With International Anti-Ransomware Day taking place on May 12, Kaspersky presents its annual report on the evolving global and regional ransomware cyberthreat landscape.

Ransomware remains one of the most persistent and adaptive cyberthreats. In 2026:

• New families continue to emerge, adopting post-quantum cryptography ciphers.
• As ransom payments drop, some groups implement encryptionless extortion attacks.
• In a constantly changing ecosystem of threat actors, initial access brokers maintain a relevant role in this market, showing increased focus on access to RDWeb as the preferred method of remote access.

Ransomware attacks decline but remain a major threat

According to Kaspersky Security Network, the share of organizations affected by ransomware decreased in 2025 across all regions compared to 2024.

Percentage of organizations affected by ransomware attacks by region, 2025 (download)

Despite the formal decrease, organizations across all sectors continue to face a high likelihood of attack, as ransomware operators refine their tactics and scale their operations with increasing efficiency. Kaspersky and VDC Research have found that in the manufacturing sector alone, ransomware attacks may have caused over $18 billion in losses in the first three quarters of the year.

The continued rise of EDR killers and defense evasion tooling

In 2026, ransomware operators increasingly prioritize neutralizing endpoint defenses before executing their payloads. Tools commonly referred to as “EDR killers” have become a standard component of attack playbooks. This reflects a continuing trend toward more deliberate and methodical intrusions.

Attackers attempt to terminate security processes and disable monitoring agents, often by exploiting trusted components such as signed drivers. This technique is called Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD) and allows adversaries to blend into legitimate system activity while gradually degrading defensive visibility.

Thus, evasion is no longer an opportunistic step but a planned and repeatable phase of the attack lifecycle. As a result, organizations are increasingly challenged not just to detect ransomware but also to maintain control in environments where security controls themselves are actively targeted.

The appearance of new families adopting post-quantum cryptography

We predicted that quantum-resistant ransomware would appear in 2025. Looking back at the previous year, we see that advanced ransomware groups indeed started using post-quantum cryptography as quantum computing evolved. The encryption techniques used by this quantum-proof ransomware could be used to resist decryption attempts from both classical and quantum computers, making it nearly impossible for victims to decrypt their data without having to pay a ransom.

One example is the appearance of the PE32 ransomware family (link in Russian); it leverages the cutting-edge ML-KEM (Module-Lattice-Based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism) standard to secure its AES keys. This specific cryptographic framework was recently selected by NIST as the primary standard for post-quantum defense.

Within the PE32 ransomware architecture, this is realized through the Kyber1024 algorithm, a robust mechanism providing Level 5 security, roughly equivalent in strength to AES-256. Its primary function is the secure generation and transmission of shared secrets between parties, specifically engineered to withstand future quantum computing attacks. This shift toward post-quantum readiness is part of a broader industry trend; for instance, TLS 1.3 and QUIC protocols have already adopted the X25519Kyber768 hybrid model, which fuses classical encryption with quantum-resistant security.

The shift to encryptionless extortion

In 2025, the share of ransoms paid dropped to 28%. As a response to this, one of the developments in the 2026 landscape is the growing prevalence of extortion incidents in which no file encryption takes place at all. Instead, attackers leave out the “ware” in “ransomware” and focus on extracting sensitive data and leveraging the threat of public disclosure as their primary means of extortion. ShinyHunters is an excellent example of such a group, using a data leak site to publicize its victims.

By avoiding encryption, attackers may aim at reducing the likelihood of immediate detection, shortening the duration of the attack, and eliminating dependencies on stable encryption routines. Often, this model is used alongside traditional tactics in so-called double extortion schemes, but an increasing number of campaigns rely exclusively on data theft.

For victims, this shift fundamentally changes the nature of the risk. While backups remain effective against encryption-based disruption, they provide no protection against data exposure, regulatory consequences, and reputational damage. Ransomware is therefore evolving from a business continuity issue into a broader data security and compliance challenge.

Industrialization of initial access (Access-as-a-Service)

The ransomware ecosystem continues to evolve toward a highly industrialized and specialized model, with initial access remaining as one of its most critical components. In 2026, many ransomware operators keep relying on IABs (initial access brokers), a network of intermediaries who supply pre-compromised access to corporate environments, aiming to no longer perform full intrusions themselves.

This “access-as-a-service” model is fueled by credential theft operations, and the widespread availability of compromised accounts harvested through infostealers and phishing campaigns.

