring just experienced a huge backlash when people realized that a feature marketed for finding lost dogs could one day be repurposed for mass biometric surveillance.  

The public will continue to resist these privacy invasive features. And EFF, other civil liberties groups, and plaintiffs’ attorneys will be here to help. We urge privacy regulators and attorneys general to step up to investigate as well.  

We are calling on technology companies like Meta and Google to stand up for their users by resisting the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) lawless administrative subpoenas for user data. 

In the past year, DHS has consistently targeted people engaged in First Amendment activity. Among other things, the agency has issued subpoenas to technology companies to unmask or locate people who have documented ICE's activities in their community, criticized the government, or attended protests.   

These subpoenas are unlawful, and the government knows it. When a handful of users challenged a few of them in court with the help of ACLU affiliates in Northern California and Pennsylvania, DHS withdrew them rather than waiting for a decision. 

These subpoenas are unlawful, and the government knows it.

But it is difficult for the average user to fight back on their own. Quashing a subpoena is a fast-moving process that requires lawyers and resources. Not everyone can afford a lawyer on a moment’s notice, and non-profits and pro-bono attorneys have already been stretched to near capacity during the Trump administration.  

 That is why we, joined by the ACLU of Northern California, have asked several large tech platforms to do more to protect their users, including: 

1.  Insist on court intervention and an order before complying with a DHS subpoena, because the agency has already proved that its legal process is often unlawful and unconstitutional;  
2. Give users as much notice as possible when they are the target of a subpoena, so the user can seek help. While many companies have already made this promise, there are high-profile examples of it not happening—ultimately stripping users of their day in court;  
3. Resist gag orders that would prevent companies from notifying their users that they are a target of a subpoena. 

 We sent the letter to Amazon, Apple, Discord, Google, Meta, Microsoft, Reddit, SNAP, TikTok, and X.  

Recipients are not legally compelled to comply with administrative subpoenas absent a court order 

 An administrative subpoena is an investigative tool available to federal agencies like DHS. Many times, these are sent to technology companies to obtain user data. A subpoena cannot be used to obtain the content of communications, but they have been used to try and obtain some basic subscriber information like name, address, IP address, length of service, and session times.  

Unlike a search warrant, an administrative subpoena is not approved by a judge. If a technology company refuses to comply, an agency’s only recourse is to drop it or go to court and try to convince a judge that the request is lawful. That is what we are asking companies to do—simply require court intervention and not obey in advance. 

It is unclear how many administrative subpoenas DHS has issued in the past year. Subpoenas can come from many places—including civil courts, grand juries, criminal trials, and administrative agencies like DHS. Altogether, Google received 28,622 and Meta received 14,520 subpoenas in the first half of 2025, according to their transparency reports. The numbers are not broken out by type.   

DHS is abusing its authority to issue subpoenas 

In the past year, DHS has used these subpoenas to target protected speech. The following are just a few of the known examples. 

On April 1, 2025, DHS sent a subpoena to Google in an attempt to locate a Cornell PhD student in the United States on a student visa. The student was likely targeted because of his brief attendance at a protest the year before. Google complied with the subpoena without giving the student an opportunity to challenge it. While Google promises to give users prior notice, it sometimes breaks that promise to avoid delay. This must stop.   

In September 2025, DHS sent a subpoena and summons to Meta to try to unmask anonymous users behind Instagram accounts that tracked ICE activity in communities in California and Pennsylvania. The users—with the help of the ACLU and its state affiliates— challenged the subpoenas in court, and DHS withdrew the subpoenas before a court could make a ruling. In the Pennsylvania case, DHS tried to use legal authority that its own inspector general had already criticized in a lengthy report.  

In October 2025, DHS sent Google a subpoena demanding information about a retiree who criticized the agency’s policies. The retiree had sent an email asking the agency to use common sense and decency in a high-profile asylum case. In a shocking turn, federal agents later appeared on that person’s doorstep. The ACLU is currently challenging the subpoena.  

Read the full letter here

Today, we’re launching Encrypt It Already, our push to get companies to offer stronger privacy protections to our data and communications by implementing end-to-end encryption. If that name sounds a little familiar, it’s because this is a spiritual successor to our 2019 campaign, Fix It Already, a campaign where we pushed companies to fix longstanding issues.

End-to-end encryption is the best way we have to protect our conversations and data. It ensures the company that provides a service cannot access the data or messages you store on it. So, for secure chat apps like WhatsApp and Signal, that means the company that makes those apps cannot see the contents of your messages, and they’re only accessible on your and your recipients. When it comes to data, like what’s stored using Apple’s Advanced Data Protection, it means you control the encryption keys and the service provider will not be able to access the data.  

We’ve divided this up into three categories, each with three different demands:

• Keep your Promises: Features that the company has publicly stated they’re working on, but which haven’t launched yet.
• Facebook should use end-to-end encryption for group messages
• Apple and Google should deliver on their promise of interoperable end-to-end encryption of RCS
• Bluesky should launch its promised end-to-end encryption for DMs
• Defaults Matter: Features that are available on a service or in app already, but aren’t enabled by default.
• Telegram should default to end-to-end encryption for DMs
• WhatsApp should use end-to-end encryption for backups by default
• Ring should enable end-to-end encryption for its cameras by default
• Protect Our Data: New features that companies should launch, often because their competition is doing it already.
• Google should launch end-to-end encryption for Google Authenticator backups
• Google should offer end-to-end encryption for Android backup data
• Apple and Google should offer an AI permissions per app option to block AI access to secure chat apps

What is only half the problem. How is just as important.

