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‘Keys to the kingdom’: hackers who gained access to heart of London transport network jailed

Thalha Jubair, 20, and Owen Flowers, 19, sentenced to five and a half years each for cyber-attack that cost Transport for London £39m

The data of millions of commuters was stolen, Londoners were left out of pocket and 27,000 Transport for London staff were forced to reset their passwords.

Over four days in 2024 a pair of teenage hackers had London’s transport network at their mercy. Thalha Jubair and Owen Flowers had burrowed into the heart of Transport for London’s IT systems and held the “keys to the kingdom”.

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© Photograph: William Barton/Alamy

© Photograph: William Barton/Alamy

© Photograph: William Barton/Alamy

Google Cloud Security Threat Horizons Report #13 (H1 2026) Is Out!

10 March 2026 at 21:02

This is my completely informal, uncertified, unreviewed and otherwise completely unofficial blog inspired by my reading of our next Cloud Threat Horizons Report, #13 (full version, no info to enter!) that we just released (the official blog for #1 report, my unofficial blogs for #2, #3, #4, #5, #6, #7, #8, #9, #10, #11 and #12).

My favorite quotes from the report follow below:

  • [in Google Cloud] “software exploitation overtook credentials as the primary initial access vector for the first time.” and “Threat actors exploited third-party software-based entry (44.5%) more frequently than weak credentials.” [A.C. — some of you may say this is because AI is making more zero days, but a dozen more mundane answers may be correct instead]
THR H1 2026 image 1
  • “While threat actors continued to use brute-force attacks against weak credentials, the increase in RCE represents a pivot toward more automated exploitation of unpatched application-layer vulnerabilities.” [A.C. — to some extent “creds or vulns” debate is rather pointless as the real answer is “both”, and it varies by environment too, see below]
  • “Threat actors continued to transition from traditional phishing to voice-based social engineering (vishing), and credential harvesting from third-party SaaS tokens to facilitate large-scale, silent data exfiltration.” [A.C. — again, this means “AND” not “OR” because classic phishing still works well in many cases, but yes “credential harvesting from third-party SaaS” has become very fruitful too]
  • [overall] Still “Identity compromise underpinned 83% of compromises. [A.C. — so, yes, “creds” still beat “vulns” on many environments]
THR H1 2026 image 2
  • “High-volume data theft operations — executed through compromised but legitimate access channels — remained the primary goal for threat actors, with our metrics showing they targeted data in 73% of cloud-related incidents.” [A.C. — again, not new, but very useful data confirming the running trend. Beware!]
  • “The window between vulnerability disclosure and mass exploitation collapsed by an order of magnitude, from weeks to days.” [A.C. — again, some of you may see the invisible robot hand of an AI here, but, as usual, the reality is more complicated…]
  • “Trend analysis from 2008–2025 indicates cloud services will soon surpass email as the primary data exfiltration pathway.” [A.C. — $32B reasons to finally get serious about it across all clouds?]
  • 45% of intrusions resulted in data theft without immediate extortion attempts at the time of the engagement, and these were often characterized by prolonged dwell times and stealthy persistence.”
  • “The traditional incident response model is no longer viable when dealing with containerized workloads and serverless architectures where data can vanish in seconds.” [A.C. — a very useful reminder here! Cloud is cloudy! Don’t be that guy who thinks that cloud is a rented colo. Cloud is not JUST somebody else’s computer.]
  • “Threat actors used large language models (LLM) to automate credential harvesting and transition from a developer’s local environment to full cloud administration access.” [A.C. — this really should not be news for anybody in 2026, but if it is, HERE IS SOME NEWS: BAD GUYS USE AI!]
  • Thus “Prevent LLM exploitation as an extension of living-off-the-land (LOTL) by treating LLM activity with the same scrutiny as administrative command-line tools.” [A.C. — or, as I say, “with AI agents, every prompt injection is an RCE”]

Now, go and read the CTHR 13 report!

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Google Cloud Security Threat Horizons Report #13 (H1 2026) Is Out! was originally published in Anton on Security on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.

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