The primary access vectors offered for sale have not changed: RDP, VPN, and RDWeb are still the top access vectors. Consequently, remote access infrastructure remains the primary attack surface for initial access sales. In response to the measures against public exposure of RDP access points to the internet, attackers are now targeting RDWeb portals, which are frequently vulnerable and occasionally inadequately safeguarded.

The result is a threat landscape where unauthorized access is increasingly commoditized, and the barrier to launching ransomware attacks declines. This means that preventing initial compromise is only part of the challenge; equal emphasis must be placed on detecting misuse of legitimate credentials and limiting lateral movement within already-breached environments.

Ransomware developments on the dark web

Telegram channels and underground forums increasingly function as platforms for the distribution and sale of compromised datasets and access credentials including those that were obtained as a result of ransomware attacks.

Advertisements posted on these resources typically include the nature of the access, a description of the exfiltrated or compromised data, price terms, and contact information for prospective buyers. In addition, some malicious actors mention their collaboration with other ransomware groups. Lesser-known gangs can use this name-dropping to promote themselves

Multiple threat actors not related to ransomware groups distribute datasets downloaded from ransomware blogs on underground forums and Telegram. By re-publishing download links and files, they spread compromised data as well as information on the ransomware attack within the community.

The ransomware itself is also sold or offered for subscription on the dark web platforms. The sellers underscore the uniqueness of their malware, as well as its encryption and defense evasion features.

Law enforcement actions

Law enforcement agencies are actively shutting down dark web platforms and ransomware data leak sites. A major underground forum, RAMP, which also functioned as a platform for threat actors to advertise their ransomware services and publish service‑related updates, was seized by authorities in January 2026. Another underground forum, LeakBase, where malicious actors distributed exfiltrated and compromised data, was seized in March 2026. In 2025, law enforcement agencies seized well-known forums like Nulled, Cracked, and XSS. Also in 2025, the DLSs of BlackSuit and 8Base ransomware groups were seized. These takedowns cause inconvenience to ransomware coordination, specifically for initial access brokers and affiliates, though similar forums are expected to fill the void over time.

Top ransomware groups in 2025

RansomHub’s sudden dormancy in 2025 marked a shift, and Qilin became the dominant player from Q2 onward. According to Kaspersky research, Qilin was the most active group executing targeted attacks in 2025.

Each group’s share of victims according to its data leak site (DLS) as a percentage of all reported victims of all groups during the period under review (download)

Qilin stands out as one of the fastest-growig and dominant RaaS platforms. Its combination of high-volume operations and structured affiliate model positions it as a central player in the current ecosystem.

Clop, the second most active group in 2025, is distinguished through its large-scale, supply-chain-style attacks, exploiting widely used file transfer and enterprise software to compromise hundreds of victims simultaneously. This one-to-many approach sets it apart from more traditional, single-target campaigns.

Third place is occupied by Akira, which remains notable for its consistency and operational stability, maintaining a steady stream of victims without major disruption. Its ability to sustain activity over time makes it one of the most reliable indicators of baseline ransomware threat levels.

Although no longer active, RansomHub stands out for its rapid rise and equally rapid disappearance in 2025, highlighting the volatility of the RaaS market. Its shutdown created a vacuum that significantly reshaped affiliate distribution across other groups.

DragonForce is also notable – not just for its own operations, but for its broader influence within the ransomware ecosystem, including reported involvement in infrastructure conflicts and possible links to the disruption of competing groups. Thus, the group claims that RansomHub “has moved to their infrastructure.” This positions it as more than just an operator and potentially an ecosystem-level actor.

New actors in 2026

While emerging actors generally operate on a smaller scale, they provide insight into the continuous churn and low barrier to entry within the ransomware ecosystem.

The Gentlemen group caught our attention in early 2026, as they managed to attack a significant number of victims over a short time. This actor is also notable for reflecting a broader shift toward professionalization and controlled operations within the ransomware ecosystem. Unlike many emerging groups that rely on opportunistic attacks and inconsistent leak activity, The Gentlemen demonstrate a more deliberate approach: structured intrusion workflows, selective targeting, and measured communication with victims. This signals a move away from chaotic, high-noise campaigns toward predictable, business-like execution models that are easier to scale and harder to disrupt. Their TTPs include the massive exploitation of hardware very common on big corporations, such as FortiOS/FortiProxy, SonicWall VPN, and Cisco ASA appliances. The group might be comprised of professional cybercriminals who left other prominent groups.