What Companies Should Do When They Launch End-to-End Encryption Features

There’s no one-size fits all way to implement end-to-end encryption in products and services, but best practices can support the security of the platform with the transparency that makes it possible for its users to trust it protects data like the company claims it does. When these encryption features launch, companies should consider doing so with:

• A blog post written for a general audience that summarizes the technical details of the implementation, and when it makes sense, a technical white paper that goes into further detail for the technical crowd.
• Clear user-facing documentation around what data is and isn’t end-to-end encrypted, and robust and clear user controls when it makes sense to have them.
• Data minimization principles whenever feasible, storing as little metadata as possible.

Technical documentation is important for end-to-encryption features, but so is clear documentation that makes it easy for users to understand what is and isn’t protected, what features may change, and what steps they need to take to set it up so they’re comfortable with how data is protected.

What You Can Do

When it’s an option, enable any end-to-end encryption features you can, like on Telegram, WhatsApp, and Ring.

For everything else, let companies know that these are features you want! You can find messages to share on social media on the Encrypt It Already website, and take the time to customize those however you’d like. 

In some cases, you can also reach out to a company directly with feature requests, which all the above companies, except for Google and WhatsApp, offer in some form. We recommend filing these through any service you use for any of the above features you’d like to see:

• Apple’s feedback page
• Bluesky’s support
• Facebook’s feedback form

As for Ring and Telegram, we’ve already made the asks and just need your help to boost them. Head over to the Telegram bug and suggestions and upvote this post, and Ring’s feature request board and boost this post.

End-to-end encryption protects what we say and what we store in a way that gives users—not companies or governments—control over data. These sorts of privacy-protective features should be the status quo across a range of products, from fitness wearables to notes apps, but instead it’s a rare feature limited to a small set of services, like messaging and (occasionally) file storage. These demands are just the start. We deserve this sort of protection for a far wider array of products and services. It’s time to encrypt it already!

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EFF has long warned about the dangers of the “real-time bidding” (RTB) system powering nearly every ad you see online. A proposed class-action settlement with Google over their RTB system is a step in the right direction towards giving people more control over their data. Truly curbing the harms of RTB, however, will require stronger legislative protections.

What Is Real-Time Bidding?

RTB is the process by which most websites and apps auction off their ad space. Unfortunately, the milliseconds-long auctions that determine which ads you see also expose your personal information to thousands of companies a day. At a high-level, here’s how RTB works:

1. The moment you visit a website or app with ad space, it asks an ad tech company to determine which ads to display for you. This involves sending information about you and the content you’re viewing to the ad tech company.
2. This ad tech company packages all the information they can gather about you into a “bid request” and broadcasts it to thousands of potential advertisers. 
3. The bid request may contain information like your unique advertising ID, your GPS coordinates, IP address, device details, inferred interests, demographic information, and the app or website you’re visiting. The information in bid requests is called “bidstream data” and typically includes identifiers that can be linked to real people. 
4. Advertisers use the personal information in each bid request, along with data profiles they’ve built about you over time, to decide whether to bid on the ad space. 
5. The highest bidder gets to display an ad for you, but advertisers (and the adtech companies they use to buy ads) can collect your bidstream data regardless of whether or not they bid on the ad space.   

Why Is Real-Time Bidding Harmful?

A key vulnerability of real-time bidding is that while only one advertiser wins the auction, all participants receive data about the person who would see their ad. As a result, anyone posing as an ad buyer can access a stream of sensitive data about billions of individuals a day. Data brokers have taken advantage of this vulnerability to harvest data at a staggering scale. Since bid requests contain individual identifiers, they can be tied together to create detailed profiles of people’s behavior over time.

Data brokers have sold bidstream data for a range of invasive purposes, including tracking union organizers and political protesters, outing gay priests, and conducting warrantless government surveillance. Several federal agencies, including ICE, CBP and the FBI, have purchased location data from a data broker whose sources likely include RTB. ICE recently requested information on “Ad Tech” tools it could use in investigations, further demonstrating RTB’s potential to facilitate surveillance. RTB also poses national security risks, as researchers have warned that it could allow foreign states to obtain compromising personal data about American defense personnel and political leaders.

The privacy harms of RTB are not just a matter of misuse by individual data brokers. RTB auctions broadcast torrents of personal data to thousands of companies, hundreds of times per day, with no oversight of how this information is ultimately used. Once your information is broadcast through RTB, it’s almost impossible to know who receives it or control how it’s used. 

Proposed Settlement with Google Is a Step in the Right Direction

As the dominant player in the online advertising industry, Google facilitates the majority of RTB auctions. Google has faced several class-action lawsuits for sharing users’ personal information with thousands of advertisers through RTB auctions without proper notice and consent. A recently proposed settlement to these lawsuits aims to give people more knowledge and control over how their information is shared in RTB auctions.

Under the proposed settlement, Google must create a new privacy setting (the “RTB Control”) that allows people to limit the data shared about them in RTB auctions. When the RTB Control is enabled, bid requests will not include identifying information like pseudonymous IDs (including mobile advertising IDs), IP addresses, and user agent details. The RTB Control should also prevent cookie matching, a method companies use to link their data profiles about a person to a corresponding bid request. Removing identifying information from bid requests makes it harder for data brokers and advertisers to create consumer profiles based on bidstream data. If the proposed settlement is approved, Google will have to inform all users about the new RTB Control via email. 

While this settlement would be a step in the right direction, it would still require users to actively opt out of their identifying information being shared through RTB. Those who do not change their default settings—research shows this is most people—will remain vulnerable to RTB’s massive daily data breach. Google broadcasting your personal data to thousands of companies each time you see an ad is an unacceptable and dangerous default. 

The impact of RTB Control is further limited by technical constraints on who can enable it. RTB Control will only work for devices and browsers where Google can verify users are signed in to their Google account, or for signed-out users on browsers that allow third-party cookies. People who don't sign in to a Google account or don't enable privacy-invasive third-party cookies cannot benefit from this protection. These limitations could easily be avoided by making RTB Control the default for everyone. If the settlement is approved, regulators and lawmakers should push Google to enable RTB Control by default.

The Real Solution: Ban Online Behavioral Advertising

Limiting the data exposed through RTB is important, but we also need legislative change to protect people from the online surveillance enabled and incentivized by targeted advertising. The lack of strong, comprehensive privacy law in the U.S. makes it difficult for individuals to know and control how companies use their personal information. Strong privacy legislation can make privacy the default, not something that individuals must fight for through hidden settings or additional privacy tools. EFF advocates for data privacy legislation with teeth and a ban on ad targeting based on online behavioral profiles, as it creates a financial incentive for companies to track our every move. Until then, you can limit the harms of RTB by using EFF’s Privacy Badger to block ads that track you, disabling your mobile advertising ID (see instructions for iPhone/Android), and keeping an eye out for Google’s RTB Control.

Dangerously unchecked surveillance and rights violations have been a throughline of the Department of Homeland Security since the agency’s creation in the wake of the September 11th attacks. In particular, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and Customs and Border Protection (CBP) have been responsible for countless civil liberties and digital rights violations since that time. In the past year, however, ICE and CBP have descended into utter lawlessness, repeatedly refusing to exercise or submit to the democratic accountability required by the Constitution and our system of laws.  

The Trump Administration has made indiscriminate immigration enforcement and mass deportation a key feature of its agenda, with little to no accountability for illegal actions by agents and agency officials. Over the past year, we’ve seen massive ICE raids in cities from Los Angeles to Chicago to Minneapolis. Supercharged by an unprecedented funding increase, immigration enforcement agents haven’t been limited to boots on the ground: they’ve been scanning faces, tracking neighborhood cell phone activity, and amassing surveillance tools to monitor immigrants and U.S. citizens alike. 

Congress must vote to reject any further funding of ICE and CBP

The latest enforcement actions in Minnesota have led to federal immigration agents killing Renee Good and Alex Pretti. Both were engaged in their First Amendment right to observe and record law enforcement when they were killed. And it’s only because others similarly exercised their right to record that these killings were documented and widely exposed, countering false narratives the Trump Administration promoted in an attempt to justify the unjustifiable.  

These constitutional violations are systemic, not one-offs. Just last week, the Associated Press reported a leaked ICE memo that authorizes agents to enter homes solely based on “administrative” warrants—lacking any judicial involvement. This government policy is contrary to the “very core” of the Fourth Amendment, which protects us against unreasonable search and seizure, especially in our own homes.  

These violations must stop now. ICE and CBP have grown so disdainful of the rule of law that reforms or guardrails cannot suffice. We join with many others in saying that Congress must vote to reject any further funding of ICE and CBP this week. But that is not enough. It’s time for Congress to do the real work of rebuilding our immigration enforcement system from the ground up, so that it respects human rights (including digital rights) and human dignity, with real accountability for individual officers, their leadership, and the agency as a whole.

EFF last summer asked a federal judge to block the federal government from using Medicaid data to identify and deport immigrants.  

We also warned about the danger of the Trump administration consolidating all of the government’s information into a single searchable, AI-driven interface with help from Palantir, a company that has a shaky-at-best record on privacy and human rights. 

Now we have the first evidence that our concerns have become reality. 

“Palantir is working on a tool for Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) that populates a map with potential deportation targets, brings up a dossier on each person, and provides a “confidence score” on the person’s current address,” 404 Media reports today. “ICE is using it to find locations where lots of people it might detain could be based.” 

The tool – dubbed Enhanced Leads Identification & Targeting for Enforcement (ELITE) – receives peoples’ addresses from the Department of Health and Human Services (which includes Medicaid) and other sources, 404 Media reports based on court testimony in Oregon by law enforcement agents, among other sources. 

This revelation comes as ICE – which has gone on a surveillance technology shopping spree – floods Minneapolis with agents, violently running roughshod over the civil rights of immigrants and U.S. citizens alike; President Trump has threatened to use the Insurrection Act of 1807 to deploy military troops against protestors there. Other localities are preparing for the possibility of similar surges. 

Different government agencies necessarily collect information to provide essential services or collect taxes, but the danger comes when the government begins pooling that data and using it for reasons unrelated to the purpose it was collected.

This kind of consolidation of government records provides enormous government power that can be abused. Different government agencies necessarily collect information to provide essential services or collect taxes, but the danger comes when the government begins pooling that data and using it for reasons unrelated to the purpose it was collected. 

As EFF Executive Director Cindy Cohn wrote in a Mercury News op-ed last August, “While couched in the benign language of eliminating government ‘data silos,’ this plan runs roughshod over your privacy and security. It’s a throwback to the rightly mocked ‘Total Information Awareness’ plans of the early 2000s that were, at least publicly, stopped after massive outcry from the public and from key members of Congress. It’s time to cry out again.” 

In addition to the amicus brief we co-authored challenging ICE’s grab for Medicaid data, EFF has successfully sued over DOGE agents grabbing personal data from the U.S. Office of Personnel Management, filed an amicus brief in a suit challenging ICE’s grab for taxpayer data, and sued the departments of State and Homeland Security to halt a mass surveillance program to monitor constitutionally protected speech by noncitizens lawfully present in the U.S. 

But litigation isn’t enough. People need to keep raising concerns via public discourse and Congress should act immediately to put brakes on this runaway train that threatens to crush the privacy and security of each and every person in America.  