The group is also notable for its emphasis on data-centric extortion strategies, often prioritizing exfiltration and leverage over purely disruptive encryption. This aligns with one of the defining trends of 2026: ransomware evolving into a form of data breach monetization rather than just system denial. By focusing on controlled pressure and reputational risk instead of immediate operational damage, The Gentlemen exemplify how attackers are adapting to lower ransom payment rates and improved backup practices among victims.
Some other groups to take note of in 2026:

• Devman appears to be an emerging actor with limited but growing activity, likely leveraging existing tooling rather than developing custom capabilities.
• MintEye hasn’t been very active yet, with just five known victims, suggesting opportunistic campaigns without a consistent operational tempo.
• DireWolf is associated with small-scale, targeted attacks, though its overall footprint remains relatively limited compared to larger RaaS groups.
• NightSpire demonstrates characteristics of an amateur group, such as mistakes during its operations, uncommon communication channels with the victims, and sometimes giving them insufficient time to pay up. Although they both encrypt and leak data, they prioritize publication rather than encryption.
• Vect shows low-volume activity. It is yet unclear whether they use a completely new codebase or are rather a rebrand of an existing group.
• Tengu is a less prominent actor, with limited public reporting and no clear distinguishing tactics beyond standard extortion models.
• Kazu appears to be created by ransomware operators previously engaged with multiple other groups. As of now, they don’t stand out for scale or technique.

Although there is little to say about these groups at the time of writing this report, each of them may be equally likely to disappear from the threat landscape or grow into a prominent threat. That’s why it’s important to track them from their early days. Moreover, collectively, these groups illustrate how dynamic the ransomware landscape is, with new entrants constantly replenishing it.

Conclusion and protection recommendations

Despite the growing effort by law enforcement agencies across the globe to seize and disrupt dark web platforms and threat actor infrastructures, ransomware operations remain stable, with new groups quickly taking the place of those who went silent. In 2026, we see a shift towards encryptionless extortion, with data leaks increasingly becoming the main threat to target organizations. At the same time, data encryption is also upgrading to the next level with the emergence of post-quantum ransomware.

To resist the evolving threat, Kaspersky recommends organizations:

Prioritize proactive prevention through patching and vulnerability management. Many ransomware attacks exploit unpatched systems, so organizations should implement automated patch management tools to ensure timely updates for operating systems, software, and drivers. For Windows environments, enabling Microsoft’s Vulnerable Driver Blocklist is critical to thwarting BYOVD attacks. Regularly scan for vulnerabilities and prioritize high-severity flaws, especially in widely used software.

Strengthen remote access: RDP and RDWeb connections should never be directly exposed to the internet, only through VPN or ZTNA (Zero Trust Network Access). It’s highly recommended to adopt multi-factor authentication on everything; the architecture may require continuous authentication for access, as one valid credential captured is enough to cause a breach. Monitoring the underground for stolen employee credentials is essential. Audit open ports across the entire attack surface. The adoption of the “Principle of Least Privilege” (PoLP), where users, systems, or processes are granted only the minimum access rights, such as read, write, or execute permissions, necessary to perform their specific job functions, is highly recommended.

Strengthen endpoint and network security with advanced detection and segmentation. Deploy robust endpoint detection and response solutions such as Kaspersky NEXT EDR to monitor for suspicious activity like driver loading or process termination. Network segmentation is equally important. Limit lateral movement by isolating critical systems and using firewalls to restrict traffic. Complete and immediate offboarding for employees is necessary as well as periodic permission reviews, with automatic revocation of unused access. Sessions with complete logging for privileged accounts are more than necessary. Monitoring the traffic divergence to new sites or even to legitimate endpoints can help the defenders to spot a new insider threat.

Invest in backups, training, and incident response planning. Maintain offline or immutable backups that are tested regularly to ensure rapid recovery without paying a ransom. Backups should cover critical data and systems and be stored in air-gapped environments to resist encryption or deletion. User education is essential to combatting phishing, which remains one of the top attack vectors. Conduct simulated phishing exercises and train employees to recognize AI-crafted emails. Kaspersky Global Emergency Response Team (GERT) can help develop and test an incident response plan to minimize potential downtime and costs.

The recommendation to avoid paying a ransom remains robust, especially given the risk of unavailable keys due to dismantled infrastructure, affiliate chaos, or malicious intent. By investing in backups, incident response, and preventive measures like patching and training, organizations can avoid funding criminals and mitigate the impact.