Throughout 2025, EFF conducted groundbreaking investigations into Flock Safety's automated license plate reader (ALPR) network, revealing a system designed to enable mass surveillance and susceptible to grave abuses. Our research sparked state and federal investigations, drove landmark litigation, and exposed dangerous expansion into always-listening voice detection technology. We documented how Flock's surveillance infrastructure allowed law enforcement to track protesters exercising their First Amendment rights, target Romani people with discriminatory searches, and surveil women seeking reproductive healthcare.

Flock Enables Surveillance of Protesters

When we obtained datasets representing more than 12 million searches logged by more than 3,900 agencies between December 2024 and October 2025, the patterns were unmistakable. Agencies logged hundreds of searches related to political demonstrations—the 50501 protests in February, Hands Off protests in April, and No Kings protests in June and October. Nineteen agencies conducted dozens of searches specifically tied to No Kings protests alone. Sometimes searches explicitly referenced protest activity; other times, agencies used vague terminology to obscure surveillance of constitutionally protected speech.

The surveillance extended beyond mass demonstrations. Three agencies used Flock's system to target activists from Direct Action Everywhere, an animal-rights organization using civil disobedience to expose factory farm conditions. Delaware State Police queried the Flock network nine times in March 2025 related to Direct Action Everywhere actions—showing how ALPR surveillance targets groups engaged in activism challenging powerful industries.

Biased Policing and Discriminatory Searches

Our November analysis revealed deeply troubling patterns: more than 80 law enforcement agencies used language perpetuating harmful stereotypes against Romani people when searching the nationwide Flock Safety ALPR network. Between June 2024 and October 2025, police performed hundreds of searches using terms such as "roma" and racial slurs—often without mentioning any suspected crime.

Audit logs revealed searches including "roma traveler," "possible g*psy," and "g*psy ruse." Grand Prairie Police Department in Texas searched for the slur six times while using Flock's "Convoy" feature, which identifies vehicles traveling together—essentially targeting an entire traveling community without specifying any crime. According to a 2020 Harvard University survey, four out of 10 Romani Americans reported being subjected to racial profiling by police. Flock's system makes such discrimination faster and easier to execute at scale.

Weaponizing Surveillance Against Reproductive Rights

In October, we obtained documents showing that Texas deputies queried Flock Safety's surveillance data in what police characterized as a missing person investigation, but was actually an abortion case. Deputies initiated a "death investigation" of a "non-viable fetus," logged evidence of a woman's self-managed abortion, and consulted prosecutors about possible charges.

A Johnson County official ran two searches with the note "had an abortion, search for female." The second search probed 6,809 networks, accessing 83,345 cameras across nearly the entire country. This case revealed Flock's fundamental danger: a single query accesses more than 83,000 cameras spanning almost the entire nation, with minimal oversight and maximum potential for abuse—particularly when weaponized against people seeking reproductive healthcare.

Feature Updates Miss the Point

In June, EFF explained why Flock Safety's announced feature updates cannot make ALPRs safe. The company promised privacy-enhancing features like geofencing and retention limits in response to public pressure. But these tweaks don't address the core problem: Flock's business model depends on building a nationwide, interconnected surveillance network that creates risks no software update can eliminate. Our 2025 investigations proved that abuses stem from the architecture itself, not just how individual agencies use the technology.

Accountability and Community Action

EFF's work sparked significant accountability measures. U.S. Rep. Raja Krishnamoorthi and Rep. Robert Garcia launched a formal investigation into Flock's role in "enabling invasive surveillance practices that threaten the privacy, safety, and civil liberties of women, immigrants, and other vulnerable Americans."

Illinois Secretary of State Alexi Giannoulias launched an audit after EFF research showed Flock allowed U.S. Customs and Border Protection to access Illinois data in violation of state privacy laws. In November, EFF partnered with the ACLU of Northern California to file a lawsuit against San Jose and its police department, challenging warrantless searches of millions of ALPR records. Between June 5, 2024 and June 17, 2025, SJPD and other California law enforcement agencies searched San Jose's database 3,965,519 times—a staggering figure illustrating the vast scope of warrantless surveillance enabled by Flock's infrastructure.

Our investigations also fueled municipal resistance to Flock Safety. Communities from Austin to Evanston to Eugene successfully canceled or refused to renew their Flock contracts after organizing campaigns centered on our research documenting discriminatory policing, immigration enforcement, threats to reproductive rights, and chilling effects on protest. These victories demonstrate that communities—armed with evidence of Flock's harms—can challenge and reject surveillance infrastructure that threatens civil liberties.

Dangerous New Capabilities: Always-Listening Microphones

In October 2025, Flock announced plans to expand its gunshot detection microphones to listen for "human distress" including screaming. This dangerous expansion transforms audio sensors into powerful surveillance tools monitoring human voices on city streets. High-powered microphones above densely populated areas raise serious questions about wiretapping laws, false alerts, and potential for dangerous police responses to non-emergencies. After EFF exposed this feature, Flock quietly amended its marketing materials to remove explicit references to "screaming"—replacing them with vaguer language about "distress" detection—while continuing to develop and deploy the technology.

Looking Forward

Flock Safety's surveillance infrastructure is not a neutral public safety tool. It's a system that enables and amplifies racist policing, threatens reproductive rights, and chills constitutionally protected speech. Our 2025 investigations proved it beyond doubt. As we head into 2026, EFF will continue exposing these abuses, supporting communities fighting back, and litigating for the constitutional protections that surveillance technology has stripped away.

This article is part of our Year in Review series. Read other articles about the fight for digital rights in 2025.

This year, you may have heard EFF sounding off about our civil liberties on NPR, BBC Radio, or any number of podcasts. But we also started sharing our voices directly with listeners in 2025. In June, we revamped EFFector, our long-running electronic newsletter, and launched a new audio edition to accompany it.

Providing a recap of the week's most important digital rights news, EFFector's audio companion features exclusive interviews where EFF's lawyers, activists, and technologists can dig deeper into the biggest stories in privacy, free speech, and innovation. Here are just some of the best interviews from EFFector Audio in 2025.

Unpacking a Social Media Spying Scheme

Earlier this year, the Trump administration launched a sprawling surveillance program to spy on the social media activity of millions of noncitizens—and punish those who express views it doesn't like. This fall, EFF's Lisa Femia came onto EFFector Audio to explain how this scheme works, its impact on free speech, and, importantly, why EFF is suing to stop it.

"We think all of this is coming together as a way to chill people's speech and make it so they do not feel comfortable expressing core political viewpoints protected by the First Amendment," Femia said.

Challenging the Mass Surveillance of Drivers

But Lisa was hardly the only guest talking about surveillance. In November, EFF's Andrew Crocker spoke to EFFector about Automated License Plate Readers (ALPRs), a particularly invasive and widespread form of surveillance. ALPR camera networks take pictures of every passing vehicle and upload the location information of millions of drivers into central databases. Police can then search these databases—typically without any judicial approval—to instantly reconstruct driver movements over weeks, months, or even years at a time.

"It really is going to be a very detailed picture of your habits over the course of a long period of time," said Crocker, explaining how ALPR location data can reveal where you work, worship, and many other intimate details about your life. Crocker also talked about a new lawsuit, filed by two nonprofits represented by EFF and the ACLU of Northern California, challenging the city of San Jose's use of ALPR searches without a warrant.

Similarly, EFF's Mario Trujillo joined EFFector in early November to discuss the legal issues and mass surveillance risks around face recognition in consumer devices.

Simple Tips to Take Control of Your Privacy

Online privacy isn’t dead. But tech giants have tried to make protecting it as annoying as possible. To help users take back control, we celebrated Opt Out October, sharing daily privacy tips all month long on our blog. In addition to laying down some privacy basics, EFF's Thorin Klosowski talked to EFFector about how small steps to protect your data can build up into big differences.

"This is a way to kind of break it down into small tasks that you can do every day and accomplish a lot," said Klosowski. "By the end of it, you will have taken back a considerable amount of your privacy."

User privacy was the focus of a number of EFFector interviews. In July, EFF's Lena Cohen spoke about what lawmakers, tech companies, and individuals can do to fight online tracking. That same month, Matthew Guariglia talked about precautions consumers can take before bringing surveillance devices like smart doorbells into their homes.

Digging Into the Next Wave of Internet Censorship

One of the most troubling trends of 2025 was the proliferation of age verification laws, which require online services to check, estimate, or verify users’ ages. Though these mandates claim to protect children, they ultimately create harmful censorship and surveillance regimes that put everyone—adults and young people alike—at risk.

This summer, EFF's Rin Alajaji came onto EFFector Audio to explain how these laws work and why we need to speak out against them.

"Every person listening here can push back against these laws that expand censorship," she said. "We like to say that if you care about internet freedom, this fight is yours."

This was just one of several interviews about free speech online. This year, EFFector also hosted Paige Collings to talk about the chaotic rollout of the UK's Online Safety Act and Lisa Femia (again!) to discuss the abortion censorship crisis on social media.

You can hear all these episodes and future installments of EFFector's audio companion on YouTube or the Internet Archive. Or check out our revamped EFFector newsletter by subscribing at eff.org/effector!

This article is part of our Year in Review series. Read other articles about the fight for digital rights in 2025.

In 2025, elected officials across the country began treating surveillance technology purchases differently: not as inevitable administrative procurements handled by police departments, but as political decisions subject to council oversight and constituent pressure. This shift proved to be the most effective anti-surveillance strategy of the year.

Since February, at least 23 jurisdictions fully ended, cancelled, or rejected Flock Safety ALPR programs (including Austin, Oak Park, Evanston, Hays County, San Marcos, Eugene, Springfield, and Denver) by recognizing surveillance procurement as political power, not administrative routine.

Legacy Practices & Obfuscation

For decades, cities have been caught in what researchers call "legacy procurement practices": administrative norms that prioritize "efficiency" and "cost thresholds" over democratic review. 

Vendors exploit this inertia through the "pilot loophole." As Taraaz and the Collaborative Research Center for Resilience (CRCR) note in a recent report, "no-cost offers" and free trials allow police departments to bypass formal procurement channels entirely. By the time the bill comes due, the surveillance is already normalised in the community, turning a purchase decision into a "continuation of service" that is politically difficult to stop.

This bureaucracy obscures the power that surveillance vendors have over municipal procurement decisions. As Arti Walker-Peddakotla details, this is a deliberate strategy. Walker-Peddakotla details how vendors secure "acquiescence" by hiding the political nature of surveillance behind administrative veils: framing tools as "force multipliers" and burying contracts in consent agendas. For local electeds, the pressure to "outsource" government decision-making makes vendor marketing compelling. Vendors use "cooperative purchasing" agreements to bypass competitive bidding, effectively privatizing the policy-making process. 

The result is a dangerous "information asymmetry" where cities become dependent on vendors for critical data governance decisions. The 2025 cancellations finally broke that dynamic.

The Procurement Moment

This year, cities stopped accepting this "administrative" frame. The shift came from three converging forces: audit findings that exposed Flock's lack of safeguards, growing community organizing pressure, and elected officials finally recognizing that saying "no" to a renewal was not just an option—it was the responsible choice.

When Austin let its Flock pilot expire on July 1, the decision reflected a political judgment: constituents rejected a nationwide network used for immigration enforcement. It wasn't a debate about retention rates; it was a refusal to renew.