Kaspersky also offers free decryptors for certain ransomware families. If you get hit by ransomware, check to see if there’s a decryptor available for the ransomware family used against you.

In 2025, the financial cyberthreat landscape continued to evolve. While traditional PC banking malware declined in relative prevalence, this shift was offset by the rapid growth of credential theft by infostealers. Attackers increasingly relied on aggregation and reuse of stolen data, rather than developing entirely new malware capabilities.

To describe the financial threat landscape in 2025, we analyzed anonymized data on malicious activities detected on the devices of Kaspersky security product users and consensually provided to us through the Kaspersky Security Network (KSN), along with publicly available data and data on the dark web.

We analyzed the data for

• financial phishing,
• banking malware,
• infostealers and the dark web.

Key findings

Phishing

Phishing activity in 2025 shifted toward e-commerce (14.17%) and digital services (16.15%), with attackers increasingly tailoring campaigns to regional trends and user behavior, making social engineering more targeted despite reduced focus on traditional banking lures.

Banking malware

Financial PC malware declined in prevalence but remained a persistent threat, with established families continuing to operate, while attackers increasingly prioritize credential access and indirect fraud over deploying complex banking Trojans. To the contrary, mobile banking malware continues growing, as we wrote in detail in our mobile malware report.

Infostealers and the dark web

Infostealers became a central driver of financial cybercrime, fueling a growing dark web economy where stolen credentials, payment data, and full identity profiles are traded at scale, enabling widespread and destructive fraud operations.

Financial phishing

In 2025, online fraudsters continued to lure users to phishing and scam pages that mimicked the websites of popular brands and financial organizations. Attackers leveraged increasingly convincing social engineering techniques and brand impersonation to exploit user trust. Rather than relying solely on volume, campaigns showed greater targeting and contextual adaptation, reflecting a maturation of phishing operations.

The distribution of top phishing categories in 2025 shows a clear shift toward digital platforms that aggregate multiple user activities, with web services (16.15%), online games (14.58%), and online stores (14.17%) leading globally. Compared to 2024, the rise of online games and the decline of social networks and banks indicate that attackers are increasingly targeting environments where users are more likely to take a risk or engage impulsively. Categories such as instant messaging apps and global internet portals remain significant phishing targets, reflecting their role as communication and access hubs that can be exploited for credential harvesting.

TOP 10 categories of organizations mimicked by phishing and scam pages that were blocked on home users’ devices, 2025 (download)

Regional patterns further reinforce the adaptive nature of phishing campaigns, showing that attackers closely align category targeting with local digital habits. For example, online stores dominate heavily in the Middle East.

TOP 10 categories of organizations mimicked by phishing and scam pages that were blocked on home users’ devices in the Middle East, 2025 (download)

Online games and instant messaging platforms feature more prominently in the CIS, suggesting a focus on younger or highly connected user bases.

TOP 10 categories of organizations mimicked by phishing and scam pages that were blocked on home users’ devices in the CIS, 2025 (download)

APAC demonstrates almost equal shares of online games and banks which signifies a combined approach targeting different users.

TOP 10 categories of organizations mimicked by phishing and scam pages that were blocked on home users’ devices in APAC, 2025 (download)

In Africa, a stronger emphasis on banks reflects the continued importance of traditional financial services. Most likely, this is due to the lower security level of the financial institutions in the region.

TOP 10 categories of organizations mimicked by phishing and scam pages that were blocked on home users’ devices in Africa, 2025 (download)

Whereas in LATAM, delivery companies appearing in the top categories indicate attackers exploiting the growth of e-commerce logistics.

TOP 10 categories of organizations mimicked by phishing and scam pages that were blocked on home users’ devices in Latin America, 2025 (download)

Europe presents a more balanced distribution across categories, pointing to diversified attack strategies.

TOP 10 categories of organizations mimicked by phishing and scam pages that were blocked on home users’ devices in Europe, 2025 (download)

Attackers actively localize their tactics to maximize relevance and effectiveness.

The distribution of financial phishing pages by category in 2025 reveals strong regional asymmetries that reflect both user behavior and attacker prioritization.

Globally, online stores dominated (48.45%), followed by banks (26.05%) and payment systems (25.50%). The decline in bank phishing may suggest that these services are becoming increasingly difficult to successfully impersonate, so fraudsters are turning to easier ways to access users’ finances.