These cancellations were also acts of fiscal stewardship. By demanding evidence of efficacy (and receiving none) officials in Hays County, Texas and San Marcos, Texas rejected the "force multiplier" myth. They treated the refusal of unproven technology not just as activism, but as a basic fiduciary duty. In Oak Park, Illinois, trustees cancelled eight cameras after an audit found Flock lacked safeguards, while Evanston terminated its 19-camera network shortly after. Eugene and Springfield, Oregon terminated 82 combined cameras in December. City electeds have also realized that every renewal is a vote for "vendor lock-in." As EPIC warns, once proprietary systems are entrenched, cities lose ownership of their own public safety data, making it nearly impossible to switch providers or enforce transparency later.

The shift was not universal. Denver illustrated the tension when Mayor Mike Johnston overrode a unanimous council rejection to extend Flock's contract. Council Member Sarah Parady rightly identified this as "mass surveillance" imposed "with no public process." This is exactly why procurement must be reclaimed: when treated as technical, surveillance vendors control the conversation; when recognized as political, constituents gain leverage.

Cities Hold the Line Against Mass Surveillance

EFF has spent years documenting how procurement functions as a lever for surveillance expansion, from our work documenting Flock Safety's troubling data-sharing practices with ICE and federal law enforcement to our broader advocacy on surveillance technology procurement reform. The 2025 victories show that when cities understand procurement as political rather than technical, they can say no. Procurement power can be the most direct route to stopping mass surveillance. 

As cities move into 2026, the lesson is clear: surveillance is a choice, not a mandate, and your community has the power to refuse it. The question isn't whether technology can police more effectively; it's whether your community wants to be policed this way. That decision belongs to constituents, not vendors.

This article is part of our Year in Review series. Read other articles about the fight for digital rights in 2025.

Across ideologically diverse communities, 2025 campaigns against automated license plate reader (ALPR) surveillance kept winning. From Austin, Texas to Cambridge, Massachusetts to Eugene, Oregon, successful campaigns combined three practical elements: a motivated political champion on city council, organized grassroots pressure from affected communities, and technical assistance at critical decision moments.

The 2025 Formula for Refusal

• Institutional Authority: Council members leveraging "procurement power"—local democracy's most underutilized tool—to say no. 
• Community Mobilization: A base that refuses to debate "better policy" and demands "no cameras." 
• Shared Intelligence: Local coalitions utilizing shared research on contract timelines and vendor breaches.

Practical Wins Over Perfect Policies

In 2025, organizers embraced the "ugly" win: prioritizing immediate contract cancellations over the "political purity" of perfect privacy laws. Procurement fights are often messy, bureaucratic battles rather than high-minded legislative debates, but they stop surveillance where it starts—at the checkbook. In Austin, more than 30 community groups built a coalition that forced a contract cancellation, achieving via purchasing power what policy reform often delays. 

In Hays County, Texas, the victory wasn't about a new law, but a contract termination. Commissioner Michelle Cohen grounded her vote in vendor accountability, explaining: "It's more about the company's practices versus the technology." These victories might lack the permanence of a statute, but every camera turned off built a culture of refusal that made the next rejection easier. This was the organizing principle: take the practical win and build on it.

Start with the Harm

Winning campaigns didn't debate technical specifications or abstract privacy principles. They started with documented harms that surveillance enabled. EFF's research showing police used Flock's network to track Romani people with discriminatory search terms, surveil women seeking abortion care, and monitor protesters exercising First Amendment rights became the evidence organizers used to build power.

In Olympia, Washington, nearly 200 community members attended a counter-information rally outside city hall on Dec. 2. The DeFlock Olympia movement countered police department claims point-by-point with detailed citations about data breaches and discriminatory policing. By Dec. 3, cameras had been covered pending removal.

In Cambridge, the city council voted unanimously in October to pause Flock cameras after residents, the ACLU of Massachusetts, and Digital Fourth raised concerns. When Flock later installed two cameras "without the city's awareness," a city spokesperson  called it a "material breach of our trust" and terminated the contract entirely. The unexpected camera installation itself became an organizing moment.

The Inside-Outside Game

The winning formula worked because it aligned different actors around refusing vehicular mass surveillance systems without requiring everyone to become experts. Community members organized neighbors and testified at hearings, creating political conditions where elected officials could refuse surveillance and survive politically. Council champions used their institutional authority to exercise "procurement power": the ability to categorically refuse surveillance technology.

To fuel these fights, organizers leveraged technical assets like investigation guides and contract timeline analysis. This technical capacity allowed community members to lead effectively without needing to become policy experts. In Eugene and Springfield, Oregon, Eyes Off Eugene organized sustained opposition over months while providing city council members political cover to refuse. "This is [a] very wonderful and exciting victory," organizer Kamryn Stringfield said. "This only happened due to the organized campaign led by Eyes Off Eugene and other local groups."

Refusal Crosses Political Divides

A common misconception collapsed in 2025: that surveillance technology can only be resisted in progressive jurisdictions. San Marcos, Texas let its contract lapse after a 3-3 deadlock, with Council Member Amanda Rodriguez questioning whether the system showed "return on investment." Hays County commissioners in Texas voted to terminate. Small towns like Gig Harbor, Washington rejected proposals before deployment. 

As community partners like the Rural Privacy Coalition emphasize, "privacy is a rural value." These victories came from communities with different political cultures but shared recognition that mass surveillance systems weren't worth the cost or risk regardless of zip code.

Communities Learning From Each Other

In 2025, communities no longer needed to build expertise from scratch—they could access shared investigation guides, learn from victories in neighboring jurisdictions, and connect with organizers who had won similar fights. When Austin canceled its contract, it inspired organizing across Texas. When Illinois Secretary of State's audit revealed illegal data sharing with federal immigration enforcement, Evanston used those findings to terminate 19 cameras.

The combination of different forms of power—institutional authority, community mobilization, and shared intelligence—was a defining feature of this year's most effective campaigns. By bringing these elements together, community coalitions have secured cancellations or rejections in nearly two dozen jurisdictions since February, building the infrastructure to make the next refusal easier and the movement unstoppable.

This article is part of our Year in Review series. Read other articles about the fight for digital rights in 2025.

State legislatures—from Olympia, WA, to Honolulu, HI, to Tallahassee, FL, and everywhere in between—kept EFF’s state legislative team busy throughout 2025.

We saw some great wins and steps forward this year. Washington became the eighth state to enshrine the right to repair. Several states stepped up to protect the privacy of location data, with bills recognizing your location data isn't just a pin on a map—it's a powerful tool that reveals far more than most people realize. Other state legislators moved to protect health privacy. And California passed a law making it easier for people to exercise their privacy rights under the state’s consumer data privacy law.

Several states also took up debates around how to legislate and regulate artificial intelligence and its many applications. We’ll continue to work with allies in states including California and Colorado to proposals that address the real harms from some uses of AI, without infringing on the rights of creators and individual users.

We’ve also fought some troubling bills in states across the country this year. In April, Florida introduced a bill that would have created a backdoor for law enforcement to have easy access to messages if minors use encrypted platforms. Thankfully, the Florida legislature did not pass the bill this year. But it should set off serious alarm bells for anyone who cares about digital rights. And it was just one of a growing set of bills from states that, even when well-intentioned, threaten to take a wrecking ball to privacy, expression, and security in the name of protecting young people online.

Take, for example, the burgeoning number of age verification, age gating, age assurance, and age estimation bills. Instead of making the internet safer for children, these laws can incentivize or intersect with existing systems that collect vast amounts of data to force all users—regardless of age—to verify their identity just to access basic content or products. South Dakota and Wyoming, for example, are requiring any website that hosts any sexual content to implement age verification measures. But, given the way those laws are written, that definition could include essentially any site that allows user-generated or published content without age-based gatekeeping access. That could include everyday resources such as social media networks, online retailers, and streaming platforms.

Lawmakers, not satisfied with putting age gates on the internet, are also increasingly going after VPNs (virtual private networks) to prevent anyone from circumventing these new digital walls. VPNs are not foolproof tools—and they shouldn’t be necessary to access legally protected speech—but they should be available to people who want to use them. We will continue to stand against these types of bills, not just for the sake of free expression, but to protect the free flow of information essential to a free society.

This article is part of our Year in Review series. Read other articles about the fight for digital rights in 2025.

Age verification mandates won't magically keep young people safer online, but that has not stopped governments around the world spending this year implementing or attempting to introduce legislation requiring all online users to verify their ages before accessing the digital space. 

The UK’s misguided approach to protecting young people online took many headlines due to the reckless and chaotic rollout of the country’s Online Safety Act, but they were not alone: courts in France ruled that porn websites can check users’ ages; the European Commission pushed forward with plans to test its age-verification app; and Australia’s ban on under-16s accessing social media was recently implemented. 

Through this wave of age verification bills, politicians are burdening internet users and forcing them to sacrifice their anonymity, privacy, and security simply to access lawful speech. For adults, this is true even if that speech constitutes sexual or explicit content. These laws are censorship laws, and rules banning sexual content usually hurt marginalized communities and groups that serve them the most.

In response, we’ve spent this year urging governments to pause these legislative initiatives and instead protect everyone’s right to speak and access information online. Here are three ways we pushed back [against these bills] in 2025:

Social Media Bans for Young People

Banning a certain user group changes nothing about a platform’s problematic privacy practices, insufficient content moderation, or business models based on the exploitation of people’s attention and data. And assuming that young people will always find ways to circumvent age restrictions, the ones that do will be left without any protections or age-appropriate experiences.

Yet Australia’s government recently decided to ignore these dangers by rolling out a sweeping regime built around age verification that bans users under 16 from having social media accounts. In this world-first ban, platforms are required to introduce age assurance tools to block under-16s, demonstrate that they have taken “reasonable steps” to deactivate accounts used by under-16s, and prevent any new accounts being created or face fines of up to 49.5 million Australian dollars ($32 million USD). The 10 banned platforms—Instagram, Facebook, Threads, Snapchat, YouTube, TikTok, Kick, Reddit, Twitch and X—have each said they’ll comply with the legislation, leading to young people losing access to their accounts overnight. 

Similarly, the European Commission this year took a first step towards mandatory age verification that could undermine privacy, expression, and participation rights for young people—rights that have been fully enshrined in international human rights law through its guidelines under Article 28 of the Digital Services Act. EFF submitted feedback to the Commission’s consultation on the guidelines, emphasizing a critical point: Mandatory age verification measures are not the right way to protect minors, and any online safety measure for young people must also safeguard their privacy and security. Unfortunately, the EU Parliament already went a step further, proposing an EU digital minimum age of 16 for access to social media, a move that aligns with EU Commission’s president Ursula von der Leyen’s recent public support for measures inspired by Australia’s model.

Push for Age Assurance on All Users 

This year, the UK had a moment—and not a good one. In late July, new rules took effect under the Online Safety Act that now require all online services available in the UK to assess whether they host content considered harmful to children, and if so, these services must introduce age checks to prevent children from accessing such content. Online services are also required to change their algorithms and moderation systems to ensure that content defined as harmful, like violent imagery, is not shown to young people.