However, this balance shifts significantly at the regional level.

In the Middle East, phishing is overwhelmingly concentrated on e-commerce (85.8%), indicating a heavy reliance on online retail lures, whereas in Africa, bank-related phishing leads (53.75%), which may indicate that user account security there is still insufficient. LATAM shows a more balanced distribution but with a higher share of online store targeting (46.30%), while APAC and Europe display a more even spread across all three categories, pointing to diversified attack strategies. These variations suggest that attackers are not operating uniformly but are instead adapting campaigns to regional digital habits, payment ecosystems, and trust patterns – maximizing effectiveness by aligning phishing content with the most commonly used financial services in each market.

Distribution of financial phishing pages by category and region, 2025 (download)

Online shopping scams

The distribution of organizations mimicked by phishing and scam pages in 2025 highlights a clear shift toward globally recognized digital service and e-commerce brands, with attackers prioritizing platforms that have large, active user bases and frequent payment interactions.

Netflix (28.42%) solidified its ranking as the most impersonated brand, followed by Apple (20.55%), Spotify (18.09%), and Amazon (17.85%). This reflects a move away from traditional retail-only targets toward subscription-based and ecosystem-driven services.

TOP 10 online shopping brands mimicked by phishing and scam pages, 2025 (download)

Regionally, this trend varies: Netflix dominates heavily in the Middle East, Apple leads in APAC, while Spotify ranks first across Europe, LATAM, and Africa. Although most of the top platforms are highly popular across different regions, we may suggest that the attackers tailor brand impersonation to regional popularity and user engagement.

Payment system phishing

Phishing campaigns are impersonating multiple payment ecosystems to maximize coverage. While PayPal was the most mimicked in 2024 with 37.53%, its share dropped to 14.10% in 2025. Mastercard, on the contrary, attracted cybercriminals’ attention, its share increasing from 30.54% to 33.45%, while Visa accounted for a significant 20.06% (last year, it wasn’t in the TOP 5), reinforcing the growing focus on widely used banking card networks. The continued presence of American Express (3.87%) and the increasing number of pages mimicking PayPay (11.72%) further highlight attacker experimentation and regional adaptation.

TOP 5 payment systems mimicked by phishing and scam pages, 2025 (download)

Financial malware

In 2025, the decline in users affected by financial PC malware continued. On the one hand, people continue to rely on mobile devices to manage their finances. On the other hand, some of the most prominent malware families that were initially designed as bankers had not used this functionality for years, so we excluded them from these statistics.

Changes in the number of unique users attacked by banking malware, by month, 2023–2025 (download)

Windows systems remained the primary platform targeted by attackers with financial malware. According to Kaspersky Security Bulletin, overall detections included 1,338,357 banking Trojan attacks globally from November 2024 to October 2025, though this number is also declining due to increasing focus on mobile vectors. Desktop threats continued to be distributed via traditional delivery methods like malicious emails, compromised websites, and droppers.

In 2025, Brazilian-origin families such as Grandoreiro (part of the Tetrade group) stood out for their constant activity and global reach. Despite a major law enforcement disruption in early 2024, Grandoreiro remained active in 2025, re-emerging with updated variants and continuing to operate. Other notable actors included Coyote and emerging families like Maverick, which abused WhatsApp for distribution while maintaining fileless techniques and overlaps with established Brazilian banking malware to steal credentials and enable fraudulent transactions on desktop banking platforms. Besides traditional bankers, other Brazilian malware families are worth mentioning, which specifically target relatively new and highly popular regional payment systems. One of the most prominent threats among these is GoPix Trojan focusing on the users of Brazilian Pix payment system. It is also capable of targeting local Boleto payment method, as well as stealing cryptocurrency.

There was also a surge in incidents in 2025 in which fraudsters targeted organizations through electronic document management (EDM) systems, for example, by substituting invoice details to trick victims into transferring funds. The Pure Trojan was most frequently encountered in such attacks. Attackers typically distribute it through targeted emails, using abbreviations of document names, software titles, or other accounting-related keywords in the headers of attached files. Globally in the corporate segment, Pure was detected 896 633 times over 2025, with over 64 thousand users attacked.

Contrary to PC banking malware, mobile banker attacks grew by 1.5 times in 2025 compared to the previous reporting period, which is consistent with their growth in 2024. They also saw a sharp surge in the number of unique installation packages. More statistics and trends on mobile banking malware can be found in our yearly mobile threat report.