The UK’s scramble to find an effective age verification method shows us that there isn't one, and it’s high time for politicians to take that seriously. As we argued throughout this year, and during the passage of the Online Safety Act, any attempt to protect young people online should not include measures that require platforms to collect data or remove privacy protections around users’ identities. The approach that UK politicians have taken with the Online Safety Act is reckless, short-sighted, and will introduce more harm to the very young people that it is trying to protect.

We’re seeing these narratives and regulatory initiatives replicated from the UK to U.S. states and other global jurisdictions, and we’ll continue urging politicians not to follow the UK’s lead in passing similar legislation—and to instead explore more holistic approaches to protecting all users online.

Rushed Age Assurance through the EU Digital Wallet

There is not yet a legal obligation to verify users’ ages at the EU level, but policymakers and regulators are already embracing harmful age verification and age assessment measures in the name of reducing online harms.

These demands steer the debate toward identity-based solutions, such as the EU Digital Identity Wallet, which will become available in 2026. This has come with its own realm of privacy and security concerns, such as long-term identifiers (which could result in tracking) and over-exposure of personal information. Even more concerning is, instead of waiting for the full launch of the EU DID Wallet, the Commission rushed a “mini AV” app out this year ahead of schedule, citing an urgent need to address concerns about children and the harms that may come to them online. 

However, this proposed solution directly tied national ID to an age verification method. This also comes with potential mission creep of what other types of verification could be done in EU member states once this is fully deployed—while the focus of the “mini AV” app is for now on verifying age, its release to the public means that the infrastructure to expand ID checks to other purposes is in place, should the government mandate that expansion in the future.  

Without the proper safeguards, this infrastructure could be leveraged inappropriately—all the more reason why lawmakers should explore more holistic approaches to children's safety. 

Ways Forward

The internet is an essential resource for young people and adults to access information, explore community, and find themselves. The issue of online safety is not solved through technology alone, and young people deserve a more intentional approach to protecting their safety and privacy online—not this lazy strategy that causes more harm that it solves. 

Rather than weakening rights for already vulnerable communities online, politicians must acknowledge these shortcomings and explore less invasive approaches to protect all people from online harms. We encourage politicians to look into what is best, and not what is easy; and in the meantime, we’ll continue fighting for the rights of all users on the internet in 2026.

This article is part of our Year in Review series. Read other articles about the fight for digital rights in 2025.

In 2024, EFF wrote our initial blog about what could go wrong when police let AI write police reports. Since then, the technology has proliferated at a disturbing rate. Why? The most popular generative AI tool for writing police reports is Axon’s Draft One, and Axon also happens to be the largest provider of body-worn cameras to police departments in the United States. As we’ve written, companies are increasingly bundling their products to make it easier for police to buy more technology than they may need or that the public feels comfortable with. 

We have good news and bad news. 

Here’s the bad news: AI written police reports are still unproven, untransparent, and downright irresponsible–especially when the criminal justice system, informed by police reports, is deciding people’s freedom. The King County prosecuting attorney’s office in Washington state barred police from using AI to write police reports. As their memo read, “We do not fear advances in technology – but we do have legitimate concerns about some of the products on the market now... AI continues to develop and we are hopeful that we will reach a point in the near future where these reports can be relied on. For now, our office has made the decision not to accept any police narratives that were produced with the assistance of AI.” 

In July of this year, EFF published a two-part report on how Axon designed Draft One to defy transparency. Police upload their body-worn camera’s audio into the system, the system generates a report that the officer is expected to edit, and then the officer exports the report. But when they do that, Draft One erases the initial draft, and with it any evidence of what portions of the report were written by AI and what portions were written by an officer. That means that if an officer is caught lying on the stand – as shown by a contradiction between their courtroom testimony and their earlier police report – they could point to the contradictory parts of their report and say, “the AI wrote that.” Draft One is designed to make it hard to disprove that. 

In this video of a roundtable discussion about Draft One, Axon’s senior principal product manager for generative AI is asked (at the 49:47 mark) whether or not it’s possible to see after-the-fact which parts of the report were suggested by the AI and which were edited by the officer. His response (bold and definition of RMS added): 

“So we don’t store the original draft and that’s by design and that’s really because the last thing we want to do is create more disclosure headaches for our customers and our attorney’s offices—so basically the officer generates that draft, they make their edits, if they submit it into our Axon records system then that’s the only place we store it, if they copy and paste it into their third-party RMS [records management system] system as soon as they’re done with that and close their browser tab, it’s gone. It’s actually never stored in the cloud at all so you don’t have to worry about extra copies floating around.”

Yikes! 

All of this obfuscation also makes it incredibly hard for people outside police departments to figure out if their city’s officers are using AI to write reports–and even harder to use public records requests to audit just those reports. That’s why this year EFF also put out a comprehensive guide to help the public make their records requests as tailored as possible to learn about AI-generated reports. 

Ok, now here’s the good news: People who believe AI-written police reports are irresponsible and potentially harmful to the public are fighting back. 

This year, two states have passed bills that are an important first step in reigning in AI police reports. Utah’s SB 180 mandates that police reports created in whole or in part by generative AI have a disclaimer that the report contains content generated by AI. It also requires officers to certify that they checked the report for accuracy. California’s SB 524 went even further. It requires police to disclose, on the report, if it was used to fully or in part author a police report. Further, it bans vendors from selling or sharing the information a police agency provided to the AI. The bill also requires departments to retain the first draft of the report so that judges, defense attorneys, or auditors could readily see which portions of the final report were written by the officer and which portions were written by the computer.

In the coming year, anticipate many more states joining California and Utah in regulating, or perhaps even banning, police from using AI to write their reports. 

This article is part of our Year in Review series. Read other articles about the fight for digital rights in 2025.