Complementing traditional financial malware, infostealers played a significant role in enabling financial crime both on PCs and mobile devices by harvesting credentials, cookies, and autofill data from browsers and applications, which attackers then used for account takeovers or direct banking fraud. Kaspersky analyses pointed to a surge in infostealer detections (up by 59% globally on PCs), fueling credential-based attacks.

Financial cyberthreats on the dark web

The Kaspersky Digital Footprint Intelligence (DFI) team closely monitors infostealer activity on both PC and mobile devices to analyze emerging trends and assess the evolving tactics of cybercriminals.

Fraudsters especially target financial data such as payment cards, cryptocurrency wallets, login credentials and cookies for banking services, as well as documents stored on the victim’s device. The stolen data is collected in log files and shared on dark web resources, where they are bought, sold, or distributed freely and then used for financial fraud.

With access to financial data, fraudsters can gain control of users’ bank accounts and payment cards, and withdraw funds. Compromised accounts and cards are also frequently used in subsequent activities, turning the victims into intermediaries in a fraud scheme.

Compromised accounts

Kaspersky DFI found that in 2025, over one million online banking accounts (these are not Kaspersky product users) served by the world’s 100 largest banks fell victim to infostealers: their credentials were being freely shared on the dark web.

The countries with the highest median number of compromised accounts per bank were India, Spain, and Brazil.

The chart below shows the median number of compromised accounts per bank for the TOP 10 countries.

TOP 10 countries with the highest compromised account median (download)

Compromised payment cards

Seventy-four percent of payment cards that were compromised by infostealer malware, published on dark web resources and identified by the Digital Footprint Intelligence team in 2025, remained valid as of March 2026. This means that attackers could still use the cards that had been stolen months or even years prior.

It should be noted that the number of bank accounts and payment cards known to have been compromised by infostealers in 2025 will continue to rise, because fraudsters do not publish the log files immediately after the compromise but only after a delay of months or even years.

Data breaches

Regardless of the industry in which the target company operates, data breaches often expose users’ financial data, including payment card information, bank account details, transaction histories and other financial information. As a consequence, the compromised databases are sold and distributed on underground resources.

It should be noted that the threat is not limited to the exposure of financial information alone. Various identity documents and even seemingly public data, such as names, phone numbers and email addresses, can become a risk when they are published on the dark web. Such data attracts fraudsters’ attention and can be used in social engineering attacks to gain access to the user’s financial assets.

Sale of bank accounts and payment cards

The dark web often features services provided by stores that specialize in selling bank accounts and payment cards. Fraudsters typically obtain data for sale from a variety of sources, including infostealer logs and leaked databases, which are first repackaged and then combined.

Often, sellers offer complete victim profiles, referred to by fraudsters as “fullz”. These include not only bank accounts or payment cards but also identification documents, dates of birth, residential addresses, and other personal details. A full‑information package is usually more expensive than a payment card or a bank account alone.

Compiled databases

Fraudsters exploit various sources, including previously leaked databases, to compile new, thematic ones. Finance- and, in particular, cryptocurrency-related databases, are among the most popular. Compilations aimed at specific user groups, such as the elderly or wealthy people, are also of interest to cybercriminals.

Usually, thematic databases contain personal information about users, such as names, phone numbers, and email addresses. Fraudsters can use this data to launch social engineering attacks.

Creation of phishing websites

Phishing websites have become a powerful tool for the financial enrichment of fraudsters. Cybercriminals create fraudulent sites that masquerade as legitimate resources of companies operating in various industries. Gambling and retail sites remain among the most popular targets.

In order to obtain personal and financial information from unsuspecting users, adversaries seek out ways to create such phishing websites. Ready-made layouts and website copies are sold on the dark web and advertised as profitable tools. Moreover, fraudsters offer phishing website creation services.

Conclusion

The decline of traditional PC banking malware is not an indicator of reduced risk; rather, it highlights a redistribution of attacker effort toward more efficient methods targeting mobile devices, credential theft, and social engineering. Infostealers, in particular, are a force multiplier, enabling widespread compromise at scale.

Looking ahead to 2026, the financial threat landscape is expected to become even more data-driven and automated. Organizations must adapt by focusing on identity protection, real-time monitoring, and cross-channel threat intelligence, while users must remain vigilant against increasingly sophisticated and personalized attack techniques.